

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMOTION IN INDIAN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

PRASASTI PANDIT & WILLIAM KRIEGER

ABSTRACT: *This paper aims to develop a comparative analysis of the place of emotion from Indian and Western philosophical perspectives. Both Eastern and Indian philosophy consider three mental states as being involved with the arousal of emotions, i.e., cognitive (epistemic), conative (desire), and affective. In Indian philosophy, there is no such single term or specific equivalent definition to the Western term 'emotion.' Further, there is no clear dichotomy (cognitive & non-cognitive) between reason and emotion in Indian culture. In Indian scriptures, there are various, at times intermingled conceptions of emotion. From a religious standpoint, emotion can be an expression of religious devotion (bhakti), and often emotions are viewed as barriers to having true knowledge and are considered a cause of attachment and an obstacle to liberation. After comparing a large amount of discussion on emotion following Western and Indian conceptions, and analyzing some real-life experiences where emotion plays various roles (intellectual, personal, and spiritual) within each philosophical tradition this paper concludes that it is critical to engage in a comparative, collaborative study of emotion.*

Keywords: *cognitive, emotion, emotional significance, liberation, non-Cognitive, true Knowledge*

1. INTRODUCTION

Emotion is an integrated and important part of human beings on moral, cognitive, religious, cultural, and spiritual levels. The term 'emotion' originates from the Latin word '*emovere*' or '*exmovere*' which means 'to move out', 'move away', 'remove', 'stir up', or 'agitate'. The French word *emouvoir/ésmouvoir* means 'stir up' or 'something moving inside when an emotion arises.' One goal of this paper will be to add to these definitions an understanding of the roles of emotion from an Indian

PANDIT, PRASASTI: Assistant Teaching Professor, The University of Rhode Island, USA.
Email: prasasti.pandit@uri.edu
KRIEGER, WILLIAM H.: Associate Professor of Philosophy, The University of Rhode Island, USA.
Email: krieger@uri.edu

philosophical context. We will then contrast Indian accounts of emotion with Western treatments of emotion.

2. EMOTION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In Indian philosophy, there is no real analog to the Western concept of emotion. In Indian scriptures, there are, instead, various intermingled conceptions, viewed as cognitive, religious, as well as culture-specific, also cross-cultural, and historically determined phenomena. Some of these conceptions refer to emotive states (*bhava/vedanā*) that refer to feelings and emotional expressions, while others are best defined as states of mental excitement (*Vikara/rasa*). Additionally, from a religious standpoint, emotions can be viewed as causes of attachment or bondage, creating barriers to obtaining true knowledge. To better understand these delineations, we will focus on two categories of Indian philosophy. The first groups are the *Astikas*/theists (such as Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga, Vedanta-Upaniṣad) who believe in the Veda and its corollaries, including the eternity of the soul, the determination of Karma, the concept of nirvana, etc. The second groups are the *Nastikas*/atheists (i.e., Buddhists and Jains) who do not follow the Veda and its corollaries (Although this group also accepts nirvana as the highest ultimate goal of individual life). Apart from these two groups, we will also discuss an aesthetic notion of emotion, following Rasa/drama theory and the Indian great epic.

2.1 NYAYA-VAISESIKA

There is no prominent discussion on emotion in the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. What little we have found originates in the Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras*, Vātsyāyana's *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-Vārttika*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāya-Mañjarī*, Kapila's *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, and Śāṅkara Miśra's *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra-Upaskāra*. Nyaya-Vaisesikas believe in the eternity of the self (*ātman*) which is a substance (*dravya*) that integrates different qualities (*guṇas*) These *guṇas* are primarily different from cognition (*jñāna*) and other mental phenomena, including feelings such as love or attraction (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*). Nyaya-Vaisesikas consider emotions as a fault (*doṣas*) that arises from ignorance (*mithyājñāna*) and eventually gives rise to actions that lead us to feelings of pleasure or pain (Nyāya-sūtras, 1.1.18). These emotions connect us with the physical world, a world wrapped in feelings of pleasure or pain. This emotional attachment of the self worldly possessions creates an obstacle in the path of one's highest goal, i.e., an eternal state of bliss or liberation.

According to Nyaya, emotions such as pleasure or pain, and more generally all qualities of the self, must be realized through cognition to be experienced. Gautama identifies that *mithyājñāna* (misunderstanding or misconception) is the root cause of human suffering, and the immediate effect of this *mithyājñāna* is the emergence of emotions and formation of attitudes which prompt human behavior. Gautama applies the term *dosa* to emotions and attitudes. Later, Vātsyāyana explains the term *doṣa* as follows: “*etasmāt mithyā-jñānāt anukūleṣu rāgaḥ pratikūleṣu dveṣaḥ*

Rāgadveṣādāhikārāt ca asūyā-īrṣyā-māyā-lobhādayaḥ doṣāḥ bhavanti” (Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2). While cognition itself is not seen as problematic, other qualities are categorized as defects, i.e., attraction, love, selfishness, greed (*rāga*), aversion, anger, jealousy, envy, malice, and resentment (*dveṣa*), illusion, error, suspicion, pride, and negligence (*moha*).

Vātsyāyana recognizes *dosa* or emotion as *rāga* and *dveṣa* (the results of misunderstanding or *mithyājñāna*). According to him: “*jñātāram rāgādayaḥ pravartayanti*” – “*raga and deveṣa induce a person who has acquired knowledge into activity.*” Vātsyāyana paraphrases *pravartana* as *pravṛtti-hetu* (i.e., the cause that prompts a person into action.) Following the above discussion, we see that Gautama finds *moha* or *mithyājñāna* as the root cause of human suffering. Vātsyāyana does not distinguish between positive and negative emotions. According to him, actions (*pravṛtti*) which are effects of emotions can be either *śubha* (positive) or *papa* (negative). However, this stream proposes that to obtain liberation/*mukti* one must go beyond both positive and negative emotions. Since without a human body, there is no chance to attain salvation, in the same way, without emotions the journey of transformation cannot begin (Jha 2018).

As a result of this background, Nyaya-Vaisesikas separate true cognition from emotional experiences. Emotional experiences have a negative impact on the self, as they obstruct cognition, and lead to attachment to worldly objects that give rise to an illusory sense of self or ego. Hence, Nyaya-Vaisesikas seek to rid themselves of all emotional experiences, using the right knowledge. The pursuit of their ultimate aim is to achieve liberation or *Moksa*.

