

ILLUMINATING CHINESE AESTHETICS WITH KANT'S ACCOUNT OF GENIUS? POSSIBILITY AND DIFFICULTY

KEFU ZHU

ABSTRACT: *Many scholars interpret Chinese Aesthetics with the Kantian theory of genius because they seem to form a parallel: similar innate and spontaneous mental talents that exceed normal cognition and imagination generates beautiful arts with similar extraordinary qualities. I argue that projecting Kant's genius to illuminate the creative power analogically, i.e., the carefree-wandering mind, is infeasible. The theory of genius assumes a critical project that stipulates a valuable way to exercise the power of judgment. Genius is only a postulated idea for successfully making aesthetic judgments on artworks. In contrast, the carefree-wandering mind assumes a Daoist metaphysical-ethical theory centering on the idea of transformative self and the way to success. The carefree-wandering mind featuring Wu-Wei (無為) is the efficient cause that produces artworks with Qi-Yun (氣韻), namely, the expressive quality. Therefore, conceiving parallels between Kant and Chinese aesthetics is difficult. I conclude by proposing a potential similarity between Kant's theory of genius and Chinese aesthetics: both draw our attention to the respective relations of each to nature.*

Keywords: *aesthetic judgment, carefree-wondering, critical, genius, Kant, Wu-Wei, Zhuang Zi*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the early twentieth century, scholars have introduced Kant's concepts to interpret Chinese aesthetics.¹ As scholars observe parallels between Chinese aesthetics and Kant's account of genius, illuminating the notions in Chinese aesthetics by projecting

ZHU, KEFU: Visiting Lecturer, University of Pittsburgh, USA. Email: kefu.zhu@pitt.edu

¹ The attempts to use Kant's ideas to interpret Chinese aesthetics could be dated back to Wang Guowei (1887-1927). Wang used Kant's notion of the aesthetic idea, a sort of complex mental ideas or images, to explain *Yi-Jing* (意境, the mindscape of artworks). Later, Yu-kung Kao (1991, 66) suggests that the artwork creating process as explained in Chinese aesthetics, in which artists first set up mental ideas or images, *Yi* (意), in mind and then print them into works, is in parallel to how genius produces aesthetic ideas in Kant's theory. Karl-Heinz Pohl (2006) suggests that the super-talented mental condition responsible for creating aesthetic ideas in both systems of thoughts involves imagination and spirit.

Kant's ideas into the former seems to be a viable approach. It seems that we could analogically understand some relations of ideas in Chinese aesthetics as we understood similar relations in Kant's aesthetics, assuming that two systems of thoughts are relevantly similar.

The parallel between Kant's account of genius and the carefree-wandering mind (*you-xin* 遊心) in Chinese aesthetics is especially notable. Scholars assume that similar innate and spontaneous mental talents generate beautiful arts with similar unique qualities. Therefore, illuminating the carefree-wandering mind analogically with genius seems plausible. However, this paper points out a mistake in this analogy.

We shall not say we can understand how the Chinese genius with a carefree-wandering mind creates beautiful arts, just as the Kantian genius that gives a rule to arts produces beautiful arts. The Kantian genius is not the efficient cause for beautiful artworks but only gives a rule to art. In contrast, the carefree-wandering mind is precisely the efficient cause that produces beautiful works.

This paper argues that projecting Kant's genius to illustrate the carefree wandering mind in Chinese aesthetics is infeasible. The theory of genius assumes a critical project that stipulates a valuable way to exercise the power of judgment. Genius is only a postulated idea for successfully making aesthetic judgments on artworks. In contrast, the carefree-wandering mind assumes a Daoist metaphysical-ethical theory centering on the idea of transformative self and the way to success. The carefree-wandering mind featuring *Wu-Wei* (controlling without controlling, 無為) is the efficient cause for artworks replete with spirit-consonance, *i.e.*, *Qi-Yun* (氣韻). Therefore, conceiving a parallel between Kant and Chinese aesthetics is difficult.

First, I point out three seeming parallels between two systems of thought as scholars observe: similar products both arise in a similar way, namely as if unintentionally, from similar mental conditions. Second, I show the differences in the approaches and aims of Kant's critical project and Chinese aesthetics. Third, the idea of genius is to coordinate two incompatible beliefs: the artificiality of the works and their perceived subjective purposiveness. Fourth, the carefree-wandering mind is a causal condition for beautiful works. I conclude by proposing a potential similarity between Kant's theory of genius and Chinese aesthetics.

2. THREE SEEMING PARALLELS

This section shows we can find three pairs of seemingly consistent claims in Chinese Aesthetics and Kant's aesthetics. (1) Aesthetically valuable artworks are beautiful in a technical aspect and beautiful in an expressive aspect. Namely, they possess *Qi-Yun*, translated as spirit-consonance, in Chinese Aesthetics, or *Geist*, translated as spirit, in Kant's aesthetics. (2) Beautiful artworks must appear intentional and unintentional at the same time. (3) A spontaneous innate mental disposition is responsible for beautiful artworks. Based on these claims, it is easy to believe that we could analogically illuminate the creative mind in Chinese aesthetics with Kant's notion of genius.

2.1 ARTWORKS WITH AESTHETIC VALUE ARE MORE THAN SENSORY BEAUTIFUL

Xie He (謝赫, 500-535?) proposes six classical laws for Chinese aesthetics in painting, which artists and connoisseurs observed and discussed throughout antiquity. The first law is “animation through *Qi-Yun*”² (Bush and Shih 2012, 95). Scholars usually translate *Qi-Yun* as spirit-consonance (95).

According to Xie He, the other five laws concern the technical aspects of works. An artwork should have “a structural method” in the use of the brush and show “fidelity to the object in portraying forms”, “conformity to the kind of depicted when applying colors”, a “proper planning in placing”, and a sound “transmission through copying” (Bush and Shih 2012, 95). Then, these five laws are only the criteria for an art product. However, they are not yet the criteria for beautiful art. In contrast, *Qi-Yun* is the criterion for beauty in art. Artists should know that *Qi-Yun* has primacy over these technical issues.

The Song art critic Guo Ruoxu (郭若虛, ca. 1080) interprets *Qi-Yun* as the quality of a painting. Specifically, according to Kao (1991, 86-7), *Qi-Yun* refers to the essential reality of the depicted object. When released into a work, *Qi-Yun* becomes “its expressive quality or content.” Classical Chinese artworks with aesthetic value have such an expressive quality that they can arouse the mental movement of audiences. That explains why the expressionistic element in a painting, the *Qi-Yun*, has primacy over its formal representation (Hu 2020, 363).

