RECENT WORK

BOOK REVIEW ON

FREE WILL, AGENCY AND SELFHOOD IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

(EDITED BY MATHEW R. DASTI AND EDWIN F. BRYANT)*

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This anthology, which contains twelve essays, aims to show that while “classical Indian Philosophy simply does not have an overarching debate about free will that neatly corresponds to [what is found] within the Western tradition, . . ., concerns surrounding the interaction of free will, agency and selfhood are not unimportant in, or negligible to, the leading schools of Indian Philosophy” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 1-2).

Problems of Free Will and Agency Across Cultures

The volume's introduction gives a brief but illuminating account of the problems concerning free will, agency and selfhood, as well as their importance and relevance in Western philosophy, and then states how in the Indian tradition these problems have been treated in a somewhat different manner. It also indicates the reasons thereof. The first reason is that the notion of free will as developed in the Western tradition can be traced back to the writings of St. Augustine, who was trying to solve the problem raised by the Biblical story about the Fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden for tasting the forbidden fruit of knowledge at the instigation of Satan in the form of a serpent. Adam, Eve and their future progeny were punished by God for disobeying His command. But the Bible also describes God as the omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent being who is the cause of all things, and this apparently makes God responsible for the ‘original sin’ committed by Adam and Eve; because even though He had foreknowledge of such an event, and even though it was possible

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for Him to prevent it, He did not do so, but instead punished the guilty couple, even though He is said to be benevolent and merciful. What makes matters worse is that God punished not only Adam and Eve but their entire progeny, even though the latter were not yet born, and could in no way commit this ‘original sin’. In order to solve this problem, the so-called problem of theodicy was formed where one has to account for the co-existence of evil and suffering with the omniscience, omnipotence, and benevolence of God. It had to be shown that Adam and Eve were the original causes of the actions that had resulted in the original sin, and in order to show this, St. Augustine had admitted the faculty of will that was capable of producing actions that can be morally evaluated as good or bad actions (all other human behaviors have to be treated as natural events that have no moral dimension). Will is the capacity for choosing a certain course of action, and one’s will is free when one is able to choose otherwise, or in other words, be the proper source of one’s choice, without the intervention of any compulsion or coercion. Agency is the capacity for performing actions, as distinguished from event causation where no question of conscious choice arises. Actions are what someone does while events are phenomena that merely happen. Actions are explained in terms of reasons, whereas events are explained in terms of causes. Thus, agency invariably presupposes the existence of free will, which makes the agent responsible for his/her actions. Determination of will by external causes is thus incompatible with moral agency.

Rival views in the contemporary debate regarding the existence of free will are (i) determinism; (ii) libertarianism; and (iii) compatibilism. Determinism lays emphasis on the fact that the “actions” of human beings are happenings that occur in time, and, hence, they are effects which are produced by specific causes. Such causes are, in their turn, due to earlier causes, and so what happens is something that could not be otherwise. Thus, causal determinism “can be defined as the view that there is exactly one metaphysically possible future as determined by prior events or states of affairs according to causal laws” (Dasti and Bryant, 48). For some thinkers who subscribe to this view, it is not true that “in any particular situation, we ‘could have done otherwise’ than what we actually did” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). According to this view, since our actions are the consequences of events in the remote past, over which we have no control, “causal determinism also threatens the notion that we are in control of our actions” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). Those who maintain “that causal determinism is true, and free will does not exist”, are known as “hard determinists” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). Libertarianism is the contrary view that causal determinism is false, and “the will is entirely under our control, and that this free will ... is a necessary condition for the justice of divine reward and punishment” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 166, n.1). Will is free if our acts are “determined by our own intentions and desires” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 160); when they are otherwise caused, then the will is not involved. Among the libertarians, too, “the ‘agent-causal’ libertarians maintain that the cause of the free action is the agent himself, while the ‘event-causal’ libertarians maintain that some non-deterministic process that holds among some events within the agent is the cause of free action” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 48). Compatibilism is the view that “freedom in the relevant sense and universal divine determinism are compatible, and also that all

our free choices are also determined” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 166, n. 1), because here determinism is, to some extent, self-determinism. If our acts are totally random, without any links to our desires and intention, then such randomness would be a mark of lunacy, and not of freedom. In this way, freedom of will actually entails determinism of some sort.

Of course, none of the philosophical schools found in India believed in the Biblical myth that is at the root of these disputes, and they were not thus led to a discussion of free will in exactly the same manner. Some of these schools, e.g. the Cārvāka materialists, the Buddhists and the Jainas did not even admit the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent creator of this world known as God; and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas too rejected the arguments for establishing the existence of any omniscient being whatsoever. Thus, these schools were under no obligation to reconciling the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent creator of this world with the existence of undesirable phenomena like evil and suffering. Schools like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and the different schools of Vedānta, which did admit the existence of such a God, had to answer the following question raised by the Buddhists and Jainas — if this world has indeed been created by a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent and merciful, then why aren’t all the inhabitants of this world equally happy and prosperous? A benevolent and merciful being is also supposed to be impartial, and an impartial creator should not create a world in which some are happy while some are miserable for apparently no fault of their own. That the facts are otherwise shows that either the world does not have a benevolent and impartial creator or that the creator of this world is characterized by partiality (*vaiśamya*) and cruelty (*nairghṛṇya*). The Buddhists and Jainas accept the first of these alternatives, and maintain that the world is shaped by the results of the good and bad deeds (*karmas*) the creatures had performed in their previous births, and not by any omnipotent, omniscient, and merciful creator, i.e. God. Others, however, maintain that God creates the world in accordance with the *karmas* produced by the past deeds of all the individual selves in an entirely impartial manner, so that each of these individual selves can experience pleasure and pain commensurate with the *karmas* for which he/she alone is responsible. Hence, the question of God being partial or cruel does not arise at all. It is obvious that such responsibility cannot be assigned to the individual selves in the absence of free will on their part.

Another reason for the said difference is that there is no unanimity among the different schools of Indian philosophy about the nature of the self, or even about the very existence of self as a distinct permanent entity. For the Cārvākas, the body endowed with consciousness is the so-called self, while for the earlier Buddhists, who do not admit any permanent entity, the so-called self (*pudgala/ātman*) is not something ultimately real (*paramārthasat*); since what is ultimately real exists in its own right and thus cannot be reduced to anything else, whereas the so-called self is nothing but a mere sum-total (*saṃghāta*) of five impermanent aggregates (*skandhas*), viz., ‘physical form’ (*rūpa*), ‘feeling’ (*vedanā*), ‘determinate cognition’ (*saṃjñā*), ‘conditioning forces’ (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*); again, for the Yogācāra (or Vijñānavādin) Buddhist, it is nothing but an unbroken flow (*santāna*) of discrete conscious states.

Being thus reducible to some more basic constituents, this so-called self is only ‘conventionally real’ (*saṃvṛtisat*) or ‘empirically real’ (*prajñaptisat*). For the Mādhyamika Buddhists, whatever is dependent on something else [e.g. ‘causes’ (*hetus*) and ‘conditions’ (*pratyayas*)], lacks intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), and is thus ‘empty’ (*śūnya/niḥsvabhāva*), and, consequently, is merely ‘a dependent designation’ (*upādāya prajñapti*), which is only another name for what is conventionally real (*saṃvṛtisat*), which is applicable to the so-called self that is dependent on the five *skandhas*.

Even those who admit a distinct and permanent entity called the self (*ātman*) often differ radically on many ontological and epistemological issues, and whether free will and agency can be genuine properties of the embodied selves known as human beings depends vitally on the stand that one adopts in such controversial matters. For the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, there are innumerable selves. Some of them liberated and others in bondage, and the selves in bondage are invariably embodied, the type of bodies being determined by the consequences of the past deeds of the respective selves inhabiting them. The actual multiplicity of selves is also admitted by the Kashmir school of Śaivism and the theistic schools of Vedānta founded by Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbārka and Caitanyadeva, and, with the exception of Sāṃkhya and Yoga, all of these schools also admit such temporary phenomena as cognitions about specific objects (*viśayasphuraṇa*), and pleasure, pain, desire, volition etc., as genuine properties of these individual selves. These selves are admitted by these schools to be actual agents.

The monistic school of Vedānta, founded by Saṃkarācārya, admits, on the basis of scriptures like the *Upaniṣads* and *Bhagavadgītā*, that the self is the same as the *Brahman* (*Maṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* 2), which is one without a second (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6.2.1), which is the ultimate reality (*paramārthasat*) that is by nature pure and infinite consciousness, which is also unborn, eternal, abiding and primeval (*Bhagavadgītā* 2.20, *Kaṭhopaniṣad* 2.18); devoid of sensible properties like colour taste, sound, touch, smell, etc.; without beginning and end, and all-pervading [and thus devoid of temporal and spatial limitations] (*Kaṭhopaniṣad* 3.15). It is also immortal and of the nature of bliss (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 2.2.7); and as opposed to other inanimate mundane objects that are mutable and subject to destruction, this self is immutable and indestructible (*Bhagavadgītā* 12.3, 15.16). Since the ultimate reality is one that does not admit difference and multiplicity in any form, the various mundane objects and the individual selves are only empirically real (*vyavahārikasat*), and merely appear to us due to nescience (*ajñāna*) or ignorance (*avidyā*), and which consequently cease to exist once this ignorance is removed by the immediate apprehension of the real nature of this self (*ātmasākṣātkāra*). The individual selves are either pure consciousness delimited (*avacchinna*) by the internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*-s) or are mere semblances (*abhāsa*-s) or reflections (*pratibimba*-s) of pure consciousness in these internal organs; and thus have no reality independently of this pure consciousness. Since pure consciousness is immutable or unchanging, it cannot have any temporary (*sāmayika*) or adventitious (*āgantuka*) properties. Thus, internal states like cognition about specific objects (*vṛttijñāna*), pleasure (*sukha*), suffering (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and volition (*kṛti/prayatna*) emerge as well as disappear; and hence, being temporary, are

not properties of even the individual selves — they actually belong to the internal organs that have nescience (*avidyā*) as their root cause (and are thus inert), that act either as delimiters (*avacchedaka*-s) or temporary adjuncts (*upādhi*-s) of pure consciousness (a claim that is supported by *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.5.7 and *Maitrāyaṇyupaniṣad* 6.30).

The Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools are pluralist, and admit the ultimate reality of mundane objects and also of the various individual selves; yet they concur with the Advaita Vedāntins in maintaining that the individual selves, which are of the nature of pure consciousness, are immutable and hence cannot possess any temporary properties, since the presence of such properties entails change or transformation in their locus (*upayannapayan dharmaṃ vikaroti hi dharmīṇam*), whereas all of the multiple selves are of the nature of pure consciousness (*dr̥śimātra*). This is due to the fact that constant change pertains to all insentient or inert (*jaḍa*) entities, as well as to the *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* of which such entities are evolutes. *Prakṛti* as well as its evolutes are constituted by the three *guṇa*-s [viz. *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*] that by their very nature always undergo transformations (*calaṅca guṇavṛttam*; Vyāsa's commentary on *Yogasūtra*-s 2.15 and 3.13). The multitude of *puruṣa*-s [i.e. selves] are, however, not connected with these *guṇa*-s in any way; and hence, all of them are equally immune to change (*kūṭastha*). This basic distinction between inert objects and conscious selves has been expressed emphatically by Vācaspati Miśra: “*pratikṣaṇapariṇāmino hi sarve bhāvāḥ rte citiśakteḥ*” (*Sāṃkhyattvakaumudī* on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* no. 5); which is also supported by the following statement of Pañcaśikha, an ancient master of the Sāṃkhya school—“*apariṇāmiṇī hi bhoktṛśaktirapratisaṃkramā ca pariṇāmiṇyarthē pratisaṃkrānteva tadvṛttimanupatati*” (quoted in Vyāsa's commentary on *Yogasūtra* 2.20). Since the selves are immutable, the selves cannot be genuine agents, since the presence of agency also presupposes the prior existence of desire (*icchā*) and volition or effort (*kṛti*), both of which are temporary and, hence, are incompatible with the immutability of their locus. Accordingly, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools ascribe agency to the internal organ (*manas*) or the principle of egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), which evolutes of *prakṛti*, and are thus constituted by the three *guṇa*-s, which are transformed constantly, the successive transformations being sometimes similar (*sarūpapariṇāma*) and sometimes dissimilar (*virūpapariṇāma*). Due to *aviveka*, i.e. lack of discriminative knowledge, the self cannot always distinguish itself from this changing principle, and consequently considers itself to be an agent. For the Advaita Vedāntins, what is responsible for this phenomenon is not the mere lack of discrimination, but also the positive fact of wrong identification (*tādātmyādhyāsa*) of the self with this internal organ. The vital distinction between these three schools is that while all of them deny agency in the self, the Sāṃkhya and Yoga school admit that the self is the experiencer (*bhoktā*) of pleasure and pain, while for the Advaita Vedāntins such experience is due to the ‘witnessing consciousness’ (*sākṣicaitanya*), and not the pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*).

It has been stated before that actions, as distinct from events, are due to free choice, and a choice is free when one knowingly adopts some specific course of action, even though he /she could have chosen otherwise; in such cases alone, the person concerned can be said to be a genuine agent who is responsible for the action performed by

him/her. Thus, if a person walking on a slippery road loses his/her foothold, and, consequently, collides unintentionally with another person then the first person is not held blameworthy or responsible for this consequence since that person did not intentionally or purposefully lose his/her foothold. In such cases, if the first person is accused of causing hurt to the second person he/she can very well answer by saying, ‘I did not do it on purpose, though it has happened due to me’. An excellent rendering of this in Sanskrit, viz. “*matto bhūtaṃ na tu mayā kṛtam*” is found in some Nyāya texts. This distinction between doing something intentionally and unintentionally is also acknowledged in the Dharmaśāstra texts, where the expiation (*prayāścitta*) recommended for some lapse that has occurred unintentionally (*anicchākṛta*) or is due to ignorance (*ajñānakṛta*) is less severe than the expiation for the same lapse that has been committed intentionally (*icchapūrvaka*), and, hence, in full knowledge (*jñānakṛta*). That actions proper are performed according to the choice of the agents of those actions has been stated clearly also by Śaṅkarācārya in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.4, where he has drawn a distinction between cognition (*jñāna*) and action (*kriyā*) by pointing out that while action is *puruṣatantra*, i.e. dependent on the person concerned who is acting, since that person is capable of performing or not performing that action, and where there are alternative ways of performing an action (e.g. going to a particular place), that person may choose any one of them, and not the other ones. But cognition is *vastutantra* or *viśayatantra*: it is determined ultimately by the actual entity (*vastu*) that is the object of that cognition and not by the desire or choice of the cognizer. Thus, under normal conditions, a person looking at a cow has to perceive it as a cow, and even if that person fervently desires to see it as a horse, he/she would be unable to do that. This is stated in the following passage by Śaṅkarācārya in the course of rejecting the claim that cognition is a mental activity (*mānasī kriyā*): *nanu jñānaṃ nāma mānasī kriyā. na, vailakṣaṇyāt, kriyā hi nāma sā, yatra vastusvarūpanirapekṣaiva codyate, puruṣacittavyāpārādhinā ca. yathā . . . “sandhyāṃ manasā dhyāyet”* (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 3.2.1) *iti caivamādiṣu. dhyānam cintanaṃ yadyapi mānasam, tathāpi puruṣeṇa kartumakartumanyathā vā kartum śakyam, puruṣatantratvāt, jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam. pramāṇaṃ tu yathābhūtavastuviśayam. ato jñānaṃ kartumakartumanyathā vā kartumaśakyam. kevalaṃ vaṣṭutantrameva tat, na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram. tasmānmānasatve’pi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam.* (*Brahmasūtraśaṅkarabhāṣya*, edited by MM Anantakrishna Shastri, Krishnadas Academy, Varanasi, Reprint, 2000, 128-129).

Having presented in outline a view of the issues across cultures, let me now turn to a discussion of the individual chapters in the anthology.

Discussion of Meyers, Chapple, Cardona, Garfield, Lawrence, Martin Ganeri and Buchta

This anthology contains twelve articles: (1) “Agency in Sāṃkhya and Yoga: The unchangeability of the Eternal” by Edwin F. Bryant; (2) “Free Persons, Empty Selves: Freedom and Agency in Light of Two Truths” by Karin Meyers; (3) “Free Will and Voluntarism in Jainism” by Christopher Key Chapple; (4) “Pāṇinian Grammarians on Agency and Independence” by George Cardona; (5) “Nyāya’s Self as Agent and

Knower” by Matthew R. Dasti; (6) “Freedom Because of Duty” by Elisa Freschi; (7) “Just Another Word for Nothing Left to Lose: Freedom, Agency and Ethics for Mādhyaṃikas” by Jay L. Garfield; (8) “Self, Causation and Agency in the Advaita of Śaṅkara” by Sthanewar Timalina; (9) “The Linguistics and Cosmology of Agency in Nondual Kashmiri Śaiva Thought” by David Peter Lawrence; (10) “Free Will, Agency and Selfhood in Rāmānuja” by Martin Ganeri; (11) “Dependent Agency and Hierarchical Determinism in the Theology of Madhva” by David Buchta and (12) “Agency in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Tradition” by Satyanarayana Dasa and Jonathan B. Edelman. All these articles are based on primary sources, and in the case of the philosophical schools, attempts have been made to relate the issues under discussion with the fundamental tenets of the schools concerned. The coverage of this volume is extensive, the only influential schools that have been left out here are the Pāñcarātra school (the doctrines of which have wielded considerable influence on the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntins), the Southern schools of Śaivism as well as the Śaivite schools based on the commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra*-s by Śrīkaṇṭha and Śrīpati, Tantric texts like *Tripurārahasya*, *Rudrayāmala* etc., and the Vaiṣṇavite Vedānta schools founded by Vallabha and Nimbārka.

Overall, this collection of articles succeeds in giving the reader a number of well-written, intelligible and illuminating accounts of the views of twelve Indian schools about free will, agency and selfhood. The chapters by Meyers, Chapple, Cardona, Garfield, Lawrence, Martin Ganeri and Buchta stand out as excellent, so let us begin by discussing this group.

Meyers. Garfield. The articles of Karin Meyers and Jay Garfield contain excellent accounts of the debate about free will and agency in Western philosophy, compare the relevant Western views with Buddhist doctrines, and discuss how the doctrine of two truths (viz. ultimate and conventional) can be utilized for establishing the Buddhist thesis that “from the ultimate perspective, there is no free will because there are no persons to enjoy it; there is merely the flow of *dharmas*. From the conventional perspective, there is most decidedly free will, of exactly the sort the Buddhist will find ‘worth wanting’ . . .” (48). They also point out why some recent arguments given in favour of the admissibility of the doctrine of free will in Buddhism do not succeed.

Cardona. The paper by George Cardona presents the views of Pāṇinian grammarians, which have been expounded in texts that are extremely technical in nature and are based on the peculiarities of the Sanskrit language. These have been explained in an admirably lucid manner, so that even readers who are ignorant of Sanskrit can understand these views. Thereafter, this paper proceeds from concrete linguistic usages to the discussion of the abstract philosophical doctrines of these grammarians, such as have been developed in texts like *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari and the commentaries on it, noting at the same time the disagreements of the grammarians with other schools like Nyāya. It is perfectly justified, to include such a chapter in this anthology because the views of these grammarians are primarily based on standard linguistic usages, and not so much on epistemological or ontological considerations, and the adherents of the different philosophical schools also take into account such standard linguistic usage, which is known as *śiṣṭaprayoga*, when such usages are

conducive to the establishment of their respective doctrines as we have seen, many of the philosophical schools admit agency (*kartr̥tva*) to be a property of conscious beings alone, while some of them admit it in the case of unconscious entities alone. Yet according to the grammarians, depending on the desire of the speaker (*vivakṣā*), agency can be assigned to conscious as well as unconscious entities, as can be witnessed in usages like, ‘I am cooking’ (*ahaṃ pacāmi*), and ‘the pot cooks’ (*sthālī pacati*), where the nominative case-ending indicates agency of the action (viz. the act of cooking) that has been expressed by the verb. The inclusion of this article thus brings to the notice of readers the importance of the views of grammarians on a number of philosophical issues.

Lawrence. The paper by David Lawrence, apart from being a comprehensive and deeply illuminating exposition of the basic tenets of Kashmiri Śaivism as well as the specific doctrines about free will and agency adopted in this system, consistently refers to some recent Western doctrines with which these views may be compared or connected, and ends by pointing out the areas where further research may be fruitfully undertaken. In Kashmir Śaivism, “Śakti (i.e. power) is incorporated into the essence of the God Śiva as his integral power and consort through whom, in the central myth, he emanates and controls the world. Through diverse rituals....the adept endeavours to recapitulate the basic mythic structure in order to realize salvific identity with Śiva as the *Śaktimat*, i.e. the possessor and enjoyer of *Śakti*” (211-212). Moreover, “[In the Śaiva theory,] the omnipotent agent Śiva/ the Self emanates things through his agential intention (*iccha*)...” (217-218), and thus, “the underlying material cause of the universe must be a conscious agent” (p.218. This theory rejects “the Advaita Vedānta version of *satkāryavāda*, according to which the universe is a projection (*vivarta*) on the Self, because of the tradition’s denial of the Self’s agency” (218). It is easy to see that such a system puts a lot of emphasis on the autonomy of the agent, and consequently, also on the existence of free will.

