Assessing Code Obfuscation of Metamorphic JavaScript

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Assessing Code Obfuscation of Metamorphic JavaScript

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Master of Science

by
Kaushik Murli
May 2019
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Assessing Code Obfuscation of Metamorphic JavaScript

by

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APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

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May 2019

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ABSTRACT

Assessing Code Obfuscation of Metamorphic JavaScript

by Kaushik Murli

Metamorphic malware is one of the biggest and most ubiquitous threats in the digital world. It can be used to morph the structure of the target code without changing the underlying functionality of the code, thus making it very difficult to detect using signature-based detection and heuristic analysis. The focus of this project is to analyze Metamorphic JavaScript malware and techniques that can be used to mutate the code in JavaScript. To assess the capabilities of the metamorphic engine, we performed experiments to visualize the degree of code morphing. Further, this project discusses potential methods that have been used to detect metamorphic malware and their potential limitations. Based on the experiments performed, SVM has shown promise when it comes to detecting and classifying metamorphic code with a high accuracy. An accuracy of 86% is observed when classifying benign, malware and metamorphic files.

Keywords- Metamorphic malware, Signature detection, Heuristic analysis, Support Vector Machines.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Malware - short for malicious software is designed to penetrate and harm computers without the knowledge of the user. Malware can take up any form of executable code or script. The code/script is described as spyware, virus, worm, or keylogger. Early versions of malware were very primitive but abundant. Malware can infiltrate computers by a number of user actions such as by downloading free software, websites that can be infected via malicious code [4] and opening an email that contains a harmful attachment. A study revealed that cybercrime cost between $400 and $608 million in the year 2017, $100 million more than the year 2014 [5].

A signature of a malware consists of a sequence of bytes. Large files consisting of these signatures could be used to detect any malware. This technique is called signature detection and is used to date in most commercial antivirus software. Signature detection is particularly useful at detecting known malware and also can be used to detect a large number of malware families.

To work around the ability of signature detection, metamorphic malware is used. To disguise malicious code, this malware is capable of rewriting its structure and thereby its signature with each iteration without changing its underlying functionality. JavaScript is useful to perform this obfuscation. Metamorphic malware can easily evade signature detection since the malware can create variants of the code that have a different signature compared to the original file.

This paper is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 provides a background about the different types of malware, techniques to generate metamorphic malware and attempts that have been made to detect the malware. Chapter 3 describes some
of the techniques that are used to obfuscate code by metamorphic engines along with their benefits. Chapter 4 covers the various experiments we will be running using opcode similarity. Chapter 5 covers detection techniques that can be explored such as Hidden Markov Models. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions and future scope of the project. The articles selected for this project include thesis projects, published papers and articles by companies in the field of malware.
CHAPTER 2

Background

2.1 Types of malware

Malware can be categorized into different classes based on the method of infection. Examples of these classes are worms, trojans, virus, spyware, rootkit, or keyloggers. Commercial anti-virus software uses signature-based detection technique to detect malware. A major drawback of signature-based detection is that it is not able to identify new malware or strains of malware that are not present in the signature file. Seeing an inherent weakness in this technique, malware writers mutate their code to change the malware’s signature. Several types of malware obfuscate their code to making it harder to analyze and be detected. Some of the types are described below.

2.1.1 Encrypted Malware

Encrypted malware was designed as a technique to evade signature detection. It contains the main virus body in encrypted format and a decryption routine. When the infected application is executed, the main virus body is decrypted using the decryption routine and it carries out its intended function, thus evading signature detection. Cascade which emerged in 1987 was the first of this type of malware [6]. The drawback of this method is that the decryption routine always remains the same and this can be used to detect the encrypted malware.

2.1.2 Polymorphic malware

To overcome the weakness of encrypted malware, polymorphic malware was designed. When the infected program is executed, the malware is decrypted and carries out its intended function. In each execution, a new version of the malware is encrypted and stored for the next execution. The decryption routine is morphed after each iteration changing the signature constantly. Thus, the malware cannot be traced back by looking for bits in the decryption routine [7]. This malware was a significant improvement but the virus body does not mutate and can be detected by
cutting-edge antivirus software. This is done by running the executable in an isolated environment, disassembling it and extracting the original virus body.

Fig. 2 shows a polymorphic malware in each cycle.

Figure 1: Polymorphic Malware Infection [1]

2.1.3 Metamorphic Malware

Metamorphic malware is a more advanced form of polymorphic malware that has proved to be harder to detect. In metamorphic malware, the virus body and the decryption routine are morphed after every iteration but retain the functionality [8] of the original code. The end result is that for two copies of the same malware, the obfuscated code bears no resemblance to the initial code. The first metamorphic malware ‘Win95/Regswap’ was released in 1989 [9]. The obfuscation techniques used can be divided into two parts namely data flow obfuscation and control flow obfuscation.

2.2 Obfuscation Techniques

Obfuscation techniques are used in metamorphic malware to evade detection tools. Some of the techniques are mentioned below and used with great success Troia et al.,[10] and Musale et al.[7].
2.2.1 Instruction Substitution

This method replaces an instruction or a group of instructions with equivalent instructions whilst maintaining the same functionality [7]. Examples of this technique are replacing a ‘mov’ operation with a push/pop sequence or replacing a ‘xor’ instruction with a sub-instruction.

