This paper argues that a number of entrenched posthumanist positions are seriously flawed as a result of their dependence on a technical interpretive approach that creates more problems than it solves. During the course of our discussion we consider in particular the question of personhood. After all, until we can determine what it means to be a person we cannot really discuss what it means to improve a person. What kinds of enhancements would even constitute improvements? This in turn leads to an examination of the technical model of analysis and the recurring tendency to approach notions like personhood using this technical model. In looking to sketch a Heideggerian account of personhood, we are reaffirming what we take to be a Platonic skepticism concerning technical models of inquiry when it comes to certain subjects. Finally we examine the question as to whether the posthumanist looks to apply technologys benefits in ways that we have reflectively determined to be useful or desirable or whether it is technology itself (or to speak as Heidegger would the essence of technology) which prompts many posthumanists to rely on an excessively reductionist view of the human being.
O'Brien, Mahon James
"THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY: HEIDEGGER, PERSONHOOD AND TECHNOLOGY,"
2, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol2/iss2/7