Chapple. Christopher Chapple gives an account of free will and agency as envisaged by the Jainas, and, in this account, the views of both the sects of Jainism, viz. Svetāmbaras and Digambaras, have been incorporated from representative works of both. As opposed to the Buddhists, the Jainas admit the existence of abiding selves, and, as opposed to the Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita schools, they admit that every self can be a genuine agent. In fact, the Jainas maintain that every individual has to attain his/her liberation through individual effort, because there is no scope for attaining it through either divine grace (since Jainism does not admit the existence of a creator God), or through the supernatural power of any saint or prophet. Human beings are in bondage due to the *karma* accumulated by them in countless earlier births, and each person has to attain liberation by checking the inflow of new *karma*-s and purging the accumulated *karma*-s by penance. Hence, voluntarism is an integral component of the Jaina doctrine. For the Jainas, every real entity is characterized by the acquisition of some new properties, discarding of some earlier properties, and permanence or continuity (*utpādayayadhrauvayayuktam sat*); there is thus no necessary opposition between change and permanence. So a permanent self may very well be an agent, though agency presupposes as its causes prior awareness, desire and volition, which

are transient properties of the agent. Both Buddha and Mahāvīra, we may note, put great emphasis on the individual's effort for the attainment of *nirvāṇa* / *kaivalya*, and such doctrines are invariably opposed to the doctrine of fatalism (*niyativāda*), a doctrine that was preached by the mendicant Makkhali Gosāla, who was their contemporary; and this view of Gosāla has been vehemently opposed in both Buddhist scriptures like *Suttapiṭaka* and Jaina scriptures like *Bhagavatīsūtra*. (Meyers mentions in her article the opposition of Buddha to the doctrines of Gosāla, but, surprisingly, Chapple does not mention Mahāvīra's rejection of Gosāla's views, even though the quarrel between the followers of Gosāla and the Jainas was a long, acrimonious and bitter one.)

Ganeri. Martin Ganeri gives a crisp account of the views of Rāmānuja, who, on the basis of scriptures, reasoning and common experience, seeks to establish the view that the individual self is a genuine agent. His primary opponents are the adherents of the Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta schools, who assign agency to the internal organ, which is unconscious, since, as we have seen, for these two schools, the conscious principle or self is immutable, while agency entails some change in its locus. That the individual self can be an agent is also admitted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, as well as the two sub-sects of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. But according to these schools, an individual self is an agent only so long as it is embodied — once it attains liberation, and thus becomes disembodied, it ceases to have qualities like cognition, desire, aversion, volition, and *adrṣṭa*, which are essential for agency. But according to Rāmānuja, the liberated souls continue to be agents, and if they so desire, they may also assume new bodies and experience pleasure. But their activity is always subjected to the supreme agency of God, who is the inner controller of everything. Even though God is the ultimate controller, his agency in this case amounts to permission (*anumati*), in the absence of which human agency in either the embodied or the disembodied state becomes impossible. There are five causes for the actions of embodied human beings: (i) the body, (ii) the individual self, who is treated as the agent, (iii) the different sense organs, (iv) the five vital airs, and (v) the divine destiny (as have been enumerated in *Bhagavadgītā* 18.14). A passage in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* seems to suggest that it is God who causes the finite, individual selves to perform good and bad deeds, which smacks of a stronger form of divine predestination. But in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.41, Rāmānuja maintains that God favours those who are devoted to Him by causing them to find pleasure in auspicious actions; but in the case of those who are hostile to Him, He causes them to find pleasure in actions that are the means of going downward. Even though it seems that in *Bhagavadgītā* 3.30, 9.27 and 18.66, Arjuna has been asked to renounce all *dharma*-s, and thus to give up agency, what Kṛṣṇa actually meant was that Arjuna should “cultivate a mental attitude of detachment that is an effective means of getting free of self-centred desire for the fruits of . . . actions” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 249).

All the actions of a devotee should be turned into acts of worship of the Supreme Self that paves the way for its liberation. Ganeri has put this doctrine in a single sentence: “. . . the finite self is free to act, and its actions are free, not despite the agency of the Supreme Self, but because of it”. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.3.41,

Rāmānuja gives an analogy to support this claim. When a property is owned jointly by two persons, one of them cannot give it to a third person without the consent of the other owner. But it does not affect the agency of the first person in any significant manner. Rāmānuja has also put forward the novel view that like the individual souls in bondage, God too is embodied (even though such a view is apparently inconsistent with scriptural passages like *Īśavāsyopaniṣad*, *Kāthopaniṣad* 2.22, *Praśnopaniṣad* 4.10, *Mundakopaniṣad* 1.1.6, *Śvetāvatelopaniṣad* 3.19 and 6.8, and so on). Perhaps in order to make this uncommon position acceptable, Rāmānuja has defined ‘body’ in a novel manner, which enables him to admit the world as well as the individual selves as the body of God, since in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.9, Rāmānuja has defined body as “any substance which a conscious entity can completely control and support for its own purposes, and whose nature is solely to be accessory of that entity is the body of that entity” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 236), and in the case of God, such a definition of body is applicable to the world along with the individual selves.

Ganeri has also evaluated the system of Rāmānuja in a systematic manner, and parts of his concluding remarks are as follows: “Rāmānuja, then argues for an account of the self in which the self (whether Supreme or finite) is a conscious subject that exercises real and free agency . . . for Rāmānuja it is a matter of how that agency is exercised that determines whether it leads to a form of embodiment that causes that *self* further limitation and misery, or becomes an expression of joyful creativity sharing in the transcendent agency of the Supreme Self. . . . His account thus maintains a form of compatibilism that is to be found in other classical theistic traditions” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 253). Ganeri also maintains that this system of Viśiṣṭādvaita “. . . would seem more fairly to be characterized as containing unresolved polarities than being incoherent” (ibid.), and in his opinion, “. . . to some extent the polarities that arise are due to the fact that he often does not go beyond what is necessary to explain either the *sūtra* or *Gītā* text sufficiently. However, to some extent the polarities are the common ones that abide in such theistic accounts in many traditions and mark the limits of human reason to make sense of realities that transcend them” (ibid.).

Butcha. In his paper on the views of Madhvācārya, David Buchta has observed very pertinently that “while Madhva comments on the same core of canonical texts as other Vedānta writers, his interpretations of those texts often differ radically from those of other Vedāntins. Nevertheless, his writings and that of his tradition have had an important influence on the development of other schools, and his views on human agency and free will are distinct in important ways” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 255). In this valuable and illuminating paper, Buchta has very correctly pointed out that while the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools deny genuine agency to the self on the ground that the presence of such agency in the self is not compatible with the immutability of the self, and the Buddhists along with the Advaita Vedāntins admit the agency of individual persons on the level of conventional reality (*saṃvṛti/vyavahāra*) and deny it on the level of ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools maintain that agency belongs permanently to God, and temporarily to the finite selves only during their state of embodiment, since it is absent when they are liberated. Madhva, however, maintains that agency (*kartr̥tva*) in the true sense of independence (*svātantrya*) belongs

only to God: in the case of the individual selves, independence is always subordinate to divine agency, and that too, only in relations to those lower than oneself, but such agency characterizes the individual selves even during their liberated state. These finite selves cannot even attain liberation without the grace of God. Madhva differs sharply from the adherents of other schools in maintaining that each self has a specific inherent nature (*svabhāva*) that makes it inclined to behave in a particular manner; depending on which it may be able to attain liberation through its volition, or undergo an endless number of reincarnations throughout its existence, or be subjected to perpetual suffering in hell. This doctrine, that smacks of predestination, brings the system of Madhva perilously close to fatalism (*niyativāda*), which has been condemned and rejected by almost all the other schools of Indian philosophy. According to Madhva, that the individual or finite self has agency has been specifically stated in *Brahmasūtra*-s 2.3.33-42, which are, in their turn, based on scriptural passages like “one attains the result of the actions one performs” (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 4.4.5), and “the world should meditate upon the Lord alone” (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* 1.4.15); and that such agency is present even during liberation has been stated in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.12.3.

In agreement with Rāmānuja, Madhva also maintains that the liberated self may assume a “luminous” body that is conducive to its activities like serving God, if it so desires, and that even in the absence of such a body it can experience pleasures of various kinds (though the second claim made here is not consistent with scriptural passages like *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 8.12.1). Even though God is omniscient, omnipotent and merciful, and even though the nature of each individual is under His control, He chooses not to change this nature of the selves who are destined to undergo perpetual reincarnation or condemnation in hell; but one cannot, on that ground, accuse God for being partial to some persons, and being unkind and cruel to other persons, since “the Lord is transcendent with regard to the presence of virtues and faults, being without beginning, and being the origin of [all] living beings” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 265). But even those who are fit for attaining liberation, cannot attain it solely by their effort, because in order to attain it, one must “(1) have the right destiny (under the control of the Lord); (2) have the right prior activities (under the control of the Lord); (3) manifest the right volition (under the control of the Lord); (4) engage in and fulfil the practice of worship of (by the grace of the Lord), and thus (5) attain devotion (by the grace of the Lord)” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 269). Buchta quite justifiably remarks here: “As one can see, while Madhva asserts that the self is an agent, it has very little, if any, control over its actions” (ibid.).

Buchta examines critically the claim of two contemporary scholars that this doctrine of inequality (*asamatva*) and hierarchy (*tāratamya*) among the finite selves provides the “best solution to the problem of how to reconcile the experience of evil and suffering in the world with an omnipotent and benevolent God” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 269). For Buchta, though, the system of Madhva presents three problems that have not been solved satisfactorily. First, it has not been proved by Madhva that God is not responsible in any way for the evil deeds of people and the consequent sufferings, because he could have prevented such things if he had merely so desired and yet he chooses not to. This amounts to what is known as “culpable negligence” in modern

legal parlance. The second problem is that the alleged hierarchy among finite selves has a dangerous consequence: a person may not know his/her place in this hierarchy, and may thus doubt whether he/she is at all fit for liberation; in the face of such doubt, the very aspiration for liberation would become impossible. In the words of Buchta, “while the unabashed claim that some people are just inherently evil may seem to be an honest assessment of the world as we experience it, it offers no hope for the lower selves. To find hope, one must assume oneself to be one of the highest selves” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 271). But that, as we see, is hardly possible in the system of Madhva. Finally, the claim that even if God is partial to His devotees, it should not be regarded as a fault because He transcends the rules of morality that are applicable for human beings, is not very satisfactory, unless one can give further justification of this claim in terms of transcendence.