2.2.2 Instruction Renaming

This technique looks for keywords such as ‘var’, ‘def’ or ‘function’ and replaces the name with a randomly generated string [7].

2.2.3 Instruction Reordering

Independent instructions are switched using this technique. Only instructions that are in the same program scope are reordered. This gives a large number of morphed versions of the initial code [11]. Based on the number of independent instructions, say n, n! morphed versions can be generated.

Troia et al. [10] and Musale et al. [7] employ similar styles of instruction reordering but with subtle differences in the format. The style followed by [10] is an identifier followed by a "|" and a number to indicate dependency to an instruction. However, both representations achieve similar results.

2.2.4 Dead Code Insertion

In this method, instructions which do not affect execution are inserted to create morphed copies of the malware [7]. These instructions are called "do-nothing" [7] instructions and were used to create Win95/ZPerm [12]. Examples of such instructions are NOP (No operation) and INC (Increment) followed by DEC (Decrement) to give the original value. These instructions can be inserted anywhere in the global scope between two instructions. This technique is particularly useful in altering the structure of the code thereby changing the signature significantly. The drawback of this method is that it is slow since the whole file must be scanned to find the possible positions to
2.3 Detection Techniques

2.3.1 Signature-Based Detection

Since the first days of security monitoring, signature-based detection has been used. The main reason for its popularity is its low false positive rates, its ability to detect a large number of families of malware, and its low complexity. A known virus database of signatures is compared against the malware to identify it. The signature is the fingerprint of a file. In signature-based detection, a file is scanned and its signature is compared against the collection of signatures present in the database to determine for a match. However, this method has two main drawbacks. First, it cannot be used to detect malware that are previously unknown. Second, the contents of the database keep increasing which makes it harder to maintain. As the size increases so does the storage and the time required to match the signature. This method can be easily beaten using obfuscation techniques which constantly changes the signature.

2.3.2 Anomaly Based Detection

Anomaly-based detection monitors system activity to determine if the behavior of the system is normal or anomalous [11]. Unlike signature-based detection which looks for the signature of the malware, this classification is based on rules/heuristics and tries to determine if the system deviates from normal behavior. The main requirement for this detection technique is to understand what normal behavior is. Idika et al.[11] describes two main phases which is the training and testing phase occur. In the training phase, the detector attempts to learn what the normal behavior is and in the testing phase, the detector compares the current system behavior to the behavior in the training phase. A particularly useful feature of this technique is the ability to detect unknown malware since it categorizes anything that deviates from the normal behavior to be an attack. This also brings about a big drawback which is the fact
that it has a very high false positive rate and high complexity [11]. Another major drawback is that it is not easy to define normal behavior in more complex networks.

### 2.3.3 Heuristic Analysis

Heuristic Analysis is used to check for features that are considered suspicious in files. It is particularly useful for detecting variants of an existing virus family [13]. A drawback of this technique is the number of false positives. When a benign program is marked as a malware, it destroys the user’s trust over time. Users could assume that real malware is a false alarm and make the system more vulnerable.

It relies primarily on data sets and machine learning techniques to detect malware. Some of the machine learning techniques used are Data Mining, Neural Networks, Hidden Markov Models, and Support Vector Machines.

Malware can be considered as a sequence of events and thus Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and Support Vector Machines (SVM) are apt tools that can be used to detect it as it uses pattern recognition. HMM are useful in bio-informatics, reinforcement learning and pattern recognition such as speech, gesture, and handwriting. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a state machine, which captures probabilistic dependencies between observed states and unobserved states, commonly called as hidden states. HMMs can be used to find the best combination of hidden states, give an observation sequence. For a given number of hidden states, the model looks at the data and constructs a hidden state transition matrix A and an emission probability matrix B. The features of the input data are represented as states of the trained HMM and the probabilities represent the statistical properties of the features. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) can be trained on a set of data which is also in the form of an observation sequence. Using SVM and its hyperplane [3], an optimal hyperplane can be calculated and used to classify data into separate classes.

Wong et al. [13][14] uses HMM to detect metamorphic malware by using opcode
sequences. Sequences from the original code and from the morphed code are extracted and then compared against each other for similarity. A score can be used to represent the similarity of the sequence using the trained HMM. The higher the similarity score is, the more similar the sequence is to the training data. Morphed variants of malware are generated using Next Generation Virus Construction Kit (NGVCK). Using a threshold value, the detection rate of this method was between 97.1 to 97.5% with a false positive rate of 3%. A limitation of this method is that it was unable to detect specifically designed metamorphic malware generated from engines such as MetaPHOR and MWOR[4].

A dueling HMM strategy is followed to better understand the hidden states in depth [12]. HMM are examined for four different compilers, hand-written assembly code, and three virus construction kits. Based on their experiments it is shown that the dueling HMM strategy can better detect malware than the method employed by Wong et al. [13][14].

