1992

The potential for non-violence in South Africa

Steven Max Pyka
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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.gvc8-5ytn>
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The potential for non-violence in South Africa

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San Jose State University, 1992

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THE POTENTIAL FOR NON-VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Political Science

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

By

Steven Max Pyka

May, 1992

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

THE POTENTIAL FOR NON-VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Steven Max Pyka

This thesis addresses the method of non-violence and its applicability to the situation in South Africa. It analyzes the theories on violence and non-violence in order to provide a framework for discussion. It then discusses the key aspects of the situation in South Africa so as to identify the main elements necessary for an effective non-violent campaign.

The research on this subject posits that the non-violent method shows great potential to be effective in South Africa. The work argues for the non-violent method to be executed to its fullest extent before any violent means are initiated.

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the potential of non-violence in South Africa today. The situation in South Africa has been at the crisis level for quite some time now and the potential for serious episodes of violence to break out is very high. The key concern is that many of the frustrated youth of South Africa are seriously considering the use of violent methods to achieve their goals.

Karl Marx once said that, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."¹ It is in that spirit that the thesis is directed towards the frustrated youth of South Africa in an attempt to show that the non-violent method is a viable and effective alternative to violent methods.

Although many histories and biographies describing past non-violent campaigns and leaders are available, there is surprisingly very little literature which analyzes the non-violent method itself. One of these works is Joan Bondurant's Conquest of Violence² which does an excellent job of breaking down the non-violent method of Mohandis K. Gandhi into its various stages and elements. One goal of this thesis is to apply the framework of this brilliant analysis to the situation in South Africa. A second goal is to consider the philosophy of non-violence, as expressed by Mohandis K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King in their various

writings, and apply it to the situation as well.

The thesis is that non-violence shows great potential in South Africa and should be executed to its fullest extent before any violence is initiated. The point is not to say that the people of South Africa do not have a right or a reason to engage in armed struggle for their freedom. If ever a people had a right to fight, it is the people of South Africa. That inalienable right cannot be denied. The point is to show that the non-violent method does possess the capability to achieve the goals of the movement in South Africa.

The first chapter of the thesis will explore the theories on both violence and non-violence. The writings of several theorists, from Karl Marx to Martin Luther King, will be analyzed in order to provide a framework for the thesis. The second chapter will explore key aspects of the situation in South Africa so as to identify the main elements necessary for a successful non-violent campaign. The third chapter will practically apply those main elements to the situation in South Africa so as to show the potential for non-violence to be effective. The third chapter will also analyze the non-violent method from a philosophical perspective.

The passionate hope of this work is that it will add to the reasoned debate as to how to best move forward and achieve true freedom in South Africa.

ENDNOTES

¹Karl Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," Marx and Engels (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1959), p. 245.

²Joan Bondurant, Conquest of Violence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).

CHAPTER 1

THEORIES ON VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE

In this chapter, the theories concerning violent means and non-violent means will be analyzed. The discussion will be of a general nature, for a more specific analysis will be applied in the second chapter, when the particular elements of the situation in South Africa will be considered. The discussion will hinge on the ideas as to why violence is deemed necessary or unnecessary.

Early Theories on Revolutionary Violence

When considering the theories of revolutionary violence, it is imperative to start with the ideas of Karl Marx. The writings of Marx have influenced so many of the revolutions of this century and continue to exert great influence on the Young Lions of many movements today.

Marx felt that the miserable social conditions of his time could only be corrected through the means of revolutionary violence. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Friedrich Engels predict that "society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat."¹ In short, Marx viewed that the bourgeoisie were exploiting the labor of the proletariat by controlling the ownership of the means of production. There is no doubt that at that time in Europe, the working people were greatly exploited, overworked, and underpaid.

Marx stated his prescription for the great social evils of his day at the end of the Communist Manifesto:

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite!²

Why does Marx feel that only by forcible means can the sad social conditions of his day be cured? Since people are alienated from the product of their labor and, therefore, exploited by the bourgeoisie by the ownership of the means of production, the only option left to the exploited people is to violently seize the ownership of the means of production. It is obvious, to Marx, that the bourgeoisie will not, under any conditions, peacefully surrender ownership of the means of production and thereby their position of class oppression and exploitation.

Vladimir Lenin furthers these ideas of the necessity of violence when he states that, "the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is violence against the bourgeoisie," and the necessity of such violence is particularly evoked, as Marx and Engels have repeatedly explained in detail (especially in The Civil War in France and in the introduction to it), by the existence of a military clique and a bureaucracy."³ Lenin also states in The State and Revolution that "formal development, i.e.,

development towards communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat, and cannot do otherwise, for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters cannot be broken by anyone else or in any other way."⁴

Lenin believed that the state was a tool of the ruling class of the bourgeoisie and that this state, backed up by the military, bureaucracy and police, could only be overthrown by a violent revolution. Lenin engaged in a great debate with the two most notable Marxist Revisionists of his day, Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, on the particular means necessary to achieve socialist ends.

Eduard Bernstein believed that the theories of Marx had to be revised for two main reasons. First, Marx's prediction of the increasing impoverishment of the working class creating two distinct economic classes was not taking place. In Germany, in the 1890s, the economy was actually expanding, largely due to further industrialization. The workers' real income was actually increasing. There was also the fact that an increasing middle class was developing and there existed numerous class divisions within the classes due to the wide variance of incomes. This meant that a monolithic proletariat class, with increasing impoverishment, had not developed. Second, those lower classes, which could be considered proletariat, were no longer in the minority as they had been in 1848 when the Communist Manifesto was published.⁵

Bernstein felt that the absence of a monolithic proletariat and the presence of many class divisions, especially the growing middle class, along with increasing real incomes, left little incentive for violent methodologies. People were not going to risk what they then had and hoped to have (with the potential, albeit small, of entering the middle class) through the use of violence. Bernstein stated in the preface of Evolutionary Socialism that:

No one has questioned the necessity for the working classes to gain control of government. The point at issue is between the theory of a social cataclysm and the question whether with the given social development in Germany and the present advanced state of its working classes in the towns and the country, a sudden catastrophe would be desirable in the interest of the social democracy. I have denied it and deny it again, because in my judgment a greater security for lasting success lies in a steady advance than in the possibilities offered by a catastrophic crash.⁶

He further stated in the conclusion that:

Whether the legislative or the revolutionary method is the more promising depends entirely on the nature of the measures and on their relation to different classes and customs of the people.

In general, one may say here that the revolutionary way (always in the sense of revolution by violence) does quicker work as far as it deals with removal of obstacles which a privileged minority places in the path of social progress: that its strength lies on its negative side.

Constitutional legislation works more slowly in this respect as a rule. Its path is usually that of compromise, not the prohibition, but the buying out of acquired rights. But it is stronger than the revolution scheme where prejudice and the limited horizon of the great mass of the people appear as hindrances to social progress, and it offers greater advantages where it is a question of the creation of

permanent economic arrangements capable of lasting; in other words, it is best adapted to positive social-political work.

In legislation, intellect dominates over emotion in quiet times; during a revolution, emotion dominates over intellect.⁷

Bernstein, in effect, has stated that it is possible for the working classes to gain control of the government through peaceful methodologies. Also, that this positive, rather than negative, method has a better chance to achieve and maintain the end goals of socialism. He felt that the Social Democratic Party of Germany could gain power in parliamentary elections and achieve, through social legislation and the help of trade union activism, a socialistic society.

Lenin attacked Bernstein's ideas as naive and unworkable. He stated that:

The experience of alliances, agreements and blocs with social-reformist liberalism in the West and with liberal reformism (the Constitutional-Democrats) in the Russian revolution has convincingly shown that these agreements only blunt the consciousness of the masses, that they do not enhance but weaken the actual significance of their struggle by linking the fighters with the elements who are least capable of fighting and are most vacillating and treacherous. . . .

A natural complement to the economic and political tendencies of revisionism was its attitude to the final aim of the socialist movement. "The movement is everything, the final aim is nothing"--this catch phrase of Bernstein's expresses the substance of revisionism better than many long arguments. To determine its conduct from case to case, to adapt itself to the events of the day and to the chops and changes of petty politics, to forget the basic interests of the proletariat and the main features of the entire capitalist system, of capitalist evolution as a whole; to sacrifice

these basic interests for the real or supposed advantages of the moment--such is the policy of revisionism.⁸

Lenin admonished that it was totally absurd to believe that you could change the capitalist system within the system. He felt Bernstein's methods would fall far short of the true end goals of socialism and for all intents and purposes sell out the true interests of the proletariat.

Karl Kautsky also believed that a socialist society could be achieved both peacefully and through the state. Kautsky did not believe that all private property had to be abolished but only the means of large production. He differentiated the private property of large industry from that of smaller holdings for personal or private use. Therefore, he felt it was possible to nationalize or expropriate the private property of large industry, peacefully, by a state under a Socialist Party government. In Das Erfurter Programm, he states that:

The state will not cease to be a capitalist institution until the proletariat, the working class, has become the ruling class; not until then will it become possible to turn it into a cooperative commonwealth.

From the recognition of this fact is born the aim which the Socialist Party has set before it: to call the working class to conquer the political power to the end that, with its aid, they may change the state into a self-sufficing cooperative commonwealth . . .⁹

He further stated later in the same work that:

It goes without saying that the Socialist Party wishes this unavoidable expropriation of large industry to be effected with as little friction as

possible, in a peaceful way, and with the consent of the whole people.¹⁰

Michael Harrington, in his last work entitled Socialism: Past and Future, claimed that Kautsky in "his stubborn insistence on the democratic character of socialism was true to the Marxist vision and Lenin himself was the deviant."¹¹

Lenin fiercely attacked the idea that the movement towards socialism could be achieved through a democratic state. Lenin pointed out that the democracies of his day were controlled by the bourgeoisie and with so many "restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles for the poor, seem slight, especially in the eyes of one who has never known want himself and has never been in close contact with the oppressed classes in their mass life (and nine-tenths, if not ninety-nine hundredths, of the bourgeois publicists and politicians are of this category); but in their sum total these restrictions exclude and squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy."¹²

Therefore, the proletariat could never achieve power through such a system, that was stacked against them and controlled by the very people they needed to overthrow. Lenin maintained that people like Bernstein and Kautsky "are not socialists at all (a point that we Bolsheviks have always maintained), but petty-bourgeois democrats with

near-socialist phraseology."¹³ Lenin maintained to the end that socialism could only be achieved by violent revolution.

