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REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS: ANALYZING THE NATO-GREEK RELATIONSHIP

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This article analyzes the reasons which account for Greece's continuing membership in the Atlantic Alliance, even though NATO has not lived up to expectations and has failed to protect the nation's security against threats from Turkey. Following a brief examination of Greek attitudes toward NATO and the nature of dissatisfaction, the article argues that strategic concerns are, at best, of secondary importance. Instead, Greece's continuing membership in the Alliance is a result of the nation's economic ties to the West and the dependency of its military on NATO and Washington for advanced training, arms, war materiel, and other professional considerations. The article concludes that domestic industrial-military complexes of small countries become closely connected to and often depend on alliance industrial-military complexes. Leaving military alliances, therefore, becomes difficult for professional military as well as domestic economic interests.

INTRODUCTION

On April 4, 1949, nine West European countries plus Canada and the United States (US) signed a treaty whose goals would be to unite the efforts of the "free and democratic" nations against what was said to be the advancing forces of International Communism. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born.¹ Collective security, promotion and protection of democratic values, territorial integrity, political independence, security, and respect for each other's sovereign rights were the basic and fundamental principles agreed upon by the signators of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Historical, geopolitical, and strategic considerations, especially in light of the Soviet-American cold war, convinced the members of the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly its leading member, the US, to enlarge its southern flank by including Greece and Turkey in 1952. Viewing it as essential to the "future of the Near and Middle East" (Wittner, 1982:53), the US, NATO's ultimate policy formulator² (Fedder, 1973:123; Kaplan et al., 1985:XVII), overcame initial British and Scandinavian objections and managed to secure Greece's entry into the Alliance. Battered by the civil war (1946-49), with an economy in shambles, and the old and "insidious habit of appealing to one or more powers for help" (Kaltchas, 1940:34-35) still alive, Greek elites saw in NATO a new protector. Operating on the notion that "neutrality is neither possible nor acceptable" (Loulis, 1984/85:376), and that their nation's security interests rested within the

1. Alliance is defined by Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan as "a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues." See their *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 4. Stephen M. Walt offers a similar if somewhat broader definition. For him an alliance "is a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states." See *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 12.

Alliance,³ Greek political leaders opted for membership, even though they "did not indeed know much about (or care to discuss publicly) the conditions under which Greece was joining" (Coulombis, 1966:49).

In spite of these overwhelming attitudes, membership in NATO has not fully met Greece's expectations. If anything, the majority of the Greek public as well as many of the country's leading political elites have repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction and disappointment with the Alliance's inability or unwillingness to safeguard Greece's security interests and respect the nation's political sovereignty. But in spite of these Greece remains and is likely to continue a full-fledged and active member in the Atlantic Alliance. The aim of this essay is to identify and analyze the reasons which have kept this troubled partnership intact. The thesis the following pages seek to advance and substantiate is that professional military and economic ties, and not security considerations, account for Greece's continuing membership in the Atlantic Alliance. However, to better understand the reasons which account for the endurance of this relationship, a brief discussion of Greek attitudes toward NATO is in order.

ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

NATO's goals were to safeguard the security, territorial integrity, and political independence of member states, and to promote freedom, the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Yet NATO has not lived up to these lofty ideals, as far as the majority of the Greeks is concerned. But the Alliance alone cannot be assigned the entire blame. Agreeing with the perception that "NATO's . . . strategy [is] an extension of American . . . strategy" (Fedder, 1973:125), most Greeks see Washington as equally, if not mostly, responsible for this breach. Thus, virtually no distinction is made between NATO and American policies vis-a-vis Greece.

The Alliance is not accused of having failed to protect Greece against threats, real or imaginary, emanating from the East. Instead, NATO and the US are reproached for: having intervened in the internal affairs of the country, which included support for the Colonels' dictatorship (1967-1974); and failing to check Turkey's expansionist designs against the territorial integrity of Greece. The latter

2. A distinction is made between the leading and the rest of the numbers. As a superpower the US is a giver rather than a recipient of security-related essentials such as arms, equipment, and training and therefore is considered more than an "equal" partner in NATO and other defense alliances to which it belongs. Edwin Fedder states that the Atlantic Alliance's strategy is nothing more than "an extension of American personnel, technology and capital." See his *NATO: The Dynamics of an Alliance* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1973), p. 125. Christopher Jones reached a similar conclusion regarding the role of the U.S.S.R. in the Warsaw Pact. See his *Soviet Influence in Western Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

