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The Bill Casey Award

The Bill Casey Memorial Fund annually awards $100.00 to the author of the best article, story, or poem appearing in each volume of San Jose Studies. Friends and relatives of Bill Casey, a faculty member at San Jose State University from 1962 to 1966, established the fund at his death to encourage creative writing and scholarship. The recipient of each award is selected by the Committee of Trustees of San Jose Studies.

The Bill Casey Award in Letters for 1980 has been presented to

Milton Loventhal and Jennifer McDowell

for their article

"The Stalin Resolutions and the Road to World War II"

The Committee of Trustees also awarded a one year subscription to San Jose Studies to the author of the best work (exclusive of the Bill Casey winner) published in the categories of (1) poetry, (2) fiction, and (3) articles. The 1980 recipients of these awards are:

Poetry
Frances M. Malpezzi, whose poetry appeared in May, 1980.

Fiction

Articles
James Steel Smith, whose article "Straw: Symbol, Beauty, Play" (with photographs by Tom Tramel) appeared in February, 1980.
This article is the second in a series on the Stalin Resolutions. In the November 1980 issue of San Jose Studies, the authors outlined the history of the Stalin Resolutions and described the physical characteristics of the documents.
THE Stalin resolutions are a portion of the secret archives of the Soviet Union’s highest governing body, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The originals of which these documents are copies are held in the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the archive which holds the most sensitive Soviet material. The documents provide the public with its first full-length, in-depth view of the Soviet leadership at work formulating policy unconstrained, spontaneous, and candid, giving its unique perspectives on the world and its unvarnished reactions. They answer many of the public’s questions about the Politburo’s inner workings, and allow the public to observe Soviet policy formed in the crucible of a dangerous period.

This direct view of Soviet decision-making at the highest level, an entrancing window on the communist world, is undoubtedly the only one at this level, and of this degree of continuity, the world public will ever have. Though it is a product of the Stalin period (and an expression of one of the most powerful dictators of all time), the material is very much alive in the Russia of today: it is a part of the political matrix out of which the present-day rulers emerged; it presents views which are staples in current Soviet political thinking; and it contains prophetic elements which shed a brilliant light on current Soviet maneuvering.
In dealing with documents as potentially important as the Stalin resolutions, the major problem to be addressed is the question of authenticity. To solve this problem, the editors devised a methodology that would explore the external and internal evidence relative to the documents. It was the objective of the editors to reach a decision as to whether the documents were or were not valid expressions of the decisions, motives, and observations of the Politburo, and whether the style, terminology, and formal features of the documents were consistent with Soviet usage.

The Methodology

To test the documents' validity, methodological techniques were developed that would take into account the special problems posed by the nature of the material, problems that are essentially four in number: (1) the question of origin; (2) the question of transmission; (3) the characteristics of the Politburo as seen in the documents; and (4) the documents' contents. The following outline formulates in detail the specific issues raised by each of these problem areas:

1. The question of origin
   a. Is the material a forgery?
   b. Is the material a Soviet distortion?
   c. Is the material authentic?
   d. Is the material a mixture of authentic and forged documents?

2. The question of transmission
   a. What were the dates of transmission?
   b. What channels were used to transmit the documents?
   c. What persons were involved in the transmission of the documents?

3. Questions raised by the technical characteristics of the Politburo as evidenced in the documents
   a. The number of Politburo meetings per year
   b. The number of Politburo meetings per day
   c. The days of the week on which the Politburo met
   d. Politburo meetings on holidays and Party Congress days
   e. The relative number of Politburo meetings in vacation months
   f. The length of the average Politburo resolution
   g. The number of hours per Politburo meeting and time devoted to foreign policy
   h. The channels of communication and policy

4. Questions raised by the documents' contents
   a. How does the terminology and style compare with available, official documents?
   b. Is there an underlying unity with respect to concerns and ideology?
   c. Is there new material in the documents?
   d. Is there strength in the definable subject areas?
   e. Is there integrity in the single document?
The first practical problem to be dealt with in formulating a methodology was the problem of time and resources available to the private scholars conducting the study. It was clear that all of the points noted in the above outline could not be given equal attention and that certain questions would have to be assigned a higher priority. It would be necessary to select problems that could be studied adequately, within the parameters of available time and resources, and at the same time preserve the objective of the study. It was decided that a concentration on internal problems (listed in points 1, 3 and 4) was the appropriate solution: major research efforts would be concentrated on these areas. Due attention would be given to the extrinsic questions raised in point 2, but it was clear that a careful study of the internal questions would yield a satisfactory verdict on the question of validity—indeed independently of confirmation via the study of transmission.

The next problem to require solution was the nature of the approach to be adopted with regard to the internal problems: what was to provide the basis of research? Was research to proceed from a sampling of the documents, or to be grounded in a comprehensive study of the total set? In view of the nature of the documents, an overall approach was chosen, since it left open avenues of inquiry inaccessible in a sampling approach: it preserved the basic unity of the documents, and hence the continuity and cumulative effect; it permitted the retention of large subjects and themes and enabled bias to be discerned; it enabled researchers to analyze one document within the context of the entire set of documents.

Having decided on an overall approach as the best means of testing the documents, the entire set was translated. A comprehensive working index of 20,000 items was derived to provide quick access to the material. The index served as a basic, vital key to the material, opening to view the wealth of complexity and detail. With the aid of the index, it became possible to visualize in the clearest terms the most feasible approaches to the documents.

A number of approaches to the material suggested themselves: the day-to-day study of foreign policy, the detailed study of internal policy (five percent of the material is concerned with internal affairs), a comparative linguistic analysis, the analysis of technical characteristics of the Politburo, detailed analyses of various subject areas, and in-depth analyses of the single document (i.e., the exegesis of selected documents).

The approach adopted, after lengthy deliberation, was essentially eclectic in nature, i.e., a methodology that provided the most comprehensive access to the material and at the same time conformed to the actual conditions of research. This approach rests on four basic assumptions, the first of which is related to the characteristics of the Politburo, and the final three to the documents' contents. The assumptions are as follows:

1. The technical-organizational aspects of the documents (see parts 3, a-h, outline of problems) should accord with the pertinent facts as these have been established over the years.

2. The style and terminology should bear many points of similarity with
available official documents, such as the resolutions of the congresses of the Party and the Communist International, published Politburo resolutions, published laws, etc.—a comparison necessitated by the fact that there is no body of Politburo resolutions on foreign policy available for study.

3. It is evident that the problem of selection (i.e., Were the subjects presented accurately in the documents? Were the points of information and ideological concerns accurate?) would be insurmountable to any person outside the highest circles of power in the USSR in the 1930s, unless this person had constant access to genuine Politburo material. The small and large concerns of Stalin and the Politburo recorded in the resolutions, the various subject areas covered, and the various emphases should therefore accord with the facts that have become known over the more than four decades of research on the Soviet Union. In other words, forgers would ultimately reveal themselves in the material they selected, but genuine material would contain the real policy concerns of the USSR with the proper emphases.

4. Considering the purported origin and direction of the Stalin resolutions, the material should reveal a high degree of complexity and sophistication. Any one document should therefore contain numerous implications and ramifications such that it should be possible to visualize each document essentially as an iceberg, having a small area visible above the surface, and a large area accessible only through research. In other words, genuine material would be rich and pregnant with complex and detailed information. Forged material would inevitably be thin and sterile—in the long run.

Means of working on the documents were accordingly devised to test the characteristics and contents of the material in terms of these assumptions.

The technical-organizational aspects were studied to deal with questions concerning structural features and formal routines of the Politburo represented in the documents. This was accomplished by a painstaking check of every known relevant source, including Soviet material in the form of the collected works of Lenin and Stalin, recent Soviet works on Lenin (articles and books), Trotsky's writings and archives, accounts by former Soviet officials, and scholarly research. The result was a partial picture of certain formal features which was then compared with corresponding features in the documents.

Style and terminology were studied by means of word and phrase analysis, by comparison with other authentic documents, and by submitting the entire set of documents (including the NKID correspondence) to a bilingual scholar, Xenia J. Eudin, who has worked with Soviet and Comintern material for over a quarter of a century.

The other assumptions—concerning selection, complexity, and sophistication—guided the formulation of the two further methods used to test the documents' contents. These methods of testing comprise the major portion of the total research and essentially consist of two distinct forms of analysis that rely on assumptions 3 and 4 above.

One form of analysis focuses on the subject area. In this approach, certain of the important subject areas present in the documents were drawn forth and
summarized through a process of tracing out all relevant data. The resulting picture was then compared with the views of specialists in the pertinent areas. While the heart of this method is the question of selection, the complexity and sophistication of the material was also traced in detail. The following summary formulates the essential elements in the subject approach:

1. Chronology can be studied with reference to policy development.
2. The pattern of selection (given the high probability of error due to the general low level of research on the Soviet Union at that time) can be ascertained from the perspective of over four decades.
3. Past and future events relative to the subject areas can be linked in a general way.
4. The complexity of the documents as a whole can be grasped in tracing the myriad threads which form the structure of each subject.

Analyses were carried out on the following subjects: Maxim Litvinov, the Stalin Reports, the relationship between the Comintern and the Politburo, the Soviet entrance into the League of Nations, and decision-making at the Politburo level.

The second type of analysis focused on the single document. Here, the assumption that each document of necessity would contain numerous implications and ramifications (reflecting the complexity of Soviet policy though without explicit statement in view of the intended readership), required the exegesis of key documents. Such exegesis was expected to bring latent structures to the surface so that the intrinsic strength of these structures (and hence of the entire document) could be tested. Documents actually selected were chosen on the basis of their potential significance. The following summary formulates the essential elements in the "single document" approach:

1. Careful study of chronology.
2. The intermeshing of events and the way in which the Politburo dealt with its policy responsibilities.
3. A detailed linking of past and future events and the various sequels or outcomes to the events portrayed in any one document.
4. A close examination of style and terminology.
5. The transection of several subject areas within the document and the determination of whether these subjects are represented in a convincing way.

Analyses were carried out on the resolutions dated May 24, June 10, and December 4, 1934. The issue of unity with respect to policy concerns and ideology was probed, the presence of new material was highlighted, and foreign and internal policy information was verified.

It was in addition apparent that forgers would inevitably leave traces of their motivations, whether monetary or political. Forgers working for money over this long a period of time would certainly not increase the length of the documents, since German intelligence paid a fixed amount per document, yet the length of the resolutions increased by about 15% from 1934 to 1935. This would mean the forgers were working needlessly for less money in 1935.

With regard to political motivation, it is apparent that forgers working for
political reasons do so in support of a cause and do not include material which seriously undermines the cause they are supporting. Yet the Stalin documents, which are heart and soul in favor of the interests of the Soviet state, placing them paramount and primary, contain material which is at times so brutally frank that, if it fell into the hands of outsiders, would do serious damage to the Soviet cause.

While the major research efforts concentrated on internal problems, the extrinsic problem of transmission was not ignored. As much information as possible was accumulated through correspondence with former German officials who received the material and through study of source material. Facts that have become known were used to test all hypotheses.

By the application of these various tests to the Stalin resolutions, the researchers were able to arrive at a judgment as to the authenticity of the material—regardless of the improbable nature of the acquisition and transmission of documents of this kind. As a result of the careful examination carried out over a lengthy period, the researchers were able to conclude that the Stalin resolutions are, indeed, authentic. A major and unique cache of documents, they constitute the most accurate and revealing information we have about the inner workings of the Politburo during a crucial era of the world’s history.

A Selection of the Stalin Resolutions

All major nations of the world publish some portion of their archives. Democratic states make the major part of their archives for a given year available after a specified interval. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, and in other communist countries, only highly selected portions of the archives are ever released to the public. The material that is released is considered “safe” from a political and military standpoint. The overwhelming majority of sensitive material never reaches beyond the inner circle.

While the publication of material from the archives of any nation before a sufficiently long interval has elapsed can be embarrassing to that nation (for internal or foreign policy reasons), if a country keeps large quantities of information away from its public as is the case in all the communist countries, then the information contained in the archives becomes a matter of much interest whatever the elapsed time period. The fact that only highly sanitized versions of events are released to the public in communist countries stimulates great curiosity about the true picture.

Because of this passion for secrecy in communist countries, secret archive material from any communist country has interest value. If, accordingly, secret archive material is obtained which emanates from the major communist country of the world—Soviet Russia—and in addition emanates from the highest governing body of that country—the Politburo—and includes material directly from the “supreme leader” of that country—then we have material that is of the highest significance. Material from this level has rarely been
made available to outsiders throughout the history of the Soviet Union, and such
quantities as have been released over the years are quite small.

The following twenty-one resolutions, translated from the Russian by the
editors, are based on reports given to the Politburo by Stalin. These resolutions
form the core of the 247 Stalin documents. They express Stalin’s views most
directly and contain some of the most interesting material in the 247
documents. Italicized material is preserved as in the original manuscript.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU (b) of May 24, 1934

Having heard in its extraordinary meeting of May 24, 1934, Comrade J. V.
Stalin’s report “On the Reconsideration of the Basic Premises of the General
Line of the CPSU(b),” the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous con­
clusion that the international political and economic situation compels the
party leadership to adopt a fundamental decision which, with all its exceptional
importance, must remain absolutely secret from all comrades, with the ex­
ception of responsible officials of the central party organs. The Politburo
CPSU(b) considers it necessary that all measures be adopted to prevent any
publicity with regard to the present resolution even in the form of vague rumors
and “confidential whisperings.”

The Politburo CPSU(b) cannot but express its admiration for the straightforwardness of Comrade Stalin who has the courage to draw political and
tactical conclusions which might, at first superficial glance, seem an open
betrayal of the principles and ideas of communism. Considering it impossible,
for tactical considerations, to publicize these conclusions widely, the Politburo
CPSU(b) cannot but acknowledge them as entirely correct conclusions which
are, under present conditions, the only way out of the situation in which the
Party and the Soviet Union find themselves.

The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to the first thesis of Comrade Stalin’s
report, that the CPSU(b) must temporarily reject its innermost ideological
essence in order to preserve and strengthen its political power over the country.
The Soviet government must, for a time, cease being communist in its acts and
measures, having as its sole aim that of being a stable and strong power, basing
itself on the broad masses of the people in the event of threat from without.

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to the second thesis of Comrade Stalin’s
report, that under the conditions of encirclement by capitalist
states which are armed to the teeth, and have in addition a tendency to go
through a prolonged stage of fascist political and social pseudo-revolutions
(which slow down the historical process, whose final stage is the world com­
munist revolution), the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government must reckon with
the compelling necessity of “the postponement” of the world triumph of
communism and opportunely carry out a difficult maneuver of retreat within
the country for the strengthening of its resistance to a possible external attack.

The Politburo CPSU(b) fully approves of the third thesis of Comrade Stalin’s
report, that the world communist movement must remain ideologically, tac-
tically, and organizationally intact, becoming a mighty weapon in the hands of Soviet foreign policy and remaining an enormous reservoir of communist cadres for the future decisive offensive against world capital. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that the rank-and-file fighters for the communist revolution by no means must know about the tactical retreat of the CPSU(b), whose leadership is obligated, in good time, to attend to a suitable, and ideologically precise, formulation of a new general line of the Party.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of October 21, 1934

Having heard in its meeting of October 21, 1934, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation, the Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously expresses itself in favor of a firm and steadfast effecting of the foreign political line planned by the leader of the world proletariat. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully and unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view concerning the tasks directly confronting the Soviet Union's foreign policy at the present moment, and comes to the conclusion that it lies within the limits of possibility of Soviet diplomacy to achieve as early as the immediate future, the goal set by Comrade Stalin.

The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to the comrade reporter's main thesis that the immediate danger to the USSR of war on two fronts can be considered removed. Thanks to the skillful maneuvering of Soviet diplomacy, Japan has been deprived of the possibility of commencing armed conflict with the Soviet Union at the present moment, and has been compelled to concentrate all her attention upon the problem of an agreement with the USA and Great Britain in the matter of naval armaments. Germany, unexpectedly confronted with the threat of open conflict with Italy, and compelled to reckon with a threat still more dangerous for itself—a Franco-Italian alliance—is experiencing a sharp crisis in its foreign policy and is showing an obvious tendency to substitute the Rosenberg plan of eastern expansion with another plan of expansion, carefully worked out by General Staff specialists, toward the south and southeastern direction, toward Trieste and Fiume as well as toward Constantinople.

The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view concerning the necessity of again raising, on an international scale, the problem of the conclusion of a system of pacts of security and mutual assistance, having the aim of insuring, in the first place, the inviolability of the far eastern and western frontiers of the Soviet Union. The Politburo CPSU(b) will permit complete freedom of initiative to the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy, insofar as the realization of the basic task mentioned above can be facilitated. The Politburo CPSU(b) recommends to the NKID, while firmly supporting in the Far East the policy of rapprochement and collaboration with the USA, and while attempting to establish foreign political contact with Great Britain, that it avoid excessive and exclusive dependence of the USSR on any grouping of powers in the sphere of European politics. The Politburo CPSU(b) believes it especially desirable that the USSR appear in the role of intermediary between France and Germany, as well as between Germany and the Little Entente. In
the event of an obvious turn in German foreign policy toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union, the Politburo CPSU(b) emphatically proposes to the NKID that it not reject the German card in NKID’s diplomatic game, all the more so since the presence of such a card must inevitably compel France and the Little Entente to move toward a faster conclusion of a defensive alliance with the USSR. Furthermore, the Politburo CPSU(b) emphasizes that it fully shares Comrade Stalin’s view that a pact of five powers would be the most suitable solution for the USSR of the problem of the security of its western frontiers, insofar as this pact would acquire the character of a guarantee pact. Reckoning, however, on the possibility of further sharpening of contradictions among the individual European power groupings, the Politburo CPSU(b) considers it a direct and basic obligation of all NKID organs that they see to it that the sharpening of contradictions should concern the southeastern and southern centers of disagreement and not Eastern Europe.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of October 31, 1934

Having heard in its meeting of October 31, 1934, Comrade Stalin’s report on the tactics of the CPSU(b) applicable to the present foreign and internal situation of the Soviet Union, the Politburo CPSU(b) states its full unanimity in regard to the basic theses of the report. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin’s assertion that the communist regime in the USSR, based on the dictatorship of the Party and the class of the proletariat, is confronted at the given moment with a threat, and that the paramount tactical task of the CPSU(b) consists of the preservation and consolidation of the political positions of the latter, i.e., speaking very simply, in retaining its power over the country. There was not the slightest doubt as to the stability of Soviet power and the indestructibility of the political positions of the communist dictatorship in the USSR until the sharp tension of the world situation and a series of heavy defeats experienced by the international proletariat, which is led by social democracy in the struggle against fascism and capitalist reaction, placed the Soviet Union under threat of open aggression on the part of imperialist powers armed to the teeth—in the aim of a new repartition of the political map of Europe and Asia, above all, at the expense of the Soviet Union. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin’s assertion that although Soviet diplomacy has succeeded, by means of a skillful utilization of Franco-German and American-Japanese contradictions, in removing an immediate threat of a repetition of imperialist intervention against the USSR—this time on a much larger scale than in 1918-19—nevertheless, the creation, in the end, of a united capitalist-imperialist front against the Soviet Union lies within the limits of possibility and presents a real, although not immediate, threat for communism in general.

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin’s view that

1.) The guiding line of Soviet foreign policy, directed toward obtaining actual international guarantees of the territorial inviolability of the USSR, is correct and is being carried out correctly.
2) The consolidation of the political positions of Soviet power within the country, which is necessary for the essential increase in the defensive capacities of the USSR, demands a broadening of the social base of the communist dictatorship, even by means of decisive concessions in the sphere of economic policy and by means of strengthening "the ruling stratum" with new elements.