2.2 VEDANTA/UPANIṢAD

The Vedantic formulation of emotion from the Advaita Vedanta scriptures follows commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras* by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. This school is regarded as the most direct continuation of Upaniṣadic thought. Through the lens of the Upanishads, the self (*ātman*) exists as the subject of experience. As a subject of experience, *ātman* consists of certain mental qualities: *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *vijñāna* (cognition), and *citta* (consciousness) (*Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 2.4.6). These mental qualities depend on different mental functions (such as doubt, and resolution) that are assigned to them, and these mental functions are the causes of love, aversion, pleasure, and pain, as well as desire, imagination, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness, shame, reflection, and fear (*Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 2.3.32). Following this, the mind possesses both cognitive and emotional abilities which are the attributes of mental functions, but which are nonetheless separate from the self.

As the aim of Vedanta philosophy is to achieve the highest spiritual state of isolation (*kevala*) the practitioner will understand this complex relationship between the self and its mental functions in order to obtain true knowledge of the self (*ātman*) devoid of any cognitive or emotional qualities. Salvation is a release from the impure material body, and this can be realized through practices focusing on purification and control. Here, the notion of emotion (whether positive or negative) is initiated from the

five-fold sensory perception of sound, touch, form, taste, and odor. The mind modifies various mental functions such as love, hate, and desire as a result of sensory experiences such as pleasure or pain. Eventually, identification of one's own self with these illusionary mental experiences generates attachment which then increases the desire for the sensory objects, consequently, this vicious cycle creates an obstacle in the path to liberation. Hence, to achieve liberation one needs to eliminate all kinds of sensory and cognitive activities.

We can find a beautiful analogy in *Nāradaparivṛājaka Upaniṣad* (Khanna and Aiyer 2011, p. 135) where the person seeking liberation withdraws one's organs and mind within one's-self like a turtle in its shell. Thus, liberation means the annihilation of organs, activities, and mental functions, leaving the self to exist in a state of witness consciousness (*sākṣin-caitanya*) state lacking a conception of 'mine' or a sense of ego from both worldly objects and sensory organs, replacing the enunciated consciousness of 'I' with the eternal absolute consciousness of brahman, which is far superior from the sensory organs, the internal organs of thought, the *guṇas* and others (Khanna and Aiyer 2011, p. 206). This is the state of *saccidānanda* i.e., the combined state of absolute real (*sat*), pure conscious mind (*cit*), and the eternal bliss (*ānanda*), and the witness of all (Khanna and Aiyer 2011, p. 22). Thus, liberation replaces the embodied individual with the non-agency (or static witness state) of the self. Hence, Vedanta envisions emotion and its resulting mental reactions as the cause of attachment and bondage and so prescribes its elimination. It should be noted that, unlike Western philosophy, here emotion is not the only obstacle to true knowledge/cognition. Both emotion and sensory organs are considered obstacles to acquiring true knowledge of one's true self and consequently, they are both seen as obstacles to liberation.

2.3 SĀṂKHYA-YOGA

The primary scripture of Sāṁkhya philosophy is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṁkhyakārikā* and its commentary *Tattvakaumudī*, composed by Vācaspati Miśra. Classical yoga philosophy comes from the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali and its most significant commentary Vyāsa's *Vyāsabhāṣya*.

Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta standpoint of emotions, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga branch does not draw a fundamental distinction between feelings and cognitions. Sāṁkhya theory is the proponent of dualism since this doctrine is fundamentally based on the absolute distinction between the consciousness-self (*puruṣa*) and matter or nature (*prakṛti*). The former is pure consciousness and does not contain any cognitions or feelings whereas *prakṛti* is primordial matter and has the three qualities (*guṇas*) *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, which are associated with different feelings: *sattva* with pleasure (*sukha*), *rajas* with pain (*duḥkha*) and *tamas* with confusion or illusion (*moha*). *Puruṣa* is pure consciousness (*cetanā*) without content, embodied in an inactive (*akartṛbhāva*) spectator (*sākṣin*) who does not possess cognition or feelings and is dissociated from empirical experience. *Prakṛti* is the cause of real effects, centered in three attributes (*guṇas*): *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, which are associated with different

emotions. Following Sankhya Karika, prakṛti itself is the composition of these three gunas: “... *avyaktim pravartate trigunatah*” (Sankhya Karika XVI).

Given that Sāṃkhya philosophy posits that material experience is caused by *prakṛti*, and that as a result, *prakṛti* is the source of distress or suffering (*duḥkha*), to attain liberation (*kaivalya*), one must get rid of one’s embodied personality. Sāṃkhya philosophy identifies puruṣa as both a contentless conscious seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and as a witness (*sākṣin*) from *prakṛti* (Burley 2007, p. 77). It is extremely difficult to achieve the state of the contentless seer. The path is: to eliminate all emotional attitudes from cognition, to then gradually liberate the mind from any cognitive objects, and ultimately to leave behind cognition and achieve the state of contentless consciousness (*kaivalya*). This systematic eliminative process is found in the doctrine of Yoga philosophy. Patañjali offers the reader an elucidation of a gradual understanding of the distinction between conscious *puruṣa* with the unconscious *prakṛti* and prescribes a series of practices to obviate the painful mental experiences that Western philosophy identifies as emotion.

Yoga philosophy identifies afflictions (*kleśas*) that affect the mind and create obstacles to differentiate puruṣa from *prakṛti*. Patañjali named these afflictions ignorance (*avidyā*), egoism (*asmitā*), attachment (*rāga*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and adherence [to mundane existence] (*abhiniveśa*) (Sinha 2008). Here, emotion is viewed as the negative cause of affliction since the sensory experience of (*triguna*) the material world causes specific emotional attitudes and creates desire for the material world and for the egoistic possession of unconscious material objects. So, emotional attitudes are the cause of desire and attachment and therefore lead to bondage. Here, emotion is considered a mental object, and to achieve liberation one must get rid of both the mental apparatus of cognition and emotion.

According to Patanjali, the mind is ‘colored’ with all the objects it knows and experiences (including both those discovered by cognition and emotion). Again, in his commentary, Vyāsa explains that the mind itself is one of the objects of consciousness and thus appears as the subject of consciousness. The removal of these ‘colors,’ the relinquishment of all objects, leads to an emptiness of mind which allows the subject to separate mind from *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* reveals itself indirectly as a transcendental ego through the evacuation of mind from cognition and emotion. In the end, Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy, like Nyaya-Vaisesika, considers emotion as the first obstacle in the path of achieving liberation and as such, liberation requires both the elimination of cognition and even further, of the contents of consciousness.