These ideas and debates predated the ideas and experiences of Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, whose ideas will be considered later in this chapter. It is imperative, at this point, to consider the ideas of more recent revolutionary theorists who had to consider and respond to the non-violent alternatives.

Modern Theories on Revolutionary Violence

In one of the most quoted thoughts on revolutionary violence, Mao Tse-Tung stated:

Every Communist must grasp the truth, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.¹⁴

This statement and the theory behind it has been very influential on modern revolutionists around the world. Mao, like Lenin, believed that the state was the tool of the capitalist class and that the modern states possessed large armies which helped maintain the rule of that capitalist class. Since armies can only be defeated by force of arms, the proletariat could achieve power only by violently defeating the armies of the capitalist-controlled states.

These basic tenets of Marxist revolutionary theory flourished in the Third World. One of the most influential spokesmen of third world revolutionaries was Frantz Fanon. Fanon was a psychiatrist as well as a revolutionary, and, as such, he developed many particularly

keen insights on the ideas of revolutionary violence. To Fanon, violence was an absolute necessity for several key reasons.

Fanon states in The Wretched of the Earth that for the oppressed, "there is no compromise, no possible coming to terms; colonization and decolonization are simply a question of relative strength. The exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost."¹⁵

The entire system of colonialism is enforced by violence so this system can only be destroyed "when confronted with greater violence."¹⁶ Therefore, "the destruction of the colonial world is no more and no less than the abolition of one zone, its burial in the depths of the earth or its expulsion from the country."¹⁷

More importantly, beyond echoing previous concepts on the practical reasons for revolutionary violence, Fanon explored for deep individual, psychological reasons. In this context, Fanon's most important contribution appeared in his idea of regenerative violence. Fanon stated that, "At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self respect."¹⁸ By striking back and destroying the system, and more importantly the guilty individual perpetrators, who had stripped the oppressed of their

dignity and sense of self-worth, could the individual regain his identity as a self-respecting human being.

Fanon further felt at the individual level that violence was the only way for the oppressed man to realize his freedom. He stated that, "Violence is thus seen as comparable to a royal pardon. The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence."¹⁹

At the collective level, Fanon posited that these individual realizations coalesce in the oppressed peoples and, therefore, imbues them with higher qualities, unites them, and leads them to a clearer understanding of social truths. He stated that:

But it so happens that for the colonized people this violence, because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning. The groups recognize each other and the future nation is already indivisible. The armed struggle mobilizes the people; that is to say, it throws them in one way and in one direction.²⁰

He further stated that:

Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving; and down at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time.²¹

Therefore, Fanon fiercely held that only through violence could both the practical collective needs and the psychological individual needs of the masses be truly satisfied. It is no wonder that, with these keen psychological insights, Fanon is held in such high esteem by many in the Third World today. The masses can clearly relate to his brilliant understandings.

There are many who agree with Fanon that the methods of nonviolence fall far short of the desired ends. In the very preface of The Wretched of the Earth, Jean-Paul Sarte viciously attacked the means, ends, and motives of nonviolence when he stated that:

Try to understand this at any rate: if violence began this very evening and if exploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth, perhaps the slogans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But if the whole regime, even your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by a thousand-year-old oppression, your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppression.²²

Therefore, it is imperative that two key concerns of violent revolutionary theory must be satisfactorily addressed by non-violent theory in order for it to be considered as a viable alternative. First, the collective practical concerns of the reality of the social condition as clearly addressed by the classical and modern revolutionary theorists. Second, the individual psychological concerns of the oppressed as so brilliantly elucidated by Frantz Fanon.

Theories on Non-Violence

There are those who claim to have found an alternative path, to that of violence, in the struggle to achieve human freedom and individual dignity. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King theorized on and practiced the non-violent method. At this point, it is imperative to consider the ideas of these two great men and to take a deeper look at their method. Gandhi named the method Satyagraha and it offers an alternative method, one in which all are allowed to regain their dignity as human beings.

The supreme irony of this method is that it was born in South Africa and has now come full circle back to South Africa. The name Satyagraha first appeared when the Indians in South Africa were looking for a name for Mohandas K. Gandhi's passive resistance method. Someone suggested "Sadagraha," which means firmness in a good cause. Gandhi stated that he "liked the word, but it did not fully represent the whole idea I wished it to connote. I therefore corrected it to 'Satyagraha'. Satya (truth) implies love, and agraha (firmness) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force. I thus began to call the Indian movement 'Satyagraha', that is to say, the force which is born of truth and love or non-violence."²³

Gandhi studied in England and was obviously influenced by both Eastern and Western traditions and ideas.

Intellectually, he admitted being influenced by the ideas of Henry David Thoreau on civil disobedience. In support of the idea of civil disobedience, Thoreau stated, "If the injustice has a spring, or a pulley, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn."²⁴ He further stated that, "Under a government which prisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison."²⁵ Thoreau was in effect saying that it is a moral duty to disobey and struggle against, even at the threat of jail, unjust and immoral laws.

Theologically, Gandhi was a Hindu and was greatly influenced by his religion. He was particularly influenced by a Gujarati didactic stanza which "gripped my mind and heart. It's precept--return good for evil--became my guiding principle. it became such a passion with me that I began numerous experiments in it. Here are those (for me) wonderful lines:

For a bowl of water give a goodly meal;
For a kindly greeting bow thou down with zeal;
For a simple penny pay thou back with gold;
If thy life be rescued, life do not withhold;
Thus the words and actions of the wise regard;

Every little service tenfold they reward;
 But the truly noble know all men as one;
 And return with gladness good for evil done."²⁶

Gandhi was also greatly influenced by the teachings of Jesus Christ. Gandhi wrote, "the New Testament produced a different impression, especially the Sermon on the Mount which went straight to my heart. I compared it with the gita. The verses, 'But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man take away thy coat let him have thy cloak too,' delighted me beyond measure and put me in mind of Shamal Bhatt's 'for a bowl of water, give a goodly meal,' etc. My young mind tried to unify the teaching of the gita, the Light of Asia, and the Sermon on the Mount."²⁷ Gandhi synthesized some of the best ideas and beliefs of both the Eastern and Western worlds when he formed his method of Satyagraha.

There are three precepts to the idea of Satyagraha; the first of which is the concept of truth. Gandhi further stated that, "Satyagraha is not predominantly civil disobedience, but a quiet and irresistible pursuit of truth. On the rarest occasions, it becomes civil disobedience. But conscious and willing obedience must . . . precede it."²⁸ At this point, the idea of Satyagraha seems very dogmatic, for who is to know exactly what the actual truth is without applying one's personal bias. Gandhi realized that he and his followers had to deal with the real world so he set up

an objective standard by which an act or law could be deemed wrong and therefore illegitimate. When he said, "The wrong act must be potent, accepted as such by all and spiritually harmful, and the doer must be aware of it, . . . There should be no room for doubt in regard to the fault,"²⁹ he was in effect saying that one did not have to engage in highly epistemological debates to determine which acts were wrong when it is an obvious clear cut decision. One does not need to see the "truth" written in the sky or carved in the stone by the hand of God to realize that such conditions as colonialism, segregation, and apartheid are clearly and morally wrong.

Martin Luther King further developed this idea when he wrote in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail" that:

The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with Saint Augustine that 'an unjust law is no law at all.' A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the Law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: 'An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.'³⁰

By this standard set down by Gandhi and King, one can realize the "truth" or the existence of a patently wrong,

unjust condition and through the non-violent method, struggle to change it.

The second precept is ahisma, which means non-violence and it is the means in which to achieve change. Gandhi stated that, "ahisma is the means; truth is the end,"³¹ and he constantly emphasized and insisted on strict adherence to non-violent means. Gandhi felt that since man could not prove the truth or the ends, he could not justify in any way the use of violence, and, in this respect, the only way the truth or ends could be justified was by the non-violent method. Gandhi further stated that, "Satyagraha is soul force pure and simple, and whenever and to whatever extent there is room for the use of arms or physical force or brute force, there and to that extent is there so much less possibility for soul force. These are purely antagonistic forces in my view."³² Non-violence, then, must be strictly adhered to in order to justify the desired ends and to reach those ends by not lowering oneself to the means of the oppressor.

The third precept is tapasya or self-suffering, which must be emphasized here as an act of courage and not of cowardice. Gandhi stated that, "He who has not overcome all fear cannot practice non-violence,"³³ and by this meant that it takes much more courage to be non-violent than to be violent. He also felt it necessary for he felt, "that it results in the long run in the least loss of life."³⁴ It is

this idea of self-suffering that is the most foreign of the precepts of Satyagraha to the 'Western mind' since it seems to directly clash with our idea of the dignity of the individual. However, it must be remembered that the truth or the ends desired is directly concerned with the dignity of the individual. It is also felt to be much more dignified to use non-violent means than to revert to the violent means of the oppressor.

King felt self-suffering was more dignified when he stated that, "Our defense is to meet every set of violence toward an individual negro with the fact that there are thousands of others who will present themselves in his place as potential victims. . . . This dynamic unity, this amazing self-respect, this willingness to suffer, and this refusal to hit back will soon cease the oppressor to become ashamed of his own methods."³⁵

The non-violent method is the only moral means to achieve the desired ends and is therefore instrumental in focusing attention on the immoral means of the oppressor (which, when coupled with the powerful effect of the modern news media, can be crucial in the achieving of the eventual results).

