1989

Elements of decision making during the 1961 Bay of Pigs action

Edwin E. Anderson
San Jose State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses

Recommended Citation

Anderson, Edwin E., "Elements of decision making during the 1961 Bay of Pigs action" (1989). *Master's Theses*. 4.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.8vkd-waxq>
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/4

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. These are also available as one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 1337783

Elements of decision-making during the 1961 Bay of Pigs action

Anderson, Edwin Earl, Jr., M.A.

San Jose State University, 1989

U·M·I

**300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106**

**ELEMENTS OF DECISION MAKING
DURING THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS ACTION**

A Thesis

Presented to

**The Faculty of the Department of Political Science
San Jose State University**

**In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts**

By

Edwin E. Anderson Jr.

May 1989

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Dr. H. Kent Schellenger

Dr. Barbara Norrander

Mr. Constantine Danopoulos

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

ELEMENTS OF DECISION MAKING DURING THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS ACTION

by Edwin E. Anderson Jr.

This thesis addresses the topic of decision-making within the executive branch of United States Government during the late Eisenhower and early Kennedy administrations. It examines three basic decision-making theories as expressed by Henry Mitzburg, Duru Raisinighani, and André Théroët in their work The Structure of Unstructured Decision Making, by Paul A. Anderson in his work, Decision-Making by Objection, and by Graham T. Allison in his classic Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. After this probe into theory, the thesis presents an historical survey of the participants and the events that made up the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Research on this subject reveals that the landings that took place in Cuba on April 17, 1961, were the culmination of a project spearheaded by an internal Central Intelligence Agency ad hoc group. This group's purpose was to further enhance the growing shadow government that was capable of carrying out U.S. foreign policy beyond the influence of the Congress or the people of the United States. The CIA took advantage of the transition between presidential administrations to transform a covert infiltration of guerrilla fighters into a full-fledged military beachhead assault by well over one-thousand expatriate Cubans led by U.S. CIA and military personnel. Unfortunately, their ambition overreached their capabilities.

Table of Contents

Introduction.	1
Part 1 - Decision-Making Models.	3
Unstructured Processes.	3
Decision-Making by Objection.	8
Graham Allison's models.	16
Part 2 - A History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion.	19
The Players.	19
The Action.	26
Historical Analysis.	53
Part 3 - Decision-Making Analysis.	64
Bibliography.	71
Maps.	75

Introduction

At about 1:50 in the morning on Monday, April 17, 1961, two commando teams dressed in shiny black wetsuits and led by United States Central Intelligence Agency operatives Grayston Lynch and William Robertson, slithered ashore onto beaches east of the Zapata Peninsula on the southern shore of Cuba. These teams were there to set up directional light beacons which would guide the imminent landing of a 1,400 man paramilitary invasion force that was the culmination of a series of events transcending two U.S. presidential administrations.

Cuba had been a growing issue in the Eisenhower administration for several years. The revolution initiated by Castro provided the president with a legitimate opportunity to act. By legitimate I mean an expressible reason to carry out an armed action against a sovereign nation without formally declaring war or getting the Congress involved. Should the president be called to answer for this armed action, a plausible reason was now available: the fight against communism.

What I will attempt to do in this paper is to examine the circumstances leading to this invasion. I will do this by examining two questions: 1) What factors influenced the decision to invade Cuba?, and 2) What factors influenced the means by which the invasion was carried out?

The study of decision-making theory vis-à-vis politics is by no means novel. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out that the Greek historian, Thucydides, examined this very issue in his work, The Peloponnesian War¹. The examination of political decision-making directs us away from thinking of states as metaphysical abstractions and leads us to consider the human participants and their interrelationships. One is made to recognize the difference between what *is* and what is *perceived* (what Harold and Margaret Sprout call "the operational environment" and the "psychomilieu")² by studying the significant actors, for it is their perception of the situation that dictates their will.

In part one of this paper I will examine three alternative ways that decisions are thought to be made. The first, a generic description of unstructured decision processes derived by Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani and André Théorêt, offers a systems approach to decision-making.³ Following that, I will describe a method of decision-making that its author, Paul A. Anderson, calls "Decision-Making by Objection" in which argument and debate among the decision makers play crucial parts. And finally, I will detail Graham Allison's theories in which he attributes the decision-making process respectively to man's rationale, his adherence to standard

1. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 469.

2. Ibid., p. 470.

3. Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and André Théorêt, "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (June 1976): 246.

operating procedures, and his inherent desire to compete.⁴

In part two I will present an historical reconstruction of the events that led to the invasion of Cuba. This reconstruction is accomplished by examining scholarly works, journal articles, and government documents obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency by way of a Freedom of Information Act request. The history is presented by first introducing the cast of players. This is done because what follows is a rather complicated, linked series of events that take place over approximately two and a half years involving many people acting in many places. I have found that being somewhat familiar with the participants lends more insight and understanding to the overall picture. The history of the events leading up to the invasion and the invasion itself includes only those portions that I feel are influential on the decision-making (or lack thereof) that took place.

With the decision-making models examined and the history recounted, part three of this thesis will overlay what appears to be the most applicable of the models onto the history. From this analysis I will provide answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the paper.

4. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston : Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp.2-7.

Part 1 - Decision-Making Models

Model 1

In "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt describe a study of twenty-five strategic decision making processes and suggest that a basic structure consisting of twelve elements underlies even "unstructured" processes.⁵

This model consists of twelve elements partitioned into three central phases, three sets of supporting routines, and six dynamic factors. The research on this model was done over a period of five years in the early 1970's by more than fifty teams of graduate students. Firms and organizations were observed and the twenty-five strategic decisions, ranging from the firing of a radio announcer to the purchase of data processing equipment, were isolated for analysis. Six studies were of manufacturing firms, nine were of service firms, five were of quasi-government organizations, and five were of government agencies.

The analysts characterized the isolated decisions by their novelty, complexity, and open-endedness. Decisions were categorized by...

1. the stimuli that evoked them (ranging from opportunity through problems to crisis):

- a. crisis decision (quantity of decisions for this category: 1)
- b. opportunity decisions (5)
- c. problem decisions (9)
- d. problem-crisis decisions (4)
- e. opportunity problems (6)

and,

2. their solutions:

- a. given (4)
- b. ready made (2)
- c. custom made (14)
- d. modified (5)

Mintzberg and his fellow authors briefly mention decision-making phase theories proposed in 1910 by John Dewey (reflective thought), Herbert Simon in 1965 (intelligence choice-design-choice trichotomy), and Eberhard Witte in 1972 (phase theorem). In their decision concepts they use elements of all, but in particular they use Simon's trichotomy. Mintzberg, et al. change the term *choice-design-choice* to *identification, development, and selection*. In renaming and modifying Simon's trichotomy, the authors develop three central themes: one in which the overall process

5. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt, "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," p. 246.

is outlined, one in which it is developed, and one which makes supporting routines available to the overall decision process. Each of these themes is further broken down into subroutines and phases.

The first set of elements is described as three central phases. The first of these is an identification phase. In the decision recognition routine the need for a decision is identified as the differential between stimuli based on information in some specific situation and an expected standard. William F. Pounds found that these expected standards were based on theoretical models, expectations, standards in another organization, projected trends, or past trends.⁶ It is also important to recognize that the amplitude of the stimulus provoking a decision may decay over time if it is not reinforced to the point of reaching a threshold of attention.

A second part of the identification phase is the diagnosis routine. After the attention threshold is breached, the decision maker taps or establishes channels of information to clarify, define, and eventually diagnose the issues. Mintaburd, et al. point out that diagnosis need not be a formal, explicit procedure; that it may be so implied in the process as to be hardly noticeable as a unique function.

The development phase, where most resources are expended, is made up of two routines. The search routine is a hunt for alternatives. This can be as simple as searching one or more decision-makers' memories (or computers' memories) for similar past circumstances. The search may be passive, such as waiting for unsolicited alternatives to present themselves. There may be a trap search, that is to say the activation of "search generators," such as letting suppliers know that a firm is looking for a particular commodity. Then there is the active search in which research, surveys, and scanning activity takes place, sometimes extensively.

Within the design routine of the development phase solutions are either custom-made for the specific problem needing attention, or they are modified from ready-made solutions. The authors found that custom-made solutions are preferable, but they are the most expensive in terms of time. Some organizations sacrificed the made-to-order solution for the shorter time and less expense of implementing an off-the-shelf model.

The third central phase is where the selection takes place. It consists of three routines. In the first of these, the screen routine, unfeasible alternatives are eliminated. This function may have already been implemented in the search routine.

The evaluation-choice routine can be carried out using judgement, bargaining, or analysis. Judgement is implemented when a choice of alternatives is made based on an intuitive, subjective choice. Bargaining is used about half of the time. It is a group decision implementing a compromise on conflicting goals. Analysis was found to be used the least. It is a technocratic evaluation followed by a managerial choice.

6. William F. Pounds, "The Process of Problem Finding," Industrial Management Review (Fall 1969): 1.

The authorization routine is a binary process where the commitment is made or denied to continue with the decision process. Authorization can lead to the next highest level of decision-making (if necessary); denial or rejection can lead to the abandonment or redevelopment.

The second set of elements is made up of two set of routines. The first of these, a set of decision control routines, is actually decision-making about the decision-making process—analogue to the transparent system management software controlling a computer network. The decision planning routine establishes the bounds or parameters, assumes a rough schedule, and allocates resources. A switching routine is implemented as each step is completed. The decision-maker directs, or switches his attention to the next step, such as choosing another subroutine, determining resources, or monitoring results.

The next group of three routines for the second set of elements are decision communication routines. Eberhard Witte in his 1972 article found that communication activities dominate every phase of unstructured decision-making.⁷

The exploration routine involves scanning for information and reviewing of unsolicited information. Gathered information is used to identify decision points, for model building, and to build the data base of basic information about the decision.

The investigation routine is a focused research phase for special purpose information. Mintzberg, et al. hypothesize that this routine is used mostly during early diagnosis and early evaluation and choice making phases. Cyert, et al.⁸ found that the largest share of decision-making man hours was spent in information gathering.

Regarding the third routine, dissemination, it was found that the more people involved in, or interested in, the decision outcome, the more time the decision-makers spend disseminating information. The clearer the solution becomes and more committed the decision-maker becomes to it, the greater his propensity is to communicate it in order to validate it and ensure its final acceptance.

Political routines make up the third group of supporting routines. These reflect the influence of individuals who seek to satisfy their personal and professional needs by the decisions being made. This activity serves to clarify power relationships, bring about consensus, and mobilize forces. Political activity generally manifests itself in the use of bargaining routines. Mintzberg and his fellow authors found that when centers of power are ignored or not consulted during development, they may be likely to confront the decision development organization and demand

7. Eberhard Witte, "Field Research on Complex Decision-Making Processes—the Phase Theorem," International Studies of Management and Organization (1972) : 156.

8. Richard M. Cyert, Herbert A. Simon, and Donald B. Trow, "Observation of a Business Decision," Journal of Business (1956) : 237.

redevelopment or simply offer resistance or harassment.⁹ Dissemination of information is a way of preempting this resistance. Gore, et al. refer to this as persuasion.¹⁰ Invitations to potential dissidents to participate in initial phases of decision-making is referred to by the same group as coöptation.

The third and last set of elements in this decision-making model are a group of six dynamic factors. The concept of dynamic factors refers to the steps that are integrated into the whole strategic structure, describing it as an open system subject to interferences, loop-backs, etc.

The first factor is termed interrupts. These are events that suddenly occur and cause changes in pace or direction, e.g., the loss of funding, or significant political resistance.

The second factor consists of scheduling delays. The notion here is that time lapses are built in to processes to enable the management of either related or unrelated tasks by managers. An example is the holds built in to complex rocket launchings.

Feedback delays are a third factor. These occur when waiting for results from a previous action. Some actions require reaction by outside or isolated groups and in some complex processes feedback delays can be designed to allow time for insight incubation.¹¹

Another dynamic factor is the implementation of timing delays and speedups. Timing of decision-making steps can be manipulated to compensate for, or take advantage of, surprises, special circumstances, or better conditions.

A fifth factor are comprehensive cycles. Mintzberg, et al. quote Pfiffner in noting that "...the decision-making process is not linear but more circular; it resembles 'the process of fermentation in biochemistry rather than the industrial assembly line'..."¹² The authors liken this practice to processes cycling within processes. These multi-layered processes are found from beginning to end of the whole decision-making project.

The last dynamic factor are failure recycles. This process plans for progress blockage due to failure. When no acceptable solution is possible, the decision-maker can either delay the project until (if and when) things are more favorable or change his criteria so that a previously unacceptable solution becomes acceptable. Mintzberg and his fellow authors found that what more commonly may happen is that the decision-making process recycles back to the development phase.

9. Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt, "The Structure of 'Unstructured' Decision Processes," p. 263.

10. William J. Gore, Administrative Decision-Making: A Heuristic Model, (New York : John Wiley, 1964).

11. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, (New York : Philosophical Library, 1967).

12. John M. Pfiffner, "Administrative Rationality," Public Administration Review (Fall 1960) : 125.

Mintzberg and his fellow researchers conclude that even though strategic decision processes are immensely dynamic and complex, they *do* lend themselves to conceptual structuring. Mintzberg feels confident in being able to reduce the twenty-five unstructured processes to one comprehensive model, with the diagnosis routine being the single most important phase.

Model 2

With respect to this second prototype, as explained in Paul A. Anderson's article, "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis," I will outline the first practical application of a theoretical model.¹³ Anderson criticizes the standard description of decision-making (that of identifying goals, searching for alternatives, predicting consequences, evaluating alternatives, and then selecting the best course of action), hereafter referred to as the Standard Model, as *overemphasizing* the information processing aspect and *underestimating* the social nature of decisions. He emphasizes that decision-making is a behavioral process that takes place in a social setting.

He criticizes the Standard Model on two points:

- 1) From an information-processing perspective because the decision-making process is not strictly linear, having many loops and cycles (similar to Mintzberg's comprehensive cycles factor). Individuals are often not able to handle the task. If individuals do not have the capacity, their organizations will not.
- 2) The second criticism focuses on the task description itself. Anderson describes the task description as a product of social interaction within the organization of the decision-making body, *not* what was assumed to be an intellectual process directed at the task. Therefore, the task description is never assimilated as an intellectual process and the subsequent organizational decision must be viewed as something other than an endeavor to make a decision.

Anderson gains access to the Cuban Missile Crisis decision-making apparatus via notes, memoranda, and minutes kept during meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (hereafter referred to as the ExCom). Of the nine meetings that occurred during the crisis, only the records from meetings 5 through 8 had been opened for public scrutiny at the time of his research, which was in 1982. Anderson states that he found that the decision-making that occurred deviated from the Standard Model in three important ways:

- 1) Instead of coming up with competing alternatives, a series of yes-no choices presented themselves over an array of non-competing courses of action.
- 2) Instead of identifying goals at the outset, goals were discovered throughout the course of decision-making.
- 3) Instead of seeking a decision to solve a problem, what was sought was a course of action that did not have a higher probability than others of making the situation worse. Solving the problem was secondary to keeping the current situation from getting worse.

13. Paul A. Anderson, "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Administrative Science Quarterly 28/1 (March 1983) : 201.

In light of these deviations from the Standard Model, Anderson develops an alternative description of the decision-making task and points out that there is a need for studying the decision-making process outside of the laboratory. Professor Anderson states that situations consisting of high density intervals of decision-making occur most likely under unusual circumstances, like during periods of crisis at foreign ministries and at crucial centers of power, like the State Department.

Methodology

Anderson devised a coding system in which the text of documents from the meetings was examined and assigned a value representing one of twelve decision-making components:

<u>Coding categories</u>	
Task description	Task goal
Outcome goal	Alternative
Description, own	Description, other
Prediction	Consequence, own
Consequence, other	Decision
Interpretation, own	Interpretation, other

Text from the available documents was presented to evaluators by a computer. The computer software then led the examiner through a series of up to forty-three yes-no questions (the binary discrimination net) regarding the portion of text in question until the proper classification was attained. This scheme of assigning codes to text resulted in an interaction frequency chart which illustrated the number of times a task identified with each coding category occurred during each of the four ExCom meetings.