Thus, in Yoga philosophy, the subject-conscious cognition (*viññāna*) is the cause of ignorance (*avidyā*), which together with certain resulting emotional attitudes originates the afflictions (*kleśas*). Yoga philosophy identifies ignorance (*avidyā*) as the root cause of afflictions and bondage (Sinha, Yoga Sutra 2.4, 1985). Patañjali argues that the mind is affected by afflictions (*kleśas*) that create obstacles to knowing the true nature and the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti.

2.4 JAINA AND BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Unlike the previously mentioned groups, Jains and Buddhists do not follow Veda and its *Karmavada*). Nevertheless, they also hold that life's goal is to achieve the highest state of liberation/*Nirvana*.

From the earliest text of Jaina philosophy (*Āyāraṃga* (*Bronkhorst, Ācārāṅga Sūtra* 1.3.1.3–4)) we know that our activities are the source of our sufferings. They define karma as a material substance like moist dirt (*puḍgula*) that 'flows in' (Pāli: *avassava*, Skt: *āsava*) to the soul and sticks to it. Given that all activities within Jain philosophy increase suffering, all emotional attitudes are seen as misery, agony, pain/suffering (Pāli: *dukkha*, Sanskrit: *duḥkha*). So, to remove suffering, one needs to expunge (Pāli: *nijjarā*, Sanskrit: *nirjarā*) karma by means of a total restraint of the body-mind–emotions complex. Jainas aspire to the total abstention of all activities to remove old karmas and stop the formation of new karmas. Jaina philosophy views human life as a journey of suffering; hence they adopt a path of inaction and rigorous abstention from all mind-body activities, even fasting until death in a position that is as motionless as possible (Bronkhorst 2013).

In contrast to the rigors of Jaina philosophy, Buddhism holds a middle path, and their philosophical doctrine and the prescribed path to achieve liberation reflect this psychological emotional standpoint. Following the psychoanalysis in Buddhism (DeSilva 2013) a person feels attraction (*saarajjati*) for something agreeable, while he feels repugnance (*byaapajjati*) for anything disagreeable. An individual poses a like (*anurodha*) approach towards pleasure-giving objects and a dislike (*virodha*) approach to avoid painful objects. Pleasant feelings (*sukhaa vedanaa*) and painful feelings (*dukkhaa vedanaa*) are the two respective affective reactions to sensations of pleasurable and painful objects. "Feeling is the mental factor which feels the object. It is the affective mode in which the object is experienced. The Pali word *vedanā* does not signify emotion (which appears to be a complex phenomenon involving a variety of concomitant mental factors), but the bare affective quality of an experience, which may be either pleasant, painful, or neutral" (Bodhi, Bhikkhu 2003, p. 80).

The entire doctrine of Buddhism is derived from the four Noble Truths (*Aryachastaya*): 1. There is suffering 2. There are causes of suffering 3. The cessation of suffering is possible 4. The noble path leads to liberation. Buddhism identifies the cause of suffering as the impermanence of reality. The only reality is the impermanence of everything (Pāli: *anicca*, Sanskrit: *anitya*). According to *pratītya-samutpāda* theory, a thing is real if it produces or becomes something else. This truth presupposes the impermanence of its previous version, and the cycle goes on like this. The first Noble Truth refers to emotion, as emotions provide a continuous reminder of the impermanence of reality, and that human life ends in death. The second Noble Truth demonstrates that attachment (including emotion, a major driver of human action) produces desire, craving, or thirst (Pāli: *taṇhā*, Skt: *trṣṇā*) which is the primary cause of suffering. This craving or thirst brings forth twelve stages of bondage (*vabachakkra*). The third Noble Truth declares that the cessation of suffering is possible through the elimination of thirst. Finally, the fourth Noble Truth prescribes the eight noble paths to

achieve liberation, a different path than the rigorous inaction of Jainism or the materialistic doctrine of Cārvāka philosophy. The Cārvāka or Lokāyata schools see our body as the creation of four materials: earth, water, air, and fire. The self comes into existence with the body and ceases with the destruction of the body. So, proponents of these schools live lives of extreme materialist philosophy.

Buddhism, unlike the theist groups mentioned above, does not ~~accept~~ believe in an eternity of self (*ātman*). Rather, Buddhists see consciousness from the perspective of an ever-changing flow (*vijñāna*) where our cognition and emotion appear. A continuous series of cognitions and emotions (*santāna vijñāna*) carry over from former lives into the present, and these will continue in future rebirths.

Following Buddhist psychology, ‘passion’ or ‘attachment’ (*rāga*); ‘hatred’ or ‘repulsion’ (*dveṣa*); and ‘delusion’ (*moha*) are derived from three primitive causes for afflictions (*kleśas*) (Bilimoria and Wenta 2015). The first two are associated with the effective notion of emotion and the last one results from ignorance (cognition) Here emotions hold the same status and location as cognition. Cognition and emotion flow as continuous processes in the mind (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*) and produce *kleśas*. These *kleśas* are associated with one or more of five possible feelings, i.e., pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*duḥkha*), neutral (*upekṣā*), happiness (*sau-manasya*) or unhappiness (*daur-manasya*) (Gombrich 2006). Buddhist psychology considers ignorance and suffering as the disease of human life, one which can be cured through the cultivation of the highest ethical virtue of compassion (*karuṇā*) and the highest intellectual virtue, i.e., wisdom (*prajñā*). Unlike the emotion-less doctrines of theist philosophers and the rigorous view of Jainism, Buddhism prescribes the cultivation of the highest feeling of love, which derives from calmness of mind, bringing kindness and love from a distance so as to not generate any attachment or sensory reactions that might result in affliction and attachment (Flood 2004). Such a calm, disassociated, compassionate, embodied soul can achieve liberation.

2.5 AESTHETIC/DRAMA THEORY

Aesthetic/drama/rasa theory provides a different composite view on emotion, expounded by sage Bharathamuni (5th century) in *Natyashastra* and its commentary by Abhinavagupta (11th century). The term *Rasa* means juice, syrup, extract, and flavor. Here it refers to something that can be relished by one as a spectator. This view is called ‘aesthetic emotionalism’ where ‘refined’ emotions (*rasas* with three components, i.e., physiological/behavioral, cognitive, and feelings (Ramaprasad 2013)) are distinguished from ordinary emotions (*bhāvas*). Aesthetic emotionalism is not concerned with ordinary emotions (*bhāvas*) which are connected with desire or ‘evil’ sources of attachment, leading to bondage. The aesthetic emotionalism of rasa theory is found in poetry, drama, and the performing arts.