Other methods have also been employed with some effect in detecting metamorphic malware. Bruschi et al. [15] employs a method that is used to undo the transformations done by the metamorphic engine. The program is normalized to its canonical form which is simpler in terms of structure while retaining the original semantics i.e removes all the techniques used during the metamorphosis. The drawback is that dynamic behavior of the malware cannot be characterized. Mohammed et al. [16] employs another method that reduces the morphed code to the respective zero form. This method shows promise but is not used on actual viruses. Although not used very frequently in malware detection, experiments have been performed for malware detection with SVM’s in the past. In 2013, Santos et al. [17] stated that SVM outperforms other classifiers using term frequency for different classifiers and obtained an accuracy of 92.92% for a one opcode sequence and an accuracy of 95.90% for a two
opcode sequence. In 2015, Ranveer et al. [18] proposed a method which achieved a True Positive Rate (TPR) of 1 with bigger test data set’s. This model is incredibly accurate in terms of classification as this proposed system considers both static and dynamic features.
CHAPTER 3
Metamorphic Techniques

3.1 Implementation

The design architecture is as follows, JavaScript code is converted to an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) to perform the obfuscation techniques and then back to JavaScript to give the morphed code. To do this, a JavaScript parser ‘Esprima’ and a package known as Escodegen is used. Esprima is a high performance, standard compliant JavaScript Parser. This is used in Node.js to produce a beautiful syntax tree to work with.

An abstract syntax tree (AST), or just syntax tree, is a tree representation of the abstract syntactic structure of source code written in a programming language. Each node of the tree denotes a construct occurring in the source code. A simple expression var a = 6 * 7 produces the tree shown below. The variable a is present under the ‘VariableDeclarator’ with an identifier name as ‘a’. 6 * 7 corresponds to a binary expression with the left and right of the tree being the value. Escodegen gives back JavaScript code which is then written into the output div tag. This is used in Node.js by using the following command.

Figure 2: Overview of the design flow
var escodegen = require('escodegen');
var newCode = escodegen.generate(AST);

This approach was selected due to its simplicity and allows to make changes to the
AST progressively.

The aim was to see which features can be converted back to JS from the tree.
All the techniques could be converted back to JS aside from String splitting. One
of the drawbacks was that we cannot convert code back into JS inside loops using
Escodegen. Alternative methods could be employed but the output would not be
visually pleasing. A figure below shows the metamorphic engine.

### 3.2 Instruction Renaming

As seen in the experiments, variable and function renaming is one of the more
effective obfuscation techniques. Using this method, we scan for keywords such as var
and function in the whole script file and replaces the name of a variable/ function
with a randomized two letter string. This consequently changes the signature of the
program repeatedly. All the occurrences of a string are changed within the same scope.
An example of our application in action is shown below:

The code is first parsed into an AST. A check is done to find out what type of
declarations the body contains. Three types of declarations are present namely Variable
Declaration, Function Declaration and Expression Statement. The implementation
takes care of all the types of declarations and return statements.

If a new variable/ function declaration is found in the program and the type is
that of an identifier, it randomizes a string and sets the new name. The old name
and the new name are then stored in a hashmap with oldname as key and new name
as the value to the key.

For a future occurrence of an existing renamed variable within the same scope,
the hashmap is searched with key (old name) and the resulting value (new name) of
the variable is retrieved to replace the occurrence. If the old name is not present, then
a new random name is generated and the hashmap is appended with new key value
pair (old name and new name respectively).

Scoping is one of the most challenging issues for variable renaming. When a
variable is declared in a function or when we have a nested function, its corresponding
value is pushed onto the HashMap. For example: If a variable ‘x’ is declared in the
global scope of the program and then ‘x’ is redefined as a local variable inside the
function scope, then a lookup is done on key ‘x’. If key is found, then the new name

Figure 3: Metamorphic Engine at work.
for x (as allotted in local scope) is pushed onto the value array for key ‘x’. When the scope of the function ends, the inserted key value pairs are then popped out thus retaining the scope. Figure 3 shows a snippet of the hashmap and figure 4 shows an image after the AST is created.

3.3 Instruction Reordering

If two instructions are independent of each other within program scope, the two instructions are reordered. A check is done to see if the instruction ‘i’ and instruction ‘i+1’ are both ‘VariableDeclaration’ in the AST and if the declaration type of the instruction ‘i+1’ is a Literal, then the two instructions can be swapped with each
other. The reordering covers the entire scope of the program even inside functions and nested functions. This gives a lot of variations of the same code. For ex:

```plaintext
int a = 1;
int b = 2;
int c = a + b;
```

After reordering,

```plaintext
int b = 2;
int a = 1;
int c = a + b;
```

A sample reordering of variables passed through the metamorphic engine is shown below:

```plaintext
var x = 10;
var y = 20;
var z = x + y;
```
3.4 Instruction Substitution

In this method, an instruction is replaced with an equivalent instruction. We look at making changes for basic binary operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and power operations. The theory behind this is that an expression "+" can be substituted with "(- -)".

For Example:

```
var z = x + y;
var z = x - (-y)
```

This morphs the program but still results in the same output. The same is repeated with subtraction where (a - b) → a (- +) b, multiplication (a*b) → a/(1/b) , division (a/b) → (x*a)/(x*b) and power $a^b$ can be replaced by $a^{(b/2+b/2)}$. 

Figure 6: A more complex AST
3.5 String Splitting

String splitting is a method by which an instruction is split every 3 or 4 characters and stored in a variable. All the individual pieces are then concatenated and then executed. This allows harmful pieces of code to get broken down, recombined at some other point and then executed. This is a particularly useful technique for hiding code.

