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BUDÔ IN JAPANESE AND U.S. POLICIES

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BUDÔ IN JAPANESE AND U.S. POLICIES

A Research Paper
and
Culminating Experience
Presented to Dr. Ronald Sylvia
of the Department of Political Science,
Public Administration

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Public Administration

By
Guy H. Power

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Updates

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CHAPTER 1. ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

1. INTRODUCTION.

Budo is a Japanese word comprising two Chinese ideographs meaning “Martial” and “Way.” The nuance of the word-phrase implies that studying martial arts is a way of life, a calling similar to that of one who enters religious life. However, *budo* is more than just a compilation of combat techniques, and is more than living a life studying combat techniques. *Budo*, in addition to its technical aspect, is a method of cultivating the “Self” through severe training.

In this modern age it is possible to write of *budo* without having to go into great detail about its combat efficacy: it is a truism that Japanese *budo* is recognized worldwide as an effective combative. As early as 1917 Frank Tiebout related that *budo*, in the form of *jujutsu*, was taught to soldiers of the US Army in preparation for their anticipated hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. “The authorities apparently thought we might have to do a little wrestling with the Boche, so they opened up a course in *jiu-jitsu*. Peculiar methods of choking and resuscitation seemed to be the Jap’s chief stock in trade” (Tiebout, ca. 1917:21). Indeed, *budo* has been adapted by the military forces and civil police of countries around the globe. However, the western world has not always understood *budo*’s “prime directive;” that is, as a means of developing individual character and self-cultivation through austere training. This misunderstanding of *budo*’s more elevated ideal influenced US authorities to dissolve the Japanese martial arts control organ, the Dai Nippon Butokukai, in 1946 (US Government, 1948).

2. THESIS.

The thesis of this paper is that budo—Japanese martial arts—were used by the Government of Japan as well as the US Government to formulate national policy. The intrinsic aspects of the budo were utilized by the Japanese Government to mold its citizenry into a militaristic society so that, “by 1941 Japan was sufficiently mobilized to begin an aggressive war” (Draeger, 1996c:47). Governmental exploitation and “corruption” (Tanaka 1966) of the inherent concept of *bushido* (the “Way of the Samurai”) as taught in the public schools and military academies, created a culture of the supreme sacrifice (Morimoto, 1992:148-151; Rosenberg, 1995:15; Russell, 1958; Sasaki, 1995; Tanaka, 1996:206). Conversely, the US Government is widely believed to have instituted a ban on the practice of all martial arts after Japan capitulated (Davey, 1997; Draeger 1996c; Harries 1978; Harrison 1958; Hassell 1983; Horsely and Buckley 1990; JMAS 1984; Kiyota 1977; Onoda 1974; Reid and Croucher 1983; Stevens 1978; US Government 1948) in a policy move supposedly made to “democratize” the Japanese . However, research shows that there was not a universal “Budo Ban;” at least, it is not recorded as such. Later chapters will further expound on the “non-ban budo ban.”

3. METHODOLOGY.

My research was conducted via a literature review of pertinent Japanese and US governmental documents, doctoral dissertations, unpublished papers, journals, historical books, and trade books. Additionally, I conducted a series of interviews with two leading exponents of budo who were in Japan during the time in review, as well as others who were present during the time in review.

In looking at my subject, I divide the areas of interest into two spheres: Japan, and America. On the Japanese side I briefly map the transition of martial arts from individual fighting to the establishment of private “schools” of tradition (*ryu-ha*) such as the Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu style of swordsmanship; to the formation of a national standard overseen by private individuals—embodied in the Butokukai organization; and eventually to the broad government control disseminated through the public education system via the *Monbusho* (Ministry of Education) and military training academies such as the Toyama Military Academy and the Army Officers Academy.

Of major import is the Japanese Government’s redefinition of classical bushido, the “warrior’s code,” into what has been called “corrupted bushido” (Tanaka 1996) of the Second World War. I believe this “corrupted bushido” bore major responsibility for the US Government’s severe view of “martial arts.”

On the US side, I begin at the post-war Occupation era of 1945 - 1950 when the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) allegedly established a policy banning martial arts as an adjunct to initiating the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. A review of the literature shows variances in the description of this so-called ban. Some writers state there was a total blackout, others indicate the ban affected only a certain population. Still, other chroniclers state there was no ban at all on martial arts, that the proscription was to be applied only to “modern warfare” training. Although there is a dearth of resources for the Japanese sphere, the US portion of this research paper suffers from a lack of information, due in part to the relatively short time period in review.

Information about the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was corollary to building and supporting my thesis. I originally planned to include information about the JSDF in an attempt to discover how strong a military force they represent, and whether or not the demilitarization process was too deeply inculcated. In other words, the question was begged, “can the modern Japanese warriors—bereft of the benefit of state propaganda—fare as well on the field of battle as did their fathers, uncles, and grandfathers?” However, the corollary proved too significant an area of study to include here only as a sidebar. In-depth research into the “JSDF v. Japanese Society” as a sole-subject research project is worthy of future study.

CHAPTER 2. THE JAPAN SIDE

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

The organization and instruction of martial arts of today differs greatly than days gone by. Today we see groups of people in brightly lighted studios practicing armed and unarmed “fighting techniques” as sport, past time, or avocation by people who are not engaged in the military or police professions. Reasons for studying modern budo are many and varied, but most people attribute training in the budo as a way to maintain health, exorcise the soul, or to become self-confident. A far cry from 600 years ago when the martial arts were learned so one could stay alive on the battlefield.

a. Beginnings of the *Ryu-Ha* (Traditional Schools).

Except for the *bushi* (knight warriors), the majority of combatants prior to the Muromachi era (1338 - 1573) went to battle with little training in arms. These light

infantry, the *ashigaru*, received on-the-job training usually in spearmanship since the spear of that day was a long-range weapon which required little knowledge—one just held it forward angled toward the opposing forces’ cavalry or light infantry. Ashigaru were drawn from the ranks of the peasantry, and although they may have been able to swing a sword in place of a hoe, they were not samurai. Nonetheless, because of the long-term struggle for power throughout early Japan, the farmer-soldier eventually became established into the lowest rank of the warrior caste. Now separated from the farming profession, the ashigaru eventually evolved into the *goshi*, or lower-class samurai, who now required training in combat arts. It was during this time that schools of traditional budo began to evolve.

The constant subversion and warfare of the Muromachi period led the bushi to progressively ignore their noble ideals and battlefield ethic although it stimulated the development of many new aspects of military skill. The values of the classical bushi almost disappeared completely (Boyet, 1983:1). According to Ellis Amdur, an historian as well as practitioner of koryu (ancient tradition) budo, it was during

this uncertain time, a few individuals desiring to preserve the old values, to improve their combat effectiveness, and to have a positive effect on their society created the first schools of martial traditions (*ryu-ha*). They attempted to restore the old sense of group identity and loyalty which originally motivated the classical warriors. Instead of a clan centered around the family network, each ryu-ha gathered itself around a discrete system of combat to support a social group...Each ryu-ha was usually the product of one individual’s spiritual insight. This “spiritual insight” did not necessarily come from any deep sense of morality nor did it engender any new religious principles. Although mystical in its origin, this insight was a non-rational understanding of the nature of combat, drawn from the founder’s own experience and designed to fit the needs of their social network (Amdur, 1996a:29-30).


The ryu-ha continued to be developed into the sixteenth century to systematize knowledge, and “samurai now approached martial arts not simply as a means to proficiency in combat, as their ancestors had, but as a means to physical and spiritual cultivation of the self” (Friday, 1997:14). As ryu-ha formalized, the martial arts became institutionalized in the late sixteenth century. These schools issued diplomas and licenses to students, and graduation certificates to disciples who mastered what the teacher had to offer (Friday, 1997:51). Nevertheless, it was not until the 250 years of peace of the Tokugawa reign (1603-1868) that budo developed into the form which we can now recognize as “formalized and businesslike, with ryu-ha headmasters and other adepts opening commercial training halls and instructing students for fees, turning the teaching of martial art into a full-time profession” (Friday, 1997:15).

At the close Muromachi period the period of training was usually short, dynamic, and intense. The training was short because systemization had not yet been fully developed, and techniques were relatively few and straightforward. But, “...during the Tokugawa period, as instruction became more professionalized and more commercialized, apprenticeships became longer [than the Warring States period prior to 1600]; and long with this, more elaborate systems of intermediate ranks began to appear, allowing students a more tangible measure of their progress” (Friday, 1997:51).

The Tokugawa period saw the proliferation of many ryu-ha, the result of students drastically changing their teacher’s system. The “new” ryu-ha were usually based on their teacher’s system, but changed significantly enough to warrant a name change. This

is best illustrated in the lineage of Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu iaido, a form of swordsmanship (Illustration 1). The foundation of this particular system is Muso Shinmei Ryu Battojutsu, founded by Hayashizaki Jinsuke Shigenobu (ca. 1546-1621), progenitor of many later styles. The term “batto” means to draw the sword, and the term “jutsu” implies practical techniques (as opposed to “polishing the soul”); battojutsu is the “harsh act of “striking instantly with the sword” in dealing with the enemy” (Draeger, 1966c:65). Hayashizaki’s immediate successor, Tamiya Heibei Shigemasa, renamed the ryu-ha as Shin Muso Hayashizaki Ryu, then he branched off and founded Tamiya Ryu, which is still extant today (Warner and Draeger, 1973:79-84; Mitani, 1994:25-26; Suino, 1994:13; Watanabe, 1993:170-173). However, change was not always welcome, especially by those who wished to continue a particular tradition, thus preserving it from extinction. Speaking to the subject of preserving martial traditions, the late-Tokugawa era commentator Fujiwara Yoshinobu commands, “In order to transmit the essence of the school to later generations, one must teach faithfully, in a manner not in the slightest different from the principles of the previous teachers” (Friday, 1997:102).

Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu Development Flow Chart



Sources: Yoshisato Mitani, *Shoka Iai: Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu*. (Tokyo: Sukii Jorunaru, 1986), pp. 25-26; Nicklas Suino, *The Art of Japanese Swordsmanship: A Manual of Eishin Ryu*. (New York: Weatherhill, 1994) p. 13; Gordon Warner and Donn Draeger, *Japanese Swordsmanship*. (New York: Weatherhill, 1983), pp. 79-94; Makoto Watanabe, "Nihon Bugei Ryuso Retsuden." In *Hiden! Bugei Ryuso Roku*. (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Oraisha, 1993) pp. 170-173.

Illustration 1
Muso Jikiden Eishin Ryu Development Flow Chart

Up to the end of the Tokugawa period, and into the Meiji period (1872-1912) budo were taught at private *dojo*; sometimes even at the *shogun* (de facto national leader) level, as was the case for the Yagyu Shinkage Ryu of swordsmanship. But never was there an attempt to organize budo nationwide. That is, not until after the downfall of the samurai caste in 1876, beginning with the *Hattorei*, the ban on wearing swords. In John Clarke's presentation to the Japanese Martial Arts Society in Tokyo, he states, "An ambivalent attitude towards swordsmanship prevailed during the early Meiji era. This general decline in interest reflected the prevailing trend to value only that which had come from the West. As the new leadership proceeded to dismantle the bushi (samurai) class they also discouraged the budo, knowing too well the type of courage that they [budo] breed (Bieri, 1984:4). The "courage" which Clarke refers to is the brash, anti-foreigner, conservative line of thought which prevailed in the budo of the day; hardly what the fledgling government desired as it began its whirlwind pace climbing up from feudal society into the modern world.

Emperor Meiji, newly thrust into power by progressive samurai factions, was committed to modernizing his heretofore antique nation. The new government placed a premium on Western culture and technology; therefore, the caste system was dissolved, the traditional top-knot was banned, foreign clothing was introduced, and things-Japanese were held to be passé, or worse, not worth keeping (Kodansha 1993).

Such radical changes in societal values left many conservative former samurai chagrined at Japan's perceived fate. Former samurai now had to find other ways of making a living and left the profession of arms; maintaining the level of personal war-

craft fell to the wayside. With the decline of samurai fighting traditions, some samurai embarked on a “budo promotion” journey to show commoners, who rarely witnessed real martial arts, what the budo really were. These shows were called “Gekken kogyo,” which means “fencing tournaments” and were to be public displays of traditional budo. Although well intentioned, the shows became a “pro wrestling”-type of side show as

fight scenarios were prepared, rehearsed and performed. Women wearing short hakama (a skirt-like trouser) that exposed their thighs were included. Over-expression became common. Kabuki-like, exaggerated poses would be struck to the accompaniment of strange sounding “kia” vocalizations. Climatic scenes were acted out in which players pretended to be struck down. To add humor, the floorboards of the stage were oiled or waxed to cause slipping; and sometimes sake was served and geisha were hired to offer more entertainment and companionship. These degenerate gekiken kogyo became extremely popular (Abel, 1984a:13).

However, Abel does point out that there was opposition to these “budo burlesque” shows by quoting from the June 1873 “News Magazine,” volume 103 in which the Mayor of Kyoto expresses his disdain for the violence of martial arts. He states,

Gekken kogyo have been held of late, but they seem to be little more than a means of selling the names of those participating. To worsen things, they deceive people and expose them to violence. Remember the saying, ‘Amateur tactics cause grave wounds.’ Moreover, they are very dangerous considering the way the head, throat and face are aimed for. These people would do better to utilise their energy and efforts for solid work, and strive to have a healthy and sound life.... (Abel, 1984:16).

2. THE DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI.

a. The Early Years

The budo were substantially effected by Japan's modernization and her 1895 victory over China. According to Watanabe, the turning point for the modern martial ways was the formation of the Dai Nippon Butokukai in 1895.

Flushed with victory against China, a group of distinguished citizens, politicians, and police and military officers along with imperial support created this organization with the following goals: (1) to preserve martial virtue (butoku) as represented by the traditional martial disciplines, (2) to honor the older budo practitioners who had kept the tradition alive in the face of Westernization and who were the last generation to have experienced true warrior society, (3) to promote and propagate the classical martial ways as an education system to help instill bushido in the minds and bodies of the nation's youth (Watanabe 1970).

The Butokukai began its mandate and "...unified various schools of swordsmanship, standardized kendo forms, and issued ranks and titles to skilled kendo practitioners....Kendo instructors were trained at centers sponsored by the Budokukai [sic]" (Kiyota 1995). One such of the "various schools of swordsmanship" was Tendo Ryu, headed by Mitamura Kengyo. Mitamura organized the Seitokusha school to teach Shinto and budo "in an effort to combat the steady influx of Western influence. In 1895, his group merged with the Dai Nippon Butokukai" (Amdur, 1996b). In addition to Kiyota's observations of kendo, the Butokukai standardized techniques in jujutsu, archery, naginata (halberd), and other classical forms of martial arts, and was to become a semi-governmental agency in the 1930s for all things related to budo. Draeger tells us that, "[s]uch matters as the standardization of techniques and teaching methods, the qualifications and examinations for instructors, and the issue of teaching ranks and licenses were the province of the Butokukai" (Draeger, 1996c:47).