Deviation One from the Standard Model

In discussing the structure of alternatives, Professor Anderson points out that choices can be seen as coming in two varieties: those involving the selection of an alternative from an array of competing mutually exclusive courses of action and those in which a decision has to be made whether to pursue one particular course of action or another...one of two. The data gleaned from the ExCom meetings during the missile crisis indicate that there were more decisions to be made involving choices from arrays than from competing alternatives.

Even though there were more array-type decisions to be made, the crisis began on October 14, 1962, by initially presenting a binary decision: the missiles were to be forced out by either an air attack or a naval blockade. An air strike on the missile installations would have achieved the objective. A naval blockade would not immediately (if ever, as far as they knew at the time) result in the removal of the mis-

siles. In order to add depth to the impact of a blockade, additional political and military measures were considered:

- 1) Action in the United Nations condemning the Soviet action of emplacing the missiles;
- 2) Support of a Brazilian resolution calling for a nuclear free zone in Latin America;
- 3) Inspection of ships at sea; and
- 4) Further surveillance.

The mutually exclusive choice was made — it was to be an array of political and military actions:

- 1) Political action in the U.N.;
- 2) Political action in the Organization of American States;
- 3) Public release of surveillance photos showing the missile batteries in place;
- 4) A selective blockade of shipping; and
- 5) Continuing surveillance.

Anderson says that this array of pressure tactics was arrived at by way of a sequential choice process. He illustrates this by providing a detailed look at the binary choice process that occurred over the issue of removing POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) from the list of embargoed goods. This process was a linear discussion (debate) in which Secretary of Defense McNamara began by suggesting an embargo of aircraft fuel. The discourse was picked up by President Kennedy and expanded to include POL. Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested a time extension in light of political efforts at the U.N. Under-Secretary of State George Ball suggested the ExCom agree on this. Secretary of Treasury Dillon expressed reservations about stopping Soviet ships. The decision about adding POL to the embargo list was delayed.

Anderson points out that conflict and disagreement within the ExCom did not occur as a result of competing alternatives, but as a result of objections to suggested courses of action; thus, the source of the nomenclature of his model: Decision Making by Objection. His coded summary records indicate that when competing courses of action were proposed, they tended to be proposals not to follow a particular course of action rather than an alternative course of action. He uses as an illustration seventeen alternatives proposed during the 6th ExCom meeting. Only two of these seventeen were proposals for a new course of action. He makes a point in stating that decision-making concerning government action is the result of sequential choices...a path taken through a binary maze.

Deviation Two from the Standard Model

The second deviation from the standard decision-making model was that goals were discovered in the course of making a decision instead of identifying them as the first step. Global goals were distinguished from discovered goals.

Anderson defines goals as those identifying a situation as a problem, e.g., the global goal of removing the missiles stimulated the decision process, but it in and of itself did not provide a resolution. Discovered goals are found in the social process in which objectives, constraints, and imperatives are linked via discussion and debate with alternatives and their associated consequences.

Seven goals have been proposed to explain the choice of a blockade. Only the first goal was mentioned in the first meeting of the ExCom: that a blockade would demonstrate the United States' firmness and commitment to the removal of the missiles. This then demonstrates the divergence from the Standard Model's requirement of identifying all goals at the outset. The other six goals were discovered in ensuing debate and argument. Goal number two was to avoid a reverse Pearl Harbor that would result from an air strike. Attorney General Robert Kennedy introduced a moral concern over the impression he felt that the world would get if a very large and powerful nation like the United States attacked a very small nation by surprise. This argument of morality convinced proponents of an immediate surprise air strike to shelve the idea (albeit, some of them reluctantly).

Goal three was to choose a midcourse between inaction and attack. Goal Four was put the ball in Khrushchev's court. Goal number five was to give Khrushchev some breathing room and ample opportunity to avoid attack by using a graduated response. Robert Kennedy, Dillon, and McNamara argued that an air strike would have escalated response without increments and without opportunities for de-escalation. This debate, as mentioned above, won support away from an air strike. Goal number six was to take advantage of U.S. Navy superiority in the area. The last goal, number seven, was to allow the U.S. to exploit its advantage in worldwide naval forces

These last two goals were discovered after the fact upon reexamination of the actions taken. Although they do appear to be hidden goals, there is no evidence in the released documents that they influenced the decision-making process at the time.

Anderson found that the tactical goals discovered in the process tended to both produce and be produced by alternatives and other goals, and that this occurred through argumentation and debate. After examining these goals, he further conceptualized them into three categories:

- 1) Evaluative - produce grounds for accepting or rejecting an alternative,
- 2) Modifier - produce modifications or extensions of an existing alternative, and
- 3) Attention directing - bring attention to an acceptable resolution.

He also brings attention to two characteristics he discovered while examining this decision-making process. The first of these is that goals discovered in the process of making decisions often had the most impact. There was near simultaneous discovery of these goals and choices of action. The second characteristic is that goals were discovered through the social process of argumentation and debate.

Deviation Three from the Standard Model

Decision makers did not choose alternatives that would solve the problem, contrary to the Standard Model. The author of this article uses the example of the United States' decision to build up troops in Vietnam knowing full well that that problem would not be resolved by that action. In the missile crisis, Kennedy chose the blockade even though he doubted that it would force the withdrawal of the missiles. He had more confidence in a missile trade or an invasion.

In this case the choice was made because the best alternative had a low probability of success in terms of ultimate consequences. The decision makers chose a less attractive alternative as a satisfactory solution. This concept negates the "if-then" duality of binary evaluation. In short, "if not good, then bad" does not hold up. A four-valued evaluation function comes into play:

- 1) Good alternative = high probability of positive outcome
low probability of negative outcome
- 2) Bland alternative = low probability of positive or negative outcome
- 3) Mixed alternative = high probability of positive or negative outcome
- 4) Poor alternative = low probability of positive outcome
high probability of negative outcome

The evaluation of the alternatives was not based in fixed "good" and "bad" concepts, but in probabilities of making the current situation worse. The blockade option was a bland option because although it did not have a high probability of directly forcing the removal of the missiles, it also did not have a high probability of making a bad situation worse. This violates a basic tenant of the Standard Model that the purpose of a decision is to solve a problem.

Anderson then compares the decision-making process during the missile crisis with Cohen, March, & Olsen's Garbage Can Model¹⁴ and Weick's Enactment-Selection-Retention Model.¹⁵

Cohen, et al. posit that if strict control is not imposed on issues during decision-making, non-indigenous and superfluous issues will collect around the cri-

14. Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Administrative Science Quarterly 17 : 1.

15. Karl E. Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely-Coupled Systems," Administrative Science Quarterly 21 : 1.

sis, clouding the vision and inhibiting the ability of the decision makers. Anderson states that President Kennedy and his top advisors kept tight control on pertinent issues and deflected those which were not. The garbage, or superfluous issues, of the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey and the elimination (assassination) of Fidel Castro were not allowed to interfere with the primary goal of getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

Karl Weich's model focuses on the tendency of decisions, once selected, to be retained in the face of adversity. Anderson points out that during the missile crisis there was much self-analysis, iteration, and reexamination before enactment. This seems to discount Weich's theory.

Because of the way goals were identified, alternatives sought, and consequences evaluated, Anderson gives his paradigm of decision-making the key term of objection:

1. A problem is defined and a global goal is identified. This produces a rough description of an acceptable resolution of the problem.
2. A course of action is proposed. The alternative will be accompanied by an argument describing the positive outcomes associated with undertaking the action.
3. The proposed course of action will produce one of three responses:
 - a. If there is general agreement on the desirability of following the course of action, it will be ratified;
 - b. If there is no support and no formal opposition, the alternative will die for what amounts to the lack of a second—the fate of the majority of alternatives proposed during the missile crisis; or
 - c. The third and most interesting case is when there is an objection to the alternative. Objections are framed in terms of the negative or undesirable consequences of the alternative. The effect is to propose constraints, beyond the global goal, that further define an acceptable resolution of the problem.
4. If there is disagreement over the newly introduced constraint, a secondary discussion on the merits of the new goal may ensue. Only if there is an imperative to act will a competing course of action be proposed.
5. In the absence of an imperative to act, the original alternative is generally discarded and a different independent course of action is proposed.¹⁶

16. Anderson, "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 217.

To illustrate his model, Anderson applies it and the Standard Model to the choice between a blockade and an air strike.

The Standard Model calls for:

- 1) the goal to be identified : remove the missiles
- 2) a search for alternatives :
 - a) air strike against the missile installations
 - b) inaction

The initial search for acceptable alternatives was unsuccessful. A second search would probably produce the blockade. The ExCom split on the issue of the blockade/air strike options. Argument, debate, assumptions, and predictions took place. The consequences of each course were presented to the President.

Initially the decision makers were confronted with an ambiguous, ever-changing set of options. This is illustrated by the multiplicity of recommendations that was presented to President Kennedy during the first few days of the crisis. The sequential binary style and goal-discovery attributes of decision-making by objection account for and handle this ambiguity.

As the situation changed, new goals were discovered, preferences changed, alternatives changed, and backers of those alternatives readily handled these ambiguous changes in preferred courses of action.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson assessed the ExCom's meetings as "repetitive, leaderless, and a waste of time."¹⁷ Anderson attributes this to "sour grapes" on Acheson's part because his advice to bomb the missile sites was not followed. It should be noted that Acheson had grown used to making decisions privately in concert with the President and then using decision-making groups to *comment* on, and perhaps to reinforce, not change, the course of action already decided upon. His remarks on the decision-making style of the ExCom reflected his dissatisfaction with that body—it *was* leaderless at times and repetitive, but not a waste of time.

Anderson readily points out that Decision Making by Objection does not exclude alternative models, particularly in cases where there is disagreement on the initial course of action or there is across the board shared agreement that some action is required. Decision Making by Objection works only when there are objections and advocates of opposing views.

The author then ties Decision Making by Objection to broader theoretical perspectives vis-a-vis The Standard Model. He first points out that Decision Making by Objection is a behavioral description of what the decision-makers do, not what their actions mean. Compare this to the Standard Model which has lent its name and concept to a *task* description whether it involved individuals, groups, or organizations. Secondly, his study of Decision Making by Objection was strongly empiri-

17. Ibid., p. 219.

cal as it drew on detailed primary-source information. Standard models have acted as frameworks upon which secondary-source recall and interpretations are laid. Finally, the author says that Decision Making by Objection preserves the argumentation and debate in a social setting constrained by the need to produce a justified product.

Anderson concludes by pointing out the most striking characteristics of Decision Making by Objection. He says that it is adaptive to organizational task environments of decision-making. It allows the decision makers to make a series of simple binary choices during a crisis situation where the propensity to overwhelm their information processing capability is high. It allows for the flexible utility of the discovery of goals in the course of making decisions. Objections arising to proposed courses of action help define acceptable alternative courses, introduce new goals, and provide a mechanism for control. The exploitation of what little certainty may exist in a situation is an inexpensive filtering process, ridding the system of alternatives with high failure probabilities.

Model 3

Graham Allison's The Essence of Decision is a volume considered by many to be the classic work on the decision-making that went on within the Kennedy administration during the crucial thirteen days in October, 1962 which history has labeled The Cuban Missile Crisis.¹⁸ Mr. Allison has constructed three frameworks, or models, of decision-making in government agencies. He examines the missile incident through the "conceptual lens" of each.

In Model I, the Rational Actor Model, Allison describes what a modern, rational man would do when facing a problem. He identifies which logical and strategic choices would be made by key individuals without reference to subjective or bureaucratic influences. Foreign policy is then the result of rational government decisions based on clearly defined goals. To quote Hans Morgenthau, "...it provides for rational discipline in action and creates that astounding continuity in foreign policy which makes American, British, or Russian foreign policy appear as an intelligible, rational continuum...regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen."¹⁹ Data is gathered and imposed or displayed on a rational outline for resolution. The decision about alternatives is simply a matter of choosing the one whose consequences are preferred over those of competing alternatives. Allison sets out four components of the rational action model:

1) Goals and objectives

This translates into "payoff" or "utility" each with its own associated side effects. These must be ranked in order of preference.

2) Alternatives

A choice must be made from among a set of alternatives. In the case of the missile crisis, Allison enumerated these:

- do nothing
- try diplomatic channels
- approach Castro secretly
- invade Cuba
- try a surgical air strike
- try a blockade

3) Consequences...

...are attached to each alternative. Variations of consequences are made based on the accuracy of the decision maker's knowledge of the alternative that is producing the consequence.

18. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971).

19. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edition. (New York, 1970), 185.

4) Choice...

...a simple selection of the alternative whose consequences have the highest rank in terms of "pay-off"

What Model I fails to take into account, though, is that rationality is not necessarily the dominant environment at all times. Allison himself makes a good point of this when talking of North Vietnam, "The question [in 1968]... Why will North Vietnam surrender [and] when?...In a nutshell, analysis according to Model I asserts: nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits. North Vietnam will surrender when it realizes 'that continued fighting can only generate additional costs without hope of compensating gains, this expectation being largely the consequence of the previous application of force by the dominant side'."²⁰ The war of attrition did not work because North Vietnam was not fighting what the West considered to be a "rational" war.

In Allison's Model II, The Organizational Process Model, decisions are formed in government by semi-independent organizations perusing standard operating procedures (SOP's). This is the application of organizational theory to government operations. This "business as usual" and "by the book" approach can be sluggish during times of crisis. This model evades the application of rationale on the actions of the players. It can be argued that some of the actions during the missile crisis took place as uncoordinated and isolated SOP's. The isolation on the Soviet Union's side was among the KGB (the Soviet state security forces), the GRU (The Soviet military security forces), the Air Defense Forces (controlling the surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites), and the Strategic Rocket Forces (controlling the IRBM and MRBM sites protected by the SAM sites). In the United States there was a lack of coordination among the CIA, the USAF, and civilian leaders who for a time vacillated between the tactics of a "surgical" air strike and a "massive" air strike.

Allison says that Model II's framework is specified by three categories:

- 1) Organizational goals
- 2) Organizational expectations
- 3) Organizational choices

He illustrates the Soviet use of the Organizational Process Model to their detriment in the establishment of air defense sites for the MRBM and IRBM sites. The missiles in Cuba were first discovered when Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analysts noticed in surveillance photos that trapezoidal ground patterns near San Cristobal, Cuba were identical to patterns exhibited by the deployments of SAM's at air defense sites previously detected (and photographed from high altitudes) inside the Soviet Union. The SOP that the Air Defense Forces strictly followed *inside* Soviet borders was transferred along with their detachment to Cuba. Had the deci-

20. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 261.

sion to deploy and construct the sites been made rationally (Model I), detection would have at least been delayed and possibly not made at all.

Allison then faults the U.S. for adhering so strictly to an Organizational Process Model during that first week...

...information about Soviet missiles in Cuba came to the attention of the President on October 14 rather than three weeks earlier, or a week later, as a consequence of the routines and procedures of the organizations that make up the U.S. intelligence community. The "eyes and ears" of the government function less as integral parts of a unitary head that entertains preconceptions and theories than as organs that perform their tasks in a habitual fashion.²¹

There has been continual speculation over the years that had U2 flights been made over certain parts of the island, detection of the missiles would have occurred weeks before October 14.

Finally in Model III, The Governmental Politics Model, Allison says that decision-making can be seen as a "pulling and hauling" among different competing organizations, or "...players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics."²² Decisions are produced as the result of decentralized coordination among powers of influence inside and outside of government. The decision makers have competitive, not homogeneous, interests.

On the Soviet side, Allison suggests that the missiles were placed in Cuba as a result of this pulling and hauling of influences inside that government's bureaucracy. For the U.S., the author further suggests that as a result of the Bay of Pigs incident, Kennedy's ExCom pushed him in the direction of taking strong action when the missile crisis occurred several months later. The decision to blockade then was a collective decision arising out of bargaining and debate within the ExCom. The Soviets' decision to withdraw the missiles was also a pluralistic one coming out of the contact established between Kennedy and Khrushchev via letters and representatives: a political deal struck between statesmen.

Then, according to Allison's Model III, decisions made on behalf of a government are the result of a game of politics among the actors involved. Each actor's interest and influence in the game is different, according to his or her priorities, goals, stakes, and deadlines.