3) The gradual relaxation of political pressure inside the USSR, and the simultaneous mobilization of the forces of the Comintern for the infliction of a decisive blow against international fascism and reaction, must proceed parallel with each other, subordinating everything to the same basic principle of strengthening the foreign and internal political positions of the CPSU(b).

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of November 10, 1934

Having heard Comrade Stalin's report on the world situation and on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that international capitalism has once again succeeded in attaining a certain stabilization of international economic relations, but that so far there can be no question of surmounting the crisis. The latter circumstance must inevitably cause, as early as the immediate future, a new sharpening of contradictions among the imperialist powers, making extremely probable a series of international-political complications, concealing in themselves the threat of armed conflicts in the Pacific as well as in Europe. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that, in spite of the unquestionable efforts of a number of states, these states will not succeed in preventing a new world war: the second half of 1935 and the beginning of 1936 must be considered a critical period. According to the profound conviction of the Politburo CPSU(b), war will first break out, not in Europe, but in the Far East between Japan and the USA. Remaining true to the basic principle of its policy, the Soviet Union must direct all its efforts to remaining uninvolved in the said conflict. Therefore, the Politburo CPSU(b) considers it tactically correct to continue to evade a clash with Japan, while dragging out, as long as possible, the settling of Japanese-Soviet relations until the moment when the sharpening of the situation in the Pacific will place the USSR in a position most favorable for negotiations with Tokyo as well as with Washington. The Politburo CPSU(b) emphasizes, however, that the indicated basic tendency of Soviet foreign policy must not have any influence on the pursuit of the immediate aims of the USSR's diplomacy, namely, the creation of a united front of the Great Powers against Japan. Yet the Politburo CPSU(b) reminds the comrade leaders of the NKID that the necessity of carrying out a policy of alliances must not overshadow the NKID's basic strivings: to contribute to the involvement of Japan in a conflict with the most powerful opponent possible, or—what is even more desirable—with the greatest number of opponents possible, avoiding the direct involvement of the USSR in the said conflict.

Furthermore, the Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that a completely analogous task confronts Soviet diplomacy in regard to
Germany. This must not, however, prevent the Soviet Union's foreign policy from demonstratively carrying out the line of the pacification and disarmament of Europe. In the opinion of the Politburo CPSU(b), one of the basic tasks of Soviet diplomacy must be the maximum utilization of the ideas and apparatus of the League of Nations for the achievement of the real political and economic interests of the Soviet Union and for the corresponding utilization of the Geneva institution in the direction of a planned and systematic struggle against international fascism.

The Politburo CPSU(b) persistently emphasizes that Comrade Litvinov's mistake consists precisely in not differentiating sharply enough between the goals and methods of Soviet foreign policy. The entrance of the USSR into the concert of capitalist powers still remains a means, and is not an end in itself. It remains a tactical step and is not a basic line of foreign policy. The subordination of the tactics of the Comintern to the tasks of the NKID is no more than a transition stage, than a preparatory maneuver for a communist offensive against international capitalism. The Politburo CPSU(b) categorically proposes to the NKID, in its joy over the "diplomatic successes," that it not forget this.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of November 14, 1934

Having heard in its meeting of November 14, 1934, Comrade Stalin's report on the world situation, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the line of foreign and internal policy carried out by the Party can be considered as uniquely correct, from the point of view of principle as well as from the point of view of tactics. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's statement that the Soviet Union, with full consciousness of its historical responsibility before the international proletariat, must not only become a decisive factor in international political and economic relations by tenaciously and steadfastly pursuing "great power" aims, but also must adapt its internal structure to the new demands of the moment. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares the basic thesis of Comrade Stalin's report that the present international situation compels the CPSU(b) to subordinate its tactics to the main task confronting the world communist movement, namely, the preservation, at whatever cost, of political power within the USSR and the strengthening of the USSR's international positions.

The Politburo CPSU(b) believes that in the sphere of foreign policy, the Soviet government has again found the opportunity—and indeed to a significantly greater extent than previously—not only to maneuver freely, but also to exert a more or less essential influence on the interrelations of the decisive factors of world politics. In an opportune and skillful utilization of the contradictions among the Great Powers, as well as among the leading groups of international capital and in a tactically correct application of the methods of revolutionary and defensive struggle in connection with the new phase of world capitalist development, the CPSU(b) is presented with a powerful, although
double-edged weapon. The adroit use of this weapon, i.e., the correct coordination of the methods of "great power" politics with the tactical methods of the Comintern, must inevitably lead to a change in the international situation such that the CPSU(b) will be given the opportunity to intervene decisively in the process of world events. The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that the inevitable result of the present political situation will be a world war, and that the direct participants in this war will be Germany in the West and Japan in the East, the two military-imperialist states whose ruling regimes must unavoidably seek a way out by an outward expansion. The above situation presents a threat to the Soviet Union and, consequently, to the world communist movement, as long as the greedy eyes of the German "upholders of civilization" and the Japanese militarists are directed toward the "colonizing possibilities" of the USSR's territory and, furthermore, as long as the struggle against the "communist menace," in the name of saving "the values of civilization," is a convenient ground—since it is sufficiently vague—for the unification of the capitalist powers and the coordination of their naturally rapacious interests. The Politburo CPSU(b), stating with satisfaction that Soviet diplomacy has succeeded in demolishing the plan of a united front of the capitalist powers against the Soviet Union, so far does not see real guarantees of the absolute impossibility of a repetition of more successful attempts in the outlined direction. Continuing the policy of betting on peace and striving for the creation of a system of guarantee pacts of security and mutual assistance providing for the automatic application of international sanctions against an aggressor, the Soviet government must direct all its diplomatic efforts to the creation of an international situation which completely excludes beforehand any possibility of armed aggression against the USSR from the West as well as from the East. The problem, in a practical sense, can be successfully solved, not by a system of international treaties, which can be violated with extraordinary ease, and will undoubtedly be violated, but by the drawing of Germany and Japan into such conflicts as would lead both of the said powers into an armed clash occurring at the furthest distance from the Soviet Union's frontiers. Along with this, even at present, Soviet diplomacy must consider the danger of the conclusion of peace agreements among the capitalist powers at the expense of the USSR and even up to the very moment when conditions favorable to the revolutionary intervention of the Comintern will have been created. In view of the above statement, the Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that a war between Italy and Germany (to a significantly greater extent than an armed conflict between Germany and France) is in the interests of the Soviet Union and of the world communist movement, as well as a war between the USA and Japan which, of course, does not eliminate the necessity for Soviet foreign policy of a consistent realization of the task "of guaranteeing peace and security" either by means of a system of guarantee pacts or by means of actively aiding the rise of an anti-German and anti-Japanese bloc of powers.

In conclusion, the Politburo CPSU(b) emphasizes that the "peace policy"
principle still remains the USSR's fundamental tactic in regard to the capitalist powers, and similarly that the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade should invariably continue its tactics in regard to rival groups of world capital.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of November 26, 1934

Having heard in its meeting of November 26, 1934, Comrade Stalin's report on the world situation, and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign and internal policies, the Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to the comrade reporter's basic thesis that the international political and economic situation of the present moment imperatively dictates to the CPSU(b) that it concentrate all its forces on the preservation of the national unity of the Soviet Union, by strengthening its military might and international political positions, as well as on the creation of conditions inside the USSR, which will guarantee the further existence of Soviet power in the event of external and internal shocks. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's assertion that the sharp crisis world capitalism is experiencing and which is provoking an extreme growth of contradictions among the groups of imperialist powers, is undergoing, at the present, such an obvious relaxation that the success of a communist social revolution to a greater or lesser extent is not to be counted upon. The present stage of the development of international events bears not so much the character of class struggle, as the character of fierce rivalry among the individual imperialist states or among the coalitions of such states. Only a new bloody war on a European or even on a world scale will create the prerequisites necessary to grip the proletarian masses with the revolutionary upsurge of the communist movement. However, a threatening danger is lurking here for the Soviet Union as the hearth and citadel of world communism, a danger which lies in the fact that the USSR could be drawn, prematurely and under unfavorable conditions, into an armed conflict among imperialist groups, or what would be worse still, could become the object [of bargaining] for the solution of imperialist contradictions. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's basic conclusion that the Soviet government will willy-nilly be included in the fight of the imperialist power groupings and all the efforts of its diplomacy must be directed toward guaranteeing the national unity and the territorial security of the USSR. However, the Politburo CPSU(b) believes that the aforementioned tactics of the government of the Soviet Union must by no means signify a renunciation by the Party of the leadership of the revolutionary world movement of the proletariat. The Politburo CPSU(b) reckons with the probability that, in view of foreign political considerations which dictate the necessity of highly complicated tactical maneuvers, even the dissolution of the Comintern and of its individual sections will have to be undertaken, but it upholds the firm view that this measure will be only formal and seeming. The Politburo CPSU(b) most emphatically suggests to the Presidium of the ECCI [Executive Committee of the Communist International] that it attend right now to a reorganization of the entire ap-
paratus of the Communist International in such a way that the leading organs of the Communist International and the sections attached to them, under the conditions of the formal termination of the existence of the Communist International, would be permitted to continue their activity without interruption. The Politburo CPSU(b) simultaneously proposes to all organs involved that they set about at once to transform the organs of [the People's Commissariat of] Foreign Trade in the USSR and especially in foreign countries into sections along the line of the Comintern. The Politburo CPSU(b) makes it the absolute duty of the Special Section of the NKID to undertake the direct leadership of the activity of the respective sections of the Comintern, utilizing, however, for the aforementioned purpose, not the apparatus of the embassies, but exclusively the apparatus of the trade delegations.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of January 26, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of January 26, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the danger of a new world war is becoming more and more real at the present moment. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's thesis that the threat of a new world war, which originates in Europe from Germany, and in Asia from Japan, has already been confirmed by the simple fact that leading figures of both of these imperialist-nationalist powers consider an armed clash with one or another of their neighbors as quite unavoidable, and are directing all their energies toward the preparation of the broad masses of the people for a war of conquest. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's view that the entire complicated diplomatic game of Berlin as well as of Tokyo is only a tactical maneuver that serves the purpose of gaining time, until the approach of the moment most favorable for the substitution of the language of notes with the language of guns. The Politburo CPSU(b) does not entertain the slightest doubt that not a single state at present has any territorial claims with respect to Germany and Japan, whereas territorial hunger is the true driving force of German and Japanese imperialisms, both of which are seized, to the same degree, by strivings to fulfill their "historical missions." The Politburo CPSU(b) cannot but agree with Comrade Stalin's assertion that "today both Japan and Germany appear as the strongest among the imperialist powers against which . . . no other state, individually considered, can measure itself in a narrow military sense." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to the basic thesis of Comrade Stalin's report that "the key to world politics, to the extent that it is determined by struggle between the individual power groups, is held by England," which—in view of the century-old tradition of her policy—is guided by strivings to maintain her dominating position, drawing from this position a maximum of political and economic advantages while not definitely adhering to one group or another which already has been organized or is still to be organized. The Politburo CPSU(b) likewise agrees with Comrade Stalin's assertion that the British government is definitely and consistently supporting
the system of a Western Locarno and is ready to support the Rome Agreement
which, in view of this circumstance, Germany will be compelled, in the end, to
join, but that the British government is, however, in no way inclined to aid the
realization of an "Eastern Locarno" plan because, as Comrade Stalin correctly
reminds, "the conclusion of an Eastern European pact of security and mutual
assistance . . . would essentially change the present relationship of forces in
the Pacific which are favorable for England." Only the existence of a secret
German-Japanese alliance (or of a German-Polish-Japanese alliance, which
essentially is the same thing) and the preparation for the creation of a German-
Polish-Hungarian-Austrian-Italian bloc, even if such a bloc were restricted for
a certain time by the framework of a central European consultative (not
guarantee!) pact, may, under certain circumstances, force England to take a
definite stand against such a coalition, because this coalition would be
dangerous to British interests, since although the coalition is predominantly
directed against the Soviet Union, nevertheless the possibility exists of an
inevitable threat to the "world balance of power" and thereby to the
dominating position of Great Britain. Basing itself on the basic thesis of
Comrade Stalin's report, the Politburo CPSU(b) emphatically recommends to
the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy that they direct all efforts toward
the most open disclosure possible of the secret plans which lie at the basis of the
German-Polish-Japanese agreement, especially, however, the colonial and
Asian clauses of the agreement between Tokyo and Berlin. The Politburo
CPSU(b) together with Comrade Stalin believes that, if the appropriate
documentary material is placed at the disposal of the French government
before the departure of Flandin and Laval for London, French diplomacy can
be greatly facilitated in the fulfillment of the task before it, namely, to secure
the agreement of the London cabinet to the realization of the "Eastern
Locarno" plan independently of Germany's participation in it.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of February 5, 1935

Having heard in its extraordinary meeting of February 5, 1935, Comrade
Stalin's report on the foreign and internal situation of the USSR and on the
immediate tasks of the party leadership, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the
unanimous conclusion that the current year will be a critical one in every
respect for the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government, and will demand the ut-
most exertion of all forces for a successful overcoming of the unavoidable
foreign and internal political difficulties, and of more or less sharp com-
plications.

The Politburo CPSU(b) states first of all that the regrouping of imperialist-
capitalist states, which is beginning to appear, is characterized by the
dominating influence of England on the development of international relations.
British policy is showing a more and more obvious tendency to attain, by means
of its mediation, a removal for as long a time as possible, of the Franco-German
contradictions in the West and of the Japanese-American rivalry in the Pacific
and in Eastern Asia. Considering the striving of the Berlin government to avoid
any friction with London, as well as the obvious tendency of Japanese policy toward collaboration with Great Britain, British diplomacy, according to all available data, has decided to confront Berlin with the fact of Franco-British contact, and Tokyo with the fact of Anglo-American contact, in order by this means to impel German imperialism to agree to the combination of a Western European guarantee pact and to compel Japan to a course of Anglo-Japanese-American rapprochement. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that British policy, deliberately and systematically, is striving for the removal of the Soviet Union from direct participation in the European as well as in the Pacific combinations which are aimed at the creation of actual security and mutual assistance guarantees. The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the London government has been more and more inclined to the tactics of keeping for the Soviet Union the role of a possible object of bargaining in the event of a new partition of spheres of influence among the imperialist powers. The Politburo CPSU(b) subscribes to the fullest extent to Comrade Stalin's assertion that "the driving force of British foreign policy... in the final result is speculation on the creation of an armed conflict between the USSR and Japan which would bleed white the two states so dangerous to Great Britain" and would give the Western European Powers "a basis for intervention in the USSR for the purpose of creating new colonization spaces in the event of the collapse of the Soviet state."

The Politburo CPSU(b) considers it necessary to recommend emphatically to the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy that they:

1) utilize to the fullest extent the positions which have not yet been lost by Soviet diplomacy for the realization of the plan of an Eastern Guarantee Pact, relying upon the support of the Little Entente, the Balkan states and the Baltic States, and making use of the psychological effect of the secret alliance concluded between Germany, Poland, and Japan aimed directly against the USSR and threatening indirectly France's vital interests;

2) seek a further closer rapprochement with the small and medium-sized states, which are interested in maintaining the international authority of the League of Nations and fear the hegemony of the Great Powers;

3) in no case permit a weakening of the foreign political relationships of the Soviet Union with France and the USA, making, especially in regard to the latter, essential concessions in controversial questions and moving to the foreground, elements of military-technical collaboration;

4) seek means for an agreement with Great Britain, with the aim of gaining time until the English Labour Party comes into power;

5) utilize, to the fullest extent, the existence of German-Italian and German-Polish contradictions with the aim of artificially aggravating them;

4) intensify the tactics of collaboration of the Comintern with the Second International.

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that the "weakening of the foreign political positions of the Soviet Union is to be explained above all by the calculation of the imperialists on the downfall of the
Soviet regime ... in connection with the internal political crisis in the USSR which has become aggravated.” The Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that further essential alleviations for the peasant population of the Union are necessary as long as these do not cause a strengthening of kulak influences. The Politburo CPSU(b) declares itself unanimously in favor of granting a certain freedom of initiative to the private sector of the economy. The Politburo CPSU(b) proposes to the respective party and Soviet organs that they submit concrete proposals on the question under discussion by the 15th of this month.

The Politburo CPSU(b) is of the unanimous opinion that it is necessary to direct special attention to the crisis which the Party has been experiencing, and chiefly the Komsomol [Young Communist League], without weakening the ruthless struggle against internal party enemies and concentrating all energies on the restoration of ideological contact between the leadership of the CPSU(b) and the Komsomol cadres. The authority of the party leadership, which has been blighted in the cities, must be restored, in the shortest time, by mobilizing the active forces of the socialist peasantry.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of February 21, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of February 21, 1935, Comrade Stalin’s report on the international situation, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the world political situation at the present is turning out unfavorably for the German-Polish-Japanese group of powers, as the British government is gradually retreating from the idea of even passive support of the plan of a territorial repartition at the expense of the Soviet Union. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin’s assertion that the inevitability of an armed conflict in the Pacific area will form the central axis of Great Britain’s foreign policy within the next 1½ to 2 years, and impels the latter, from now on, to direct all efforts toward the preservation of its positions in the zone which stands under the direct threat of Japanese imperialism. The existence of a secret Japanese-German alliance is regarded, not only by France and Italy, but also by both Anglo-Saxon powers, as an obvious attempt, in the not too distant future, to establish neither more nor less than the hegemony of Germany and Japan over the world. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin’s opinion that the temptation of an understanding among the imperialist powers at the expense of the USSR can be considered as removed for some time and that it is the basic task of Soviet diplomacy to make use of the present international political situation for the realization of the plan of Anglo-Franco-Soviet collaboration in Europe and Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration in Asia. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely agrees with Comrade Stalin that it is necessary, out of tactical considerations, to create a firm conviction in Paris, London, and Washington that Communism is in the stage of self-liquidation, particularly since it is expedient to create an analogous psychological effect within the Soviet Union also, especially among the masses of the toiling peasantry among whom the property instincts have not yet died...
out. The Politburo CPSU(b), together with Comrade Stalin, recognizes all the dangers of such a tactical maneuver in foreign policy and in internal policy, but considers the systematic realization of the above-mentioned maneuver as quite unavoidable, insofar as the fate of the Soviet Union is at stake. The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that a new world war is absolutely inevitable, but it is at the same time the obvious prerequisite for the world revolution. The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously recognizes all the dangers of such a tactical maneuver in foreign policy and in internal policy, but considers the systematic realization of the above-mentioned maneuver as quite unavoidable, insofar as the fate of the Soviet Union is at stake. The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that a new world war is absolutely inevitable, but it is at the same time the obvious prerequisite for the world revolution. The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to the basic thesis of Comrade Stalin's report: "The Soviet Union is confronted with the danger of becoming the object of a territorial repartition for the purpose of a temporary understanding among the already existing hostile imperialist coalitions. With the goal of self-preservation and in the interests of the revolutionary world movement, the Soviet government must do everything possible to find a place for itself in the camp of powers which forms the strongest coalition. This must be attained even at the cost of a temporary renunciation of the open application of the principles upon which the CPSU(b) and the Soviet state are founded." The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's opinion that Great Britain, at the present, evaluates the political situation developing in Europe exclusively from the point of view of any possible influences which might derive from European events on the interests of the British Empire as a whole: the London government fears a serious armed conflict in Europe and correctly assumes that such a conflict will inevitably end with social revolutions in most of the European states, and will inevitably lead to uprisings in the colonial and semi-colonial countries directly threatening the lifelines of Great Britain. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that Great Britain will make every effort to prevent a war in Europe, and, in consideration of France's position in regard to the Eastern European desires of Germany, it will be compelled to aid, to a greater or lesser

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of March 17, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of March 17, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the further development of events in Europe as well as in Asia is almost exclusively dependent on the position which Great Britain will take. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that British policy, at the present, is guided by the following three tasks:

a) not to allow an excessive strengthening of Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia;

b) to prevent the formation of a bloc of states against Germany on the foundation of a military defensive alliance between the USSR and France;

c) to guarantee effectively the security of England from an air attack from the continent but without becoming exclusively dependent on France.