3. Greece is considered a small power. For Robert L. Rothstein a small power is "a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics." See his *Alliances and Small States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 29.

includes inability or unwillingness on the part of NATO or the US to side with Greece regarding the Cyprus issue, and subsequently to prevent Ankara's invasion and occupation of the island; and parallel disagreements between the two countries over the Aegean, known as the Aegean dispute. The problems and manifestations surrounding these issues are beyond the scope of this essay and have been extensively analyzed elsewhere.

Dissatisfaction with NATO has surfaced from nearly all segments of the political spectrum, save the extreme right. Reflecting widespread discontent with the Alliance's refusal to support Greece's "just" struggle to unite Cyprus with the motherland, the pro-Western but widely respected daily *Kathemerini* openly urged in 1955 "withdrawal from NATO" (cited in Verney, 1987:255). Some years later, frustrated by what was perceived as the Alliance's "tilt" toward Turkey on the Cyprus dispute, the centrist government of George Papandreou apparently threatened to sever Athens' ties with NATO. The "national unity" government under the pro-Western Constantine Karamanlis, in the wake of the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Alliance's failure to check Ankara's aggressive designs, was temporarily forced to pull Greece out of NATO's military wing, vowing not to return until the occupation troops had vacated the island.

The left has been even more vociferous. The pro-Moscow Communist Party of Greece (KKE), as expected, has maintained a virulently anti-NATO position. But the most organized demands in favor of severing ties with the Alliance came from Andreas Papandreou's socialist party (PASOK), before it came to power in 1981. The socialists viewed continuing membership as detrimental to the country's national security interests and blamed NATO and the US for the seven-year dictatorship (1967-74), the Cyprus debacle in 1974, and Turkey's aggressive and intransigent behavior in the Aegean. Papandreou stated that even though "we belong to NATO, this alliance [has] refused to guarantee our frontiers [against Turkish attacks]" (Time 1981-39). The socialists' argument was reinforced by Brussels' and Washington's insistence on viewing the Greco-Turkish disputes as outside the jurisdiction of the NATO treaty. NATO policy makers suggested that the two parties find solutions to their problems through bilateral negotiations -- a position Athens finds unacceptable and a clear indication of the Alliance's "tilt" toward Ankara.

As a result of the Alliance's stands, popular sentiments in Greece against NATO and the US ran high throughout the 1970s, and although they seem to have subsided somewhat by the mid 1980s, still remain high. For example, a 1977 survey revealed that 61.1% supported withdrawal from NATO, 10.6% were neutral, and 28.3% supported membership in the Alliance (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1981:77). A 1985 survey showed that "only roughly one-fourth of the public . . . approves of full NATO membership, and has confidence in [the Alliance's] ability to defend Western Europe" (Dimitras, 1985:137). A more recent public opinion poll found that 52% believe that NATO membership has been detrimental to the nation's security interests, and 57% hold the view that alignment with the US has hurt Greek national interests (Dimitras, 1987:70). A 1982 study found that 48% had not confidence at all in the US and 39% had very little. Distrust for the US was found to be "coterminous" with distrust toward NATO (cited in Kourvetaris, 1987:442). More than 90% of Greeks believe that Turkey

threatens the territorial integrity of their country (Dimitras, 1985:137). Paul Kennedy is on the mark when he observes that "the Greek and Turkish armed forces often seem more worried about each other than about the Warsaw Pact" (1987:473).

The menace of International Communism, which was responsible for the formation of NATO and Greece's membership in it, is no longer viewed by Greeks as a threat to the territorial and political integrity of their country. Only 22% of the respondents saw the Soviet Union as a threat and 19% saw Albania in this light. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were perceived as dangerous by less than 10% (Dimitras, 1984). Since 1974, Athens' relations with other Balkan countries, especially Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, have improved substantially. A four-decade long *de jure* state of war with Albania was recently terminated. During the height of the Greco-Turkish conflict of March 1987, when war between the two NATO partners appeared likely, Prime Minister A. Papandreou dispatched his foreign minister to Sofia for consultations with the Bulgarian leadership. In so far as Athens is concerned, it is Turkey and not the Warsaw Pact that poses a threat to Greece's security.