In what sense can *Qi-Yun* refer to the reality of depicted items? To have *Qi-Yun* requires artists to employ their genius talent to capture and resonate with the essential reality of the depicted object (Hu 2020, 365-6). Therefore, *Qi-Yun* in the artworks means a mental resonance between the subject and the object that captures the object’s reality and expresses it to the audience.

Similarly, according to Kant:

One says of certain products, of which it is expected that they ought, at least in part, to reveal themselves as beautiful art, that they are without spirit, even though one finds nothing in them to criticize as far as taste is concerned. A poem can be quite pretty and elegant, but without spirit. A story is accurate and well organized, but without spirit. A solemn oration is thorough and at the same time flowery, but without spirit. Many a conversation is not without entertainment, but is still without spirit; even of a woman one may well say that she is pretty, talkative and charming, but without spirit. (CPJ 5: 313)³

² “氣韻生動”: the laws of Chinese aesthetics in painting quoted by Guo Ruoxu.

³ Citations from the *Critique of pure reason* are given according to the customary first (A) and second (B) edition format. For other works, I give a short title along with the volume and page number of the Academy Edition. I refer to the standard Akademie pagination and use the translation of *Critique of pure reason*, 2000; [CPJ] *Critique of the power of judgment*, and [FI] the First Introduction of CPJ, 2000; [CPrR] “*Critique of Practical Reason*” in Kant, *Practical philosophy*, 1996.

Artworks can be beautiful in the sense of formal or sensuous presentation. However, beautiful artwork should also possess *Geist*, namely, spirit, “the animating principle in the mind” (CPJ 5: 313). Accordingly, spirit “purposively sets the mental powers into motion, *i.e.*, into a play that is self-maintaining and even strengthens the powers to that end” (CPJ 5: 313). Beautiful art with spirit animates the mind by “opening up for it the prospect of an immeasurable field of related representations” (CPJ 5: 314-5). And then it gives imagination “an impetus to think more” beyond the limits of experience, “with a completeness that goes beyond anything of which there is an example in nature” (CPJ 5: 314-5). As a result, audiences grasp the spirit that hides behind the depiction of objects and the sensory appearance of works. They are aware of a certain depth of the work, for example, the personality or virtue in person or the perfect natural or social order in poetry, story, and oration.

Then we found the first consistency in both Chinese aesthetics and Kant’s aesthetics: beautiful art can convey either the *Qi-Yun* or spirit of the depicted object and animate the audience’s mind.

2.2 BEAUTIFUL ARTWORKS MUST APPEAR INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL AT THE SAME TIME

While the first parallel concerns aesthetic values of works of art, the second parallel concerns our perception of beautiful art: beautiful art should appear unintentional.

In Chinese Aesthetics, artworks should not appear as the products of the author’s intention. *You-Yi*, intention (有意), is the artist’s consciousness of the plan and process of production (Shi 2018, 871). In contrast, *Wu-Yi* means being unintentional (無意). That means the artist is not conscious of the plan or work for predetermined ends in production, meaning that the works should arise spontaneously (871).

We cannot tell whether intention or plan is present when artists create their works. Nevertheless, it is a consensus through antiquity that audiences prefer *Wu-Yi*, namely, the spontaneity of art production, over *You-Yi* (Shi 2018, 876). According to an observation made by the Song critic Su Shi (蘇軾, 1037-1101), “when you have no intent to produce excellent work that it turns out to be excellent” (Egan 1994).⁴

The primacy of *Wu-Yi* then demands that artists should go beyond following their plans by forgetting their intention in production (Shi 2018, 876; Hu 2020, 359). Even though having an intention or plan is essential for the artists to conduct production, at least the artists should balance *You-Yi* and *Wu-Yi* to exhibit spontaneity in their works. Moreover, the primacy of spontaneity also suggests that artists should not imitate how others produce their works. The Qing painter Wang Yuan Qi (王原祁, 1642-1715) once tried to bring out the expressive quality of the Yuan painter Ni Zan (倪瓚, 1301-1374) by imitating his works, but he failed to do so. As Wang observed, spontaneity constitutes the expressive quality of Ni Zan’s works, and one cannot achieve spontaneity through imitation. Artists imitate when they follow the routines or plans of

⁴ “初無意於佳乃佳”.

others' production. Imitation fails to bring out the spontaneity of one's works. Thus, spontaneity and the expressive quality of works require going beyond any plans or intentions.

Similarly, according to Kant:

In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a mere product of nature...art can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is art and yet it looks to us like nature. (CPJ 5: 306)

Even though audiences could know that artworks are products of intention, they must appear unintentional; instead, they must seem to be the products of spontaneous nature. Kant highlights the same spontaneity because aesthetic pleasure is constituted by harmonious mental animation when audiences appreciate beautiful artworks that rest on the freedom from constraint by plans or rules (CPJ 5: 306).

Then, regarding our perception of beautiful artworks, both Kant and Chinese aesthetics seem to suggest they should appear unintentional because the spontaneity thus exhibited is essential.

2.3 A SPONTANEOUS INNATE MENTAL DISPOSITION IS RESPONSIBLE FOR BEAUTIFUL ARTWORKS

According to Xe He, the generation of *Qi-Yun* of painting must involve a mental disposition naturally endowed to the artist: "it assuredly cannot be secured through cleverness or close application, nor will time aid its attainment" (Bush and Shih 2012, 95). Precisely, the capacity of "an unspoken accord, a spiritual communion" constitutes this innate disposition: it is "something that happens without one's knowing how" and is not "open to study" (95). The artist's innate and unlearnable mental disposition determines the ability to produce a painting saturated with *Qi-Yun* for painting.

Guo Ruoxu suggests this unique disposition consists of the mental aptitude to have *You-Xin*, the mental "carefree wandering" (Jullien and Todd 2009, 165). We shall translate it as a carefree-wandering mind featured by spontaneity. As Guo explains, when the mind becomes relaxed and tranquil, "the varying emotions and aspects of men, and the different characteristics of objects, will spontaneously order themselves in your mind and appear without effort under your brush" (Bush and Shih 2012, 157).

Two aspects characterize the spontaneity of a carefree-wandering mind. First, the work spontaneously appears once the artist's mind is carefree-wandering. Second, the audiences can receive the expressionistic *Qi-Yun* and find the spontaneity they value, with the essential reality of the depicted objects captured and mental animation aroused. Thus, Chinese aesthetics construes the carefree-wandering mind to have a robust inter-subjective power.