Buchta concludes his discussion by pointing out that even though the views of Madhva may be criticised on several counts, it is undeniable that his system has significantly influenced the subsequent schools of Vaiṣṇava Vedānta founded by Vallabha and Caitanyadeva. So far as the hierarchy of selves is concerned, the adherents of the school of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism (founded by Caitanyadeva) like Baladeva Vidyabhūṣaṇa and Viśvanātha Cakravartin have admitted that such a hierarchy does exist, and that God is indeed partial to His devotees, who are the good souls. But such a partiality, which makes him protect his devotees by suppressing the wicked persons, should be considered as an ‘ornament’ (*bhūṣana*), and not as a fault (*dūṣana*). Vallabha goes one step further, and maintains that even though all the individual selves are intrinsically good, God changes some of them into wicked ones, and creates a hierarchy that suits His purpose. The response of the followers of Madhva to the charges that have been brought against the system of their Master (*ācārya*) also deserves to be studied in depth. Buchta also records the findings of Roque Mesquita that a large number of quotations in the works of Madhva are either from unknown sources, or are not traceable in the texts from which they have been claimed to have been taken; and this certainly puts a question mark on the authenticity of the so-called scriptural support for the doctrines of Madhva.

Discussion of Dasa and Edelman, Bryant, Dasti, Freschi and Timalisina

The remaining chapters in the anthology all make valuable contributions. The papers exhibit great erudition, and offer genuine insights into problems of Indian philosophy. The reviewer will not attempt to summarise the content of these chapters, but will simply engage with some points and issues that they arise.

Dasa and Edelman. The paper entitled “Agency in the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Tradition” by Satyanarayana Dasa and Jonathan B. Edelman shows how the exponents of this school, such as Jīva Gosvāmin, Viśvanātha Cakravartin and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, on the basis of texts such as *Bhāgavata Pūrāṇa*, maintain that the individual self can be a *real agent* even in the liberated state, and that in such a state, the individual self has a different type of body that makes it possible for it to enjoy happiness of the highest sort. In order to explain how the individual self can be a genuine agent, the relation of the self with the mind-body complex has been explained

in terms of the inherent properties of the self as well as its extrinsic properties. Thus, the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas differ from schools like Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta, which deny agency in the individual self, as well as from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools that admit agency only in the individual self that is in bondage. This paper also shows how these adherents interpret in a different way the verses in scriptures like *Bhagavadgītā* that at best apparently deny the agency of individual selves.

While this paper points out in a footnote (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 299) the similarity between the view of Jīva Gosvāmin and those of Nimbārka, it does not compare the views of Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas with the views of Madhva, even though, as has been pointed out by Buchta, “Baladeva promulgates a guru succession that connects Caitanya to Madhva in the opening of his *Prameyaratnāvalī*. A similar list can [also] be found in the 16th century *Gaurāṅgoddeśadīpikā* of Kavi Karṇapūra . . .” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 272, fn. 43). Moreover, in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.35-36, Baladeva “closely follows that of Madhva, citing the same texts (including untraceable passages likely composed by Madhva himself)” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 273-274), although “In commenting on sūtra 37, Baladeva significantly differs from Madhva” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 274). Whether or not such influences of Madhva are traceable in the writings of Jīva Gosvāmin and Viśvanātha Cakravartin could very profitably have been discussed in this paper.

Bryant. Bryant states at the concluding part that “...to a great extent, the unwelcome corollaries of Sāṃkhya’s hard-line position...act as a trigger for much subsequent development in Indian philosophy. Unhappy with the Sāṃkhya position, Nyāya seeks to couple an eternal unchanging *ātman* as substance with separable changing qualities such as agency; Buddhism to jettison notions of any eternal entities in the first place, and Advaita Vedānta of non-eternal ones; and the theists to conclude that irresolvable philosophical problems of this sort mandate the existence of an *Īśvara* who is beyond comprehension. . . . We are thus left with the choice of, on the one hand, an ongoing chronological history of philosophical debate between the various schools . . . or, on the other hand, of accepting the will of an inconceivable *Īśvara* beyond the boundaries of philosophical resolution. Sāṃkhya, as the earliest expression of systematic philosophy evidenced in Sanskrit texts, has, in many ways, set the stage for both options” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 38-39). This is a valuable observation, though it would be somewhat misleading to say that, for the Nyāya system, the self is eternal and unchanging. That the self, according to Nyāya, is eternal, is certainly true. But the claim that it is “unchanging” is not correct. For the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, bondage and liberation are genuine as well as mutually opposed states of a self, and, hence, when a self becomes liberated it undergoes genuine change. For the Sāṃkhya school, however, the unchanging self (*puruṣa*) does not undergo any genuine change, since it remains immutable (*kūṭastha*) even when liberation takes place — because what undergoes bondage and attains liberation is the unconscious *prakṛti*. Again, we come across the following sentences: “For our purposes here, a well-known axiom central to much Indian philosophising becomes pivotal in this regard: If something is eternal, then that thing cannot change. And by the principle of *anvaya-vyatireka*, the contrapositive holds true: if something undergoes change, it cannot be eternal. This, then, for

Sāṃkhya, requires that if an *ātman* be deemed an entity that is eternal, . . . its essence or nature must also be eternal; they can never change or move . . .” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 19). As a matter of fact, this rule is admitted only in Advaita Vedānta, where the only eternal principle, viz. *Ātman* or Brahman, is admitted as unchanging. All else is subject to change, and hence, are not ultimately real. Strangely enough, Bryant also states quite correctly in p. 37 that according to Sāṃkhya, *prakṛti* is eternal, even though it undergoes change or transformation at every moment. This is evident from the remark of Vācaspati Miśra while justifying the expression ‘*prasavadharmi*’ as an adjective of *prakṛti* in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 11: “ ‘*prasavadharmeti vaktavye matvarthīyaḥ prasavadharmasya nityayogam ākhyātum. sarūpa-virūpa-pariṇāmābhyāṃ na kadācidapi viyujyata ityarthah*”. Again, in his commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 5, Vācaspati Miśra has stated that apart from the conscious principle, all else undergoes change at every moment: “*pratikṣaṇapariṇāmino hi sarve bhāvāḥ ṛte citiśakteḥ*”; and here, “all else” includes *prakṛti* as well. These two statements of Bryant (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 19 and 27) flatly contradict each another. So far as schools other than Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Advaita Vedānta are concerned, the so-called principle stated above has not been accepted at all. Thus, for the schools like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, all eternal substances like the atoms of the four great elements, *Ākāśa*, Space, Time, Self; and also Mind (*manas*) undergo innumerable conjunctions and disjunctions with various other substances, and both conjunctions and disjunctions are temporary qualities. Besides, the colour, smell and taste of earth-atoms undergo change due to their connection with heat. Moreover, the self that in bondage can have some distinguishing qualities (*viśeṣaguṇa*-s) like cognition, desire, happiness, suffering, volition, merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), and memory impressions that are non-eternal; and *Ākāśa* can be qualified by the distinguishing quality known as sound. Some of these qualities last for only two moments. All the founders of the theistic schools of Vedānta, starting from Bhāskara (whose name surprisingly does not surprisingly occur anywhere in this collection) to Baladeva, maintain that *Brahman*, the ultimate and eternal reality, is both the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) as well as the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the world, and, hence, subject to transformation (*pariṇāma*). It is thus evident that the claim made by Bryant quoted above is not correct.

This error has spread to several other articles, where, on the authority of Bryant (who has reiterated it on Dasti & Bryant 2014, 24 and 27), it has been repeated again and again in this anthology (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 10, 129, 134, and 288). The fact of the matter is that for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools, the unconscious *prakṛti* and its evolutes that are constituted by the three *guṇa*-s (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) always undergo change, since these three *guṇa*-s are liable to change by their very nature (*calaṅca guṇavṛttam*—Vyāsa’s commentary on *Yogasūtra* 2.17). By contrast, *puruṣa*, which is conscious and has no connection with these three *guṇa*-s, is immutable and unchanging. Fortunately, Ganeri and Buchta have been more careful and exact while discussing this issue (see Dasti & Bryant 2014, 219 and 256).

In footnote no. 14 on (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 23), we come across two sentences that are also not quite accurate. These are: “*Satkāryavāda* is the view that all effects are present in one cause. Nyāya is *asatkāryavāda*: effects are new entities not present in

their causes; reality is to be understood as product of seven distinct causes”. *Satkāryavāda* is the doctrine that what is called an effect (*kārya*) is pre-existent in its material cause (*upādanakāraṇa*) in a subtle (*sukṣma*) or unmanifest (*avyakta*) form—the task of the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) is to make it gross (*sthūla*) or manifest (*abhivyakta*). The further claim that all effects are ultimately present in one material cause (viz. *prakṛti*) is established on the consideration of parsimony (*lāghava*). But for *asatkāryavāda*, there is prior non-existence of an effect in its material cause (where the effect inheres after its production)—the efficient cause brings that effect into existence. The real point of difference between these schools is that what are treated by the supporters of *asatkāryavāda* to be cases of generation (*utpatti*) and destruction (*vināśa*), are regarded as cases of manifestation (*avirbhāva*) and disappearance or reabsorption (*tirobhāva*) respectively by the supporters of *satkāryavāda*. The last part of this remark by Bryant (viz. “reality is to be understood as the product of seven distinct causes”) is totally incomprehensible to the present reviewer. The expression “seven causes” may mean either ‘seven kinds of causes’, or it may mean ‘causes that are seven in number.’ Now, supporters of *Asatkāryavāda* like the Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas admit only the following three types of causes: (i) *samavāyikāraṇa*, (ii) *asamavāyikāraṇa* and (iii) *nimittakāraṇa* — and thus, “seven causes” cannot mean here “seven kinds of causes”. Besides, for these philosophers, reality comprises an infinite number of eternal and non-eternal things, that may be classified into seven types or categories of reals. The eternal entities are obviously not products of any causes whatsoever. Among the non-eternal entities, the positive ones alone are produced by all these three types of causes, and non-eternal negative entities, like destruction, are produced by their respective *nimittakāraṇas* alone; and hence, there is nothing that can be produced by “seven types of causes.” It would also be improper to claim that every real effect is produced by causes that are exactly seven in number, since this claim does not hold in every case. One can cite some other passages from this chapter that are equally problematic, but perhaps the examples given here will serve the purpose at hand.