A devotional movement (*bhakti*), largely inspired by Rasa theory, interprets the aesthetic emotion of Bhakti as a religious emotion. Bhakti devotees experience intense religious bliss and connect themselves emotionally (*Bhaktirasatmk* realization) with God. Vaishnavism is inspired by the Bhakti movement where devotees worship their

deity Vishnu through the emotion of *bhakti rasa*. This is a form of impersonal love where the ego transcends its egocentric notion and embraces itself with God through equal sympathetic realization. Unlike Vedic, Buddhist, and other Indian philosophical schools, the Bhakti movement prescribes that one can realize and cultivate one's true self through an intense sympathetic impersonal emotional connection (via love) with God. The love for God eventually helps one to realize one's true self. Bhakti-Yoga is not only the cultivation of love for others but also for the love of God, where God (here) denotes the highest form of love, compassion, and kindness.

The Rasa theory is primarily dealt with a virtual, fictional world, aiming for the spectator's aesthetic 'savour' (*rasa*) or 'relish' (*āsvāda*). In aesthetic theory, an open-minded spectator (*prekṣaka, rasika*) who has a heart (*sahṛdaya*) capable of absorbing sympathetic emotional responses and a pure mind, can receive all the images reflected in them while savoring a fictional reality or a mere product of creative imagination. Thus, from this perspective, a passionate heart and emotional temperance are necessary tools for the ideal spectator.

Additionally, according to aesthetic theory, a passionate heart/mind (*śṛṅgārin*) is required for a poet or an author along with (simultaneously and paradoxically) the absence of passion (*vītarāga*). The aesthetic theory regards 'passion' as the emotional sensibility of a poet, 'the determining factor responsible for endowing poetry or drama with an aesthetic delight (*rasa*)' (Bilimoria and Wenta 2015, p. 42). According to Goodwin (1998), the doctrine of aesthetic emotionalism propounded by aesthetic Rasa theory portrays the conflicting tendencies as 'the paradigmatic worldview of Indian culture, eternally torn between a desire for sensual pleasure gain to emotional fulfilment and an ascetic ideal of complete detachment from emotions (*vairāgya*)' (Bilimoria and Wenta 2015, p. 43) on the quest for self-restraint, leading toward liberation (*Moksa*).

Indian emotions and their strong relation with virtues are found in the lives and situations illustrated by the Great epics, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana (Sinha 2008). For example, in the Bhagavad Gītā (in the Mahābhārata), the great warrior Arjuna faces tension in the battlefield of Kurukshetra between his duty to wage war for justice and his compassionate heart for his relatives, brothers who are standing against him as rivals in the battle. His inner humanity throws him into confusion, asking: 'what is the moral worth of this battle which will cost bloodshed and loss of your own?' His long-cherished conviction to the battle for 'right' is shaken due to his inner emotional virtues of care, sympathy, and humanity for his own. This is the most famous instance of the dilemma between moral emotions in Indian literature where one's altruistic concern for compassion overshadows the utilitarian appeals and it questions one's 'rational duty' for the right or fairness. As a Kshatriya (member of the warrior caste), it is Arjuna's rational duty to go to war to regain rights which were taken from him inappropriately through conspiracy. However, as a virtuous person, his compassionate heart tears him inside and transcends his egocentric desire toward others for whom he cares. This illustration of Arjuna depicts the interrelation of emotion with virtue. According to Bilimoria (2013), we can draw the cognitive status of emotion in Indian philosophy from this famous moral dilemma of Arjuna since the way Arjuna expresses his poignant emotional dilemma reveals that 'a deeply subjective dimension with a strong evaluative

sensibility (that might be called belief or justified belief) is implicit in emotion, from which certain judgments about good and bad, desirability or undesirability, approval, and disapproval are projected onto the object, the act, the “other”, the event or the situation in the relevant field of awareness’ (Bilimoria 2013, p. 299). Secondly, it also reveals that although an individual holds certain values or duties like the duty of war, these duties may clash with one’s emotional response as a moral being. Here, the clash is between ahimsa or nonviolence and war as a duty that initiates violence. In the end, we see the emotional expression of Arjuna is a moral response to the cognitive realization of the devastating effect of war. We believe this is the most desirable response from a moral being and we would consider the absence of this moral response as evidence that a person may be morally deficient (Pandit 2021).

2. EMOTION IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

One of the earliest mentions of emotion in the Western tradition stems from the 400-300s BCE, by Democritus, who said that “Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from passions” (Freeman 1948, p. 149) and in distinctions made by Plato between the selfless love found in Phaedo in the context of grieving for the suicide of his master Socrates and the self-serving love of the Symposium. Although this struggle for higher (as opposed to bodily) love will find fertile ground in Christianity. Even in this context, Plato generally viewed emotions negatively (apart from Love in Phaedrus), instead (following the Republic) placing emotion under rationality. Aristotle focuses on finding a balance point for our emotional selves and is the first one who recognizes the emotional worth of virtue in the domain of morality (Aristotle 1954). Aristotle explains his doctrines of virtue with the psychological connection of emotion. Unlike Plato, he regards the moral worth of proper emotional responses along with its intellectual component of virtue. According to Aristotle, virtues can also be understood as human traits with their connection between actions and passions. This psychological connection can be seen between a particular virtue with its relation to a particular passion or emotion. Moreover, according to Aristotle, virtues should always be disposed of in the right proportion, i.e., neither too much nor very less but balanced. Here, the emotion of compassion will be regarded as a virtue, when its disposition maintains this balanced margin between two extremes. For him, the connection occurs between a particular virtue with a particular passion or emotion such as compassion and gratitude. The virtue of compassion should be felt at the time, by the right person and motivated for the right action, i.e., to help or do beneficence for others. However, both Plato and Aristotle accept that uncontrollable emotions lead to the destruction of one’s moral worth, so emotions need to be controlled by wisdom.