There are three stages or steps to be taken when conducting a campaign through this method. The first step is the attempt at persuasion through reason, which is self-explanatory. The second step is the act of self-suffering

in an attempt to both dramatize the issues and to get to the oppressor's unprejudiced judgment as a human being. Of course, these first two steps are not always and usually won't be successful, which leads to the third step referred to as non-violent coercion.

This idea of non-violent or positive coercion, through non-cooperation or civil disobedience, is one of the most crucial elements of the Satyagraha method. It is an attempt to get the oppressor to realize that it is in his own best interests to meet the movement's demands than to suffer the consequences of the acts of either non-cooperation or civil disobedience (which could include boycotts, strikes, or demonstrations, etc.). The consequences could lead to a clogging up of the government's judicial system or a strangulation of the oppressor's economic profits or both. It is at this stage that the threat of violence is present, but if violence does take place, it is instigated by the oppressor who feels most threatened at this stage. The tension that leads to any violence is a tension that has already existed and is not the invention of the movement.

As Martin Luther King said, "Actually, we who engage in non-violent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its

ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured."³⁶ The irony of non-violence is that the third stage of non-violent coercion is almost always necessary, which in turn almost always leads to the presence of violence, which seems to say that some degree of violence is needed for the non-violent method to work. This admittedly, in most cases, is true and both Gandhi and King realized it. However, it must be pointed out that the level of violence is of a much lesser degree than would be so if out and out violence were employed as the means. In both Gandhi's movements in South Africa and India and King's campaigns in the South, the method of violence would have led to a much higher degree of human suffering and may not have necessarily led to the achievement of the goals that were so reached through non-violence. The non-violent method is, in this sense, much preferable to any violent method, for it does lead to less human suffering and it does achieve results.

Erik H. Erikson, in his psychoanalytical treatise on Gandhi's method entitled Gandhi's Truth, claims that the strength of Satyagraha lies in its ability to overcome the base effects of the Pseudo-Species Mentality of humankind. This mentality leads people to identify with particular groups and to feel a sense of superiority over other groups

to the extent that these other groups must be, in some way, kept in their place at some inferior position.³⁷ Erikson claims that Gandhi's method "refused, then to permit that cumulative aggravation of bad conscience, negative identity, and hypocritical moralism which characterizes the division of men into pseudo-species."³⁸ The point of the non-violent method is not to identify further divisions of humankind, but to help unite the divisions that already exist, so that people can identify with and relate to each other as equals. All this to give the opponent in a given movement the "courage to change."³⁹

It is important to realize that Gandhi was not a political theorist and therefore never identified the end system. The absolute truth or the ends could not be realized by humankind. The non-violent method is a dialectical process which identifies the means by which the true end should be approached. Both Gandhi and King were more concerned with the present practical social needs of humankind and not with ideal theoretical constructs of the end system.

This is the key point at which the left critiques the non-violent method. As stated earlier, Fanon, felt that non-violence at best would lead to some readaption with a few reforms. Sarte went even further to claim that those who follow non-violence are for all intents and purposes in the camp of the oppressors. The non-violent dialectic is

seen as a basically gradualism process that cannot lead to the great changes needed to cure the true evils of society.

The redemptive non-violence of Gandhi and King can be seen as the antithesis to the regenerative violence of Fanon. The non-violent method attempts to raise the morale level of the oppressor up to that of the masses, while the violent method attempts to raise the political and economic level of the masses up to that of the oppressor.

Conclusion

The theories of violence and non-violence have been analyzed so as to identify the key ideas and concerns of both sides of the debate. The thesis that non-violent methods can achieve the great changes needed in South Africa today can be defended only by addressing the concerns and critiques stated by the theorists on violence. Simply stated, can the non-violent method achieve the great changes necessary in South Africa, so as to meet the practical collective needs and the psychological individual needs of the people as addressed by the theorists on violence? Before addressing this question in detail, it is imperative to analyze the present situation in South Africa.

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CHAPTER 2

KEY ASPECTS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

In this chapter, key aspects of the present political and economic environment of South Africa will be discussed and analyzed. For practical purposes, the discussion will address the situation as of November 22, 1991. First, the political situation will be addressed and, second, the economic condition will be considered. The third chapter will apply the ideas of non-violence to the realities of the situation in South Africa and address the concerns of the theorists on violence.

The General Political System and Military Power of South Africa

It is imperative to first take a brief look at the political system and the military strength of the government of South Africa.

The South Africa Constitution of 1983 gives no civil rights to blacks. The national government in South Africa consists of a Parliamentary system with three chambers: a white House of Assembly, with 178 MPs, a so-called colored House of Representatives with 85 MPs, and an Indian House of Delegates with 45 mps. The State President of South Africa is technically chosen by a college of 88 members (50 white, 25 colored, and 13 Indian), but he is essentially the leader of the majority party in the white House of Assembly. Also,

technically, each chamber can legislate for the so-called "Own Affairs" of its community, but it is up to the State President to determine what constitutes an "Own Affair," as distinguished from a "General Affair," which falls within the greatly expanded authoritarian power of the State President. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the real power exists in the hands of the State President.¹

There are four provinces within South Africa (Natal, Orange Free State, Cape Province, and the Transvaal), each of which has a provincial council. However, the provincial administrations are appointed by the central government for a period of five years and are strictly subservient to the national government.

There is a theoretically independent judiciary in South Africa, but the courts have always recognized parliamentary supremacy and the Supreme Court cannot declare acts of parliament unconstitutional. This creates a situation where if a group does win a civil or human rights case in court, then all the government has to do is simply change the law. There are also no habeas corpus rights for blacks in South Africa.²

The government of South Africa has an insidious reputation for political assassinations. Since 1977, there have been 49 political assassinations, 160 assassination attempts, and 10 abductions, with not one of these cases being solved by the government.³

The military situation is another major problem in the path towards freedom in South Africa. The active military forces have about 110,000 members and the reserves have 317,000 members. The national police of the country has about 56,000 members. In South Africa, both the national troops and police are frequently used to quell any movement programs. It is also an acknowledged fact that South Africa has nuclear weapons and the means of 200 aircraft and some missiles to deliver them.⁴

White Politics of South Africa

As stated, the actual power in South Africa is concentrated in the hands of State President F. W. de Klerk. He became the leader of the National Party and State President in February of 1989. In the elections held in September of that same year, the National Party maintained their majority in the white chamber. However, they lost nearly one-fourth of their 123 seats, with 13 of the 30 lost seats going to the Democratic Party, and the other 17 seats to the Conservative Party. The National Party ended up with 93 seats, the Democratic Party with 33 seats, and the Conservative Party with 39 seats. The National Party came very close to losing more seats in 18 races, where the NP candidate beat the Conservative with fewer than 1,000 votes.⁵

President de Klerk's party lost more ground, and came close to losing even more, to the right than to the left.

There is also the problem that many more of the National Party members are leaning to the right as well. The main point to understand here is that, with all else equal, the present political balance will put much more pressure on de Klerk to move to the right than to the left. It will take an enormous amount of pressure from the left to shift the balance and push the momentum towards the left. Those who argued in the United States and other countries to prematurely lift the sanctions did not, or did not care to, understand this fairly obvious situation.

The pressure from the right on de Klerk can be seen from his administration's covert attempts to fund the Inkatha Freedom Party and its associated trade union, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). Inkatha received two payments, totalling \$87,000, in November of 1989 and March of 1990. These payments coincided with two large Inkatha rallies which were held shortly after ANC mass rallies. The de Klerk administration is obviously attempting to further the rift between the ANC and Inkatha and to propel Inkatha to a position as a viable alternative to the ANC. However, with the scandal that has followed the public disclosure of those payments, this strategy has backfired and restored the ANC to the position as the leading spokesman for the black majority. Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok and Defense Minister Magnus Malan were demoted to lower positions in the de Klerk cabinet as a

result. The United Workers Union of South Africa had also been paid about \$525,000 over a five-year period.⁶

There is a serious concern that there exists a so-called "Third Force" in South Africa, consisting of right wing reactionary elements among the police, the military, commercial farmers, and white blue-collar workers.⁷ It is feared that these elements are a well-organized cohesive power that is both bringing great pressure on de Klerk and further instigating violence between the ANC and Inkatha. Even though there is no absolute evidence of the existence of this third force, it does follow, from the situation of the far right, that such a force would likely exist. The right wing knows that if they overtly take over power by a coup, that the armed struggle would almost assuredly resume immediately and that international economic sanctions would almost certainly be reimposed. It follows that the best strategy for the right would be to covertly operate behind the scenes. This creates an added pressure on the de Klerk administration from the right.

The effects of this pressure from the right can be seen in the very gradual change that has occurred so far in the first two years of de Klerk's administration. It is true that de Klerk has repealed many of the insidious Apartheid Acts, including the Group Areas Act and Land Act (both repealed on June 5, 1991) and the Population Registration Act (repealed June 17, 1991).⁸ However, these actions are

basically of a cosmetic nature, changing the face of things, but not dealing with the key issues of the black majority. These, most importantly, include the vote, desegregation of schools, and equal economic opportunity.

The de Klerk administration's latest proposal for a future governmental structure shows that he has no real intention of allowing real majority rule to materialize. De Klerk's proposal, released at a recent convention of the National Party, would have racially integrated structures of government at local, regional and national levels. The present tricameral Parliament would be replaced by a bicameral Parliament, where one body would have seats allocated to political parties on the basis of the number of votes received and the second body would have representatives elected from nine newly-created regional councils. This second body would have the authority to veto legislation from the first body. The Office of President would be replaced by a three- to five-member council drawn from the most prominent political parties. The plan would include a bill of human rights and an independent judiciary.⁹

This proposal is clearly unsatisfactory, for by simply gerrymandering several of the regional councils to favor whites, it would give the white politicians in the second body of Parliament effective veto power on any major changes. The three- to five-member executive council would

further dilute and divide the power of the black majority. It is clear from de Klerk's actions that he is both being greatly pressured and influenced from the right.