Called a “cultural nationalist organization” by Dann and Monday, the Butokukai did not promote the classical martial ways for national defense or technical fighting ability among its members. Its goal was the transmission of traditional martial disciplines which would allow individuals to feel and experience their samurai heritage vis-à-vis traditional education. This subtle inculcation would improve morals, elevate bushido, and prepare Japan’s youth as loyal and healthy citizens of the state (Dann 1978:2; Monday 1985:1).

Illustration 2 is a representation of the composite organization of the Butokukai.

b. The Butokukai and the Monbusho

As early as 1895 the Butokukai tried convince the Monbusho to incorporate “gekken,” (kendo) in public schools as a required course; however, the Monbusho refused. The Ministry refused again in 1901 and 1905. Although some within the Ministry felt the martial ways were “too violent and dangerous for school age youth,” the final reason for the opposition was financial: the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 had depleted the country’s finances. Budo was too expensive to incorporate at the national public school level because new equipment and more teachers would be required, and the national funds were just not available (Dann, 1978:88). It is interesting to note that the Monbusho’s School of Physical Training had been investigating various schools of jujutsu hoping to develop that art as a physical fitness subject and that through “...the efforts of Kano [Jigoro, the founder of Kodokan Judo], the Monbusho recognized judo as a more “mature” form of jujutsu. In 1887, instruction was started at Tokyo University,

Keio University, and the Naval Academy as an extra-curricular activity” (Relnick, 1984:17). However, it was not until 1912 that both kendo and judo were finally sanctioned by the Ministry and incorporated into public school curricula as required subjects for middle school students (Dann, 1978:90). “Thus,” says Dann, “the Meiji Period closed with the total acceptance of the modern martial ways (shin budo) albeit in a modified national form that fit the political and social values of the government” (Dann, 1978:90). The Butokukai began the long process of codifying training pedagogy, customs, and techniques from the various extant fencing ryu-ha. The Monbusho was adamant that budo instructors were to also be qualified public school teachers and sensitive to the students’ age and body type” (Watanabe, 1970:773; as quoted in Dann, 1978:89).


c. The Butokukai and the Army Connection

Although the Butokukai actually represented high ideals and morals, much ill has been said against the organization at the conclusion of the Second World War. Western powers did not understand the true aim of the Butokukai, for all they could see was a Butokukai which had been gradually, little by little, politicized and co-opted by the Japanese Imperial Army. As a result of the Army’s co-option, and because the budo were tainted by war rhetoric, American Occupation officials perceived the Butokukai as an ultra-nationalist tool for propaganda and war preparation.

According to Dann, the militarization and politicization of the budo occurred during the Taisho and early Showa periods; that is, 1919-1926 and 1926-1945 respectively (1978). It is during this period of time that kendo and other budo increased in popularity in the

public schools, local communities, business companies, and police and armed forces (Dann, 1978:91).

DAI NIPPON BUTOKUKAI FLOW CHART



_____ Influence

_____ Direct Control

Sources: Etsujiro Uehara, "Memorandum to SCAP Commander," (Washington DC: National Archives, 1946-50); Rikugun Toyama Gakko, *Kenjutsu Kyohan*. (Tokyo: 1935); Ichiro Watanabe, *Meiji Budo Shi*. (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Shueisha).

Illustration 2

Dai Nippon Butokukai, 1895-1945

Dann goes on to say that participation “in the modern martial ways offered the opportunity for many Japanese of widely divergent backgrounds to participate in an officially sanctioned system of physical and mental culture that dramatically expressed...their ideal of warrior heritage” (1978:91). Dann’s point is well taken that with the country mobilizing for war, the Japanese government was able to find and utilize the all-important, common frame of reference required in building consensus or popular support of future policies. Even amongst the farmers who had no tie to the warrior tradition, all Japanese came to feel an affinity with the military government through the trappings of “martial spirit.”

It was in the 1930s, however, that the budo were totally co-opted by the government as its propaganda machine promulgated, idealized, and spread militaristic and political trappings throughout the nation (Dann,1978:94); as well, the Butokukai “increasingly became identified with the political and military national goals rather than self-perfection, the traditional goal of the budo” (Monday, 1984:1). Since 1915 the Butokukai had been headed by retired generals or admirals on the theory that they would be impartial and of high integrity and unrelated to politics. This ideal was followed until 1942 when the Chairmanship automatically fell to the Prime Minister, who happened to be General Tojo Hideki (US Government, 1945-1948). It was during this latter period that “the martial arts and the Butokukai increasingly became identified with the political

and military national goals rather than self-perfection, the traditional goal of the Budo” (Monday, 1984:1-2).

d. The Butokukai Post 1945

To SCAP officials, the Butokukai represented ultra-nationalistic and para-military propaganda, and was responsible for preparing Japan’s youth for war. SCAP officials cannot be held to blame for this view, since combat style training was carried out—but that was only during Premier Tojo tenure (US Government, 1948:67). Under Tojo’s reign, activities such as bayonet drill, rifle marksmanship, and hand grenade practice were included in the Butokukai’s program (National Archives 1946). These practices were fully explained by Home Minister Uehara Etsujiro in his memorandum to General Whitney, circa 1946, in which he explains,

[T]he Butokukai was formed [by] followers of the ancient Japanese art of fencing, judo (jūjitsu) and archery and aimed, through improvement in training and technical skill, at fostering a deportment of frugality, chivalry, and pride and at elevating character and training of physique. Thus it is neither a political, ideological [sic] body nor a militaristic body....[I]n addition to fencing, judo and archery (including the arts of scythe, staff and stick wielding) the two arts of bayonet drill and shooting were added....[W]ith the surrender...it abolished bayonetting [sic] and shooting....As far as bayonet drill and shooting were concerned they were not practised by the Butokukai, but were given training courses mainly in the Japan War Veterans’ Association..., Bayonetting Advancement Association..., and the Japan Shooting Association (Olympic member organization) and in schools. The Butokukai merely conducted tests for those who desired [sic] them in bayonet drill (National Archives 1945-50).

Combat related training being taught to civilians should not sound so evil or radical, as similar activities such as rifle marksmanship and grenade throwing were carried out in American colleges during the First World War (Svinth 1997b).

Following Japan's surrender, the Butokukai reorganized itself to its pre-1942 status; that is, before the Army's co-option. However, SCAP officials, particularly the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence), believed the reorganization was an attempt to cover up its war-time activities under the guise of "democratic reorganization." SCAP officials did not have a clear understanding of martial arts because of the stain placed on budo by the Japanese Government since the 1930s when it began to politicize the martial arts, using budo as an adjunct to forming national polity as a socialization process. (As Sylvia and Pindur point out in their study of martial arts in America, which may also be applied to Japan at the time in question, "Socialization also is intensified by making great demands on the individual's time and energy and by incorporating rituals and ceremonies in the socialization process" (Sylvia and Pindur, 1978:216).) Because of this misperception of the budo, the G2 reinforced his recommendation that the Butokukai be dissolved by quoting from the organization's charter, that their goal was "to promote military arts and to contribute to the training of the people" (US Government, 1948:68).

Defending its mission, Shimura Hisaku, a prominent Butokukai leader from Ibaraki province expressed the Butokukai's sentiment:

We wish to introduce to the general public the real nature of military arts by continuous meetings in various places, and to propagandize the reason why we should absorb the real spirit of military arts in order to rebuild a peaceful Japan. We want to have the people acknowledge that the *military arts are obviously not the tools for war, but for peace*, and

are really the national arts of Japan (US Government,1948:68). [Emphasis added]

Unfortunately for the traditional martial arts, the US did not share the same paradigm as did Japan about “martial” arts. Still smarting after a hard-earned victory over the Japanese “martial” spirit, SCAP policy makers could not understand the apparent dichotomy between “martial arts” and “military combat training.” So alien was the concept “military arts are obviously not the tools for war, but for peace,” that the official SCAP record says of Shimura’s statement, “The contradiction inherent in such rationalization should have been obvious” (US Government,1948:68).

Unfortunately, Americans overall did not then, and still mostly do not today, understand the spiritual underpinnings so essential to Japanese budo. Although many Americans had studied jujutsu and judo in America from the early 1910s, apparently only the competitive “sport” aspect was taught. Sylvia and Pindur’s study indicate that the values of self mastery, spiritual as well as physical training, martial arts virtues, etc., “are not easily transferred from one cultural environment to another” and that the American karate organizations observed “did not internalize the underlying philosophical tenets of Buddhism which govern the martial arts in the Orient (Sylvia and Pindur, 1978:225). Sylvia and Pindur’s research was published in 1978 and reflect the norms of the time in which there was a martial arts boom and that Oriental philosophy within the martial arts was trendy. At the supposedly “enlightened” times of the 1970s it is interesting to find that Americans still did not appreciate or understand the philosophy of budo; therefore, one can safely interpolate these findings and apply the

results to the American Occupation authorities of 1945. That is, they had no clue as to the philosophy of Japanese budo.

As a result of dissolving the Butokukai, 1,312 officials were displaced and barred from further positions of authority within the Japanese governmental system. The decision to dissolve the Butokukai and purge its officials was predicated on SCAPIN 548, paragraph I f, couched to eradicate any organization “affording military or quasi-military training” and provides the “perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan” (NARA 1946a; US Government, 1948:71-72).

It is noteworthy that the strength which budo binds the Japanese, as part and parcel of its society. Budo is held in such regard that the Butokukai was restored four months before the passing of the Self-Defense Forces Law in 1954, in order to promote a healthy martial spirit among the people of Japan (Harries, 1987:276).

3. BUSHIDO.

No research involving the study of the budo, or for that matter the Pacific War of 1941-1945, can avoid the study of *bushido*, the “Way of the knight.” There are essentially two types of bushido: true bushido, and false bushido. Bushido has been blamed for the excesses of the Japanese army during the Second World War, and this blame must be firmly attributed to the Government of Japan. Through its corruption of ideals, “bushido” was conveniently transformed into the Frankenstein monster of Japan. That is, essential elements were dismembered from the “true body” and assembled together to form a vehicle upon which jingoistic, expansionistic, and xenophobic attitudes could be transported. A new, profane body devoid of “spirit” was reanimated

and turned loose against society. In the end, its demise was caused from the misunderstanding of an irate and vindictive “global village.” Bushido, like Frankenstein’s monster, is not to be blamed for its affront against mankind. However, unlike Frankenstein’s monster, the true bushido was revived, Lazarus-like, from death with new life breathed into its body, and its soul again was intact and pure.

Literally translating the Chinese ideographs which comprise “bushido,” we have “the way of the knight.” Most translators will say “warrior” vice “knight;” however, that would be an oversimplification of the word “bushi.” In comparison with European chivalry of the 9th through 15th centuries, a bushi must be likened to a knight. In both cultures, anybody could be a “warrior,” even the peasants, who, incidentally, were pressed into combat service, just as English yeoman were archers and light infantry. However, not just anyone could be a knight.

a. The European Knight: a Comparison to the Japanese Bushi

Becoming a knight began first with birth and parentage. The process extended through childhood when the male child of a knight or nobleman was sent to the lord or baron of the area of operations. The child, as a page or attendant to a knight, would learn horsemanship, courtesy, literature, and the skill of arms. In this case, arms meant lance and sword; both tools of the trade for the European knight. The term “knight” (cognit) is synonymous with horse—a knight was not a knight without a horse—and the primary weapon of the knight was the lance. The sword also required wealth to purchase, as it was an expensive article of purchase—no peasant or lightfoot could afford a sword; it was the sword that distinguished the knight warrior from the “great unwashed.”

Upon investiture into knighthood, the page/celebrant was presented a sword, shield, and spurs as symbols of his status, and he swore to uphold the laws of the lord, right wrongs, honor women, and protect the weak. In relation to the entire population of the country it is evident that those who held knight status were microscopically small. Therefore, there are few today in European nations who can claim direct descent from medieval knights.

b. The Bushi: a Comparison to the European Knight

I use the term “bushi” instead of the popular term “samurai” for a very pertinent reason. A bushi was a high-level “knight,” whereas originally a samurai was a servant. The word “samurai” actually derives from the verb “sabarū,” meaning to serve. Therefore, samurai were “low-level” warriors who served the bushi. The common use of the term “samurai” did not come about until the Tokugawa period.

In the “dark ages” of Japanese history at the end of the Muromachi era, anybody could be a warrior on the battlefield—even peasants. Peasant warriors who proved their merit in combat could receive recognition and promotion, even become a “great general” *daimyo*. One such person, Kinoshita, was a peasant farmer born of a farmer-cum-warrior. Kinoshita’s intelligence caught the attention of his master, Nobunaga, and was promoted until he became one of Nobunaga’s top strategists. After Nobunaga’s assassination, Kinoshita—by then known as Hideyoshi Toyotomi, became the supreme leader of Japan.

However, after Hideyoshi’s day, one could only become a bushi by birth. Male children would be schooled in literature, arms, etiquette, and civil service. Often male

children would be adopted into the family of a senior-ranking bushi as part of their education, as well as to pass on the adopted family name. The status of bushi was relegated solely unto those within the warrior caste, and outsiders were not permitted. That is not to say that commoners did not become proficient in the use of arms, as Japanese history is replete with such stories of “*ronin*,” the masterless samurai. However, the tenets of bushido were thoroughly inculcated only within the bushi, not the other four classes of aristocrat, artisan, farmer, and merchant.

Like their European counterparts, the hoi-polloi were aware of stories and tales of bravery and “bushido,” but as they did not live the life of the bushi, these other classes did not have the in-depth understanding of “true bushido.” And just as in the European paradigm, only 2% of the modern Japanese may claim truly that they descend from the bushi class. This is the state of affairs in the Japan of the 1930s when the government used bushido as the mortar to cement its national polity. The government chose “bushido” as its rallying cry and inculcated its own meaning into the ancient tenets. Few in Japan were then alive who actually served in the offices of bushi/ samurai, and they were too old, or too ultra-nationalistic, to profess to the common Japanese that “bushido” had become contaminated.

As incorrect as it is to claim that all Englishmen are descendants of knights, it is just as incorrect to say that all Japanese are descended from bushi. Therefore, one cannot state with any conviction or accuracy that the entire population of a country has been able to inherit the intrinsic qualities of nobility which, along with proper training, produced European knights and Japanese bushi. Populations may recite stories and tales of knights

and bushi, and through this medium be able to recognize what chivalry or bushido are; but that does not mean that the common people know from experience how to exemplify these two deeply respected codes.

c. True Bushido

We may well begin this section with a quotation by Douglas MacArthur about the Japanese culture of warriorship, which was the cultural “mother” of bushido:

For centuries the Japanese people, unlike her neighbors in the Pacific basin...have been students and idolators [sic] of the art of war and the warrior caste. They were the natural warriors of the Pacific. Unbroken victory for Japanese arms convinced them of their invincibility, and the keystone to the entire arch of their civilization became an almost mythological belief in the strength and wisdom of the warrior caste. It permeated and controlled not only all the branches of the government, but all branches of life—physical, mental, and spiritual. It was interwoven not only into all government process, but into all phases of daily routine. It was not only the essence, but the warp and woof of Japanese existence (MacArthur, 1964:354-355).