In addition to spontaneity, this carefree-wandering mind also features a supra-cognitive talent: internalizing the nature or reason of depicted objects (Kao 1991, 65). Kao (55) interprets this internalization as "the process of incorporating external data." The carefree-wandering mind in question then concerns the employment of internalization capacity. By employing this capacity, artists can resonate with the nature

of depicted objects, a fusion of the artists' minds with the outside world (*Shen-yu*, 神遇) (Pohl, 2006). Consequently, *Qi-Yun* transmits into the audiences' minds. They can also receive *Qi-Yun* and engage in a similar free wandering.

According to Kant, producing beautiful arts with spirit must involve a similar innate mental disposition, genius, "the inborn predisposition of the mind through which nature gives the rule to art" (CPJ 5:307). 'Nature' here not only indicates that genius is not learnable. It also means an individual's inborn mental capacity generates materials spontaneously, just as nature creates materials and lives. Artworks are precisely the products of this spontaneity instead of intention or plan.

In addition, as Kant also suggests, genius is more than cognition or imagination. Instead, having beautiful art requires the employment of "imagination, understanding, spirit and taste" altogether (CPJ 5: 320). We may also wonder whether genius may employ a similar internalization process. However, because imagination and understanding are cognitive faculties, the employment of imagination and understanding already implies the assimilation of sensible data provided by nature or the intended objects.

2.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF ILLUMINATING CHINESE AESTHETICS WITH KANT'S AESTHETICS

As we put Chinese Aesthetics and Kant's idea of genius side by side, we can see that similar innate and spontaneous mental talents that exceed normal cognition and imagination generate beautiful arts with similar unique qualities. Then, audiences could perceive either the essential reality or spirit. Accordingly, they seem to propose parallel theories about the creative artistic process. Consequently, it seems sufficient to claim we could understand how the creative carefree-wandering mind produces masterpieces with spirit resonance as the Kantian genius produces beautiful art with spirit. However, we shall not neglect Kant's critical project; otherwise, we misread the specific function of genius in the critical project and overlook the sharp distinction between the notion of genius and the carefree-wandering mind.

3. THE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES AND AIMS

This paper argues that genius is a postulated idea that makes sense only in a critical project. To explain the notion of genius and its difference from the carefree-wandering mind, I shall first explain the critical project that stipulates the exercise of mental faculties with specific values. I pay special attention to one of these exercises, namely, reflection, and its principle, namely, purposiveness, with which Kant is concerned in the *Critique of the Power of Judgement*. The notion of genius pertains to this exercise because, as I argue in the next section, the postulation of genius makes the aesthetic judgment of works of art possible. In contrast, in Chinese aesthetics, artist or connoisseurs are interested in the actual practical process of producing art. The carefree-wandering mind has its root in Zhuang Zi's theory of self and practical guide to success. We could not find a similar critical project underlying Chinese aesthetics.

Instead, we could discover Daoist ethics beneath Chinese aesthetics featuring a transformative self and an identification with nature. The difference in approaches and aims grounds the difficulty in conceiving a parallel between two systems of thought.

3.1 WHAT DOES KANT'S CRITICAL PROJECT PROPOSE?

Kant's critical project proposes that exercising some principle-giving mental faculties has unique value (Zinkin 2018, 3149). For the *Critique of Pure Reason* (CPR), the value is objective validity; for the *Critique of Practical Reason*, moral goodness; for the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (CPJ), systematicity.

The CPR suggests that thinking subjects should rely on the understanding and sensibility to obtain objective cognition. The understanding and sensibility provide a priori principles that distinguish cognition with objective validity from those without objective validity: the forms of intuitions and the categories of the understanding (A12/B17). Exercising the understanding and sensibility in experience secures the objective validity of cognitions.

Similarly, the CPrR suggests that agents should ensure the independence and autonomy of the will to obtain moral goodness. Action has moral worth only when the will is independent and autonomous, can legislate universal laws, and determine itself according to them. That means agents should prevent "empirically conditioned reason from presuming that it, alone and exclusively, furnishes the determining ground of the will" (CPrR 05:16).

Notably, the employment of the will or the understanding alone will not suffice to obtain a piece of cognition or make a choice. Individuals must judge with the determining power of judgment to conclude cognitive or practical reasoning. That means they must eventually make cognitive or moral inferences and determine the particular in question by subsuming it under some predetermined universals, rules, or principles (CPJ 5: 179). Doing so is to determine "whether something stands under a given rule or not" by subsuming a "P" under the concept "U" and hence judge that a "P" is a "U" (A 132/B171).

We can distinguish between the capacity that gives principles and the power that acts on the principles (Zinkin 2018, 3152). The understanding gives us the capacity (*Vermögen*) to judge because it contains the categories, the synthetic a priori principles, which validate cognitive judgments, and without which no cognitive judgments would be possible. The practical reason, namely, the will, gives us the capacity (*Vermögen*) to take moral action because it examines the maxims of actions according to the categorical imperative. Therefore, exercising the understanding and the will could have particular normative values. In contrast, we only use the determining power (*Kraft*) of judgment to conclude the thinking guided by the categories or the categorical imperative. That means the power of judgment in the determining mode does not have authority in thinking because it only follows predetermined principles and is not the source of principles.

Can the power of judgment give a principle to and have authority in some of our thinking? The CPJ concerns the mental activity in which the power of judgment is itself

the source of its principle and has a unique normative value. This mental activity is the sort of thinking that we usually call reflection. In reflection, individuals employ reflective judgment. Judgment in the reflective mode searches for the universal for the given particulars (CPJ 5: 179). That means judgment assumes no predetermined rules but gives the principle to itself regarding how to conduct and actualize itself.

Specifically, in reflection, the power of judgment gives itself the *a priori* principle of purposiveness to conduct and actualize itself. This principle states the idea of a systematic form the judgment aims to realize: “Nature specifies its general laws into empirical ones, in accordance with the form of a logical system, in behalf of the power of judgment” (FI 20: 216). The power of judgment dictates that it must aim to find a principle, a logically systematic form, to determine the particulars thoroughly. That means it can only find an indeterminate universal because no universal is given but is yet to be determined. The indeterminate form of a logical system is the goal that the power of judgment wants to realize. Letting the power of judgment determine its judging activity is to conduct judgment to realize the logically systematic form. Consequently, the power of judgment in its reflective mode only strives to actualize itself, *i.e.*, to judge.

The faculty of judgment thus aims for something systematic: the faculty of judgment attempts to have a form that, once found, can determine the structure or organizations of the particular cognitions. For example, the principles determining the structures of crystals, flowers, and artworks are instances of the systematizing principles judgment aims to find (FI 20: 217-8). These systematizing principles determine the design of materials that brings their parts into a sensible structure. Therefore, to employ judgment with a unique value is not only doing reflection and searching for law. Essentially, it is also to systematize the cognitions yet to be determined.