Ex : `return harmfulCode;`

`String 1 : ret`

`String 2 : urn`

`String 3 : ha`
To further explore the concept of Metamorphic JavaScript which is the aim of this project, we performed the splitting on the JavaScript code directly instead of performing them in the AST. This proved to be a simpler method rather than making changes in the syntax tree. More techniques can be implemented this way instead of parsing the code to AST and then back again with the drawback being that it could be detected by some antivirus.
3.6 Dead Code Insertion

The last technique that we have tried to implement is Function Insertion. The main aim of Function Insertion is to insert dead code that does not affect execution. This creates morphed copies with different signatures to avoid detection. For implementing this technique, we explored ways for manipulating JavaScript code itself. We split the JS code on every occurrence of ";" character and insert dead code at that location. A simple implementation of dead code insertion is used. More complex mutations can be used such as randomizing the name of each function generated and inserting simple instructions inside each of the functions with randomized names. This would further morph the signature of the program.
CHAPTER 4

Assessing modification extent using Similarity Graphs

4.1 Rhino

In 1997, Netscape worked on a project that was aimed at creating a version of Netscape Navigator that was fully written in Java. The end product was called the ‘Rhino’ project, an open-source JavaScript implementation written in Java. This is now maintained by Mozilla. Rhino is used to compile JavaScript code to Java classes. It can primarily run in two modes - compiled and interpreted mode. The compiled mode is very useful as Rhino compiles JavaScript to a Java bytecode. This produced the best performance results, outdoing the C++ implementation of JavaScript with Just-in-time-compiling (JIT).

The Rhino engine consists of four parts namely Parser, Byte-Code generator, Interpreter and the JIT.

- Parser: The parser parses the JavaScript code and converts it to an AST.
- Byte-Code generator: AST is then passed into the Byte-Code generator which generates the bytecode.
- The Interpreter uses the output from the generator to convert the bytecode to machine code while using the JIT.

The output from the bytecode generator is needed for performing all the experiments. Once the AST is generated from the parser, the bytecode generator converts this to bytecode one block at a time. The sample output from the bytecode generator is shown below

```java
JavaScript code:

```int a = 2;```

```Byte code generated:

```
bipush 2
istore_0
```
‘bipush’ is used to add a byte as an integer onto the stack which in this case is 2. ‘istore_0’ is used to store an integer in a local variable. The general format is istore_<n> where n can be 0, 1, 2, or 3 depending on the number of local variables. Anything greater than 3 is represented by the generalized opcode ‘istore’.

There are also limitations when it comes to using Rhino. The primary reason is, as compiling JS directly affects the load time of a page in the browser, Rhino can only compile small files [7]. To deal with this problem, a method is employed by Mangesh et al.[7] to compile a file of any length and disregard any optimization that Rhino inherently performs. The opcodes are extracted at compile time itself by writing the output to the console. This method saves the time of decompilation of the class file to extract the opcode sequence. However this method is not implemented as most of the files can be extracted using Rhino, including big files. The compilation process for an entire directory finishes in a matter of seconds. When the file is converted to a human readable format, most of the vital information is present in the file. It has a list of function calls to show the operations that take place and what value is stored in memory. Therefore the above method is deemed unnecessary.

To retrieve the output from the intermediate stage we perform extra steps shown in the next section.

4.2 Similarity Graphs

The method employed by Mishra et al. [2] will be used to assess the extent of metamorphism done by the engine and to compare two files of code. This program compares code at a bytecode level to quantify the degree of metamorphism after a file is passed through the metamorphic engine. To do this, the code needs to be converted to an appropriate form. Figure 10 illustrates the process mentioned below.

- The first step in the process is to compile the JavaScript file to a class file using Rhino. The following command is used.
The next step is to disassemble the class file and convert it to human readable language,

\texttt{javap -c <filename>}

- The output from the command line is saved as a txt file.
- The file is parsed using python to remove all the leading white spaces, function names, comments and the number preceding each instruction.
The `java -cp` command is used to compile the file from a JavaScript file to a class file and the `javap` command takes the class file as an input and gives us a more human readable file. A script is written to parse through a directory, retrieve all the JS files and perform the required operation thereby removing the manual work required for this process. A sample file in Figure 11 is shown below:

```
+ AccountBase +
1 public class AccountBase extends org.mozilla/javascript.NativeFunction implements org.mozilla/javascript.Script {
2     public AccountBase(org.mozilla/javascript.Scriptable, org.mozilla/javascript.Context, int);
3     Code:
4         0: aload_0
5         1: invokespecial #11 // Method org.mozilla/javascript/NativeFunction."<init">:{V
6         4: aload_0
7         5: iload_3
8         6: putfield #13 // Field _id:I
9         9: aload_0
10        10: aload_2
11        11: aload_1
12        12: iload_3
13        13: tableswitch { // 2 to 2
14                 2: 36
15                   default: 32
16                }
17        32: invokespecial #17 // Method _11:(long;long;org.mozilla/javascript/Scriptable;)V
18        35: return
19        36: invokespecial #20 // Method _12:(org.mozilla/javascript/Context;org.mozilla/javascript/Scriptable;)V
20        39: return
21
22     public AccountBase();
23     Code:
24         0: aload_0
25         1: invokespecial #11 // Method org.mozilla/javascript/NativeFunction."<init">:{V
26         4: aload_0
27         5: iconst_0
28         6: putfield #13 // Field _id:I
29         9: return
30
31     public static void main(java.lang.String[]);
32     Code:
33         0: new #2 // class AccountBase
34         3: dup
35         4: invokespecial #27 // Method "<init">:{V
36         7: aload_0
37         8: invokevirtual #32 // Method org.mozilla/javascript/optimizer/CompiledMethod#invoke
```

Figure 11: A sample file after converting to bytecode.

To compare two files we look to Mishra’s method. File X is the original code and File Y is the code that is passed through the metamorphic engine. The method put forward by Mishra consists of the following steps. Figure 12 illustrates the process mentioned below.
Given two pieces of code X and Y, X before the file is passed through the engine and Y after the metamorphism is done, the opcode sequences are extracted from each of the files. Redundant commands such as comments, blank lines, and such are removed from this sequence.

The resultant file is an opcode sequence of length \( n \) and \( m \) where \( n \) and \( m \) are the number of opcodes in each file.

Two opcode sequences are then compared by considering subsequences of three opcode. A match is found if all the three opcodes are similar regardless of their position in the subsequence. The coordinates \((x,y)\) are marked on the graph where \( x \) is the opcode number of the first opcode of the three opcode sequence in program X and \( y \) is the opcode number of the opcode subsequence in program Y.

Opcode numbers of Program X are represented in the x-axis and opcode numbers of program Y are represented in the y-axis. After matching all the coordinates,
a n*m graph is obtained.

- If a line segment falls on the main diagonal of the graph, it means that the opcodes are at the same location in both the files. A line of the diagonal indicates that the match appear at different locations in the two files.

A number of experiments are run using this method to verify that the implementation of JavaScript metamorphic techniques is effective.
CHAPTER 5
Support vector machines.

Support Vector Machines (SVM) proposed in the 1990s is a discriminative classifier. It is a supervised machine learning algorithm and a preferred model for classification as it has high accuracy with less computation power. It was mainly designed for pattern recognition but is also applied in many classification problems such as image, speech recognition, text categorization, and face detection.

Given training data which is labeled i.e each data belonging to a specific class, a SVM is capable of building a model that can predict the class of new test data. The main objective of a SVM is to find a separating hyperplane that can clearly classify data points. The hyperplane is a line dividing a plane into two parts where each data point falls into one category. Figure 13 below shows an example of the hyperplane. For a set of independent and identically distributed training sample

![Figure 13: A HyperPlane](image)

\[ \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^N \text{ where } x \in \mathbb{R}^d \text{ and } y \in \{-1, 1\} \]

which is the input and output of the classification and (x,y) is a set of training data.
The aim is to find a hyperplane represented as

\[ w^T x + b = 0 \] (2)

which can be used to separate the two different samples accurately. \( w \) is the weights vector, \((x, y)\) is a set of training data, and \( b = -w.x_0 \).

The optimal hyperplane is one that maximizes the distance from the hyperplane to the nearest point of each class. This hyperplane is selected from a number of hyperplanes or the classifying patterns. The figure below 14 gives a basic idea.

![Set of Possible Hyperplanes](image)

**Figure 14: Set of Possible Hyperplanes[3]**

The dimension of the hyperplane is dependant on the number of features fed into the model. The model becomes more complex when the number of features exceeds 3. To build an SVM, Support vectors play a vital role. Support vectors are data points that are closer to the hyperplane and influence the position and orientation of the hyperplane.

Using Support vectors, we maximize the margin of the classifier. The bilateral blank area \( \frac{2}{||w||} \) must be maximized to obtain the partition hyperplane and this is done by maximizing the weight of the margin. Formula 3 [3] is used to maximize the weight of the margin.
\[ \min \Phi(w) = \frac{1}{2} ||w||^2 = \frac{1}{2}(w, w) \quad [3] \]

such that
\[ y^i(w.x_i + b) \geq 1 \quad [3] \]

where \( w \) is the weights vector, and \( \Phi \) is the kernel function. The kernel function is used to map a pattern onto a higher dimension such that the pattern can become linearly separable. \( \frac{1}{2} \) is used in the formula as it is convenient for taking the derivative. \( 4 \) are the constraints to ensure that all instances are correctly classified. Maximizing the margin of the classifier is done to give better classification. Larger the margin, better is the classification of the model and thereby lesser percentage of error.

5.1 Implementation

For the implementation, a sequence is required as the input to the model. A significant amount of data pre-processing must be done to convert the files into the input format. The opcode sequence generated from Rhino in the previous step is used. The top 30 occurring opcodes have been used to create a dictionary. This dictionary will be used to convert the opcodes into symbols. This sequence of symbols will become the input to the SVM. A script file performs the following operation:

- The file is read line by line and stripped for leading and trailing white spaces to get each line.
- A check is done to see if each line starts with a digit since the output from Rhino is of the format ‘1:invokespecial’. This is done to remove function declarations and get only the opcode list.
- The line is split based on ‘:’ to get the opcode.
- Regular expressions are used to remove comments and any other extra characters/symbols since Rhino generates comments in most lines.
- If the opcode matches the key in the dictionary, the opcode is converted into a
symbol and stored.

The table below shows the contents of the dictionary.