Black Politics in South Africa

Nelson Mandela, in reacting to the above-stated plan for a future government by de Klerk, stated that: "The National Party proposals are a recipe for disaster, designed to deny a future South African government the power to truly liberate the country from the misery that Apartheid has wrung."¹⁰

There are two key aspects of Black Politics in South Africa that need to be addressed. One is the situation within the African National Congress and the other is the relationship between the ANC and other major black organizations.

The ANC is clearly the preeminent black political organization in South Africa, especially after the "Inkathagate" disclosures. However, the ANC cannot claim yet to represent a majority of the black population and faces challenges from the right by Inkatha and from the left by the Pan-Africanist Congress and other left wing organizations such as the Azanian Peoples Organization.

In July of 1991, the ANC held its first national conference within South Africa in three decades. At that meeting, more than 2,000 delegates voted in a more moderate leadership than had existed during the many years of exile.

Nelson Mandela was elected unopposed as the new President of the ANC to replace the ailing Oliver Tambo. More significantly, moderates beat out more radical opponents for the positions of secretary general and deputy president. Cyril Ramaphosa, leader of the National Union of Mine-workers, defeated the previous secretary general, Alfred Nzo, for that position. Walter Sisulu defeated Harry Gwala, a hard-line communist, by a wide four-to-one margin. Altogether, radical candidates opposing peaceful negotiation garnished a little over twenty percent of the vote.¹¹ However, it is imperative to understand that on the front lines of the struggle, and particularly among the youth of the ANC, the radical element has much more influence and that influence is growing stronger. Youths in the townships are understandably very angry and tired of talk of peaceful negotiation. One such young lion, Azhar Cachalia, stated this condition in these words:

Coming from our townships, young people who have been on the cutting edge of the struggle and brutalized by the system are prone to working to solve political problems in the same way they have experienced these problems--by violence.¹²

Many of these youths have just in the last few years rejoined the ranks of the ANC, after spending much of the 70s and early 80s, particularly during and after the Soweto crisis in 1976, with various Black Consciousness organizations. The Pan African Congress is attempting to recruit many of these angry youths to their ranks. One

recent flyer passed out in the townships by the PAC stated:

Negotiation will not result in fundamental change!! Revolution is the only hope of the hopeless! The lie that the negotiating table is another arena of the struggle must be rejected for what it is. The negotiation table is more than a facility to trade concessions and compromises. Therefore, what we did not achieve in the battlefield we could not hope to achieve at the negotiating table.¹³

This situation puts the ANC in a position where they have to appear to the youth to be making realistic headway through peaceful negotiations or risk losing many of the youths to the PAC or even losing control of the young lions within their own organization.

The great break between the PAC and the ANC took place in late 1958 for the particular reason that the Africanists were diametrically opposed to the concept of multiracialism as espoused in the Freedom Charter of the ANC. This break led to the founding of the PAC in April of 1959. Robert Sobukwe, the first president of the PAC and an ex-member of the ANC, and the other Africanists felt that whites should be given no role in the revolutionary movement. They felt that the white liberals had ulterior motives of protecting their own interests and that their inclusion would "perpetuate the psychological subservience and dependency on whites upon which minority domination rested."¹⁴

The PAC further argued that since the great contradiction in South Africa was a racial one, then it could only be resolved by a racial conflict with the lines

clearly drawn between blacks and whites.¹⁵ There were also several ideological and strategic differences between the PAC and the ANC.

This break between the two organizations led very shortly to disastrous consequences at Sharpeville in March of 1960. The PAC purposefully chose to use provocative actions, at the same time that the ANC was launching a massive nationwide anti-pass campaign, in order to both preempt and disrupt the strategy of the ANC.¹⁶ These provocative actions gave the police the excuse they had been looking for and led to 300 police shooting at a crowd of 5,000 at Sharpeville. Sixty-nine people were brutally killed and another 180 were wounded. Most of those wounded were shot in the back as they attempted to flee the murderous police fire. This event did not, however, lead to serious outbreaks of violence elsewhere, as many in the PAC had hoped.

The PAC has never developed to anywhere near the size and strength of the ANC, mostly due to internal factional warfare. At the height of its power, its military wing, POQO, could field only about 300 fighters, as compared to the 8,000 fighters of Umkhonto we Sizwe or MK, the military wing of the ANC, could field.¹⁷ There has always been a good deal of jealousy felt by the PAC over the ANC's superior strength and position and, until recently, practically no consultation or cooperation took place

between the two.

There does appear to be some light at the end of the tunnel within the last year. In February of 1991, two important events took place. First, senior ANC and PAC leaders marched together in several demonstrations. Walter Sisulu of the ANC and PAC President Clarence Makeweto marched hand-in-hand in Pretoria as did ANC executive member Joe Slovo and PAC vice president Dikgang Moseneke. Moseneke was also one of Winnie Mandela's lawyers at her trial for kidnapping and assault. Second, a high level meeting was held on February 4, 1991 in which Nelson Mandela and Clarence Makeweto took part. This was the first high level meeting between the two organizations in thirty years. In the meeting, they agreed to form a closer cooperation in order to "confront the common enemy."¹⁸ They also agreed that the drafting of a new non-racial constitution for South Africa should be accomplished by a constituent assembly, an idea opposed by the de Klerk government. They also agreed to a permanent liaison committee, future high level meetings, and future joint actions.¹⁹ Major differences remain, however, because the PAC is still basically opposed to multiracialism and ideologically falls much further to the left of the basic political and economic positions of the ANC. PAC leaders have walked out on several meetings, in the last few months, between the government and key black organizations.

In the last several years, the schism between the PAC and the ANC has been overshadowed by the already-mentioned violent confrontation between followers of Inkatha and the ANC. This conflict has cost the lives of over 5,000 people since 1986.²⁰

Inkatha was originally founded in 1928 to help preserve the Zulu culture, but within a few years, it basically died out. On March 22, 1975, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi revived Inkatha as a "National Cultural Liberation Movement" which he had enacted by the Kwa Zulu legislative assembly.²¹ Inkatha now claims to have 1.9 million paid members.²²

Buthelezi, the political leader of the Kwa Zulu Bantustan and an ex-member of the ANC Youth League, has always fought against the ANC's positions on sanctions and armed violence. He has proposed the idea of a separate government for the Natal region, with blacks and whites sharing the government administration, while still maintaining racial separation.²³

The big break between the ANC and Inkatha took place after a meeting in London between the two organizations fell apart. Buthelezi, for his part, claimed that he refused to supply safe houses and recruits for the ANC's guerrilla movement.²⁴ The ANC was angry that Buthelezi refused to cooperate with their efforts on sanctions and revolutionary violence. Since then, the two organizations have followed very separate strategies and the relationship has denigrated

to one of sharp verbal assaults. Joe Slovo has described Inkatha's political program as "tribalism" and Chris Hani, also of the ANC, has characterized Buthelezi as "a government lackey,"²⁵ because the Kwa Zulu Bantustan is supported and financed by the South African government.

In March of 1986, Inkatha formed a new trade union named the United Workers Union of South Africa, whose program was to support free enterprise, oppose socialism, oppose sanctions, and support peaceful negotiation rather than violence on the political front.²⁶ This was done in an obvious attempt to subvert the efforts of the ANC and its affiliated trade union, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), to achieve worker solidarity in order to support the ANC's strategies against Apartheid.

In July of 1990, Buthelezi officially formed Inkatha into a political party, which it had been for all intents and purposes, and for the first time allowed whites and non-Zulu blacks to join the organization. This he did, in an obvious attempt, to challenge the ANC by offering an alternative political choice to blacks as well as whites. Buthelezi claimed that:

We will have a multiparty democracy in the new South Africa, despite the ANC's attempt to monopolize political power to produce a bipolar South African situation in which it alone can deal with the South African government. Inkatha will be there generating choices for the people and assuring the people that there will be a multiplicity of choices in a multiparty democracy.²⁷

It must be pointed out, in Buthelezi's defense, that he has not always touted a pro-government line as the ANC critics claim. Buthelezi fought vigorously against the government's attempts to make the Bantustans completely independent in an effort to reduce the size of the black majority within South Africa. He also refused to negotiate with the government on constitutional issues while Nelson Mandela was in prison.²⁸ Recently, when defending Inkatha actions, Buthelezi said that critics "do not understand the depth of the commitment that we have to each other as Zulu brothers born out of Zulu warrior stock."²⁹

Buthelezi and Inkatha have taken a large amount of serious criticism at home and abroad, especially since the "Inkathagate" revelations. However, is it really very surprising that a group numbering about seven million persons, which is almost one-fourth of the black population, has a political organization that ardently defends its own self-interest? Does that make Inkatha all that much different from any other major political organization within South Africa, or anywhere else, for that matter? The ANC is going to have to face the reality that they are going to have to, one way or another, effectively deal with this large, naturally self-interested, legitimate political power on the road to black majority rule.

The ANC has faced this reality to the extent of having had several major meetings with Inkatha and making a few key

concessions; namely, that Inkatha will be represented at any major negotiations with the government and that the ANC will support a multiparty post-Apartheid society. Unfortunately, attempts to end the fighting between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha have so far failed. Also, Buthelezi has stated that he is against the idea of a constituent assembly drafting a new constitution, a proposal which had already been endorsed by both the PAC and the ANC. Buthelezi instead favors the idea of round table discussions between the major groups and the government, an idea that the government supports.³⁰

The key to understanding the black political situation lies in recognizing that the ANC obviously would not be able to move effectively forward while ideologically struggling with the PAC on the left and physically fighting with Inkatha on the right. The ANC will have to come to some accommodation with these two political organizations in order to effectively bring pressure to bear on the white minority government. While a close tripartite alliance between the ANC, Inkatha, and the PAC is highly improbable, though highly desirable, a peaceful coexistence of sorts is both possible and probable. The proposed nature of this peaceful coexistence will be further discussed in the third chapter.