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's opinion that Great Britain, at the present, evaluates the political situation developing in Europe exclusively from the point of view of any possible influences which might derive from European events on the interests of the British Empire as a whole: the London government fears a serious armed conflict in Europe and correctly assumes that such a conflict will inevitably end with social revolutions in most of the European states, and will inevitably lead to uprisings in the colonial and semi-colonial countries directly threatening the lifelines of Great Britain. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that Great Britain will make every effort to prevent a war in Europe, and, in consideration of France's position in regard to the Eastern European desires of Germany, it will be compelled to aid, to a greater or lesser
degree, the realization of the "Eastern Locarno" plan. The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that Comrade Stalin, with exceptional clarity, has formulated the basic tendency of British foreign policy at the present moment: "British imperialism is aiming at gaining the possibility of an active and decisive influence on the development of events in Asia, in order to allow neither the further strengthening of Japan nor the consolidation of the Soviet Union's positions. British imperialism critically requires a breathing space in order to have sufficient time at its disposal for the reorganization of the entire administrative system, and for the consolidation of the economic structure of the empire. The British government has come to the conclusion that any serious armed conflict in Europe or in Asia threatens to end in an unbreakable chain of political, economic, and above all, social upheavals which could have catastrophic consequences for the structure of the British Empire, which already is showing signs of cracking." The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously shares Comrade Stalin's thesis that British foreign policy "in the immediate future will be guided by a sincere (because it is dictated by the drive for self-preservation) aspiration to avert the danger of war .... In regard to the Soviet Union, British policy is sincerely ready to follow the road of rapprochement and collaboration under the condition that Great Britain, after having bound Germany's hands in Eastern Europe, does not thereby untie the Soviet Union's hands in Asia; the regulation of Japanese-Soviet mutual relations appears as the prerequisite for British support of 'Eastern Locarno' as well as the renunciation by the USSR of any threat to British interests in Persia, Afghanistan, India, Tibet, etc., and the discontinuance of communist propaganda in the countries and areas belonging, directly or indirectly, to Great Britain's sphere of influence." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy must exploit, to the fullest extent, the above mentioned foreign political tendencies of the British government, and must show, in the forthcoming negotiations, a maximum of elasticity in finding formulas able to satisfy Great Britain. The Politburo CPSU(b) considers that it lies within the bounds of possibility of Soviet diplomacy to shift the centers of future conflicts in Europe and in Asia in such a manner that the Soviet Union escapes from the immediate danger of being drawn into them: the consolidation of Anglo-Soviet relations is the first step toward the destruction of plans which see in the USSR a convenient "object of bargaining."

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of March 28, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of March 28, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the overwhelming majority of European states, at the present, are under the more or less strong impression that there is a direct or indirect threat of an armed conflict prepared by National Socialist Germany with extreme stubbornness and methodical consistency. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade
Stalin's assertion that the aggressive plans of German imperialism essentially extend to all of Europe, and that the "right" of expansion to the East, defended by Berlin, is only the first stage in the process of the establishment of German hegemony over the entire European continent, and what is quite probable, covers up, for the purpose of diversion, the preparation of a crushing blow of lightning speed against France. The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the British government reckons with the obvious facts, and is convinced of the sincere readiness of the USSR to establish a firm and lasting collaboration with Great Britain in Europe, and especially in Asia; therefore the British government cannot but recognize the indubitable advantages of a collective system of guarantees of security and mutual assistance, above all for the preservation of British positions themselves. The Politburo CPSU(b) notes, with a feeling of deep satisfaction, the confidence of Comrade Stalin that "the dangers of a further strengthening of Germany and Japan, correctly evaluated by British policy as dangers for the vital interests of Great Britain which cannot be removed by diverting German and Japanese expansions toward the Soviet Union, dictate to London the necessity of actively promoting attempts which could paralyze the bellicose ardor of Berlin and Tokyo." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's thesis that "the Soviet government must prove to Great Britain, with sufficient persuasiveness, its readiness to adhere to any formula acceptable to Berlin and Warsaw, under the condition that this formula be not merely a platonic expression of commonplaces regarding the necessity of maintaining peace, but contain real guarantees securing the Soviet Union an effective and military support in the event of an attack against it from the West." In the unanimous opinion of the Politburo CPSU(b), the only acceptable solution to the problem for the USSR is the formal assurance of the British government that steps by France against Germany, in the event of an attack by the latter on one of its neighboring states, will not be regarded by London as a violation of the Locarno Treaty: the existence of such a declaration by the British government would be equivalent to London's agreement to the conclusion of an Eastern European Guarantee Pact without regard to the joining of it by Berlin and Warsaw. At the same time, the Politburo CPSU(b) shares Comrade Stalin's idea about the necessity of the Soviet government's actively aiding the plans of British diplomacy for the purpose of working out the formula of a pact of the powers based on the League of Nations Covenant, and free of the elements of a bloc openly directed against Germany, or, insofar as the affair concerns Asia, of a bloc openly directed against Japan: such a tactic by the USSR will lead more than anything else to the disclosure of the aggressive intentions of Berlin and Tokyo, and compel the British government (reckoning at the present more than ever with public opinion in England and the Dominions) to adhere to the front of powers aiming at moderating the appetite of the German and Japanese imperialists.
Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of April 3, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of April 3, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the world situation and the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign and internal policies, as well as on the tactics of the Comintern, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to unanimous conclusion that the basic and central problem for the party leadership remains the preservation of the international-political positions of the Soviet Union, since the preservation of these positions under the conditions of the present moment is an indispensable prerequisite for guaranteeing the vitality of the communist movement. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully shares Comrade Stalin's assertion that "the unavoidability of an armed conflict among the imperialist powers in connection with the irrepressible energy of expansion of Japan and Germany, represents a serious threat to the USSR as long as Soviet diplomacy has not succeeded in creating a situation which will remove the danger of a direct involvement in the war." The Politburo CPSU(b) is of the unanimous opinion that the arduous and responsible tasks of the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy consist not only in securing a sufficiently powerful support from the outside in the event of an armed attack, but in promoting a situation in which the conflict in Western Europe would break out in the form of armed conflict between Germany and France-Italy, and in the Far East, Japanese-British relations would become aggravated to the utmost. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's point of view that "the system of guarantee pacts of security and mutual assistance does not at all represent an end in itself for the Soviet Union, since armed conflict among the imperialist groups in Europe and Asia does not in the least determine an automatic active intervention of the USSR in the war, but it can prove to be, under certain conditions, the first stage in the reactivation of the revolutionary world movement under the banner of the III International." The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that "the natural instinct of self-preservation dictates to the Party such a direction to Soviet foreign and internal policies which would secure, to the highest degree, the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union even at the cost of a temporary abandonment of the consistent carrying through of communist ideology, even at the cost of a return to forms of a social and economic structure which, at a superficial glance, would be equivalent to the self-liquidation of Communism under the conditions of the simultaneous consolidation of the political positions of the Soviet government."

The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that Comintern tactics, must, to speak with Comrade Stalin's words, "be adapted to the goals of Soviet foreign policy and indirectly to the goals of Soviet internal policy: the organs of the Communist International and its individual sections are changed, under the conditions of the present moment, into an apparatus of the government of the Soviet Union, into an institution similar to the NKID as well as RKKA [Red Army]. The unconditional and sacrificial service for the Soviet Union as a
world power now becomes their task, since, at present, the Soviet Union remains the only citadel of Communism, whose destruction would be equivalent to a mortal blow for the revolutionary proletariat of the world.” The Politburo CPSU(b) is perfectly well aware of all the moods in international working class circles, and even in the Soviet Union, which have been engendered by the present tactics of the Soviet government, and even of the CPSU(b), tactics hardly compatible with the “purity of the doctrine,” but the Politburo CPSU(b) is absolutely convinced of the fact that the world proletariat, as represented by its revolutionary active members, correctly takes into account the significance of the historical maneuver which is being firmly and skillfully carried out by Comrade Stalin with the aim of demoralizing the enemy camp of international capitalism and imperialism. The Politburo CPSU(b) recognizes its full responsibility, but, together with its leader and guide, it sees no other possibility of removing the otherwise unavoidable danger of the annihilation of the Soviet state by the united forces of imperialist plunderers.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of April 24, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of April 24, 1935, Comrade Stalin’s report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that, to speak with the words of the [comrade] reporter, “the world political situation is again shaping up quite favorably for the Soviet Union: independently of any direct or indirect successes or failures of our diplomacy, the character of the growth of German and Japanese imperialisms, as well as the external manifestations of this growth, will inevitably lead to the rise of serious armed conflicts in Europe and in Asia which will involve the British Empire, which is threatened by Germany and Japan to the same degree.” The Politburo CPSU(b) fully adheres to Comrade Stalin’s assertion that “traditional British policy will naturally attempt to remain outside the conflict to the end, and to confine itself to the role of tertii gaudentis, accumulating means and forces in order actually to dictate peace conditions.” Therefore, in Comrade Stalin’s words, “the basic danger for the Soviet Union still lies in the fact that British diplomacy will drive both Germany and Japan into an attack upon the USSR; and ... consequently Soviet diplomacy faces the difficult task of turning the development of events toward such conflicts which are farthest away from the territory of the Soviet Union.” The Politburo CPSU(b) completely adheres to Comrade Stalin’s view that, “in the event of a failure of Soviet policy to bring about an international system of guarantees of security and mutual assistance, which essentially would allow the USSR to provoke artificially an armed conflict among the individual powers or groups of powers at a moment most favorable for the Soviet Union, it is necessary, right now, to place the USSR in a situation which will more or less secure the inviolability of its borders and which will transfer the sharpening of the imperialist-capitalist contradictions which is in itself inevitable, toward places which are as far away as possible from the Soviet Union’s borders.” The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that such a tactic
of clever maneuvering assumes, as Comrade Stalin correctly notes, "not only the inclusion of the USSR in the system of guarantee pacts, which are obviously directed against the German or Japanese imperialisms, but also the simultaneous seeking out of ways for a direct understanding with Germany and Japan, in order to turn their expansion in the direction of a conflict with states which are not directly bound up with the Soviet Union by obligations of mutual assistance." The Politburo CPSU(b) believes that Soviet diplomacy, right now, must strive toward the creation of a situation which will involve, above all, Great Britain in a direct armed conflict in Europe or in Asia.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of May 1, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of May 1, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that Comrade Stalin's basic thesis, which amounts to the recognition of the necessity "of completing the forthcoming conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact by means of the open collaboration of Italy, the Little Entente, and Poland with France and the USSR," outlines the only correct way to prevent any international combinations which will remove the Soviet Union from direct participation in the European system of guarantees of security and mutual assistance. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's view that the "Polish government, which has been strenuously endeavoring to realize its conception of an understanding along the line Warsaw-Rome-Paris-Berlin-London, has been compelled to seek, first of all, British and Italian mediation in order to restore the former extent of its influence in France, which still suspects the existence of a secret German-Polish agreement. . . . The inclusion of Poland into the Franco-Italian combination is not conceivable under the conditions of the present moment without a decisive abandonment by Warsaw of collaboration with Berlin; Poland has been placed by its [collaboration] in the extremely difficult position of having to choose between two possibilities: a) continuation of the hitherto existing ambiguous policy which leads unavoidably to an open transition to the German camp, or b) incorporation into the Stresa system in the hope that British and Italian policies will after all take the course Warsaw is strenuously defending." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that "the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet and the Czech-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pacts will make impossible the realization of the Polish combination, and inevitably will lead either a) to the complete isolation of Germany or b) to the isolation of Germany, Poland, and Hungary as a group. . . . In either case, Soviet diplomacy will have before it a wide field of activity in the direction of a return to the original plan of an Eastern European Guarantee Pact with the inclusion of Germany and Poland." The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the acceleration of the aforementioned process can be attained by the inclusion of the Baltic States in one regional guarantee pact or another, with the indispensable participation of the Soviet Union. The Politburo CPSU(b) most
emphatically proposes to the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy that they bend every effort to induce the Baltic States to conclude such a pact. In this the Politburo CPSU(b) shares Comrade Stalin’s view that “the indubitable change of Italian policy in the direction of a rapprochement with the Little Entente (ultimately even at the price of an actual abandonment of the leading idea of the Rome bloc) opens definite possibilities to Soviet diplomacy for an appropriate agreement between the USSR and Italy, in the spirit of a real foreign political contact which will find its formal expression in a merging of the Danubian Pact with the regional pacts (Eastern European, Mediterranean, and Black Sea Pacts) which are again becoming the order of the day.” The Politburo CPSU(b), together with Comrade Stalin, is firmly convinced that “Soviet diplomacy’s persistent and systematic pursuit of its final goal—the realization of an international system of guarantees of security and mutual assistance—must take place in the future, and that any slight possibility must be utilized which permits it to take a new step in the above direction.”

In the opinion of the Politburo CPSU(b), Comrade Stalin’s assertion that “Japanese-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a nonaggression pact, which are beginning, clearly indicate a change in the political and strategic situation in the Pacific” [is completely correct]. This situation compels the Soviet Union to direct all efforts toward the utilization of this change in order to bring to the fore again the plan of a Pacific guarantee pact of security and mutual assistance.

The Politburo CPSU(b) enthusiastically sees in the concluding words of Comrade Stalin’s report a clear prognosis of the forthcoming development of events: “In the West, a new war of the states against German militarism is being prepared. In Asia, a clash between Japan, the USA and Great Britain is becoming inevitable . . . . The Soviet Union will participate in these conflicts only to the degree that would allow her to become the decisive factor in the transformation of the world war into the world revolution.”

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of May 13, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of May 13, 1935, Comrade Stalin’s report on the tasks of Soviet foreign policy in connection with Laval’s visit to Moscow and with the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance of May 2, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that it is necessary to achieve a further strengthening of the results already attained in regard to France. The Politburo CPSU(b) considers it tactically expedient:

1) to promote a new Eastern Pact plan which will be constructed on the principle of nonaggression, noninterference, and consultation, and which will deprive Germany and Poland of reasons for declining to join;

2) to give up communist propaganda of an anti-militarist nature in France and her colonies, directing every effort of the French comrades toward propagating the idea of the defense of the Soviet proletarian state, as represented by the USSR, from the encroachments of German National Socialism and Japanese imperialism;
3) to restore formal negotiation with the French government concerning partial satisfaction of the claims of French stockholders of old Russian securities;

4) to meet French desires concerning a further "softening of the regime" in the USSR.

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that "as a result of prolonged and persistent efforts on the part of our diplomacy we have succeeded in radically destroying both the German plan of a 'crusade against Communism' and the complicated Polish intrigue, and by this means have secured the western boundaries of the USSR from attack. If one had to bourgeoisify oneself superficially for this and if in the future one will have to make further compromises in this direction, then it is necessary to acknowledge that this price is very small in comparison with what the Soviet Union has acquired for it."

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously expresses absolute faith in Comrade Stalin. The Party and the workers' and peasants' masses of the Soviet Union stand behind their great leader in closed ranks. The world proletariat estimates correctly and at its true worth the political and tactical line firmly carried out by Comrade Stalin.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of May 17, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of May 17, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that the theses formulated by Comrade Stalin outline, with exhaustive fullness and clarity, the further process of development of international relations and determine the foreign political line of the Soviet Union. The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously resolves to propose to the NKID leadership that it regard the concluding theses of Comrade Stalin's report as the basic tenets and directives of Soviet foreign policy, which are as follows:

1) The conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, which has met the approval of the British government, makes the determination of the fate of Europe actually dependent on the mutual relations among the three Great Powers, the USSR, Great Britain, and France. The German game can be regarded as definitely lost. Italy is becoming a Great Power of the second class. Poland is changing into an object of international politics and is finally losing the possibility of leading an independent policy.

2) Germany, encircled and isolated, must either beat a hasty retreat and return to the starting points of the tactics of Stresemann and Brüning or it must stubbornly pursue its present policy which unavoidably will lead to a war on three fronts. The political situation of Europe has changed so radically that at present it no longer can be a question of an attack by Germany upon any power, but of a preventive war by Great Britain, France and the USSR against Germany, a war in which the Third Reich will have no allies.

3) By the conclusion of the mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union,
France has obtained the possibility of putting Italy in its place: the next months will be characterized by a consolidation of France's influence and consequently of the Little Entente in Central Europe, as well as by the complete pushing away of Italy from the Danubian area as well as from the Balkans. Italy, which in all respects is dependent on Great Britain, will be forced to reconcile itself to its natural role, as long as the collaboration among Paris, London, and Moscow will constitute the decisive factor in European politics. The tragical tactical mistake of Germany in regard to Great Britain (the wrecking of the disarmament negotiations, the exit from the League of Nations, the striving for hegemony in Europe, etc.) now deprives Berlin diplomacy of any possibility of returning to a combination of European equilibrium on the basis of the consolidation of relations among Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the USSR, which would be favorable to it. The solution of the fate of Europe is definitely passing to the three Great Powers, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France.

4) The almost unavoidable war in Europe, which will end with the inevitable military defeat of Germany, will lead to a new territorial repartitioning whose basic elements will be the following:
   a) Disintegration of Germany into South and North Germany;
   b) Partition of Poland;
   c) Inclusion of the large Polish provinces [Eastern Poland] and of the Baltic States into the direct spheres of influence of the Soviet Union;
   d) Creation of a new democratic state, whose nucleus would be Czechoslovakia and which would form a buffer state between the capitalist West and the communist East;
   e) Expansion of the British sphere of influence in Asia as compensation for the expansion of the USSR's positions in the West.
   f) If Germany manages to realize the danger threatening it and agrees to a capitulation, the aforementioned process will either be slowed down or assume other forms, depending on the new regrouping of forces in Europe, which can only crystallize in the course of the next five to ten years.

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that Soviet diplomacy must now direct every effort toward the avoidance of complications in the Far East even at the price of new and even territorial concessions to Japan.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of June 23, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of June 23, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to the [comrade] reporter's assertion that "National Socialist Germany, under the conditions of the present moment, represents the main, if not the only danger threatening the USSR from without." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's opinion that "Japanese imperialism will be stuck in China for at least a decade and furthermore, at the present, is absorbed in the preparation of an open conflict
with British imperialism, which is being ousted from all positions of control in Eastern Asia." The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the formal and even actual readiness of Germany "to conclude all possible pacts with her neighboring states, exclusive of Lithuania and Austria, quite apart from the obvious endeavors of the Berlin government to remove the Soviet Union from any influence in the course of European politics" is most significant for the present international political situation. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's opinion that "the significance of the Anglo-German Agreement only partly consists in the establishment of a kind of Anglo-German front; the naval pact represents an essential part of the flanking maneuver of Germany, directed toward an understanding with France, which is almost compelled to conduct direct negotiations on the establishment of the ratio of the French and German land forces." As Comrade Stalin further remarks quite correctly, "the secret plan of National Socialist foreign policy, at the present, consists not so much in the establishment of the front Berlin-Warsaw-Rome with one hanger-on or another, but in the creation of the front Berlin-London-Paris, opening for Germany possibilities of embarking upon a partial realization of its expansionist program." The Politburo CPSU(b) subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that "in regard to Eastern Europe, Germany has decided to confine itself, in the immediate future, to the consolidation of its position in the Memel Territory and simultaneously to concentrate all efforts on advance in the direction of the Balkans by way of Austria. The Ethiopian conflict must, according to Berlin's calculations, turn out to be the decisive factor in the isolation of Italy in the Danubian area."