Because it is unstated, and inculcated through one’s surroundings, there were many interpretations as to what true bushido consists. Although teachings and philosophies differed within the various geographical locations of ancient Japan, it is interesting that the entire warrior caste had similar perceptions of the meaning: loyalty and death.

(1) Loyalty.

First, we must understand that the concept of bushido as a code of conduct did not appear until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Japan was at peace (Friday,

1994:340). Only during a “peaceful” time could warriors take time to codify and enforce their house rules; tasks impossible during the constant intrigue of internecine warfare.

Friday explains the thread of loyalty to one’s master harkens back to “the beginnings of the samurai class and the lord/vassal bond in the eighth century” when “ties between master and retainer were contractual, based on mutual interest and advantage, and were heavily conditioned by the demands of self-interest” (Friday, 1994:342). Therefore, the bushi were bound by honor to their lord, as long as they recognized him as such. If retainers changed sides, so too did their honor. This explanation should not convey that bushi had no honor, only that honor was provided as long as they considered themselves “under contract.”

(2) Death.

By far, death has been the main focus of bushido. However, not in the terms of throwing away one’s life to escape the travesties of life and fate, as is the common misperception. The emphasis on death within bushido is made so that the warrior can go into battle with 100% concentration on the task at hand. Therefore, in order to prepare to fight the great battle effectively, the bushi had to subjugate the natural fear which death holds over mortal man. Some held these fears could be subdued through constant training in the budo.

Kato Kiyomasa’s view (circa 1600-1611) of bushido centers around the military arts and is not as refined as other bushi of the period. Whereas other bushi felt that a warrior should round out his education with literature and poetry, Kato disdained all effete practices not related to war, stating that:

[O]ne should rise at four in the morning, practice sword technique, eat one's meal, and train with the bow, the gun, and the horse....If one should want diversions, he should make them such outdoor pastimes as falconing, deer hunting, and wrestling....A person who loves beautification where it is unnecessary is fit for punishment...." (Wilson, 1985:130).

Wilson further explains to us that Kato believed in the cultural synthesis of *bubun* [literature and warriorship] but did not go as far as other samurai leaders (1985, 28):

One should put forth effort in matters of learning. One should read books concerning military matters, and direct his attention exclusively to the virtues of loyalty and filial piety. Reading Chinese poetry, linked verse, and *waka* [31 syllable short poem] is forbidden. One will surely become womanized if he gives heart knowledge of such elegant, delicate refinements. Having been born into the house of a warrior, one's intentions should be to grasp the long and short swords and to die. If a man does not investigate into the matter of bushido daily, it will be difficult for him to die a brave and manly death...." (Wilson, 1985:131-2).

"Life and death were identical, theoretically at least... and his whole purpose in life was to prepare for death in such manner as to bring honor to his lord, his family, and to himself" (Buck, 1959:52). In addition to death on the field of battle, bushi at times faced death at their own hands. Whether to take responsibility for failure, or to reinforce to others his firm views about unpopular policy, or at the decree of a superior for crimes committed (or imagined committed) a "samurai schooled in bushido had the moral supremacy adequate to judge his own actions and this explains the seemingly barbaric custom of seppuku (hara-kiri). Seppuku was an honorable death reserved to the samurai, and implicit in the act itself was the samurai's freedom from the moral judgment of others" (Buck, 1959:52).

Too much emphasis has been placed on the supreme sacrifice of bushido, that "death" appears to be the only teaching point. At least, that is the way bushido was

reinterpreted in the 1930s and 1940s. Real bushido is primarily concerned with the mental attitudes and goals of the feudal warrior. This aspect has often been forgotten, misplaced, or misused. Otake Risuke is a master of the Tenshin Shoden Katori Shinto Ryu of swordsmanship. A long-time student of budo and a “survivor” of the Japan of the 1930s, Otake sensei believes that bushido was grossly distorted from its original meaning when it was used to sanctify militaristic and nationalistic feelings and activities (Reid and Croucher, 1983:148). In Reid and Croucher’s interview, Otake sensei clears up the misinterpretation that bushido is equated to ‘seeking death’:

...the meaning of bushido is not just to go out and die. Because of this kind of misunderstanding, people in foreign countries think that bushido is synonymous with seppuku....Actually, the meaning of bushido is to do something in the world, to leave something behind and then to be able to throw away the human body and to accept death....It is something quite different from just going out and dying. If you try to achieve something, but for some reason you fail and then say, “I’ve failed, I must kill myself”, that is not a very productive way of thinking. Bushido has nothing to do with so irresponsible a way of living.

If you have tried to perform some act and failed, there is also in bushido the concept of continuing to live, even though you may have to live in shame, there is the possibility that you may be able to rectify the wrong you have done, or to correct the situation you have caused. This is real bushido.

Real bushido is concerned with the spirit of self-sacrifice. The meaning of this spirit of self-sacrifice is that you will make the effort to help people or to do something good in the world, even to the point of it costing you your life, it is for some good purpose” (Reid and Croucher, 1983:148-149).

Supporting Otake sensei’s vision of bushido, the widow of General Yamashita Tomoyuki states, “My husband was a man of great responsibility who would never have committed hara-kiri. He felt he could not die until all his men had been looked after”

(Potter, 1962:178). Surely, there is here evidence of a deeper service commitment which is elsewhere engraved above a stone gate, “Duty, Honor, Country.”

d. Bushido’s essence.

The essence of bushido may be boiled down to “duty, honor, and loyalty.” It is the beau ideal in which one selflessly gives service and endures hardships for the betterment of one’s society, country, superior, or liege. Contemporary views from 1905 through the present day can better provide a more succulent flavor of true bushido, therefore, I present the following views.

In 1888 a British cavalry officer was sent on a mission to teach 20th century warfare to the new, “modern” Japan. During his tenure he became one of the first Europeans to study, and become very proficient after 15 years, what today is called kendo (Norman, 1905:49). It is interesting that in this example, the teacher became the student, and converted to the ancient Japanese warfare and philosophy with the passion of a zealot. He states,

[B]ushido, or “the way of the warrior,” soon became, as it still is, a most important factor in the education, guidance and training of the Japanese soldier and official. But about this same bushido a great deal of nonsense has been written of late; for, comparing it with the chivalry of the West, we find that while the European knight considered it his duty to respect women and the weakness and unpreparedness of a foe, the bushi, on the other hand, held to the maxim that “all is fair in love and war,” and scrupled not to resort to devices of the most dishonourable kind in order to gain a desired object” (Norman, 1905:2).

Norman’s retort about “...a great deal of nonsense has been written of late....” was unquestionably aimed at the “great Christian apologist, Nitobe” (Dann, 1978:86), who attempted to explain bushido to the West in terms of his adopted Christian faith’s ideals.

Nitobe removed bushido from its historical context and justified it by paralleling bushido's virtues with those of medieval Europe (Kiyota 1995). However, Nitobe should not be taken to task so harshly. In his day, to the Western world, anything not "White" was considered inferior. Nitobe was attempting to explain how his "inferior" country was able to defeat a great white nation in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In order to make his ideas palatable to the Victorian readers, he qualified everything with an "acceptable" Christian or European flavor.

Nitobe's book *Bushido* did not gain kudos in his own country if Kunishige Nobuyuki's comments are to be considered standard within the budo community of the late 1800s. Kunishige, a master of fencing, archery, spear, jujutsu, and other budo states,

The essence of bushido is contained in the martial arts....(Dr. Nitobe) recently published a work on bushido in which he says that bushido is a moral teaching which favourably compares with the moral doctrines taught in the various countries of the world; and he then proceeds to remark that bushido is independent of fencing, judo and other martial arts. I do not agree with this gentleman in the latter remark.

In my opinion, the martial arts are important parts of the structure which is termed bushido. Without the martial arts bushido, however noble and lofty it may be, must fade into nothingness. Loyalty and justice are the precepts of bushido and the martial arts are the essential means of attaining the object in view. Bushido imposes upon men the sacrifice of their lives for the cause of loyalty and justice. But when an emergency calls upon us to die in defence of the State we can be of little service if we are ignorant of the martial arts" (Harrison, 1983:113).

Harrison instructs us that bushido surpasses even religion and other moral teachings because it gives prompt chastisement to wrongdoers. "Bushido" he writes, "calls upon men to rise to the succour of their fellow-creatures in danger from bandits, robbers and other evil-doers, even at the sacrifice of their lives." Ever the diligent pupil, Harrison

echoes his teacher in his belief that “[a] person ignorant of the martial arts can do little to help others a the call of bushido if he is ignorant of the martial arts” (Harrison, 1983:114).

Although bushido is ingrained through practice in the budo, it is not only about martial arts. According to Wilson, bushido teaches the way to the total man as he embarks along a journey to the fuller self. In today’s Western culture the scholar and poet are doveish, whereas the military man is hawkish—too martial and devoid of feeling; each inhabiting a mutually exclusive position. The Japanese bushi attempted to bridge the abyss. If the ideal was not realized, they did maintain and preserve it (Wilson, 1985:34). And even if the ideal was not realized or maintained or preserved, at least the concepts of bushido were passed down to the current generation of budo practitioners; modern martial arts are now seen as a way becoming the “total man” and fulfilling the “fuller self” as a corollary to the physical training.

Buck’s 1959 explanation of bushido is that it was not an institution and had no founder, was not codified, and was not eclectic system of ethics. Influenced by the Chinese classics and Zen Buddhism, it was a distinctively Japanese means of personal development that emphasized bravery and selfless service above all. Bushido strove to develop self-knowledge, or impersonality; self-mastery, equanimity in all situations, rectitude, propriety, courage, valor and stoicism. Etiquette and manners were essential as a manifestation of a cultured soul (Buck, 1959:52). The bushido ideals represented the consciousness of the Japanese warrior-elite and formed the intellectual and psychological foundation for policy decisions of the high-born samurai leaders (Buck, 1959:53-54).

Draeger provides a view of bushido which may be considered “official” Japanese policy as it is taken from the *Kokutai no Hongi* [National Polity Fundamentals] of the 1930s:

Our nation is one that holds bushido in high regard...But this martial spirit is not [a thing that exists] for the sake of itself but for the sake of peace, and is what may be called a sacred martial spirit. Our martial spirit does not have for its objective the killing of men, but the giving of life to men. This martial spirit is that which tries to give life to all things, and is not that which destroys...It is a strife which has peace at its basis with a promise to raise and to develop; and it gives life to things through its strife. Here lies the martial spirit of our nation. War, in this sense, is not by any means intended for the destruction, overpowering, or subjugation of others, and it should be a thing for the bringing about of great harmony, that is, peace, doing the work of creation by following the Way (Draeger, 1996c:45).

And elsewhere, the Japanese American view of bushido was that of imparting benevolence and character building. Svinth quotes Okajima Kenya’s article in the *North American Times*, 22 August 1939:

Benevolence...is Bushido’s essential teaching... ‘Benevolence is to love universally’...The Samurai’s sword was not intended to kill and destroy, It was the emblem of his soul, and was to be used for defending his honor, and protecting women, children, and the weak. In kendo, the fencing stick represents the precious sword. Due regard was given to it and its significance, so that the character building of the participants might be unconsciously affected. Kendo, or the precepts of the Sword, therefore exercise a great moral influence upon the boys and girls of Japan (Svinth, 1977:2).

According to Svinth (1977), the bushido qualities stressed in kendo prompted many Japanese-American parents of the 1920s and 1930s to enroll their children in local kendo courses, and thus impart and maintain a sense of culture, morality, and identity.

e. Corrupted Bushido.

“Many of the worst crimes perpetrated by the Japanese were committed in the sacred name of Bushido”

Lord Russell of Liverpool

The Bushido that the Butokukai “promoted was that of the classical warrior, not the nationalistic hodgepodge which came to be called Bushido in the 1930s and 40s (Monday, 1984:2). Therefore, the question is begged, “what became of bushido in the 1930s and 40s?” Research shows that the Japanese used bushido as a method of sanctifying ultra-nationalism (Friday 1994, Tanaka 1996) and, later, for rationalizing battlefield atrocities (Rosenberg 1995, Russel 1948). At the conclusion of the Second World War the Western powers had a misconception of bushido based on observed Japanese military conduct which was being called “bushido.” But the Imperial Army connection to bushido and the samurai tradition was not just a Western artifice; it was an important part of Japan’s early propaganda and remained a favorite theme of Japanese militarists and right-wing essayists right up to Japan’s defeat in 1945 (Friday, 1994:340).

I wish to note at this point that bushido never was the cause of barbarity and cruelty, and I shall explain how “bushido” was used as a euphemism for misconduct. However, because of the perceived relation between bushido and cruelty, the Western powers would later attribute “corrupted” bushido with budo; ergo, promote a cessation of anything closely related to “budo,” “bushido,” and “butoku.”

Speaking to bushido, one Soviet historian offers the flawed implication that the battlefield code of the samurai taught that Japan and Japanese were superior to other countries and peoples (Zhukov 1977). I think it is instructive to provide Zhukov’s quotation in full so that we may get a flavor of his line of thought:

The cult of the warrior existed in Japan since time immemorial. Although the samurai estate was abolished following the bourgeois revolution of 1867-68, the feudal code of the samurais was kept alive in

the Army and Navy under developed capitalism. This code was founded on the teaching that Japan and the Japanese were superior to other countries and peoples, and it was proclaimed the basic principle of conduct on the battlefield (Zhukov, 1977:271).

Here, Zhukov mixes the Japanese propaganda of the 1930s and 40s with bushido, or at least one infers he is speaking of bushido. The important note here is that Zhukov wrote in the late 1970s when animosity with Japan had subsided (except for the Kurile Islands issue between Japan and the then Soviet Union).

“[T]he legacy of the samurai has its sinister side” (Friday, 1994:339) for those who fought or were occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War. This is the legacy of “corrupted bushido” (Tanaka, 1996:206). However, labeling the Imperial Army’s ideology as *bushido* “involves some fairly overt historian’s sleight-of-hand” (Friday:1994:340).

Japan’s jingoistic paradigm that initiated the Asia-Pacific War and the societal values of the officers and soldiers are believed, by some, to be a by-product of the ancient code of warrior behavior called bushido (Friday, 1994:339). However, it is incorrect to believe that these military men received a thorough education in true bushido—by osmosis—because few of samurai lineage were actually in military service. According to Donn F. Draeger, around the end of the 1890s the military was in a

state of moral decay....Neither group of the new generation of officers was recruited from the families of ex-samurai, a practice Yamagata [Aritomo, Army Minister] had insisted upon. Instead, they came entirely from the peasantry, and literally were Yoshida Shoin’s “grass-roots heroes” put in roles of leadership that they had neither the temperament nor the sense of moral obligation to assume. They were men from families that had been completely dissociated from the classical warrior traditions. The result, therefore, could hardly have been different,

for these men obviously could have had no real understanding or appreciation of the rigid ethical values of the traditional warrior institutions (1996c:43).

