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Traditional strains in Mao Zedong's Marxism : 1893-1949

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Chu, Yickwah, M.A.

San Jose State University, 1994

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TRADITIONAL STRAINS IN MAO ZEDONG'S MARXISM: 1893-1949

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Yickwah Chu

May, 1994

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ABSTRACT

TRADITIONAL STRAINS IN MAO ZEDONG'S MARXISM: 1893-1949

by Yickwah Chu

Mao Zedong was the founder of the People's Republic China. He ruled over China for over twenty-seven years. Chinese society is deeply influenced by Mao. Many social phenomena in today's China are rooted in Mao's influence.

Study of Mao's ideology helps us to understand that influence. My research emphasized the development of Mao's ideology before 1949. After 1949, his supremacy was unchallenged, he became virtually an object of worship and his ideology ceases to be his own. In 1949 he was 56 years old and no longer likely to change.

Mao was educated in traditional Chinese culture but ended up claiming himself a Marxist. This thesis examines how the era of his generation and his experience affected his understanding of traditional culture and Marxism. By examining closely his writings before 1949, we may figure out the real face of his ideology.

PREFACE

After the collapse of communist polity in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, many people believed Chinese Communist polity would be the next to collapse. Four years have passed. There is no strong sign that the Chinese Communist polity will collapse. Why not? Although both Chinese and Eastern Europeans claimed themselves communist, each was quite different from the other. So, we can't foretell what will happen in China by examining Eastern Europe. We must study Chinese Communism independently. What does communism really mean for Chinese and how does it manipulate China? Mao Zedong is the key to understanding Chinese Communism. This is why I chose this topic.

I need to thank for their help the librarians of the East Asian Collection of Hoover Institution, especially Mr. Tam. They did great favors for me during my four years' research. Dr. George E. Moore not only acted as my thesis advisor, giving me good advice and guidance, he also helped me to write more clearly. I also am grateful to Dr. Harris I. Martin and Dr. D. Bruce Reynolds for their help with my thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

The Opium War (1848) heralded the beginning of China's modern history. After this, China officially began contacts with the West. This was a severe shock to Chinese society. This shock was felt in economic and technologic fields, in education and in the political system, in ideology, and also culturally.

Once the Chinese had hoped that a change in their economic system and in their technology could strengthen their military power. They began the Modernization Movement which emphasized military technology. They produced new weapons and built battleships. They modernized their army. They hoped by using Western weapons to defeat the West, they refused to accept and recognize Western culture. A series of wars broke their hope. The Chinese began to realize that the strength of the Western nations was not only because of technology, it was also because of their education and political systems. So the Chinese turned their attention to education. They established colleges according to the Western system and taught different subjects, such as mathematics, geography, and foreign languages. They set up parliaments and wrote constitutions. They even had a revolution in 1911 to overthrow the monarchy and establish a democratic system. They hoped to transform China into a modern nation and save China from the control of imperialists; but they failed. Finally, the Chinese concluded that all these reforms failed because of the faults of Chinese culture. They discovered that the core of Western education and political systems was its culture.

The May Fourth Movement in 1911 viewed Western culture as the hope of China and means for its salvation.

During this remarkable time, many Chinese proposed different methods of how to save China. Mao Zedong was one of them. Mao has a special position in Chinese history. He saved China from perishing and unified the country; but he was different from traditional leaders. He was also recognized as an ideologist. He had a dual status. Although Marxism was an important element in Mao's ideology, in the beginning Mao was not a Marxist. Not until 1918, when Mao went to Beijing to be the assistant of Li Dazhao, did he begin to turn to Marxism.

Chapter One will concentrate on Mao's ideology before 1918. Mao's past experience, his education, his friends and the history of his time cannot be isolated from the formation of his ideology. Chapter Two will investigate Marxism's initial impact upon Mao's thought. Chapter Three will study his absorbing Marxism during a period of intense activity and Chapter Four will analyze the convergence of Chinese traditional ideas and Marxism in Mao's thought.

My thesis argues that deeply embedded in Mao's thought lay certain traditional ideas which remained central to what became Maoism and that this synthesis is what gave his ideas power and his leadership effectiveness.