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously resolves to propose to the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy that they regard the concluding words of Comrade Stalin as a basic directive:

"The USSR must, in the future, continue to pursue, firmly and undeviatingly, the policy of using the League of Nations, and must struggle, using all available means, for the transformation of the plan of a collective system of guarantees of peace and security into a series of bilateral pacts allowing one to operate with the tactics of 'localization of conflicts' (Japan in China, Italy in Ethiopia, in the future—Germany in Austria, etc.). Soviet diplomacy must, above all, influence France to take a firm counter position against that finely, psychologically calculated trap in which Great Britain has already been caught and which Germany is now setting for France... Soviet diplomacy must treat quite attentively the possible application by Germany of an analogous tactic even in regard to the Soviet Union."

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of July 8, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of July 8, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that, to speak with the words of the [comrade] reporter, "the world political situation is characterized
by a sharpening of contradictions among the individual imperialist groupings and simultaneously is distinguished by an extraordinary growth of sentiment in favor of an international organization [pertaining to] a collective security system." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that "obviously the peace factors will prevail over the factors of aggressive adventurism as long as the USA, Great Britain, France, and the USSR pursue, unshakeably and firmly, a policy of counteraction against war." The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's assertion that "essentially only three Great Powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—are pursuing expansionist aims, threatening to provoke, in the process of their development, more or less serious armed conflicts: Memel Territory and Austria, Ethiopia and Outer Mongolia—these are the objects of the corresponding imperialist desires, which already in the immediate future, could be transformed into theaters of military action." The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously believes that Comrade Stalin is absolutely correct when he maintains that "one cannot otherwise avoid the aforementioned armed conflicts than through the creation of a system of international guarantees of peace and security and through the application of sanctions against the aggressor." The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the practical realization of the aforementioned aims in the first stages presupposes no more than "the creation of a lasting ring, of a barrier, around each of the states, which in view of the tendency of its development, is a permanent threat to its direct neighbors as well as to the idea of a collective peace and security system."

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously resolves:

1) to propose to the comrade leaders of Soviet foreign policy, expressing the strength and awareness of the power of the USSR, that they launch a decisive diplomatic counter-offensive against Japan by categorically maintaining the exclusiveness of the Soviet Union's interest in Outer Mongolia; to recommend to the NKID that it take, at once, appropriate steps in London and Washington with the aim of advancing together against the final and actual conquest of China by Japan;

2) to propose to the NKID leadership that it support, with all its energy, the principle of the inadmissibility of nonintervention on the part of the League of Nations in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict; the establishment of a unanimity of views on this point between the USSR and Great Britain would be an especially important success for Soviet diplomacy, for such a contact must logically lead to the British Cabinet's pursuing a policy of a world system of guarantees of peace and security as well as to the inclusion of the USA in the circle of active participation in such a system;

3) to propose to the NKID leadership that it renew its efforts in the direction of accelerating the realization of the Eastern Pact plan especially utilizing the change of sentiment in the Baltic and Scandinavian states frightened by the threat of German hegemony in the Baltic Sea, the natural result of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement; to recommend to the leadership of Soviet foreign policy that it pay special attention to the tension becoming noticeable in Ger-
man-Polish relations which allows Soviet diplomacy to aid actively the growth of essential disagreements between Berlin and Warsaw.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of August 4, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of August 4, 1935, Comrade J. V. Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to the assertion of the [comrade] reporter that "the three imperialist states—Germany, Japan and Italy—are consciously pushing the development of events in the direction of a new world war, since they are counting upon finally obtaining territories for themselves in a new repartitioning which they would unavoidably lose in the event of the establishment of a system of international peace and assistance guarantees."

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely shares Comrade Stalin's view that "the direction of Italian expansion and Italy's final goal do not affect the interests of the Soviet Union, but precipitate the danger of an Anglo-Italian conflict which could bind Great Britain's hands for a long time in the questions of Eastern European politics and especially in regard to the Far East . . . . The task of Soviet diplomacy consists in the active support of the French and British governments in the matter of as swift a liquidation as possible of the Ethiopian conflict and of the strengthening of the organization of the League of Nations, within whose framework the collective system of peace and security guarantees must finally be realized."

The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that Comrade Stalin is completely correct when he assumes that "only the simultaneous and decisive pressure of the Great Powers on Italy, not stopping even at this side of the threat of the application of radical sanctions, can compel Mussolini to abandon his plans for the conquest of Ethiopia . . . . Nevertheless, it is in the interests of the Soviet Union that the center of gravity of the Italian expansionist aspirations be transferred to the Danubian area from which a new sharpening of contradictions between Rome and Berlin on the Austrian question will result . . . . Soviet diplomacy must direct all efforts to transfer again the focus of the inevitable European conflict from Eastern Europe to Central Europe, especially since, in connection with the Danzig question, quite an essential upheaval in German-Polish relations is being ushered in which likewise must be utilized to the fullest extent by the leadership of Soviet foreign policy for the strengthening of the barriers to be created against German pressure toward the East."

The Politburo CPSU(b) considers it essential to draw the sharpest attention of the NKID leadership to the fact that, to speak with the words of Comrade Stalin, "the plans of conquest of Japanese imperialism will assume more tangible forms, the more tense the atmosphere becomes, created by the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and the new internal political crisis of Germany, driving, however, the latter to the slippery but only possible way out [to direct attention
away from class conflict] . . . . The situation in the Far East is, for the time being, such that a further retreat of the USSR before the pressure of Japanese militarism-imperialism is not conceivable without the loss of almost all the positions of the Soviet Union in Asia."

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to Comrade Stalin's explanation that "the Soviet Union cannot allow the conquest of the Mongolian People's Republic by Japan without risking the loss of large Far Eastern territories of the USSR east of Lake Baikal. . . . The advance of the Japanese-Manchurian forces to Ulan-Bator will inevitably mean the opening of military action between Japan and the USSR . . . . The Tokyo government must finally clearly feel and understand that this time we are not attempting a bluff, but we have firmly decided to defend our vital interests with arms. If Tokyo is actually convinced of this, then one can almost certainly expect that it will not go to war with the USSR."

In conclusion, the Politburo CPSU(b) considers it necessary to emphasize to the [comrade] leaders of Soviet foreign policy that under the conditions of the present international situation, the Soviet Union must carry out, firmly and undeviatingly, the line of rapprochement with Great Britain and the USA and thus narrow the contact established with France by means of this prerequisite. The Politburo CPSU(b) most emphatically calls the attention of the NKID leadership and of Comrade Litvinov to the fact that an understanding with Italy, desirable in itself, in no case may occur at the expense of Anglo-Soviet relations, finally entering the stage of a rapprochement.

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of August 8, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of August 8, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the new tactics of the international revolutionary proletariat, the Politburo CPSU(b) states with satisfaction that between the Communist International and the socialist parties belonging to the Second International, there are no essential differences of opinion at all in the estimation of the social-political world situation and in the evaluation of the basic tasks confronting the working class of the whole world. The Politburo CPSU(b) notes as a universally recognized thesis uniting all forces of the world proletariat, the assumption that Hitlerite Germany, at present, is the mightiest fortress of international fascism and that the military smashing of National Socialist Germany is one of the most important conditions for the unleashing of the proletarian revolution in Central Europe. The Politburo CPSU(b) furthermore affirms, with particular satisfaction, the firm and unanimous conviction of all the socialist parties, without exception, that the military victory of the Soviet Union appears as desirable for the entire working class, independently of the party membership of its individual groups. The Politburo CPSU(b) welcomes the firm determination, not only of the communist organizations, but also of the Menshevik-socialist organizations of the working class, to exploit any possible new war for the seizure of power and the overthrow of capitalism.
The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that a prevention of the war, not an acceleration, is in the interests of the world proletariat, since the postponement of a new world slaughter does not strengthen, but only weakens, the internal political positions of each fascist regime. Therefore, the world proletariat is compelled to support even the bourgeois-democratic regimes as long as they stand on the basis of the preservation of peace. The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's thesis that the creation of a mighty coalition of states against Germany, as well as the strengthening of the authority of the League of Nations, which will realize a system of collective security, are tasks which should receive the complete support of the world proletariat. In the opinion of the Politburo CPSU(b), the complete unanimity of all leading proletarian movements and parties lies in the fact that the regional pacts of mutual assistance among the states threatened by a German attack, as well as the armaments and organization of the national defense of the aforementioned states, deserve a definite support on the part of the working class.

The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the Soviet Union remains the nucleus of the future all-European and then world federation of the socialist workers' and peasants' republics. The Politburo CPSU(b) considers it not only possible but also necessary to dispel right now the apprehensions of a certain part of the proletariat that the Soviet Union's military policy could fall under the influence of its capitalist allies: this policy remains revolutionary and proletarian and is directed toward transforming the war into the world revolution. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully subscribes to Comrade Stalin's assertion that "the time has come to forget all differences of opinion in regard to principles and tactics within the working class . . . . Such a decisive moment has come, that an alliance with all forces opposing world fascism out of one consideration or another, is permissible. In the efforts to avert war, one may not forget that in the event of its occurrence, all means are good and permissible in order to inflict a defeat upon fascist reaction, [and] that all opponents of fascism, merely through the fact of this hostility, are allies of the revolutionary proletariat in its fight against the frightful and mighty enemy."

Resolution of the Politburo CPSU(b) of August 23, 1935

Having heard in its meeting of August 23, 1935, Comrade Stalin's report on the international situation and on the immediate tasks of Soviet foreign policy, the Politburo CPSU(b) comes to the unanimous conclusion that, to speak with the words of Joseph Vissarionovich, "the sharpening of British-Italian colonial contradictions threatening to wreck the whole matter of the creation of a system of peace and security guarantees clearly shows how unstable is the structure created by the victorious powers after the smashing of Germany and her allies as a result of the imperialist world war. Quite apart from the state of affairs arising in Central Europe on the fragments of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and representing a continuous source of varied conflicts, Italy and
Germany, the two Great Powers armed to the teeth, feel themselves discriminated against, although from different motives, in the control over areas suitable to the aims of colonization and possessing an abundant wealth of raw materials."

The Politburo CPSU(b) completely subscribes to Comrade Stalin's view that "the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, exceptionally sharpened as a result of the attitude taken by Mussolini personally, is again stirring up the temporarily calmed sea of imperialist contradictions and has raised the colonial problem to the fullest extent, even concealing the sharpest questions of European politics. The international situation now arising is characterized, above all, by the fact that the solution of the European problem, still possible a year ago, appears, independently of other, essentially more complicated problems of international politics, under the present conditions, only as a part of the total problem insoluble outside of the principles first introduced by the Soviet Union in the sphere of international relations."

The Politburo CPSU(b) is firmly convinced that the attempt of French diplomacy to return again to the basis of the London Agreement of February 3rd of this year is condemned to failure, as long as Great Britain sees itself confronted with the possibility of shaking the foundations of the British Empire, as a result of the spontaneous resistance, provoked by Italy, of the colored peoples against the Italian plan of a conquest of Ethiopia by force of arms. The Politburo CPSU(b) fully shares Comrade Stalin's assertion that "the basis of the Stresa Anglo-French-Italian front is absolutely not sufficient for London to build cooperation with Paris and Rome, bought at the price of convulsions, unavoidable in the event of an Italo-Ethiopian war, in Africa and Asia."

The Politburo CPSU(b) unanimously subscribes to the basic thesis of Comrade Stalin's report, according to which "the British government cannot allow, in any shape or form, an armed invasion of Italy in Ethiopia, and is compelled, not so much out of considerations of principle as of tactics, to take the road of absolute support of the League of Nations Covenant and of the Kellogg Pact, resulting in the possibility for Soviet diplomacy of a realization of the plan of an international system of security and assistance guarantees based on a corresponding extension of the British point of view on the Ethiopian conflict to all analogous cases in general."

The Politburo CPSU(b) considers it necessary to propose formally to the leaders of Soviet foreign policy that they take, opportunely, all diplomatic steps toward an adequate preparation for the League of Nations' meeting of September 4, 1935. The Politburo CPSU(b) believes that it is absolutely necessary to attain, not so much a concrete solution by the League of Nations in regard to the settlement of the individual case of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, as the actual transformation of the apparatus of the League of Nations into the executive organ of the Geneva institution capable, on the basis of the Covenant, of applying sanctions to any aggressor.

In conclusion, the Politburo CPSU(b) must stress especially Comrade
Stalin's assertion that "a repartitioning of the colonial mandates is in the interests of the entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union, particularly, however, the appeasement of the colonial requirements of Italy and Germany, especially since, in this latter case, it appears possible to transfer gradually the center of gravity of the inevitable conflict to the sphere of colonial contradictions among the individual imperialist Great Powers, but under circumstances corresponding to the interests of the USSR's foreign policy."
This diorama of a crusader departing for the Holy Land (c. 1194) shows in some detail the chain mail conical headgear, the broadsword at his side, and the kite-shaped shields of the men who are probably the lord's household retainers.
Between 1066 and 1087, William the Conqueror and his Normans imposed a military and political system upon the Anglo-Saxons that was modified considerably during the years following William’s death in 1087 as crises occurred and as William’s successors saw fit to alter it. The period from the battle of Hastings to the Inquest of 1166, in fact, witnessed profound changes in the English military system, changes which have been thoroughly studied by the great scholars of medieval English warfare such as John Beeler of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.¹ This essay goes a chronological step farther and examines some of the changes in English medieval warfare between 1150 and 1250. In doing so, the purpose of this essay is twofold:

(1) to present a historiographical summary of the major nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship on English medieval warfare from 1150 and 1250,

(2) to comment upon the major military development of the period, focusing on the following areas: (a) the composition of armies, (b) tactics and strategy, (c) fortification, (d) arms and armor, and (e) the cost of war. Specific campaigns and battles are mentioned to illuminate the commentary.

John Marshall Carter
But first, a word about current scholarship regarding medieval military history and about the role of the Norman Conquest in influencing medieval warfare and society will place medieval warfare during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in its proper historical perspective. Since World War II, the study of medieval military history has witnessed a great revival. For almost seventy years, Sir Charles Oman, the dean of medieval military historians, held a unique position in the study of medieval warfare. His original essay "The History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages," written when Sir Charles was an undergraduate at Oxford in 1884, not only won the Lothian Prize but dominated the study of medieval warfare until the 1950s and 60s. The lengthy essay was expanded into two large volumes in 1924. In 1953, John Beeler saw the need for making Oman's ideas available to a wider audience, edited the original essay, and added the latest findings by medievalists. While praising Oman's originality, Beeler pointed to the obvious flaws in Oman's work and suggested a number of English and continental studies important to the student of medieval military history.

Until recent scholars suggested otherwise, the prevailing view was that warfare in the Middle Ages consisted of the deliberate and courageous—yet stupid—charge of heavy cavalry. From the battle of Adrianople in 378 A.D. (the harbinger of Rome's death) to the battles of Crecy (1346) and Poitiers (1356) in the Hundred Years' War, the armored horseman allegedly carried the day. Added to this was the more accurate view that the majority of medieval engagements were sieges. Although scholars have, on the whole, agreed with Oman's assertion about the nature of fortress warfare, many writers have pointed to a number of flaws in his "heavy cavalry" thesis. Beeler in Warfare in England, Hollister in The Military Organization of Norman England, and John Schlight in Monarchs and Mercenaries have shown that even though the mounted levy of knights was the symbolic core of the medieval army, English armies always contained non-feudal elements.

In their research into the Norman Conquest—the greatest event of English medieval history—scholars have divided into two camps: those who agree with the findings of John Horace Round, the nineteenth-century aristocrat-historian, and those who adhere to the views of Edward A. Freeman, whose magnum opus, The History of the Norman Conquest, continues to be the greatest survey of that great event. Round saw the Conquest as a great aristocratic revolution, while Freeman considered it to be a mere turning point which altered little the institutions of Anglo-Saxon England. At this point, the consensus is with Round, yet Freeman still has his adherents. In the military history field, Beeler, Hollister, and R. Allen Brown side with the Roundian view while Eric John and Schlight have re-asserted the ideas of Freeman. With all due respects to H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, two diligent scholars of the Conquest, the Normans had a great deal to teach the Anglo-Saxons. Nowhere was this fact so obvious as in war.

The Norman Conquest caused a great many changes in the English military system. It brought about the institution of knights on horseback; it introduced a
system of vassalic commendation; it created the fief; and it produced the private fortress. All was not new, however. The Normans never destroyed anything that worked, and the Conquest merely added new dimensions to English warfare. The fyrd units (i.e., the general militia) of Anglo-Saxon England, for instance, were led now by the chivalry of Normandy.

One of the last acts of the Norman conqueror, William, was the collection of the Domesday Inquest. Militarily, this great document was the beginning of a centralizing and organizing process which would continue throughout the period from 1150 to 1250. There were threats of invasion throughout the Conqueror's reign. None came, but the threat was always imminent. To prepare for an invasion, the Conqueror needed information about the military strength of the realm. The Domesday returns provided him with this information.

While medieval armies of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were in no way comparable in size to many of their ancient and modern counterparts, there was a certain increase in numbers from the battle of the Standard (or, Northallerton) in 1138 and the battle of Bouvines in July of 1214. The crusading armies of Richard the Lionhearted of England tended to be greater in size than the field armies fighting in Europe, but the research of the German historian Hans Delbruck nevertheless shows that the Grand Armee of a William the Conqueror, Henry II, or King John was a myth. The small population of medieval Europe compelled armies to be small. Knowing this fact about size, a look at the more important element of composition should illuminate our understanding of medieval English armies of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Sir Charles Oman's heavy cavalry thesis must meet with the pikesquare of fact. In believing that the heavy horse-charge of knights constituted medieval warfare, Sir Charles saw infantry units in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as absolutely insignificant. The foot soldiers, according to his view, accompanied the army for no better purpose than to perform the menial duties of the camp or to assist in the numerous sieges. Professor Round's Feudal England encouraged much the same view. Indeed, most of Round's critics point to his lack of interest in the non-feudal elements of English medieval warfare.

Most contemporary medievalists agree that the military needs of English kings could never have been met from feudal sources alone. R.C. Smail's "Art of War," an important article of synthesis in Poole's Medieval England, Beeler's Warfare in England, Hollister's Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, and J.O. Prestwich's "War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State" have all illuminated our understanding of the composition of Anglo-Norman and Angevin armies: Smail reviewed the latest findings on medieval warfare up to the 1960s, Beeler focused on the campaigns of Anglo-Norman armies, Hollister studied the society which produced the Anglo-Norman armies, and Prestwich explained the importance of money in the maintenance of medieval English armies, proving that, in addition to the bond of vassalage, the tangible bond of money was significant. Further, chapter LI of the Magna Carta is a contemporary reflection of the complexity of the Angevin military force.
This weapon was decisive in "unhorsing" the medieval horseman. The halberd was three weapons in one: a pike for stabbing or prodding, an axe, and a hook used to unhorse a rider.
had known mercenary armies since the Norman Conquest and before. Not only were they indispensable for English warfare, but King John had a particular preference for them. When salaries could not be paid, however, a mercenary army might turn on its host. And the great barons of England saw in the mercenary armies an instrument by which the king could encroach upon their power. Nevertheless the heyday of the feudal knight was a short one in England. By the beginning of the twelfth century, although kings continued to rely heavily on the contingents of tenants-in-chief, various military factors led them to depend increasingly on non-feudal elements.

The mounted warrior remained the core of the English army in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, and the means through which he was trained, mustered, and finally deployed are important. According to Beeler, training was almost non-existent for knights as tactical units. Like many modern soldiers, the medieval soldier got considerable on-the-job training. Hollister has suggested, without much evidence, that castle-guard in peacetime may have been used for training purposes, but it appears that on-the-job experience played the greatest role in the training of a knight.