In the early Meiji period (circa 1868-1880), the military code of conduct was still strongly influenced by bushido; however, it had fully vanished from the armed forces by 1920 (Tanaka, 1996:206). Therefore, these new “samurai” were indoctrinated with a new, tainted concept of bushido that, according to Wayne Muromoto, “engendered a very negative connotation when Japan built up its regular conscript army and began imperial hostilities, which led to World War II” (1996:11). Muromoto continues:

Japan’s soldiery, now a modern army with its ranks filled with commoner draftees, were exhorted to live up [to] the ideals of “bushido,” although most of the soldiers were farmer and merchant sons who had never ever been exposed to the finer points of Neo-Confucianism (the philosophy of the Edo-period samurai) or the deep discipline of the bujutsu (Muromoto, 1996:11).

To further complicate the misunderstanding of bushido, Western soldiers who once had been assigned as liaison officers or observers to the Japanese army in the 1930s, or those who compiled research, wrote of their experiences (Doud 1942, Gayne 1942, Lorry 1943, Scofield 1942, and Thompson 1942). These writings were published during the 1940s in books (Lorry, Gayne) and magazines like *The Infantry Journal*, the trade publication of the US Army officer corps. One such article attempted to explain the Japanese soldier’s battlefield conduct as an extenuation of a common samurai heritage:

The modern Jap soldier is the product of centuries of internecine warfare that made the island kingdom one vast blood-soaked battlefield....no quarter was ever shown....all prisoners—men, women, and children—were all beheaded....Up to 1870 it was the usual Japanese procedure to collect heads after every battle....The paradoxical Samurai code is as high in many of its standards as that of King Arthur’s Knights;

at the same time, it authorizes the most despicable treacheries and brutalities (Clear, 1942:16-17).

4. BUSHIDO'S NEW PARADIGM.

It is not the fault that Western powers identified bushido with cruelty. It was in the 1920s and 30s that changes were being implemented within the political ideas and ethics of the military. “One of the most important changes was the reinterpretation—or more plainly, corruption—of the ethical code of bushido...in order to subordinate it to the emperor ideology and the new military ideology. The inculcation of trainee officers in the emperor ideology at the military college gave them a very distorted understanding of bushido” (Tanaka, 1996:206).

a. Bushido inhumanity?

“It is often held that the inhumane conduct of the Japanese during the Asia-Pacific War arose from within *bushido* itself. The Japanese Field Service Code, *Senjinkun*, which among other things required that soldiers commit suicide rather than surrender, and the Imperial Code of Military Conduct, *Gunjin Chokuron*, which demanded absolute loyalty to the emperor, were both held to carry the essence of *bushido*. All Japanese soldiers as well as Formosan and Korean prison guards were required to memorize them, and much of their understandings of *bushido* would have come from these codes. Prisoners of the Japanese also believed that the cruelty of their captors stemmed from *bushido* (Tanaka, 1996:206-7).

“Does bushido justify cruelty? To answer this question it is necessary to look at the details of the code, which consists of seven elementsrighteousness...courage...

humanity...propriety...sincerity...honor...loyalty....In summary, it can be seen from the elements of the code that *bushido* requires great self-discipline together with great tolerance toward others. So how and why were the demands for tolerance and compassion in *bushido* forgotten?....The Imperial Code of Military Conduct, which was issued in 1882 by Emperor Meiji, emphasized five elements that every Japanese soldier must respect: loyalty, propriety, courage, righteousness, and simplicity. The code held that sincerity underlay all five elements. Justice and morality were also emphasized. It is clear that the code was heavily influenced by *bushido*....Nothing in the conduct code could possibly be taken as justification for the cruel treatment of POWs. Article 3 requiring the soldier to respect courage, states that violent and impetuous acts can never be acts of courage. It was also stated that the courageous soldier must treat others with love and respect (Tanaka, 1996:207).

b. The Field Service Code of 1941.

“The Ministry of War’s 1871 instructions to the troops listed seven character traits that soldiers should strive for: loyalty, decorum, faith, obedience, courage, frugality, and honor...the Imperial Rescript to the Military promulgated on Jan. 4, 1882 listed five such traits: loyalty, decorum, courage, faith, and frugality. (Apparently the government had lost interest in keeping its troops obedient and honorable during the intervening eleven years)” (Friday, 1994:343).

The Field Service Code of 1941 was codified to prevent the sort of crimes committed by Japanese soldiers in the Nanjing massacre of 1937 by tightening the definitions of how soldiers should conduct themselves. Specifically, it addressed the

humane treatment of prisoners of war. Clearly, the ethic in which the ill-treatment of POWs was justifiable did not originate from within *bushido* but rather from the corruption of it (Friday, 1994:346; Tanaka, 1996:208). However, one may infer from Friday's translation of the Senjinkun--that death is preferable to life as a prisoner of war--the Japanese soldier was provided the logic to rationalize their cruel behavior: "One who knows shame is strong....Do not endure the shame of being made prisoner while alive; die and do not leave behind the sullied name of one who foundered and fell" (Friday, 1994:348).

c. Atrocities in the name of bushido.

Clearly we see that Russell's declaration, "[t]he uncivilized ill-treatment of prisoners of war by the Japanese was the natural outcome of the code of Bushido, which was inculcated into the Japanese soldier as part of his basic training" (Russell, 1948:46), is incorrect. However, when Russell states, "many of the worst crimes perpetrated by the Japanese were committed in the sacred name of Bushido" (Russell, 1948:163), he is right on the mark. Russell provides an appropriate example in the translated entry from the diary of a captured Japanese soldier who witnessed the execution of an Allied aircrew member on 30 Mar 43:

...Unit Commander Komai...told us personally that, in accordance with the compassionate sentiments of Japanese Bushido, he was going to kill the prisoner himself with his favourite sword....[H]e tells the prisoner that in accordance with Japanese Bushido he will be killed with a Japanese sword....The savageness which I felt only a little while ago is gone, and I feel nothing but the true compassion of Japanese Bushido (Russell, 1948:64-65).

Bushido “was a propaganda tool, consciously shaped and manipulated as part of the effort to forge a unified, modern nation out of a fundamentally feudal society, and to build a modern national military made up of conscripts from all tiers of society” (Friday, 1994:342). However, no matter how much propaganda is fed to a populace, there will be those who are not “properly” inculcated. On at least one occasion during the Pacific War, a mass desertion under fire occurred during the opening hours of General Yamashita Tomoyuki’s invasion of the Malay Peninsula on 7 December 1941. On that morning a large self-propelled landing barge containing thirty men and two officers had come to within thirty yards of the beach when it suddenly turned around and went out to sea. Later, the men admitted they planned to desert in the face of the enemy and had even stock-piled rations in advance (Potter, 1962:58). Amazingly, this act -- which is the antithesis of the force-fed “corrupted bushido”— happened on the opening day of hostilities against the West.

General Percival, who surrendered Singapore to General Yamashita, feels Japanese atrocities could be attributed to medieval behavior, from which Japan was unable to extricate itself due to the relative short time in adopting the Western idea of civilization. “It is a great pity that the Japanese commanders allowed and sometimes even ordered the atrocities which were committed by their officers and men. But that again may be due in some measure to the lack of time since their country emerged from its isolation. There was not enough time to absorb fully the accepted doctrines of civilisation” (Percival, 1949). However, Friday—an historian of Japanese history—disagrees that the Imperial Forces were adhering to medieval standard operating procedures, citing that

“[m]assacring or otherwise mistreating the occupants of newly captured territories was...counterproductive” because it would leave fewer workers in the newly acquired fields (Friday, 1994:346). In opposition to Dr. Friday’s view, Ellis Amdur—an historian and practitioner of Japanese martial arts—paints a different scene of twelfth century Japan: “Although downplayed or ignored in the battle-tales, slaughter and rapine of non-combatants was the rule, not the exception. The women and children of the leaders of [the] defeated side were usually killed, and women of lesser rank were given to the warriors as spoils-of-war” (Amdur, 1995:18). Despite Friday feeling that “the connection between Japan’s modern and premodern military traditions is thin” (1994:345), there is an unfortunate parallel. Following the Imperial Guards Division establishing a beachhead on the Maur River in Malaya on or about 21 January 1942, they summarily beheaded 200 Australian and Indian prisoners of war (Potter, 1962:72). To Friday, this is “aberrant, if not outright degenerate conduct by Japanese as well as western standards” (Friday, 1994:346). Unfortunately, Japan’s military history is virtually saturated in the blood of this type of “aberrant” behavior in foreign countries. During Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Korea campaigns of 1592 and 1597 (Kodansha, 1993:621), he ordered the noses and ears of defeated combatants and non-combatants to be cut off, pickled, and sent back to Japan. The body parts were so voluminous that the pile was called “Ear Mountain.” It must be said in defense of objectivity that Hideyoshi’s advisors, generals, soldiers—and the public in general—were all revolted by this particular show of cruelty. Kodansha’s *Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia* portrays Hideyoshi as a brilliant strategist and shrewd politician who, untypical of his day,

showed a generosity toward his enemies (p:1617). Obviously, Hideyoshi--like his 20th century progeny--was better behaved at home than during his overseas campaign.

5. EDUCATING THE NATION--ACADEMICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY.

Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, educating Japan's youth was seen as a way to build a strong nation which could compete in the world economy and hold its own. Therefore, the new Meiji government established a policy of providing education to all subjects. No mention of education is complete without the inclusion of a reference to the Meiji Rescript on Education that was read aloud daily in all classrooms. Usual post-war mention attributes the Rescript as providing a basis for the nationalization of youth, and it is often portrayed as a sinister document. The Far Eastern Commission drafted a policy recommending "Imperial rescripts should not be used as a basis of instruction, study, or ceremonies in schools" (FEC 1947:95). However, I wish to go one step further and provide a copy of the original document (Illustration 2) along with its entire translation to assert there is nothing wrong with the rescript. If the principles within this rescript are wrong, then by the same inference our "Pledge of Allegiance" could be considered wrong.

a. The Meiji Rescript on Education.

KNOW YE OUR SUBJECTS:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire, and herein lies the source of our education. Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests;

always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial throne, coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye be not only our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by their descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to lay it to heart, in all reverence, in common with you our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji (Oct. 30, 1890)

Mutsuhito
[Imperial Seal]
(Hokubei Butokukai, 1939:4-5)



朕惟^フニ我^カ皇祖皇宗國^ヲ肇^ムルコト
宏遠ニ德^ヲ樹^ツルコト深厚ナリ我^カ臣
民克^ク忠ニ克^ク孝ニ億兆心ヲ一ニシテ
世世厥ノ美^ヲ濟^{セル}ハ此レ我^カ國體ノ
精華ニシテ教育ノ淵源亦實ニ此ニ存ス
爾臣民父母ニ孝ニ兄弟ニ友ニ夫婦相和
シ朋友相信シ恭儉己レヲ持シ博愛衆ニ
及ホシ學ヲ修ノ業ヲ習ヒ以テ智能ヲ啓
發シ德器ヲ成就シ進テ公益ヲ廣ノ世務
ヲ開キ常ニ國憲ヲ重シ國法ニ遵ヒ一旦
緩急アレハ義勇公ニ奉シ以テ天壤無窮
ノ皇運ヲ扶翼スヘシ是ノ如キハ獨リ朕
カ忠良ノ臣民タルノミナラス又以テ爾
祖先ノ遺風ヲ顯彰スルニ足ラン
斯ノ道ハ實ニ我^カ皇祖皇宗ノ遺訓ニシ
テ子孫臣民ノ俱ニ遵守スヘキ所之^ツ古
今ニ通シテ謬ラス之ヲ中外ニ施シテ悖
ラス朕爾臣民ト俱ニ拳拳服膺シテ咸其
德ヲ一ニセシコトヲ庶幾フ
明治二十三年十月三十日

朕 仁

Source: Sasaki Morio. 1990. *Nippon no Kokoro: Jidai wo Ninau Seishonen e*. Tokyo: Mizuho Shobo

Illustration 3
Meiji Rescript on Education (Original Facsimile)

As is apparent, nothing is sinister in the format or wording of the rescript, unless offense is taken at the sentence, "...should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state...." However, this is probably the one sentence within the rescript which held the most propaganda value to the government. That the rescript came directly from Emperor Meiji is the strongest inducement amongst the common person to comply with the State's request to arm and mobilize the youth. And that this sentence was included in the rescript further gives credence to the theory that the "medium used to develop the frame of mind necessary in time of war was the educational system (Draeger, 1996c:47).

b. A brief history of the education system, 1917-1945.

The educational system, centrally controlled by the Monbusho without the inclusion of a local school board or superintendent (MacArthur, 1964:356), had a broad-range impact in inculcating Japan's youth in preparation for war.

Military training was included in the school curriculum from the Meiji period (1868-1912) through the end of World War II and was based on the government policy expressed as *fukoku kyohei*: rich country, strong military. Infantry exercises were carried out in the 1880s and military style calisthenics were incorporated. After the 1905 victory over Russia the military education trend in public schools became stronger and military courses called *kyoren* were established in elementary and secondary schools for both boys and girls (Kodansha, 1983:175).

In 1917 military training was included and emphasized in order to promote the concept of *Kokutai*, the national polity (Kodansha, 1993:325). After the First World War

career army officers were assigned to the faculty of middle and higher schools, and college preparatory schools (Kodansha, 1983:175). In 1925 youth training centers with a four-year curriculum of vocational, physical, and military training were established by Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige, both army ministers. The centers were run by elementary school principals, his teaching staff, and the local reservists who provided over 100 hours of military drill and 100 hours of other instruction to the 85% of Japanese men who did not go on to middle school (Kodansha, 1983:174). Following the Manchurian Incident in 1931, educational policy became ultra-nationalistic; however, it was after the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 that the educational policy transformed to a militaristic format. In 1939 the *Seinen Gakko*, or Boys Schools, a combination of vocational and military schools, were established and became compulsory for elementary school graduates. In 1941 the elementary schools were reorganized under the name *Kokumin Gakko*, National Peoples School, which were used to train subjects for the empire (Kodansha, 1993:325-326), and used Monbusho-approved textbooks “filled with militaristic and anti-American items” (MacArthur, 1964:356). Colonel Clear will later provide a clear “snapshot” of the militaristic schooling which young boys underwent as part of their “education.”

c. Youth and military training.