Table 1: 30 most occurring opcodes and their symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opcode</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Opcode</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aaload</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>areturn</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aload_0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ifne</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invokespecial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>aload</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iload_3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>getfield</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>putfield</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>ldc</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aload_1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>sipush</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aload_2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>bipush</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tableswitch</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>putstatic</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>return</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>ireturn</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iconst_0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>aaload_3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>iload_1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dup</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>iconst_4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invokestatic</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>iconst_1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aconst_null</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>iconst_3</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invokevirtual</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>ldc_w</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A sample of the conversion is shown below.

Bytecode:

aload_0
aload_1
return
invokepecial

Opcode sequence generated:

[1, 2, 3, 4]

This generates an array of variable length (depending on the size of the file).

This is run for each of the input files. Once the opcode sequence is converted into symbols, this is then fed as the train data to the model and a label assigned to it. A
label ‘0’ is assigned if the file is a benign file and a label ‘1’ is assigned if the file is a malware file. The train and test data is split in an 80-20 ratio. The SVC classifier is used in this model, fitted and can then be used to predict against the test data. The parameters for the SVC are mostly the default values. Parameter tuning done for this implementation is, the kernel is set to ‘rbf’, gamma is set to ‘scale’ and the max_iter is set to -1. A python script is written to create the model.

To evaluate the classifier output from the model, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is used. The Y axis of a ROC curve is the true positive rate (TPR) and the X axis is the false positive rate (FPR). The top left corner of the plot i.e FPR of zero, is the ideal point. While this is not possible in most cases, it does mean that a larger AUC is better [19]. The ‘steepness’ of ROC curves is also important since it is ideal to maximize the true positive rate while minimizing the false positive rate[19]. ROC can be also be used for multi-label classification. This is calculated by comparing the y_test and y_score.

\[
y\_score = \text{classifier.fit}(X\_train, y\_train)\].decision\_function(X\_test)
\]

The roc curve is plotted by calculating the area of the curve of the false positive rate and the true positive rate.

In recent years, Hidden Markov models have had great success in classifying malware. In this implementation, SVM’s are chosen over Hidden Markov Models to classify data as malware or benign due to a vital reason. In the case of the HMM, the data points fed to the model consists of a two dimensional array where each row corresponds to the opcode sequence of one file. The limitation is that the files fed to the HMM is considered as one file instead of considering each file separately i.e

\[
\text{Input to the model : [file1, file2, file3, file4, file5]}
\]
How HMM's considers it: [file1]

Thus the HMM calculates the probability of one symbol appearing after the next and not classifying the malware based on the opcode sequence in each malware file. Implementing a Hidden Markov Model that accepts a two dimensional array is not straight-forward and requires a lot of mathematical calculations. This makes SVM to be the more suitable algorithm in this case.
CHAPTER 6

Experiments and Results

This chapter covers all the experiments, files used and the results from each of the experiments mentioned below. The methods experimented with are listed below

- Metamorphic Engine
- Similarity Graphs
- HMM/SVM.

The metamorphic engine works on the JavaScript while the similarity graph and the model on the opcode/opcode sequences. Benign and malware files are in JavaScript and then passed through the engine. This is converted to opcodes using Rhino. Opcode sequences are then extracted from each of the files using bash script files. All of the experiments are performed on a laptop with the following system configurations listed in Table 2.

Table 2: System configuration’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Lenevo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processor</td>
<td>Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.60GHz (8 CPUs), 2.6GHz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAM</td>
<td>16GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System Type</td>
<td>64-bit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java Compiler</td>
<td>Java8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Operating System</td>
<td>Windows 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guest Operating System</td>
<td>Ubuntu 16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The malware files are stored/extracted on a Ubuntu environment in an Oracle VM VirtualBox. This is done as a precaution in case the malware somehow affects the system. Snapshots also allow you to go back to a previous system point.

For the dataset, the files used consist of benign and malware files. The breakup is shown in Table 3.

For the malware set, a GitHub repository of JavaScript malware [20] is used. This collection has 40,000 malware samples from different families all collected in the
year of 2017. A variety of malware totaling 50 is selected and used for the malware samples. 60 different JavaScript files from different libraries are used as the benign set.

6.1 Similarity Graphs:

For the similarity graphs, different experiments have been performed and the results have been listed down below. The advantage of similarity graphs is that it creates a visual representation of the difference between the two pieces of code. A match across the diagonal indicates that the file is similar in the same location i.e the metamorphic engine does not cause enough change to the code. A match away from the diagonal indicates that the file is similar in different places of the code. When a steady diagonal is not present in the graph, it shows that the engine is performing well and the resultant code from the metamorphic engine is completely different while remaining functionally equivalent.

6.1.1 Sliding windows

The first experiment conducted is the sliding window experiment. Mishra [2] assumes a sliding window of 3 opcodes to be ideal. This is put to a test as an opcode sequence of 5 could also result in better output. If a match does not occur for a length of 5, there is definitive proof that metamorphic techniques are used and that there
is a significant difference. The similarity graphs were run against different sliding windows (length of 1, 2, 3, and 5) of the opcode sequences and observed.

![Similarity graph](image)