English armies continued to be mustered in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as they had been in the eleventh. A summons of William I in 1072 gives us a contemporary illustration of the process:

William, king of the English, to Athelwig, abbot of Evesham, greeting. I command you to summon all those who are under your charge and administration that they shall have ready before me at Clarendon on the octave of Pentecost all the knights that they owe me.

This royal command for service was renewed in 1181, the year of Henry II’s great Assize of Arms:

... each of them shall swear to have these arms before the feast of Saint Hilary, to be faithful to the lord king Henery ... and to bear these arms in his service ....

The tradition was continued by King John in 1212:

The king to the reeves and good men of Canterbury, etc. We command you that ... you have with well prepared with horses and arms, forty of the soldier and better men of our town of Canterbury, that they may well be fit and ready to cross the sea with us in our service ....

Offensively, medieval armies—as we can infer from these royal commands—were slow in getting started. On the other hand, as a defensive system feudalism was almost perfect, since no organization ever devised could so quickly produce an effective military force wherever it was needed.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to cite a battle between armies composed entirely of feudal troops. In fact, most battles of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries contained fewer knights than other elements. How many knights were available to the Angevin kings of England and what were other
sources of military personnel? By the Inquest of 1166, the famous *Cartae Baronum*, Henry II took a great step toward organizing the feudal levy of England. According to Round, the Inquest of 1166 provided a new feudal assessment, which was a great advantage to the Crown. If a lord had enfeoffed fewer knights than his *servitium debitum* required, the Crown considered this to be a minimum. If a lord had enfeoffed more than he was required, the Crown added that excess to his pre-existing assessment and, in actuality, increased the service due from him. Hollister does not see *Cartae Baronum* as a great victory for the Crown, emphasizing that Henry asked his tenants-in-chief how many knights they had enfeoffed rather than demanding that knowledge of them. The gist of the *Cartae Baronum* was: (1) how many knights were enfeoffed up to the death of Henry I (1135)? (2) how many knights were enfeoffed between 1135 and 1166? (3) how many remain charged upon the demesne? (4) what are the names of the enfeoffed knights? Clearly, the military necessities of the early years of Henry's reign and the remembrance of the chaos during Stephen's reign (1135-1154) forced the greatest of the Angevins to re-assess the feudal levy. 14

Of the sources of non-feudal strength available to the Angevins, the most obvious one was the conquered English. The Anglo-Saxon fyrd (the general militia) had already been used by the Norman kings to supplement the feudal host. From early Anglo-Saxon times, there existed a belief that every freeman should bear arms in defense of the shire. There was also the Great Fyrd and the Select Fyrd. The Great Fyrd was a local defensive militia summoned only in time of invasion and serving only within one-half day's march of the town. The Select Fyrd were men who had some expertise with arms and who served with undertenants. If the undertenant was summoned by his lord, he would gather the members of the Select Fyrd. Fyrd units proved their worth quite handsomely at the Standard. The Ordinance for the Preservation of the Peach of 1242 demonstrates the continuance of such non-aristocrats in units for military service in the reign of Henry III. The Commission of Array in 1278 also confirms that feudal and non-feudal elements served together. 15 Oman contradicted his own heavy cavalry thesis when he implied that most monarchs were forced to rely on yet another non-feudal element, "inferior in morale to the feudal force." Beeler's newer edition of Oman's work cited the examples of mercenaries used in the reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard. Thus, mercenaries were not new to Angevin England, but the increased use of them in the reigns of Henry II, Richard I, and John helped to institutionalize mercenary service in England—an institution much disliked by the native populace. John Schlight insists that mercenaries dominated warfare during the reigns of Henry II, Richard I, and John. Henry could not count entirely on the feudal levy, since on any given day, knights who owed military service might be unable to provide it. 16 Therefore, Henry expanded the policy of his predecessors by allowing knights to commute their service to a money payment, institutionalizing the practice of scutage (i.e., sending money to the lord instead of coming in person to provide military service; the word itself comes from the
Latin *scutum*, shield. Thus, scutage is "shield money").

The campaigns in Wales in 1165, the Irish campaigns of 1170/71, and the English phase of the revolt of 1173/74 are key examples of Henry's reliance on hired troops. Henry learned that the feudal levy was ineffective in the rugged terrain of Wales and bought a detachment of light-armed Welsh to fight against their own kinsmen. The Welsh bowmen subsequently became famous throughout Europe. In 1169, English knights and Welsh mercenaries helped Earl "Strongbow" overcome the challengers to Dermot McMurrough's Irish throne. Henry's mercenaries faced their toughest challenge in 1173/74, the only serious threat from within England throughout Henry's reign. Henry had to fight a two-front war, a challenge he handled with his Brabantine and Welsh mercenaries. In one month Henry's continental mercenaries defeated the rebel leader Hugh Bigod, a battle the so-called militia had been fighting for twelve months.

The campaign of 1189, culminating in Richard the Lionhearted's defeat of his father at Le Mans, proved that the son had learned his lessons well. Richard defeated Henry by taking part of his father's mercenary force. On the continent of Europe and in Palestine, Richard continued his father's mercenary policy. But if Richard had used mercenaries, John was to make them the sole source of his strength: as F.M. Powicke maintains, "the chief reason of his failure to secure the support of his subject." The horror of mercenary warfare has been one of the oft-quoted—and unfair—indictments of John.

The military problems of handling a loosely-knit empire forced the Angevin kings to turn to sources other than feudal to fill the ranks of their armies. Mercenaries and the fyrd units had been employed in Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman England, but the Angevins made mercenaries an institution. One of the most important military developments in England between 1150 and 1250 was this formation of a complex military force with feudal and non-feudal elements working side by side.

In the realm of tactics and strategy, medieval generals have been sorely criticized. Oman remarked: "If the minor operations of war were badly understood, strategy—the higher branch of the military art—was absolutely non-existent." This view, like the heavy cavalry thesis, has been superseded by more modern scholarship. Beeler has shown that medieval tacticians and strategists were no more blundering than their modern counterparts. Oman described the development of a typical medieval army this way: "it was usual to form the whole of the cavalry into three great masses, or 'battles,' and launch them at the enemy." Keeping a reserve in hand as a trump card, according to Oman's view, was not practiced by medieval commanders. However, time and again, tactical and strategical ingenuity appears in English warfare of the Middle Ages. Stephen certainly showed strategical expertise in keeping his enemies from massing against him simultaneously. Henry II most assuredly constructed castles to weaken the position of a powerful lord—a strategical move. And the greatest military expert of all the Angevins, Richard
A detailed view of a kite-shaped shield used by medieval warriors from the tenth to the thirteenth century. It is approximately four feet tall, made of wood, and reinforced with strands of iron.
I (1189-99), was sometimes under suspicion by his French knights, who could not understand why Richard would not plow headlong into the enemy without first securing a sound base of operations. The Lionheart showed his mastery over the Turkish commander, Saladin, and returned to Europe in 1195-96 to out-fortify his French rival, Philip Augustus. Richard's crusading experience, his strategical and tactical superiority, and his use of mercenaries were instrumental in ignominiously routing his tactically and strategically over-matched opponent.

John showed a surprising knowledge of the importance of swift movements in his victory at Mirebeau in 1202. His force of knights and mercenaries surprised Arthur of Brittany's troops and crushed them before they were deployed. The two humiliating military defeats in Normandy in 1204 and at Bouvines in 1214, on the other hand, demonstrate John's lethargy. There, he either could not or did not react quickly or effectively. Bouvines, the most decisive battle in Angevin history, has provoked some conflict among scholars. Certainly it was the battle in which the greatest number of troops were employed in the thirteenth century: Philip Augustus had a force of 27,000 for the defense of Normandy. Oman called the battle a "mere scuffle," reinforcing his idea that medieval warfare in the field consisted of two groups of knights running headlong into one another and then engaging in personal melees until a victor emerged. Other scholars see more in the battle: Beeler lauds the strategic genius of Philip Augustus and his use of a medieval combined operation, a rare manoeuvre for the thirteenth century in which two separate armies converged upon a common enemy after much strategic planning.

The period 1150 to 1250 thus indicates a transition in medieval strategy and tactics—from the dismounted cavalry phalanx of Lincoln (1141) to the combined operations of Bouvines (1214). Eleventh-century pre-Conquest armies might affirm Oman's heavy cavalry and strategical blunder theories, but the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw infantry being used in ingenious ways: combined operations, interior lines, rear-guard action, and ruse of various kinds, usually the employment of a tactical vacuum (such as at Hastings in 1066) or the execution of an ambush. Feigned flights were used by the crusaders in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

In the realm of fortification, Beeler believes that medieval commanders expressed surprising strategical skill, since many quickly-constructed, motte-and-bailey castles were erected in strategically-significant places in twelfth and thirteenth-century England. R. Allen Brown disagrees and insists that the geographical knowledge of medieval English commanders was so slight that they could not possibly have built castles strategically. The argument over the origin of military architecture—the private fortress—is long-standing. G.T. Clark in Medieval Military Architecture maintained that the Anglo-Saxon burh, the walled village, was a Saxon castle. In 1912, Ella S. Armitage's definitive work about the introduction of the private fortress into England refutes Clark by showing that the words motte and mota did not appear in documents until the twelfth century. Armitage and A. Hamilton Thompson in Military Architecture
of England During the Middle Ages both conclude that motte-and-bailey fortifications were built invariably in arable country, a point with which F.M. Powicke agrees: "A castle was not a strategic point in a planned system of fortification, but the military and administrative center of a district or a barony which provided knights to guard it and a means to supply it." 22

There were few stone buildings in the eleventh century and throughout the reign of Henry I. Henry II made numerous changes in the fortification system of England between 1154 and 1189. He substituted stone for wood at many castles. He placed castles at strategic points within the realm: (1) at main waterways and along the coast, (2) along the Welsh marches, (3) on the Scottish frontier. His primary innovation involved the building of polygonal keeps instead of the more common square or rectangular ones, an innovation that came about because of the advanced methods of siegecraft. Trebuchets (accurate stone-throwing machines based on the principle of counterpoise), superseded the less-effective mangonels, or catapults, of Roman days. Sapping and mining became an art. It was easy to mine the corner of a square-based keep which sent it sprawling to the ground. Polygonal keeps—and eventually round ones—guarded against being overturned by a crew of miners. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed a relentless race between besiegers and besieged to invent the perfect weapon. The greatest thirteenth century innovation was the keepless castle and the construction of a castle which consisted of a square or oblong court surrounded by a strong wall with massive towers at right angles. These castles gave greater protection from trebuchet shots and allowed the defenders in the towers to create a crossfire which presented a formidable obstacle to those unfortunate enough to jump from a scaling ladder onto the wall-walk. 21

A brief scholarly scuffle has ensued because of the long-standing belief that the returning crusaders brought back ingenious fortification ideas from Palestine. Oman gave the Easterners credit for improving fortification in the West in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a view challenged by Armitage and Smail. Armitage concedes that Richard I learned something about siegecraft and castle construction in Palestine, but believes that the warrior considered it inferior and therefore did not incorporate his learning in the construction of Chateau-Gaillard. Smail suggests that many aspects of Latin fortification in Palestine already existed in Europe before the Crusades and that the increased size and appearance of castles in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries resulted from greater wealth and the changing needs of society.

Defensive armor developed only slightly from 1150 to 1250. The age of chain mail was in its heyday. The Bayeux Tapestry and other artistic illustrations reveal that the body armor of the Anglo-Norman and Angevin knight and footman—if he could afford it—changed very little from the last quarter of the eleventh century to the middle of the thirteenth. Leg armor, on the one hand, became more apparent. The mail breeches were reinforced at the knees by solid metal guards. A trend toward reinforcing the breast area with metal plates shows the increased use of the charge with a lance levelled at the enemy
 Courtesy: World Heritage Museum, University of Illinois

Photo: A Hauberk of Chain Mail, 8th Through 14th Century
(Suzon Grogan Carter)

A coat of mail offered protection along with flexibility for the medieval knight who could afford it. The period 1150 to 1250 witnessed the continued use of mail but with periodic additions of plate armor over the mail.
The conical helmet of the Normans and Anglo-Saxons gave way to the heaume which almost completely covered the head.
horseman. By the end of this period, a few pieces of plate armor were beginning to appear.\textsuperscript{22}

While the mail hauberk continued to be the standard defensive armor of medieval aristocrats, there were considerable changes in head gear. From the Bayeux Tapestry, we know that the conical skull cap with nose-guard dominated head-gear in the eleventh century. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the trend developed which eventually encased the whole head in a metal helmet, the \textit{heaume}. This change indicates the increased use of bowmen who might let loose a volley which could blind or kill, even accidentally.

The long bow, for which the English became famous in the Hundred Years' War, dueled for existence with the crossbow, or arbalester, in the period 1150-1250. The Church helped the cause of the long bow quite accidentally. In 1139, the Lateran Council condemned the use of the crossbow, contending that its penetration was not suited for Christian warfare. Both Richard I of England and Philip Augustus of France introduced the crossbow into their respective armies. John of England preferred a mercenary detachment of crossbowmen. The victorious royalist forces at Lincoln on 20 May 1217 included 406 knights and 317 crossbowmen. In addition, the crossbow was valuable for either laying or raising a siege.

The trebuchet, the engine for flinging heavy stones into castles, was the most significant siege innovation of the period 1150-1250. Firsthand evidence for these "wild asses," as they were called, comes from the sketchbook of Villard de Honnecourt, a great military engineer. At the least, the trebuchet forced architets to build higher walls around their castles.\textsuperscript{23}

Any discussion which includes the composition of medieval English armies, their tactics and strategy, their fortifications, and their armor and weapons cannot overlook a most important element—money. How was the money attained to pay for soldiers and the \textit{materiel} for war? Land could not constitute the single source of payment. Much of the cost of war was paid by scutage, an institution used by Henry II on seven occasions, each time in conjunction with a major military campaign. The Pipe Rolls lead us to believe that Henry bought the defense of England. By levying scutage, Henry did not have to depend on the feudal levy, but could have the best troops money could buy. Both his sons, Richard and John, used scutage to the limit, particularly John. In chapter XII of \textit{Magna Carta}, the key word is scutage. Unfortunately for John, great losses in war, higher prices, and personal problems had forced him to increase the revenue to the point where he became so dependent upon his tenants that he had to acquiesce to chapter XII. Such monetary problems were also passed on to John's son Henry III (1216-1272).

Until recently it was commonplace to assess a knight's wages at eight pence a day for forty days' service a year. But C. Warren Hollister has shown that there is no solid evidence for such a view. Knights' wages, scutage rates, and the length of wartime or peacetime service all fluctuated during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. A customary turn at Richmond was 60 days; Saint Edmund's Abbey's knights served 90 days; at Hastings Castle, the knights served
The increased usage of the bow and the general deadliness of warfare inspired the creation of helmets which began to encase the head.
This particular arbalest has the cranequin (winding device) as its distinguishing feature. Arbalests (crossbows) of the period c. 1150 to c. 1250 did not have this feature. The crossbow's penetrating power, along with the development of firearms, eventually made body armor obsolete.
A stark contrast to the flexible chain mail of the period c. 1150 to c. 1250 was the total encasement of the body in plate armor. By the time this major step had been taken in the history of armor, the Middle Ages had nearly run their course.
a month three times a year. Many tenants found it easier to serve their tour of duty than to commute them to money payments. Tenants, in many cases, probably resisted attempts at forced commutation. Richard I even imposed a system more strenuous than scutage on the feudal levy of England; he assessed a fine pro servicio which was almost always in excess of scutage.

Money thereby became as important as land in Angevin warfare. Bryce Lyon has suggested that the fief-rente, or money fief, was the bridge which connected feudalism and the indenture system. Militarily, the fief-rente was an annual sum paid to an individual in return for service. Money fiefs were only granted by the king. By John’s reign, the great majority of the men in the king’s service, apart from the mercenaries, were knights and men-at-arms who fought for a fixed wage. It was John’s misfortune to have reigned in a period of great inflation: he had to pay two shillings a day to hire a mercenary for whom Henry II would have paid only eight pence.44

Under Henry II and Richard I, scutages had been raised always with reference to bona fide military expeditions. But the summonses and campaigns of John were often mere pretexts for raising money, and the military operations were trifling, if carried out at all. In 1201, the king assembled an army at Portsmouth to cross into Normandy. The king of France, on hearing of this, gave up the sieges he had undertaken. John sent home most of the army, first taking from each man the money he had brought for his personal expenses. Yet John, with all his shortcomings, did only what Henry and Richard had done, except at thirteenth century prices.

By 1250, the mounted warrior, while still the dominant force in English medieval warfare, was not alone. Feudalism, medieval Europe’s method of dealing with military and political crises, was being replaced by non-feudal military elements such as the money-fief and mercenaries. In strategy and tactics, medieval generals such as Richard I showed more generalship than merely overseeing an undisciplined slaughter. Great innovations occurred in fortress construction and in siege engines. Truly, if the twelfth century witnessed a Renaissance in arts, letters, and architecture, then the thirteenth century witnessed a comparable rejuvenation in military ideas.
NOTES

1 I would like to thank Professor John Beeler for helping me to understand the significance of medieval warfare. His continued encouragement is a constant inspiration. Bennett D. Hill, Chairman of the History Department at the University of Illinois, and Donald E. Queller, Professor of medieval history at the University of Illinois, have also made significant contributions to my understanding of the nuances of medieval life. Professor John Lynn, military historian at the University of Illinois, has encouraged me in the pursuit of medieval military history. I appreciate the assistance of Ms. Betty Wendland, Assistant Director of the World Heritage Museum, University of Illinois. Lastly, I would also like to thank the referees for San Jose Studies, whose timely suggestions helped me avoid many pitfalls.


3 Chapter I of Beeler’s Warfare in England deals with the campaign of 1066.

4 Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, xv.; Oman, Art of War (Beeler edition), 67.


Beeler, "Composition of . . . Armies," 248; *Warfare in Feudal Europe*, 107-110; the *Cartae Baronum* were inquests made by Henry II to determine how many knights had been enfeoffed by his tenants-in-chief since the time of his grandfather, Henry I: the servitium debitum was the quota of knights that had been established during the reign of William I; Round, *Feudal England*, 178; Hollister, *Military Organization*, 31-40.


20 Smail explains that infantry in the Holy Land was formed around the levy of mounted knights, *Crusading Warfare*, 115-117. When the knights were ready to charge, gaps would open in the infantry allowing the cavalry to pursue the enemy. *Interior lines* were established whenever one opponent could successfully communicate between two allied armies and keep them from massing against him; King Stephen was able to establish interior lines during the Anarchy. *Rear-guard action* ensued when an opponent circumvented the enemy's front and attacked the enemy's rear — many times this was the baggage guard of medieval armies; see Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 128-129.


21 Two stone castles, one at London and another at Colchester, were built immediately after the Conquest, but these were exceptions; Vesey, *A History of War and Weapons*, 449-1660 (New York, 1966), 50-51; Armitage, *Norman Castles* 351; 366; Schlight, *Monarchs*, 69; Norman, *War and Weapons*, 56-57.

21 Oman, *Art of War*, 71-72; Armitage, *Norman Castles*, 376; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 238-239; F.M. Stenton, *The Bayeux Tapestry* (New York, 1957); good representations of thirteenth century knights and their equipment were drawn by Matthew Paris, the famous English historian. A helpful one is reprinted in Vesey Norman's *Arms and Armour* (London, 1972), 13; a similar print can be
seen in Charles H. Ashdown's *British and Foreign Arms and Armours* (London, 1909), 106; a good pictorial account of the development of leg armor is available in J.S. Gardner's *Armour in England* (London, 1898), 23. The *cuisse* covered the thigh while the *poleyn* covered the knee.