The budo at this point were well established both in public school (kendo, judo, and naginata) and had ties to the Butokukai, which trained budo instructors and promoted performance based on codified techniques. However, not only were martial arts taught at public schools, but so was military training. This training is similar in form to the

modern Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) held on some American grade school campuses. The main difference being that Japanese school military training was compulsory and was actually based on real military training. Conversely, JROTC is concerned about teaching some drill and ceremony, history, and self-esteem.

Colonel Clear paints a very clear picture of boy's training:

Not even the people of Germany and Italy have known such regimentation as the people of Japan have passively accepted for centuries. For years before induction, the conscript has been fired by recitals of supreme sacrifice and devotion....At the Yasukuni-jing[u], famous military memorial to departed heroes, I once saw a hundred thousand schoolboys assembled, caps in hand, bowing low in deep reverence. The Minister of War, and later Premier, General Ugaki, standing beside me and watching the impressive sight, smiled as he remarked, "Thus we plant the hemp in preparation for braiding rope."

The child's military training begins at the age of six when he straps on his first knapsack and goose-steps around the schoolyard singing military songs. At twelve he is in uniform, carrying a light rifle, and participating in annual maneuvers involving light field guns and hand grenades. At fifteen he is shouting battle cries as he charges up a hill to take a simulated enemy position with the bayonet. A year later he is throwing live grenades, and driving plywood tanks through the fields of his school. At nineteen he has already marched twenty-five miles in a day with his school battalion, rifle, pack and all; dug trenches, filled in latrines, strung barbed wire, and studied mapping. He has forded shoulder-deep, ice-cold mountain streams, slogged through mud and dust, and cooked his handful of rice in a little bucket over an open fire with perhaps a few sardines and a swallow of tea to wash it down. Then, back to school again, after days in the field, he resumes his schedule of reporting at 0600 hours on cold winter mornings for fencing and judo (wrestling) in an open air gymnasium (Clear, 1942:18).

The military training provided to the public school came from the reserve association for both military drills and fencing (including bayonet drills). Martial arts training figured prominently in Japanese society since the 1930s, and even comic books

and other magazines featured budo geared for war. “Shin Budo” [New Martial Arts] regularly featured service men throwing grenades, or test-cutting with swords; senior citizens practicing with wooden swords; or school children practicing swordsmanship with real swords (Takahara, 1992:82-83). The emphasis on budo is explained by Richard Smethurst in his 1974 book, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*:

From the army’s and community’s point of view, reservist-led drill and martial arts training for young men was one of the most important of the organization’s military activities. The army was not able to conscript and “socialize for death” a generation of prewar Japanese males, as Kazuko Tsurumi says, but it could and did discipline and indoctrinate a very high percentage of rural teenage males through the youth association and the youth centers and schools (154).

Smethurst proceeds, “By the time the army led Japan into the China and then the Pacific wars, many years had been spent in educating young Japanese in military values and skills” (Smethurst, 1974:155). However well Japan trained its youth in military skills, that was not enough. The spirit of the samurai had to be inculcated so that students would identify themselves directly with the samurai, or to the samurai heritage. This was best done through kendo, a modern version of fencing with the long Japanese sword, in which a substitute sword of tubular split bamboo is used. “Closely related to military drill was reservist-directed martial arts training. [Reservist] leaders gave rifle, bayonet, and sword training to their followers, to youth association members, to youth school students and, on occasion, even to women” (Smethurst, 1974:157). Smethurst continues:

The bayonet and sword training also prepared the young men to take part in community-wide and district level competitions. The bayonet training (jukenjutsu or jukendo) and competition, in which participants fought with long wooden staves in the shape of rifles with fixed bayonets, was the twentieth century military’s addition to Japan’s “traditional”

martial arts and thus one which virtually disappeared from the sports's scene after 1945. Sword fighting (kendo), on the other hand, the martial skill which separated the Tokugawa warrior from his social subordinates, had a long premodern history. All three types of training – rifle, bayonet, and sword – taught young men discipline, imperviousness to pain, controlled violence, and ultimately an ability to rise above the fear of death (Smethurst, 1974:157).

d. Training women.

According to Smethurst, not only were boys subject to military arts training, but also women. “On at least one occasion,” he writes, “the women were trained in military skills. After 1943, the reservists mobilized the women for the famed “bamboo spear” defense groups. Home guard units of women were set up to help defend Japan against the expected invasion” (Smethurst, 1974:158). Nakamura Taizaburo is an 86 year old modern master of the sword. Nakamura sensei corroborates Smethurst's statement and asserts that, “In 1945 the US forces landed on Okinawa. My Division was reassigned from the Chinese continent to Kyushu [southern Japan] in order to prepare for a land battle on our own land. In Kyushu and other areas I, as a fencing master, was sent to home guard units to conduct bamboo spear training” (Nakamura, 1995:274). Iwasaki Yasue, 70, also underwent this type of training on the northern island of Hokkaido. “During the war I was taught naginatajutsu and received 2nd dan; it was a required course for girls. At the end of the war we girls were taught bamboo spear techniques. Essentially we were to wait for American paratroopers to descend, then spear their genitals before they hit the ground” (Iwasaki, 1997).

e. Naginata: an historical precedence for arming women.

Precedence for arming women and using them in combat was set in 1232 when “the Jōei Code supplanted the old Imperial Code. Containing 51 chapters, it became the legal system of the Hojo [family which ruled Japan from 1203-1333]. Interestingly, one of the laws was that women were allowed to inherit property and act as bushi [warriors] on an equal footing with men” (Amdur, 1995:20). Amdur goes on, “[m]edieval women could go to war, although they did not do so, by choice, in any significant numbers (the most famous women warriors were Tomoe Gozen and Hangaku of Jo). Most women who found themselves on the battlefield did so *in extremis*; when invaders broke through the defenses of a castle or estate, and women became part of the last-ditch resistance [sic]” (Amdur, 1995:25).

At the end of the Warring States Period and the introduction of (relative) national peace in 1603 by Tokugawa Ieyasu, “the naginata became obsolete as a weapon of war and was assigned to the women of warrior families for the defense of the home. They, in turn, were required to master its application by the time they reached the age of eighteen” (Riley, 1995:34).

“As part of the [naginata] training for teachers, Nitta [Suzuyo, 19th generation lineal successor to the Toda ha Buko Ryu] was told that the most important thing was to boost the girls’ morale and strengthen their spirit in case of an enemy landing. Nitta said that the girls liked the training, which was done in place of “enemy sports” such as baseball or volleyball” (Amdur, 1996c). Apparently this tradition lasted until today, except that training in naginata is done for grace, poise, sport, and other non-combat attributes.

f. Education and godly winds.

Having a slight background knowledge of the Japanese education system, what MacArthur calls “an official propaganda machine” which “existed for the purpose of ‘thought control’” (1964:357), makes it easier to understand how Japan’s soldiers were willing participants in *kyokusai* special assault charges (known to the West as “banzai charges”). Kamikaze pilot training was enhanced by the systematic and organized public school education system of 1917-1945 where students were taught to die for the emperor. By late 1944, the slogan *Jusshi Reisho* (Sacrifice Life) was taught, making such efficient “brainwashing” [Kamikaze training] possible. (Morimoto, 1992:148-151).

Sasaki Mako agrees, saying that “[m]ost of the [Kamikaze] pilots who volunteered for the suicide attacks were those who were born late in the Taisho period (1912-1926) or in the first two or three years of Showa. Therefore, they had gone through the brainwashing education, and were the products of the militaristic Japan” (Sasaki, 1995).

“The effect of the brainwashing that the military had done to the students is surprising. The pilots felt it was “obvious” that they were to take part in the Kamikaze attacks” (Sasaki, 1995). Sasaki’s research is interesting in that she interviewed former Kamikaze pilots, those who had to abort their mission, or whose numbers did not yet come up. She found that the Kamikaze pilots were generally happy that they could serve the country, but had other thoughts towards death. The training in public school, reinforced by military induction training, was strong enough to change life’s basic priority of “self then country” to “country then self.” The first priority became the Emperor and the country. She also discovered that the college graduates may have felt fear (Sasaki 1995). Sasaki further tells us that some of the college graduate pilot recruits

even wrote letters home which were not the standard “cherry blossom falling into the ocean” letter home. One pilot even stated he was not eager to die, and was going to miss his girlfriend (Sasaki 1995).

g. Shushin and Shinto.

(1) **Shushin.** No mention of the Japanese education system is complete without mentioning *shushin*, the moral education provided in the public school system until 1945. These daily classes stressed Confucian moral virtues such as respect, loyalty, and obedience of subordinate to superior (Neide, 1995:36; quoting Rohlen 1983). The *Shushin-sho*, Moral Training Manual, was the vehicle used to teach manners, filial piety, and decorum. The lessons were usually exemplified by Taro (“Johnny”), who in one example advises his friend that they should not take fruit from a tree because the tree belongs to the farmer, not them (Hall 1949). Earlier editions, circa 1932, even introduce lessons from foreign countries; usually to emphasize thriftiness, hard work, and service. Even examples from Benjamin Franklin’s and Thomas Jefferson’s lives were highlighted. The lessons on thrift, honesty, and proper decorum are commendable; however, after reading selections from the *Shushin-sho*, one easily sees the constant, subtle push towards militarism, expansionism, and national service. The following passages were extricated from Robert Hall’s 1949 monograph, *Shushin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation*:

Ever since the Conscription Law was passed in the 6th year of Meiji [1873] all the people of the land must [with the implication of an honor bestowed] become soldiers to guard the country. Before the Meiji era only the warriors [*samurai*] were permitted the honor of guarding the country. But since the law was passed under the leadership of His

Majesty as the Supreme Commander of Army and Navy forces, a strong Imperial Army has been organized, with every subject developing his fighting spirit, receiving discipline as a soldier, and improving his military effectiveness. We have fought several wars since then and have demonstrated our national power before the eyes of the world.

Our territory has been expanded, but its expansion has not been compatible with the increase in population. Consequently many people have left the country to live in Manchukuo [Manchuria] and others have gone out to China and other countries to engage in various occupations.³

It is needless to say that our national development in the future will make great strides.⁴

³TM [Teachers' Manual] *note*: "Our people should further go abroad with great ambitions.

⁴TM *list of important teaching points*:

- a. The Emperor's way in the Restoration.
- b. The nation followed the Will of the Imperial Charter Oath of Five Items, and people both high and low contributed their efforts to bringing prosperity to the nation.
- c. The advancement in methods of government.
- d. **The strengthening of the military and the enhancement of national prestige.** [Italics and emphasis added.]
- e. The development of diplomatic relations.
- f. The increase in land and population, and the expansion overseas.

When teaching this chapter and the following, take special care not to teach the chapters historically and thus defeat the very purpose of the lesson (Hall, 1949:84).

The above examples from the Shushin-sho clearly illustrate the state-controlled "propaganda" that many researchers have mentioned. Meiron and Susie Harries' view of shushin is that it had a "near-obsessive stress on loyalty, filial piety, obedience and the subordination of the individual will" which was replaced in 1946 with civics and social studies stressing "reflective not customary morality, the ethical rather than the obedient citizen." Harries points out that school radio broadcasts featuring nationwide coordinated calisthenics and such items as 'Juvenile Stories from the Co-Prosperity Sphere' were also replaced in 1946 with an adolescent psychological series called 'What

Am I?’ to explore the “naturalness of curiosity, rebelliousness, and other intense emotions” (Harries, 1978:64). Harries aversion to coordinated calisthenics is not well explained, as these had been introduced to Japan by the French, English, and Americans when the educational system was revised in 1873 (Kodansha, 1993:324-328).

However, the “democratization” of the Japanese education system in 1946, which Harries heralds, does have its detractors, as many older Japanese are concerned by the “lack of discipline, a refusal to conform, rampant consumerism and individual ambition – which they attribute directly to the alien code of values imposed by the Americans in the 1940s” (Harries: 272). A former Imperial Army major, now 79 years old, echoes Harries’ sentiment when he told me, “I am chagrined at today’s youth, who have no manners or respect. They should be taught shushin in elementary school” (Funaya 1998).

(2) **Shinto.** Implicit with shushin was the teaching of State Shinto, the politicize—vice religious—form of Shinto which should not be confused with Shrine Shinto. State Shinto (hereafter called Shinto for simplicity) revolved around the deity of the Showa emperor (reigned 1925-1989), Hirohito, and differed in emphasis (but not concept) from the Meiji emperor’s “democratic god-emperor.”

Shinto was used by the militarists and those in power to unify the mind and strengthen the loyalty of the Japanese people, and was eventually to become the bulwark of the preservation and independence of the racial culture and the protection of the country from foreign domination. During the Second World War, Shinto provided the strong spiritual glue used to cement the people’s patriotism. It was during the 1940s that Shinto acquired its pronounced nationalistic character (Ono, 1962:78-79).

The emphasis on the deity of the Emperor had become so overpowering that by 1938 “the great majority of Japanese, both the intellectual and the common man, sincerely believed in the benevolent omnipotence of the Imperial Line and in the unique Japanese characteristic of a government by rulers physically descended from the Gods....If it had once been propaganda, the Japanese themselves had been duped by their own propaganda” (Hall, 1949:51).

(3) **Yamato Damashii.** The nationalistic flavoring added to Shinto during the 1930s and 40s also incorporated the concept of *Yamato Damashii*, “the peculiar endowment of the Japanese people resulting from their genealogical succession from the Gods” (Hall, 1949:57). *Yamato Damashii* (Soul of Japan) is more clearly “a phrase used to describe spiritual qualities supposedly unique to the Japanese people. These range from physical and moral fortitude and courage, sincerity, and devotion” to the national spirit, and was equated to unquestioning loyalty to emperor and nation (Kodansha 1993:1736-7).

(4) **Nihon Seishin.** *Yamato Damashii* is directly related to *Nihon Seishin*, the Japanese spirit “synonymous with Emperor worship,” fusing “the Confucian veneration for ancestors with the Shinto belief in the divine origin of the Japanese Emperors” (Hall, 1949:57). As *Yamato Damashii* was directly related to *Nihon Seishin*, so were they both combined in a synergetic synthesis using *Seishin Tanren* as the catalyst. *Seishin Tanren* literally means “spiritual forging” and is implemented through severe, austere training. The aforementioned “coordinated calisthenics” was one method of building the group

solidarity which is so elemental to Japanese society; however, the exercises are not enough to be considered “forging.”

h. Budo: the Linchpin of Shinto, Yamato Damashii, and Seishin Tanren.

The Seishin Tanren method most often implemented was through the budo. School children were heated, hammered, and annealed repeatedly through the daily practice of budo which by this time was a compulsory course taught throughout the public school system in the forms of kendo and judo for boys, and naginata for girls. In addition to the public school courses which exemplified Yamato Damashii, private budo dojo were used to propagate the ultra-nationalistic and militaristic mores of the Japan of the 1930s and 40s. Ultra-nationalistic ties to private dojo were established well before the 1930s and it is documented that many of the small revolutionist movements prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868 were headquartered in private fencing halls such as the Rempaikan, headed by Yamaoka Tesshu (Stevens 1984).