Dasti. Dasti provides valuable insights into the Nyāya view that agency and free will are genuine properties of the finite selves, and he discusses how the different doctrines of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools provide a coherent defence of these claims. The causal chain from cognitions to actions via the intermediate states of desire/aversion and volition or effort has been explained with meticulous care, and it also contains the following pertinent observation: “In debates over the existence of the self, Buddhism is Nyāya’s greatest opponent; but when discussing the nature of self, Nyāya often takes aim at the Sāṃkhya school” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 121). This remark is perfectly justified, because unless the immutability of self is denied, it cannot be claimed that the self can be an agent in the proper sense of the term. But one may add here that in this debate, the Advaita Vedāntins also deny agency to self, and the Nyāya philosophers must argue against them as well.

A few issues can be raised. One comes across the sentence: “..... Nyāya defends a more robust notion of selfhood, placing desire, aversion, volition and moral responsibility alongside cognition as the self’s distinctive qualities.” (Dasti & Bryant

2014, 112-113). It is obvious that, here, *jñāna*, *icchā*, *dveṣa* and *prayatna* have been quite correctly translated as ‘cognition’, ‘desire’, ‘aversion and volition’ respectively. However, according to Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10 (*icchādvēṣaprayatnasukhaduḥ-khajñānānyātmāno līngam*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) are also two distinctive qualities of the self that is in bondage, and their omission here seems to be somewhat surprising, since desire for or aversion towards an object is produced due to the past experiences of pleasure and pain respectively produced by that object. Moreover, ascription of pleasure and pain to the self complete the Nyāya picture of the self that is the cogniser (*jñātā*), doer (*kartā*) as well as the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) of the results of its actions, such enjoyment being due to merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), which are also distinctive qualities of the self in bondage, and which accrue to the self on account of morally good actions and morally bad actions respectively performed by that self. Perhaps Dasti has rendered *dharma* and *adharma*, (which are collectively called *adṛṣṭa*) as “moral responsibility,” and the present reviewer is not certain that the expression “moral responsibility” can fully convey the specific senses in which the terms “*dharma*” and “*adharma*” have been used in Nyāya philosophy. Again, it has been stated that for the Nyāya school, the locus of consciousness is the self, and that the same is the case with the Sāṃkhya school (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 122). However, there is a subtle but significant distinction between the tenets of these two schools. For the Nyāya school, the self is a substance that may at some time be characterised by the temporary quality known as cognition or consciousness (*jñāna/caitanya*), whereas for the Sāṃkhya school, consciousness, which is eternal and immutable, is the very nature of the self. In Sanskrit, one can say that for the Nyāya school, the self can sometimes become *cetana*, whereas for the Sāṃkhya school, the self is always *caitanyaśvarūpa*.

One comes across the strange sentence “the category of self (*ātmajāti*) is delimited by the condition of being a substratum of pleasure, pain and the rest” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 122), a translation of the Sanskrit sentence “*ātmajātistu sukhaduḥkhādisamavāyikāraṇatā-avacchedakatayā sidhyati*”, that occurs in *Siddhāntamuktavālī* on *Bhāṣāpariccheda*. Here the word ‘*atma-jāti*’ has been printed wrongly, it should be ‘*ātmajāti*’, and its translation should be “the universal [known as] selfhood”, and the translation of the entire sentence may be something like “the universal [known as] selfhood is established as that [property] which delimits the property of being the cause in which pleasure, pain and the rest inhere”. In this paper, Dasti has translated *manas* as ‘mind’, which is perfectly in order. But sometimes, instead of the word *manas*, which is a nominal stem, he has used the word ‘*manah*’, which is obtained when ‘*manas*’ is declined in the singular number of nominative case that takes the first nominal triplet-endings (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, and 126), though in other such cases, only the relevant nominal stem has been mentioned. On one page both the forms *manas* and *manah* have been used, and more care should have been taken here.

Dasti has remarked that the expression *pratyātmanīyamādbhukteḥ* has been employed by Udayana in verse no. 1.4 of his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* for rejecting the views of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga schools (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 125). The claim that Udayana wants to reject some Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts is true, since it is supported by Udayana’s autocommentary on verse no. 1.14, which starts with the introductory remark “*etena*

sāṃkhyamatam apāstam”, where we find a summary statement of the Sāṃkhya views and their refutation. But this particular quarter of verse no. 1.4 is primarily aimed at the view that the results produced by human actions have the objects of enjoyment as their loci, and not the relevant individual selves. For example, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsakas maintain that when the things to be offered in a sacrifice are sanctified as per the instructions of scriptures, a special property called *apūrva* is produced in those things, which ultimately leads to the result supposed to be produced by that sacrifice. In like manner, such *apūrva*-s, being located in the objects of enjoyment, produce pleasure and pain in individual selves. This Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā view has been stated in verse no. 1.10 with its auto-commentary, while its refutation is found in verse no. 1.11 with its auto-commentary.

Dasti writes, “If *buddhi* is temporary and subject to destruction, then (according to a widely held principle in Indian thought) it must also have a beginning” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 128). What has been stated here holds good only of all temporary entities that are positive in nature (*bhāvapadārtha*-s). Those who, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, admit also negative entities, maintain that the absence of an entity prior to its creation has no beginning, though it has an end, and the absence of a thing after its destruction (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) has a beginning, but it has no end (*anādiḥ sāntaḥ pragabhāvaḥ, sādiḥ anantaḥ dhvaṃsābhāvaḥ*).

Dasti has observed that Udayana has drawn a distinction between properties (*dharma*-s) and property - bearers (*dharmin*-s) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 129). This is true, but much before Udayana, this distinction was established by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* (NV) on *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.14, and this view of Uddyotakara was defended against the counterclaims of the Buddhists (for whom there is no such distinction here), and of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (who admit here identity- in - difference instead of full-fledged difference or distinction) by Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā* (NVTT). (For details, see NV ed. by A. Thakur, ICPR, 1997, 68-74 and NVTT, ed. by A. Thakur, ICPR, 1994, 86-89 and 187-194.) Besides, the categorical framework admitted in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools would collapse unless such a distinction is admitted. In this categorical scheme, the seven types of entities that are admitted happen to be substance, quality, action, universal, particularity, inherence and absence/negation; which are absolutely different from one another, such difference between them being implied by the division of all entities into seven, and only seven groups; which is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Here, component substances that are effects, are located through the relation inherence in its component parts that are the inherent causes of this effect; qualities and actions are located through inherence in substances to which they belong; universals are located through inherence in substances, qualities and actions characterized by them; particularities are located through inherence in eternal substances; inherence is an eternal relation that is located in its relata through a self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha*); and negation, which requires a location as well as a counter positive (*pratiyogin*), and resides in its location through another self-linking relation. In each of these cases, there is a full-fledged distinction between a property-bearer and its properties.

Freschi. There are many interesting issues to discuss in the paper by Freschi, which contains, besides, a lot of useful information and valuable observations. For example, there is the following sentence: “Thus the Veda is the *only* instrument of knowledge regarding what is to be done instead of what there is” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 138). This is an overstatement, because the Vedas are held to be authoritative about only those means of attaining what is desirable and avoiding what is undesirable, which cannot be known through either perception or inference. Such has been stated by Sāyanācārya in his *Ṛgvedādibhāṣyabhūmikā* (*pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yastūpāyo na vedyate / enaṃ vidanti vedena tasmādvedasya vedatā*// Thus one has to know only from the Vedas that one who wants to attain heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice, and that one who has not performed the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices should not perform any Soma sacrifices. But even those who are either ignorant of the Vedas, or are not entitled to study the Vedas, or have not studied the Vedas even though entitled to do so, or do not even regard the Vedas as authoritative, know very well that a sick person should take the medicines prescribed by the physician, and that one should not put one’s hand in a blazing fire. Likewise, when a person asks his servant to close the door, the latter does not require the help of the Vedas for knowing what is to be done by him. In such cases, what we should or should not do is known from our mundane experience, or from the advice of knowledgeable persons.

In footnote 3, we find the following sentence: “The Naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives, in fact, as evidence of the Veda’s validity, that after having performed a *grāmakāma* sacrifice, his grandfather actually conquered a village” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 139). There are at least two errors in this statement, and also a questionable assertion. First, the word “*grāmakāma*” employed by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is not the name of any sacrifice – it simply means “someone who wants to acquire a village”, just as the word “*svargakāma*” employed in the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*” is not the name of any sacrifice but simply means “one who wants to attain heaven.” (In technical parlance, such a person is called “*adhikārin*.”) Second, the actual name of the sacrifice performed by the grandfather of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was “*sāṃgrahaṇī*”, as is evident from the relevant statement of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa : “*tathā hyasmatpitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ sāṃgrahaṇīm kṛtavān. sa iṣṭisamāptisamānantaram eva gauramūlakaṃ grāmam avāpa.*” (*Nyāyamañjarī*, Oriental Institute, Mysore, edited by V. Varadacharya, Vol. I, 653). Third, “conquering a village” befits a *kṣatriya*, who is by profession a warrior, and hence, entitled to participate in warfare and thus conquer some territory. A *brāhmin* (i.e. member of the priestly class) like the grandfather of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa was more likely to receive the village called “*gauramūlaka*” as a gift (*dāna/pratigraha*) from the local king or some such person.

In footnote 10, there is the following sentence: “Predestination is, accordingly, *only* admitted by the theistic school of Dvaita Vedānta founded by Madhva....” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 142-143). We have already noted that much earlier than Madhva, the doctrine of pre-determinism that verged on fatalism (*niyatīvāda*) was preached by Makkhali Gosāla (the founder of the sect of mendicants known as Ājīvika-s), and whose doctrines were vehemently criticized by both Buddha and Mahāvīra.