Adding to the Greek philosophers’ distinction between emotion and reason, the Stoic scholars strived for a rigorously controlled life where the unified soul (as opposed to the dualistic Platonic soul) is ruled by reason. Given the unruly nature of emotions, the stoics viewed emotion as a barrier to truly reasonable cognition at best, and as something to be avoided at worst. Cicero shows this distain in his explanation for which Latin word best captured the Greek word for emotion: “pathos. Let us then accept the

word ‘emotion’ [perturbatio] the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence.” (Cicero, 94). Stoic philosophers pursued an emotionless life since they considered emotions as the root of all evilness. A similar pessimistic standard for emotion holds in Jaina philosophy where only one kind of emotion is experienced, that is suffering, grief, pain, or agony since it creates attachments to the worldly object, and so emotion is an obstacle to achieve spiritual liberation. Conversely, we find Cyrenaic school. Cyrenaic school is the earliest and most extreme form of hedonism propounded by Aristippus, who argues that the goal of a good life should be the sentient pleasure of the moment. According to Aristippus, each person ought to seek pleasure in each moment as it passes without consideration of future consequences. Hence, he finds the true art of life is in maximizing as much enjoyment as possible from each moment. Following the momentariness of this theory: only present experience can give present pleasure. This theory finds the value of happiness in intensity & holds that Bodily pleasures (and pains) are more intense than those of the mind. This theory is similar to the Indian atheistic Cārvākas movement, which believes in enjoying the materialistic world through sense organs and striving to enjoy the present world as much as possible. Since, in this context, we cannot directly perceive our past and future they believe in enjoying the momentariness of life.

In the medieval period, Augustine would combine the strictures of stoicism with Christian dualism, focusing on minimizing certain emotions/desires such as temptation and lust. Not all emotions were to be avoided, however. Emotions that could be associated with grace were seen positively, as human attempts to connect bodily love (eros) to the love coming from the divine (agape) (Pandit 2022). These issues would be further refined until the modern period, where we continue to see a qualitative distinction between emotions, where emotions like love, faith, benevolence, compassion, and charity are regarded as higher-level emotions, while bodily desires like appetites, intoxication, and sexual passions are viewed as lower. In this Christian tradition, the notion of unconditional love or agape, which is the essence of Christianity, would be seen as the highest virtue of humanity.

In the modern period, David Hume finds morality within emotional sentiments. He identifies moral feelings within virtues and vices, following his belief that we have a general desire for good and an aversion to evil. For him, we associate beneficial acts with approbation and, we experience disapprobation from exposure to our vices. According to Hume, these feelings of approbation or disapprobation rise from emotion. These emotional attitudes towards others develop from three psychological associations (relation, acquaintance, and resemblance), associations that cause us to develop sympathetic feelings for other beings. As our relationships produce more live and vivid impressions on our minds than do our interactions with strangers, consequently we produce more sympathetic feelings and feel more benevolent towards family and friends than we do toward strangers. Generally, we feel benevolence towards those whom we are acquainted with, to those with whom we interact, and towards people who resemble us. Hence, these three associations produce sympathetic feelings towards other-beings which bring forth love and benevolence to other-beings.

Utilitarians Jeremy Bentham and John Stewart Mill (1863) also focused on the role emotions play in our lives. While Bentham's egoistic focus was limited to quantitative pleasure, Mill refined utilitarianism by creating a qualitative distinction, focused on higher-level emotional happiness to the expense of lower-level pleasures on top of Bentham's quantitative scale.

While the aforementioned philosophical tradition sought to differentiate 'good' from 'bad' emotions, other philosophers attempted to eliminate emotion altogether from philosophical work. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), known for his work on systematizing scientific inquiry, orders thinkers to strip themselves of the Idols of the past and to focus their energies on the empirical, inductive study of nature. This focus on systemic, objective thought, would be refined by Kant in the 1700s. Kant excludes any kind of emotion from the context of morality. He advocates the theory of deontology, concerned only with the rational duty of an autonomous individual. He does not bother about why or how a person feels. Rather he concentrates on why one should act in a particular manner in a certain situation. Kant excluded all emotions, emotional expressions, and inclinations from the domain of morality since he considered them as passionate, subjective, irrational states of mind. Interested instead in objectivity and rationality, Kant only focuses on the reason or rational capabilities within human beings and derives from them universal, rational maxims for moral activities, devaluing pathological or sensible feelings and denying them as motivations for moral actions. In his own words, even 'Sympathetic joy and sorrow . . . are really sensuous feelings of a pleasure or pain . . . at another's state of happiness or sadness' (Kant, 1964, p. 456). Kant's focus on cognitive (as opposed to emotional and other non-cognitive) values would shape views on the aims of science, would be practiced by scientists (so named by Whewell in 1834), and would again be updated by the logical positivists in the late 19th century. Interestingly, the 20th century has seen a reevaluation of emotion, even in the scientific space. Hempel, one of the Logical Empiricists, argued for a place for emotion in science. Although the real work of science would be done in the objective context of justification, in his case study on Semmelweis' discovery of the cause of 'childbed fever,' Hempel argued that inspiration and emotion could play a part in suggesting hypotheses within the context of discovery. (Hempel 1966, p. 5).

One of the major concerns of meta-ethics has emerged from the moral justification of value judgments. Ethics is divided into two rival groups as moral cognitivism and non-cognitivism based on the meaning and justification of value judgments. Moral cognitivists hold that the proper justification of moral judgments is possible, whereas non-cognitivists claim that moral judgments are neither true nor false and even there is not any justification. A non-cognitivist position is maintained by the logical positivist A. J. Ayer (1936) who holds that any proposition is meaningful only if it is verified by our sense-experience. Following this standpoint, non-cognitivism claims that moral or value judgments are meaningless since they cannot be verified by our sense experience. Conversely, non-cognitivism leads to emotivism. Emotivist Stevenson (1960) holds that all moral propositions express certain feelings and attitudes which are approved and believed by the speaker and expressed with the expectation that affect listener's

attitude through emotional associations. On the contrary, Hare (1961) rejects that moral statements are emotional expressions. For him, they are universal prescriptions or imperatives that are conceived through our intuition and direct someone to do something.

Following non-cognitivism, the difference in emotional attitudes towards some particular actions associated with 'ought', 'good' or 'bad' is acquired from our daily use of the language and lived experiences. Such strong feelings of the speakers which are acquired from their daily life experiences are expressed through their statements which often affect the listener's attitude. Hence, for emotivism moral judgments are the expressions of emotional attitudes. This distinction primarily divides reason and emotion respectively as rational and irrational components. Another version of emotivism is developed by William James and John Dewey who emphasize the connection between emotions and bodily sensations. This is the conative-affective theory of emotion which is concentrated on the physiological arousal of passions or feelings centering the body following a neurophysiological process sometimes refers to strong desire. This theory mainly reduces emotion as sensory feelings.