Since the late Edo period (circa 1840) fencing training had become an activity for commoners, thanks in part to the incorporation of the safe split bamboo “foil.” The commoner trend had grown to such extent that numerous ryu-ha were founded by and for non-warrior classes, which allegedly was approved by the authorities. Seemingly, the feudal government viewed the rise of a sport-like form of fencing as a useful way to dissipate energy; however, they erred in that the “kendo dojo of the later half of the 19th century became centers of political discontent. It is a fact that many of the lower level samurai who engineered the Meiji Restoration of 1868 formulated some of their attitudes

and ideas in the dojo which incorporated bamboo swords (Bieri, 1984:3). Laszlo Abel provides us with a brief sketch of the *machi dojo* (town dojo, i.e., private dojo):

During the revolutionary ferment of the 1850's and 1860's, the *machi dojo* served as meeting places for large groups of disgruntled lower ranking samurai and others. There, opinions could be aired and strategies planned without the threat of detection by the authorities. The *machi dojo* instilled virtues like fortitude and determination. Also important, they attracted people from many areas of Japan and brought them together for a common purpose. Friendships and the feeling of sharing a common plight fostered a sense of nationhood, a view of Japan as a single state, that had been lacking when primary loyalties were to family or fief. In time, they proved to be the best arenas available in which to train the younger generation samurai and commoner. Many of them relied on lessons learned in the *machi dojo* as they guided Japan through the turmoil of the Meiji Restoration, the Satsuma Rebellion and on into the twentieth century (Abel, 1984b:14-15).

i. Recipe for educational reforms: a delay along the martial way.

Educational doctrine, militarism, thought control, shushin, Shinto, Yamato Damashii, Nihon seishin, seishin tannin, and budo. These nine elements were in toto the component parts comprising Japan's education system, and ultimately the reason for the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) dissolution of the entire education system in 1945. The preceding nine parts share equal responsibility for disseminating ultra-nationalism and sustaining Japan's expansionism; a recipe for war. However, if we look at the above items as salad vegetables and a bowl, the first eight items would be the recipe ingredients, whereas budo would be the salad bowl. We may consider budo the salad bowl as it was the vessel by which ultra-nationalistic nutrition was conveyed to the "body Japan."

I address Budo as the vehicle used to express the wartime Japanese spirit. However, it is more precise to say that kendo—the senior art of the traditional budo hierarchy—was the vehicle of choice by the authorities. Kendo is symbolic of the attitude which authorities of the day desired, and is manifest in the Japanese sword, holding for the Japanese the embodiment of their national entity. The sword is one of the three Imperial Regalia comprising Japan’s national symbols of authority and legitimacy of the emperor (Kodansha, 1993:596). Although the three Imperial Regalia symbolize Shintoism, it is especially the sword that exudes the spirit of Japan and has had a spiritual significance for the Japanese for more than twelve centuries (Kodansha, 1993:1491). This very sword is said to contain the soul of the samurai and was his authority, mentor, and spirit. Therefore, it was the sword and the sword arts that received more exposure in the 1930s and 40s as a means of inculcating the “Japanese Spirit.”

j. The military sword.

From 1872 through the early 1930s the Japanese military used swords patterned after the European model. In 1934 the pattern (Model 94) was changed to resemble the *tachi*, an ancient style sword suspended from two hangers which is more commonly—yet incorrectly—called a “samurai sword” (Fuller and Gregory, 1987: 26; Fuller and Gregory, 1997: 54), and remained a part of the military uniform until 1945. According to Robert Leurquin, “It was General Araki [Sadao] who...after the Manchurian campaign, brought back to honor the famous Samurai saber, a terrific weapon which is wielded with both hands and whose guard [i.e., handle] is almost half as long as the blade” (Thompson, 1942:28). “The big heavy swords carried by officers are not a mere badge of rank but are

used skilfully [sic] whenever opportunity offers.... [T]he classic single-edged blades of Japan's feudal era will slice a handkerchief in mid-air, or part of a man's body from collar bone to waist in a single slash" (Scofield, 1942:24).

It was this "terrific weapon" that school children were being trained to eventually wield; this sword that was to taint the shield of bushido with its sanguine use in Nanking and other areas of operation; this sword which now exemplified an aggressive, expansionist, and fanatic nation. The "soul of Japan" had for a time departed the corporal body and was now replaced with a sullied "doppelganger," or evil-twin. "During the wars of the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa eras the *Katsujin-ken* had been thrown away and the *Satsujin-ken* taken up" (Nakamura, 1995:37). In Japanese swordsmanship there are two philosophies of using the sword. *Katsujin-ken* is literally the "Life-giving Sword" and embodies all that is righteous: protecting the weak, destroying evil, and cultivating one's own spirit. Conversely, *Satsujin-ken* is the "Murdering Sword" which takes the lives of the weak, propagates evil, and eventually destroys one's humanity (Dann 1978, Nakamura 1973, Warner and Draeger 1982). As Nakamura points out from his first hand experience as a swordsmanship instructor to the Japanese Army from 1932 through 1945, Tanaka's "corruption of bushido" was revealed by the *satsujin-ken*.

6. CHAPTER 2 CONCLUSION.

Japan has a long martial tradition beginning from the eighth century and ending in 1945 with Japan's defeat in the Second World War. Throughout this period, various schools of budo were established to convey skill in weaponry to the bushi caste. These various schools, called *ryu-ha*, once taught complete systems of warriorship called "sogo

budo,” or comprehensive martial arts; however, beginning in the seventeenth century the ryu-ha became increasingly specialized, usually in one or two arts. Thus, schools specializing only in fencing, unarmed grappling, archery, naginata, scythe-and-chain, and other arts became standard.

The nineteenth century saw the socialization of martial arts extend to include not only the warrior caste, but commoners as well. Socialization was responsible for the mass dissemination of the martial arts and culminated at the end of the century into a nationalized, standardized, control overseen by a semi-governmental organization called the Dai Nippon Butokukai. The Butokukai desired to extend the benefits of martial arts to all Japanese and was responsible for kendo and judo finally being added to public school curricula in 1912. As the country went to war in the 1930s the Butokukai became increasingly politicized and became a fountainhead of official governmental propaganda by stressing ultra-nationalism, militarism, and a martial spirit. The Butokukai’s direction became more oriented toward preparing Japan’s youth and men for combat training by emphasizing a battlefield goal approach to martial arts instead of the traditional goals of cultivating the spirit. Additionally, the Butokukai incorporated the modern disciplines of bayonet fencing, grenade throwing, and rifle marksmanship. Illustrations 4 and 5 depict the global budo relationship before and after World War II.

The educational system was also responsible for indoctrinating Japan’s youth with ultra-nationalistic brainwashing, and reinforcing that propaganda through compulsory classes in the martial arts that emphasized the Yamato Damashii, Japanese Spirit.

The Monbusho was a willing participant of the war effort and their molding school children into soldiers was insidious, subtle, and severe. For these ultra-nationalistic and militaristic reasons, SCAP closed the school system in 1945 and oversaw its complete overhaul along American lines.

The dissolution of the old educational system impacted budo in that kendo, judo, and naginata training would eventually be prohibited by the reformed Monbusho at the direction of GHQ, MacArthur's General Headquarters (Futaki et al., 1994:208-209). Doubtless, Japan's military battlefield manner and over exuberant use of the "murdering sword," as well as the strong propaganda value of the budo were major contributors to this decision.

JAPANESE CIVIL-MILITARY MARTIAL ARTS RELATIONSHIP 1895 ~ 1945





Illustration 4
Japan's Global Budo Map, 1895-1998

POST-WAR MARTIAL ARTS DEVELOPMENT



Sources: Taizaburo Nakamura, *Iai-Kendo*. (Tokyo: Seitosha, 1973); Taizaburo Nakamura, *Katsujinken Battodo*. (Tokyo: Seibunsha, 1995); Nihon Budokan, "The Budo Monthly." (Tokyo: Beisubaru Magajin, 1991).

Illustration 5

CHAPTER 3. THE AMERICAN SIDE

1. Historical background.

The United States of America declared war on Japan after Japan's attack on the US Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 7 December 1941. Simultaneously, Great Britain entered the war against Japan after being attacked in Singapore in what was a Japanese coordinated attack against the enemies of Nazi Germany.

Japan's initial success soon turned into a protracted war of attrition in the Pacific Ocean and upon the Asian continent. Bugged down in China since 1937 after overextending its lines of communication and supply, Japan soon was to feel the gnawing of logistical hunger throughout its areas of operation. Consequently, against superior firepower and logistic support, Japan capitulated on 15 August 1945 and signed the instruments of unconditional surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Harbor on 2 September 1945.

2. Occupation of Japan.

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was designated by President Harry S. Truman as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and ran the occupation from Tokyo from what is known as General Headquarters, or GHQ. Receiving "civil responsibility and absolute control over almost 80-million people and...maintain[ing] that control until Japan had once more demonstrated that it was ready, willing, and able to become a responsible member of the family of free nations," MacArthur was placed in charge of the democratization of Japan (MacArthur, 1964:321). The unilateral power of

the Americans was repeatedly called into question by both the British and Soviets who wanted to divide the Japanese pie as had been done in Berlin; however, MacArthur refused a multilateral division because of the governing problems surfacing in Germany (MacArthur, 1964:333). To this day the Soviets exhibit a strong disgruntlement, as is evidenced in Zhukov's book *The Rise and Fall of the Gunbatsu: A Study in Military History*:

The cooling of chauvinistic passions among the people after the war and the upswing of the working-class and democratic movements should, it seemed, have closed the road to any revival of militarist practices. ***However, the social roots of militarism were not removed. Japan proper was occupied by US forces.***

The actions of the American occupation authorities showed that US policy was in fact oriented toward the preservation of militarism....

US imperialism began to regard Japan as a key instrument of its policy in Asia. The ***US aggression against Korea*** was the first serious test in this context....(Zhukov, 1975:9) [Emphasis added.]

Despite Zhukov's insistence that Japan capitulated because of Russia's declaration of war on Japan (Zhukov 1975) three days prior to dropping the atomic bomb, the fact remains that the US and Great Britain did the fighting and dying; the Soviet contribution was at best, minimal in the Japanese theater. Therefore, without the inclusion of a Russian presence the Occupation of Japan was underway in 1945. Under the command of General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, American forces were encumbered with bringing the defeated Japan from a militaristic society to a democratic one.

3. The "Budo Ban": Fact or Fiction?

Much has been written in the Japanese martial arts community about a SCAP ban on martial arts. According to these writers, any reader would infer that the US authorities placed an overall blanket-ban on budo or that a “laundry-list” of banned martial arts existed. My review of the literature presents a different picture, leading me to hypothesize that there was in fact no overall ban on the practice of martial arts. However, the fact cannot be denied that a cessation of activities did occur...sporadically at best. Therefore, was there really a ban or is this a popular myth?

Myths tend to become larger with each telling, and at this juncture in time the popular belief is that martial arts were not practiced during a five-year period from 1945 through 1950, the time period of the occupation. This belief is so strong that it is repeated with conviction and accepted without question; however, there are indications budo were openly practiced during the period in question.

The purpose of this section of my paper is to question the “budo ban” myth. My hypothesis is that there are three possibilities present: (1) a total ban; (2) a partial ban; (3) or no ban. Accordingly, I shall begin with the policies which may have had the most impact on budo.

a. Policy administration.

Chapter two presents how traditional budo, infused with militarism and ultra-nationalism was propagandized and disseminated throughout Japan in the 1930s and 40s. Dissemination was enacted through three portals: (1) private semi-governmental organizations such as the Butokukai; (2) boys’ military prep schools and military

academies such as the Rikugun Toyama Gakko and the Shikan Gakko (army officer academy); and (3), through the public school system.

Illustration 6 depicts the connection between the Rikugun Toyama Academy, other government schools, and the Butokukai.

As part of MacArthur's mandate to transform Japan into a democratic society, he undertook to first remove militarism from the culture. This task was partially accomplished by instituting a purge against, and preventing from holding future office, those public officials who were (1) connected in anyway with the military or war effort, (2) exponents of militaristic nationalism, and (3) influential members of certain rightist organizations (NARA 1946a). Additionally, the educational system was to be dissolved and reformed along American lines (FEC 1947, Martin 1948).

The purge, demilitarization of the country, and reformation of the educational system were placed into effect with four policy documents, all which in one way or another became related to budo. The first of these documents is the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, 8 November 1945 which lays down the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The second document is Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction to the Japanese Government (SCAPIN) 548 (4 January 1946) dealing with the Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations. The third document is SCAPIN 550 (4 January 1946), Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office; and lastly, the Far Eastern Commission Policy

Decisions (27 March 1947 and 12 February 1948). These policy decisions are what I hypothesize as the genesis of the “budo ban.”

b. Genesis of the “budo ban.”

(1) Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, 8 November 1945. This document tasks MacArthur to

assure the dissolution of...all Japanese *ultra-nationalistic...societies* and their agencies and affiliates... provide for the permanent dissolution of all military and *para-military organizations...and other militaristic associations which might serve to keep alive the military tradition in Japan....*All military and *para-military training* on land and sea and in the air *will be prohibited....*” and that “*Japanese military and para-military training and drill in all schools will be forbidden*” (Martin, 1948:128-133). [Emphasis added.]

Note that this policy addresses para-military training, not classical martial arts. It is possible that “para-military” training could be over interpreted as “martial art,” thus using this clause used to close down budo dojo and forbid their being taught in school. But could we in all honesty consider fencing, wrestling, boxing, javelin, discus, hammer, and archery as “para-military training?” These sports, analogous to Japanese budo, were military arts in their day and are the foundation of the Olympic games, originally a display of military skill. Nazi Germany taught these Olympic-type sports, plus fencing and marksmanship, to its youth in schools and extra-curricular clubs; they, too, were used as a platform to teach racial superiority. However, these sports were not banned during Germany’s occupation even though the sports and teachers were as full of ultra-nationalistic propaganda as were their Japanese counterparts. What would be the reaction of Americans if these Olympic sports were banned from American schools and

universities on the basis they were “para-military training?” And let us include the epitome of militarism: football; is not football military training and maneuvers?

(2) SCAPIN 548 proclaims:

You will prohibit the formation of any political party, association, society or other organization and any activity on the part of any of them or of any individual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity, is the following:...[para] f. Affording military or quasi-military training, or providing benefits, greater than similar civilian benefits, or special representation for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit in Japan (NARA 1946a).

This clause, too, is subject to interpreting budo as “quasi-military” training, and in fact it was used to dissolve the Dai Nippon Butokukai. SCAPIN 548 included a list of organizations to be dissolved, but the Butokukai escaped mention. However, “the Japanese Government was orally instructed to add the Dai Nippon Butokukai to the list of organizations in appendix A of SCAPIN 548 and to dissolve the organization....” (US Government, 1948:68-69).