At (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 146), there is the following sentence: “Thus, for Prābhākaras, desire is only the indirect cause of action (the direct cause being the prescription).” However, a totally opposite view is found at (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 304-305) with reference to *Gurusammatapadārthāḥ* (a small work on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā by an anonymous author, that has been appended to *Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa edited by Swamī Yogīndrānanda; Varanasi): “*prayatnaḥ dvividhaḥ – jīvanapūrvakaḥ icchādveṣapūrvakaśca. tasya [i.e. jīvanapūrvasya] dharmādharmāpekṣād ātmamanahsaṃyogādutpattiḥ. icchādveṣapūrvakaprayatnastu. icchādveṣāpekṣād ātmamanahsaṃyogād utpadyate.*” Here, one also finds the following sentence: “*icchāphalāni tu prayatnakṛtidharmādharmāḥ.*” From such sentences, it follows that for Prābhākaras, apart from activities like breathing etc. that are due to vital processes within a person’s body, many actions can be due to either desire or aversion. None of these sentences mentions prescription as the immediate cause of volition. Moreover, in *Tantrarahasya* of Rāmānujācārya, another well-known work of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, we find the following statement about qualities: “*guṇāstu—rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparsa-parimāṇa-prthaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāga-paratvāparatva-gurutva-drava-tvasneha saṃskāra-śabda-buddhi-sukha-duhkhecchā-dveṣa-prayatna-dharmādharmāḥ eteṣāṃ nityānityavibhāgastat-hotpattisthitivināśaprakāraśca kaṇādatantrasiddhaḥ. Vedārthavicārānupayogānnās-makaṃ tatrābhīniveśaḥ.*” Here, it has been clearly stated, after enumerating the qualities (which include cognition, desire, aversion and volition) that the manners in which these qualities are produced and destroyed are to be known from the work of Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. It has been stated with evidence in the paper by Dasti that in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, the causal chain resulting in action is either cognition→desire→volition(or effort)→action, or cognition→aversion→volition (or effort)→action, and as we have already noted, this is acceptable to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as well. Thus, even Rāmānujācārya does not admit ‘prescription’ as the invariable and immediate antecedent of all types of activities.

There are, on the other hand, some statements in *Prabhākaravijaya* of Nandīśvara, as also some verses quoted in it from *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra, that may have induced Freschi to think that for Prābhākaras one performs an action only when one knows from some prescription that this particular action is *kārya*, i.e. something that is fit for being performed, or what ought to be performed. For the Prābhākaras, it is the obligatoriness of the prescribed action that induces one to perform it rather than the fact that the action concerned produces some desirable result. Here, the view that is being rejected has been maintained by Maṇḍana Miśra, the noted author of *Vidhiviveka*, who maintains in the following verse of this work that an imperative impels the listener for performing the prescribed action, since it is *iṣṭasādhana*, i.e. the means of attaining something desirable: *pumso neṣṭābhyupāyavāt kriyāsvanyaḥ pravartakah / pravṛttihetum dharmañca pravadanti pravartanām //* (*Vidhiviveka*, verse no.27). Śālikanātha and Nandīśvara have tried to show against this view that the two properties *kāryatva* and *iṣṭasādhanatva* are not equipollent (i.e. co-extensive), and hence, they cannot be said to be the same. Thus, the past acts of eating etc. are characterized by *iṣṭasādhanatā*, but not by *kāryatā*, since it is not possible for anyone to perform acts

that have happened in the past; and pleasure is characterized by *kāryatā*, and not by *iṣṭasāadhanatā*, since pleasure is desirable in itself, and is not a means for attaining something else that is desirable. This argument, and a few others, have been stated in the following passage: (i) “ *kāryadhīta eva pravṛttiḥ. tadanvayavyatirekitvāt pravṛtteḥ. iṣṭopāyajñānasyāpyan-vayavyatirekau sta iti cenna. Kāryajñānot-pādakatvenānyathāsiddhatvātyatra kāryajñānam nāsti, kevalamiṣṭopāyajñānameva, tatrātītānāgatavar-tamānopāyajñāne’pi pravṛttirna dṛśyate. Nan-vayaṃ vyabhicāra iṣṭopāyatāyāḥ kāryadhī-janane’pi samah. naivam. kṛtyuddeś-yasyeṣṭopāyasya kāryadhīhetutvam. ato’tītādi-vyavṛttisiddhiḥ. dvidhā hyupāyatādhih – atītādyākārā kāryākārā ca. tatra kāryākārataḥ pravṛttiḥ kāryadhītaḥ pravṛttirityucyate. (ii)iṣṭopāyatvameva kāryatvamiti na śakyate vaktum. Kāryatveṣṭopāyatvayoratyantabhedasya sphuṭatvāt. kāryatvam ca iṣṭe vartate, iṣṭasādhane ca. tathā’niṣṭaparihāre’pi vartate. iṣṭopāyatvam tu na tatheti tayorbhedaḥ sphuṭatara eva.....kiñca anyonyavyabhicārādapi bhedaḥ. kāryatvam sukhe’pi vidyate, tatreṣṭopāyatvam nāsti. iṣṭopāyatvam bhūtabhojanādāvapi vartate, tatra kāryatvam nāsti.....etatsarvamabhipretyoktaṃ Prakaraṇapañcikāyām – “phalasādhana-nāma parā parā ca kāryatā /” iti, kāryatā kṛtisādhyatvam phalasāadhanatā punaḥ/kāraṇatvam phalotpāde te bhidyete parasparam/” iti ca. (Prabhākaravijaya, edited by D. Prahlada Char, Bangalore, 35-37.) Now, it is a fact that according to Prābhākaras, a command or imperative expresses that the action prescribed therein is obligatory, and, thereby, produces some activity. This may create the impression that the reverse is also true, i.e. whenever someone acts in a particular way, it is due to some prescription or command. But we have already noted that this is not always the case.*

Freschi states that “Kumārila is even ready as far as to risk denying the fixedness (*nitya*) of the self, in order to make room for the possibility of its undergoing change” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 148); and in support of it, verse nos. 22cd-23cd from the Ātmavāda section of Ślokavārttika and the commentary on them by Pārthasārathi Mīśra have been quoted in footnote no.26 (viz. “*yadi vikāramātram anityaṃ tadastu, na hi vikāramatreṇa svarūpocchedo bhavati, pratyabhijñānāt*”). Yet from the context of the verses it is also clear that what is at stake here is not the mutability of the self, but its permanence. Besides, there is the hint that even though some people may prefer to apply the term ‘*anitya*’ to a thing that is subject to change, the term ‘*anitya*’ usually means something that is not eternal, and a thing is called ‘eternal’ if it has neither origination (*utpatti*), nor destruction (*vināśa*). This has been explicitly stated by Śāṅkarācārya in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.4, where he has drawn a distinction between entities that are admitted by some schools to be permanent or eternal, even though they undergo change, and those that are permanent as well as immutable. The three *guṇa*-s admitted by the Sāṃkhya school and the atoms etc. admitted by Vaiśeṣikas are examples of the first type, whereas *Ātman/Brahman* admitted in Advaita Vedānta is the example of the second type: The relevant comments of Śāṅkarācārya are as follows : “*tatra kiñcit pariṇāminityaṃ yasmin vikriyamāṇe’pi ‘tadevedam’ iti buddhir na vihanyate, yathā pṛthivyādi jagannityatvavādinām, yathā ca sāmṅhyānām guṇāḥ. idaṃ tu pāramārthikaṃ kūṭasthanityaṃ vyomavat sarvavyāpi sarvakriyārahitaṃsvayaṃjyotisvabhāvam*”. (*Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya* with

Bhāmatī, *Vedāntakalpataru* and *Kalpataruparimala*, edited by M.M. Anantakrishna Shastri, Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay, 1938, 117-119.) Besides, one may also treat here the initial reactions of Kumārila and Pārthasārathi as the provisional admission of the opponent's view for the sake of argument, though such a position is liable to be rejected subsequently. This procedure, which is employed quite often in works of Indian philosophy, is technically called *prauḍhivāda*, and its adoption is justified by the popular maxim “*tuṣyatu durjana iti nyāyaḥ*.”

Freschi states that “Corpses are not bodies, and after death, subjects will probably need some new form of (subtle?) body” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 152). This statement is apparently based on the fact that “bodies have been defined as the instrument for realizing experience,” and in this connection, Freschi has quoted *Tantrarahasya* of Rāmānujācārya, where body has been defined as “*bhogasādhana*”; i.e. the locus where the self experiences pleasure and pain. But almost the same definition of body has also been given in *Mānameyodaya*, a work on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā by Nārāyaṇa (“*tatra ātmabhogāyatanaṃ śarīram*” – *Mānameyodaya* edited by Swamī Yogīndrānanda, Varanasi, p.144). Now, Nārāyaṇa has also given some arguments for showing that the body is not the self, and the first one of them is that the qualities of the body are present so long as the body is existent, but the distinctive qualities of the self like cognition, pleasure, pain etc. are not present in the corpses [.....*ātmaviśeṣaguṇādīnāṃ śarīraguṇatvānupapattēh. yadi sukhaduḥkhādayaḥ śarīraviśeṣaguṇāḥ, tarhi te yāvaccarīram avatiṣṭheran, na hi te mṛtaśarīreṣūpalabhyante* – Ibid,188]. Besides, this definition has been borrowed from *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyāna (*tatrātmā sarvasya bhoktātasya bhogāyatanaṃ śarīram* – *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.9), which shows that this definition of body is acceptable to the Nyāya system, as well as to Rāmānujācārya. Yet, in verse no. 48 of the Nyāya text *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, it has been argued that consciousness is not a property of the body, since it is absent in corpses (*śarīrasya na caitanyaṃ mṛteṣu vyabhicārataḥ*). That corpses can be treated as bodies is also supported by the employment of the expression “*mṛtaśarīrāṇām*” in the commentary *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on this verse.

In footnote no. 34, there is the following statement: “.....the Buddhist *pramāṇavāda* (notwithstanding what seems a mechanistic account of causality) is not deterministic, as shown by the fact that Dharmakīrti refutes the possibility of inferring a result from its causes, so that even a karmic cause cannot be said to invariably lead to a certain result.” We need not contest here the claim that the Buddhist *pramāṇavāda* is not deterministic, but what has been said here about Dharmakīrti seems to be problematic. It is true that for Dharmakīrti, while one may infer the cause (say fire) of an effect (say, smoke) from the presence of that effect, the reverse is not true, because there may be the absence of the other causal factors that are necessary for producing that effect, or there may be some obstructive factor (*pratibandhaka*) which can prevent the production of that effect. But in the presence of *kāraṇasāmagrī* of some effect (i.e. the collection of all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the production of that specific effect, which also includes the absence of any preventive factor), the effect is bound to be produced. That Dharmakīrti would accept this position is clear from his statement in *Pramāṇavārttika* verse no. 3.53 that no effect can be produced by a single

causal factor; and that all effectuation is due to the presence of the collection of all the relevant causal factors (*na kiñcidekamekasmāt sāmāgryā sarvasambhavaḥ*). Hence, if the words ‘causes’ that has been employed here by Freschi stands for the sumtotal of causal factors (*kāraṇasāmāgrī*), then the effect cannot but be produced; otherwise, the very definition of cause as the invariable antecedent of the relevant effect would have to be rejected. (As Uddyotakara and Jayanta have pointed out, even though one cannot infer rain from a mere cloud; one can do so in the case of a dense and dark rain-cloud, that is accompanied by lightning and rumbling sound.)