3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

From the above discussion, we find that despite the variety of accounts and influences coming from Western philosophy, there does seem to be a reasonably consistent viewpoint of the place for emotion within that tradition. There is a clear distinction between cognitive, non-cognitive, and conative-affective processes, and at best, reason enjoys a superior status to emotion, since reason denotes something which is meaningful and hence intelligible, whereas emotion is centered in the body and deals with sensuous expression and is unintelligible and requires reason to control. In other cases, emotions are identified with passions, strong desires, or individual expressions which are usually identified as irrational, uncontrollable, and blind.

Given the fundamental place that emotion has in our lives (whether Western or Indian), and seeing the very different roles that emotion plays within each philosophical tradition, the authors of this article believe that it is critical to engage in a comparative, collaborative study of emotion. Below are a couple of examples of nascent engagement to this end.

For example, a mother's love for her child is regarded as one of the most noble acts both in eastern and western society. This notion of love encompasses huge reasonable responsibilities & gamut of emotions. In this case, emotion plays and operates a stronger role than reason which sometimes triggers a mother to make compromises and sacrifices, sometimes the most selfless sacrifices. While consequentialism might argue that the mother's love should be focused toward teaching children utility, and while deontology would guide the mother to nurture the child in order that it learns its ethical responsibilities, neither viewpoint gives any weight to the compassion and love that is the actual cause of the mother's actual behavior. In fact, Kohlberg argues that women are ethically inferior to men for just this reason, that they are ethically stunted due to their need to connect ethical behavior to empathy and compassion. To Kohlberg, truly

ethical behavior should leave beneficence behind, instead being rooted in Kantian duty (Kohlberg 1963.)

However, emotion and reason/duty always go hand-in-hand specifically in the context of beneficence. We can illustrate this point by analyzing Stocker's (1976) example where a person visits his sick friend in the hospital out of duty. Now, the question is whether duty is sufficient for this action. Following Stocker, we can argue that a person who visits his sick friend only for the sake of duty fails to understand the morally required sympathetic notions of love, care, and compassion. If the person visits his friend only for duty's sake without any sympathetic concern for him, such a dutiful person with his cold behavior may hurt his sick friend by making him/her feel uncomfortable or neglected via his cold behavior. Here his dutiful visit is not sufficient since his lack of moral concern towards his sick friend raises the question of the person's actual motivation behind his 'duty-based' action. Here dutiful visit for its duty's sake is not sufficient, but to be morally justified, one requires genuine concern and sympathy for his sick friend, and consequently, reason-based duty along with altruistic emotions should be the motivation behind our altruistic actions.

The fact that Western approaches have this blind spot to the role compassion plays in our ethical behavior provides ample reason to search for other meta-ethical foundations that can work when the so-called distinction between emotion and reason breaks down. In this case, Buddhist compassion would fill this gap, providing a strong ethical foundation for a compassion centered ethics of care (i.e., Gilligan 1988).

3.1. COLLABORATION IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

As noted above, while the Hempelian model in the Philosophy of science admits the role of emotion such as excitement and curiosity as the initiator for some new discovery or developing a hypothesis for some new innovations. Nevertheless, these emotions need to be subjugated to the rational expression of mind. Summarily, following Western tradition, from ancient to contemporary 'meaningful' or 'cognitive emotions' can be deduced as rational expressions or our reasonable outcomes, whereas emotions such as aggression, grief, sorrow, and even love are considered as irrational passions if they are uncontrollable by reason. Contrary to this traditional rationalist approach of Western philosophy, the feminist theory of emotion tries to defend emotion in its own terms: a nonrational (noncognitive) emotionality (Marks 1991).

On the contrary, as noted above, there is no such exact denotation of the term 'emotion' in Indian philosophy. Indian philosophy covers many complex, overlapping layers of thought systems where religion, society, culture, spirituality, epistemology, and morality are intrinsically related to each other. Most of the Indian theories (except Cārvākas) hold that the ultimate fulfillment of an individual is to achieve the supreme state of eternal balance, i.e., liberation, and the epistemic and moral theory of Indian philosophical schools are dedicated to the quest for the most appropriate and deserving path to achieve that end. Since the final goal is to achieve the supreme state of moral goodness, the means to achieve this highest level of morality can never be morally inappropriate.

Following this, all epistemic and moral doctrines of Indian philosophy reflect this teleological notion. Both Indian epistemology and moral theory prescribe such cognition that serves one's highest moral pursuit for achieving liberation. With this aim Indian philosophy differs regarding the notion of true knowledge from Western thought; specifically with the notion of Western realism which accepts only those propositions as true cognitive statements which are verifiable through sense-experience.

Even Indian epistemology which accepts intelligence (*Buddhi* the mental faculty) differs from the theory of Western Rationalism as the source of true knowledge. In Indian theories, cognition and emotion share the same status since cognition often refers to what an embodied individual obtains from his cognitive, emotional, and sensual apparatus from the external sense-experience world and is realized through its mental faculty, *buddhi*. As embodiment comes from all of these external and internal stimuli, a cognitive statement holds equal worth with its associated emotional expression. For example, the cognition of an apple can be obtained from the external world through our sense organs and from an internal mental realization through the intellect or *buddhi*. After having the apple if the subject proclaims that s/he loves the apple, this whole process occurs simultaneously and falls under the umbrella of cognition along with an emotional expression which connects the affection or pleasurable experience with the hidden desire to having more of it. However, as this cognition does not aid in the quest to achieve liberation, it would not be regarded as 'true knowledge'.

Indian philosophy differentiates between the notion of embodied body and its associated mind-body-emotional complex entity and the idea of self or ego (which refers to *ātman*, *puruṣa*, *brahman*, etc.), in Indian scriptural terms. Here, true knowledge can be defined as the realization of one's-self or ego as *ātman*, *puruṣa*, *brahman* which is disassociated from the embodied entity of mind-body-emotional complex. The embodied cognition and emotion that are centered in the external world threaten the self by creating desires and attachments to worldly objects. These connections ultimately cause bondage and suffering. Problems occur when the true self falsely identifies itself with the embodied body and gets caught in the vicious circle of suffering. So, embodied cognition and emotion ultimately create obstacles on the path of liberation. Thus, unlike the deontological conviction of emotion-free knowledge, Indian philosophy argues to disassociate and perturb one's true self as much as possible from the embodied entity of mind-body-emotional complex. Again, as we have discussed above, this is in contrast to the Nyaya, Vedanta, Jaina, and Buddhism, the Bhakti movements, which consider emotion as the most significant and necessary means to realize the true self and to unify the self with God. However, despite this very different treatment of emotion, here and in the other Indian philosophical movements, emotion is not separable from (or inferior to) other cognition. In fact, emotion in Bhaktivadi thought is seen as having moral worth as well as cognitive value.