POETRY
DAVID CITINO

LETTERS FROM THE SHAMAN

THE COUVADE

My shadow kneels along the wall
trembling to the fire-rhythm,
night a threat outside the hut,
its speartip pricking wounds of light
in patterns in the sky.
I fall into a nine-month dream.

When I emerge it’s dawn.
I assemble the people, leap among them
like monkey, paut and squeal
like a widow in the bushes with three warriors,
drum and bull-roarer guiding my feet and hips,
member swollen like a melon.

I sing: “Cut my limbs to wet the crops
and slake the thirst you earned in birth.
I’ll suck poison from your wounds,
demons from beneath your tongue,
spit out stones to give you proof.
Empty womb woman? I’ll fill you every year.

Troubled in love old man? I’ll make it hard
for you. Wish any beast into your totem.
I’ll wear its cunning into your hut
on the night your daughter bleeds,
a son comes home with bloody hands.”
Night returns me to the hut.

I kneel between my shadow and the fire.
RITES

Until you can discern
your left hand from the right
and words that mean merely
what they say from
words that mean much more,
you've no rites.

When you confuse a neighbor's
wife with your own or
calculate that another's increase
diminishes what you are,
your hands become two sins.
Rites make them hands again.

Rites inform you when a life
begins or ends, when it's time
to call a girl "field," a boy "the plow."
Rites draw blood, draw out blame
as poison's sucked from a puncture.
Rites are even when you lie together.

If life's a crackling fire,
rites are kindling, flint and smoke.
If life's a river, rites
are its two banks, the gourds
you use to bring it home, its sweetness
on the tongue, the water you return.
RITES OF THE BODY

Inside this tent
fashioned by the skill
father learns from father,
dim with family shades and scents,
creaking in the wind and stained
with the blood of fallen seasons,
I'm dancing.

KNIFE AND HUNTING, NETS AND LOVE

He
Make your mark
on me, fathers.
Cut me with the knife
blunted by
your lust for custom.
I've watched you
all my youth,
long enough to know
the ritual of pretending
to be no longer soft and young.
Hurt me enough
to make me want
to hunt.

She
I blame my pains
on the new moon, mother.
I'm pierced by its horns,
my lips the shade of blood.
I'm not allowed to garden or mend
nets for fear the yam and salmon
will wither
with the change
that swells my hips,
gorges my breasts,
the ache that tells me
it's become my right
to love.
RITES OF THE WIND

Wind's the god of discontent,
cold lips pressed to the flower,
sultry breath in winter's ear.

Ever just a shade in front of
or behind your looking, it sits
in fire until the time for smoke,
delves in the belly until
loving or the chase trumpets out
your joy or warning

as far away as hill or forest,
as far as back again. Walk
to greet it, and it'll make you weep.

The seventh rain after one
you love's gone dry enough
to fly away in wind, light as

August soil, will bear her scent,
against your lips feel soft
as hers, her fingers in your hair,

a sign you've mourned too long
one you could no more keep
from coming and going

than you could prevent the wind.
A CHARM FOR BARREN COUPLES

Lie on your back together
at the end of summer
in grass tall as a boy who's
reached the age of reason
but not the season of lust and rage,
grass rippling like
the long hair of a young girl
running barefoot toward
the place the wind comes from.

Wait just long enough for stars.
RITUAL OF THE POND

A man who’s walked a long time
and decided he can walk no more
looks into a pond
just as his father’s swollen face
drifts to the surface
haloed in ripples fashioned
by the rhythm of the wind,
his grimace a crescent of new moon.

The words hiss from stiff lips
thin as a wind that’s filtered
through pines: "This is the way, son,
this way."

In those brimming eyes he finds
what he’s been looking for.
As he steps
the dark waters rise to greet him.
RITES OF THE RAIN

When night
tosses in fever
the morning will weep.
When lovers tumble and roll
through the dawn
clouds must wait to anoint them.

The moon
loses its shape
ten hours before hard rain.
A woman can lose hers
any afternoon she and a lover
shiver and dance in fear of age.

The trees
lose their light
six hours before a storm.
Familiar lovers lose theirs
the first dark time
they sleep all through the night.

Where lightning
strikes go dig your well.
Water and fire bring
discovery and life,
and love that trickles
from somewhere sacred and deep.
LAMENT

How insubstantial these dwellings are, fragile in the slightest wind, celebrating the majesty of seasons with the song of their own decay;

how disappointing the craftsman, who keeps us dreaming of palaces filled with joy and health yet can’t keep us happy and well,

who keeps us dreaming of living forever, yet for all the magic and skill in his fingers can’t keep us from waking to death.
THE bank manager, a man so thin his suit seemed unoccupied, led Marty Mandell to the vault, ceremoniously introduced him to #146, and inserted his master key into the slot above it. Then he folded his arms—or at least the sleeves—to await further developments. That should be the job description, Marty thought: “Must invest money transactions with the formality of prayer.” A few words about Aunt Tillie seemed in order as Marty lined up the drawer, his pen, and a yellow pad before his witness in the cubicle.

“Did you know Mrs. Samuelson, Mr. Kennicut?”

The stick figure swayed alarmingly before Marty realized he was merely rocking back and forth on his heels. “Indeed I did. Been in this branch four years now. Pleasant woman. Account in order. Short, wasn’t she? Your aunt, I understand.”

The sentences shot out in staccato bursts. Not like Tillie, thought Marty. That dumpling was able to give words a relaxing home from which they emerged sugared, spiced, in loaves of free association. After a week, it was still painful to realize he wouldn’t hear her again, urging him to get married and have a good meal with equal vigor.

Now he had to perform this bitter task, nephew and executor, lawyer and friend. Aunt Tillie’s open heart and wallet had been closed by an untimely cerebral hemorrhage while she’d been pinning on a badge for her volunteer Tuesdays at the hospital.

Back to business. The long drawer was full of documents. After a year of estate work for Bryce & Bryce, he knew exactly what to do. “This is an official inventory, Mr. Kennicut. When I’ve completed the listing, your signature and mine will be witnessed by two of your staff. I’ll remove nothing at this time unless we come upon an instruction sheet on the disposition of these assets. Mrs. Samuelson’s will is already in my possession.”
The exclamation mark became a parenthesis as the gentleman leaned over Marty's shoulder during the recital: mutual funds, insurance policies, bank books, stocks in public utilities, a velvet box filled with old-fashioned cuff-links and brooches. When Marty's hand reached the last stack, he thought he'd found cherished photographs. The rubber band disintegrated at his touch.

"Just some—" His voice broke off at the same moment Kennicut bent down further to see the black-and-white prints. Was it possible? The first one featured a young girl lifting her petticoats while her dog—. Marty quickly put it at the end of the pile, only to expose a group of three women who—.

"My word," offered an almost-strangled Kennicut. "Mrs. Samuelson. Are they all—?"

While his mind refused the message, Marty's hands continued to shuffle the lewd deck till he was once more facing the girl with the too faithful pet. Aunt Tillie of the reading volunteers for the blind? What had she been reading them? Aunt Tillie of Weekends-in-the-Sun for City Children? Did they by any chance stop at a photography studio on their way to grassy fields?

It was madness. Not the slightest whisper, in a family in which whispering could power windmills, had ever tarnished Aunt Tillie. Her father's favorite child, only sister of six brothers. Married at twenty, widowed at sixty. And now dead and dishonored at seventy.

No, not dishonored. Not unless he could not rise to the occasion and perform one small service in return for all she'd done for others. "Mr. Kennicut, you can see that for purposes of the estate these are without value. I'll simply list them as 'miscellaneous photographs of a personal nature' and take them now. Will that be satisfactory?"

The man rocked himself to a standstill. "Perfectly satisfactory. Quite appropriate." He buzzed for the clerk while Marty transferred the contraband to his attache case. The rest went back into the box. Soon the inventory was signed and witnessed and a very shaken nephew emerged into mid-afternoon traffic.

That evening Marty was ostensibly playing chess with Sally Goodman in her pillow-filled living room. The board was on the coffee table, the only article in the room that didn't sway under pressure. She asked him, "Are you thinking or are you dead? Blink if you have understood this message."

"Sorry, Sal." He shook himself into a semblance of attention but didn't advance a man. Neither did he retreat.

"I knew the mind would go one day, Einstein." She batted him on the head with a ball-fringed paisley circle. "Where should I ship the body?"

"Please," he winced. "I'm still edgy about my Aunt Tillie. No bad jokes."

"In that case—" She swept the pieces into a heap and plopped down on her knees beside him, hands massaging the back of his neck. "May I ask why? It was sudden, yes, but she wasn't all that young."

Marty considered the pert, cheerful market researcher, short brown hair half over one cheek, eyes as inquisitive as a spaniel's. She had become important to
him since they’d met over her aunt’s estate a year earlier. “I’d like to tell you. But it’s confidential.”

She pushed him into the foam rubber, hands at his throat. “Swear me in as your deputy or I’ll kill you.”

“I’m embarrassed.”

“You can spell it.”

“You’ll think it’s too good a story not to spill.”

“Never. I’ll even call it You-Know-What when I’m talking to you.”

“Okay, you win. Let me up.” He ran his fingers through his lint-filled hair, a sure sign he’d been visiting Sally. “You remember my aunt? At the Cousins’ Club picnic?”

“Sure. A tiny, energetic bandanna print. Cute. She was crazy about you, Marty.”

“That’s the one.” He sighed down to his ankles. “She collected dirty pictures.”

Sally giggled. “You mean nude paintings? That’s not—”


“I don’t believe it. She told me to see to it you ate regularly.”

“I don’t believe it, either. Neither did the bank manager. But there they were in the vault. God knows what’s in the apartment. I’ll have to clean it out before my folks get there.”

“Your Aunt Tillie.” Sally clearly didn’t want to laugh but was afraid she might. “I’m making coffee.” She left him nursing his new pain.

Over a second doughnut, Marty said morosely, “I’m just going to keep it quiet, tidy up the estate, and forget about it.”

Sally licked a jelly drip off her finger. “No, you’re not. It’s going to haunt you. Where are they now?”

“Sealed envelope in the safe at Bryce & Bryce. Don’t worry, nobody opens it but me. A lawyer can’t just throw away part of a pending estate.”

Who’s the man at the bank?”

“Kennicutt at City Prudential. Why? He won’t talk.”

“Just curious.”

Two days later his phone was ringing as he got home. “Marty? Were you at your aunt’s place? Looking for You-Know-What?”

“Yes, Sal. I leafed through a thousand prints in a drawer and three albums. Nothing more incriminating than a baby on a bearskin. Thank goodness. Maybe she had a premonition and got rid of the ones at home. Am I seeing you Friday? What have you been doing?”

“Tell you Friday. Do like your aunt said. Eat regularly till then. ‘Bye.’ ” He brushed his hair and regretted the absence of lint.
Friday after a morning court appearance he found himself in his old neighborhood at lunchtime. What else? "Hi, Ma. Got a sandwich for a starving lawyer?"

She did better than that, covering the table with refrigerated treasures. "Honestly, Ma, your leftovers are better than a restaurant's first-times. Hand over the chicken wings."

After he paused for breath, she slid a cup of tea toward him. "You like that girl?"

"Sally? Sure." He took a sip while appraising her. "What's up, Pearl? Think I'm too young to go steady?"

"No, no. For me she's fine. A little messy-looking, the hair, but I'm sure she's clean. I just never had one of your girls show an interest. Did you tell her to do it?"

"I don't even know what you're talking about. An interest in what?"

His mother was snapping on plastic lids and rewrapping bread. "Out of nowhere she brought me crocheting instructions. For the stole I admired, must be months ago. She sat down right where you are now and we got started discussing the family. Do you think maybe she's a writer? You could find yourself in a book, Mr. Starving Lawyer."

He grinned at her. "Don't you think I'm worth a book? Come on, Ma. Mothers are supposed to overpraise their sons."

She sniffed. "I left that to your father's mother, may she rest in peace. Once she answered back her cousin Hortense, 'So what's the crime? All my sons got swell heads so why should I worry about that?' Anyway, my point is this girl must be after your head. Talking to your mother about your Uncle Louie's shirt factory and his no-goodnik kid brother Albert. Today young people talk about disco. Nonsense like that."

Marty laughed and kissed her. "Relax, Ma. What could Sally find out about disco from you? Now the Charleston or the Turkey Trot—" She swatted at him with a dish towel as he left.

Waiting for the elevator he had a twinge. Not of the heartburn variety. What if Sally had hinted at something shameful about Pearl's sister-in-law? A risky business. She had no right. And again the mystery of it all. Tillie had set the tone for them. She wouldn't even stay in the room when Uncle Max started one of his Las Vegas jokes. Marty could feel his Monday headache scheduling a reappearance. Could he charge visits to a shrink to his aunt's estate?

By the time he picked up Sally at her office at six, he knew exactly what he wanted. "Drinks before dinner, Sal. Not 'drink.' 'Drinks.'"

"Okay, okay. But coffee at my place afterward. Don't try to tempt me into all-night dancing."

He almost smiled but the throbbing temple, plus acute complications of self-pity, stifled the impulse. She'd hear about Pearl later.
Two and a half hours later, to be precise. Outside three whiskey sours and a half-bottle of Mateus, Marty put down his steak knife to ask, “What if I told you I know you went snooping to my mother?”

She waved an onion ring at him. “What if I tell you that I knew she’d tell you?”

“What kind of an answer is that?”

“It’s the kind of an answer for that kind of question.”

The conversation ceased while they continued eating. After another sip of wine, Marty said, “I think we’re not as witty as we think we are. Let’s postpone arguments until the alcohol levels in our bloodstreams have decreased.”

“Certainly, counselor.”

The fresh air charged them up again so that connecting Sally’s key to the lock became something of a challenge. Once solved, however, Marty realized the inestimable value of a roomful of pillows. He settled on the nearest pile, sinking into feathers and cotton batting. Sally kicked off her shoes and turned on a lamp before joining him.

“Where was I?” he asked.

“ ‘Snooping’,” she prompted.

“Well, didn’t you?”

“Of course. I’m a researcher, aren’t I? It was bugging you, wasn’t it?”

“Private matter, not business. Loyalty oath.”

She laughed a delicious series of sounds. “I was loyal, you idiot. I was your undercover agent. I found out everything.”

He sat up with great effort. “Everything?”

“Enough.”

Sobriety was overtaking him. “From my mother, Pearl Mandell, you got the answers to pornography?” The question was soaked in incredulity.

“She was very helpful. There were others, naturally.” The nasty girl was enjoying his mystification. She’d found a loose feather to tickle his ear with.

“Be serious, Sal. You did promise me secrecy, you know that. If you’ve been blabbing—”

“—Oh, don’t look so wounded. You’ll just have to apologize later. Besides, I don’t care whether you approve or not. I have a case on Kennicut.”

His turn to shove her into downy submission. “Speak! I’ve had all the perversion I can take without picturing you and that coat hanger—”

“Calm down. I started at the end. The pictures are in your company safe. Then I thought, ‘What if something happened to you.’ But that’s no problem since you labeled the envelope. Only you’re a lawyer. Aunt Tillie wasn’t. So I figured she got them the same way you did. She just didn’t get around to throwing them away. I guess nobody expects to die.”

Marty released her and sat back. “Sheer speculation. You didn’t get any proof of it.”

“Who says?” She was gloating. “Pearl remembers when Tillie was executrix of her husband’s estate. Because she was so upset she had to leave all her
charities in the middle of the fund drives to take two weeks in Miami. They thought it was from Louie's death, naturally."

"How'd you get to Kennicut?" He was still wary.

"Easy. I said I was from your office. You needed some information on the inventory of Mr. Samuelson's box. He wouldn't let me make a photocopy but it was right there."

"'Miscellaneous pictures'?"

"'Assorted photographs,' I think. Signed by Oliver Wilkins who's retired to Coral Gables and Samuel Kaplan who's gone to his reward."

Marty whistled. "So it was Uncle Louie."

Sally broke up, muffling the full-hearted glee in pillows. Finally, she said, "I can't help it. You're such a slow learner. How do you know whose estate Louie cleaned up?"

"You're right." He was properly chastised. "Who knows how many relatives this epidemic went through? And now I'll have to marry you, Sal."

She righted herself. "Just to keep the secret in the family?"

"No." His hand crept sneakily down her back. "So I can practice all the tricks I learned from some obscene—"

She put her fingers to his lips. "Don't say that. I don't like it. We wouldn't want our children to pick up that idea."

He kissed her hand.

The lint was flying.
In their attempts to discover new expressions of American thought and experience, contemporary writers have increasingly turned to the conventions of the Western story. Such recent works as Thomas Berger's *Little Big Man*, E.L. Doctorow's *Welcome to Hard Times*, Ishmael Reed's *Yellow Back Radio Broke-Down*, David Wagoner's *Where is My Wandering Boy Tonight?*, John Hawkes's *The Beetle Leg*, and John Seelye's *The Kid* demonstrate not only a flowering of interest in the methods and materials of the traditional Western story, but a desire to play loosely with these materials in creating what has come to be known as the anti-Western. *The Kid*, in particular, is an extremely fine novel, worthy of further critical attention because it typifies the trend in contemporary American literature to parody various fictional forms.
In presenting a parodic Western with The Kid, Seelye places himself in a fictional fraternity with writers such as Vladimir Nabokov, who parodies the scholarly edition in Pale Fire; John Barth, the picaresque in The Sot-Weed Factor; and Thomas Pynchon, the detective story in V. The Kid is significant, then, not only as an index to one writer's creative growth but as a reexamination and parody of the distinctly American myth of the West and the variety of widely accepted assumptions it implies about American life and culture.

The action in The Kid takes place in a single day, at the beginning of the spring of 1887, a time just after the worst winter in memory in the Wyoming territory. The cattle industry that once thrived in this area is now virtually extinct after the deaths of nearly two-thirds of the stock. In turn, the town, once a cavalry fort, is haunted by jobless, moneyless, sullen cowboys, who in their boredom, are impatiently waiting for something — anything — to happen. It does when the Kid and his black companion, Ham, wander into Fort Besterman.

In any Western, setting is of major consequence for an understanding of the form's many themes, and The Kid is certainly no exception to this. However, where the landscape in a classical Western such as The Virginian is vast and limitless, it is confined and narrow in The Kid. In fact nearly all the action and most of the descriptions are limited to a barroom in Fort Besterman, and although the narrator informs us that this is big country, its immensity is never presented directly. The effect is one of increasing claustrophobia and tension as the narrative works towards its climax. Where the Western traditionally employs the vastness of terrain to suggest epic contests of valor and honor, The Kid presents a vision of neurotic boredom and destruction.

This is especially evident when the narrator, at one point, comments to the Captain, the community's sole legal authority, that the "town's a regular bughouse" because everyone is living on empty hope. The Captain answers, "I have a theory.... It's the space that gets to people out here. There's just too much sky, and people swell up like frogs in a vacuum jar. There's no holding them down.... A man like that back East might just have a little germ of madness somewhere in him that wouldn't ever really amount to anything, like most have deep down inside, like a shoot on a potato that's kept in a bag. But out here, things grow."

In another way, this Western follows a classical pattern by introducing strangers who unexpectedly wander into town and find themselves involved in a confrontation with the town's villain. In an extension of the Huck Finn-Nigger Jim relationship, Seelye has a young white appear with a towering, mute and deaf, black companion. As he attempts to secure lodgings, the Kid is baited by Fiddler Jones, an ugly, malodorous, and malevolent Texan, reputed to be the "orneriest man in the Territory" (20). With a "joky way about him," Jones decides to make the boy and his friend his sport for the afternoon.