An interesting issue arises in connection with Freschi's statement that, “For Mīmāṃsā authors, desire is part of the natural world, which is governed by the laws of *karma* and restricted by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions..... An evidence of this attitude is found in discussions concerning the *Parisāṅkhyāvidhi*, *pañca pañcanakhā bhaktavyāḥ* “the five five-nailed ones are to be eaten.” The *Parisāṅkhyāvidhi* is a prescription restricting something else. In this case, Mīmāṃsā authors explain, it restricts one’s natural appetite – which would be directed to everything – to these five animals *only*” (Emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 155). Here, a few points should be noted. First, the word ‘*bhaktavyāḥ*’ is a typo – the correct form being ‘*bhoktavyāḥ*’. Second, the said prohibitory sentence in its exact form cannot be found in the extent Vedic corpus, though a sentence similar to it is present in *Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa*, and a similar statement is found also in *Manusmṛiti*, verse no. 5.18. The relevant verse has been uttered by Bāli, the monkey-king and the brother of Sugrīva, a friend of Rāma. When Bāli was fighting with Sugrīva, Rāma, in order to ensure the victory of his friend, pierced Bāli from behind with his arrows. Rāma was accused by Bāli before his death for several improper acts. There was no prior enmity between Bāli and Rāma, and it was cowardly on the part of Rāma to attack Bāli from behind. Moreover, human beings kill wild animals for their skin, hair, bones and meat, but the skin, hair and bones of Bāli were considered to be impure, and his meat could not be eaten by Rāma since among the animals that have five nails on their feet, only five (viz. rabbit, porcupine, iguana, rhinoceros and tortoise) are fit to be eaten by *brāhmins* and *kṣatriyas*, and while Bāli was a five-nailed animal, he was not included in this group. The implication is that five-nailed animals other than the five mentioned in this list should not be eaten — this does not extend to a prohibition against all the other beasts and birds that are not five-nailed. The relevant verses of *Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa* are as follows: *adhāryaṃ carma me sadbhī romāṇyasthi ca varjitam / abhakṣyāni ca māṃsāni tvadvidhairdharmacāribhiḥ // pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyā brahmakṣatreṇa rāghava / śaśakaḥ śallakī godhā khadgī kūrmaśca pañcama // carma cāsthi ca me rāma na sprśanti manīṣiṇaḥ / abhakṣyāni ca māṃsāni so’haṃ pañcanakho hataḥ //* (*Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa*, Kiṣkindhyākāṇḍa, Verse no. 17.38-40).

That the injunction “*pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ*” does not by implication prevent one from consuming the meat of creatures like deer; and also the meats of birds like partridge, peacock, wild cock etc., it can be established by adequate evidence from *Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa* itself. When Rāma, accompanied by Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa left Ayodhyā and came to a forest, Lakṣmaṇa was asked by Rāma to build a suitable hut, and then to kill a deer, so that the venison obtained thereby could be used as an offering

in the sacrifice for sanctifying that hut. Accordingly, Lakṣmaṇa killed a blackbuck, that was fit to be eaten, roasted its meat in fire, and this roasted meat was offered as oblation in the said sacrifice: *tām niṣṭhitām baddhakaṭām dṛṣtvā rāma sudarśanām / śuśrūṣamāṇamekāgram idaṃ vacanamavravīt // aiṇeyam māṃsamāhṛtya sālām yakṣyāmahe vayam / mṛgaṃ hatvānaya kṣipraṃ lakṣmaṇeḥa śubhekṣaṇa // atha cikṣepa saumitriḥ samiddhe jātavedasi / sa lakṣmaṇaḥ kṛṣṇamṛgaṃ hatvā medhyam pratāpavān //* (Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, Verse no. 65.21-22, and 26) Moreover, when Bharata along with his ministers and soldiers came to Daṇḍakāraṇya in order to implore Rāma for returning to Ayodhyā; the sage Bharadvāja (at whose hermitage Bharata had met Rāma), by virtue of his supernatural powers, created for these soldiers lakes full of the intoxicating drink maireya, and heaps of roasted meats of deer, peacocks and cocks: *vāpyo maireyapūrṇāśca mṛṣṭamāṃsacayairvṛtāḥ/ prataptair paṭharaiścāpi mārgamāyūrakukkuṭaiḥ //* (Vālmikīrāmāyaṇa, Ayodhyākāṇḍa, Verse no. 92.70).

One possible source of Freschi's view that the sentence “*pañca pañcanakhā*” etc. restricts one's appetite only to the meat of the five creatures like rabbit etc., may be the following sentence in *Paspaśāhnika* of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*—“.....*bhakṣyaniyamena abhakṣyapraṭiṣedho gamyate. 'pañca pañcanakhā bhakṣyāḥ' ityukte gamyate etat – 'ato'nye' bhakṣyā' iti*”; the last part of which apparently means that all animals other than these five specified animals are unfit for consumption. But that this is not the case is clear from the commentary *Rājalakṣmī* on this sentence, viz. “*pañcanakhāḥ – godhākūrmaprabhṛtayaḥ smṛtāvuktāḥ. ato'nye – pañcātirikṭāḥ pañcanakhāḥ*”, which means that the restriction concerned applies only to five-nailed animals like cats etc. that are other than rabbits etc. (*Mahābhāṣya* with several commentaries, edited by Guruprasad Shastri, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan, New Delhi, Vol.I, 39-40) This is further fortified by the next two sentences of *Mahābhāṣya*, viz. “*abhakṣyapraṭiṣedhena vā bhakṣyaniyamah, tadyathā – 'abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ, abhakṣyāḥ grāmyasūkaraḥ' ityukte gamyate etat – 'āranyo bhakṣya' iti*”; which states that from the prohibition ‘domesticated boars and domesticated cocks should not be eaten’, it follows that wild boars and wild cocks are fit to be eaten. Neither the boar nor the cock is five-nailed.

The most explicit statement in this regard is found in *Manusamhitā* (verse no. 5.18), where in addition to the statement that among the five-nailed animals, only five (viz. rabbit etc.) are fit to be eaten, it is also stated that with the exception of camels, animals like goats, sheep, deer etc. that have only one row of teeth, are animals whose meat is fit to be eaten : *śvāvidhaṃ śalyakaṃ godhām khaḍgikūrmaśaśāṃstathā / bhakṣyān pañcanakheṣvāhuranuṣṭrāṇścaikatodataḥ //*. Here also, animals like goats etc. do not belong to the group of five types of five-nailed animals. Besides, the import of the sentence ‘*pañca pañcanakhāḥ*’ etc. is not that eating the meat of these five types of animals is mandatory, because one who abhors the eating of meat as such may desist from eating the meat of these animals without violating the scriptures. (Manu has said quite categorically (verse no. 5.56) that while the eating of the meat that is fit for consumption is not censurable (*na māṃsa- bhakṣaṇe doṣaḥ*), desisting from eating meat produces great merit (*nivṛttistu mahāphalā*)). Thus the words “are to be eaten” in

the translation of Freschi are somewhat misleading — “may be eaten” or “are fit to be eaten” would be a better rendering, which would mean that the consumption of the meat of these animals is optional, and hence, not prohibited, and thus does not incur any sin that calls for expiation.

Freschi states that, “The Veda is an instrument of knowledge about what one ought to do, because it prescribes something to be done instead of describing a state of affairs. It is thus a collection of commands” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 157). While the Vedas contain a lot of commands, they contain also something else, some of them being descriptions. The Vedic sentences can be initially divided into two parts: (i) *Mantras* and (ii) *Brāhmaṇas* (*mantrabrāhmaṇayor vedanāmadheyam*), the second part also containing the sub-sections like *Āraṇyakas* and *Upaniṣads*. The commands mentioned above are usually found in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion. Alternatively, the Vedic sentences may be divided into five groups: (i) *mantra* (the hymns to be recited at rituals); (ii) *vidhi* (injunctions or instructions about what is to be done); (iii) *niṣedha* (prohibitions, i.e. instructions about what is to be avoided); (iv) *arthavāda* (sentences that are either laudatory i.e. statements that praise the recommended action, or deprecatory i.e. statements that denigrate the actions that are prohibited); and (v) *nāmadheya* (sentences that state the names of rituals). (Some authors have treated prohibitions as negative injunctions, and included them under commands; but authors like Śomeśvara Bhaṭṭa have pointed out in works like *Nyāyasudhā*, a commentary on the *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila, the basic distinctions between *vidhi* and *niṣedha*.) Again, in *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.64, *arthavāda*-s have been divided into four groups: (i) *stuti*; (ii) *nindā*; (iii) *parakṛti*; and (iv) *purākalpa*. The first and second of these are respectively the laudatory and denigratory statements mentioned earlier, the third one states how a certain group of priests perform the prescribed ritual in a different manner, and the fourth one states how the prescribed action is being performed from ancient times. Many of the *Upaniṣads* contain a number of stories, where one finds a lot of sentences that are not injunctive or prescriptive in nature. Thus, it is not proper to say that the Vedas are only collections of commands. It is, however, a fact that according to both the sub-schools of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, sentences like *mantra*, *arthavāda*, *nāmadheya* etc. are significant *only* in so far as they can be connected in some way or other to some prescriptions or prohibitions (*vidhinā tvekavākyatvāt stutyarthena vidhīnām syuḥ* – *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.7).