CHAPTER ONE

THE TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF MAO'S THOUGHT

Hunan means the land south of the lake. People from other provinces, especially Cantonese, are known to dislike Hunanese because they consider them rude and violent.¹ They regard Hunan as rather poor when compared with the other provinces, the reason for this being that the Hunanese are "lazy and do not like to work." Of course, Hunanese tell a different story about themselves. Hunanese say that they are distinguished throughout China for their inflexibility and their courage.² So how are the Hunanese to be characterized? Rude? Violent? Inflexible? Courageous? There are the two sides to every story.

When they are inflexible and courageous, they have martial spirit and a strong sense of righteousness. This results in a feeling of mission, especially during times of confusion. On the other hand, these characteristics lead them to have a furious temper and go to extremes in risking their lives. This is why they are called rude and violent.³ These characteristics cannot be isolated from Hunan's geography.

Hunan is located in Central China and lies south of Lake Dongting. Hunan is drained by four rivers, Siang, Li, Yuna and Tzu, which make the "Hunan landscape rugged, awe-inspiring, and extremely picturesque."⁴ Hunan is famous for its change of scenery between day and night. Some say this is why Hunanese love reverie and exploration.

At times these characteristics of inflexibility, courage, romance and exploration came together, in a person. Hunan first appeared in history as a country named Chu (403 B.C.). During that time, Chu had a famous poet, Qu Yuan (343-290 B.C.). His poems are full of romantic characters, dreams and feeling. His patriotism also made him famous. When he realized his idealistic projects of reforming the country would not be carried out, he threw himself into the lake and died. This act classically exhibits the combination of these characteristics. Although Chu was conquered by Qin, there was an expression saying that if only three Chu families were left alive, one day they would be able to rebel against Qin! In later years, this became true; the Qin dynasty was destroyed by Chu people.⁵

At the end of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), there were Hunanese scholars such as Wang Fuzhi who manifested nationalism and patriotism. Wang emphasized practical solutions to save China, and even when later on the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) replaced the Ming, he avoided pressure and danger from the Qing government, and spread the idea of rebellion.

During the Qing dynasty, there was the Hunanese scholar-statesman Zeng Guofan. He was not only famous as a general, he was also respected and praised as a scholar who continued the way of Confucius. He established a voluntary army called "Xiang Jun" to suppress the Tai Ping rebellion. The army was brave and fierce. When Zeng was at home, he lived a simple life. He emphasized action rather than ideology. He was a practical person.

Near the end of the Qing dynasty, there was Tan Sitong, another Hunanese, who was famous for his revolutionary character. He was beheaded by the Qing government for his revolutionary activities. There were also Huang Xing and Song Jiaoren who set up a revolutionary organization, the China Revival Society, and led an uprising against the Qing government. After the Revolution of 1911, there was a movement led by Cai E which fought against the warlord Yuan Shikai. Finally, Mao Zedong, leading the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People's Republic of China. Hunanese think of these heroes as exhibiting Hunanese characteristics.

During the "Self Strengthening Movement" in the Nineteenth Century, Hunan was one of the first few provinces to carry out modernization, especially in education. In 1897, the governors of Hunan, Chen Paochen, and the Hunan provincial judge, Tsun Hsien, who were reformers, established Western-style colleges, published newspapers, built railroads and opened mines. By 1907, there were nearly 100 colleges with fourteen thousand students.⁶

Mao thus was born in a province with a heritage of rebellion and change led by men of strong character. He was born on December 26, 1893, in the village of Shao Shan, in Xiangtao county, Hunan province. Edgar Snow recalled Mao saying that his father "was a poor peasant and while still young was obliged to join the army because of heavy debts."⁷

Many years later, Mao's father went back to his village, and managed to buy some land and save some money. From Mao's description, his father was a man who

could endure hardship, and was self-disciplined, keen and capable.⁸ When Mao was born, his family's living standard was better than that of the other villagers, but his father never let Mao have a more comfortable life than the other children. The old Chinese believed that if you gave children a comfortable life, it would spoil them. They needed to learn to endure hardship, then they would learn to use their wealth wisely. Mao's father was no exception, going through a lot of hardship himself; he firmly maintained this belief. Furthermore, Mao was the first son. It was common for a father to select the first son as his heir, so his training for Mao was more severe than for the other sons.