For his part, the Kid is entirely naive and accepts Jones's remarks and questions as expressions of frontier camaraderie. As he is plied with increasing
amounts of liquor, the Kid eagerly explains, in his weak and "quavery" voice, that he and his companion have struck gold in the Black Hills and are on their way to Oregon to purchase and graze a herd of sheep. In the course of this account, the youth boasts that their luck is due entirely to the intuition and clairvoyance of Ham, his African ("he wasn't really a nigger, but an African") friend (41). Found by missionaries, Ham is named after one of Noah's sons with a term that means black in Arabic. The word originally referred to the richness of the Egyptian soil, and it is a fitting title for a figure rich in creative talents. In his abilities to "point to buried things," "Witch for water," and "tell fortunes," all in spite of his muteness, Ham is a poor man's Tiresias. And like Tiresias warning Oedipus, Ham attempts to pull the Kid away from impending doom which only he can discern with any clarity. Besides being a "magic nigra," we are told that Ham lacked the "stubbornness like some you see," and unlike most blacks "was proud of hisself" (43).

The greater part of the narrative is composed of the descriptions of the narrator, Winky, as he hustles between the barroom and the jailhouse, warning the Captain of the evolution of events. Radically unlike the precise, Eastern dude narrator of The Virginian, Winky is, as one reviewer has said, a "regular vernacular encyclopedia of the West," and as such, he is a reminder of the American vernacular hero Twain initiated and perfected. Winky is a former cavalry scout who was captured, tortured, and castrated by the Sioux. His mixed and exaggerated metaphors and scatological preoccupations provide much of the novel's hilarity and irony. Winky's speech is the idiom of the West, and it is bawdy, ribald, and unrestrained in ways that no traditional Western ever could be. The following description of the origin of his nickname provides some small glimpse of the unique texture of Winky's speech:

They call me Winky because I blink all the time ever since some of Red Cloud's braves got holt of me for a tolerable slow half-hour. It was my own damn fault, scouting too far ahead of the main troop, and when the Captain come up with the rest and drove the Injuns off he would of give me hell only he seen what they done and throwed up instead. He was younger then, and all the fighting he done was in the Rebellion, where people just shot one another or blew them up. Well, it wasn't nice what the Injuns done to me, but at least they left me my hair, which is apt to get me into less trouble than the other. I told the Captain that — later, I mean — and he sort of laughed and then made me company clerk, seeing how painful it was for me to ride out for quite a spell afterwards (10).

As the day progresses, Winky tells us that Ham has discovered a silver dollar hidden in one of the cowboy's boots, and an extravagant wager has been laid that he cannot best the local card shark, Leland Stanford, in a game of three-card monte. Stanford's actual name is "Sturgis Something or Something Sturgis," but his adopted name indicates the type of wealth we find in this West, a gambler's fleeting fortune. After Ham reveals that the dealer has palmed the
king and Stanford has been stripped and thrown into the muddy street, Jones, in his frustration, attempts to wrest the Kid from Ham as the two are leaving. With a single blow, Ham kills Jones and the rest of the town turns into an hysterical, racist lynching mob. For their protection, the two are jailed and an immediate trial is held.

A series of witnesses offer testimony and after the gambler has requested leniency for Ham and the Kid, the Captain rises as the prosecutor and gives an explanation and defense of the concepts of law and order in a frontier community. His speech stands as a gloss to the moral imperative which encouraged and justified the settling of the frontier. It reads as an apologia for the westward expansion and emphasizes concepts entirely contrary to romantic notions of the purity of nature and the natural man.

"And on the borders of civilization, where order is constantly threatened by the lawlessness of raw Nature, and by the lawlessness in men which raw Nature inspires, we must be particularly scrupulous in our respect for the common good.

"Without it, our community would collapse, order giving way to disorder, sane logic to insane reasoning, regard for property and the rights of others to the common exercise of greed and rapacity. Like the aboriginal inhabitants of this Territory, your Honor, we would be little better than wild animals — savage, ignorant, naked, unhoused. For such is the state of Nature, where the primitive values of friendship and decency do indeed maintain sway, but where unregulated passions bathe the tooth and claw in the red ink of moral bankruptcy. Given the choice between savagery and civilization, your Honor, I for one find no difficulty in choosing the latter. Those whose sympathies are with the accused, I fear, will be choosing the former." (104-05)

Essentially this is the argument used by figures such as the historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, and the writer, Owen Wister, and it corresponds closely with Turner's notion of the West being a "transforming arena." That is to say that the frontier offers the unique opportunity for a revitalization of the democratic principles which founded the country. The West is envisioned as a place where rugged individualism and Eastern habits of order and community can meet and produce a new, stronger America. Although Wister partially agrees with this, he differs by seeing the meeting of East and West as a catalyst for producing a new American aristocracy, one which would bring order and unity to the country. Both men see the West as ultimately accommodating the values of the East and becoming increasingly civilized. Most Westerns have incorporated this thinking, and while they express regret over the loss of the primal quality of the West, most implicitly argue that this loss is an inevitable and tragic necessity for the unification of the country.

Opposing both the Captain and these theories is the figure overseeing the trial, a man known only as the Judge. Though markedly different from the
civilized, philosophical Judge Henry in *The Virginian*, this judge is, Winky tells us, "the nail that held that town in place. He wasn't a real judge, with a law degree and cowhide-covered books and all, but from early on people had got in the habit of coming to him for a judgment betwixt theirselves. . . . He was a natural-born judge, there wasn't no getting around it, a regular Solomon, and yet he didn't have no books but a Bible, which he only used to give oaths on" (14 & 37).

Although he is a drunk and "touched in the head," the judge has the ability to "look at things clear and deep" and adjudicate with his heart. In fact many of his judgments result from a careful study of a defendant's face, because "he held that they was more important than any other kinds of evidence" (97). This case is complicated, however, by another consideration. From the time he entered Fort Besterman, the Judge took quarters that allowed him full view of the road from the southeast.

The Captain used to say the only west that road had for the Judge was in his eyes, where it was reflected back, you see, and that everybody who might come into town rode up that red line right into his head. They might ride on to California, but the only west they had so far as the Judge was concerned was what lay behind his eyes, and that was a Territory no man could come to the end of. (35)

So he spends his days searching, we learn later, for "his nigger," and he now hopes that Ham is that seventy-year old black man he has long been expecting. "'The Judge believes in his black man, and there isn't an argument invented that can convince him he's wrong. He accepts it on faith, like you accept your shadow at high noon. It's his religion, Winky' " (25).

After listening to the Captain's plea, the Judge begins his deliberation by defending the comradeship between members of different races against the "hate and anger and murder" of the world. He next refutes the Captain's arguments by insisting that "law an' order hain't all there is, nor is this town nor civilization, nuther. And most of us come out here to the Territory for one of two reasons, either to get shunt of civilization or to get rich . . . Well, they's got to be exceptions, Cap'n, or the world would be so damned civilized a body'd be better off dead" (107-08). In rendering his defense of human values and emotions, the Judge is finally turning in a verdict on behalf of mercy.

His mercy is offset, though, by the mob outside which never hears his decision. As Ham leaves the courthouse, he is attacked, and in the mad fracas that ensues, he is eventually bludgeoned with a crowbar and killed. When the culprit is apprehended, he is shot by the Kid, who is thereupon shot by the Judge, who finally turns the gun on himself. The final grim surprise comes when the undertaker discovers the Kid is actually a girl and that she and Ham have been lovers. The revelation not only calls into question sexual identities and sexual roles in the West, but adds reverberations to the complex of literary allusions that have underscored much of the action. The various characters can
easily be compared with figures from Melville and Twain, which is obviously no coincidence in light of Seelye's other fictional and critical interests.

Viewed in this way, then, the Captain stands as a Captain Vere of the West in his determination to uphold the purity of justice; Winky and his frontier dialect, along with the Judge and his wisdom and "shunting of civilization," is an elderly Huck Finn; Fiddler Jones, as "the resident devil," is a Claggart to the golden-haired Kid's Billy Budd; in his innocence and foresight, Ham is both another Nigger Jim and a black Billy Budd; and on the equations can go. One reviewer has defined these associations when he writes:

Seelye is not alluding in all of this, he is revising. While meticulously building the kind of Western that will resonate with dime novels and movies, he subjects his shimmering mythology to the rest of American literature and the extravagances of criticism. It is what Charles Boerhs called in another context "a revisionist view" of myth.

Seelye himself provides the best look at his own intentions in a long book review of Ben Merchant Vorpahl's My Dear Wister: The Frederick Remington-Owen Wister Letters. In this essay, Seelye defines Remington and Wister's attitudes towards the West and defines the way in which they held radically opposite views on the subject. As we have seen, Wister viewed the West as an area that blended the best aspects of Eastern civilization and Western individuality and as a place where his romantic conception of latter-day knights in jeans and boots could reign supreme. On the other hand, Remington viewed the West as an "evanescent phenomenon," something that was rugged in appearance but basically fragile and delicate. Remington encouraged no accommodation of the West to the East, and instead saw the two areas as polar opposites, where the intrusion of the one on the other sounded the cultural death knell for the West. As Seelye further explains, Wister's West was a territory of the mind, while Remington's was one of the passions, a place where the renegade, the barbarian, and the illiterate were the closest things to heroes.

While the interpretations supplied by Wister, Turner, and Theodore Roosevelt are undoubtedly the inspirations of our popular conceptions of the West, Seelye concludes, "James and Remington, in their far different ways, both belong to that odd fraternity founded by Cooper and continued by Melville and Mark Twain, that tradition in American literature which regards innocence and savagery as not permanent and enduring but fragile and fleeting qualities." Thus in The Kid, Seelye is both attempting to disprove "Wister's thesis, deny the consensus interpretation, and lay to rest that old romantic trope of a noble-blooded hero in rags," and is suggesting that the alternative story of the West must come from a tradition in American literature established and sustained by its best writers. Now obviously this is not to say that The Kid is a modern Billy Budd or Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, but the novel does certainly owe a great deal, both materially and spiritually, to each of these works.
In offering this revisionist Western, Seelye is additionally indebted to Leslie Fiedler; his acknowledgment in the novel’s dedication and epigraph explicitly indicate this. Seelye is expanding on Fiedler’s contention in *The Return of the Vanishing American* that the West has been desexed by the romantic cowboy-heroes of writers like Wister — “Ivanhoes in chaps” — who have imposed “comic limits on the Western myth.” The point, Fiedler feels, is “to understand the West as somehow a joke [because this] comes a little closer to getting it straight; and there is a reward more substantial than the mere pleasure of muckraking in learning that one or another of those lantern-jawed gunslingers celebrated on TV was in fact a ‘pimp-fighter,’ bringing whores into the Territory and living on them thereafter.” He continues by explaining that the Western has always acted as an apology for the “taking of the law into one’s own hands”; it has stood as “a plea for extra-legal violence as the sole bastion of true justice in a world where authority is corrupt and savagery ever ready to explode.” As a result, the Western has often advocated, or at least seemed to advocate, the genocide of the savage or renegade.

These lessons are not lost on Seelye, and Fiedler’s remarks greatly explain what he is attempting in this novel. By using a vernacular narrator whose comments are exaggerated, witty, and ironic and by parodying many of the stock conventions of a Western, Seelye is obviously trying to illuminate the joke that Fiedler says is implicit in most Westerns. Seelye’s method, like that of any parodist, is to handle the medium self-consciously to the extent that it doubles back on itself and explodes. *The Kid*, therefore, represents a comic version of a very serious fantasy.

At the same time, Seelye recasts the implicit homosexual relationship of Nigger Jim and Huck that Fiedler defines in *Love and Death in the American Novel*, and, through a startling sexual masquerade, transposes it into an explicit, heterosexual one. In so doing, Seelye is destroying the sexual stereotyping that has long been an integral part of the Western. Beginning with James Fenimore Cooper, the Western story has frequently presented models of the good and bad woman. The “good” woman usually represents the ideal of civilization, and it is her benign, unselfish influence that tames the wildness of the cowboy-hero. In *The Kid*, however, the woman symbolizes neither domesticity nor civilization, but mobility and a certain wildness. Unlike women in the traditional Western, this figure is a member of the masculine community, shares their frontier camaraderie, and is temporarily accepted, despite all the jokes, as an adolescent initiate to the manners and codes of the Western male.

Moreover, it is her love of a black man that puts this woman even further beyond the stereotypical Western female. As a rule, the savage or renegade — be he Indian, black, Mexican, or outlaw — is rarely rendered as a sympathetic figure with whom audiences can align themselves. After all, the Western implies, theirs is a doomed order, one destined to extinction by the necessary and inevitable approach of civilization. To admit their emotional and ethical legitimacy would destroy the illusion that social progress is a just imperative. Thus Seelye is revising the Western to demonstrate the emotional and sexual
confrontation of a white woman with a forbidden Other, in this case a black man, that Fiedler has suggested in *The Return of the Vanishing American*.

Throughout all this, the question Seelye seems to be asking is the same one Fiedler poses in his study when speaking of Montaigne, "Is civilization 'more savage, more barbarous than nature, [and is not] natural man the real gentleman'?" Certainly the town, despite all the Captain's pleadings otherwise, is not entirely civilized. Their mass hysteria over the killing of a white outlaw by a strange, "electromagnetic African," followed by their self-righteous shock over the true nature of the relationship between the Kid and Ham, indicate their intellectual and ethical retardation. Ham, on the other hand, is polite, courteous (though never servile), and passively tolerant, and resorts to violence only when he is forced to by his opponent. The image, therefore, of the savage and traditional hero are inverted, and the novel in turn shows, as one writer has described it, a "West, [that] beneath its comic and virile swagger, is squalid, fetid, and brutal." In writing his ironic version of the Western, Seelye demonstrates that parody is the perfect comic vehicle for any writer attempting to overturn established patterns of fictional form and of the reader's habitual responses to that form. Parody, after all, operates in such a way that it "disrealizes and dethrones literary norms" and consequently reveals "the illusory nature of literature." It is the fictional method, then, of the writer attempting to fashion anew a fictional form and a cultural vision that appear exhausted.

In this way, Seelye is creating what Fiedler has called "the new Western, a form which not so much redeems the Pop Western as exploits it with irreverence and pleasure, in contempt of the 'serious reader' and his expectations." Through ironic methods, Seelye seeks to redefine the shape of the classical Western and the largely "American" values that fictional form seems to promulgate. He is, in effect, asking his audience to look deeper into the myth of the frontier and see that the so-called "Winning of the West" actually represents not only a destruction of the land, but more importantly, a desperate waste of human spirit and imagination.

The promise of civilization and the potency of reason are shown as hopelessly inefficient means of ordering and organizing the world and human experience. The American dream of social progress and individual success are equally inapplicable to the West that Seelye creates. John G. Cawelti defines the attitudes of the classical Western by noting:

In the western creations of Grey, Hart, and their contemporaries, the elements of the formula are deployed to develop the image of the West as a symbolic landscape where the elevating inspiration of the vastness and openness of nature together with the challenge of violent situations and lawless men can lead to a rebirth of heroic individual morality and the development of an ideal relationship between men and women. Seelye would argue, however, that such a vision of the Western experience is absurdly optimistic and finally unbelievable and illusory.
By reconsidering these cultural platitudes and by employing innovating stylistic techniques, Seelye is redefining and reshaping the form and content of the Western story. Through his parodic method, he is actually extending the limits of our understanding of certain traditional American values and of the possibilities for the modern American novel as well.

Notes

1 John Seelye, *The Kid* (New York: Viking Press, 1972), p. 70. Subsequent references are to this edition and noted parenthetically in the text.


3 John Seelye, "When the West was Wister," *The New Republic* (September 2, 1972), p. 30.

4 Seelye's *The True Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Mark Twain in the Movies,* and *Melville: The Ironic Diagram* collectively indicate this interest.


6 John Seelye, "When the West was Wister," p. 33.


Anglo-American Exclusion of Mexico from the League of Nations

Louis Bisceglia

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RECENT events confirm that Mexico and the United States have not been the friendliest neighbors. Frequently, relations between the two nations have been charged with an electric current of distrust and ill will. The basis for this tension is varied and rooted deep in the historic past; but one aspect of its development can be seen in the events surrounding the formation of the League of Nations.

Historically, the League of Nations has been viewed in many ways: as an idealistic panacea, a foundation of "functional internationalism," as an instrument of both conciliation and security, a receptacle for the "new diplomacy." and as a slag heap of World War I promises. In the shadows, however, with respect to Mexico, the founding of this international body appears more than anything else as a powerful political tool—one employed by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States and Lord Robert Cecil, head of the League of Nations Section of the British Foreign Office at Paris, to control a self-determining Mexican government. This was the opposite of what the two chief proponents of the League professed to achieve; nevertheless, their policy toward Mexico contradicted the incipient League's principles. Unpalatable sections of Mexico's 1917 Constitution, outstanding foreign investment claims, and the refusal of the Venustiano Carranza regime to waver from a policy of
neutrality during the First World War incurred the displeasure of both the United States and British governments. In the ensuing postwar conclaves, therefore, Mexico was cast as an immature country and as such, excluded from the League of Nations.

The earliest reference to Mexico within the general discussion of the proposed peace settlement occurred in a telegram sent by Colonel Edward House, U.S. Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, to Woodrow Wilson, dated November 18, 1918. This document consists of some tentative proposals put forth by the French Foreign Office with additional comments by House, the President's confidant. Under a section entitled “Representation of the Powers and of the States,” the French merely listed Mexico with the other states that had remained neutral during the war and suggested provisions “for the presentation and protection of their interest.” Despite the fact that France, like Great Britain, had not repaired its relations with Mexico, it seems evident that unlike Great Britain, France had no special treatment reserved for the Carranza government. This impression is supported by subsequent developments. As late as January 13, 1919, according to the French text entitled “Plan des Premières Conversations entre les Ministres Alliés à partir du 13 Janvier, 1919,” Mexico was still in a category with twelve neutral nations that were to be given one seat each at the conference.

Nor is Mexico singled out for exclusion in the first important United States Department of State Draft. On the contrary, in a document entitled “Skeleton Draft of the Peace Treaty,” dated December 30, 1918, Mexican interests were conspicuously considered. In this draft (written by James Brown Scott and David Hunter Miller, Technical Advisors to the Commission to Negotiate Peace) which was given to Secretary of State Lansing, Mexico was cited with twelve other neutrals under the heading “the more important neutrals [that] may be signatories to the Treaty of Peace.” Moreover, under a section captioned “General Observations,” Scott and Miller (who had major roles in the drafting of the Covenant), noted that while Mexico had slight interest in the problems arising out of the settlement of the war, it was in the “interest of the United States that any scheme for a League of Nations should have the assent of Mexico.” On January 9, 1919, this document was revised and once again Mexico’s interests as a neutral were observed. The contradiction between this statement and the ultimate policy pursued by the United States developed because the State Department had not yet coordinated its efforts very closely with Wilson or Lord Cecil, although there had been consultation and exchanges of proposed settlements.

The first indication that the situation in Mexico warranted special consideration appeared in the “notes” of Lord Cecil’s draft of January 16, 1919, as revised under the heading of “British Draft Convention, January 20, 1919, with Notes.” The British draft suggested that invitations to the conference be issued to all Latin American countries except Mexico and several other states. In doing this, the British indicated they were complying with the wishes of the United States. Undoubtedly then, by January 20, 1919, Wilson had decided to
exclude Mexico from the League. The President was not alone in this matter. According to the notes taken at the time by Miller, whenever discussion of the position of neutrals within the general framework of the League came before the Drafting Committee, it was Lord Cecil who held adamantly to the exclusion of Mexico.  

Eventually the U.S. State Department began to shape its policy in accordance with the wishes of Wilson and Cecil. Yet even toward the final days of the Paris meetings considering the Covenant, Mexico’s position was still not clear to Secretary of State Lansing. Miller related: “Earlier in the day (April 11) at the close of one of the Plenary Sessions of the Conference I talked with Secretary Lansing about the Annex and regarding the states that shall be invited to join the League. Mr. Lansing expressed the opinion that both the Dominican Republic and Mexico should be invited but not Costa Rica.”