In spite of overwhelming sentiments distrusting NATO, Greece remains in the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, both conservative and socialist governments had to eat their words. Although public opinion polls indicated that 58% of Greeks favored "neutrality" and only 12% supported re-entry, the New Democracy government of George Rallis successfully negotiated Greece's return to the military wing of NATO (1981), even though the problems which had prompted withdrawal from the military wing of the Alliance in 1974 had not been eradicated (Melakopides, 1987:560n). As leader of the opposition A. Papandreou bitterly denounced the return as a sellout. Later, when he assumed the reins of government (1981), he stated that Greece would limit its military commitments to NATO (New York Times, 1981).

Notwithstanding Greece's less acquiescent stance and willingness to differentiate its position from the Alliance on such issues as the imposition of martial law in Poland and the downing of the Korean jetliner by the Soviet Union in September 1983, the Papandreou government gradually mellowed its once scathing criticism of NATO and the US. Finally in January 1987, citing continuous problems with Turkey, Prime Minister Papandreou reversed his previous stance and categorically declared in Parliament that withdrawal from NATO "would render war with Turkey inevitable" (cited in Couloumbis, 1987:15). Even the severest of the Alliance's critics, the pro-Moscow Greek Communist Party, seems to have taken a more conciliatory attitude lately. Younger and more reform-minded party cadre appear prepared to accept continuing membership, at least for the near future (Petras, 1987:22).

Why this about face? The explanation given by Greek political leaders is that strategic imperatives forced both the conservatives and the socialists to swallow their pride and put the nation's security before political gains and ideological dispositions. This view, which is supported by a number of academic writings, assumes that severing relations with NATO would enhance Turkey's strategic importance as far as Washington and Brussels are concerned, and correspondingly would render Greece more vulnerable to Ankara's expansionist designs

(Coufoudakis, 1985:212; Axt, 1984:204-206; Melakopides, 1987; Papacosma, 1985). According to this argument, the pro-Western Karamanlis and his successor, George Rallis, never ceased subscribing to the notion that Greece's strategic interests can best be served within the Alliance. Even the Cyprus dispute and other difficulties with Turkey can only be dealt with in the Alliance framework. The decision to withdraw from the military wing of NATO in 1974 was taken as a temporary measure to pacify public opinion, "which demanded an assertion of independence against the feeble reactions of the allies" (Woodhouse, 1985:169). Papandreou's public statements, at least, would seem to confirm the strategic argument.

However, the strategic thesis provides only a partial explanation and may, in fact, be of less importance than is perceived. If Washington and Brussels failed to put the brakes on Turkey in the past and continue to take a hands-off attitude regarding the Aegean, while supporting the Turkish position by suggesting a negotiated settlement, it is difficult to see how Karamanlis, Rallis, and especially Papandreou would base their policies to return and remain in NATO solely on the strength of the strategic position. As late as January 1987, Prime Minister Papandreou gave evidence to the contrary during a debate in Parliament: "[I]t has been demonstrated that NATO has not protected even the frontiers or the national integrity of our country, particularly in the critical region of the Aegean" (Spotlight, 1987:4). Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Yannis Charalambopoulos went even further, stating on October 4, 1987 that "NATO is indirectly supporting Turkey's expansionist designs, and the provocative stance adopted by the Alliance in the [Aegean] area is increasing tension rather than reducing it" (Spotlight, 1987:5).

If the Atlantic Alliance did not safeguard Greece's interests in the past, there is little reason for Karamanlis, Rallis, and more recently Papandreou to think that NATO will be more forthcoming in the future. Washington and Brussels continue to view Greco-Turkish problems as beyond the Alliance's jurisdiction and have unequivocally declined Papandreou's request to guarantee Greece's security in the event of a Turkish attack. After all, Cyprus was occupied during the time Greece was a member of the Alliance, not when membership was partially suspended. Re-entry has neither provided guarantees against future Turkish aggressive behavior nor has it brought solution to the Cyprus and Aegean problems any closer yet. And who is to say that the country was any more or any less secure during the partial suspension period (1974-1981)?