The Role of the Church

Since 1985, the various and numerous black churches

have become much more actively involved in the anti-Apartheid movement. In September, 1985, 151 church leaders representing 16 denominations drafted a theological position paper that has since been called the Kairos Document. In this document, the leaders identified the South African government as illegitimate and called for its downfall. The paper stated that "two irreconcilable causes or interests in which the one is just and the other unjust" exist in South Africa and that "the most loving thing we can do for both the oppressed and for our enemies who are oppressors is to eliminate the oppression." It further states that in order to help bring this about, the church must become prepared to be involved in civil disobedience and that "a church that takes its responsibilities seriously in these circumstances will sometimes have to confront and to disobey the state in order to obey God."³¹

Since that time, the church has taken on a much more higher profile in leading mass services and demonstrations, especially after the banning of the United Democratic Front, sixteen other organizations and several key political leaders in February of 1988. A power vacuum was created in which several black churches and church leaders bravely moved into in order to keep the anti-Apartheid movement active.³² The South African Council of Churches (SACC) was instrumental in these actions and organized strategy seminars on non-violent resistance in twenty-four cities

across the country.³³

Until a few years ago, the white churches of South Africa have been of no great help to the cause. For centuries, a majority of the white churches preached that the blacks are descendants of Ham, who the Bible says will "forever after be hewers of wood and drawers of water."³⁴ Ham's descendants were given this punishment for having seen his father in drunken disarray and a vast number of white churchgoers in South Africa actually believe in this nonsense. There has recently been some change to this sad situation. For example, the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa (60% of the white Afrikaaners belong to this church) has declared Apartheid a sin and called for its abolition.³⁵ In November of 1990, at a meeting representing every black and white denomination except four small white ones (over 80 denominations and 40 para-church organizations were represented), the Dutch Reformed Church "officially confessed to its participation in the heresy of Apartheid" and asked for forgiveness.³⁶ The charismatic church representatives also asked for forgiveness and stated that they had in the past "adopted an allegedly neutral stance which in fact was complicity with Apartheid."³⁷ A statement was drawn up and agreed upon by all the representatives that called for the end of Apartheid. Even though this declaration is about 350 years late, it is a major turn of face by the major white churches and does seem to show a

coming to grips with reality by white church leaders and their constituency.

Another key factor of the role of the church is that it has produced several key charismatic figures to help lead the struggle. Archbishop Desmond Tutu is clearly the leading figure in this respect. He has been instrumental in getting the various anti-Apartheid groups together to have talks and attempt to form a general consensus regarding both the methods and the goals of the movement. He has met ANC leaders abroad and has supported them at home even though it was against the law. He has helped organize meetings of religious leaders, leaders of the ANC, leaders of the South African Organization of Trade Unions, leaders of the then United Democratic Front, leaders of the National Forum Committee (representing various black consciousness organizations), and leaders and representatives from other groups as well as to include the government. A biographer of Tutu stated, when talking of his central position, that:

In taking this stance, . . . and placing himself firmly in the role of a reconciler, he was taking the first step along the political tightrope on which he was to balance for the rest of his public life. And if it was a balance that sometimes, from the outside, might look slightly precarious, it is in reality a poise very firmly held, infused with an inner confidence, a 'centeredness' that can only belong to someone deeply rooted in something beyond the changing world of outer events.³⁸

The need for and role of key central charismatic figures will be explored more deeply in the third chapter.

The church has also produced hundreds of key church leaders at the local level as well.

The participation of the church in the movement has helped in many ways. Most importantly, it has infused the movement with a moral legitimacy and clearly identified the government as morally illegitimate. The church has helped moderate against the use of out-and-out violence and has helped provide the moral courage necessary for effective participation in non-violent tactics. It has also helped influence the opinions and policies of the outside world through the international organizations of their individual denominations and by their prestige and influence upon the world press. In the third chapter, an expanded role for the church in the movement will be further discussed.

Key Elements of the Economic Situation

It is very important to consider the class structure in South Africa in order to assess the potential of violence or non-violence. The white population, presently 13 percent of the total population, owns 98 percent of the industrial and commercial assets.³⁹ South Africa has the most unequal distribution of income of the upper-middle income countries.⁴⁰ In the mining industry, whites earn 5.7 times more than blacks; in the construction industry, 4.7 times more; and in the central government, 2.5 times more. In all sectors of the economy, whites earn 3.8 times more than blacks.⁴¹ Overall per capital income, from wages and all

other financial assets, gives whites 8.9 times more income than blacks.⁴² Whites receive 56.8 percent of all income.⁴³ The lowest 40 percent of blacks receive less than 10 percent of total income.⁴⁴

The situation is worse when one considers that blacks have a much higher infant mortality rate, little access to higher education, health care, union apprenticeships, and have an over-60% dropout rate before finishing secondary school.⁴⁵ Blacks also suffer much more from unemployment, making up 95 percent of the total unemployment number in South Africa.⁴⁶

Few whites are at the lower income level due to decades of so-called civilized labor policies which have raised white incomes at the expense of blacks. The total effect of the economic segregation of Apartheid and the migrant labor system have led to a segmented labor system, where the price of white labor is artificially raised and the price of black labor artificially depressed.⁴⁷ In addition, most blacks have to pay higher transportation costs because they have to travel much further to work on a daily basis and many, on a periodic basis, travel great distances to visit their families restricted on the reserves.⁴⁸

The situation in the homelands is even worse. Over 14 million blacks, a little over one-half of the total black population, live on the reserves or homelands. Only 13.3 percent of South African land is reserved for the homelands,

and it is some of the least fertile land in the country.⁴⁹ Of the 14 million people, 80 percent live beneath the poverty line.⁵⁰ The black farmers in the homelands average having \$150.00 a year in disposable income which is one-sixteenth the average for white farmers.⁵¹ More ridiculous is the fact that 50,000 white farmers in the other 87 percent of South Africa have "12 times as much land for cultivation and grazing as 14 million rural blacks."⁵² An example of how infertile the land in the reserves is can be seen in the Ciskei homeland, where 46 percent of the land is moderately or severely eroded and another 39 percent is overgrazed.⁵³ Overall, the homelands account for only 4.8 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Africa and only 12.4 percent of total government expenditures.⁵⁴

If any capitalist country has fulfilled the prophecy of Karl Marx (as stated in the first chapter) that capitalism would lead to the formation of two monolithic separate classes, it is South Africa. There is only one distinction from that situation which is present in the class structure in South Africa, which is the planned emergence of a small, but important, black middle class.

In the late 1970s, key business leaders and government officials realized the need for such a middle class in order to coopt a sizeable portion of the black population into a relatively privileged position with a stake in the system.⁵⁵

There was also a need to make up for a shortage of skilled labor, as the manufacturing level increased and more whites were being employed in the security forces.⁵⁶ As William J. Pomeroy has explained, "The shift in attitude by the Apartheid regime toward relaxing the limits placed on a black petty bourgeoisie and toward allowing some proliferation of its opportunities had the aim of tying this sector in with the white economy."⁵⁷ There are no accurate measures, at this time, as to the actual size and influence of this black middle class. However, it is important to realize that it is growing and that it is an important part of the government's overall strategy to stall and limit the progress of actual reform.

Other significant aspects of the general economic situation of South Africa must be analyzed in order to point out potentially vulnerable areas which might be attacked by a non-violent campaign. It is important to realize that the trade and investment sanctions leveled against South Africa did have a significant effect on both the South African economy and the political behavior of the Nationalist Party. Particularly since 1986, the sanctions have been very costly to South Africa. Oil and armament prices have risen significantly, and, as Stephen R. Lewis has written,

Access to some export markets and availability of imports direct investment and long-term lending has dried up, foreigners have withdrawn investments, and South Africa is no longer welcome as a major borrower in short-term markets. The combined

effects are extremely difficult to measure, but they must be in the neighborhood of several billion dollars annually in losses, from higher prices paid for imports, or lower prices received for exports, or lack of access to capital inflows to finance investment.⁵⁸

Most of the nations that had sanctions in place against South Africa have lifted those sanctions within the last year. However, many corporations, local and state governments, and important lending institutions still are refusing to conduct business with South Africa. The key point is that the sanctions are a form of economic warfare that proved to be effective. The foremost strategy of any non-violent campaign would be to replace the external economic pressure of the sanctions with internal economic pressure.

There are areas of the South African economy that are vulnerable to internal economic pressure. Three examples of such vulnerable areas will be briefly discussed. The first example is in the mining sector of the economy. Gold and diamond exports make up 40 to 50 percent of South Africa's total export earnings, depending on world prices at the time.⁵⁹ When the price of gold rises by \$10.00, the effect is a net increase of \$200 million per year to South Africa.⁶⁰ If a large proportion of these exports could be cut off, it would cause serious damage to an already weakened economy. It would also have serious consequences on the confidence placed in the economy by both the white population and foreign investors.

A second example is South Africa's economic relations with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). This organization was set up in 1980 among the nations of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with the primary objective of increasing the member states' economic independence from South Africa's regional dominance. South Africa's trade surplus of \$1.3 billion with the members of the SADCC represents roughly 40 percent of South Africa's total trade surplus.⁶¹ The SADCC nations also provide about 350,000 workers for South Africa's mining industry which represents almost 50 percent of the black labor force in all mines and 43 percent in the gold mines.⁶² Any major attempt to shut down the mines in South Africa would naturally require the cooperation of the SADCC states. It must be pointed out that any serious attempt by the SADCC states in any form of serious economic warfare would almost assuredly be met by serious countermeasures by the South African government. For example, a vast majority of the trade of the landlocked six members of the SADCC (namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) passes through the rails and ports of South Africa.⁶³ South Africa also supplies 49 percent of the imports of the landlocked six nations, that would have to be seriously curtailed in any attempt to reduce South Africa's trade surplus.⁶⁴ The repercussions of such a situation will be

further analyzed in the third chapter.