Our engagement in reflection employs our “natural gift” (Zinkin 2018, 3155). Therefore, the CPJ reveals a heautonomous mode of judgment: it “does not give the law to nature nor to freedom, but solely to itself” (FI 20:225). This mode of judgment is valuable because it directs us to find systematicity from the manifolds in the world. This mode pertains to our concern because, in our reflection on the artworks, the notion of genius is necessary for successfully making aesthetic judgments regarding the aesthetic value, *i.e.*, beauty, of artworks.

3.2 WHAT IS THE PROJECT UNDERLYING CHINESE AESTHETICS?

In contrast, the descriptions and practical advice for the actual practical process of producing art constitute an essential part of Chinese aesthetics. We cannot find a corresponding critical approach in Chinese aesthetics. Instead, we find a Daoist metaphysical-ethical project underlying Chinese aesthetics from the practical advice and descriptions about producing masterpieces.

Artists or connoisseurs are interested in the actual practical process of producing art. They give practical advice and descriptions about producing masterpieces. They pay little attention to investigating the proper ways to employ mental faculties in artistic

activity or evaluating artworks. Such advice suggests that “the painter should act like the creator or semi-creator of the universe in terms of presenting the pictorial idea in his mind and capturing the spiritual aspect of nature” (Gao 1996, 136). That means the Chinese genius could possess some causal power similar to cosmological power. Such causal power also involves the mental power to enter an eternal or tranquil mental state. This mental state enables individuals to witness the vicissitudes of the world all at once or perceive the dynamics between two cosmic causal powers⁵. As suggested, “Chinese perception of existence or reality as a process, and of polarities as harmonized” underlies Chinese art (Hu 2020, 364).

The above advice and descriptions have roots in a Daoist metaphysical-ethical project featuring a conception of transformative self and corresponding moral implications.

The metaphysical aspect of this Daoist project consists of a theory of the authentic self. The authentic self assumes no fixed identity. Instead, it is not only transformative but also identical to the incredible process of the natural transformation itself. Therefore, it participates in and can grasp nature’s productive and transformative processes and the dynamics between the two cosmic causal powers.

Nature’s incredible transformative process is a process of transforming identities:

How great is the Process of Creation-Transformation! What will it make you become; where will it send you? Will it make you into a mouse’s liver? Or perhaps an insect’s arm? (chapter 6 in Ziporyn 2009, 132)

A virtuous person who realizes such a transformative self can diminish her psychological self through various skills of forgetting all its objective, logical, and normative features. Through doing so, the virtuous person identifies herself with the activities of various encountered objects and hence grasps the mutual dependence and influences of the subject and the object. In this process, the virtuous person could assume the perspective of encountered objects and grasp their reality. She could also identify herself as the process of transformation and is free from the boundary of fixed identity:

This is how the perfect Virtuoso, who vanishingly unifies self and other, wanders far and unfettered... It is only one who can vanish into things and follow along with the great process of transformation, who can be truly free of dependence and thus constantly unobstructed. (Guo Xiang in Ziporyn 2009, 132)

That does not mean that an individual becomes a set of encountered objects. Instead, the individual becomes a temporal flow of activities: the individual constantly shifts into various activities. This flow enables the individual to have multiple perspectives, attune to various reasons and situations, and perceive alternative possibilities, namely, freedom in thinking or, in our context, a carefree-wandering mind.

⁵ *Yin* (陰) and *Yang* (陽) are responsible for the creation of the cosmos.

The ethical aspect of this Daoist project consists of the following suggestion: to have various kinds of success is to cultivate oneself towards the authentic self and go along with the transformation process in whatever activities in which one participates. As Zhuang Zi suggests:

Seeing all the possible dwelling places as one, let yourself be lodged in whichever cannot be avoided. This will get you close to success. (chapter 4 in Ziporyn 2009, 27)

That means any identities, values, rules, or concerns would hamper one's pursuit of success. An individual shall not fix her mind and identity. Instead, one ought to liberate oneself from such boundaries and have a carefree-wandering mind that enables one to perceive multiple possibilities to have a natural and happy life.

In the context of aesthetics, producing beautiful artworks or masterpieces is precisely a success in artistic production. Producing masterpieces requires that artists achieve a carefree-wandering mind. Accordingly, artistic production in Chinese aesthetics is consistent with the general Daoist project.

3.3 CAN WE CONSTRUCT A PARALLEL BETWEEN TWO SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT?

Constructing a parallel between Kant's and Chinese aesthetics would be challenging. Kant draws attention to our minds. Kant conducts a critique of mental faculties to discover the *a priori* principles that govern the use of our mental faculties. In contrast, Chinese aesthetics draws attention to the relation between our life and the world. Chinese aesthetics embodies a theory of self and corresponding moral implications in real life.

From a Kantian perspective, the descriptions and practical advice in Chinese aesthetics may appear exaggerated because it may not be possible to have such an experience in our life. We could undoubtedly hypothesize the entire history of the world and the dynamics between two cosmic causal powers. However, it would be questionable to say that we could perceive them. Further, it would be too hasty to assume that every success is worthy of our pursuit without evaluating its value. We should conduct a critical project before forming theories or taking action because only the relevant critiques can justify ways of knowing and acting.

From the perspective of Chinese aesthetics, Kantians would lay too much stress on principles and lose the opportunities for a carefree-wandering mind. Instead, we shall let principles go, submit ourselves to the natural transformative process and wait for our opportunities and fortune.

Consequently, the two philosophical systems are not similar and even incompatible in their approaches and aims. We might say that they could complement each other in other ways. However, we must be at least cautious in projecting Kant's idea to illuminate Chinese aesthetics. I shall argue later that the idea of genius makes sense only in our reflection of artworks. Hence, it is radically different from the carefree-wandering mind.

4. THE IDEA OF GENIUS IN KANT'S CPJ

The following two sections argue that genius and the carefree-wandering mind are sharply different. Section 4 shows that from the perspective of the critical project, successfully conducting aesthetic judgment to evaluate artificial objects or mental images requires the idea of genius. Thus, genius goes hand in hand with aesthetic judgment. I will discuss the principle and the mental process of judging something as beautiful. Next, I will look at the corresponding criterion for the beautiful works, namely, the perceived purposiveness, to explain why the notion of genius is necessary. Section 5 shows that, in Chinese aesthetics, the carefree-wandering mind refers to a causal power *Wu-Wei* (無為), namely, controlling without controlling. In the end, I will show that Kant's notion of genius, a conceptual condition for aesthetic reflection on works of art, and the carefree-wandering mind, an objective causal condition, are radically different. This difference makes conceiving the parallel between Kant's notion of genius and Chinese aesthetics difficult.