(3) SCAPIN 550 quotes the Potsdam Declaration as it instructs:

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

SCAPIN 550 sought to exclude from public office those individuals who were war criminals, career military members, special police, officials of the war ministries, career civil service members, influential members of ultra-nationalistic patriotic societies, other political groups, officers involved in Japanese expansions (i.e., Manchurian

Development Company), governors of occupied territories, and additional militarists and ultra-nationalists who were not previously mentioned—more than likely a catch-all to cover anybody who did not come under the other categories.

Although SCAPIN 550 does not address budo, it was applied to former leaders of the Dai Nippon Butokukai who were declared “purgeable” in that “...all influential members of this association (Dai Nippon Butokukai)...will be treated as falling within the provisions of category “G” (rather than “C”) appendix A, SCAPIN 550” (US Government 1948).

(4) Far Eastern Commission Policy

The Far Eastern Commission (FEC) was composed of representatives of the allied powers and was headquartered in the former Japanese embassy in Washington DC. The FEC wrote policies already outlined in the Potsdam Declaration and the Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP such as, “All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed” (FEC,1947:51). FEC Policy Decision, February 12, 1948: “Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment” is another example of making official acts already accomplished. Appendix 1, Paragraph 10 of this document directs that “Reestablishment of the following should be prohibited:...any military or para-military organizations,” and paragraph 12 instructs “Military training of the civilian population and military instruction in schools should be prohibited” (FEC 1949).

Of all Occupation policies, the only one directly attacking budo is FEC Policy Decision, March 27, 1947: Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System.

This educational reform policy was established to dismantle the propaganda machine which the education system had become. In the policy, the FEC directs that “Classical sports such as Kendo, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned. Physical training should no longer be associated with the SEISHIN KYOIKU” (FEC, 1947:95). Seishin kyoiku is the spiritual forging which is derived from severe or austere budo training.

MacArthur was not kind to the FEC. In MacArthur’s eyes “the Far Eastern Commission [was] ineffective....they usually confined themselves to approving actions which the occupation had already taken on its own initiative” (MacArthur, 1964:335). Therefore, with the FEC’s policy against “classical sports such as Kendo” in mind, we may infer that MacArthur had actually imposed a ban on the martial arts. However, that being the case, the ban would have affected only the “classical sports” taught in the public school system, not the entire budo community.

Harries, speaking to the effect of the SCAP and FEC policies on public schools, provides an indication of how the policies were administered:

*‘Military science halls’ [budo dojo] were to be converted into gymnasia. Any suggestion of military drill was to be eradicated from the bearing of students....Most revealing were the list of **courses ordered deleted from the curriculum**....For elementary school pupils, between the ages of five and eleven, **judo, kendo, kyudo**,...‘Warships’, ‘Play at Soldiers’, ‘Fish Torpedoes’. For secondary pupils: aviation, **halberd practice [naginata]**, Navy March, “Strength of Iron (Kurogane No Chikara) shout of triumph’ [kiai?], **bayonet exercise**, throwing hand grenades (Harries: 64). [Emphasis added.]*

Judo, kendo, and kyudo courses must have been eliminated for secondary pupils also, as these arts were taught beyond the elementary level.

c. Discussion.

Often, writers of history tend to pass on a “falsism” based on other writers’ research, expecting the information to be factual; this phenomenon occurs also within the field of martial arts research and history . Donn Draeger was a highly respected historian, researcher, and practitioner of budo, and is widely considered the most informed researcher of Japanese budo in the English language. Not detracting from Draeger’s mostly factual and scholarly contributions, he did make errors. For example, in Draeger 1996c:46 he states “An unplanned clash between Japanese and Chinese troops near Peking in 1937 spread and developed into general conflict.”

Draeger is citing the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (Kodansha,1993:923), referred to by the Library of Congress book, *Japan—A Country Study* as “an *allegedly* unplanned clash” (LOC, 1994) [Emphasis added]. In opposing Draeger, I take into consideration the Japanese machination of the Manchurian Incident of 1931 in which an attack by Japanese forces against the Chinese was expertly planned by Japanese Army ultra-nationalists then stationed in China. In this event, similar in perspective to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Japanese forces blew up a few meters of South Manchurian Railway Company track (owned by Japan) and blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, providing an excuse to seize the town of Mukden (<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/jptoc>, 1994). Because of precedence and an unending desire to involve the country in a war with China, we must conclude that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a minutely calculated affair. Although a minor point, I am not over-reacting. Remember that many Western

martial artists accept Draeger as the “gospel;” therefore, by showing his inexactitudes or outright errors, we lay a foundation to further dispel his statements about the so-called “budo ban.”

In the same book Draeger gives the false impression that Emilio Bruno was the senior “Western” judo player of the day, calling Bruno “America’s senior Caucasian judo exponent” (1996c:49). In actuality, America’s “true” senior exponent was Warren Lewis, an African-American from Los Angeles who beat Tamura Masato in 1936 (Svinth 1997).

Minor inaccuracies aside, Draeger’s most quoted “falsism” is that the US Occupation authorities banned all martial arts. Usually, this “falsism” is passed on and expanded by other authors who do not investigate any further; the “falsism” then becomes: “the post-war American occupation authorities under General Douglas MacArthur banned judo, aikido, and kendo.” Here are Draeger’s actual quotes on the martial arts ban:

Among the many measures taken by the Allied Powers to eliminate Japan’s potential to wage war was a prohibition of all institutions considered to be “the roots of militarism.” As a result, the Butokukai and its affiliates were disbanded....(Draeger,1996c:48).

This first part of the quote is true. However, the following second part of the quote contains misinformation which has been assumed by others to be true because Draeger wrote it:

Included in the prohibition were classical bujutsu and budo, as well as the modern disciplines. But the Allied Powers were unable to identify precisely the component systems of the modern disciplines, and one such

discipline – karate-do – escaped detection and continued to be openly practiced (Draeger,1996c:48) [emphasis added].

As we have seen in the actual policy statements, there were no prohibitions against “classical bujutsu and budo;” there were prohibitions against “para-military and quasi-military training.” Although Draeger attempts to convey the spirit and the actual enforcement of the policy, he unwittingly creates a new myth: the Allied Powers prohibited all budo. Draeger would have done greater service had he stated that the policies were over interpreted and applied to the martial arts in addition to the targeted “military combat” training which was being instructed to civilians and school children.

d. Purge.

The purge was enacted against all ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations; however, for the sake of this paper we will address only the Butokukai. I believe that it is due to the purge and dissolution of this “Martial Virtue Society” that there is the perception that all budo were proscribed between 1945-1950.

Prior to the Butokukai’s disestablishment it was the senior authority on budo practiced in Japan. The organization was staffed by people from all walks of life with the common interest of preserving the martial arts who believed the budo held values and morals which could not manifest from other types of training. Additionally, preserving the budo assured the continuance of tradition; ergo, Japan. Amongst the staff, there were those who were and were not ultra-nationalists. However, at the assumption of command by the Allies from 1945, all members of the Butokukai were to be banned from public office. The nuance here is similarly applied to Germany: it was impossible not to find a

member of the National Socialist Party amongst post-war occupation public administrators—they were all Nazis; that is, they all belonged to the party whether or not they agreed with its platform. The membership of the Butokukai was similarly composed: some were ultra-nationalists, some were not. Be that as it may, the purge was enacted and prevented many capable administrators from obtaining posts in the post-war Japanese administration.

One such case is that of former justice minister Tokutaro Kimura, who had been barred from obtaining his former position. After being turned down, Kimura obtained the support of the Japanese Prime Minister who wrote a letter to MacArthur. MacArthur responded by refusing Kimura because he held the office of National Director of Dai Nippon Butokukai (MacArthur 1948). Later, Kimura was approved because MacArthur had been convinced that:

Kimura...was not a rightist, but had been merely head of the financing division of Butokukai, a position offered to him 'because of his preeminence as a citizen and his hobbies of fencing and sword collection which of course have nothing to do with militarism and aggression.' This time it worked, SCAP's reverse course had begun and thousands of rightists were being depurged. On October 13, 1950, Kimura was reinstated and became once again justice minister" (Kaplan and Dubro, 1987:89).

However, Kimura was in fact a rightist and ultra-nationalist who worked to organize yakuza support for the government against communism (Kaplan and Dubro 1987).

Due to MacArthur's "soft approach" in exercising SCAP directives, many former ultra-national public officials were not purged as they should have been according to SCAPIN 550, earning MacArthur the scorn of some chroniclers as "being indulgent to

the Japanese militarists and war criminals” (Zhukov, 1975:196). Of course, not everybody considered most Japanese as war criminals, however, there were still the militarists with which to contend. Kaplan and Dubro appear not to agree with MacArthur’s “SCAP policy that let Kodama and other prewar ultra-nationalists back out on the streets and into the elective offices and the corporate boardrooms” (Kaplan and Dubro, 1987:89).

Apparently, MacArthur shared the same reasoning as General George S. Patton, who was crucified by the media for using so many former Nazis during the US occupation of post-war Germany. MacArthur writes:

The Potsdam declaration also contained a purge provision requiring all Japanese who had actively engaged in war to be removed from public office and excluded from political influence. I very much doubted the wisdom of this measure, as it tended to lose the services of many able governmental individuals who would be difficult to replace in the organization of a new Japan. I put the purge into operation with as little harshness as possible....As soon as the peace treaty restored Japan’s full sovereignty, all prohibitions against the purgees were promptly, and properly, removed (MacArthur, 1964:341-2).

e. Budo during the ban.

(1) Karate.

Controversy abounds in reference to karate and the ban. Some researchers conclude that it was banned outright, others say it was banned but received a reprieve. Still, others state that karate was banned but practiced in the form of a dance when occupation troops came around. Let us review the available literature on karate and see if fact can be separated from myth.

According to Draeger, “Allied Powers were unable to identify precisely the component systems of the modern disciplines, and one such discipline – karate-do – escaped detection and continued to be openly practiced” (1996c:48). It is unclear how karate could escape detection since it was formally accepted into the Butokukai in 1935 (Higaonna 1995, Yamazaki 1997), and the Butokukai maintained lists and records of the martial arts broken down by discipline, ranks, and numbers within the ranks.

Howard Reid and Michael Croucher contend that an American commission “concluded that the national martial arts systems had played an important role in the development of nationalistic and militaristic attitudes. Consequently, for a time, the practice of all martial arts except, strangely enough, karate, was banned” (1983:196). Another author passes on the same information about a ban on karate stating that “the U.S. Occupation authorities had banned the practice of all martial arts (with the exception of *karate*)” (Stevens, 1987:51). None of the authors provide a source for his statement, but as noted earlier in this paper Draeger initially established that idea in 1974. Karate appears to have been unaffected by the budo black-out.

Was karate actually banned? This question is answered by Masatoshi Nakayama, former head of the Japan Karate Association, as he explains karate avoided the ban because:

the edict of the GHQ (General headquarters of Allied Powers) was worded in such a way that it included karate as a part of judo. I had a friend who knew the head of the Education Bureau at the Ministry of Education, and he helped us convince the allied powers that karate was not part of judo at all. Using the premise that karate was actually a form of Chinese boxing—a sport—we received permission to practice. The GHQ thought karate was just a harmless pastime! So, while the other

martial arts had to wait until the ban was lifted in 1948, we were able to practice and progress” (Hassell, 1983:47).

Nakayama’s statement is convenient, however, his memory may have been influenced by time and the retelling of a myth. Judo and karate were not in the verbiage of the policy documents, therefore, it is difficult to explain how karate could become confused with judo; with the exception that they both wore white uniforms. However, as pointed out earlier, the policies were apparently subject to broad interpretation as to what constituted “para-military training.”

Other karate experts believe that karate was such an unknown budo at the time that it escaped because GHQ simply did not recognize it as a martial art (Iguchi 1998). A Japan-wide ban on budo was in fact enacted upon the public schools by the Monbusho at the urging [read: “orders”] of GHQ as part of the educational reform (Futaki et al., 1994:209). If karate were part of the official educational curriculum it could have been mixed in with the “ban;” however, karate in Japan was only being taught in universities as extra-curricular activities and had no formal support from the government. Because karate was not part of the Japanese Monbusho curriculum it naturally was not included in the ban (Iguchi 1998). However, to-de (the original reading of “kara-te,” the Chinese characters meaning Chinese Fist) was being taught in Okinawan schools as early as 1905 (Higaonna, 1995:21), and in April 1933 it had become recognized within the educational curriculum of Okinawa (Higaonna, 1995:70). Since karate was recognized by the Butokukai in 1935 (Higaonna, 1995:70; Yamazaki, 1997:35) and was entered into the list of “official budo,” it is possible that American occupation forces could have confused

karate with judo practice, at least in Okinawa, and that it may have been included in the Monbusho decree.

George Van Horn, a Chito Ryu karate sensei, stated that Chitose sensei related to him that “[Chitose] and his peers would in fact get together and train, but when the Occupation military police happened by, their kata would suddenly become [sic] an Okinawan “dance.” In this manner, they could train without being caught violating the law, since Okinawan dance and kata have many similarities” (Colling, 1996:35). Unfortunately Van Horn does not relate to Colling when, during the occupation, this episode allegedly happened.

Enough information is presented to support the hypothesis that the “ban” may have been, in the case of karate, enacted on a regional case-by-case basis: that while allowed in Japan, karate was still proscribed in its country of origin: Okinawa.

(2) Kyudo.

Mr. David Chambers intimated to me that in 1970 he was returning from Kamakura’s Hachiman Shrine with Onuma Hideharu sensei when the subject of the ‘budo ban’ came up. Onuma sensei was the 15th headmaster of Heiki Ryu archery, a Japanese archery master (hanshi), and an Olympic archery coach. Onuma sensei told Chambers, “Kyudo was banned; however, I was able to have an audience with General MacArthur and I explained that kyudo is little different than Western archery—not a ‘martial art.’ The next day I was able to open my dojo again” (Chambers 1998).

“In 1946-47 SCAP...had a command performance to see if they would allow horseriding archery again, after it was banned for being part of state Shinto, which was

felt to have been a detrimental influence on prewar Japan” (Muromoto, 1997:61).

Unfortunately, Muromoto does not relay the SCAP decision. It is probable that Onuma was part of the performance because of his exalted position within the Japanese archery world and was highly respected as a dismounted archer and yabusame archer (Onuma and DeProspero, 1993).

(3) Judo.

Almost all references to the “budo ban” include judo as a subject of restriction, as in this classic Draeger quote, “The prohibition against carrying on martial arts and ways declared by SCAP in 1945 included judo and resulted in its technical stagnation....[J]udo was finally reinstated in 1947” (Draeger, 1996c:123). Harrison, the noted jujutsu and judo practitioner from the early part of the twentieth century, follows along Draeger’s line and tells us that:

“Following the surrender of Japan and the assumption of virtually autocratic powers by General MacArthur, a ban was imposed upon the practice of judo. Later this shortsighted measure was relaxed but judo teaching was restricted to the Kodokan whose premises, as already stated, had amazingly escaped the almost wholesale devastation inflicted on the capital by Allied air attack” (Harrison, 1958:83).