A third example of a vulnerable area is South Africa's SASOL coal gasification plants, which supply about one-third of the country's total liquid fuel requirements.⁶⁵ The serious consequences of a major shutdown of these strategic operations is obvious, as South Africa pays significantly higher prices for imported oil due to the already mentioned oil boycott.

Conclusion

South Africa is essentially ruled by a white minority government, under the National Party, which is supported by substantial military and police forces. The present political situation is one in which the political pendulum is in the course of swinging to the right, under the pressure of conservatives within the National Party, the Conservative Party, and the hideous presence of a third force within the political apparatus of the government. This swing can be seen in the gradual nature of the mostly cosmetic reform so far instituted and proposed in South Africa.

The African National Congress is the preeminent black political organization in South Africa. In order to move effectively forward, the ANC must be able to come to some accommodation with the Pan Africanist Congress on the left and Inkatha on the right.

The black church has displayed an instrumental role in

keeping the movement alive in South Africa through some extremely trying times. It has expanded its role greatly in the last decade and potentially can play an even greater role.

South Africa has developed into a predominately two-class economic structure with a white bourgeoisie and a predominately black proletariat. There is an emerging black middle class, chiefly due to a concerned government effort to coopt an influential segment of the black community.

The economy in South Africa is still very weak from the effects of the international sanctions. The South African economy clearly does have several key vulnerable areas that can be exploited by internal economic pressure.

As the third chapter will demonstrate, the situation demonstrates that the potential exists for non-violent economic direct action to succeed in creating positive political change in South Africa.

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CHAPTER 3
THE POTENTIAL FOR A NON-VIOLENT
SOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the final chapter of this thesis, the potential for a successful, non-violent solution will be discussed. First, a practical application of the non-violent technique to the situation in South Africa will be considered. The elements of the situation, discussed in the second chapter, will be addressed. Second, a philosophical analysis of the non-violent method will be discussed. The concerns of the political theorists, discussed in the first chapter, will be further analyzed.

The greatest irony is that the greatest threat of violence and the greatest potential for non-violence coexist in South Africa. Now that the proverbial genie has been let out of the bottle, and some positive change has been accomplished, the expectations of the masses have been greatly expanded. If the political pendulum continues to swing to the right, it will almost assuredly produce a strategy of gradualism and eventually a situation of extreme political stagnation. Such a situation could prove catastrophic, for, as James C. Davies has written:

Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. The all-important effect on the minds of people in a particular society is to produce, during the former period, an expectation of continued ability to satisfy needs--which continue to rise--

and, during the latter, a mental state of anxiety and frustration when manifest reality breaks away from anticipated reality. The actual state of socioeconomic development is less significant than the expectation that past progress, now blocked, can and must continue in the future.

Political stability and instability are ultimately, dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society. Satisfied or apathetic people who are poor in goods, status, and power can remain politically quiet and their opposites can revolt, just as, correlatively and more probably dissatisfied poor can revolt and satisfied rich oppose revolution. It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of "adequate" or "inadequate" supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution. In actuality, there must be a joining of forces between dissatisfied, frustrated people who differ in their degree of objective, tangible welfare and status.¹

This condition, where a collective state of frustration leads to a situation with a high potential for aggressive behavior, is generally known as the Frustration - Aggression Theory.² It is crucial to understand its applicability to the situation in South Africa, because without some form of positive pressure on the government, the situation could lead to one of repeated outbreaks of violence among the various groups. Such a situation would most probably lead to further entrenchment on the side of the government, with the active involvement of the security forces, which could then lead in turn to an even higher level of frustration and ensuing violence.

This leads us to the key question, as to the potential for a non-violent campaign to succeed.

The Practical Applicability of Non-Violence to the
Present Environment of South Africa

There are several key elements to the non-violent method which must be satisfied in order for its application to prove effective. The most important element is the tenacity and determination of the participants. The movement must be able to maintain and even increase the number of active participants in the face of harsh counter-measures by the government. This was a key flaw in past movements, such as the 1952 Defiance Campaign of the ANC and the 1960 Campaign of the PAC, where the numbers of participants seriously decreased after initial harsh counter-measures by the government.³ Initial determination by the participants against the first few incidents of counter-measures is crucial, for this will affect the collective psyche of the rest of the masses who are in the process of deciding whether or not to become participants. Gandhi realized in India that the key factor was "to strengthen the determination, independence, and ability to resist"⁴ of the participants.

The first step in increasing the determination level is to increase the self-respect of the masses. In South Africa, this has already been greatly accomplished, and a large part of the credit must go to the work of the Black Consciousness Organizations in the last two decades. Steve Biko did not die in vain.

The tenacity and determination levels have also been greatly raised by the examples to endure hardship given by great leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu and Joe Slovo, just to mention a few. It is obvious today that the determination level is higher than it has ever been. More and more people are becoming involved and the numbers at demonstrations have been constantly increasing in the last eight years.

A second important element to the non-violent method is the necessity for charismatic leadership. Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King were two of the greatest charismatic leaders of this century. South Africa has produced leaders of immense courage and charisma, as those mentioned above attest. In addition, there are great people at all levels of society, such as Desmond TuTu of the Anglican Church and Jay Naidoo of COSATU. This is another element in which there is an abundance in South Africa today.

A third element necessary to non-violence and the most crucial in South Africa today is the need for some high degree of unity among the various groups participating in the movement. Gandhi was able to keep the movement in India in a unified direction, in the face of great odds, due to his ability to convince both the Moslem and Hindu organizations that they shared a common goal against a common enemy. In December of 1916, the Lucknow Pact was signed by the

predominantly Hindu Indian National Congress and the Moslem League, where "Hindus and Moslems agreed on a broad program"⁵ to create the political changes that would benefit both organizations. One of the few critiques that has been made against Gandhi is that he refused to recognize the reality that these two disparate communities would refuse to live under a common government. The Moslems were just simply not going to be part of a country with a heavy Hindu majority. The Moslems felt they would be placed from one rule of tyranny, by the British, to another tyranny, by a Hindu majority.

There is a great parallel that can be drawn between the situation that existed in India and the present situation in South Africa. On the one hand, the ANC must reach out and convince Inkatha that they share a common goal against a common enemy, while on the other hand, it must realize that Inkatha is simply not going to accept being part of a political system dominated by the ANC. Like the Moslem League, Inkatha is not going to accept going from one form of tyranny to what it sees as another form of tyranny. The ANC can offer Inkatha one of two proposals in return either for cooperation or at least non-interference in the movement. One, they can offer a future government with a loose Federal system, with a strong Inkatha state government or two, they can offer Inkatha a totally separate and independent nation. Inkatha represents a proud people with

a courageous heritage who are not willing to accept minority status under any circumstances. The ANC will not be able to move effectively forward without at least gaining a policy of non-interference by Inkatha and the workers of its affiliated trade union, the United Workers Union of South Africa.

On the left, the ANC must also come to some further accommodation with the PAC in order to prevent any serious future erosion of the support of the youth, especially in the townships. The ANC could offer a guarantee of a certain percentage of representation in the legislature and a number of seats in the cabinet. On the ideological level, the ANC could guarantee that particular PAC positions, such as nationalization of key industries, be included in the future constitution of South Africa. PAC, for its part, must come to a realization of the futility of its position on multiracialism. The ANC is simply not going to tell someone like Joe Slovo, who has served the struggle heroically for over forty years, that he can no longer be a part of the movement simply because he is white.

As was stated in the second chapter, there have been many high level conferences among these three political organizations. The potential exists for the ANC to obtain, at the very least, a policy of non-interference from both the PAC and Inkatha. Achieving this accommodation among the ANC, the PAC, and Inkatha is the major hurdle that must be

traversed before a major non-violent campaign can be effectively commenced.

Sincerity is a very important element of non-violence, for the method can easily be debased and used for the wrong ends. Those both leading and participating in the movement must sincerely believe in the morality of the ends desired and the means utilized. While the means must be ethically superior to those of the oppressor, the participants must act without promoting an aura of self-righteous arrogance. Such an attitude could lead to unnecessary harassment, which "obscures or precludes supportive acts aimed at winning over the opponent."⁶ The idea is to eventually win over the oppressor by getting him to realize the immorality of his acts, not to totally alienate him and harden his resistance. Only through sincerity can the movement and its goals claim any sense of legitimacy. Even though the movement will basically proceed at the third level of non-violence, at the positive economic coercion level, it is still important to win over as many of the oppressors at the first and second levels of non-violence. Persuasion through reason, at the first level, and winning over as many of the oppressors who can be made to realize the immorality of their position at the second level, are still vital components of the non-violent method.

Planning and organization are two elements crucial to effective non-violence. Previous non-violent campaigns,

such as the 1952 Defiance Campaign, failed partly due to inadequate planning and organization. The success of the movement in India was to a great extent due to planning, preparation, and studied execution of the non-violent method. The choice and announcement of objectives, the choice of tactics, the selection and training of participants, and the preplanning of logistics all have to be carefully considered before the campaign begins. During the campaign, the reactions of the oppressors must constantly be analyzed in order to plan further actions accordingly. The leaders must realize that the method is elastic and can be applied in various ways.

Earlier, leading political organizations were banned or exiled and the planning and organization phase was difficult, to say the least. Now that these organizations are legal again and able to operate a little more freely and communicate more effectively, the planning and organization, both before and during the campaign, will proceed much more smoothly and effectively.