Freschi says that, “Given that the Veda is the *only* source of morality, one might expect the Veda to prescribe only rituals having objectives that are clearly acceptable, such as sons and cattle, and that it would avoid prescribing rituals where results run against the very Vedic rules. In fact, since the Veda.... is the *only* source of ethical norms, how can it prescribe one to do something which it prohibits elsewhere?” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 158-159). After raising this question, Freschi has shown how the Vedic injunction “*śyenena abhicaran yajeta*” (*Ṣaḍviṃśabrāhmaṇa* 4.2.1.1) cannot be treated as an example of the Veda commanding one to do something morally reprehensible, even though the *śyena* sacrifice is supposed to result in the death of some enemy of the beneficiary of that sacrifice. This injunction is supposed to be incompatible with the prohibition “one should not cause any harm to any living being”

(*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*), which cannot, however, be found in any extant Vedic text. Freschi provides the standard answer given here in the texts of Pūrva -Mīmāṃsā. Here, two things are to be noted. The first is that according to the texts of Dharmaśāstra, there are various sources from which one can know what is moral, and what is immoral, the Vedas being *only one* of such sources, even though it has the highest authority in matters regarding *dharma* and *adharma*. Apart from the Vedas, the *Smṛti* texts, the conduct of people conversant with the Vedas, the practices of honest persons, and one's own conscience (or self-satisfaction unaccompanied by a sense of guilt or remorse) can also be such sources. The following two verses from *Manusmṛhitā* and *Yājñavalkyasmṛhitā* mention these sources: (i) *vedo 'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiṣile ca tadvidāṃ/ ācāraścaiva sādḥūnāmātmanastuṣṭireva ca* // (*Manusmṛhitā* 2.6); (ii) *śrutiḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyamātmanah / samyaksaṃkalpajo kāmō dharmamūlamidaṃ smṛtaṃ* // (*Yājñavalkyasmṛhitā* 1.7). Such *Smṛti* passages contain an echo of the following words of *Taittirīyopaniṣad* 1.11.2-4: *yānyavadyāni karmāṇi. tāni sevitavyāni. no itarāṇi. yānyasmākaṃ sucaritāni. tāni tvayopāsyāni. no itarāṇi..... atha yadi te karmavicikitsā vā vṛttavicikitsā vā syāt. ye tatra yuktā āyuktāḥ. alūkṣā dharmakāmāḥ syuḥ. yathā te tatra varteran. tathā tatra vartethāḥ* ("Whatever deeds are blameless, they are to be practiced, not others. Whatever good practices there are among us, they are to be adopted by you, not others..... Then, if there be in you any doubt regarding any deeds, any doubt regarding conduct, you should behave yourself in such matters, as the Brāhmanas there, who are competent to judge, devoted to good deeds, not led by others, not harsh, lovers of virtue, would behave in such cases.") (translation by S. Radhakrishnan). So far as the prohibition "*na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*" is concerned, one can find such a prohibition in a modified manner in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.15.1 ("*ahiṃsan sarvabhūtāni anyatra tūrthebhyah*"), which prohibits the killing of animals, with the exceptions of the killings involved in sacrifices. Besides, in some editions of the *Mahābhārata*, the line "*na hiṃsyāt*" etc. occurs in Vanaparvan (212.34.37).

Timalsina. The paper by Timalsina justifiably emphasizes the fact that "the historical context in which the issue of agency emerges in Advaita is different from the contemporary discourse on agency and free will" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 187), even though there may be some similarity between the arguments employed in those two traditions. The first reason thereof is the fact that the Advaita Vedāntins admit the law of *karma*, even though for them it does not entail the lack of agency on the part of the individual. Consequently, "whether the events experienced in this life are the consequences of past actions, or are determined by a free will acting in the present time is a complex issue" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 187). Besides, like the Mādhyamika Buddhists, "Śāṅkara also describes reality in two tiers, consisting of the conventional (*vyavahārika*) reality that corresponds to our phenomenal experiences, and the absolute (*pāramārthika*) reality of Brahman" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188), and that the issue of agency arises only at the level of phenomenal reality. But Śāṅkara "rejects the paradigm of agent and action when postulating the absolute viewpoint.....his is not a case of either free will or determinism: it is a compromise between free will and a mild

determinism that is based on the karmic residue of an agent's previous actions that were affected with his own free will" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188).

There are, however, some remarks in this paper which may be disputed. Thus, Timalsina says, "Similar to the Mādhyamika BuddhistsŚaṅkara adopts the model of describing reality in two tiers, consisting of the conventional (*vyāvahārika*) reality that corresponds to our phenomenal experiences and the absolute (*pāramārthika*) reality of the Brahman" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 188). Here, it may be noted that while *vyāvahārika sattā* or empirical /conventional reality is accorded to objects of our experience that are sublated or cancelled by the direct experience (*aparokṣānubhūti*) of *Brahman*, and absolute reality (*pāramārthika sattā*) is admitted in the case of *Brahman*, a third type of reality, known as *prātibhāsika sattā* is accepted by Advaita Vedāntins in the case of illusory objects. These are not fictional like sky-flower, since they are experienced, and they subsist only during their appearance (*pratibhāsa*).

Timalsina says, "Śaṅkara maintains that the wisdom imparted by the Upaniṣadic sentences such as "you are that" suffices to grant liberation independent of performing rituals or any actions for that matter" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 189). While it is true that such a view is acceptable for the adherents of the Vivaraṇa school, i.e. those who admit the views of Prakāśātmayati, which admits the possibility of such 'great sentences' (*mahāvākyas*) producing direct awareness (*aparokṣānubhava*) of the self in its pure nature, this view is not admitted by Vācaspati Miśra, for whom the purified mind (*manas/antaḥkaraṇa*) produces the immediate knowledge of self, and the followers of Maṇḍana Miśra like Vidyāraṇya Muni admit that the real nature of self is grasped through contemplative practices that are known as *nididhyāsana* or *prasaṃkhyāna*. Thus it is a bit difficult to determine the exact view of Śaṅkara in this matter. This entire debate arises out of the interpretation of the statement in *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* that 'one should 'see' the self by means of hearing, ratiocination and contemplation" (*ātmā vāre draṣṭavyaḥ śrotāvyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*" (2.4.5, 4.5.6)), and an unidentified Smṛti verse "*śrotavyaḥ śrutivākyabhyah mantavyaścopapathibhiḥ / matvā ca satataṃ dhyeya ete darśanahetavaḥ*". Besides, the purified mind and contemplative practice have been said to result in the direct awareness of self in Upaniṣadic passages like "*eṣo 'nuratma cetasā veditavyaḥ*" (*Muṇḍaka Up.*3.1.9); "*eṣa sarveṣu bhuteṣu gūḍho ātmā na prakāśate / dr̥śyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣma-darśibhiḥ*" (*Kaṭha Up.*1.3.12) "*te dhyānayogānugatā apaśyan devātmaśaktiṃ svagunairni-gūḍhām*." (*Śvetāśvatara Up.*1.3); "*adhyātmayogādhigamena devaṃ matvā dhīro harṣaśokau jahāti*" (*Kaṭha Up.*1.2.12) etc. Timalsina has not stated where these alternative doctrines have been clearly rejected by Śaṅkara. In fact, Vācaspati Miśra has quoted a sentence from Śaṅkara's *Gītābhāṣya* in favour of his view.

Timalsina says, "What exists in reality is just *Brahman* or the self. This self, due to forgetting its real nature, imagines itself both as agent and effects: The phenomenal world, or the reality as we see it, is the creation or imagination of the self" (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 189). This virtually equates the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta with the view known as *Dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*, where the individual self is said to be the creator of the world inhabited by it. Even though Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has admitted that this view is the

principal doctrine of Advaita Vedānta, Timalisina has not given any evidence in favour of the view that this has been admitted by Śaṅkara.

Timalisina says, “Advaita maintains that *Brahman* and the phenomenal self are identical in essence. This being the case, if there were any creation, the phenomenal self could then be considered the autonomous personal creator of the world..... To prevent this conclusion, Śaṅkara responds that the *Brahman* transcends individuality because it is eternally pure, and always in the state of liberation..... One can further argue that the self is the creator with regard to the person who has realized the identity of the self and the *Brahman*, Śaṅkara counter argues, “in that state, what is creation [there?]” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 194-195). Here, one should also notice that Śaṅkara has also composed a small work entitled *Pañcīkaraṇa*, where he has described how the gross objects of this world are made from *avidyā* through a process of quintuplication. The text has been commented on by Sureśvara, a direct disciple of Śaṅkara, and hence this work cannot be treated as spurious. It seems to us that in such cases one should state that for Śaṅkara, the process of creation pertains to entities that have only empirical or phenomenal reality (*vyāvahārika sattā*), but not absolute reality (*pāramārthika sattā*). Again, we find the following sentence: “Furthermore, the agency imposed upon the self is not permanent, as one can see its absence in the deep sleep state, and if the self were *composed* of impermanent properties, this would lead to the impermanence of the self.” (emphasis added) (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 200). What is said here is true to a certain extent. Thus, a cloth that is composed of (or constituted by) a number of impermanent threads is also impermanent. But nobody treats agency etc. as components of the self, or as properties of which the self is composed. One may say that agency etc. are not components of the self, but they are properties that belong to the self; and in that case, the self may be permanent, even though some of its properties may be impermanent; just as *Prakṛti* admitted in the Sāṃkhya system is eternal or permanent, although the properties that it acquires through transformations are impermanent.

Finally, Timalisina says, “According to Sureśvara, the very *Brahman* when conditioned by *avidyā* assumes the collective subjectivity of *Īśvara*, and when conditioned by *buddhi* becomes the phenomenal self” (Dasti & Bryant 2014, 204). This position, however, is not acceptable to many other Advaitins. Sarvajñātman (1027 CE) for instance, rejects the idea that *Īśvara* is pure consciousness delimited by *avidyā*. Pure consciousness, for him, is like the surface, where what is reflected due to *avidyā* is *Īśvara*.” The last sentence of this passage is incorrect. For Sarvajñātman, both *Īśvara* and *jīva* (i.e. individual self) are reflections (*pratibimbās*) of pure consciousness. Their distinction being due to the fact that while *Īśvara* is the reflection of pure consciousness in *avidyā* (*avidyāpratibimbitacaitanya*), *jīva* is reflection of pure consciousness in the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇapra-tibimbitacaitanya*). This has been stated clearly in the following verse of *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka* by Sarvajñātman: *sukṛtaduṣkṛtakarmaṇi kartr̥tām matigatātmaciti-pratibimbakam / vrajati tadvadadaḥ paramātmāno jagati yāti tamaḥpratibimbakam //* (1/327) That according to Sarvajñātman both *jīva* and *Īśvara* are reflections in intellect / internal organ and *avidyā* respectively is clear from the following lines of *Sārasaṃgraha*, Madhusūdana’s commentary on the verse quoted

above: “*yathā puṇyapāpayor jīvabhāvamāpannam antaḥkaraṇe pratibimbacaitanyam eva karṭṛ, ‘kartā śāstrārthavattvād’iti nyāyat. na tacchabalam iti mantavyam, tadvajjagato’pi tamaḥpratibimbakaṃ caitanyameveśvarābhīdhānaṃ karṭṛ bhavati, na tamoviśiṣṭam ityarthah.*” That Sarvajñātman has used here the word ‘*tamas*’ in the sense of *avidyā*, is clear from *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, verse nos. 1/318, 1/319 and the commentaries on them.

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To conclude, as said before, this anthology succeeds in providing the reader with many well-written and illuminating accounts of the views of twelve Indian schools about free will, agency and selfhood. It is a very valuable contribution to the contemporary discussion of these problems across cultures.