This epistemic difference between Western and Indian accounts of emotion creates a space for engagement on issues fundamental to our understanding of the world. For instance, Indian philosophers might have a lot to say in response to Western debates over the proper place for emotion (expressed as 'non-cognitive' values) in science. Just

as Western logic has been challenged by Sarukkai's (2005) work in the *Navya Nyāya* form of Indian logic, deconstructing the Western distinction between induction and deduction by means of a more fluid, or world connected approach, Indian philosophy has here a similar opportunity to speak to epistemology more broadly.

When Sarukkai focuses on epistemological issues in the philosophy of science, the position he espouses is in complete contradistinction to Western approaches to this problem. When Hempel distinguishes the context of discovery (the place for emotion) from the context of justification (a space for reason alone), he argues that the real 'science' goes on in the latter and that a part of justification's role is to serve as a corrective to the subjectivity emotion brings to science. Responding to Hempel, contemporary western philosophers of science have recognized the difficulty of (or illusion underlying) sustaining objectivity throughout the scientific process. While some (Lacey 2017) have tried to refine moves to grant separate roles between cognitive from non-cognitive values, others argue that non-cognitive values (including emotions) play a variety of potentially positive roles within science, whether they elicit 'outlaw emotions,' which provide the impetus to critique the scientific status quo (Jaggar 1989), or by undergirding the array of standpoints that define the questions we ask and the roles we want science to play (Wylie 2012). Viewing this distinction, Sarukkai argues that *Navya Nyāya* positions our initial beliefs far more centrally, and views justification as secondary at best.

The kinds of belief statements that can be generated in scientific activity are not unbounded but constrained in various ways. The mechanism of belief creation is essential for understanding the kinds of beliefs produced in the scientific activity. This, therefore, dilutes the emphasis placed on justification of beliefs. For example, it is not that there are beliefs such as 'there is an electron' or that 'the earth goes around the sun' which then require justification. Prior to this process of belief creation are reasons which initiate these beliefs, Therefore, what is important in scientific knowledge is to analyse the causes of certain beliefs (Sarukkai 2005, 221)

Sarukkai's position does more than add to the current debate on which emotions are acceptable within the Western context (or whether the distinction holds), as all of these positions place primacy on justification. By engaging with literature taken from Indian traditions like *Navya Nyāya* these debates would take on new meaning, recentering the discussion on the causes of scientific beliefs instead of their effects.

3.2 COLLABORATION IN ETHICAL THOUGHT

In Indian philosophy, the embodied individual in the external world confronts emotional dualism and moral dilemmas (as the mythical Arjuna faced them on the battlefield of Kurukshetra.) In daily living, one must fulfil their responsibilities (including social and moral duties.) One often finds one's-self torn between equivalent moral predicaments. Indian philosophy identifies this continuous struggle of an individual in day-to-day life and prescribes dissociating one's true self or *ātman* from the mind-body-emotional complex to achieve a balanced state of mind. In Western philosophy, deontologists prescribe the complete exclusion of emotion in favor of

rational duty, consequentialists focus on the best possible ends, and virtue ethicists find moral worth by raising ethical dilemmas in an individual. In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Krishna finds moral worth in Arjuna's dilemmas by studying the conflict between his emotional response to his inner humanity and his duty to just action. Here, emotion is regarded not as mere feeling or sensual expression but also as a cognitive realization that holds moral worth. Krishna advises Arjuna to balance his reason and emotion within a calm state of mind (*Stithaprajna*) and to observe the whole situation as a spectator to a drama, disassociating his embodied entity from his true self. This demonstrates a continual process of ego transformation from an egocentric view, moving toward a holistic approach, a continuous process to move toward a balanced state of mind by acquiring true knowledge and practicing yoga. Here the moral pursuit is to achieve a sublime state of calmness where the apparent distinction between reason and emotion diminishes. According to Majithia (2015, 75-76), this detachment allows Indian ethics to provide a consilience account of duty and utility, where right action (out of obligation) is done in order to achieve *moksa* (the proper consequence). However, we believe that in addition to questions of motivation and consequence (Western concerns), we must focus on beneficence (an Indian concern), focused on the discovery and development of the inherent goodness deeply enrooted within every human being.

Although Indian philosophy in general considers emotion (defined as striving) as one of the obstacles to achieving *Nirvana*, the ultimate sublime state of spiritualism, Mahayana Buddhism regards compassion as the highest virtue. In fact, the Bodhisattva's compassionate virtue goes as far as taking a vow to delay their salvation if needed to help others and continue to live in the world of misery rather than achieve *Nirvana*. As such, following Pandit (2021), We are required to continuously maintain a balance of reason and emotion (accepting both have equal worth) to nurture, grow, and embrace this inherent essence of humanity that guides us toward betterment.

Given the variety of ways that emotion can be conceptualized, and given that the same emotion could, in theory, be seen as striving or as compassion, a comparative, collaborative study of emotion from both Indian and Western perspectives would help to clarify how emotion works for (and against) us. Pandit (2021) argues for just such a critical reengagement, with concepts such as beneficence serving as a bridging principle between Duty and Utilitarian based ethics on the one hand and Indian ethical epistemology on the other.

For Pandit:

Following Benhabib, I emphasize the common essential virtue of these three ethical theories and will develop a more credible form of beneficence that will overcome both the excessive demand of Utilitarianism and the limitation of Kant's Deontology which excluded emotions as part of our natural ethical responses to others. (Pandit 2021, 414)

Pandit's focus on beneficence from an Indian perspective allows her to avoid problems underlying attempts to overlay beneficence on top of duty or utility, founding it instead

in a beneficence deeply rooted in the transcendental humanism that is central to Indian thought.

Thus, from the above comparative analysis, we want to conclude that ‘emotion’ holds a holistic approach in Indian philosophy which is different from the Western connotation of this term. There is no clear distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive and conative-affective states of emotion in Indian Philosophy. Since emotion cannot be eliminated entirely within any of these above definitions often it swings in between the middle position of these definitions. Consequently, there is no distinct hierarchy between cognition and emotion, and ‘emotion-free’ cognition does not hold any extra moral worth within Indian epistemology, whether because both are considered as barriers to achieve liberation or in cases when both are to be used in that pursuit.