21. Ibid., p. 118.

22. Ibid., p. 144.

Part 2 - A History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion

The Players

Alejos, Roberto:

Alejos was the owner of the land in northern Guatemala where Camp Trax was established as a brigade training area. His brother, Carlos, was the Guatemalan ambassador to the United States at the time.

Arbenz, Jacobo:

Arbenz was the president of Guatemala when he was overthrown by a CIA backed coup in 1954

Artime, Manuel Francisco:

Mr. Artime was a Jesuit trained former member of Castro's José Martí column. He held command of the Redondo region in the Sierra Maestra Mountains until Castro's general staff accused him of speaking against Raúl Castro and Che Guevara. He was hidden by the CIA Havana station and ex-filtrated to Miami where he assisted in forming the anti-Castro Movement of Revolutionary Recovery. He met with Howard Hunt in 1960. After going ashore in the Cuban invasion, he and about fifty followers got mired down in the Zapata Swamp and were eventually captured. He was imprisoned in Havana after the invasion. What follows is some of his personal background.

Manuel Artime was born on January 29, 1932 in Camagüey Province, Cuba. He graduated from the University of Havana in 1949. He had started by studying medicine, but did not complete his studies in that discipline. His political interests were aroused against the Batista regime while in school.

Artime joined the anti-Batista "26th of July Movement" headed by Castro, and followed him into the Sierra Maestra Mountains in November, 1958, as an aide to a judge advocate general. He organized a group of Catholic university students and assisted in obtaining the support of farmers against Batista.

After Castro took power, Artime was appointed as an administrator of an agrarian reform plan. Artime resigned that position in the fall of 1959. He became disillusioned with Castro and wrote a letter in which he accused Castro of planning to communize Cuba. He sought and received exile in the United States and became a prominent critic of Castro.

CIA documents describe Artime as being astute and ambitious, possessing good patriotic ideals.²³ They state that he liked political life better than military life and that he knew how to use the military as an effective means

23. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Bulletin, 3 January 1961, p. 1.

of furthering his political ambitions. Arttime is further described as having leadership skills, but tending to be more dictatorial if flattered by friends. He had much appeal to the Cuban masses, but his disorganization made him a terrible administrator. The CIA predicted that he would be a lasting figure for years if the Castro regime fell.

Barnes, Tracy:

Tracy Barnes was the CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Plans.

Bender, Frank ; aka: Droller, Gerry:

This man was the CIA Headquarters Chief of Political Action for the Cuba project. Bender's real name, as far as I can determine, is Gerry Droller, a German refugee who first surfaced in United States hands in the 1930's. He was the primary CIA coordinator at the brigade level. Wyden describes Droller as a "Swiss [CIA] desk officer and smoked a large, pungent cigar, lacked any Latin American experience." Wyden further says of Droller..."He was recruited by Tracy Barnes...The German-born Droller had worked for the OSS during the war [WWII] behind the lines in France...His English was so heavily accented that sometimes his Spanish interpreters had trouble with it...Slight and balding, Gerry chain smoked cigars. The ashes landed on his jacket. He was deferential to colleagues and supervisors and called them 'Popsy'...With the Cubans he posed as a steel tycoon with arrogance to match. He liked to tell them that he carried the revolution in his checkbook."²⁴ In A Thousand Days Droller is characterized as saying that, "...he was carrying the [Cuban] counterrevolution around in his checkbook."²⁵ In an apparent effort to muddy the issue of Droller's identity, if in fact it is truly revealed in my research at all, In Give Us This Day his real last name is listed as 'Drecher'.²⁶ In The Cuban Invasion, Bender is described as "a Central European (reportedly an Austrian) who had fought with the French Marquis during WWII, who had contacts with the Office of Strategic Services and who then became an American Citizen and an operative in the CIA . He chose the cover name of Frank Bender. This man Bender also had the disadvantage of knowing little about Cuba or Latin America, but those drawbacks, which included his inability to speak Spanish, were compensated by immense energy, monumental self assurance and a commanding manner that succeeded in im-

24. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs The Untold Story (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1979), pp. 31-32.

25. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 230.

26. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Day (New York: Arlington House, 1973), p. 24.

pressing a great many Cubans."²⁷

Berle, Adolf A.:

Adolf Berle was the head of a six man Kennedy-appointed task force which in January, 1961, stated that the communists in Cuba intended to convert the Latin American social revolution into a Marxist attack on the U.S.. He saw Latin American in 1960 as Europe in 1947 and wanted a Marshall Plan to implement. He did not agree with the use of the CIA in its role in the invasion, and disliked its covert nature. He wanted to see Castro overthrown with the help of other Latin American governments. He and Arthur Schlesinger maintained contact with the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) before and after the invasion.

Bissell, Richard:

Richard Bissell at this point in his career was the CIA Deputy Director for Plans / Chief of Clandestine Services.

Bundy, McGeorge:

It was National Security Advisor Bundy's job to compile the information gathered by the different intelligence agencies and present it to President Kennedy in an concise, orderly fashion. He controlled access to the president. Kennedy had grown upset with the poor advice he had received from the State Department in the months prior to April, 1961, and began relying more and more on Bundy for information and counsel. He streamlined communications within the White House to the extent that Arthur Schlesinger was later to say that by the end of 1961 he had come close to achieving a small semi-secret office to run foreign affairs while maintaining the State Department as a facade.

Cabell, General Charles Pearné:

General Cabell was the deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the acting director during the actual invasion because Allen Dulles was in Puerto Rico at a speaking engagement. In conjunction with Dean Rusk, he was instrumental in convincing Kennedy to cancel the second series of air strikes to support the actual landing.

Cardona, Dr. José Miró:

27. Karl E. Meyer and Tad Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 78.

After serving as Castro's first premier, Cardona was sent as the Castro government's ambassador to the United States in May, 1960. Disillusioned with Castro, he later became the Cuban "presidente" in exile as set up by CIA in Miami and then in New York. As such he headed the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the CRC.

Davis, Robert K.:

CIA Guatemalan project officer (Camp Trax and Retalhuleu).

Dulles, Allen W.:

Allen Dulles began his career with secret services as an official within the Swiss office of the OSS during WWII. He was instrumental in expanding the role of the newly formed CIA in 1947 from that of a simple information gathering organization to include the capacity to conduct covert operations abroad. He was put in charge of these operations in 1951 as Deputy Director for Plans. Appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1953, he further expanded CIA's role during the Cold War 1950's to include establishing and implementing foreign policy. Note that his older brother, John Foster Dulles, was Secretary of State from 1953 to 1959 and probably had much to do with encouraging and facilitating this expansion. The CIA during these formative years intervened in the domestic affairs of other countries like Guatemala, Iran, Vietnam, and Laos. Allen Dulles was aware of Bissell's and Hunt's plans to assassinate the Castro brothers. He also authorized the plan to assassinate Congo leader Patrice Lumumba, but domestic forces beat him to it. Dulles himself was no stranger to the concept of assassination as an instrument of foreign policy; he played a part in the attempt on Hitler's life in 1944. Dulles was purposefully in Puerto Rico on April 17, 1961, giving a long planned speech and was thus not present when the final decision was made to cancel the invasion day air cover. While participating in the subsequent Taylor commission investigation into the Bay of Pigs incident, Dulles argued that had both air strikes been allowed to occur, the plan would have succeeded.

Engler, Jake:

This is an alias for the overall project chief for the Cuban project who reported to Tracy Barnes and Richard Bissell. My attempts to learn Engler's real name met with no results. I was told by one Hans Moses, speaking as a representative of an organization called *The Association of Former Intelligence Officers* that, "I'm afraid I can't help you identify 'Jake Engler'". The bearer of that alias is not free to reveal his true name in connection with

the Cuban campaign."²⁸

Hunt, E. Howard:

Hunt, during this period of time, was a CIA senior field operative who used the moniker of Eduardo. He was often seen as a bungler who was given a wide berth by fellow agency employees.

Jones, Lem:

Lem Jones was a public relations specialist (Lem Jones Associates of New York City) who specialized in the field of politics. He was hired by the CIA to provide publicity releases in the name of José Cardona on behalf of the Cuban exile government. He did so beginning early on the morning of the invasion. He had previously done work for Wendell Willkie and Twentieth Century Fox.

Kennedy, John:

John Kennedy was President of The United States from 1961 to November, 1963.

Kennedy, Robert:

Robert Kennedy was the U.S. Attorney General during the Bay of Pigs incident.

King, Colonel J. C.:

Colonel King was the CIA Chief of Western Hemisphere operations during the Bay of Pigs affair.

Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.:

General Lemnitzer was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October, 1960 to July, 1962. He was one of the first to fully brief newly elected President Kennedy on the imminent invasion of Cuba. He personally endorsed the invasion, telling Kennedy that his options were to commit immediately or abandon it altogether because of growing Soviet military build-up in Cuba. He later asked Kennedy to commit air and naval forces directly to reinforce the brigade.

28. Hans Moses, interview with author, April 6, 1988.

McNamara, Robert S:

McNamara was appointed as the Secretary of Defense by Kennedy in January, 1961, after resigning as the first non-Ford family president of the Ford Motor Company.

Ray, Manuel:

Manuel Ray was an American-schooled engineer who had directed the sabotage section of Castro's "26th of July Movement" in Havana during the Cuban civil war and who later became Castro's Minister of Public Works. He resigned in November, 1959, and eventually joined the underground after teaching architecture for a short time at Havana University. He helped found the MRP (Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo), or in English, The People's Revolutionary Movement. Schlesinger describes Ray as borderline out of control and says of him that "his advocacy of the underground thesis posed a threat both to the status of the more conservative exiles and to the control of the CIA. Accordingly the older exiles and the Agency were ready to collaborate in an attempt to discredit him. His policy was denounced as, "Fidelismo sin Fidel—Castroism without Castro."²⁹

Roa, Raul:

Roa was the Cuban foreign minister. He represented Cuba at the UN and succeeded in pushing up the discussion on U.S. involvement in Cuba from April 17, 1961, to an emergency meeting on April 15.

Rostow, Walt W.:

An academician by trade (economics), Rostow was convinced by Kennedy to come on board as the deputy to Special Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy in early 1961. He was the one who called Kennedy away from his white tie dinner late in the evening of April 18, 1961, to set up briefings on further bad news from the beaches of the Zapata Peninsula.

Samoza, Luis:

Luis Samoza was the Nicaraguan dictator who allowed the use of Puerto Cabeza on Nicaragua's eastern shore as the debarkation point for the brigade's flotilla and as a forward air base for the brigade's B-26's.

29. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 231.

Schlesinger, Arthur:

As a Kennedy advocate from the late 1950's, Schlesinger recruited most of the president's "brain trust." He became Kennedy's special assistant after the election. Following Kennedy's directions, he prepared a white paper on Cuba that endorsed the revolution against Fulgencio Batista, but not in the socialist direction that Castro was taking it. The white paper called upon Castro to return to the democratic goals of the revolution. Schlesinger was present during the top level sessions that occurred in late March and early April when the final decisions were made to go with the invasion. He argued that the military operation, the invasion, would either fail or lead to a prolonged civil war. He and Adolph Berle met with members of the CRC in Miami and New York both before and after the invasion.

Sorenson, Theodore C.:

Sorenson was Kennedy's closest aide and speech writer. He, along with a few other close aides, became Kennedy's source of trust and confidence following the invasion because of Kennedy's loss of confidence in the Departments of State and Defense—the so-called "experts." He was a mitigating, calming, influence on Kennedy in the face of confrontational diplomacy.

Stevenson, Adlai:

Veteran statesman Adlai Stevenson was the United States Ambassador to the UN during the Bay of Pigs incident. He claims that he was purposefully led astray by ambiguous CIA briefings just prior to the invasion. Stevenson gave a speech before the UN on the Saturday prior to the Monday invasion which he was subsequently embarrassed by. Because the CIA had not been candid with Stevenson, the content of his speech made him, a seasoned statesman, look like a misinformed buffoon.

Ydigoras Fuentes, Miguel:

Ydigoras was the Guatemalan president who allowed the establishment of secret brigade training facilities at Retalhuleu and Trax.

Chronology of Events

January 1, 1959

Eisenhower was informed that Batista had fled Cuba. Castro assumed leadership of Cuba.

January 8, 1959

Castro declared Batista's defeat and the birth of a new revolutionary government in Cuba. The U.S. State Department granted diplomatic recognition to the new regime and assured it America's "sincere good will."

January 15, 1959

The U.S. owned Cuban Telephone Company was taken over by Castro's government.

March 1, 1959

Vice President Richard Nixon first proposed the use of Cuban exiles as a counter insurgency force.³⁰ Another source reports Nixon proposing this in March, 1960. Janis, in Groupthink, says that Nixon proposed this in March, 1960.³¹

March 7, 1959

Castro charged that enemies of his revolution were buying arms in Miami.

March 17, 1959

Shortly after returning to the U.S. from a Latin American tour, Eisenhower directed the CIA to organize a wide political grouping of Cuban exiles (excluding left wing communists and right wing Batistanos) and to recruit and train a guerrilla force capable of operating inside Cuba.

March 24, 1959

Castro first publicly stated that "reactionary Americans" were planning an invasion.

April 17, 1959

Exactly two years before the invasion, Castro spoke before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C. where he denied a commu-

30. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 226.

31. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: A Psychological Study of foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972).

nist revolution was taking place and stated that American interests would be safe.

May 17, 1959

Castro announced an agrarian land reform program. The U.S. took note because of American real estate interests there.

June 11, 1959

The U.S. issued a statement of concern that "prompt, adequate and effective compensation" should be made to Americans whose property was being confiscated by the Cuban government.

July 1, 1959

The Chief of the Cuban Air Force, Major Pedro Luis Díaz, fled Cuba. He testified before a Senate Committee that communists were taking over in Cuba. This prompted Castro's first violently anti-American speech.

about July 1, 1959

Castro began eliminating political rivals and/or accepting the resignations of his non-communist supporters and began shifting his economic and military ties from the U.S. to the USSR.

November 20, 1959

Castro pruned out moderates from his cabinet and showed his true colors in terms of alignment with communist ideology by ordering the arrest of a military commander after he complained of communist influence within the military. This showed that Castro equated anti-communist statements with treason.

January 30, 1960³²

An old friend³³ of Castro informed the CIA that all of Castro's key government people are communists. An attempt to consolidate anti-Castro forces is discussed.

February 14, 1960

Cuba entered into a formal trade agreement with the Soviet Union for sugar - a million tons a year for five years. The Soviet Union extended a

32. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report #00A3177755, 30 Jan 61.

33. Not identified in the CIA source document

credit line of \$100,000,000.

February 19, 1960

U.S. Air Force Pilot Robert Ellis Frost was shot down over sugar mills in Las Villas Province in central Cuba.

March 1, 1960

CIA agents inside Cuba began distributing guns, ammunition, and radio transmitters to disillusioned Batistanos in an effort to establish a U.S.-backed Cuban 5th column.

March 6, 1960

The Cuban ammunition ship La Coubre blew up in Havana Harbor. The U.S. was blamed by Cuba. Some researchers suspect that the CIA was behind this.

March 12, 1960

Cuba began indiscriminately seizing property and land owned by United States citizens. This was far and beyond what had been expected under Castro's agrarian reform movement. This expropriation included sugar mills and the nickel plant in Oriente Province.

March 16, 1960

The U.S. State Department refused the sale of helicopters to Cuba. Cuba stated that she would then buy them from the Soviet Union.

March 19, 1960

Che Guevara, speaking as Castro's president of the Cuban National Bank, declared economic war on "the great power of the North" in a televised speech.

March 22, 1960

American reconnaissance pilots William L. Schergales and Howard Rundquist were shot down near Matanzas.

April 1, 1960

Che Guevara, an advocate of promoting Marxist revolution by openly declaring one's intentions, what he called "speaking clearly," published his manual on The War of the Guerrillas — General Principles of the Guerrilla Struggle. This monograph set out in detail the tactics and the strategies to

be followed in organizing and carrying out a revolution based on peasant and worker support against the regular armies and administration of a government. Guevara clearly established Cuba's contribution to the "mechanics of revolutionary movement in America."³⁴ The U.S. recognized this effort at exporting revolution from Cuba throughout Central and South America.