4.1 FROM THE REFLECTION ACTIVITY TO MAKING AESTHETIC JUDGEMENT

The subject engaging in reflection must have felt herself as "affected by the representation" of some objects or images to make aesthetic judgments (CPJ 5:204). Specifically, suppose individuals judge the precepted items as beautiful. In that case, they must have felt a harmonious free play between the imagination and the understanding arising in reflecting on the representation in question. Kant identifies this feeling as aesthetic pleasure, the basis for making aesthetic judgments.⁶

Suppose individuals think the items in question are beautiful. In that case, individuals perceive it to be cognizable, *i.e.*, purposive for cognition. They imagine how the materials of the object cohere and continuously look for alternative ways to understand the synthesis of imagination but do not aim for an objective cognition to determine the object. The feeling of such a mental movement constitutes the free harmonious interplay between the powers of imagination and understanding. This feeling of a free animation of the mind is aesthetic pleasure.

An individual's reflection is the basis of experiencing the aesthetic feeling, the self-cognition of which leads the individual to make an aesthetic judgment. We should note that aesthetic judgment is only a reflective judgment conducted according to the principle of purposiveness to judge if items are beautiful. When an individual is engaged in reflection, the pleasure of the harmonious mental animation underlies and occasions the aesthetic judgment that asserts the object as beautiful.

⁶ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making me think about this point.

4.2 CONDUCTING AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS REFLECTS THE MENTAL ACTIVITY OF REFLECTION ON FORM

When one experiences aesthetic pleasure, her self-cognition of this pleasure leads her to make an aesthetic judgment. The aesthetic judgment essentially reflects the individual's reflection on the intuitive form of the perceived object or mental image. In such reflection, the individual searches for a universal principle for the sensory aspect of the precepted items, which turns out to be the principle of purposiveness.

Therefore, purposiveness is the sole principle for conducting one's aesthetic judgment when reflecting on the intuitive form. Individuals must search for a logical system to organize the design or structure of the intuited materials. Motivated by aesthetic feeling, individuals need to perceive that an intuitive representation is purposive for understanding to assert that this representation is beautiful justifiably. That means, on the one hand, individuals shall perceive some temporal-spatial arrangement or interconnections from the intuitive representation. On the other hand, individuals shall not determine the intuitive representation as a specific objective cognition (CPJ 5:179). If they succeed in putting the imaginative synthesis under the principle of purposiveness, they judge the item as beautiful.

To note, individuals only reflect on the intuitive form of perception. They are only concerned with the imaginative synthesis of intuitions provided by the items in question. They think they could (not would) bring the formal structure of imaginative synthesis under universal principles or concepts. Individuals confronted with a beautiful object suitable for cognition are ready to subsume the obtained intuition under a concept. However, they have no thought or desire to apply a concept to determine the beautiful item. In this manner, individuals enjoy the freedom of not having to apply a concept in their aesthetic experience. There would be no temptation for them to employ the determining power of judgment. Therefore, individuals only assert the purposiveness of the organization of intuitions in a given perception.

That means individuals would not subsume the perceived representation under a specific concept if they decide to remain in the reflective process. They are not concerned with using the items or knowing their objective or logical properties in specific ways at the moment of aesthetic reflection. Then, individuals do not employ the determining power of judgment. The reasons could be various. For example, the structure of the intuition is overly complex, so a given nominal concept cannot capture it. Alternatively, the reflecting individuals enjoy the moment of harmonious free mental play and do not wish to terminate their reflection. Therefore, their reflection assumes no determinate ending.

4.3 THE SUBJECTIVE *NATURE OF THE PERCEIVED* PURPOSIVENESS

I have shown the principle and the mental process to judge something as beautiful. We shall shift our attention to the corresponding criterion for the beautiful representation to explain why the notion of genius is necessary for making aesthetic judgments on works of art.

The criterion for a beautiful representation is perceived purposiveness. Individuals must perceive the purposiveness of a representation to say it is beautiful. The perceived purposiveness only leads to the free animation of the mind. Then, the beautiful representation only addresses the reflecting individual's cognitive faculties. Therefore the perceived purposiveness is subjective.

Further, the reflecting individuals can only say that the beautiful representation is purposive without an objective purpose. That means the beautiful representation does not refer to anything other than the reflecting subject. For example, the reflecting individuals cannot say that the author wants to win a prize, persuade others to do something, or achieve emotional catharsis. Then, the purposiveness at stake is not objective. Otherwise, the item in question is useful, or good, but not beautiful. It would not have aesthetic value because it is not for the free interplay among cognitive faculties. Thus, the reflecting individuals do not conceptually determine the objective purpose of the beautiful representation by referring it to or explaining it in terms of other objects. Therefore, the perceived purposiveness is a feature of beautiful representation with a conceptually indeterminate purpose (5:236).

This perceived purposiveness thoroughly addresses the subject's mind. It leads to the wonders about the imaginative synthesis, namely, how the intuited materials cohere into a spatiotemporal structure. Once individuals reflect on artwork showing purposiveness, it only sustains the delightful harmonious interplay among cognitive faculties (5:190). Therefore, the perceived purposiveness is valuable for redirecting the attention of the judging individuals inside. Once perceived, it animates the mind.

4.4 THE DIFFICULTY OF CONCEIVING ARTIFICIAL SUBJECTIVE PURPOSIVENESS

Individuals have contradictory beliefs, namely, the cognition of artificiality and the perception of subjective purposiveness when making an aesthetic judgment on beautiful artworks. On the one hand, the cognition of artificiality is that individuals know that a work of art is an artifact: the artist produces it as a work of art for some determining and objective purpose. On the other hand, individuals also perceive that something beautiful is subjectively purposive. Namely, they think that beautiful things do not refer to other objects or concepts that could explain why they are produced. Therefore, Kant's critique of aesthetic judgment encounters an impasse. One cannot make an aesthetic judgment on works of art without compromising these two contradictory beliefs. The notion of genius is precisely the solution to this impasse.

Unlike those natural laws or biological instincts that determine the natural processes leading to an abundance of natural beauty, the conceptual representation of an end determines an artistic activity leading to beautiful artwork because it is a kind of art (CPJ 5: 303).

Kant designates intentional production in general with "art" (CPJ 5: 303). Accordingly, art is a practical ability requiring the creative agent to conceive an objective purpose. This purpose helps agents plan or give rules to the course of action and carry it out. At least, the creative agent must have some values in her mind to

determine what the product or performance ought to realize. Otherwise, it is not intentional action but random behavior.