When Mao was only six years old, he worked in the fields. Although he entered the village school when he was eight, he still worked on the farm, kept the family books and did the accounts. When he was thirteen, he left school and worked full-time doing a man's work.⁹ His father kept him working busily, but was still not satisfied. He told the others that Mao was lazy and useless and he constantly beat Mao. Moreover, Mao was fed only vegetables, no meat or eggs.¹⁰ As a result, Mao thought his father was unkind and cruel. Once, he rebelled openly against his father in front of many guests. He threatened to jump into the pond. Finally, they negotiated. Mao agreed to perform a "kou-tou" before his father; in return his father promised not to beat him.¹¹

Mao also disliked his father because the farm work clashed with his interest in studying. Although he left school at thirteen, he continued studying clandestinely at home. His father did not allow reading at night, because this would waste oil. So Mao

would cover up the window of his room so that no light could be seen. Later, reading at night was not enough, he began reading during the day time. To fulfill his father's requirement of work, Mao used half of the day to do all the work. The other half of the day, he read his books quietly. His thirst for knowledge became such that once he ran away from home to study for half a year with an unemployed law student.¹²

The types of books Mao read fell in three categories. One category was the classic works in philosophy, such as the Yijing (*The Books of Changes*), Mengzi (*Mencius*) and Daxue (*Great Learning*), and in history, the Shiji (*History*), Chun-qiu (*The Spring and Autumn*), Zuochuan (*The Historical Book of Zuo*) and Rizhilu (*Diary*).¹³ The second category was traditional novels such as, Suihuchuan (*The Water Margin*), FanTangji (*Revolt Against the Tang Dynasty*), Sanguoyanyi (*The Romance of Three Kingdoms*), and Xiyouji (*Travels in the West*). The final category was contemporary articles in journals such as Jingshiweiyan (*Words of Warning*) and Xinmincongbao (*Journal of the New People*).¹⁴

Although he disliked the first category, he was influenced by them, especially the historical ones. He learnt military knowledge and political struggle from them. The other two types of books had great influence on him at the time. The second type induced his spirit of resistance against great power and his sympathy towards the weak. The third type raised his sense of righteousness to resist injustice and inequality. He was building up his courage. Unfortunately, his father's behavior became the first object for him to oppose. He was upset with his father hoarding grain during a food shortage

shortage in the district. His father exported the grain to the city for more profit rather than selling it to hungry villagers. One of his father's consignments was seized by the villagers. Mao did not sympathize with his father though he did not agree with the methods adopted by the villagers.¹⁵ Once his father sent him to collect a sum of money. While on the way back, he distributed the money amongst the poor that he met along the way. Mao, his mother, his brothers and even the laborers united together and opposed his father's "tyrannical measures." Mao represented the weak struggling with the "tyrant."

A example of Mao's compassion can also be seen in the sympathy he showed during the riots in 1909 and 1910. In 1909, there was a severe famine. There were thousands starving in Changsha. The government did not send any aid to them. They rebelled and were suppressed. Mao felt great sympathy with them.

I felt that there with the rebels were ordinary people like my own family and I deeply resented the unjust treatment given to them.¹⁶

Not long afterwards, there was another riot led by the Gelao Society, a secret society. It was also suppressed and the leader was beheaded. Mao admired the leader as a hero.¹⁷

His relationship with his mother was far better than the one with his father. His father had a negative influence on him while his mother had a positive one. Mao's courage on the one hand was a kind of resistance against his father's "tyranny," but on the other, was a reflection of his mother's charity. His mother's "was a kind woman,

generous and sympathetic, and ever ready to share what she had."¹⁸ She also supported Mao's courageous action. When Mao studied in the village school, one of his schoolmates was so poor that he did not have food for lunch, so his mother prepared extra food for Mao to take to school to share with him.

The hardship of work, the discontent with his father and the desire to learn, all encouraged him to seek further learning. When Mao was sixteen years old, his father wanted to send him to a rice shop as an apprentice. However, Mao heard that there was a new school named Dongshan Higher Primary School in Xiang Xiang County which taught new knowledge from the West and was using new teaching methods. Mao made up his mind to go there rather than to the rice shop.¹⁹ It was an important turning point in Mao's life. This was a chance once again to pursue education. The education he had previously received was traditional. Now, he would gain greater knowledge from modern education. From that time onward, he departed from the old and entered the new world. It was a milestone in his development.