April 7, 1960

The Movimiento de Revolucionaria Recuperación, later the CRC (Movement of Revolutionary Recovery) became a de facto clearing house for the factions of anti-Castro sentiments. It entered the conspiracy in an official way with the publication of a manifesto calling for Cubans to take up arms to defend the revolution that Castro had failed.

On this date too, Eisenhower first used the word "betrayal" in referring to the Castro government in the context of what it did to the revolution against the Batista regime. He did this in a letter addressed to Cuban students who had also been speaking up (quite dangerously) against the Castro government.

May 1, 1960

At a May Day celebration Castro announced that the U.S. was preparing an invasion of Cuba in Guatemala with the help of the United Fruit Company and the CIA. The crowd took up the chant "Cuba Si, Yankee No" and the U.S. was thus publicly designated an enemy of the revolution.

on or about May 15, 1960

Castro ordered U.S. owned refineries in Cuba to refine Soviet crude oil. They refused. The U.S. responded with economic sanctions by taking away Cuba's privileged position in selling its sugar exclusively to the U.S.

May 22, 1960

The Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was established at Miami's Skyway Motel. This was a CIA concocted coalition of Cuban revolutionary groups. This was done in an effort to suppress in-fighting among them.

May 26, 1960

The White House announced that all existing aid programs to Cuba were canceled.

34. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p. 51.

June 1, 1960

The decision was made to train the brigade in Guatemala.

June 3, 1960

In a diplomatic note, the U.S. accused Castro of conducting a "campaign of slander." This resulted in the below incident on the 15th.

June 15, 1960

Cuba ordered two U.S. Embassy aides to leave the island because of their contacts with counterrevolutionaries, which in turn resulted in the incident on the 17th.

June 17, 1960

The U.S. ejected two Cuban diplomats, which escalated to an incident on the 22nd.

June 22, 1960

Castro threatened to counter any further U.S. actions regarding Cuba's sugar economy by confiscating American property on the island.

June 23, 1960

U.S.-owned petroleum refineries were ordered to refine Soviet crude oil.

June 27, 1960

Castro seized the Texaco plant in Santiago for refusing to process Soviet crude oil.

June 30, 1960

Castro seized the remaining two U.S.-owned petroleum refineries for refusing to process Soviet crude oil.

July 6, 1960

Sergei M. Kudryavtsev arrived in Havana as the Soviet Union's first ambassador to Castro's Cuba.

July 9, 1960

Khrushchev stated to a meeting of schoolteachers in Moscow, "We shall do everything to support Cuba in her struggle." He further added that the Soviet Union had rocket power sufficiently capable of hitting the United States if the "Pentagon dares start an intervention...The only thing left to do

with the Monroe Doctrine is to bury it, just as you bury anything dead, so it will not poison the air."³⁵

on or about July 15, 1960

Howard Hunt visited Havana and returned to report his findings and recommendations to CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell. He gave four options:

1. Assassinate Castro before or coincident to invasion. An interesting side note here is that CIA boss Dulles played a role in the general's plot to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944.³⁶
2. Destroy Cuban radio and television before or coincident to invasion.
3. Destroy the island's microwave relay system just before invasion.
4. Forget about a popular uprising.

on or about August 15, 1960

Hunt established a series of safe houses for Cuban exiles (FRD Frente Revolucion Democrático [English: The Democratic Revolutionary Front]) to meet at in Mexico.

September 12, 1960

Castro and an accompanying Cuban group came to New York City to address the United Nations. There was trouble finding a hotel that would accept them. They wound up at a less than adequate establishment in the Bronx.

September 23, 1960

In response to an election-related questionnaire submitted by the Scripps Howard news chain, Nixon made a statement that U.S. policy is governed by two guidelines:

1. Problems should be met in concert with "our sister republics of Latin America," and,
2. Under no circumstances should the U.S. tolerate communist intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

He went on to say, "We must realize that the use of force toward Cuba or any other sister republic is bound to reawaken Latin American fears of this nation as an aggressive colonial power. This would inevitably damage our own prestige and work to the advantage of the communists and other anti

35. Ibid, p. 72.

36. Wyden, Bay of Pigs, p. 23.

American forces in the Americas..."³⁷

In response to the same questionnaire, Kennedy stated:

"...we must use the full powers of the Organization of American States to prevent Castro from interfering with other Latin American governments, and to return freedom to Cuba."

October 1, 1960

An article appeared in the Hispanic American Report, published by the Institute of Hispanic American Studies at Stanford University, mentioning the brigade Guatemalan training camps.³⁸

October 3, 1960

Howard Hunt moved the FRD Executive Council from Mexico to Miami.

October 19, 1960

The Eisenhower administration announced that a sweeping embargo had been imposed on all U.S. trade with Cuba.

October 22, 1960

Nixon attacked statements made by Kennedy that the U.S. should strengthen non-Batista democratic forces in and out of Cuba by calling Kennedy's statements "shockingly reckless" and promoting circumstances that could lead to WWII. Note that Nixon himself had proposed the exact same thing months before in private by giving the go-ahead to the CIA operation in Miami.

November 1, 1960

Castro mobilized his militia thinking that a U.S. invasion was imminent.

Dr. Ronald Hilton of the Stanford University Institute of Hispanic American Studies published a second article in Nation about the Guatemalan camps.³⁹

November 10, 1960

Kennedy announced that he would retain Allen Dulles as the Director of Central Intelligence in his new administration.

37. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p. 66.

38. Ibid, p. 114.

39. Ibid., p.115.

November 15, 1960

On its own the CIA shifted emphasis from infiltration to a beach head assault. This is significant because the agency in effect took on the role traditionally played by the Department of Defense; expanding its task from being not only an intelligence gathering agency but one capable of waging a clandestine war. The guerrilla band was thus transformed into a "pocket army." Note that this decision was made during the period of waning influence and/or interest of the Eisenhower administration and before Kennedy was made aware of the plan.

November 17, 1960

As the newly elected president, Kennedy learned of the project.

November 29, 1960

Kennedy was told that there was not going to be sufficient time to build up a large enough 5th column to subvert Castro.

December 11, 1960

An article appeared in the St. Louis Post Dispatch by journalist Richard Dudman which mentioned the existence of the brigade training camps in Guatemala.⁴⁰

December 22, 1960

An article appeared in the Los Angeles Mirror by aviation editor Donald Dwiggins in which he reported what he called 'anomalous' happenings in Guatemala during a recent visit - alluding to the brigade camps and the associated air support and training activity.⁴¹

January 2, 1961

Castro demanded reduction of the Havana U.S. Embassy personnel to eleven within forty-eight hours, matching the number in the Cuban Embassy in Washington. Soviet, mainland Chinese, Czech, and Polish embassy personnel in Cuba numbered more than one hundred. There were currently in excess of two hundred Eastern Bloc advisors in Cuba. Seven other Bloc countries were expected to open embassies in Cuba shortly after this.

January 3, 1961

The U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

January 6, 1961

Probably as a reaction to the break in formal relations, war hysteria and feverish preparations for an invasion broke out in Cuba. The Cuban people in Havana were reported to be in a state of frightened expectancy. The CIA Current Intelligence Weekly Summary of January 12, 1961 reported that this was how other Latin American countries were feeling about the Cuban situation:

Brazil - wanted to mediate U.S./Cuban differences

Ecuador - wanted to avoid actions that would jeopardize her plans to host the upcoming Inter-American Conference

Chile - reluctant to associate with strong action against Castro

El Salvador - reluctant to associate with strong action against Castro

Dominican Republic - reluctant to associate with strong action against Castro

Argentina - critical of Cuba yet reluctant to sever ties

Time Magazine carried a detailed story on the funding of the exile groups; the Frente and the MRP and implicated the CIA.

January 10, 1961

The New York Times carried an article by Paul Kennedy giving an account of the CIA's participation in the Guatemalan base at Retalhuleu.⁴²

January 17, 1961

CIA information report #TDCS 3/462,360 indicated that the highway between Havana and Matanzas was guarded by a militia post containing a .50 calibre machine gun. Some vehicle checks had taken place on this and other highways. Three-hundred fifty fired electrical workers staged an anti Castro demonstration.

January 18, 1961

The Cuban militia was mobilized in Las Villas Province, resulting in heavily armed patrols and the installation of anti-aircraft units. It was reported that people caught in possession of explosives would be shot. Skirmishes were reported between militia and opposition forces. Castro again received notice of an invasion. His information from Miami indicated that about 2,000 men were to land at three separate locations and that they were to be exiled Cubans. Castro began a purge of his administration in

42. Ibid.

order to weed out possible defectors in case of an invasion.

January 20, 1961

When no invasion occurred, Castro demobilized his militia.

January 21, 1961

A march of about 1,500 fired, dissident, and unemployed workers occurred in Havana's Central Park. The march was dispersed by police and army G2 units after beating several marchers and arresting 40 to 50 of them.

January 22, 1961

CIA Director Dulles and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lemnitzer exposed the Bay of Pigs project to leading members of the new administration: Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

January 26, 1961

Seven Soviet Bloc countries granted Cuba \$245 million in credit. Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Uruguay suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba.

January 27, 1961

In a memorandum sent to Dulles entitled "Is Time On Our Side In Cuba?", Sherman Kent, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Estimates Board, made the following observations:

Castro's position is likely to grow stronger, but he will continue to lose popular support. This loss of support will be counterbalanced by his increase in control over daily life. The Soviets will keep economic problems from becoming a detriment. Other Latin American governments are becoming more concerned about Cuba.⁴³

January 28, 1961

Castro publicly acknowledged a counterrevolutionary force in the Escambray Mountains of about 500.

January 30, 1961

Castro's militia began using mortars to fight opposition in hills 15 miles from Trinidad. An informal survey indicated that less than 30% of popula-

43. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Director. "Is Time on Our Side in Cuba?", 17 January 1961.

tion supported Castro. Castro's helicopter was shot at as he passes over hills near Trinidad, killing an aide. Drugs and medical attention were getting harder to come by as the economy withered and currency became scarce. The owners of trucks were forced to give up their vehicles to the government. A plane containing Castro officials was shot down over Varsiero Beach. A number of Naval officers were dismissed from the regular navy and the academy at Mariel. The differences between Che Guevara and Castro surfaced as Guevara criticized Castro on TV. Guevara criticized Castro for mobilizing the militia and his anti-U.S. policy.

January 31, 1961

Castro was shot in the right arm while flying in his helicopter over Escambray Hills. Fifty militiamen resigned from militia. Some of the militia was demobilized so that they could return to their civilian jobs. Many of the anti-aircraft guns guarding Havana were noted to be obsolete and were unmanned due to soldiers' reporting "colds." A funeral parlor in Trinidad prepared 36 caskets in 1960 for soldiers killed by rebels in Escambray Mountains. The Cubans built five Soviet-style concentration camps. A network of informers was established by Castro's Revolutionary Defense Committee and was instructed to search the homes of those suspected of counterrevolutionary activity.

February 1, 1961

Cuba made a move to reclaim the U.S. Naval facility at Guantánamo, on the southeastern tip of that island. In a TV interview Cuban Foreign Minister Roa said that Guantánamo was illegally leased by the U.S. in 1903 and that it should be returned to Cuba. Castro seized control of the company that provided water to the base.

Cuban people were being spied upon by workers from public utilities. The lack of food, household supplies, and replacement parts was growing. Salaries of public employees were left unpaid. Buses of Soviet manufacture began to appear on the streets.

February 4, 1961

Teachers staged a rally at the suggestion of the Cuban government. They are told in Havana that the intensification of counterrevolutionary activity the Catholic clergy and private school students were involved in was closely connected with the U.S. The CIA predicted that the Cuban government was planning to take over Cuban private schools.

February 6, 1961

Students at private schools and colleges staged a strike as a protest against government firing squad executions of counterrevolutionaries. A tobacco plant was burned, presumably as a result of sabotage. Cuba's economy was further impacted by the mobilization of the militia which resulted in a manpower shortage of cane cutters.

Diplomatic relations were suspended with Cuba by Peru, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic.

The student strike in Camagüey Province was considered to be 60% successful.

Supplying food to the opposition forces was a major problem.

The people of Camagüey Province expected Castro to fall at any time.

February 26, 1961

CIA information report #CS 3/464,320 dated February 16, 1961 reported that...

1. The number of high ranking Cuban officials seeking asylum was growing.
2. Members of the militia were seeking ways to get out.
3. Members of the militia had refused to fight rebels in Las Villas Province.
4. Attendance at government organized events was dwindling.
5. The rural population seemed to be cooperating more with the rebels than with the militia.
6. Castro may have the support of less than 20% of his people.
7. The feeling of the people was that Castro would soon fall.
8. Up to 80% of the militia would defect when it becomes evident that open revolution has broken out.

February 27, 1961

CIA agents reported that anti-Castro rebels were captured in Las Villas Province's Escambray Mountains and that only widespread public support could sustain this guerrilla activity. Guerrillas had detailed plans for the sabotage of oil refineries near Havana. Skirmishes continue between rebels and government troops in Oriente, Matanzas, and Camagüey Provinces. Rivalries between rebel groups lessen.

February 28, 1961

Castro imposed travel restrictions on the highway from Sancti Spiritus to Trinidad due to revolutionary action in the area. Military passes were re-

quired for those traveling between towns. Unrestricted railroad travel was still permitted, but there was an armed presence at railroad stations. Counterrevolutionary proponents began to lose hope: "...we are tired of risking our lives and living in the hope day after day that the counterrevolutionary invasion will come. If something does not happen in the near future, we shall give up and do our best to get ourselves and our families out of Cuba."⁴⁴ Arrests were frequent and arrestees were often shot without benefit of trial. A total embargo, including tobacco sales to the U.S., was suggested as a way to bring about the sure downfall of Castro. The U.S. paid \$1 to \$2 per pound of tobacco. Europe, with the exception of Holland and Switzerland, paid only 25 to 30¢ per pound. The U.S. made up nearly 100% of the sale of Cuba's top grade tobacco. U.S. dollars were hoarded and not exchanged for pesos, which was against the law.

March 3, 1961

CIA Information Report #00 B 3,180,309 predicted that sabotage would soon increase and that Castro would be overthrown within three to four months. It also reported that Castro over-stated the number of rebels captured or neutralized and that the militia was showing a marked disinclination to fight. The local people's tolerance for housing and feeding the militia while they chased the rebels in the area was believed to be falling and the report further noted that Khrushchev did not tell a disillusioned and discouraged Che Guevara in a recent meeting that the Soviet Union would enlarge its support of the Cuban economy. Khrushchev told Guevara that he should consider improving economic relations with the United States.

March 19, 1961

The MRP met in Miami to discuss disbandment because of internal disunity and disenchantment with the role of the CIA in dictating its own make up.

March 20, 1961

As an indicator of the degree to which MRP leaders were lied to, on this date they were assured by the CIA that upcoming military operations would be under their control, that priority would be given to helping the underground in Cuba, and that all former Batistanos would be removed from the brigade.

44. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report #00K 3.182.230. 27 Mar 61.

March 21, 1961

The CIA backed anti-Castro Revolutionary Council headed by Jose Cardona was publicly announced.

March 22, 1961

Dr. José Miró Cardona assumed leadership of a provisional Cuban government in exile, the Revolutionary Council, with his lieutenants, La Frente's Tony Varona and the MRP's Manolo Ray. The CIA formed this coalition in another effort to smooth the internal dissent of the organized Cuban opposition forces.

March 23, 1961

The Cuban navy acquired two manned destroyers from the Soviet Union. Rumors persisted regarding anticipated Cuban action against U.S. at Guantánamo.

March 25, 1961

The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the U.S. Navy to begin planning support activity, a program the Navy named OPERATION BUMPY ROAD.

March 29, 1961

Senator Fulbright submitted a memo to President Kennedy outlining the basis of his opposition to the invasion plan. He based it on his opinion that there were two courses open: the overthrow of the Castro regime, or toleration combined with isolation.

Concerning overthrow, Fulbright contended that unaided internal forces were not strong enough to do this job. An outside attack would mean undeniable U.S. involvement. The long range damage, therefore, would probably outweigh any short term gain in getting rid of Castro.