Precisely, because the artist's creative activity is an art, it must aim for an objective purpose, with which artists can plan or gives technical rules to the course of their actions. Audiences who realize the artificiality of artworks can infer the technical rules for production and obtain an objective cognition of artistic activity and artworks with reason and understanding. That means the recognition of artificiality would lead to determinative judgment. If audiences know the objective purpose, they could subsume their intuition of an artistic product under it and then specify its properties and the technical rules for making it. At this juncture, the audiences do not need to reflect on the perceived object and search for principles. No aesthetic pleasure or judgment can arise.

However, suppose audiences want to conduct aesthetic reflection. In that case, they must think that no conception of end or principle is involved in their perception of the artistic activity. That means they must think the artistic activity that generates beauty happens spontaneously instead of intentionally according to plan or rules. Only then can the work address the subject instead of having objective purposes. Only then can the work resonates in their mind by quickening their imagination and understanding, causing a pleasure that leads to the aesthetic judgment that asserts the beauty of the work.

Therefore, unlike natural beauty, it is challenging to comprehend the purposiveness found in artworks because the audiences have incompatible beliefs. (1) Artistic activity is an intentional action aiming for a purpose—artworks are intentional products. (2) Artistic activity must not appear intentional or aim for a purpose: art happens spontaneously, and artworks appear as products of natural processes.

Without compromising these two beliefs, interpreters encounter a difficulty, artificial subjective purposiveness, hampering their engagement in the aesthetic reflection of works of art. Meanwhile, the critical project also meets a conceptual problem limiting its explanatory power on beautiful works. Accordingly, Kant's suggestion is to postulate the idea of genius to make the artificial purposiveness thinkable. Genius is a powerful super-intentional intellectual capacity that spontaneously gives rise to the subjective purposiveness that audiences find in beautiful arts.

4.5 POSTULATING GENIUS WITH FOUR FEATURES

The idea of genius is a conceptual framework that could take over the explanatory role played by the concept of efficient cause to understand the subjective purposiveness of beautiful art. We should not use objective purposes we inferred from our observation and investigation of the production process of actual works to explain artistic activities. That means artistic activities should not be seen as intentional actions. That is to postulate a conceptual framework to say that beautiful artworks appear natural while believing they are products of human activity. We could achieve this by conceiving that beautiful artworks come from individuals' subjective nature or disposition

(Allison 2001, 279). This disposition in possible authors is genius. A possible author possessing it can spontaneously produce works without intending them.

This conceptual framework makes thinking about artwork's subjective purposiveness possible. Genius spontaneously gives the rule of nature to art. This spontaneous subjective nature allows us to say that beautiful artworks appear natural because we see that they appear natural even though they come from the hand of artists. Consequently, a beautiful artwork can be more than sensory beautiful because it embodies something lively and spontaneous, namely, spirit, or, in the language of Chinese aesthetics, spirit-consonance.

According to Kant, if we analyze the notion of genius, we can derive four logical features from it:

(1) Originality: unlike agents who intend the ends, conceive and follow step-by-step procedures in the ordinary production of items, a genius does not need to follow the rules to produce beautiful artworks (CPJ 5: 307). Originality, an aptitude that gives principles to its activity and products, means the genius disposition is the sole source of the audience's perception of artificial beauty, just as nature that gives natural laws to its mechanisms is the sole origin of its productive processes. Originality "gives rise" to the perception of beautiful art spontaneously. To note, to be original only implies that the audience attends to and perceives the beautiful works as governed by some undetermined principle instead of an objective cognition. This attention and perception are what judging individuals want to understand with the idea of originality.

(2) Exemplariness: the products of genius, *i.e.*, beautiful artworks, serve as the standard for judging; namely, they show purposiveness (CPJ 5: 308). Once perceived, the products are purposive and ready for the audience to make aesthetic judgments and have accompanying pleasure. Their purposiveness triggers the pleasure that underlies the aesthetic judgment. The pleasure and judgment happen all at once. Just as originality implies the audiences' attention to look for the undetermined principles of products, the exemplariness implies that the audiences have already discovered that the works are purposive for cognition so that they reflect on them and feel pleasure.

(3) Mystery: "it cannot itself describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its product into being, but rather that it gives the rule as nature" (5:308). After all, genius is only an ideal spontaneous talent in the subjective nature of the possible author specifically postulated by the audiences. Audiences conceive it to function the exact way nature creates the manifolds. The self-knowledge of the possible author is irrelevant to reflection. The audiences are not concerned with it.

(4) Specificity: this naturally endowed capacity prescribes rule to art, not science. Because the notion of genius aims at eliminating the tension between artificiality and subjective purposiveness, science is irrelevant here.

4.6 POSTULATING GENIUS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CRITICAL PROJECT

Therefore, we are ready to see that Kant's genius cannot share features with the Chinese artist's disposition, the carefree-wandering mind for making beautiful art. According

to Kant, the audience judges the artwork as beautiful and expressive. In contrast, the Chinese artist gives her work its beauty and expression, independent of any audience. Genius is an audience-postulated concept that enables audiences themselves to think coherently that the artwork is subjectively purposive.

On the one hand, Kant's notion of genius compromises two contradictory beliefs during the reflective activity, structuring them logically. The postulation of this notion has its source in the reflective activity of the power of judgment conducted according to purposiveness: the awareness of artificiality and the perceived purposiveness must be purposive for our cognition, and individuals can find a principle given by genius for comprehending them. Therefore, genius is never an idea designating the creativity of artists. It does not matter whether the creator exists as a person or has such talent. Instead, it is a matter of the audience's belief. Genius is only an idea belonging to the audience to resolve a conceptual problem. It compromises the awareness of artificiality and the purposiveness in the audience's perception. Saying the genius creates is like saying nature had created the purposive artworks by giving them the law, *i.e.*, purposiveness.⁷

On the other hand, we could determine the logical properties of genius by analyzing its concept. However, it is impossible to determine the objective properties of genius because it is only an ideal made by the audiences to compromise two beliefs. It is not a psychological or causal condition that we could infer from observing how artists produce masterpieces or how the masterpieces psychologically influence us. The postulation indicates that audiences do not mechanically conduct judgments. That means they do not assume some external causes or metaphysical principles to explain art and artworks. Instead, audiences employ judgment artistically and actively search for principles to organize specific cognitions and make sense of their relations.