Although both of the theories aim for a good life, Western theories concentrate on a more worldly approach, whereas, Indian theories pursue liberation as the final goal. Liberation is a sublime state of balance, one that can be achieved through the continuous process of balanced virtuous practice of self-restraint of reason and emotion as practiced in day-to-day lives. Thus, Indian philosophy shows a moral path for both, whether for those people who focus on the complexities of their day-to-day mundane lives and for those who aim instead for spiritual liberation.

4. CONCLUSION

Given the large amount of scholarship on emotion touched on in this paper (in its various Western and Indian conceptions), clearly, emotion plays a number of roles in our intellectual and personal lives. Scholars (east and west) have written extensively on the ways that emotion impacts our actions, our knowledge base, and our spiritual goals. That said, written work on the subject rarely moves beyond geographic boundaries, either focusing on Western or Indian approaches to ethics and epistemology.

This division comes at a cost. Global philosophical problems defy local cultural barriers. We believe that collaboration has the potential to bring the Indian connection to the self and world together with the formal analysis favored by the West, and we hope that our case studies in science and ethics help to, in a small way, widen that conversation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the editorial team at *Comparative Philosophy* as well as the comments made by the anonymous peer reviewers assigned to our article. Their critique helped us to better focus our article, and their support encouraged us to transform this piece to its current form. We would like to also thank URI’s College of Arts and Sciences for its ongoing support.

REFERENCES

- Ali, Daud (2006), *Courtly Culture and Political Life in Early Medieval India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Aristotle (1954) *Rhetoric* (New York, NY: Modern Library).
- Ayer, A. J. (1936), “Critique of Ethics and Theology”, in *Language Truth and Logic. Mineola* (New York: Dover Publications).
- Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2003), *A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma* (Washington: Pariyatti Publishing).
- Bilimoria, Purushottama and Wenta, A. (2015), *Emotions in Indian Thought-Systems* (Delhi, India: Routledge).
- Bronkhorst, Johannes (2013), *Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).
- Burley, Mikel (2007), *Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience*. (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Cicero (1883), *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*.c 45 BCE, trans. James Reid. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Online (accessed March 3, 2023). <<https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.32000000647208&seq=15>>
- Dasgupta, S. N. (1979), *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*. Delhi, India: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Flood, Gavin (2004), *The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory and Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Freeman, Kathleen (1948), “Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments”, in *Diels, Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker* (Harvard: Harvard University Press).
- Gautama, Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha (eds.) (1985), *Nyāya-sūtras* (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal)
- Gilligan, Carol. (1988), “Remapping The Moral Domain: New images of Self in Relationship”, in C. Gilligan, J. Ward & J. Taylor. (eds), *Mapping the Moral Domain* (Harvard University Press).
- Gombrich, Richard F. (2006), *Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo* (Abingdon: Routledge).
- Goodwin, E. Robert (1998), *The Playworld of Sanskrit Drama* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).
- Hare, R. M. (1961), *The Language of Morals* (London: Clarendon Press).
- Hempel, Carl (1966), *Philosophy of Natural Science* (New Jersey: Prentice hall).
- Hume, David (1975) [P. Didditch (ed.)], *Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Jacobsen, Knut A. (2002), *Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya-Yoga: Material Principle, Religious Experience, Ethical Implications* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).
- Jaggar, Alison (1989), “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology”, *Inquiry* 32: 161-176.
- Jha, V. N. (2018), “Nyāya Philosophy of Emotion”, *Journal of East-West Thought* 8.1: 35-40.

- Kaṇāda, Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkkapañcānana (ed.) (1981), *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with the Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra* (Kolkata, India: Bibliotheca Indica).
- Kant, Immanuel (1964), H. J. Paton and Mary J. Greogor (eds.) *Doctrine of Virtue* (London: Harper & Row).
- Khanna, Madhu (ed.) and Aiyar, K. Narayanasvami (trans.) (2011), *Thirty Minor Upaniṣads* (Delhi: Tantra Foundation).
- Kohlberg Lawrence. (1963), *The Development of Children's Orientations Toward a Moral Order: I. Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought*. *Vita Humana* 6: 11-33 <<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26762149>>.
- Lacey, Hugh. (2017), “Distinguishing Between Cognitive and Social Values”, *Current Controversies in Values and Science*, 15-30 <<https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/474/>>.
- Majithia, Roopen.(2015), “The Bhagavad Gita’s Ethical Syncretism”, *Comparative Philosophy* 6.1: 56-79 <www.comparativephilosophy.org>.
- Marks, Joel (1991) “Emotion East and West: Introduction to a Comparative Philosophy”, *Philosophy East and West* 41.1: 1-30.
- Mill, J. S. (1863), *Utilitarianism* (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn).
- Pandit, Prasasti (2021), “On the context of benevolence: the significance of emotion in moral philosophy”, *Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems* 19.1: 47-63.
- Pandit, Prasasti (2021), “Towards a More Credible Principle of Beneficence”, *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research* 38.3: 407–422.
- Pandit, Prasasti (2022), “The Transition within Virtue Ethics in the context of Benevolence”, *Philosophia (Philippines)* 23.1: 135-151.
- Paranjape, A.C. (1998), *Self and Identity in Modern Psychology and Indian Thought* (New York: Plenum Press).
- Ramaprasad, Dharitri (2013), “Emotions: An Indian perspective”, *Indian Journal of Psychiatry* 55.Suppl 2: 153-156.
- Śaṅkara (2007), *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* Vol. 3. (Delhi: Motil Banarsidass).
- Śāntarakṣita (1984), *Tattva-saṃgraha*, Embar Krishnamacharya (ed.) Vols 1 & 2 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute).
- Sarukkai, Sundar (2005), *Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science* (Motilal Banarsidass).
- Sinha, J. (1985) “Emotion and Wil”, in *Indian Psychology*, vol. 2. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).
- Sinha, J. (2008) *Indian Psychology*, vol. 2. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass).
- Stevenson (1960) *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Publication).
- Stocker, M. (1976) “Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 73.14: 453-466 <<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2025782>>.
- Torella, Raffaele (2011), *The Philosophical Traditions of India: An Appraisal* (Varanasi, India: Indica Books).
- Wulff, M. Donna (1985), *The Evocation of Bhava in Performances of Bengali Vaisnava Padavali Kirtan*. (Houston: University of Houston).

Wylie, Alison (2012), "Feminist Philosophy of Science: Standpoint Matters,"
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 86.2: 47–
76.