Fulbright said in his memo to Kennedy that exile groups that the United States had targeted to take over from Castro were not strong enough to retain effective leadership in Cuba—leaving the U.S. open for blame for its inevitable failure.

Fulbright said that he felt that the invasion would be a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of U.S. laws and treaties resulting in damage to this country's reputation.

April 1, 1961

As an indication of the growing bureaucratic momentum, the U.S. Navy issued its Rules of Engagement for its minimal role in the upcoming opera-

tion:

1. The carrier [USS Essex] shall operate no closer than 50 miles to Cuban territory.
2. Aircraft shall operate no closer than fifteen miles to Cuban territory.
3. Not more than four aircraft will be on station at one time.
4. U.S. aircraft shall attack if any unfriendly aircraft makes an aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed toward a ship to be protected, or starts a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition.
5. There will be no hot pursuit inside the 15 miles line from Cuban territory.
6. U.S. aircraft shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft, except when attacking it.
7. If an unfriendly aircraft is shot down, every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such actions has taken place.

CIA information report #CS 3/473,011 dated May 1, 1961 reported that the number of militia stationed on the coast changed radically and sporadically during the weeks just prior to the invasion and that 90% of the workers were believed to be anti-government.

Former Cuban Senator Rolando Masferrer, a supporter of Batista who had organized a private army which terrorized the rebels in the back country of Oriente Province during the revolution, was indicted for violating the Neutrality Act, USC Title 18, §960... "knowingly begins or provides or prepares a means for a military expedition against a country with which the United States is at peace." What does this action say about the slogan engraved in the granite above the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court Building — "Equal Justice Under Law"? It seems to say that the shadow government that was masterminding the overthrow and death of a national leader was even then beyond the very law that allowed it to run rampant.

April 3, 1961

The State Department released a White Paper on Cuba. It was written by Schlesinger and was an indictment of the Castro regime for failing in its revolution against the atrocities of Batista.

The character of the Batista regime in Cuba made a violent popular reaction almost inevitable. The rapacity of the leadership, the corruption of the government, the brutality of the police, the regime's indifference to the needs of the people for education, medical care, housing, for social justice and economic opportunity—all these, in Cuba as elsewhere, constitut-

ed an open invitation to revolution. The people of Cuba remain our brothers. We acknowledge past omissions and errors in our relationship to them. The United States, along with other nations of the hemisphere, expresses a profound determination to assure future democratic governments in Cuba full and positive support in their effort to help the Cuban people achieve freedom, democracy and social justice.

Because the Castro regime has become the spearhead of attack on the inter-American system, that regime represents a fateful challenge to the inter American system. For freedom is the common destiny of our hemisphere—freedom *from* domestic tyranny and foreign intervention, *from* hunger and poverty and illiteracy, freedom *for* each person and nation in the Americas to realize the high potentialities of life in the twentieth century.⁴⁵ [emphasis in the original]

April 4, 1961

The formerly fanatically pro-American, anti-Castro Cuban opposition began to question the United State's motives in Cuba; distrust surfaced.

Most all researchers agree that the pivotal meeting for the entire operation took place on this date. President Kennedy called for a full dress debate regarding the Cuban situation. Present were Dulles, Bissell, Lemnitzer, Rusk, McNamara, Berle, Schlesinger, Bundy, Mann, Nitze, Dillon, and Fulbright. All who were asked by Kennedy assented to go ahead with the invasion except Fulbright. Schlesinger did not agree, but was not asked at that meeting. Analysts of this meeting say that Schlesinger felt like the new kid on the block and was too intimidated by the power present to speak up. Schlesinger, in his book A Thousand Days says that Kennedy called him back into the meeting room, where he listened to his (Schlesinger's) opposition. Even then, Schlesinger said that the reasons he gave Kennedy for being opposed to the plan seemed "hurried and disorderly." This inability on his part to fully express himself to Kennedy led to his writing a detailed memorandum to the president expressing that the concept of *non*intervention deeply appealed to him and that the only way he would be in favor of the invasion would be "If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke..."⁴⁶

"Go ahead" by consensus was achieved at the State Department.

The CIA enlisted the aid of a privately-owned cable laying vessel, The Western Union, in a plan to assist the crew from a Cuban torpedo boat to escape from the Cuban naval base at Baracao, northwest of Guantánamo. The plan failed.

45. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: Chronicle of a Disaster, pp. 108-109.

46. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 252.

April 6, 1961

CIA Information report #CS 3/470,587 indicated that the mass of Cuban people expected an invasion prior to mid-April and again that the Castro regime was losing popularity. There were indicators of growing civil unrest and strife; fuel for the CIA's theme of an looming counterrevolution. The report said that the fear of the Castro government was subsiding and that lines for consumer goods were increasing in size and number. There were reports that the city of Santiago de Cuba seethed with hate for Castro and that the Cuban army was penetrated by the rebel opposition. The document continued with information about uniformed militia members being attacked by the opposition who took their weapons from them. Castro at this time was supposed to be more and more distrustful of his regular army and was arming members of his youth brigade with automatic weapons received from Czechoslovakia. There were reported observations of growing numbers of Soviet Bloc personnel appearing on the streets of Havana. A plot against Castro was discovered fomenting among Cuban naval officers.

April 7, 1961

A Miami newspaper reporter was contacted and notified by Cubans in Florida that the day of the invasion was set for April 18, 1961. This was based on the fact that radio and TV stations broadcasting exile news had been asked to remain silent on April 18th so that their frequencies could be used for operations.

April 8, 1961

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, was briefed by Schlesinger and Barnes. The briefing was "unduly vague," as described by Schlesinger, and left Stevenson with the impression that no action would take place during the UN discussion of the Cuban problem.

April 9, 1961

Reporter William V. Shannon reported in the New York Post that Cuba was about to get the "Guatemala Treatment."⁴⁷

April 12, 1961

Kennedy made a public statement in a news conference that under no circumstances would the U.S. directly participate in the pending showdown with Cuba. This statement effectively handcuffed him during the situation

47. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p.115.

that would erupt five days later. Kennedy sent Schlesinger and Berle to New York to convey to Cardona that U.S. forces would not be used in the landing.

April 13, 1961

Skirmishes between opposition and Cuban troops increased in eastern Oriente Province.

Further intelligence gathered by CIA and documented in Information Report #00 B3,186,062 pointed out that saboteurs burned a building at El Encanto market and that priests and the United States were blamed for these and other acts of sabotage. Soviet propaganda appeared at vendors stands in the streets. Jewelry was confiscated from citizens and household items were rationed at stores contributing to the growing lines. People boycotted Soviet canned goods and the subject of a Soviet take over surfaced.

"Here there is courage because there is optimism. They all believe that what happened in Hungary will not happen here because we all believe that there will be outside help since our problem is not only ours. We just hope it does not take much longer."⁴⁸

The Revolutionary Council was moved to New York City by the CIA and was quartered in the Hotel Lexington.

April 14, 1961

A flotilla of seven ships left Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua with the brigade and equipment on board. The CRC was told that the preliminary air strikes would occur the next morning, April 15, 1961.

April 15, 1961

The first air strikes took place.

6:00A.M.

Havana's Camp Libertad airfield was bombed by two of the brigades' B-26's with Cuban FAR (Cuban Air Force) markings.

6:10A.M.

The Cuban airfield at San Antonio de los Baños was strafed.

7:00A.M.

A B-26 with an opaque nose cone (genuine Cuban FAR B-26's had clear plexiglass nose cones) and two pilots landed at Key West Naval Air Station with one engine feathered; a genuine malfunction that threw a wrench into plans of using just the one other plane that landed at Miami International an hour and a half later.

48. Source : unidentified CIA indigenous Cuban opposition member.

7:10A.M.

The airfield at Santiago in Oriente Province was buzzed by a brigade B-26.

8:20A.M.

A B-26 with an opaque nose cone and one pilot landed at Miami International. The CRC claimed that it and the other plane that had landed at Key West earlier in the morning were piloted by Cuban Air Force defectors who saw the error of their ways, bombed their own airfields and were defecting. They were in fact CIA plants; B-26's that had flown in from Nicaragua with Cuban expatriate crews. The press questioned the discrepancy over the nose cones of both planes and the quick sequestering of the pilots.

About noon

Cuban UN delegate Raul Roa told the UN that the U.S. had carried out the bombing campaign earlier that day and denounced it as "vandalistic aggression." U.S. delegate Adlai Stevenson, at his post in the United Nations, denied allegations based on misinformation previously fed to him by CIA.

These air attacks brought swift reaction from Castro's militia. After the attacks on Camp Libertad and San Antonio de los Banos, selected members of Castro's militia and G2 began house to house searches for insurgents. Arrests occurred en masse and threats were made against family members. Cordons were formed around Catholic churches and people were searched going in and out.

April 16, 1961

In a speech delivered at a military funeral for those killed in the air raids, Castro called the air attack on 15 April "Cuba's Pearl Harbor" and predicted that it was a prelude to aggression. He mobilized 20,000 additional men for the militia.

1:00P.M.

The CRC was flown back to Opa Loka and sequestered under guard in an isolated structure. They were told only that the invasion was imminent and were given the impression that they would be leaving any moment to join their comrades.

about 6:00P.M.

President Kennedy decided to cancel air support for the invasion on the following morning. This, of all of Kennedy's decisions regarding the Bay of Pigs incident, is one of his most decisive moves. It is often viewed as the pivot upon which success or failure of the land invasion tipped, for without air support, the ground forces found themselves at the mercy of an unexpectedly ferocious Cuban air force.

April 17, 1961

The invasion took place. The U.S. Navy was authorized to provide early warning information to brigade ships, but under no circumstances were they to become involved.

1:00A.M.

The invasion fleet, four cargo ships, two infantry landing craft, and a dozen smaller vessels, took positions off of Playa Gíron (code named Blue Beach) and Playa Larga (code named Green Beach).

1:15A.M.

On a small island midway between Honduras and Cuba the CIA had established a clandestine radio broadcast station. Named after the island, Radio Swan broadcasted a statement in the name of Juan Cardona announcing the beginning of the battle. The message broadcast was a psychological ploy designed by the CIA's propaganda chief, David Phillips, to throw the listening Castro government off guard by adding to the conspiratorial ambience of the invasion:

LOOK WELL AT THE RAINBOW. THE FISH WILL RISE VERY SOON. THE SKY IS BLUE. THE FISH IS RED.

Lem Jones Associates in New York issued War Bulletin #1.

1:50A.M.

CIA frogmen came ashore to position landing navigation lights and to do preliminary reconnaissance.

2:45A.M.

Two battalions of the brigade landed at Playa Girón and one landed at Playa Larga. Five tanks rolled ashore at Playa Girón and secured the beachhead. A column of troops marched off toward the village of Jagüey Grande to secure it and the airstrip. During the day the beachhead was to expand to a maximum of 20 miles inland and 43 linear miles of coast. Relentless air attacks and no indigenous support doomed the invaders from the start. Eight-hundred sixty-eight tons of supplies were landed along with 4,000 weapons; extras for the "friendly forces" who were to join up with the brigade invaders.

2:58A.M.

Main force landings began at Playa Girón.

3:30A.M.

Main force landings take place at Playa Larga

4:00A.M.

Lem Jones Associates in New York issued war bulletin #2. A Cuban radio station announced that an invasion force had landed in the central Cuban province of Matanzas and that reinforcements had been called for by Cuban militia forces there.

5:15A.M.

Presidential military adviser General Chester Clifton heard by phone that the invasion had begun.

5:30A.M.

President Kennedy had by now risen and was studying preliminary reports of the invasion. His information was running five to seven hours behind real time.

6:00A.M.

Castro was fully informed of the landings via telephone from Jagüey Grande and alerted his tiny air force: two armed T-33 jet trainers, two British Sea Furies, and two B-26's.

6:45A.M.

One of the Cuban B-26's sunk the cargo ship Houston with rockets. It went down two miles from Playa Larga carrying all of the brigade's communication gear and an entire battalion.

7:15A.M.

Lem Jones Associates issued war bulletin #3.

7:30A.M.

The brigade's SS Marsopa and eight of the smaller support vessels were hit and sunk by Cuban pilots.

8:00A.M.

Castro mobilized his militia battalion at the Australian sugar mill near the landing sites and a battalion at the city of Cienfuegos. A general mobilization order went out. Havana radio broadcast urgent calls from the army ordering all militiamen to report to their units.

about 9:00A.M.

Dean Rusk made the first public statement on invasion : "There is no secret about the sympathy of the American people for those who wish to be free. What happens in Cuba is for the Cuban people themselves to decide...there is not now and will not be any intervention there by United States forces."⁴⁹

11:07A.M.

Havana radio broadcast a proclamation by Castro declaring a national alert and that Cuban troops were moving against the invaders.

49. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p.135.

Elsewhere, the Venezuelan Chamber of Deputies unanimously approved a resolution condemning the armed intervention in Cuba. The press reported that volunteers to help the Castro forces were being enrolled in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Radio Swan was jammed, blocking "news" to the Cuban public. Travel to and from Havana was blocked. Official cars were allowed to pass only after a thorough search by militia. Cuban citizens first heard about invasion via Miami radio at 7:00A.M.

An in-place rebel heard nothing from his underground group until 3:00P.M. that day. Then he was told by an underground leader that the invasion was doomed and that he should attempt to conceal his involvement in the underground. He said that radio Swan was full of lies too easily seen through and that the people had stopped listening to it. He further said that the invasion was expected no sooner than April 28, 1961. This, he said, was a complete surprise. Another in-place rebel first heard about the invasion via Miami radio broadcast at 5:00A.M. on April 17, 1961. He said that priests and teachers were hidden in private homes.

April 18, 1961

11:00A.M.

McGeorge Bundy prepared a memo for Kennedy urging aggressive action by U.S. Navy's CAP (Combat Air Patrol) against the FAR (Force Aero Revolución [Revolutionary Air Force] the Cuban air force)...

I think you will find at noon [April 18, 1961] that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good. The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feeble than we had hoped. Tanks have done-in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others. The CIA will press hard for further air help this time by Navy cover to B-26's attacking the tanks. But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid crescendo, because we are up against a formidable enemy, who is reacting with military know how and vigor. The immediate request I would grant (because it cannot easily be proven against us and because men are in need)...In my own judgment, the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally painted U.S. planes if necessary, and let the battle go its way.⁵⁰

Pro-Castro demonstrations in Latin American were directed against U.S. installations. They occurred in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy, accusing him of arming and equipping the brigade and said that the aircraft used belonged to the

50. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Jack B. Pfeiffer, "Bitter Recriminations: The Navy CAP [Combat Air Patrol] At the Bay of Pigs 19 April 1961" (internal CIA memorandum, 24 Dec 82), p. 4.

U.S. Khrushchev indicated in this letter to Kennedy that things could escalate; that "military techniques" make it possible for any "so called small war" to produce a chain reaction.

Kennedy began to place blame on the CIA upon hearing reports that the battle was going badly.

1:20P.M.

Lem Jones Associates issued war bulletin #4 denouncing Cuban forces for destroying "humanitarian" supplies destined for the invaders and thanking "supporters" worldwide for messages of encouragement.

7:00P.M.

Kennedy drafted a reply to Khrushchev's statement that the Soviet Union would provide support to Cuba : "You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to the events in Cuba...I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by outside forces we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression."⁵¹

10:15P.M.

Kennedy attended a formal dinner with members of Congress in which the new cabinet members were presented.

11:00P.M.

Kennedy was called out of his dinner party to meet with Bissell, Rusk, McNamara, Burke, Lemnitzer at the White House to go over reports of the invasion falling apart and the pleas for air cover. Rusk was adamant about the President's pledge of no direct U.S. intervention and Kennedy sticks to his decision, thus dooming the invaders.

April 19, 1961

1:00A.M.

Kennedy authorized one hour of air cover for brigade B-26's by six unmarked jets from the USS Essex. His orders, as they reached the U.S. naval force in the Caribbean, west of Cuba were:

1. Positive aggressive Navy air support and cover is granted for one hour, 1130Z to 1230Z (Greenwich Mean Time, or 4:30P.M. to 5:30P.M. local time), 19 April.
2. All enemy forces on approaches leading into Playa Giron airfield should be attacked.
3. Supply aircraft will also receive escort for this period.

51. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 276.