It is in the area of logistics that the role of the church can be greatly expanded. It is the responsibility of the leaders of the movement to attempt as best as possible to provide the basic necessities of food, clothing and housing to those workers who will be unemployed and dislocated when the economic phase begins. The church has the will, the numbers of people, the facilities, and the

organization for such a task. The church buildings themselves can serve as food banks. Churches, in areas of the country not affected by the ensuing economic dislocation, can help provide food and clothing supplies and set up a network where volunteer families would take in the dislocated workers and their family members. Of course, this would all be coordinated with the leading political organization before the economic phase. This role of the church will also help to hinder countermeasures by the government, for it would put the governmental authorities in a very difficult position were they to attempt to seriously interfere with church-related activities at church facilities. As stated earlier, the church possesses the strong-willed, courageous, charismatic leadership at both the national and local levels to carry out such a responsibility. The church can also help with smoothing relations between people of the ANC and Inkatha at the local level and in sponsoring conferences at the national and regional levels.

At this point, it can be argued that all of the necessary elements for an effective non-violent campaign are present in South Africa. The tenacity and determination of the masses are at a very high level. There is an abundance of charismatic leaders who can effectively plan and organize the campaign. Unity is the only key area where a problem exists and this problem has the potential to be overcome.

This all leads to the last necessary element for a successful non-violent campaign, which is to make use of some form of economic vulnerability within the oppressor's economy.

In the second chapter, it was pointed out that, overall, the economy of South Africa has already been severely weakened, due mainly to the effects of the sanctions. Three examples of economic vulnerability were also shown. The economy of South Africa is the weak underbelly of the Apartheid Regime. It is, of course, the decision of the movement leaders as to where best to attack the economic system. The point of the exercise here is to show three examples where non-violent economic coercion shows great potential. It is suggested that at least three vulnerable areas be dealt with, so as to spread out the oppressor's forces and to distract the enemy's attention from focusing on any one threat. The masses in South Africa have a clear numerical superiority of well over eight to one over the oppressor and this superiority must be taken advantage of in order to weaken the effect of any countermeasures.

The movement has already shown that it can successfully launch large scale strikes. In early November of 1991, the ANC and its allied trade union COSATU launched a massive two-day strike in order to send a clear message to the South African government. Government officials estimated that the strike would cost over \$800 million in lost production⁷ and

that was for only two days. Jay Naidoo, general secretary of COSATU, stated that, "The organized working class has today and will tomorrow strike a body blow to Apartheid."⁸ The point should be to continue the strikes and deliver a knockout punch to the Apartheid state. As stated in the second chapter, a successful strike in the gold and diamond mines alone would cut off almost one-half of the country's export earnings. Any such strike would have to have the support of the nations of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, which supplies about one-half of the workers in the mines.

The ANC can negotiate with these nations to support such a strike and to offer economic boycotts which could help cut into the 40 percent share of South Africa's trade surplus already mentioned. In return, the ANC could offer much cheaper rates for the use of the nation's rails and ports for the majority of their exports once black majority rule has been attained.

An effective strike action can also be leveled at the SASOL coal gasification plants in order to cut off a large share of the country's liquid fuel needs. Such an action would have a cyclic effect on the economy, for it could seriously affect the manufacturing sector.

These examples show that there is a weak underbelly to the Apartheid economic system which can be effectively exploited by a non-violent campaign. The ultimate goal is

to destroy the profit margin of the exploitive Apartheid economic system and keep its coffers empty until either the government meets the movement's demands for majority rule or the system collapses.

Redemptive Non-Violence Versus Regenerative Violence

The primary argument in the defense of non-violence, as it should be, is that the non-violent method is far less costly in terms of human life lost than the alternative of violent revolution. This is one obvious fact that cannot be debated.

The non-violent campaigns in India resulted in 8,000 deaths, at most, in a country of hundreds of millions of people, while the revolution in Algeria is estimated to have cost about one million lives in a country with, at most, ten million people.⁹ The key argument against non-violence is that it simply cannot achieve the goals of the struggle, so therefore the loss of life argument is irrelevant. Therefore, it is imperative to show that the non-violent method is capable of achieving the goals of the movement.

As has already been shown, the potential does exist in South Africa for a non-violent movement to, at the very least, bankrupt the Apartheid system. Ownership of the means of production will no longer be of any value to the oppressor when the profits have been dried up. It is at that stage that the movement can negotiate from a superior position in order to achieve black majority rule. At some

point, the oppressor is going to have to see the handwriting on the wall in the face of the fact that the system is financially and morally bankrupt. It is at that particular point that the movement's leaders can offer some form of remittance, without violating principle, in return for a peaceful transition of power. The movement can offer a small monetary amount as a small percentage of the supposed worth, for it is worthless without labor, of the means of production. This will avoid the mistake of cornering a wounded animal and at the same time give the oppressor an option to withdraw with at least something. The oppressor will have little choice at that point, for the control of the profit margin will, for all intents and purposes, have passed into the hands of the leaders of the movement. Once majority rule has been negotiated, the masses can vote in the party that best represents their needs. No party should be afraid of the ballot of its own people. The point is that control of the government and the means of production can be achieved by the non-violent method in South Africa and, therefore, the practical collective needs of the people can be achieved.

At the psychological individual level, it must be pointed out that non-violence is a form of warfare that can beat the oppressor by using a higher moral means and can lead to the regeneration of the spirit and self-esteem of the oppressed person. Frantz Fanon's primary belief in

violence, acting as a cleansing force and restoring the self-respect of the oppressed, lay mainly in his a priori assumption that violence was the only force capable of destroying the system of the oppressor. If it can be shown that non-violence can be effective at destroying the system of the oppressor by a higher moral means than those of the oppressor, then most of Fanon's argument becomes moot. The non-violent method can also strike back at the guilty perpetrators of the oppression by taking away their profits and control of the means of production.

The main problem with the views of both Marx and Fanon is that the actual threshold of violence, that point at which a large enough amount of the masses will engage in violent action in order to be effective, is much higher than either of them had envisaged. When the oppressed person begins to seriously contemplate the use of violence, he or she will look over at the sleeping faces of their children and spouse and realize a higher responsibility that transcends the aggressive impulse that is rising inside. This higher responsibility to family and friend helps to assuage the level of frustration and the natural passion of the individual, to the extent that it raises the threshold of violence to a much higher level than had been previously believed by the theorists on violent methodologies. The level of frustration must rise to a point high enough that the individual will risk not only his or her own life but

also the lives of their children, spouse, extended family and friends before risking all through violent action. Before risking all, by tearing apart the very fabric of the infrastructure of society, the oppressed individual must be thoroughly convinced that a non-violent alternative does not exist. The oppressed are not holding back merely because of the false promise of a place in the middle class, but out of the false premise that only violence can effectively change the situation. The oppressed peoples of the earth will naturally opt for non-violent alternatives, first and foremost, and this is the key point that Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Fanon did not understand. Violence is not spontaneously inevitable in all situations of harsh oppression.

Therefore, any theory or prescription that provides nothing short of the false expectation of mass spontaneous violence to provide for the betterment of the masses is bankrupt and lacking in imagination. It is obvious that the level of frustration necessary to cross a threshold of non-violence, where a significant amount of the masses will engage in non-violent action, is significantly lower than the threshold of violence. Marx and Fanon would have a vast void in the zone between these two thresholds, with little effective action, other than planning and waiting for the supposed inevitable revolution to take place (Marx never successfully explained why a supposedly spontaneous and inevitable revolution needed to be planned and organized).

So the question becomes whether the oppressed masses in South Africa would be supposed to have no effective alternative to awaiting a supposed inevitable clash of violence that would most assuredly cost millions of lives and leave the infrastructure of the country in a total shambles.

The point is not to say that the threshold of violence may not be crossed and that violent revolution may not become necessary, for it is the inherent right of the masses of South Africa to engage in whatever activity it takes to become free. The point, rather, is that once the threshold of non-violence has been crossed, there does exist great potential for non-violent methodologies to be effective and that they should be executed first and foremost.

Ironically, it is a key military dictum that guides the main strategy of non-violence, which is to attack the enemy at their weak points. The key economic strategy of any non-violent campaign is to outflank the strong points of the oppressor's military and police forces and to attack the weak economic underbelly. Several key strategies of non-violence that also share a military analogy.

A second classic military dictum is that once the outer walls or the first line of defense have been breached, the enemy must not be allowed the time to fall back to the second line of defense in an organized manner. This is what is in effect happening in South Africa, for the oppressor

has abandoned the outer ring of the Laager (Afrikaner for a circle of wagons), with absolute Apartheid at all levels of society, and retreated to an inner ring of defense with a toned-down Apartheid with some cosmetic changes. The movement must keep up the pressure and replace the now defunct external sanctions with internal economic warfare in order to keep the enemy off balance so they cannot successfully stall the process of change.

A powerful aspect of the economic warfare of non-violence is that it cannot be defended against by the powerful military and police forces of the oppressor. This is especially important currently in South Africa, for in the last few years, the military has retreated from the so-called operational zone in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, and the government can now concentrate these forces at home. These forces, the most powerful in all of Africa, are useless against mass economic warfare. This swings the psychological edge in favor of the masses, for they are defeating the oppressor despite their military superiority. The enemy in turn suffers from a feeling of helplessness, for they cannot defeat the economic forces of the masses, because they cannot tangibly engage them with their military might.

A point that must be remembered is that even if the non-violent campaign should fail, its economic warfare phase will have greatly weakened the enemy. Therefore, if a

violent phase does unfortunately become necessary, the enemy will be easier to defeat because of a severely weakened economy.

The overall effect of the economic warfare phase is to creatively funnel the frustration of the oppressed masses towards positive effective means. By defeating the oppressor in this way, the oppressed individuals' self-respect can be regenerated and their spirit can be redeemed.