Without altogether rejecting the merits of the strategic thesis, there appear two other reasons which seem to provide a better explanation regarding Greece's return and continuing participation in NATO: the role of the armed forces, and economic ties to the West, especially the European Economic Community (EEC). Let us elaborate on each one separately.

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

In recent decades the separation between foreign and security policies of nation-states has become indistinct. It is difficult, if not impossible, to perceive that the formulation of a country's national security policy has no impact on its foreign policy orientation, and vice versa. In fact, some argue that since World War II,

security considerations have a more decisive impact on foreign policy (Yarmolinsky, 1971). Given the paramount role of national security and increasing military defense budgets, it is only natural for those who specialize in the "stuff" of war --the military -- to play an important part in the foreign policy of modern states. The military's professionalization and expertise in handling ever more complicated weapons and modes of warfare have strengthened their position and sharpened their ability to participate in formulating national security affairs; foreign policy included (Abrahamsson, 1972:19-20; Bletz, 1972).

In addition, professionalization has turned the military into a powerful and potent pressure group. The latter, of course, can be important in both developed and developing policies as well as democratic, totalitarian, or authoritarian regimes. Thus, the military are able and willing to influence security and foreign policies either through normative, institutional, and/or group processes or a combination thereof. If everything else fails, the military, if necessary, can influence the process by means of a coup or a threatened one.

Military professionalization is a function of two processes. One refers to environmental factors such as political stability, level of economic development, and historical experiences; and two refers to internal socialization processes. Environmental factors involve "the creation and maintenance of a complex, effective, and well organized social institution," while the socialization process involves "the indoctrination and internalization of certain values, outlooks, and behavior elements" (Abrahamsson, 1972, 16-17; Danopoulos, 1985). This, then, implies that factors that contribute to the professionalization of a nation's armed forces at a given time are bound to have a major impact in shaping the attitudes and perceptions of the military. Participation in defense alliances (such as NATO), and dependency on them for equipment and support often lead the military of member states (especially smaller ones) to view participation in and adherence to the basic principles of a "common bloc" as "positive" and even indispensable, for they improve "the position of each individual country against the common adversary." Concern for the security of the state, which is the primary mission of the military, "is transformed into a favorable opinion for the defense community," in so far as the officer corps is concerned (Abrahamsson, 1972:83).

The evolution and role of the Greek military exemplify the above description. Beginning in 1947, American military and economic aid (see Table 1) and subsequent participation in NATO facilitated the professionalization, autonomy, and independent posture of the Greek army by providing it with funds, equipment, sophisticated training in allied installations, and support. More than half of the total aid went to the military. The overall thrust of the training programs was "dogmatically anti-Communist" and highly pro-NATO oriented, reflecting the fundamental goals and perceptions of American foreign and defense policies (Wolpin, 1972:52). Since the highly factionalized political parties of Greece provided little comfort to American and NATO policy makers who wanted to see the country's instability yield to an effective and stable regime, the Western-trained, fiercely anti-Communist and pro-NATO Greek military was perceived as the institution capable of accomplishing these objectives. Under the circumstances the military was transformed into the single most powerful "political force within the country" (Roubatis, 1979:55), with growing influence in the elaboration of policy

and a homogeneous, die-hard, right wing organization which no longer reflected "the contradictions of the political society" (Alivizatos, 1978:37).

TABLE 1. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO GREECE
(1946-1964 in millions of dollars)

YEAR	ECONOMIC AID		MILITARY AID
	Grants	Loans	
1946-48	---	---	198.4
1949-52	706.7	---	323.5
1953-57	153.0	35.0	433.7
1958	15.7	12.0	143.4
1960	25.6	31.0	116.7
1961	20.4	---	42.8
1962	20.3	10.0	34.9
1963	0.1	31.6	85.8
1964	0.1	7.7	83.2

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, A.I.D. Special Report, prepared annually for the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, DC, 1965.

The Greek military's indisputable Atlantic credentials have been displayed readily in the postwar period. Fearing that a reduction of budgetary appropriations for defense, proposed by the Karamanlis government, would weaken Greece's commitment to NATO, the armed forces were quick to plot in 1962 against the very government they had helped maintain in power (by taking part in the electoral fraud of a year earlier). Moreover, Greek military officers spoke approvingly of the virtues of NATO and its contributions to world peace. The overwhelmingly pro-NATO attitudes of the military contrasted sharply with the anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments prevalent in Greece during and after the years of praetorian rule.