4. Main purpose is hope to catch enemy aircraft in area.
5. Follow on air strikes as indicated, in your message desired.
6. Please advise plan.
7. Essential make best use opportunity this one hour period.
8. Small boats will be resupplying beach, avoid attack.

8:30A.M.

A meeting was held in Director of Central Intelligence Dulles' office. Bundy phoned Kennedy, again requesting that the USN air cover be allowed to attack ground and air targets. Kennedy refused, reiterating the USN's only role was to provide defensive air cover for the brigade.

9:00A.M.

The navy reported the downing of brigade aircraft manned by U.S. crew.

10:00A.M.

Castro's troops had driven invaders from village of San Blas.

12:00 noon

Lem Jones Associates issues war bulletin #6.

3:00P.M.

President Kennedy met with his advisors all afternoon. At one point, when he left the room for a few minutes, Robert Kennedy said that the U.S. would have to take some action or be judged "paper tigers" by the Soviet Union. Rostow chided him in private and Robert Kennedy's response was "that's constructive!".

Air activity by the United States was ordered to cease.

3:30P.M.

Communications ceased between in-country brigade forces and the outside.

5:00P.M.

Members of the CRC, after being flown up from their sequestered quarters at Opa Loka, met with Kennedy at his invitation at the White House to go over the disaster. This rapport eventually led to a decision many months later to trade brigade prisoners for tractors.

5:30P.M.

Playa Girón beachhead fell.

6:00P.M.

Castro's tanks began an encircling maneuver to pin other invaders down. Surrenders began.

9:00P.M.

Lem Jones Associates issued a final communique acknowledging losses and pledging that the struggle would go on.

Elsewhere on April 19th, Castro's forces supported by air, tanks, and artillery began a hard counter-attack. No information regarding a general Cuban uprising had been heard. Brigade survivors began dispersing into countryside. Arrests and executions markedly increase. "Anti-Castro fighters" virtually ended organized resistance in the beachhead area. No general uprising materialized. Cuban national radio announced the arrest of the Roman Catholic auxiliary bishop of Havana Province. The Cuban people became disillusioned and confused. Realizing that Castro had crushed the invasion made them see that he had also destroyed whatever organized resistance there was inside Cuba. The mass arrests for the time being wiped out the underground in Cuba.

April 20, 1961

Kennedy delivered a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he drew parallels between the communist uprising in Cuba and those in Asia and Latin America. He said that the country would profit from the lessons learned and said, "Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril!"⁵²

April 21, 1961

Rostow wrote a memorandum to President Kennedy with copies to Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy...

Right now the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our foreign policy thrown off balance by what we feel and what we do about Cuba itself. We have suffered a serious setback; but that setback will be trivial compared to the consequences of not very soon regaining momentum along the lines which we have begun in the past three months.⁵³

Kennedy, along with Johnson, decided to keep Dulles on at least for the time being to avoid accusations by the Republicans that the Bay of Pigs fiasco was a Democratic debacle. He replaced Dulles in November of 1961 with John A. McCone.

52. U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents - John F. Kennedy 1961 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 306.

53. Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power. An Essay in Recent History (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972), p. 211.

April 22, 1961

Kennedy established an investigating committee headed by General Maxwell Taylor. It included Allen Dulles, Robert Kennedy, and Admiral Arleigh A. Burke. The panel never reached agreement on whether or not the invasion plans had had any chance of success. It did recommend that the CIA be permitted to continue to conduct clandestine operations but not to undertake major military operations unless they could be plausibly denied.

April 23, 1961

Castro threatened the lives of U.S. citizens in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America if another invasion took place. The fear of an invasion became an obsession with Castro and Khrushchev through the missile crisis that evolved over the next eighteen months. Castro threatened lives of the prisoners taken (1,087 according to him) unless the U.S. halted aid to insurgents.

Consequences to the failed operation began to be apparent. Foreign governments, including West Germany and South Vietnam, expressed concern over the inability of the U.S. to carry out a successful action against Castro.

April 27, 1961

As a result of the invasion, the Cuban government had by this time arrested 20,000 persons.

April 28, 1961

A CIA staff memorandum (#23-61) entitled Consequences for the U.S. of the Abortive Rebellion in Castro's Cuba : some Preliminary Thoughts stated the following: Castro is stronger than ever. The communist Bloc would then keep the United States on the defensive, but would avoid direct confrontation. Allies became more fearful; they shared concern over the rashness and naivete of U.S. leadership. There was widespread uncertainty concerning the damage to Western prestige consequent to the failure of the invasion. Uppermost in the minds of friendly governments would be the question of U.S. strength and prestige; they would question the ability of the United States to protect *them* against direct communist intervention. The third world would remain unchanged. Pro-U.S. third world governments would criticize the concept and technique the U.S. used in its effort to unseat Castro.

World opinion (formed mostly as a result of press reports and fed back through CIA sources) included these concerns:

1. The United States was responsible for the intervention in Cuba.
2. The intervention failed miserably.

3. There appeared to be confusion and contradiction in the formation of U.S. foreign policy.
4. CIA complicity and irresponsibility were apparent.
5. Cuban opposition is fragmented more than ever.
6. Castro's militia was effective in defeating the invasion.
7. The abortive attempt to unseat Castro will provide him with justification to escalate economic austerity and ask for Soviet aid.
8. CIA staff memorandum number 23-61 dated April 28, 1961 (no author listed) states that,

We believe, however, that the sum of these factors is not very great. There is probably nothing in the Cuban affair which has caused the Bloc leaders to modify their basic views on American intentions or capabilities. While they would like to turn the Cuban victory to good account in some other area, they may also fear that this is a dangerous time in which to push the U.S. too far. This factor is likely to be weighty, not in Laos, where they probably regard the risks of general war as low, but in Berlin, where we continue to believe that the USSR hopes to make advances in a relatively low keyed fashion. Thus, while the atmosphere of East-West relations has been made more difficult and unpleasant, the Cuban affair at its present stage is not likely to cause any substantial change in Bloc policies.⁵⁴

May 18, 1961

CIA Information Report #CS 3/476,618 reported that terrorist activity inside Cuba continued. Public opinion in Cuba was then sixty percent in favor of Castro. Public opinion was largely unfavorable toward the U.S., the consensus being that the U.S. had been weakened and ridiculed by Castro. Cardona's Revolutionary Council was seen as a complete failure.

June 5, 1961

CIA Information Report #00 K3,187,929 reported that sixty to seventy percent of people were anti-Castro, but were too terrorized and disorganized to do anything about it (a contradiction to the CIA information report detailed above). This report's recommendations on what should be done if another invasion is mounted were that it should be massive in scale, the underground must be armed and be kept informed, and that when the invasion is imminent, the underground must be given a chance to head for the hills.

54. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences for the U.S. of the Abortive rebellion in Castro's Cuba: Some Preliminary Thoughts, no author listed, (Washington, D.C.: CIA, April 28, 1961), pp. 8-9.

Historical Analysis

The above chronology reveals two categories of events: those that affected the makers of policy and those that reflect the policy made — the cause and the effect. Let me point out what I mean.

Events

The events upon which the United States based its opinion of Cuba involved that government's moves toward communism, its aggression against U.S. resources, and intelligence concerning the mind set of the Cuban people, i.e., their perceived oppression. In other words, Washington was concerned about the effect Castro's revolution was having on American holdings on the island and the people who lived there, and on the proliferation of Soviet (communist) influence in Latin America. These concerns were symbolized in the person of Fidel Castro.

Less than two weeks after Castro assumed leadership of Cuba, the American owned Cuban Telephone Company was expropriated. In March of 1959 Castro charged that enemies of the "revolution" were buying arms in Miami. Later that month he declared for the first time that an invasion was being planned by the Americans. In July a Cuban military defector testified before a U.S. Senate Committee that communists had indeed assumed control in his country.

In November of 1959 the privately owned (American) King Ranch Company was seized by the Cuban Agrarian Institute. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke and Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter convinced Eisenhower to form an active opposition to Castro at the same time. That same month, Castro finished pruning his cabinet of non-communist-oriented officials.

Early in 1960 Cuba entered into formal trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Cuba continued to seize American-owned mills and factories in the name of agrarian reform. In a March televised speech, Che Guevara declared economic war on the United States, or as he termed this country, "the great power of the North."⁵⁵ He suggested that alternative markets for Cuba's sugar exports be explored. Alternative markets certainly included the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Eisenhower approved Bissell's plans to put Operation Pluto (as the invasion plan was known) into effect. This included organizing a refugee anti-Castro paramilitary force, the establishment of a propaganda radio broadcast station on Swan Island, and the organization of a 5th column inside Cuba. In May, Castro again announced that the U.S. was preparing an invasion of his island country. He also ordered American-owned petroleum refineries to process Soviet crude oil. When they refused, he seized them. This began a tit-for-tat economic and diplomatic game which slowly eroded the relations between the U.S. and Cuba. In July of that year,

55. Meyer and Szulc, Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p.43.

Khrushchev declared in a policy speech that Cuba had the full support of the Soviet Union in its struggle against perceived capitalist oppression.

Early in January, 1961, Castro initiated what amounted to be a demand for the withdrawal of embassy personnel from the U.S. Embassy in Havana. This resulted in a similar move on behalf of the U.S. regarding the Cuban Embassy in Washington. Sources within Cuba indicated that as the number of American emissaries dwindled, the number of Soviet Bloc representatives increased.

U.S. intelligence agencies began receiving information regarding the militarization of Cuba. Information came in regarding the establishment of guard posts, barricades, encampments, and the seizing of vehicles by the military. The Cuban government established a policy of making the possession of explosives and other like material a crime subject to execution. This was in response to the growing anti-Castro guerrilla activity in the same hills where Castro himself began his 26th of July Movement against the Batista regime in the early 1950's. Strikes and anti-government public assemblies began to occur in Cuba. Eastern Bloc countries began aligning with Cuba and many Latin American countries began aligning with the United States.

Newly-installed President Kennedy began receiving CIA reports based on these items of intelligence. In reviewing these documents it is easy to see how they could lead one to believe that revolution was ripe again in Cuba, this time against the new Castro regime. There were reports from CIA sources suggesting the repression of the common people via summary executions, the establishment of armed camps and anti-aircraft positions and check-points along major highways, and the persecution of education and religious leaders. There were also reports that various military units had intruded upon private dwellings, searching for "dissidents" and taking over the housing. Kennedy was told that Castro's support from the populace was reported to be as low as 30%. He also was told that even though the presence of the military was slowly spreading throughout the country-side, there were indications that the soldiers making up that presence were not dedicated to the job: many were "sick" more often than not, and some refused to take action against anti-Castro elements in the countryside. There were two independent reports of Castro being shot while flying in his helicopter over rebel-held hills.

In late March, Senator J. William Fulbright communicated his opposition to the invasion plan in a memo to President Kennedy. Also in late March the CIA received a report that Castro had received a shipment of Soviet destroyers to supplement his navy.

This information resulted in several policy decisions that led directly to the fiasco in the Bay of Pigs.

Policy

In mid-March, 1959, two and one-half months after Castro seized control of Cuba, Eisenhower directed the CIA to organize Cuban exiles into a guerrilla group capable of operating covertly inside Cuba. A year later, CIA began distributing arms and radios to the underground inside Cuba. At the same time, the U.S. refused the overt sale of military equipment to that government.

In May and June of 1960 the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Cuba by canceling its purchases of sugar. This was a reaction to Cuba's expropriation of U.S.-owned oil refineries. The cancellation of all existing aid programs eventually resulted. In July of 1960, Howard Hunt made recommendations to the CIA to adopt a plan to assassinate Castro prior to any invasion. These plans were adopted, and plans to kill the Cuban president were formulated and attempted.⁵⁶ In fact, Richard Bissell admitted in 1984 that CIA plans to assassinate Castro were an integral part of the invasion itself.⁵⁷ This may have been a reflection of the apparent obsession with the need to remove Castro as a source of aggravation that the Kennedy brothers developed. This necessity to rid the world of Castro, even by assassination, is suggested in Bob Woodward's Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA.⁵⁸ The efforts to remove him from office and discredit him in the eyes of the Cuban people, even after the failed action at the Bay of Pigs, is pointed out in Ralph McGehee's Deadly Deceits.⁵⁹

As part of their coverage of the 1960 campaign, the Scripps-Howard newspaper conglomerate got Nixon and Kennedy to respond to a questionnaire. Their publicized responses had the effect of official policy statements. The responses said in essence that the use of force was not the right way and that the Organization of American States should be used to prevent Castro's influence from spreading to other countries. This seems to point out that there was in fact a difference between publicly stated policy and true policy, the secret or hidden agenda of government, for at the same time Nixon was aware of the CIA's project in training the brigade in Guatemala. Nixon, in fact, liked to think of himself as the action officer within the White House for the entire invasion project.

At the time of the election, the CIA shifted its emphasis on the mission of the brigade from that of being a well-trained, 500-man infiltration unit (still a thousand short of its eventual invasion-force size) to the concept of an Anzio-style beach-head assault. This was done against the advice of its own on-the-scene military advisors. They likened it to sending a group of boy scouts up against the Marines. Since August, the CIA had been parachuting supplies into the Escambray Mountains in

56. Wyden, Bay of Pigs, pp. 38-45.

57. Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1987), p. 88.

58. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

59. Ralph McGehee W. Deadly Deceits (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, Inc., 1983).

support of the guerrillas. These supply missions were not always successful. The Cuban army was being strengthened by the Soviets. Because of these reasons the guerrillas were not always as prone to manipulation and receptive to CIA directives as the CIA wished they would have been. The infiltration plan was dropped and the assault plan took shape, complete with anticipated air, naval, and artillery support.⁶⁰

Those supporting the assault remembered the CIA's role in overthrowing the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. In fact the Cuban assault plan was referred to as "the Guatemala model".⁶¹ In that 1954 invasion, the CIA used less than 200 Guatemalan exiles along with some antiquated World War II P-47 airplanes flown by American pilots as an invasion force to overthrow the government. (The same base at Retalhuleu was used as was the Florida base at Opa Loka.) Many of the same personalities were also involved, such as David Atlee Phillips and the mysterious Jake Engler.

As the autumn of 1960 wore on into winter, the United States imposed a sweeping trade embargo on Cuba. This move and others that followed through the first part of January, 1961 led to a complete break of diplomatic relations.

In March of 1961 the invasion site was changed from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs because Kennedy wanted a more isolated location to enhance deniability and to be able to spread out the actual landing zones. The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the U.S. Navy to begin planning support activity for the brigade. According to information contained in The Puzzle Palace, the Navy had for some time been operating two signal intelligence (SIGINT) gathering vessels in and around Cuban waters under the direction of the National Security Agency.⁶² Again, this indicates a break between the publicly stated (and President Kennedy's own) policy of absolutely no U.S. military intervention in Cuba and the obvious intent of others to do just that. This directive resulted in the issuance of Rules of Engagement for the involved Navy sea and air forces. These rules themselves reflect the official desire of the U.S. to be able to build a deniability factor into the military support it had authorized.

On April 4, 1961 President Kennedy held a pivotal policy meeting with his key advisors at a National Security Council gathering. Adolf Berle and Arthur Schlesinger represented Kennedy's personal advisory staff. Robert McNamara and Paul Nitze were there from the Defense Department. Dean Rusk and Thomas Mann represented the State Department. General Lemnitzer spoke for the Joint Chiefs. Richard Bissell and Allen Dulles were there from CIA. In order to avoid future partisan reprisals, Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate

60. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p.229.

61. Wyden, Bay of Pigs, p.20.

62. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 276.

Foreign Relations Committee, had been previously consulted by Kennedy and was also present. The outcome of this meeting could have canceled the whole affair. According to Schlesinger, though, Kennedy's team was still too new to candidly, objectively, and thoroughly analyse the whole plan. Dulles and Bissell pushed it through, mutating from analysts to advocates. Schlesinger said that he privately dissented, but felt too intimidated by the personalities present at this meeting to voice his concern.