**Figure 15:** Sliding window of 2.

From the figures 15, 16, and 17, it becomes clear that bigger the sliding window is lesser are the number of matches between the two opcode sequences. From figure 15, it is clear that there are too many unwanted matches that occur between the two opcode sequences due to the small size of each window. A sliding window of ‘3’ and ‘5’ is more promising in that regard and can be used for the experiments. From the figures 16 and 17, the number of random matches are drastically lesser. A sliding window of ‘3’ seems to be the ideal number to perform experiments but a number of ‘5’ could also be used for future experiments.
6.1.2 Experimenting with each of the techniques

The similarity graph is used to assess the strength of each technique in the metamorphic engine. An experiment is run to see which combination of techniques
yield the best result. While all the five techniques is the best approach, it would be interesting to see how to mix and match the techniques for future implementations. A sliding window of ‘3’ is chosen for all the experiments shown below.

Figure 18: A file matched against itself.

![Similarity graph](image)

The above figure shows the same file matched against itself without going through the metamorphic engine. A clear diagonal indicates that the opcode sequences are present at similar locations in each of the files.

Graph 1 indicates when sequential matches are done i.e window (1,2,3) followed by window (4,5,6) are compared. Graph 2 indicates when a sliding window of 3 i.e window (1,2,3) followed by window (2,3,4) is used to check the two files. Both methods are implemented purely for experimentation.

Figure 19 shows the degree of metamorphism performed by the instruction reordering technique. From the diagonal, it is clear that the degree of metamorphism that it performs is very less from the opcode sequences extracted. There is a small break in the program towards the end and this is due to the fact that when compiled using Rhino,
instruction names are present in a function in the end called ‘getParamOrVarConst’. Thus the change appears only towards the end of the diagonal. While this break is not significant, it can be effective for bigger files.
Figure 20 shows the degree of metamorphism done by the engine performing only Instruction Reordering. From the figure, it is clear that this technique performs very less change. Since we swap two independent instructions within the same scope and compare a sliding window of 3 opcode sequences in the similarity graphs in any order, the change that appears is very minimal. The break occurs when instructions that are independent, in the same scope, and do not occur sequentially are present in the program. Thus this technique is not very effective while performing metamorphism. A lower value of the sliding window might provide better results.

![Similarity graph](image)

Figure 21: Instruction Substitution.

Figure 21 shows the degree of metamorphism done by the engine performing only Instruction Substitution. Similar to Figure 20, the changes by Instruction Substitution is minimal.

Figure 22 corresponds to dead code insertion done by the metamorphic engine. This technique creates the most metamorphic functionally equivalent code. Dead code insertion changes the structure drastically by inserting ‘do-nothing’ functions.
From the graph, it is apparent that the output from the engine is nothing like the initial code. Thus this technique is very effective at altering the structure of the code and thereby the signature.

6.1.2.1 Dead code vs All other techniques.

From the above graphs, it is very apparent that dead code insertion offers very promising results. This is compared to an engine that performs all the other techniques.

When comparing the techniques, the metamorphism performed by dead code is much better than all the other techniques combined. This implementation of dead code inserts the code wherever semicolons are present and appends the rest of the body to it. While this implementation might increase the amount of memory required for the program also making it more visible to the user, this does offer more promise when it comes to changing the signature of the code. Also when inserting dead code, care must be taken because if the malware writer is too reliant on dead code, there are
(a) All the other techniques combined

(b) Dead Code

simple methods to remove all the dead code such as reducing the code to its zero form [16] and running the executable in a safe environment to get the original code again.
6.2 SVM:

A variety of experiments were run with SVM during the detection phase of this project. The dataset consists of benign files taken from various sources and the malware files are taken from the 40000 JavaScript collection samples from GitHub. Table 4 shows the number of files that are used in the training and testing phase of the SVM.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source File</th>
<th>Number of Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benign Files</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Number of Files to the SVM

The above files are split roughly in a 90-10 ratio to get the training and test data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Number of Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Data</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Data</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Training and Test data split

Data pre-processing:

The following steps are used to get the data that is fed to the SVM.

- The JavaScript file is passed through Rhino to get the class file.
- java-p is then used to get a human-readable format to work with. A python script then converts the file to an input for the SVM.
- The file is read line by line and stripped for leading and trailing white spaces to get each line.
- A check is done to see if each line starts with a digit since the output from Rhino is of the format ‘10:return’. This is done to remove function declarations and get only the opcode list.
• The line is split based on ‘:’ to get the opcode.
• Regular expressions are used to remove comments and any other extra characters/symbols since Rhino generates comments in most lines.
• If the opcode matches the key in the dictionary, the opcode is converted into a symbol.
• A length of 500 opcodes is chosen as an ideal point for the length of the opcode sequences.
• If the opcode length is more than 500, the first 500 opcodes are used to represent the file. If the opcode length is less than 500, a ‘other’ symbol is used to fill the array with a symbol. In this case, ‘45’ is taken as that symbol.
• This output is then written to a file.

A sample is shown below of a row generated from the python script that converts the byte code into symbols. The sample below consists of the first 30 symbols of a file.

[2, 2, 10, 9, 12, 2, 9, 2, 6, 7, 12, 14, 16, 6, 2, 6, 7, 25, 16, 2, 6, 7, 25, 16, 10, 24, 16, 10, 24, 24]

6.2.1 Experiment1: Opcode Length

The first factor to decide on is the opcode length for each file. Since the length of each file varies, an ideal length parameter must be decided. This is done such that smaller files can append an ‘other’ symbol to fill up the opcode sequence to make each row of the array of equal length. The first experiment was conducted using the length value of 250. The data set taken for this experiment consisted of 50 files which can be broken down into 20 malware and 30 benign files. The following figure shows the output from the experiment.

The accuracy of the given model is 87.5% given the input parameters and the
Figure 24: ROC curve for Experiment 1.

size of the dataset. The main reason for this is that the length of the opcode sequence