The military's pro-NATO attitudes became even more apparent in their handling of the Cyprus issue. While publicly proclaiming their support for *Enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece), the praetorian rulers adhered to American-NATO wishes to work out the dispute bilaterally (with Turkey). They undertook a series of moves -- ranging from political pressure to outright coups -- to force the Greek-Cypriot leadership to accept a solution certain to lead the partition of the island-republic. The July 1974 overthrow of President Archbishop Makarios was but the last scene in a long string of intrigues against the popular Cypriot leader by the Athens praetorian regime. But the plot backfired, and the Greek military were forced to return to the barracks amidst public indignation and loss of prestige.

In spite of this debacle it would be foolhardy to assume that the Greek military no longer play a role in the elaboration of the nation's security policy. Unlike the past, the post-junta influence of the officer corps seems to be channeled within the institutional-legal framework. Greek officers have improved their bargaining capabilities and negotiating skills and have a greater understanding and apprecia-

tion of the processes and virtues of pressure group tactics and politics. More Greek officers today are versed in foreign languages, especially English and a greater number of them receive postgraduate training abroad in West European and American military academies. The US and other NATO countries have been and remain Greece's primary arms suppliers. For example, between 1964 and 1973, out of a total of \$941 million spent toward purchasing arms and other war materiel, \$792 million worth came from US suppliers, \$42 million from France, and \$98 million from West Germany. In the 1974-1979 period out of a total of \$2 billion, \$1.2 billion was spent in the American arms market, \$390 million in the French, \$230 million in the German, and \$80 million in the Canadian, British, and Italian combined. The 1981-1985 period reflects an effort by the Papan-dreou government to diversify Greece's sources of arms procurement. From a total of about \$1.9 billion spent on war-related equipment, \$95 million worth came from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, \$600 million from other countries (not including Warsaw Pact nations), and the remainder (\$1.3 billion) from the US and other NATO countries. In spite of the latest arms diversification efforts, Greece's dependence on the Atlantic Alliance for war materiel remains very strong (World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1985).

Moreover, preoccupation with the Turkish threat is pervasive and the single most important concern in the country. Almost 20% of total government expenditures are devoted to defense, and about 20 out of 1000 people are in military uniform (see Table 2). Both of these are among the world's highest and have domestic, economic, social, and psychological repercussions. The Greco-Turkish conflict has bolstered the standing as well as the influence of the Greek armed forces in the post-junta period, despite the humiliation the military suffered as a result of the seven-year dictatorship and the Cyprus debacle.

TABLE 2. GREEK MILITARY EXPENDITURES, ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

YEAR	M.E. (current millions \$U.S.)	% ME GE	MEN IN UNIFORM (in thousands)	MEN IN UNIFORM (per 1000 people)
1974	1467	18.7	186	20.7
1975	1903	22.3	185	20.5
1976	2045	20.9	186	20.3
1977	2157	20.4	187	20.0
1978	2196	19.5	186	19.8
1979	2132	18.6	187	19.5
1980	1954	15.9	186	19.3
1981	2404	17.3	188	19.3
1982	2377	18.6	186	19.0
1983	2195	15.0	177	18.0
1984	2515	16.8	197	19.9

Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1986. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, DC, 1987.

The dramatic events of the last quarter of a century have not significantly altered the attitudes of the Greek military with regard to NATO and the US. In sharp contrast to the civilian society, the military continues to be favorably inclined toward the Atlantic Alliance and the U.S. Though diminished in intensity, the East-West conflict provides the context through which Greek officers view the world, and see NATO as important to the defense of Europe. Agreeing with their counterparts in other NATO countries, the Greek military recognizes the need for the US, as the leading non-Communist power, to play a prominent role in formulating the Alliance's strategies. The military also views American participation in NATO as almost indispensable. Finally, Greek officers see attendance in Western, and especially American, military academies as important and very beneficial for professional advancement and promotion. Such perceptions of a less political but more professional military institution, operating in a security-conscious society, influence Greek security policies, including participation in NATO. The Soviet-American rapprochement is unlikely to alter these attitudes in the foreseeable future.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Although the strategic-military commitment was the primary element in Greece's relationship with the Atlantic Alliance, economic considerations soon followed a concomitant path. In the eyes of American and NATO policy makers, establishment of a viable economy was a necessary prerequisite for social stability and a pro-Western orientation. Toward this end American economic aid poured into the war-devastated country (see Table 1), resulting in the integration of "the Greek economy into the Western economic system as it was being reshaped after the war" (Thomadakis, 1980:75).