Dulles and Bissell spearheaded the argument to go ahead with the invasion. They said that the invaders would land and hold territory until the CRC could proclaim itself as the new government and rally internal support. The brigade's planes would be able to neutralize the Cuban air force before the landing took place. They did not emphasize the pivotal importance of the air support. They said that Cuban history was one of small insurrections overcoming larger forces, so the counterrevolution would be in place, hinting that the United States' complicity in it would not be suspected. And finally, they argued that Castro would be receiving recently trained pilots and MiGs from Czechoslovakia any day and when that occurred covert management of an invasion would be impossible. Berle said to invade because he felt that the United States would have to confront communism in Latin America anyway, so it might as well be in Cuba. Nitze was skeptical about the chances of success, but went along with the majority. Lemnitzer said that if CIA assessments and assumptions were correct, the plan was militarily feasible, but did not point out that since the change of landing sites from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs, the plan was becoming logistically futile. The Pentagon was playing a game of isolating itself from the operation while trying to keep a thumb on its pulse. One almost gets the impression that the Pentagon was paying out rope to the CIA with which to hang itself.

Fulbright presented the argument against invasion. His reasoning was that the plan was disproportionate to the threat presented by Castro. He also brought forth the issue of morality. Was it right for the United States to be involved in subterfuge and lies on an international scale? Arthur Schlesinger disapproved, but did not voice his opinion at the meeting and was later rebuffed for doing so in private. This is a good point to note that Irving Janis, in his book GroupThink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, offers a possible explanation for Schlesinger's failure to act. Janis suggests that a psychological impetus sweeps weak dissenters along with the majority, quashing any effective opposition.

Why did Kennedy call this meeting? Was it to form a consensus to decision or simply to reinforce one he had already made? Based on his earlier briefings from both the CIA and Eisenhower, it was probably the latter. Senator Fulbright and President Kennedy had spent a few days secluded in Florida. Fulbright was the

only outspoken critic of the plan, and yet Kennedy went ahead with it. It is likely he sought social or peer reinforcement through consensus. In The Necessity of Choice, Kissinger says that American pragmatism saw "in consensus a test of validity," because it attempted...

"...to reduce judgment to methodology and value to knowledge. Disagreement is considered a reflection on the objectivity or the judgment of the participants [in the process of decision-making]...even very eminent people are reluctant to stand alone...the obvious insurance against the possibility of error is to obtain as many opinions as possible. And unanimity is important, in that its absence is a standing reminder of the tentativeness of the course adopted. The committee approach to decision-making is often less an organizational device than a spiritual necessity."⁶³

Kennedy did not consult those of his administration who tended to be more liberal, like Adlai Stevenson or Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles.

That same day, the CIA was able to influence a private company, probably Western Union, to assist in exfiltrating some Cuban naval officers. Sanctioned at the top level or not, for a governmental organization to use a private corporation to assist in such potentially inflammatory covert activity is a definite policy move.

The following week, on April 12th, President Kennedy made a public statement that caused him much consternation when the affair turned sour the next Monday. His policy statement that the U.S. military would under no circumstances be used in a Cuban showdown would soon come back to haunt him. He later had to work his way out of a contradictory situation wherein he had sanctioned an invasion involving a multiplicity of U.S. government civilian, paramilitary, and military organizations providing everything but the main force in the invasion while at the same time stating that the U.S. military had no part in the Cuban affair. A wary and intelligent press corps in Florida was quick in pointing out the subtle differences in B-26 nose cones when the two "Cuban" bombers "defected" at the start of the invasion. The addition of a third genuine B-26 defector confused the issue even further.

The day after the invasion began and Kennedy began to see that things were not going at all well, McGeorge Bundy urged him to modify his covert policy by allowing CIA pleas for naval air cover to be met. Kennedy eventually gave in and authorized very limited (one hour) air cover by disguised planes. Unfortunately, through mis-communication, the navy planes missed their rendezvous with the brigade bombers. This resulted in the deaths of four Alabama Air National

63. Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 342-343.

Guardsmen flying two of them. On this same day, Kennedy issued an official statement to the Soviet premier that the U.S. was not intervening in Cuban domestic affairs.

Kennedy's unwavering insistence that no further air cover be provided at this point is often used as the reason for the total failure of the invasion. In retrospect it can be argued that Kennedy at this point was committed to some kind of support and that it is unfortunate that the support was not a total commitment, for without it, the invasion itself did fail. But what should be asked is that even if the overthrow of Castro's government had succeeded, what would then have taken place? Conceivably, a counter-counter-revolution sponsored by Castro, or if he had been assassinated and turned into a martyred symbol of U.S. capitalist imperialism, by a suitable clone who would have continued the political turmoil. Disregarding the presence of a communist state ninety miles from the U.S. mainland, one has to admit that Castro has lived up to his promises to his people of stability and survival. Had Kennedy decided differently, who is to say what would have resulted?

Policy resulting from the failed invasion was articulated by both Kennedy in a speech to an assembly of newspaper editors on April 20, 1961 and by the committee that he appointed under General Maxwell Taylor to critique the affair. Kennedy drew parallels between the rise of communism in Asia and its presence in the West and expressed his administration's commitment to fight it. The Taylor committee recommended that the CIA continue to be allowed to conduct covert military operations, but only as long as they could be plausibly denied.

This, then, was the legacy that Kennedy inherited from the Eisenhower administration: First, here was a costly investment in an exile army of approximately 1,400 men anxious to reclaim their island homeland, or actually just to go home. Disbandment would be dishonorable and initiate what Kennedy came to refer to as the "disposal problem" — what to do with hundreds of committed and trained expatriate soldiers who had been kept sequestered in secret Guatemalan training camps for up to a year and primed for a counterrevolution. Second, there was an administrative quagmire in which the CIA had been allowed to become a power unto itself. And finally, he had to address a situation wherein the U.S. was put in the position of supporting backers of the former Batista regime.

How is it that President Kennedy, a young, articulate, and exuberant personality, found himself within 100 days of his inauguration to be mired down in the swamps of southern Cuba? According to Irving L. Janis in his book Victims of Groupthink, Kennedy was a victim of a psychological contagion that interfered with the mental alertness displayed by him and his advisors under other circumstances — he and his advisors were taken in by a "stupid patchwork plan" promoted by the

CIA.⁶⁴ Kennedy and his "new frontiersmen" were subjected to a series of briefings and introductions to executive life that resulted in their being sucked into a set of circumstances that they could have, under other conditions, avoided. Janis goes on to say, in explaining his "Groupthink" hypothesis, that "members of any small cohesive group tend to maintain *esprit de corps* by unconsciously developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with critical thinking and reliability testing."⁶⁵ Here are some of the factors that have been mentioned as constituting the source of the gap between the concept of the Bay of Pigs as projected by the CIA and the reality of its failure:

The president and his immediate staff were new. They were not fully functional as an executive decision-making body or as a Commander In Chief and staff. Walt Rostow tells a fitting anecdote : Shortly after the dust from the Bay of Pigs fiasco began to settle, his wife made a comment to him one evening concerning all of Kennedy's staff, "I've not seen you for years more cheerful or effective. You're an odd lot. *You're not politicians or intellectuals. You're the junior officers of the Second World War come to responsibility.*"⁶⁶ [emphasis added] Kennedy, being the new president, had no formed, intimate channel to intelligence; "Uncertain about the venture [the Bay of Pigs project] but feeling personally vulnerable, worried about secrecy, the President took several cautionary steps: he asked the JCS to review the plan; he encouraged Senator Fulbright to voice his doubts; he insisted on reducing direct United States involvement, *but neither he nor anybody else pulled these things together...*"⁶⁷ [emphasis added]

Time and secrecy certainly worked against Kennedy. There was very little time in which to make changes. Kennedy was first briefed about the plan on November 17, 1960, just after his election. He was not in a position to make any moves until his inauguration in February. By that time the CIA had been working on the project for over two years and had already decided to switch modes from a clandestine infiltration to all-out invasion. This, coupled with compartmented secrecy, discouraged any radical changes in the program. This secrecy excluded government experts who could have provided useful insight. The pervasion of secrecy surrounding the invasion also kept the CIA from functioning as it had been designed. The analysts who probably would have seen the folly of it were excluded from the decision-making apparatus. The CIA was not only shaping foreign policy at this point, but was in fact exempt from any outside checks on its activities. They were managing clandestine activities and gathering and evaluating the intelligence

64. Janis, Victims of Groupthink, p.iii.

65. Ibid., p.35.

66. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power An Essay in Recent History, p.215.

67. I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy. The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.186.

by which those activities were appraised. The CIA's roles as intelligence-gatherer and policy-maker hampered its ability to objectively appraise assumptions upon which the operation rested. The CIA possibly did not check its own intelligence regarding estimates of anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba. "They fell in love with the plan and ceased to think critically of it."⁶⁸ Meyer and Szulc also strongly suggest that during the change in presidential administrations, policy was made by the CIA, and in particular, Bissell and Dulles. Further, it is suggested that Bissell became so enmeshed in the project that he lost the ability to objectively critique the day to day operation because he was embedded in its most central point. Meanwhile, Janis says that Dulles and Bissell were so emotionally devoted to the plan that they were unable to make sound judgments. If this was the case, then the advice they proffered upon a dependent, neophyte president was just as unsound.

Kennedy had yet to establish any administrative organization for crisis planning. He depended on his own patchwork of aides to work out his desires and to keep him informed of the operation.

Even after being first informed of the operation, President Kennedy thought that he was approving a quiet infiltration.

Kennedy was given the impression that the brigade could "go guerrilla," that is, fade into the welcome arms of their fellow revolutionaries at some nearby mountain base. The nearest mountains to hide in were dozens of miles to the south on the other side of Cienfuegos, a town occupied by a contingent of Cuban soldiers. The Bay of Pigs is in the middle of the Zapata Swamp. There had been no communication with the anti-Castro revolutionaries since the previous September, and even then it was not on the friendliest of terms.

The President was told that no overt, identifiable U.S. military aid would be needed. (The CIA was at the same time telling the leaders of the underground that there would be plenty of U.S. Navy sea and air support.)

Kennedy was led to believe that support would surface from the Cuban underground, deserting Cuban military forces, and a rebellious population.

Kennedy was told that there could be only two possible outcomes: the desired national revolt, or the brigade could fade into the hills to try again later.

Kennedy was given the impression by the CIA that time was working against him and he was rushed into making decisions. He was told that Castro was soon to receive trained Cuban pilots back from Czechoslovakia with Soviet MiGs and that in itself would spell disaster for the brigade's B-26's. Kennedy was told that the rainy season would soon be upon the island and that for some reason this would deter success. Kennedy was also informed that the 1,500 men making up the brigade were growing anxiety ridden at being kept at such a fever-pitch of readiness

68. Meyer and Szulc, The Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster, p.104.

for so long and that they were becoming a liability.⁶⁹

President Kennedy was not told about the vital military importance of the air support on the day of the invasion until he had already committed himself otherwise.

The President was convinced that the Cuban air force could be knocked out prior to the invasion via the April 15th raids.

The President was told that the brigade was willing to carry out the invasion without U.S. support.

The President was informed that Castro had a small, weak army that would be easily defeated by the invaders.

The Kennedy administration was told that the invasion would touch off a massive popular uprising that would topple the Castro regime.

Kennedy was backed into a political corner:

A. On the domestic, partisan side, he had to ask himself that if he did not back the invasion after taking such an activist stance during his campaign, could it be construed that his Democratic administration was not as willing as the Republicans to fight communism?

B. On the international political scene, Kennedy was told by the CIA that after June 1, 1961, when the Cuban trainee-pilots returned from Czechoslovakia with their new MiGs, it would take a major U.S. military offensive to stage a successful landing.

At the beginning of the crisis the intelligence community tended to tell the president what it thought was necessary instead of the other way around. The CIA, in its continuing effort to expand its capabilities and responsibilities, wanted to initiate and manage a war in Cuba. By the end of the crisis, Kennedy had learned that military actions on the scale demanded by the CIA should be handled by the Pentagon. The president also learned of the necessity of "dirty tricks," but thought that they should remain within the framework established by the foreign policy of the United States. He learned to be skeptical of advice, which led to his developing a program of soliciting written opinions from the JCS and relying more on trusted White House staff. Over the next few years, as events in Southeast Asia developed, Kennedy used this jaded skepticism to hold back on committing resources until more facts were in. This certainly took place in 1962 when Chiang Kai-shek put out feelers to see how receptive the U.S. would be in supporting his proposed invasion of mainland China. It is unfortunate that the wisdom gained here in doubting the "ex-

69. There were in fact incidents involving recalcitrant members of the brigade in Guatemala, but it cannot be said for certain that this was due to the prolonged wait or simply because out of 1,400 trained soldiers, there will always be a few rotten apples.

perts" was forgotten by April 24, 1980, when President Carter authorized the ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue attempt. According to an article he wrote in the New York Times Magazine, Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, knew that McGeorge Bundy had concluded after the Bay of Pigs, "In the future the President...should hear something from other than advocates."⁷⁰ The official inquiry into the hostage rescue mission noted that "planners...reviewed and critiqued their own product for soundness as they went along...The hostage rescue plan was never subjected to rigorous testing and evaluation by qualified, independent observers and monitors short of the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves."⁷¹

70. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Failed Mission," New York Times Magazine, 18 April 1982, p. 64.

71. United States Naval War College, "Iran Rescue Mission Report," Washington, D.C., August 1980, p. 21.

Part 3 - Decision-Making Analysis

Let me remind the reader of the central points of the decision-making models reviewed at the beginning of this paper.

Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani, and Andre Théorêt broke the decision process down into twelve basic elements. These basic elements are made up of three central phases, three sets of supporting routines, and six factors. The thesis of Mintzberg's, Raisinghani's, and Théorêt's work is this: No matter how unstructured a decision process appears to be, it can always be understood by way of identifying these twelve elements within the process.

Paul Anderson's model, *Decision-Making by Objection*, emphasized the social nature of the decision process. He illustrated this by criticizing the standard model. Anderson reduced the decision process to one of binary social interaction, one which allows flexibility throughout.

Graham Allison's three models can be thought of as "conceptual lenses." Allison's Model I is represented by a rational actor who logically and strategically chooses from among alternatives without reference to subjective or bureaucratic influences. His Model II is based on organizational bureaucracy, or the tendency of organizations to establish and follow standard operating procedures. And finally, Allison's Model III views the decision-making process as a game of political pulling and hauling among competing organizations. The decision in this last case is decided by who wins the tugging contest.

Now, the question remains: does the Bay of Pigs action, a classic exercise in American interventionism, lend itself to single paradigm of decision-making? In a word, no.

Certainly the model described by Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt can be applied. The identification phase had occurred before Kennedy took office. The CIA recognized a problem in Castro's ideological alignment and diagnosed it as a threat. The CIA's alternative to Castro was a new government made up of U.S. aligned non-Batista, anti-Communists. The CIA's solution was not custom-made, but was based on a modification of one that had worked for them before in Guatemala. Because the CIA was in total charge of the operation from its inception, there was no need to bargain for the method of executing the plan. An intuitive judgment was made. Had the CIA used its capacity to implement an objective technocratic evaluation, perhaps the plan would have been altered. The CIA attempted, and mostly succeeded, in bulldozing the authorization to go ahead with their plan through two presidential administrations. There was some resistance and modification made by President Kennedy. This was the reason that the invasion failed on the beach. The CIA had developed an operation without proper planning under the assumption that President Kennedy would not disown it once it began to fall apart. When

Kennedy did oppose the use of overt U.S. military aid, the plan collapsed. There was no clear communication established between the planners and the president. If there had been, President Kennedy would have known of the inability of the brigade to hide in the swamp, he would have known of the sting Castro possessed in his small air force, and he would have known of the lack of support the invaders could have expected from the Cuban people.

The mechanisms of argument and debate, Anderson's decision-making by objection, were available for use at the April 4, 1961, National Security Council meeting. They were used into the wee hours of the morning of the invasion as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Charles Cabell and CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell argued with Dean Rusk over the resurrection of the vital second air strike.