An important aspect of non-violence is that its power structure tends to diffuse power and lead to pluralistic systems, while violence tends to concentrate power in the hands of a few key party leaders and lead to authoritarian systems.¹⁰ The non-violent campaign needs the widespread support and active participation of many groups, and the natural give and take negotiations and compromises of these groups engenders a pluralistic power structure. The violent campaign naturally needs to concentrate power in the hands of the military commanders of the struggle and, in the past, these violent campaigns have tended to lead to one-party authoritarian power structures. The main problem with a violent campaign is that by using the same repressive control techniques of the enemy, the command structure of the campaign becomes a mirror image of the oppressor's power structure which the movement is trying to overthrow. It accomplishes nothing to replace one authoritarian system with another one. Archbishop TuTu stated in this regard

that:

We are preparing for a society that is going to be able to discriminate between good and bad, and we must not allow ourselves to become like the system we oppose. We cannot afford to use methods of which we will be ashamed when we look back.¹¹

The masses want more than to just end the oppressive system. They want to ensure that the new system offers freedom of choice and action that was absent in the old system. The pluralistic power structure of a non-violent campaign offers the best hope for accomplishing that result.

The Dialectical Nature of Non-Violence

The dialectic of non-violence operates at three levels of human history. First, with each individual campaign, the dialectical process operates in two ways. One, the campaign brings to the surface the tension and conflict that exists between the oppressor and the oppressed. Each campaign takes a step in accomplishing the goals of the movement. Two, each campaign proceeds with a distinct dialectical process operating within the pluralistic leadership structure of the movement. As stated earlier, non-violence allows reason to rule over passion, and as the campaign progresses, various ideas come forth as to how to best deal with the changing situation. The synthesis of these various ideas allows the leadership to better analyze the changing situation, adapt to it, redirect new tactics and strategies, and control the overall situation.

Violence, on the other hand, operates in a very

different environment with a much more constrained dialectical process operating within its command structure. In a violent campaign, the leadership operates in an environment with a much higher level of psychological stress and physical deprivation. Also, there is much less communication between the leadership and the various elements under its command. The mere authoritarian command structure of a violent campaign, coupled with its accompanying higher stress levels and much lower availability of information and new ideas, leads to a highly constrained decision-making process. Add to this the almost certain fact that the violent campaign will move much more quickly and give the leadership much less time to react and it can be seen that the leadership structure of a violent campaign has a much more narrower and constrained dialectical process operating within the movement. The non-violent method offers its leadership a higher ability to effectively adapt to the changing tactics and strategies of the oppressor. Each individual non-violent campaign is therefore a learning process which allows the movement to better adapt to the situation in the present campaign and better prepare and plan the next campaign.

The second level at which the dialectic of non-violence operates is at the process of change of a complete movement, involving several individual campaigns. It is at this level that the main phase of a complete dialectical process is

achieved. The conflict between the thesis, represented by the enemy's oppressive system, and the antithesis, represented by the demands and goals of the non-violent movement, is resolved at this level. The resulting synthesis creates a new condition where the practical collective needs and psychological individual desires can be satisfied. As stated earlier, the synthesis of a non-violent movement can create the desired results that go far beyond the "minimum of readaption"¹² supposed by Frantz Fanon and the other theorists on violence. It is true that some level of compromise is necessary in the formation of the synthesis, for the synthesis, or new social condition, must retain the elements of truth from both the thesis and the antithesis. This does not, however, entail a compromise of key principles of the movement and therefore does not necessarily lead to a condition short of achieving the required minimum goals of the movement. The resulting synthesis raises the condition to a higher level of truth with the best ideas of both sides maintained.

This synthesis can be seen developing in South Africa today, where key movement leaders are considering an economic and political system that will include ideas from both sides. Jay Naidoo, general secretary of COSATU, recently stated that:

I wouldn't deny our socialist orientation, but we have seen the problems facing Eastern Europe because of an overcentralized command economy. At

the same time we have seen the problems caused by an unbridled free-market system. We are researching ways to devise a system that we believe will tackle the problem of inequality at the same time as maintaining economic growth in a high wage economy.¹³

It may very well be out of South Africa, in the next few years, that a new ideal of a political economy that meets the needs of the masses will emerge.

At this point it can be seen that each campaign takes a step in fulfilling the goals of the movement and each movement takes a positive step in the progress of human history. It is at the level of human history that the third level of the dialectical nature of non-violence operates. At the second level, great events in history are achieved, such as the formation of a free and independent India and potentially the future creation of a free South Africa. It is at the third level that the lessons of these achievements become etched into the world collective conscience. It is at this level where the non-violent means can become an end in itself, for if the method proves to be effective, the potential exists for the real formation of a new world order where the method of violence is relegated to a much lesser role in the affairs of humans.

Georg W. F. Hegel espoused his view of history as:

. . . the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been victimized--the question involuntarily arises--to what principle, to what final aim these enormous sacrifices have been offered.¹⁴

Hegel also stated that, "We may affirm absolutely that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion."¹⁵ It is obvious that up until the present day, human history has seen no shortage of slaughter and victims and passion has ruled over reason on all too many tragic occasions. However, Hegel did leave open the potential that evil may be overcome by reason when he stated that:

The ill that is found in the world may be comprehended, and the thinking Spirit reconciled with the fact of the existence of evil. Indeed, nowhere is such a harmonizing view more pressingly demanded than in Universal History; and it can be attained only by recognizing the positive existence, in which that negative element is a subordinate, and vanquished nullity. On the one hand, the ultimate design of the World must be perceived; and, on the other hand, the fact that this design has been actually realized in it, and that evil has not been able to permanently to assert a competing position.¹⁶

Any evil that exists is not of a permanent nature and has the potential of being excised from human affairs. For example, slavery was once considered an acceptable fact of the human condition, but now it is universally viewed as unacceptable. It could be argued that violence is an innate element of human nature and therefore can never be eradicated. However, it is not violence itself that is innate, but aggression and even though the human social condition may cause high levels of frustration at various points and times in history for some time to come, it does not follow that violence must necessarily ensue. For if the method of non-violence can be effectively shown to

creatively funnel that aggression before the threshold of violence is crossed and to successfully achieve substantial human needs, then the method of violence can be effectively shown to be an unnecessary human evil that can be weeded from human affairs. The potential therefore exists that non-violence will someday become the universally accepted method of conflict resolution, first and foremost, in human history.

It may also be realized that non-violence can speed up the inexorable progression of human history, for what has violence really ever achieved in human history? Violence has always been a regressive force in history and has all too many times been used to install or keep in power authoritarian oppressive regimes, such as exists in South Africa. Violence has the all-too-dangerous potential to force unnatural outcomes in the dialectical process, while non-violence shows the greatest potential to give birth to natural positive outcomes in the march of human history. The dialectical nature of non-violence could, therefore, produce an evolutionary phase in human history where violence is substantially conquered and create a real new world order.

Conclusion

The great irony and tragedy in South Africa today is that the potential for violence is greatly increasing while the potential for non-violence is showing its greatest

promise for success. The key elements of the non-violent method are present in South Africa.

The tenacity and determination of the people are at their highest point ever. Charismatic leadership exists at every stratum of society to effectively plan and organize the movement. The church is actively supporting the movement and shows great potential to physically support the campaigns of non-violence. The South African economy possesses several economic vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The only serious problem is in the area of unity and this situation has the potential to be overcome. Overall, therefore, the South African situation and environment are ripe for the non-violent method.

The non-violent method should always be preferable to the violent alternative. Obviously, there is less loss of life and the very infrastructure of society is not torn asunder. The practical collective needs and the psychological individual needs of the masses can be achieved by non-violence. The threshold of violence is much higher than Marx and Fanon posited and has not been crossed yet in South Africa. The threshold of non-violence has, however, been crossed for quite some time and its power should be unleashed as soon as possible in order to outflank the superior military and police forces of the enemy.

The means and the ends of non-violence and violence cannot be separated, for the means directly affect the ends.

Martin Luther King once stated that:

We will never have peace in the world until men everywhere recognize that ends are not cut off from means, because the means represent the ideal in the making, and the end in process, and ultimately you can't reach good ends through evil means, because the means represent the seed and the end represents the tree.¹⁷

Non-violence diffuses power and shows the greatest potential for producing pluralism, while violence concentrates power and shows the greatest potential for authoritarianism. Violent movements that use the same methods as the oppressor unfortunately cannot ensure that they will not become a mirror image of the enemy that they are attempting to overthrow. The new political system created must ensure the freedom of choice and action of the masses and this can best be achieved by the method of non-violence.

The dialectic of non-violence operates at three levels. At the campaign level, it gives the leadership the best capability to adapt creatively to a changing situation. At the movement level, it produces the greatest potential to achieve a new social condition where the substantial needs of the masses are satisfied. At the level of human history, the means of non-violence shows the potential to become an end in itself. The evil of violence may never be completely expunged, but this evil can be relegated to a much less active role. The dialectic of non-violence could create a world where all non-violent means are used, first and

foremost, before any violent means.

The thesis stands that non-violence shows great potential in South Africa and should be executed to its fullest extent before any violence is initiated. The non-violent method is the last best hope for South Africa today.

ENDNOTES

¹James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review (February 1962):5.

²Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 90-93.

³Gene Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, Inc., 1980), pp. 170-171.

⁴Ibid., pp. 173-174.

⁵Louis Fischer, Gandhi (New York: New American Library, Inc., 1954), pp. 59-61.

⁶Joan Bondurant, Conquest of Violence (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1965), p. viii.

⁷Associated Press, "Massive Strike Grips South Africa," Omaha World-Herald, 5 November 1991, 4(A).

⁸Ibid.

⁹Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, p. 168.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 168-169.

¹¹Naomi TuTu, The Words of Desmond TuTu (New York: New Market Press, 1989), p. 48.

¹²Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968), p. 147.

¹³Philip Brooks and Ivor Powell, "Taming the Lions," Mother Jones (June 1990):55.

¹⁴Georg W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 21.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 23.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 15-16.

¹⁷James M. Washington, A Testament of Hope (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 1986), p. 255.

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