In the initial stages Western involvement in the Greek economy took the form of government-to-government loans and grants. This public sector cooperation gradually and increasingly was complemented by private sector linkages. Law Decree 2687, introduced by the Greek government in 1953, was designed to attract foreign capital into the country by providing legal protection as well as a host of economic incentives to foreign firms investing in the Greek economy. This law became "the major vehicle for the inflow and penetration of foreign (mainly Western) investment into the Greek economy" (Thomadakis, 1980:77), contributing to economic improvement and "dependent capitalist industrialization" (Mouzelis, 1980:254; Evangelinides, 1979; Papandreou, 1981; Freris, 1986; Gianaris, 1984; Fotopoulos, 1978). By and large American and West European firms invested in such areas as petrochemicals, metallurgical products, transport equipment, minerals, paper, and rubber, which amount to over 60% of manufacturing activity in the country (Evangelinides, 1979:189). Tobacco, textiles, food processing, and other traditional areas were left to domestic capital and control.

The fall of the dictatorship in 1974 and the eventual rise to power of the socialists in 1981 did little to lessen Greece's economic dependency on the West. The nation's total external debt has been steadily rising during the last two decades. It reached a whopping 17 billion dollars in 1986. Inflation during the same period has hovered at about 20%, and current budget deficits have been

climbing at an alarming rate, reaching 3,250 million dollars in 1986, while public sector borrowing soared to 17.9% of total government spending in the same year. The level of imports reached 6.655 million dollars in 1986 while exports stood at 2,850 million dollars (Spotlight, 1987). As before 1974, Greece's main trade partners have been and continue to be OECD countries. In 1980, 73% of imports and 80% of exports involved trade with OECD -- figures about 30% higher than during the 1950s and 1960s. Owing to the "stabilization program" the Papandreou government introduced in late 1985 and the drop in oil prices, inflation has been brought down to about 12% and there has been a corresponding improvement in other areas such as the budget deficit, domestic investment, and trade. In spite of these, Greece's economic dependency on the West remains as high as it was in the pre-1974 era. The *Economist's* assertion that the Papandreou government "may be needing American help to climb out of its present economic hole" is not totally without foundation (1986:39).

Perhaps the clearest example of Greece's dependency on the West is tourism. Regarded by the present as well as past governments as "a significant factor in the economic, social, political, and ecological development of the country" (EOT, 1985:19), tourist activity is inexorably tied to the pleasures of vacation-seeking citizens of the more affluent West. Table 3 makes abundantly clear that on average, more than 60% of those visiting the picturesque beaches of Greece come from NATO countries. This lucrative source of revenue is simply too important to be jeopardized.

TABLE 3. TOURISTS IN GREECE

YEAR	TOTAL #	TOTAL FROM NATO COUNTRIES	% OF TOTAL
1981	5,557.109	3,081.673	55.46
1982	5,463.860	3,140.440	57.48
1983	5,258.372	3,313.012	63.30
1984	6,027.266	3,789.268	62.87
1985	7,039.428	4,526.275	64.30
1986	7,340.000	4,832.000	65.83
1987*	8,004.000	5,475.000	68.40
1988*	8,360.000	5,685.000	68.00

Source: Statistics provided by the New York office of the Greek National Tourist Organization.

* estimated

NATO countries have been shown to have both the willingness and the means to influence events in Athens. For example, in June 1985 President Reagan, in the wake of terrorist incidents, issued a travel advisory causing a significant decline in the volume of tourism. In spite of the Greek government's efforts to condemn terrorism and assure tourists that Greece was a safe place to spend their vacations, earnings from tourism, one of the country's most important sources of foreign currency, fell almost 25% short of what had been projected that year. Remittances and potential investments by the over 2 million Greek-Americans could also be said to be an avenue through which Washington can influence economic policy in Athens. Pressure from Greek-Americans certainly caused the

Papandreou government to reverse its previous decision and to have Truman's statue restored to the same prime spot where it once stood, before it was damaged by those opposed to the continuation of American bases in Greece. Athens is actively courting Greek-Americans to invest in their ancestral land.