5. THE CAREFREE-WONDERING MIND IN CHINESE AESTHETICS CAN EXERT CONTROL WITH NO CONTROL

The previous sections argue that audiences postulate the idea of genius to compromise two beliefs when reflecting on beautiful artworks. Thus genius designates nothing in the mind of creators, and it has no objective features. In contrast, we could determine the objective feature of the Chinese genius, and we could infer a specific causal power belonging to the carefree-wandering mind. Such a feature underlies the practical suggestion of mind-printing (*Xin-yin*, 心印) in Chinese aesthetics. I will point out that this objective feature of the carefree-wandering mind is the Daoist conception of control with no control, namely, *Wu-Wei* (無為). Because *Wu-Wei* is the highest standard for successful action in Chinese philosophy, aestheticians believe that artistic production should conform to it. Then, artists should strive for a corresponding balance between *Wu-Yi* (無意, being unintentional) and *You-Yi* (有意, being intentional). As an idea with logical features in the perceiver's mind, genius is not relevantly similar to the

⁷ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer whose suggestion lets me think about it.

carefree-wondering mind, which possesses an objective causal feature. Therefore, drawing parallels between the former and the latter is not plausible.

5.1 THE MINDPRINTING AND *WU-WEI*

Chinese aesthetics does not investigate the principles for making judgments as Kant does. Nevertheless, we could find a theory that stipulates the best production process as mind-printing in Chinese aesthetics. The ideal product is the work replete with *Qi-Yun*, which only the process of mind-printing could achieve. Then the goal of one's productive activity is to have the mind-printing process. To achieve this goal is to have a carefree-wandering mind which possesses the power of *Wu-Wei*, in a meditation-like manner, as Zhuang Zi would call the fasting of the mind.

Guo Ruoxu suggests artworks replete with *Qi-Yun* must be the prints of the mind. Artworks are mind's prints because they "originate from the source of the mind and are perfected in the imagination to take shape" on paper (Bush and Shih 2012, 95-6). While a masterpiece is more than a simple perfection of the technical aspects of work, there is hardly any objective standard to work out a masterpiece. The practical advice is to achieve the ideal productive process, mind-printing. Therefore, the goal of productive activity is to realize this process.

To realize the mind-printing process is to build up a carefree-wandering mind. It is not only the cognitive power to transform oneself as one identifies with the flow of various activities and shifts perspectives. The carefree-wandering mind must also possess a causal power that could conduct the mind-printing process. We shall term this power *Wu-Wei*, a power of exerting control without control. Such power gives rise to proper actions that flow freely and immediately from the mind (Shi 2018, 875). *Wu-Wei* thus designates the causality of the creative carefree-wandering mind we can get from Chinese aesthetics.

Wu-Wei does not imply that the artists exert no control at all. Instead, artists shall intentionally do two things. The first is to train oneself with various relevant skills or techniques intentionally. For example, calligraphers need to learn generally accepted styles, memorize them with repetitive practice, and acquire a "somatic memory" or habit to automatically perform their artistic production (Shi 2018, 875). The second is to always deliberate and set a goal for oneself when engaging in production. Setting a goal only means that one shall eventually have a print of mind; namely, the production process must end, and the creator wants a result at some time. Artists still exert deliberative control over the process. They should at least consider what the products will be, how they will be valuable, or how the artists could produce them.

What is specific about *Wu-Wei* is that all the intentional deliberative control shall withdraw to the mind's background when engaging in productive activity. This withdrawal enables the mind to concentrate on the ongoing activity. That is why the carefree-wandering mind can identify with various activities, take the encountered objects' perspectives, and identify with the supreme natural transformative process. As a result of *Wu-Wei*, the artist is attuned to the nature of and resonates with the encountered objects. The artist with the carefree-wandering mind could eventually

print out a work replete with *Qi-Yun* because of the resonance achieved by *Wu-Wei*. In Chinese aesthetics, the proper shapes or figures of the objects arise in the mind as if in a natural and involuntary process, and the artist's body movements correspondingly print them out on paper or silk.

5.2 THE MIND FASTING AND *WU-WEI*

Wu-Wei is achievable through a specific meditative skill. A master called Sung Ti (11th century) suggests:

You should first look for a damaged wall, and then stretch plain silk against it. Gaze at it day and night. When you have looked for a sufficient length of time, you will see through the silk the high and low parts, or curves and angles, on the surface of the wall, which will take on the appearance of landscape...Once they are complete in your eyes, then follow your imagination to command your brush. Silently, through your intuitive apprehension (*shen-hui*), the natural scene will be spontaneously achieved... (Bush and Shih 2012, 122)

It seems that a process of doing nothing but a prolonged focus on blankness leads to the eventual mind-printing.

This meditative skill is more spelled out in Zhuang Zi's term, the fasting of the mind:

I fast to quiet my mind, and after three days, I no longer presume to care about praise or reward, rank or salary. After five days, I no longer presume to care about honor and disgrace, skill and clumsiness. After seven days, I become so still that I forget I have four limbs or a body... it is as if the royal court has ceased to exist. My skill is concentrated and the outside world slides away...(chapter 19 in Ziporyn 2009, 81–2)

The fasting of the mind is equivalent to shifting the focus of the mind. While individuals surely deliberate about the ending states initially, they shall withdraw their attention from the goals, various extrinsic rewards of their activities given by society or political powers, and even their existences. Instead, they fully emerge in employing their skills and attending to encountered objects. As a result of the mind-fasting, individuals get close to achievements.

Correspondingly, individuals shall achieve *Wu-Yi* and go beyond *You-Yi*. They need to attempt to be unintentional to show spontaneity in their works. Then we can see no relevant similarity between the Kantian genius and the carefree-wandering mind.

5.3 NO RELEVANT SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE NOTION OF GENIUS AND THE CAREFREE-WANDERING MIND

Kant's idea of genius and the carefree-wandering mind are not similar. The latter intends to explain the actual production process in which this innate talent is sufficient for *Qi-Yun*. A work produced by such a Chinese genius has the inter-subjective power to transmit *Qi-Yun* into the mind of its actual or potential audiences. That means Chinese genius causally precedes the reception of *Qi-Yun* by the audience. However,

Kant's genius is an idea. Only when people enter into reflection on works of art, perceive the works as if created by nature, and feel the harmonious interplay of imagination and understanding will they need the idea of genius. Genius is the condition to take the final step of making aesthetic judgments successfully.⁸

To sum up our discussion in sections 4 and 5. First, we assume two different ways of reasoning when clarifying the notion of genius and the carefree-wondering mind. On the one hand, we explain the carefree-wondering mind as the efficient cause functioning by exerting *Wu-Wei* and psychologically affecting their audiences. On the other hand, the power of judgment makes it possible for us to postulate an idea of genius as the conceptual framework to compromise two mutually contradictory beliefs. Because of genius, artificial purposiveness is thinkable.