The next day Miller mentioned the matter to House and was directed to write a memorandum for the President about the three states in question. With respect to Mexico, Miller’s comments were as follows:

Mexico:
Lord Robert Cecil is quite opposed to the inclusion of Mexico.
Mr. Lansing expressed to me an opinion in favor of the invitation.
I believe that the present Government of Mexico has not been recognized either by Great Britain or France, and the invitation would in my opinion, be a recognition of that Government by those countries.

House sent Miller’s memorandum to the President asking him for comment, and Wilson complied by informing Miller that the statement met with his approval:

In returning this Memorandum which you were kind enough to send me, let me say that I think on the whole it would be wise not in include any one of these states in the invitation.

In this fashion British and American policies were brought into basic agreement and Mexico was excluded from the League without further ado.

An assessment of the tangible economic motives in that decision is beyond the scope of this study. But a cursory glance at the existing evidence suggests that pressures were brought to bear upon the principal participants by U.S. and British interests with large holdings in Mexico. The clearest expression of these interests was manifest in the establishment of the International Committee of Bankers on Mexico in October 1918 in which J.P. Morgan officials served as a clearing house or lobbying group with direct ties to the State Department and representative ties in Paris. In Britain this group attempted to use the question of Mexico’s uncertain status as leverage in abating some of the more distasteful aspects of the 1917 Constitution. Canadian Premier, Robert Borden, as Chairman of the Economic Committee at Paris, had intimate contact with both
Lloyd George and Lord Cecil during the League negotiations. He was seen as one of the more susceptible pressure points. Large Canadian interests in Mexico were represented on the J.P. Morgan Committee by E.R. Peacock, Chairman of Mexico Tramways, Light and Power, who urged Borden to depict the plight of Canadian and British economic interests to British leaders. And, indeed, in March 1919, Borden passed on to Lloyd George a proposal from the General Committee Representing British Interests in Mexico which called for the placement of Mexico under the tutelage of the United States as a League mandate. The suggestion was in fact considered, and while it was fobbed off, the principle of using both governmental and League recognition of Mexico as a lever to obtain economic concessions was accepted and used by Lloyd George and Cecil. And in the end, in the eyes of the British, Mexico's status upon her exclusion from the League was not, in reality, very different from that of the mandates.  

After the Covenant was completed, it was generally assumed that Mexico was excluded as the Soviet Union had been under the stipulation in what ultimately became paragraph two of Article I of the League Covenant:

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations . . . . [Italics mine]

While this might have been the prohibiting clause, the "British Draft Convention" of January 20, 1919, simply relegated Mexico to the status of a United States protectorate in the class of occupied Haiti and Santo Domingo. Invitations were to be issued "to Latin American States not represented at the present Peace Conference, except Mexico, Haiti, Santo Domingo and any other State which, in the opinion of the United States, may be considered unready for membership."  

Since much of the British Empire was included in the League, Mexico had good reason to inquire about the criteria of sovereignty used in awarding admittance. Moreover, since the United States had formally recognized the Mexican government of Carranza, what further qualifying status could Mexico acquire under international law? In reality, none. Hence the exclusion of Mexico from the League, while understandable as an action for economic and political leverage, must be seen as straining the bounds of credulity—even in an era of "moral diplomacy." Yet the category into which it was placed was not surprising considering the manner in which the country was depicted in the United States.

Mexico in Senatorial Reaction to the League

The treatment and portrayal of Mexico as an outlaw among nations did not
seem odd to an American public subject to daily doses in the press of Mexico's "outrageous" conduct toward foreigners residing there and the government's attack on international investments. In the United States Senate, reaction centered upon the apparent abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine. Among Senators who were ultimately to become known as "bitter-enders," Mexico was indeed an outlaw state. The questions they raised were emotion-packed denunciations of the United States' inability to handle Mexico on its own if it became party to the League. Thus, on February 19, 1919, Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington asserted that if the United States signed the Peace Treaty, under Article XVIII (paragraph "d", Article XXIII of the final League Covenant) it would relinquish its ability to influence affairs by the sale of arms and ammunition as it had done so well in the past with respect to both Cuba and Mexico. Furthermore, Senator Poindexter contended, adherence to the League would interfere with the "humane impulses" of the United States government to protect its citizens in Mexico. Two days later, Senator William E. Borah expressed similar fears. The next day, February 22, 1919, Senator James A. Reed of Missouri asserted that the vital interest of the United States in Mexico would be subject to decisions by foreign governments, "most of whom would be representatives of kings or depotisms, either European or Asiatic." Just how important a position Mexico held in the fears of the opponents of the League might be seen from the warning delivered before the Senate a week later. In a most imaginative manner, Senator Thomas Hardwick of Georgia conjured up a situation whereby as a result of "a little freebooting expedition" (the Mexican War) the United States, if it joined the League, might have to give back to Mexico not only Texas but New Mexico, Arizona, and California as well. Though somewhat inconsistent, Senator Henry Ashurst of Arizona was equally vociferous. Ashurst's colleague, Senator Albert Fall from the neighboring state of New Mexico, gave vent to his opposition when he envisioned circumstances under which the United States would have to hand over the Chamizal to Mexico if the case were brought before the League for judgment.

This concern by League opponents remained manifest long after the Monroe Doctrine had been provided for in Article XXI of the League Covenant. One Congressman, Representative John F. Fitzgerald of Massachusetts (the grandfather of President Kennedy), apparently unaware of the basic tenents of the League or simply voicing a good old Boston-Irish standby, expressed extreme alarm over the rumor that Mexico would soon be "given to Great Britain as a mandate" under the League; and he even introduced a resolution in the House expressing his displeasure that was passed on to the Foreign Affairs Committee. As late as August 1919, stalwart "irreconcilable," Senator Frank Brandegee of Connecticut, had read into the Congressional Record a lengthy editorial appearing in the New York Sun entitled "If Mr. Wilson's League was Established and We had Trouble with Mexico." Neither did League supporters trouble themselves over Mexico's exclusion from that body. The only references to Mexico were made to assure League opponents that the United States would be able to handle Mexican affairs as
“adroitly” as ever. One Senator did see the possibility of the League definitely settling existing problems between Mexico and the United States, but he chose to remain unidentified.  

**Mexican Reaction**

During the first two months of 1919, the Mexican government officially remained silent concerning League matters. On February 14, 1919, when the peace negotiators had administered the final touches to the first public draft of the Covenant, there did appear in Paris a statement given to the Associated Press of Francisco Léon de la Barra, former Provisional President of Mexico, who told the press that Mexico was well disposed to the formation of a League of Nations and that the League would offer Mexico respite from its turbulent past and grant to it peace it so badly needed—“not a peace imposed by arms but an organic peace” Then addressing himself to Mexicans in general, de la Barra stated:

> We Mexicans must show the entire world that we deserve as a nation to participate in this “formal concert of powers,” as President Wilson has called it. In this solemn moment of history every Mexican must earnestly consider the special obligations imposed upon us by the present situation.

De la Barra further contended that

> ... opinion in Mexico is favorable to the idea and will show itself from now on not only in the spirit animating the Government, but also through all organs of its national life.

Whether the former associate of Porfirio Diaz had correctly assessed the tenor of opinion in Mexico is not known, but officially it took over a month for the “spirit animating the Government” to manifest itself. On March 19, 1919, two resolutions in the Mexican Senate in connection with the League of Nations were made public. Neither had been acted upon up to that time. One resolution expressed “sympathy and admiration” for President Wilson and his work for internationalism. The other declared the Mexican senate wished that

> the noble democratic proposals of President Wilson, which it admires and applauds, be realized, and manifests its desire that if it has the opportunity, the Mexican Republic form a part of the proposed League of Nations.

The dispatch pointed out that thus far these resolutions were the only expressions available in any way indicating Mexico’s stand relative to the League. No official statements had been forthcoming.

Outbursts in the United States Senate over the League forced Wilson, when he
went back to Paris in March 1919, to obtain several amendments to the Covenant. Of considerable importance to Mexico was the amendment which included the Monroe Doctrine as a regional arrangement within the League. Pointedly, the first official protest of the Mexican government was directed at the Monroe Doctrine and not the League. On April 25, 1919, Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Ygnacio Bonillas, received instructions from Carranza and informed Acting United States Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk:

The Mexican Government has learned that the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine has been under discussion in the conference at Paris. The Mexican Government has not recognized nor will it recognize that doctrine, nor any other which attacks the sovereignty and independence of Mexico.22

Despite its stated position on the Monroe Doctrine, the Carranza government, for a while anyway, appeared reluctant to commit itself to a definite policy with respect to the League. On May 8, 1919, two weeks after Ambassador Bonillas's note to Polk, Carranza granted an interview to Robert H. Murray of the New York World. When questioned about Mexico's policy vis a vis the new League, Carranza asked to be excused from any discussion of the formation of an international government, Mexico's interest as a nation in the League, or his country's exclusion from that body.23 Hence it seems that Carranza was intent upon keeping the door open for possible acceptance of membership if the League offered it.

Throughout the rest of May, the Mexican government remained silent, but on June 3, 1919, it issued a definite policy statement, declaring that the Mexican government "has not asked, nor will it request, to be admitted to the League of Nations."24 Nevertheless it appears that the Mexican government's policy was far from final. Shortly after the announcement of June 3, Carranza sent his son-in-law, General Candido Aguilar (Governor of the State of Vera Cruz) on a special mission. After arriving in Washington with the rank of ambassador, on June 10, 1919, General Aguilar (accompanied by Ambassador Bonillas) called upon the State Department for consultations with Polk and Henry Fletcher, United States Ambassador to Mexico. Aguilar's mission was not limited to Washington. From there he was to go to London and Paris seeking recognition for the Carranza regime. One of the expressed objects of Aguilar's mission "was to bring about the admission of Mexico to the League of Nations." "Official sources" in Mexico City had indicated that

Nothing in recent history has so humiliated the Mexican people as the exclusion of their country from the League. So great is the dissatisfaction that open criticism is being made of President Carranza for so conducting the affairs of Mexico that the other nations of the world will not admit her to their society. President Carranza, recognizing danger in the situation,
is declared to have dispatched his son-in-law to President Wilson and Poincaré in an effort to remove the stigma. 25

Stigma or not, General Aguilar undoubtedly did not receive very much encouragement in Washington. On June 14, 1919, he granted an interview to the press in which he qualified some of Carranza's recent remarks about the Monroe Doctrine and then stated that "for the present time Mexico" would "not seek admission to the intended League of Nations." Evidently Carranza was leaving the door slightly open in lieu of future developments. General Aguilar further stated that in the "opinion of the Mexican Government . . . the League of Nations could not be formed upon a solid and conclusive basis until after peace is adjusted and consummated between the belligerent powers." 26

General Aguilar's statement is significant because from this time forward it became the official position of the Mexican government until it lost interest in the entire matter of the League. In July 1919, Carranza's hand-picked successor, Ygnacio Bonillas, Mexican ambassador to the United States, told news reporters in Washington that Mexico was still watching developments:

We are in an expectant position to see how we are going to be treated. The Mexican people in general feel that a great injustice has been done to Mexico by not being invited or admitted into the League of Nations. But, notwithstanding we hope we will not be made the target of prejudices and will be permitted to work out our problems. We know best how to work them out, and it certainly is our desire to work them out in order that Mexico can fulfill her international obligations. 27

Addressing the opening session of the Mexican Congress on September 1, 1919, President Carranza basically reiterated the same policy statement that General Aguilar had made about the League on June 14, 1919:

The Mexican Government on its part has not made nor will it make any effort to enter that international society [the League of Nations], inasmuch as the bases upon which it is founded do not establish, as regards either its organization or its operation a perfect equality for all nation and races. 28

As Carranza continued, he implied that the League question was linked to other basic problems confronting his regime:

... the Mexican Government has proclaimed as fundamental principles of its international policy, that all the states of the globe should have the same rights and the same obligations, and that no person within a state may invoke a privileged situation or protection by reason of foreign citizenship or for any other reason. 29
Undoubtedly piqued by the slight rendered his regime, hereafter Carranza refused to cooperate with the League. When he was ousted in May 1920, the issue of Mexico’s exclusion still remained unresolved.

Aftermath

Throughout the 1920s, whenever it was asked, Mexico cooperated with the League. Yet the wound inflicted by Wilson and Cecil was a long time in healing. In 1922, the Chilean delegate to the League (President of the Third Assembly) expressed the hope that Mexico would soon join the League. Mexico did not reply. The following year the League extended an official invitation. In September 1923, Mexico refused the offer, stating that it was compelled to do so because of the unwillingness of Great Britain to recognize the Mexican government. However, the British recognition of the Calles government later in 1923 produced no changes in Mexican policy toward League membership. Numerous subsequent expressions on behalf of Mexico by Latin American delegates before the various League assemblies also failed to coax Mexico into joining—although Mexico did accredit an observer to Geneva in 1929.

The basic obstacle to Mexico’s entry stemmed from the original exclusion in 1919. The Mexican government could hardly consider it consistent with its dignity to make or accept an ordinary application for League membership. Such a move would have implied that the snubbing of Mexico during the formation of the League was justified. As it turned out these difficulties were broached in 1931 at the second plenary meeting of the twelfth Assembly of the League. After making sure beforehand that there was no possible opposition, the delegate from Spain tendered Mexico’s nomination to the League. In an unprecedented move the League Council frankly apologized for having excluded Mexico in the first place, and stated that Mexico should be treated as though it had been invited from the outset. At the same time, representatives from the world over witnessed Lord Cecil’s public mea culpa for having joined Wilson twelve years before in ostracizing Mexico. Lord Cecil stated penitently:

I was in part . . . guilty of it. It therefore gives me particular pleasure to take part in remedying an omission which should never have been made.

It is indeed rare in the diplomacy of international relations to come upon so frank an admission as that of Lord Cecil’s. Three days later Mexico accepted the League’s invitation with the stipulation that it did not recognize “the regional understanding mentioned in Article XXI of the Covenant” (i.e., the Monroe Doctrine). No objections were raised, and in the same meeting of 1931 Mexico was admitted to the League. No more fitting climax to its original exclusion could have occurred.

The situation in Mexico in 1919 was obviously an extremely fluid one, as witnessed by the Carranza assassination the next year. Certainly within the
purview of commercial and national interests, Great Britain and the United States had the right to advance and protect their interests. It is not unusual that they should have been seeking to bolster their own bargaining position in Mexico. What the Mexicans found objectionable was the attempt to use the newly created international body not as an instrument of conciliation and mediation but as a lever to modify the shape of the Mexican revolution. In this sense there was nothing "new" in the League's diplomacy. It was used from the outset to obtain an old fashion diplomatic advantage. While somewhat cynical in its evaluation, there was probably nothing unusual in the actions of Wilson and Lord Cecil with respect to the conduct of international affairs. People merely expected something else because of the grand principles assigned to the newly created international body.

Notes


2 Ibid., 1:398.
3 Ibid., 1:313-17.
4 Cf. Tillman, pp. 108-17. It was reported that when Lansing handed the State Department Draft to Wilson, the latter stated that he did not want any lawyers messing up his treaty, Lansing, pp. 41-42.
7 The extent to which the drafts of the Covenant at this stage reflected the liberal internationalism of Cecil and Wilson is clearly borne out by the analysis of Egerton. See E.G., chapters 6 and 7.
8 Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, 1:466. Costa Rica's case was unique. See Ricardo Fernandez Guardia, Cartilla Historica de Costa Rica (San Jose, Costa Rica, 1967), pp. 140-44; and Carlos Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica (San Jose, Costa Rica, 1966), pp. 253-79. Also Hudson, p. 449; U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1940); and Emily S. Rosenberg, "World War I and 'continental Solidarity,'" Americas, 31 (Jan. 1975): 313-34. The exclusion of the Dominican Republic from the League was not widely known in the United States and was the occasion for some humous ex-

10 Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, 1:466-67. Both the British and French had outstanding claims emanating from the Mexican Revolution which were not settled until the 1930s.


12 Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, "British Draft."

13 For newspaper accounts see Rippy, pp. 352-56.


15 Ibid., 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1919, 57 Part 5, 4700. At one point Ashurst introduced one of his many resolutions calling for negotiation with Mexico for the purchase of Baja California and part of the state of Sonora, Mexico. Later he called for an expeditionary force, Ibid., 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919, 58, Part 1, 63; ibid., 66th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1919, 59, Part 1, 72-73. In proper context, the "Bitterenders" were obviously searching for any argument, no matter how outrageous, to prevent acceptance of the Covenant.

16 Ibid., 1st Sess., 1919, 58, Part 6, 6133-34. Senator Fall was probably the most active member in the 66th Congress dealing with Mexican affairs. In June 1919, he called for United States intervention in Mexico. Ibid., Part 2, 1173-78. During the later part of 1919 he headed a Foreign Relations Subcommittee investigation of the conduct of Mexican affairs, the nature of which was so thoroughly "spewed with hearsay and slander," that historians have considered it a crude attempt to drum up an election issue. See ibid., Part 4, 3886; U.S., Senate, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess, Senate Document No. 285, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs* (Fall Committee Report), 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1920); and Cline, pp. 190-92. Subsequent events prompted Fall to introduce a

17 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919, 59, Part 2, 1366. Two days later Acting Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk pointed out the impossibility of such a proposal and termed the rumor "absurd and mischievous." New York Times, June 19, 1919, p.3; June 21, 1919, p.6.

18 Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919, 58, Part 4, 3917-18. The position taken by League opponents in the Senate was that the very nature of the Monroe Doctrine as an instrument of American policy rendered any attachment of it to the League impossible; see Perkins, pp. 276-313.


21 New York Times, March 20, 1919, p. 2. It is interesting to note that these statements were made public just one day before Cecil met with the neutral nations concerning the League. Mexico was not invited to this meeting. Of the thirteen neutrals called upon, six were Latin American countries. None of these countries took up Mexico's cause. For both the English and French versions of these meetings see Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, 1:303-09; 2:592-645.


23 Ibid., 2:546-48.

24 New York Times, June 4, 1919, p. 5. The statement was issued in the form of a bulletin to the Mexican press by the Department of Foreign Relations and signed by Salvador Diego Fernandez, the head of the Department.

25 Ibid., June 11, 1919, p. 32. According to Senator Fall, the Committee on Foreign Relations was not informed of the meetings. Congressional Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 1919, 58, Part 2, 1173.


27 Ibid., July 15, 1919, p. 17.

28 Diario Official, September 1, 1919, p. 28 (Informe Presidencial); Foreign Relations, 1919, 2:542.
"Ibid. Carranza’s speech was a lengthy affair touching upon all facets of Mexican policies and problems. The fact that he chose to state the above in the small section he devoted to the League would seem to indicate that his remarks were pointedly directed at the United States and Great Britain.

30 League of Nation, Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings (Geneva, 1922), Part I, 393.


33 It was maintained that the League by no means affirmed the Monroe Doctrine. It merely stated that nothing in its Covenant ran counter to the Doctrine. L.N.U., Geneva 1931, p. 60.
Notes on Contributors

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The goal of each issue is to provoke that particular type of intellectual pleasure that comes with discovering a new thought or with reexamining old concepts from new perspectives. In that respect, *SJS* complements the formal learning that goes on within the university and contributes to the continuing education of our readers.

Past issues have included articles on topics as diverse as eugenics techniques and their implications for society, the misuse of intelligence tests to predict incompetence, Melville’s deliberate “errors” in *Billy Budd*, the use of arithmetic for financial survival, historical disputes about the Battle of Hastings, and the letters of William James (several published for the first time). Special issues have been devoted to John Steinbeck and to the American Bicentennial.
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