Finally, Greece's strong economic ties with its partners in the EEC are another source of potential economic pressure. For instance, agricultural subsidies have been important to Greek farmers, and the Papandreou government is in no mood to jeopardize this source which has helped it gain the favor of rural Greeks. In spite of its many accomplishments, the EEC has yet to develop a substitute for NATO. Western Europe still depends on the Atlantic Alliance to act as its defense umbrella and the jitters displayed by European leaders regarding the impact of the recently signed INF Treaty between the two superpowers exemplify the importance Europeans attach to the Alliance. Pressure from European leaders, and especially from fellow socialist Francois Mitterant, may have been instrumental in convincing Prime Minister Papandreou to abandon his once critical remarks against NATO, separate Greco-Turkish issues from those involving the Alliance and the US, and perhaps move toward an understanding with Turkey. Given the closeness of Greece's economic ties to the EEC it is fair to conclude that Athens would not risk alienating its European partners by severing its membership in NATO.

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages sought to analyze the basic reasons which explain Greece's continuing participation in NATO, even though the country's experiences with the Alliance have not lived up to expectations. The most poignant areas of Greece's discontent with the Alliance have been and continue to be American, and by implication NATO's, failure to protect the country's security interests against threats from another NATO partner, Turkey; and disrespect for the nation's political sovereignty and independence. Then, the paper analyzed the reasons which account for Greece's continuing membership in the Alliance, despite dissatisfaction. The country's pro-Western and US and NATO-trained and supplied military, and Greece's strong economic ties with members of the Alliance, more than strategic considerations, account for the return and continuing participation in the Alliance.

Although NATO and the US failed to support the Greek position in disputes with Turkey, and the Alliance has not lived up to its commitment as far as Greek public opinion is concerned, economic elites and the nation's powerful military establishment have had little reason to be dissatisfied. To the conservative political and economic elites American aid, Western investments, and participation in NATO provided and continue to provide security, financial benefits, and technological know-how. The latter has assumed even more importance if Greece is to compete effectively within the EEC. The socialists' ideological dispositions and rhetoric flew in the face of reality. The professional dependency of the Greek military on NATO for equipment, training, and support has propagated the view that participation in and adherence to the basic principles of the Alliance is paramount. It is no accident that the military and the more affluent strata of the Greek society maintain pro-NATO attitudes at a time when public

opinion polls consistently show dissatisfaction with the Alliance and the US (Dobratz, 1987).

In other words, modern defense organizations, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are more than mere agreements between states to combine their efforts to repel a common enemy. Instead, they constitute impressive organizations with permanent command structures responsible for formulating contingency plans to deal with possible uprising, riots, and other disturbances within member states which could threaten a member state's commitment to the alliance, in addition to external threats. It is no accident that the Greek colonels activated a NATO emergency plan called "Prometheus" to stage their coup in 1967. The latter was designed to mobilize the Greek army in case of an attempted take-over by the defeated and factionalized KKE operating in exile from Bucharest, Rumania.

Finally, the business of defense is no longer a part-time effort, but a permanent, full-time, all-pervasive commitment inseparably tied to every sector of a society. Modern defense alliances are no different. Domestic defense establishments are closely tied if not subsumed by alliance efforts. Put differently, domestic industrial-military complexes are closely connected to and often dependent on alliance industrial-military complexes. Leaving modern defense alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, becomes difficult not only from a military point of view, but also from the point of view of domestic economic elites whose continued well-being may be closely fastened to the larger alliance domain. The Greek-NATO relationship seems to be a case in point.

In sum, barring unforeseen developments (such as the highly improbable assumption of power by the KKE), Greece is unlikely to sever its relations with the Atlantic Alliance even if the ongoing contacts between Papandreou and Prime Minister Ozal of Turkey succeed in eradicating the possibility of war between the two countries -- a consideration publicly cited by the Greek leader as a justification necessitating Athens' continuing membership in NATO.

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