taken for each file is insufficient for the model to draw conclusions for classification.
Also, the size of the dataset is small for this experiment as the data preprocessing
required to obtain the converted opcode sequence is very time consuming and tedious
even with the help of scripts to automate the process.

Another solution could be to set the optimal length to be the length of biggest
opcode sequence and pad all the other files with the ‘other’ symbol. But the drawback
of this method is that since the file size varies quite often, many files end up with
more padding rather than the actual file.

A length of 500 gives the best accuracy in classification. Figure 25 shows that
this length is an ideal limiter for the opcode sequence.
6.2.2 Experiment 2: Parameter tuning for SVC

Some of the important parameters that have been experimented with have been explained below.

The kernel parameter decides the type of hyperplane that splits the data. The parameter that can be used is ‘linear’, ‘rbf’, and ‘poly’. Linear is not selected as this will use a linear hyperplane to separate the data. Rbf is chosen since a non-linear hyperplane is used. Gamma is a parameter that is used for non-linear hyperplanes. The training data set is exactly fit given higher a gamma value. The gamma parameter is set to ‘scale’ as the ‘auto’ parameter is now deprecated and setting it to this value means that no value is passed. The scale parameter uses the formula 1/ (n_features * X.var()) to determine the value of the kernel coefficient. These parameters are used in the final parameter is max_iter which is set to ‘-1’ i.e. the number of iterations as no limit. Setting a limit on the maximum number of iterations results in the accuracy dropping drastically to 50%.

Other parameters such as ‘C’ used the default value that is passed to the SVC.

The figure 25 shows that the model is highly accurate and efficient when it comes to detecting malware based on the opcode sequence. This model is used to test if SVM’s are capable of detecting any metamorphic operations performed on benign / malware files. By detecting the changes at a byte code level and analyzing the opcode sequences will help finalize how efficient metamorphic techniques are.

This implementation of SVM has a higher accuracy than existing implementations of SVM for malware detection. Existing implementation using SVM by Ranveer et al. [18] achieved a 92% accuracy for opcode based malware detection and Santos et al.[17] achieved a TPR of 0.95 for malware detection. The implementation in this project has a better accuracy for a dataset of the same size. Thus to test metamorphic
code, a powerful detection algorithm with a very high accuracy is used.

6.2.3 Experiment 3: Adding new classes to the classification.

This section experiments with using benign metamorphic code to make the problem harder. In this experiment, an extra class is added which represents benign metamorphic code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Label</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benign file</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware file</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benign Metamorphic file</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A file consisting of benign metamorphic code is a benign file that is passed through the metamorphic engine and morphed. If the SVM is capable of separating the data into the third class accurately, a conclusive method is now found to detect the presence of these effective metamorphic techniques. The same preprocessing is done to get the
data in the appropriate form.

Table 7: Number of Files to the SVM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source File</th>
<th>Number of Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benign Files</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malware Files</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benign Metamorphic Files</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Training and Test data split

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Number of Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training Data</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test Data</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7, 8 highlights the breakdown of the input files and the split of the train-test data. 45 benign files are passed through the metamorphic engine and added to our train data. The output from the model is shown below in Figure 26. ‘micro-average’ and ‘macro-average’ also tell us how the model performs by giving the average statistic information of the classification. The ‘macro-average’ in the figure is the calculated metrics (true positive rate, false positive rate) for each label which is then used to find the mean. The ‘micro-average’ is the collective metrics for all labels globally to compute the average [19]. For most multi-class classification, micro-average is preferred in case of class imbalance.

The SVM is capable of classifying benign metamorphic code with an accuracy of 86%. An area under the curve (auc) value of 0.8 and macro average (as there is no dataset imbalance) of 0.90 is obtained for benign metamorphic class meaning that the model is capable of decisively classifying the file. Thus the opcode sequence can be fed to the Support Vector Machine to detect metamorphic code with reasonable accuracy. The accuracy drops by 12% compared to the earlier models when the extra
class is taken into consideration as the number of files used in the dataset is less. This drop in accuracy is acceptable as an extra class is added. This stands to prove that SVM can be used to detect metamorphic code with reasonable accuracy.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusion and Future Work

The aim of this project was to explore and test the various metamorphic techniques using JavaScript and assess how effective each of the techniques are when it comes to changing the structure of the code. Rhino is used to compile JavaScript files to class files which can then be converted into bytecode and thereby extracting the necessary opcodes. These opcode’s can then be used for all the further experiments.

Similarity graphs was implemented to visualize how much the code morphs by using these techniques. It is found that Dead code was particularly effective when it comes to morphing the code. While the other techniques do show promise, the signature does not vary as much. This project also explains why SVM’s would be a better classification algorithm over HMM’s when observing the opcode sequence’s. From the experiments, we can conclude that SVM’s can classify malware and detect metamorphic code with a high degree of accuracy. When classifying malware, 98% accuracy is observed and when detecting/classifying metamorphic benign files, 86% accuracy is observed. Given that the model is capable of detecting metamorphic benign files, it will also be able to detect metamorphic malware. A more advanced version of SVM would be able to detect almost any metamorphic malware techniques used in the future.

Future work for this experiment can be to test SVM’s against metamorphic malware’s techniques such as Transcriptase and Advanced Transcriptase. These techniques have proved to be very hard to detect in previous research papers. Given how promising the results are from the experiments performed, SVM should be able to classify advanced malware techniques. To improve accuracy of the model, the size of the dataset could be drastically increased to around 1000/2000 files. A lot of time and data preprocessing would be required to obtain train/test data of this size.
LIST OF REFERENCES