All of the key players (except Adlai Stevenson) were present at the April 4th meeting. Kennedy had just returned from a short respite at Palm Beach, Florida with a clear mind and apparently ready for a final meeting with his key staff. The invasion date at that point was thought to be much earlier than the 17th of April. If Kennedy had managed this meeting as he did those a year and a half later during the missile crisis, if the participants were more of a team rather than so new to each other, then true constructive argument and debate may have come about. What happened instead was that Bissell and Dulles bulldozed their plan through the membership. The momentum the CIA plan had gained and their intimidating manner overwhelmed Fulbright's opposing arguments and intimidated Schlesinger, Rusk, and Mann into silent acquiescence. This meeting turned out to be not a debate, but a closing pitch by snake-oil salesmen. Opposing issues like the plausible deniability of U.S. government involvement (Kennedy's concern over "noise") and the ability (or lack thereof) of the brigade to "go guerrilla" were not given proper notice.

At a meeting early April 17, 1961, there was tremendous pressure placed on Rusk to approach Kennedy on the issue of the air strike the CIA needed to accompany the invading forces. This was the point where no one within the CIA could conceive of Kennedy not giving in and consenting to send in the cavalry. Rusk simply told Cabell and Bissell that overriding political factors transcended their need for the military air support. At 4:30A.M. Kennedy turned down without further debate the final appeal for combat air patrol missions from the USS Essex. This decision-making by objection episode evolved a day later into organizational pulling and hauling as Robert Kennedy outstripped Rusk's influence over his brother and got him to authorize a one hour sortie over the Cuban air field at San Antonio de Baños. It was aborted due to fog.

The application of Graham Allison's three models (the rational actor model, the organizational process model, and the governmental politics model) is examined in a

1984 article by Lucien S. Vandenbrouke in The Political Science Quarterly entitled "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs."⁷²

Lucien Vandenbrouke criticizes the application of Allison's Rational Actor Model on the Bay of Pigs for assuming that a plan that had worked in Guatemala in 1954 under quite different internal political circumstances would work in Castro's Cuba in 1961.⁷³ He and others have already pointed out that the United States' hoping to deny involvement and/or avoid international censure once involvement was revealed was useless and irrational, that it was a manifestation of Janis' "Groupthink" theory. I have to agree with this argument, but I do so knowing that twenty-twenty hind-sight is a gift of time. It is hard to understand from the perspective of 1989 how in 1960 and 1961 President Kennedy could have allowed himself to be rushed into such an operation without the opportunity to fully study it. Perhaps Kennedy's administration, or any presidential administration, emerging from the cold war years of the 1950's, and the flourishing of foreign covert activity that accompanied them, just assumed that this type of activity was acceptable behavior. Perhaps to them at that time, in that environment, it was rational.

Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model states that the goal of bureaucracies is to ensure their own health and interests through the use of standard operating procedures. This prototype seems to apply because by the middle of 1960 the CIA had already drawn up the invasion plans and had received authorization from Eisenhower to proceed. How did an organization evolve to the point of proposing a clandestine invasion that under ordinary circumstances would provoke a war? The CIA was in its adolescence. It had just barely survived as an independent organization after World War II. It had proven during the late 1940's and 1950's to two administrations that it could effectively act as the president's private envoy of foreign policy. To continue in this role, to continue along its path of organizational viability and expansion, it, through the Dulles brothers, assumed more and more responsibility. It became a standard operating procedure for the CIA to acquire and spend millions of dollars with no Congressional oversight. It became standard operating procedure for the CIA to meddle in the domestic affairs of foreign governments. It became standard operating procedure for the CIA to assume that it, and it alone, could carry out the foreign policy of the United States when the State Department or the military were held back by law or public disapproval.

The two standard operating procedures that drove the CIA into Cuba were its reliance on past successes to promote current endeavors and its obsession with secrecy.

72. Lucien S. Vandenbrouke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," Political Science Quarterly, 99 (Fall 1984): pp. 471-491.

73. Ibid., p. 473.

The CIA based its invasion plans on its success in Guatemala (conveniently ignoring a failure at toppling Sukarno in Indonesia in 1958). It was a kind of perverse mathematical logic that stated that "success in Guatemala" equals "success in Cuba". Once the plans were more or less presentable, it pursued the next objective, which was to get President Eisenhower to approve them. The CIA did this by taking advantage of the government's bureaucratic organization. The CIA became not only the policy making body (in coming up with the invasion plans), but it was also in complete control of information regarding the invasion. The CIA defined the options and then provided the information required to evaluate and validate them; a garish, self-serving technique. In the name of security, the CIA cut out other sources of advice and input that might have shed a different light on possible outcomes and ignored its own administrative chain of command by over-compartmentalization. By the time Kennedy was in office, the CIA, as the sole purveyor of knowledge of the plans, supplied him only with reports and estimates that supported their invasion plan. They even lied to Kennedy and his advisors in order to forestall any latent doubts that they may have had.⁷⁴

Secrecy of course is a basic characteristic of such organizations, maintained in order to ensure national security. In the case of the Cuban invasion though, it had a hidden element: to eliminate dissent. This is the breeding ground not of national security, but, as Bill Moyers has aptly termed it, the "national security state."⁷⁵

Another aspect of organizational behavior that contributed to the implementation of the plan was the relationship between the CIA and the only other organization that might have frustrated the plan, the Pentagon. Yet, the Department of Defense, out of bureaucratic parochialism and institutional logic, did not oppose them. Vandenbrouke quotes General Lemnitzer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as telling him in an interview, "You couldn't expect us...to say this plan is no damn good, you ought to call it off; that's not the way you do things in government...the CIA were doing their best in the planning, and we were accepting it. The responsibility was not ours."⁷⁶

The influence of organizational theory is again evident in that once a bureaucracy attains the momentum of a year's worth of planning, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to depart from the plan. This is made apparent by pointing out that

74. The CIA reported to the administration that the invasion brigade (training then in Guatemala) had an excellent morale when in fact there had been a near mutiny and an isolated stockade for malcontents had to be set up. The CIA also misinformed the administration regarding the ability of the brigade to "go guerrilla" (escape into the Cuban countryside) should the invasion get bogged down.

75. Bill Moyers (writer, executive editor). The Secret Government: The Constitution in Crisis (Public Broadcasting Service, 1987), television broadcast.

76. Vandenbrouke, "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs," p. 477.

even after Kennedy's repeated orders to cut out direct U.S. involvement in the invasion proper, American CIA employees drove the planes that bombed Cuban airfields, sailed in the brigade's armada to Cuba, and were the first frogmen ashore in the beachhead assault. Vandenbrouke reveals handwritten notes from Allen Dulles, the CIA Chief at the time of the invasion, which state that once operations got underway, restrictions tended to disappear. Dulles proceeded with his plans, anticipating direct U.S. military support, even after being told by Kennedy that this would not occur. He did this assuming that Kennedy would have no choice but to order overt U.S. military intervention in order to save the brigade. In other words, the President's intelligence organization was intending to force him to use the armed forces to pursue their perception of proper foreign policy. That Kennedy would allow the brigade to be defeated was not a possible outcome to Dulles and Bissell.

So, despite modifications made by the White House (such as the cancellation of a crucial second air strike and the withholding of direct U.S. military influence), the CIA proceeded because of three organizational characteristics: inertia, repertoire (SOP's), and independence.

The Organizational Process Model fails though to explain why President Kennedy did not heed the few valid non-CIA viewpoints he heard nor why he did not recognize the glaring fallacy of the United States being able to deny involvement. This model also does not explain why at the CIA end of things the project was managed by an ad-hoc group not experienced with covert operations.

What I mean by this is that the president did receive significant objection to the invasion plan through proper channels. Take for instance Senator Fulbright's objections. If standard operating procedures reigned successfully, a veteran senator's voice would have carried substantially more weight against the organizational momentum of the CIA. Another aspect of this model is the fact that the entire invasion plan was handled within the CIA by a group of people who, although experienced intelligence officials, were inexperienced in covert paramilitary operations. Had standard operating procedures been followed, seasoned military experts would have been in charge of managing the practical aspects of the landing. Had that occurred, and had they received proper intelligence from inside Cuba, the invasion would have either been upgraded to a full force massive landing or been called off.

Allison's Governmental Politics Model proposes that decisions are the result of bargaining games; that they are the result of pulling and hauling among participants with different interests and power resources. The players who could have (Lemnitzer and Rusk) or should have (Schlesinger) been involved with their interests, influences, and power bases chose not to. The key player, President Kennedy, went ahead out of his concern for his domestic image on communism. The bargain-

ing that occurred was one-sided.

This model does not account for self-delusion. The assumption that the Castro government would collapse was perpetrated by the CIA without proper basis. Kennedy continued to believe in the plausible deniability factor and the ability of the brigade to fade away into the landscape if they had to.

So, again having these things in mind, how *were* the decisions made? Is there one particular model that best explains what happened at the Bay of Pigs at the very beginning of the Kennedy years? Was there an attempt on the part of the U.S. leadership to make coherent, cohesive, and responsible decisions? What seems to have happened here is that the decisions that took place were a function of the ability of the leadership to grasp the situation, and the political and historical context of the situation itself. Remember that the circumstances that led to the Bay of Pigs coalesced at the end of an eight-year administration that perhaps in its twilight was not paying as much attention to the matter as it could have. Also remember that the Eisenhower administration fostered a tremendous growth in CIA covert operations, that it had in fact allowed it to evolve from a moderately benign information coordinating organization into an international conglomerate specializing in criminal activity, political destabilization, and military action. The CIA (Dulles) recognized this and took advantage of it in order to maximize its expansion. Kennedy came in on the tail-end of the operation and did not stop it because he did not want to seem soft on communism and because he did not yet have the confidence to challenge the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Cuban government in exile.

I think that the decisions that took place regarding the Bay of Pigs are explained most appropriately by all three of Allison's models. It seemed rational (Model I) to Kennedy to allow what he thought were CIA standard operating procedures (Model II) to proceed. The CIA portrayed Allison's governmental politics model (Model III) by the way it hoarded all information and operations to itself in an effort to proceed with its rise in power through its adolescence of the 1950's and 60's. Not only did the CIA gather and hold the information to itself, it kept it to a small ad-hoc group deep within itself, thereby bypassing many of its own internal checks, balances, and resources.

The decision to invade Cuba in 1961 was made within the CIA, not the White House. When it failed, the White House had to assume responsibility, for to do otherwise would be to admit the existence of a loose cannon with a smoldering fuse in the form of the CIA, rolling around the deck of the ship of state. To admit that such an operation could take place without ongoing presidential and congressional oversight would have in 1961 been an admission of the existence of the shadow government, the "Enterprise," that surfaced in November of 1986. This was, of course, the Iran/Contra/Who's Got the Money affair. Lack of oversight had created a mind set within the CIA that is portrayed by statements made by Dulles in his private pa-

pers. He said that he did not want to raise the issue of the lack of indigenous popular support for a counterrevolution with Kennedy because he thought that it would harden feelings against a landing. He and his supporters felt that no matter what happened, *any* action required for its success would be authorized by the president rather than allow the entire operation to fail. Dulles is quoted by Trumbull Higgins as saying that the CIA Cuban invasion plan was, "a sort of orphan child JFK had adopted—he had no real love and affection for it [and] proceeded uncertainly towards defeat—unable to turn back—only half sold on the vital necessity of what he was doing, surrounded by doubting Thomases among his best friends. There were enough [doubting Thomases] to dull the attack but not enough to bring about its cancellation."⁷⁷

Decisions that are made in the government seem to be, with some notable exceptions, the result of rational thinking. During periods of crisis, rationality becomes a relative concept. It may be that due to the cyclic nature of the presidency, decision-making enters a sensitive or a crisis state at the end of, and at the beginning of administrations: at the transition. The Bay of Pigs affair was a crisis perpetrated during such a transition, a crisis on top of a crisis. Certainly what seems rational during periods like this is subject for criticism later. This occurs at all levels of government, from occupants of the White House to lieutenants at My Lai. Now, this does not justify the actions taken, but perhaps recognizing it can serve as a starting point to further explain the psychological, political, and social factors that play upon each other during periods of crisis decision-making. This is certainly a subject deserving of more research.

77. Higgins, The Perfect Failure, p.103.

- Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1971.
- Anderson, Paul A. "Decision Making by Objection and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (June 1983): 201-222.
- Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace. New York: Penguin Books, 1982.
- Destler, I.M.; Gelb, Leslie H.; and Lake, Anthony. Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984.
- Dougherty, James E. and Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations and Comprehensive Study. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.
- Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1987.
- Hinkle, Warren, and Turner, William W. The Fish is Red. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.
- Hunt, Howard. Give Us This Day. New York: Arlington House, 1973.
- Janis, Irving L. Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972.
- Kirkpatrick, Lyman B. "Paramilitary Case Study: The Bay of Pigs." Naval War College Review 25 (November-December 1963): 32-42.
- Kissinger, Henry A. The Necessity of Choice. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
- Lichtenstein, Nelson, gen. ed. Political Profiles: The Kennedy Years. New York: Facts on File, 1976.
- McGehee, Ralph W. Deadly Deceits. New York: Sheridan Square Publications, Inc., 1983.
- Meyer, Karl E., and Szulc, Tad. Cuban Invasion: The Chronicle of a Disaster. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

- Mintzburg, Henry; Raisinghani, Duru; and Théorêt, André. "The Structure of "Unstructured" Decision Processes." Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (June 1976): 246-275.
- Moyers, Bill. The Secret Government. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1988.
- Rostow, Walt W. The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972.
- Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. A Thousand Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965.
- Sorenson, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972.
- U.S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents - John F. Kennedy 1961. Address Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors April 20, 1961. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962.
- Vandenbrouke, Lucien S. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." Political Science Quarterly 99 (Fall 1984): 471-491.
- Woodward, Bob. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.
- Wyden, Peter. Bay of Pigs The Untold Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979.

- Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Bulletin. 17 April 1961.
- . Central Intelligence Bulletin. 20 April 1961.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 12 January 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 26 January 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 2 February 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 9 February 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 9 March 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 23 March 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 30 March 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 6 April 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 13 April 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 20 April 1961.
- . Current Intelligence Weekly Summary. 27 April 1961.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum, author not specified. "Consequences For the U.S. of the Abortive Rebellion in Castro's Cuba: Some Preliminary Thoughts". 29 April 1961.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum, Barnes, Tracy. 12 May 1964.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum for the Director, Kent, Sherman. "Is Time on Our Side in Cuba?". 17 January 1961.
- . "Why The Cuban Revolution of 1958 Led to Castro's Alignment with the USSR.". 21 February 1961.
- . "Is Time on Our Side in Cuba?". 10 March 1961.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Report, Pfeiffer, Jack B. "Bitter Recriminations : The Navy Combat Air Patrol at the Bay of Pigs 19 April 1961". 26 December 1964.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Report #00TDCS-3/462,360, 17 January 1961.
- . Report #TDCS-3/462,532. 18 January 1961.
- . Report #TDCS-3/462,556. 21 January 1961.
- . Report #00-A3177755. 30 January 1961.
- . Report #00-A3177796. 30 January 1961.
- . Report #00-X3177504. 31 January 1961.

- . Report #00-B3178206. 9 February 1961.
- . Report #00-K3178879. 15 February 1961.
- . Report #00-B-3180309. 3 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/466,973. 3 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/L67,309. 7 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/467,630. 10 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/468,193. 15 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/464,320. 16 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/469,391. 17 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/467,056. 23 March 1961.
- . Report #00-K3,182,230. 27 March 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/470,587. 6 April 1961.
- . Report #00-M-3,183,692. 12 April 1961.
- . Report #00-B-3,184,664. 25 April 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/473,011. 1 May 1961.
- . Report #00-B-3,186,062. 11 May 1961.
- . Report #CS-3/474,832. 19 May 1961.
- . Report #00-K3,187,929. 5 June 1961.
- . Report #00-M3,187,928. 5 June 1961.
- . Report #C-3/476,618. 5 June 1961.
- Central Intelligence Agency. Supplement to Current Intelligence Digest. 2 March 1961
- . 19 April 1961.

Maps

The Bay of Pigs

The Carribean and Locations of Interest

CUBA

Provinces

Las Villas {

- 1. Pinar del Rio
- 2. Ciudad de la Habana
- 3. La Habana
- 4. Matanzas
- 5. Cienfuegos
- 6. Villa Clara
- 7. Sancti Spiritus

Oriente {

- 8. Ciego de Avila
- 9. Camagüey
- 10. Las Tunas
- 11. Holguin
- 12. Granma
- 13. Santiago de Cuba
- 14. Guantánamo