It is possible that Harrison at that time may have been operating out of a vacuum, and relied on information brought back from Japan. At the time of writing he had not been in Japan for over a score of years. Harrison does not give the date when practice was again allowed and may, in fact been confusing the educational system ban with an “all out” ban.

Another view establishing that budo was not banned outright was written by the noted Buddhist scholar and author Christmas Humphries, who was attending the Tokyo War Trials as a news correspondent. He documents that after his arrival in Japan on 3 February 1946, judo was being publicly displayed in front of a group of American servicemen.

I attended a great display of Judo in Tokyo....It was quite terrific, and I was deeply moved by the tremendous spiritual force displayed....(O)ne of the girl pupils persisting in her attempt at a tummy throw until she got it. Imagine the cheers from about 2,000 American G.I.s!...I also attended a special display of Kendo with my Japanese friend, Mr. Tateno...For the moment, Kendo is barred from the schools as a "military art." May it soon return for, like English boxing, it lets off steam in vigorous youngsters and teaches control in muscle, temper and mind" (Humphries, 1948:44).

Because Humphries was actually on the ground soon after Japan's surrender, his statement must be given stronger consideration than that of Harrison's.

Stronger yet is Walter E. Todd (judo 7th dan), who puts this particular part of the myth to bed for good. He tells us, "I was sent to Japan. I arrived the autumn of 1945....Abe sensei...registered me at the Kodokan. In a minute, he had me in the dojo, starting my initial lesson in judo. This was close to the end of 1945 or the start of 1946" (Heard and Davey, 1997:32). Todd's statement conclusively indicates that judo was not proscribed in the private dojo, outside of the public schools.

Apparently the British military in post-war Singapore did not have the same reservations against "para-military training" as did the Americans and allowed their Japanese prisoners of war to practice judo and sumo. Jack Dallaway wrote from Singapore, "One Sunday I obtained permission to visit a Japanese P.O.W. camp hoping

to see a good display of Judo. Unfortunately, Judo was not practised at all, owing to the difficulty of obtaining jackets and mats. ‘Sumo’ proved to be very popular” (London Budokwai, 1947:3).

(4) Aiki-jujutsu.

Aiki-jujutsu, an earlier form of the softened *aikido*, was not taught in public school, yet it appears to have been repressed—to a certain degree. Therefore, because of the impact on aiki-jujutsu we may infer that other *kobudo* [ancient martial school traditions] could have been likewise affected. Another source confirming that budo were being taught during the alleged ban emanate from Hugh Davey, whose father Victor H. Davey—a jujutsu practitioner since 1925—studied aiki-jujutsu in Japan during the occupation:

Due to the efforts of Captain [Victor H.] Davey, the Saigo family’s standard of living was raised considerably. Perhaps out of gratitude, or as a way of avoiding the occupying force’s ban on the practice of bujutsu/budo, Saigo Kenji agreed to teach Davey Saigo Ryu [aikijujutsu]. (Logically, Captain Davey would have taken steps to allow Saigo to continue to teach quietly, on a limited basis, despite the fact that the practice of Japan’s martial arts and ways had generally been banned) (Davey,1997:58).

(5) Kendo.

“Classical sports such as Kendo, which encourage the martial spirit, should be totally abandoned. Physical training should no longer be associated with the SEISHIN KYOIKU” (FEC, 1947:95).

Thus, kendo—the senior Japanese budo—seems to have taken the full brunt of the so-called ban because of the patriotic fervor applied to it, and emanating from it. The initial prohibition policy apparently affected kendo and other budo (under the moniker “para-military training”) *only within the public school system*. Nonetheless, the ban

evidently overflowed from the public schools into the private dojo; again, possibly because of an over interpretation of of the “para-military” clauses in the former cited SCAP policies. Extrapolating from MacArthur’s earlier observation that the FEC only approved actions which he had already taken (MacArthur, 1964:335), we should give careful consideration to the probability that MacArthur had already singled out kendo for removal from the public school curriculum.

Other researchers have recorded their assessments of the prohibition against practicing kendo and other budo. Minoru Kiyota explains in his book *Kendo*, that “[a]fter occupying the defeated nation, General Douglas MacArthur... outlawed kendo...on the grounds that [it] had contributed to nationalism and militarism” (Kiyota 1997). Another author tells the reader that “[a]lso prohibited for a time were the martial arts; *kendo* sword-training and *judo* clubs were closed down.” (Horsley and Buckley, 1990:20).

There can be no doubt that kendo was prohibited. However, I again assert that the prohibition was directed against kendo being taught in the public school system. If there was a “total shut-down” of kendo it must have derived from an overreaction to the Ministry of Education’s policy (under direction of SCAP) banning budo training in school.

In actuality, kendo was being openly taught although occupation forces were going to various ex-military dojo (and assumably school dojo) to systematically destroy the training equipment (Hazard 1998).

The overall implication of historical data categorically states kendo was banned during the occupation. However, that is not an accurate account. Why, then, do we not read of kendo being taught during the ban? Again, Draeger provided the initial confusion and misinformation upon this subject. He tells us that:

...in 1947 the Allied Powers authorized the retention of several classical bujutsu...as methods of self-defense necessary in the training of Japanese policemen within the greatly decentralized police force. In the following year *kendo and judo were also reinstated* as desirable training disciplines for the members of the skeleton law-enforcement agency; and, given a sport emphasis, these same modern disciplines were also made available to the general public.” (Draeger, 1996c:48). [Emphasis added.]

This paragraph is completely incorrect. In the first sentence Draeger states that bujutsu was retained for police use in 1947, implying incorrectly that Japanese police were not practicing kendo prior to 1947. The police were actively and openly training in kendo from 1945 (Hazard 1998). 1947 was the year kendo was *allowed* to be openly taught (Hazard 1998; Nakamura, 1995:276), not 1948 as Draeger concludes.

Supporting the mistaken view that “kendo was retained for the police in 1947,” J. Svinth relays I.I. Morris’ opinion that “SCAP allowed kendo training to resume because it wanted strikebreakers trained in the use of sticks” (Svinth 1998). The mention of strikebreakers probably refers to the May Day strike in 1949 and if so, Morris’ theory seems to go in tandem with Draeger’s. Both assert that kendo was banned until its use was required for police activity.

However, Benjamin Hazard, Ph.D. (kendo kyoshi, 7th dan) states that both Draeger and Svinth (ergo, Morris) are wrong. The Japanese police openly trained in kendo from 1945 with SCAP’s tacit approval. Hazard, then a Military Intelligence lieutenant and

Japanese language specialist, trained with the Tsukiji Police during the time Draeger et al imply the police were not training in kendo. For a short time in 1948 the police were affected by the kendo moratorium; however, Hazard and his senior teacher would meet privately for lessons. During the first lesson there were only the two; thereafter, participation slowly increased to four, then six, then eight people—until once again there was full-blown kendo training going on. The fact that Hazard was a POW interrogator and member of the military intelligence community provided a legitimacy to the ongoing kendo training and his participation was not questioned by SCAP authorities; however, Hazard always felt that he would eventually be called upon the carpet for instigating the continuance of kendo (Hazard 1998).

According to Hazard, Communist strikers on 1 May 1949 disarmed Japanese police who were using 4 foot staffs for crowd control. The US Provost Marshal (PMO), not knowing the difference between *keijo* [police staff] and kendo, attributed the Japanese police force's crowd control inadequacy to their training in kendo. Blaming kendo as the problem, the PMO prohibited the police from training in kendo and arranged for New York City police trainers to teach Japanese police the use of the night stick. Because Hazard was training in kendo with the Tsukiji Police, he was also required to attend night stick training (Hazard 1998).

Another piece of misinformation comes again from Draeger, stating “[w]ith the Korean War, the ban on both classical and modern disciplines was officially removed...” (Draeger, 1996c:49). Rosenberg also incorrectly paints the picture that “...with the intensification of the Cold War, the approaching “fall” of China and war in Korea, and

the emergence of Japan as a new ally, MacArthur dropped the martial arts ban” (Rosenberg, 1995:19-20).

As we have seen in previous paragraphs, kendo (ergo, other budo) was allowed to be publically taught in 1947 with the distinction of “not being kendo.” Its new name became *shinai kyogi* [bamboo-sword competition] and the emphasis shifted from budo to pure sport. “[S]ome evidence exists to suggest that many martial systems were influenced by the American presence. Kendo re-emerged in the 1950s in an even more rule-bound and competitive form than it had been before 1945....” (Reid and Croucher, 1983:196).

An article in the Japan Martial Arts Society journal provides a filler to Reid and Croucher’s mention of the “sportification” of kendo:

After the defeat, kendo and the other budo were suppressed by the Occupation but this negative attitude slowly changed as more of the Occupation troops became interested in them. In an attempt to placate Western tastes, some kendo teachers devised a form of *shinai* [bamboo training sword] training that somewhat resembled fencing. The traditional training uniform (*keiko-gi*) were replaced and *kiai* [combative shouts] vocalizations were suppressed. This so-called “*shinai-kyogi*” (bamboo-sword competition) was supposed to encourage individualism and “democratic values” and continued to be practiced for sometime. With the end of the foreign occupation, local dojo again opened and true kendo gradually regained to its former popularity....The mainstay of support for the art of kendo today is the public school system and the Ministry of Education, whose emphasis is to promote it as a sport. Meanwhile, the police department and local private dojo continue to be active centers of a more traditional budo attitude of physical and spiritual training” (JMAS, 1984:6).

It was only after the Treaty of San Francisco (1951), returning administrative control to Japan, less Okinawa, that the budo were once again included in the public

school curriculum (Iguchi 1998). This was the renaissance of the true budo, now authorized to be taught in school.

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Enough evidence is presented that indicates the “budo ban” was only enforced periodically or by geographic location.

f. Alternative reason for the ban?

Could there be an alternative reason for the “budo ban” other than trying to make Japan safe for democracy? It has been suggested that the ban against budo was enacted to protect the repatriated Japanese soldiers from their brethren (Foeller 1998), so let us explore the possibility.

It is true that the Japanese placed great hope and store in their military leaders until their defeat in 1945, but how was the populace’s reaction after the war? MacArthur says that “[i]dolatry for their feudalistic masters and the warrior class was transformed into hatred and contempt...” (MacArthur, 1964:355). We can assume that the Japanese were disappointed, and they did hate and hold in contempt the Imperial military man, but would they go to extremes in segregating for abuse those battle-hardened men? Tom Foeller and John Allison seem to think so. Foeller, in his correspondence to me on 13 January 1998, states that Allison, now a retired army general, was “the de facto Chief Financial Officer of Japan” during the occupation.

Relaying my question to Allison about the “budo ban,” Allison states the “budo ban” was implemented for the good of the repatriated Japanese soldiers who were treated with more disdain by their countrymen than were our post-Vietnam soldiers.

As the returning soldiers and sailors returned to their homeland, they were totally disarmed by the occupying troops, right along with the civilian populace. That, however, did not protect the returning military from their hostile civilian brother and sisters who, using various martial art-forms...did damage whenever and wherever they could....John Allison then did the only sensible thing that he could do; he issued an edict via military channels that no practice of simulated swordplay or any other martial arts were to be permitted by anyone, even in a dojo (Foeller 1998).

Allison doubts that there were any old military or Japanese records dealing directly with the history and enforcement of the martial art prohibition. He adds that many such events and policies were deliberately not memorialized in official documents as, in keeping with Japanese wishes, the shame of the general population striking out at the returning military was not something the Emperor wanted written into the history books (Foeller 1998).

As interesting a tangent as this explanation is, it must be held in further abeyance until more research brings data to light. Therefore, although I do not discount Allen’s views, I feel that the available evidence supports the concept that budo were banned in an attempt to demilitarize the Japanese.

A corollary thought is that the combination of the martial arts ban, plus the post-war hatred of the military has engendered the current Japanese disdain for the military, to include their Self-Defense Force (except, of course when the SDF is saving the public

from earthquake and typhoon damage). Of course, further research along this tangent would benefit social anthropologists, and should be undertaken.

4. CHAPTER 3 CONCLUSION.

A great dichotomy appears to exist in whether or not there was a ban. One side of the divide indicates there was no ban on martial arts, only on “para-military” or “quasi-military” training. The other side of the schism forces the reader to go beyond intent and look at the actual effect; that is, a moritorium on the practice of budo did occur. This issue is further compounded by levels of disagreement upon the moritorium. In this chapter both Dr. Hazard and Mr. Todd proclaim that classical martial ways were being taught during the “ban” in open sessions. Mr. Davey gives evidence that bujutsu training occurred in secret, “allow[ing] Saigo to continue to teach quietly, on a limited basis, despite the fact that the practice of Japan’s martial arts and ways had generally been banned” (Davey,1997:58).

Yet another view, again provided by Davey, states that there was a total blackout on the martial arts; whereas a dissenting opinion asserts that the proscription affected only the public school system:

My father told me that all budo/bujutsu activities were banned—everywhere—period...Todd sensei, on the other hand, insists that budo was only banned in the schools...not private dojo. Sato Shizuya Sensei seems to agree with my dad, but adds that it was possible to get around the ban. (Obviously...since my dad was practicing aiki-jujutsu with Saigo Sensei, as well as teaching his own judo classes to US military guys, and all this took place during the SCAP ban.)” (Davey, 1997).

Overall, sufficient evidence is presented to proclaim without reservation that there was a de facto, if not de jure, proscription on martial arts. However the so called “budo

ban” did not affect the authorized teaching of kendo and judo outside of the public school system. Apparently the ban did not have much of an effect on practicing other martial arts, although they were taught in a surreptitious fashion.

Also, one must point out that whereas kendo and judo were being taught publicly, they were removed from the public school system. While the proscription may have overflowed to the other budo, martial arts were in abeyance only until 1947 when kendo was allowed to be taught outside the police dojo.

Overall, the intent to expurge the teaching of bushido and seishin tanren from Japanese society was ineffective as there was no lasting impact as a result of the two years abeyance. Conversely, I ascertain that the “budo ban” was a boon to the post-war growth and internationalization of Japanese budo; that this growth was husbanded by the serious martial artists who believed in the purity of budo; and that this growth and internationalization of budo was the direct result of US servicemen who developed an interest in budo during the occupation years.

Further Research

Although I have gathered sources from many different facets of history to reach my conclusion, I realize that gaps my research are present. In order to maintain objectivity, I actively seek the assistance of others to clarify or expand upon my research. A quest for further clarification to what is presented in this paper is solicited so that a fuller understanding of the actual ban on martial arts may be provided. While I have been unable to locate any policy in Japanese or English that expressly forbids classical bujutsu, budo, or the modern budo, that is not to say these policies do not exist.

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