Second, the works created by the carefree-wandering mind and the works of genius influence the audiences differently. According to Kant, the judging individual assumes primacy and independence over the influence of the works of art. If audiences find some artifacts beautiful, our understanding and imagination harmoniously interplay when they perceive their well-designed forms. The works themselves, regardless of being products of genius or ordinary works, have only well-designed forms of materials instead of direct power to influence audiences. It is instead the conceiving power of the mind to take a reflective stance on the form and elicit the experience of beauty and pleasure in itself. The Kantian genius has no real power over audiences. However, according to Chinese aesthetics, the works repleted with *Qi-Yun* could arouse the mental movement of the audiences. That means it psychologically affects the audience's mind, amounting to saying that the carefree-wondering mind has substantial powers over audiences. Therefore, the carefree-wandering mind and the Kantian genius have different relations with the audiences.

Therefore, the asymmetry between the notion of genius and the carefree-wandering mind makes it difficult to conceive parallels between Kant's notion of genius and Chinese aesthetics.

6. CONCLUSION

Does projecting a parallel between Kant into Chinese Aesthetics still appear feasible? It might be that similar innate and spontaneous mental talents produce beautiful artworks with a similar unique quality that captures the spirit or the essential reality of depicted items. However, it is challenging to conceive such a parallel. (1) Kant's theory of genius is integral to a critical project that stipulates valuable ways of exercising mental faculties. A Daoist metaphysical-ethical view is present in Chinese aesthetics. (2) Genius is a postulated idea for coordinating our thinking of artificiality and subjective purposiveness. It is not similar to the carefree-wandering mind that is the efficient cause for artworks with *Qi-Yun*.

It is worthy to note that the carefree-wandering mind in Chinese Aesthetics refers to some cosmological or spiritual power the authors of masterpieces possess. A Kantian

⁸ Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer who corrects me about this point.

would be skeptical of such an idea. Experiencing the carefree-wandering mind seems impossible: we shall instead conduct a critique and justify the principles for cognition before making a theory of such a transcendent power. However, this paper does not intend to criticize these two systems of philosophy. It only intends to show that illuminating the notions in Chinese aesthetics by projecting Kant's ideas into the former is not a feasible approach.

We may still wonder if Kant's aesthetics could be similar to Chinese aesthetics and Chinese art in other aspects. Kant's genius and the carefree-wandering mind relate similarly to nature conceived as some systems.⁹

The Kantian genius gives the rule of nature to art, making the art look as though nature produces it. Kant takes nature not as a productive force here. Instead, it is a system of unified empirical laws, which is necessary for us to make determinative judgments (Ostarcic 2017, 1379). Our capacity to make determinative judgments has its basis in the logical act of comparison: we need to compare the species and decide which genus to subsume them. Nature as a system of empirical concepts enables us to compare particular empirical cognitions to the system itself, recognize their places in the system, and identify their genus (Longuenesse 1998). Thus, nature conceived as this system is necessary for successfully making judgments in cognitive and moral situations. The thought of genius is valuable by directing our attention to this nature as something underlying artworks and purposive for exercising our cognitive faculties.

Chinese artists strive to capture the essence of their intended objects in their mental space. Then they could imprint the images of the objects onto paper or silk with their techniques, such as brushwork or carving. Masterpieces can express the *Qi* of the depicted objects in the sense that nature makes the artworks because the artists identify themselves with such nature. Nature here has become a cosmological system, a single manifold composed of mutually resonant systems of heaven and earth, the state, and the body (Sivin 1995, 7). The sages are indispensable mediators and guardians of those resonating systems as they master the skills to grasp and regulate the *Qi* within the cosmic nature. Such sages could be talented artists in our context. They could also be masters of various skills, such as physicians who practice traditional Chinese medicine very well. The carefree-wandering mind draws our attention to the place of virtuous persons in the whole cosmological system.

Indeed, nature as a system of empirical laws and nature as a cosmological system could be radically different. Nevertheless, what is essential is that the Kantian genius and the carefree-wandering mind draw our attention to similar privilege or emphasis on systematic thinking in both east and west. It would be an exciting project to pursue in the future.

⁹ I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer whose suggestion lets me think about it.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Melissa Zinkin, whose expertise was invaluable in formulating the part on Kant. I am also grateful to the the anonymous reviewers of *Comparative Philosophy*, who gave me a lot of helpful suggestions about this paper.

REFERENCES

- Allison, H. E. (2001), *Kant's Theory of Taste: a Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Egan, Ronald C. (1994), *Words, Image, and Deed in the Life of Su Shi* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press).
- Gao, J. (1996), *The expressive act in Chinese art: from calligraphy to painting* (Uppsala: Academiae Ubsaliensis).
- Xiaoyan Hu (2020), "Genius as an Innate Mental Talent of Idea-Giving in Chinese Painting and Kant", *Philosophy East & West* 70.2: 354–373. <doi:10.1353/pew.2020.0025>
- Jullien, F. & Todd, J. M. (2009), *The great image has no form, or On the nonobject through painting*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
- Kant, Immanuel, and Gregor, M. J. (1996), *Practical Philosophy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Kant, Immanuel, Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood (1998), *Critique of Pure Reason*. (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Kant, Immanuel, Paul Guyer, and Eric Matthews (2000), *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Liu, H (2015), *The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons*, (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong). Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central.
- Longuenesse, B. (1998), *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press).
- Ostarcic, L. (2017), "The Free Harmony of the Faculties and the Primacy of Imagination in Kant's Aesthetic Judgment", *European Journal of Philosophy* 25: 1376–1410. <doi:10.1111/ejop.12219>
- Pohl Karl-Heinz (2006), "Chinese Aesthetics and Kant", in Hussain, M. and R. Wilkinson (ed.), *The Pursuit of Comparative Aesthetics: An Interface Between the East and West*. (London: Routledge). <<https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315237541>>
- Xiongbo Shi (2018), "The Aesthetic Concept of Yi 意 in Chinese Calligraphic Creation", *Philosophy East & West* 68.3: 871–886. <doi:10.1353/pew.2018.0076>
- Sivin, N. (1995), "State, cosmos, and body in the last three centuries B.C", *Harvard journal of Asiatic studies* 55.1: 5–37.
- Zhuang Zi [trans. B. Ziporyn (2009)], *Zhuang Zi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries* (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.).

Zinkin, M. (2018), "What Is Critical About the Critique of the Power of Judgment?", in V. Waibel, M. Ruffing, and D. Wagner (eds), *Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*. (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter), 3149-3158. <<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110467888-320>>