Of course, he went through much more struggle before he won victory over his father, which further confirmed his belief in struggle and the necessity for struggle.

The relationship between Mao and his new schoolmates was not good. Besides age differences, most of his schoolmates came from wealthy families and were city boys. By comparison, Mao was poor, his clothing was unpresentable and he was rustic. Moreover, he was not a native of Xiang Xiang while most of them were, so they despised him.²⁰ Now Mao's situation was totally reversed. In his own village he came

from a well-to-do family and he was a scholar. He represented the weak in the fight against the tyrant. In Dongshan Higher Primary School, Mao was poor and rustic. He was the weak. Later, he recalled the feeling of being oppressed would and say, "I felt spiritually very depressed."²¹

In this environment, Mao was alone and had few friends.²² This required him to become more independent and more self-confident which led him to be more stubborn in his own belief. His argument about the truth of The Romance of Three Kingdoms is a good example of his stubbornness. Mao always argued with his history teacher that The Romance of Three Kingdoms was a true story while his teacher told him that it was a romanticized version of the historical fact. Mao could not accept that. He suggested to his schoolmates that they should get rid of the history teacher and he even tried to persuade the headmaster to fire the history teacher. When the headmaster supported the history teacher, Mao "even produced a petition addressed to the mayor of the city asking that the headmaster be replaced and he urged all the students to sign it."²³

Mao's stubbornness shown by his pugnacity was reflected in his study. He entered Dongshan Higher Primary School on a temporary basis.²⁴ He needed to study hard and show progress before he could become a permanent student, so he studied hard. He made good progress and the teachers liked him.²⁵ He was proud of this. He showed that although he was poor, his learning ability was far better than that of his wealthy schoolmates. He felt that he had beaten them and was filled by a sense of victory.

What Mao really gained in Dongshan Higher Primary School were theories and real examples to back up his belief in struggle. In both Chinese and foreign history, Mao found some historical heroes who became his models of struggle. The Chinese hero he worshiped most was Liu Bang. Mao considered Liu Bang a great hero because he had overthrown the Qin despot and was the first commoner in Chinese history to become an emperor. What Mao really admired in Liu was Liu's struggle and success.²⁶ In Liu's early years, everyone treated him as a hoodlum and disliked him. Mao perceived his situation in Dongshan Higher Primary School as similar to Liu's, so Mao sympathized with Liu. Liu's accomplishments also inspired Mao. Even more, the times they faced were, in some aspects, quite the same. Liu Bang rebelled against the tyranny of the Qin emperor. Mao rebelled against the tyranny of the Qing government. Both rose to power amid widespread popular confusion, distress, and suffering. Mao may have seen his own mission in life paralleling that of Liu Bang.

Among Mao's foreign heroes were Napoleon, Catherine of Russia, Peter the Great, Wellington, Gladstone, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Lincoln. The one that impressed Mao most was Washington because, as he explained to Edgar Snow, "after eight years of difficult war Washington won victory and built up his nation."²⁷ Mao admired Washington's eight years' struggle.

Mao found in Journal of the New People, the theory to back up his ideas about struggle. It transformed and widened his concept of struggle. Journal of the New People was edited by Liang Qichao. There were many essays by Liang himself and his

teacher Kang Youwei.²⁸ Kang and Liang were reformers. Kang suggested that more than technology was needed to change China. The political system also needed to change from an autocratic to a constitutional monarchy. He further suggested that in the future there should be no more monarchy or president, no private property, no classes, no nations and no countries. All mankind should live in a common world where everyone was equal. In some degree his theory was similar to communism. Liang's theory was quite the same as his teacher's; however, Liang suggested that civil rights replace monarchical power. To promote civil rights, the people must first be educated to improve their talents. To improve the talents of the people the talents of the government servants needed to be improved, because the government servants were the ones who would educate the people.

Mao worshipped both men and memorized their essays. Their thoughts deeply influenced Mao which lifted Mao's struggle onto a higher level.²⁹ The objects of Mao's struggle were no longer only his father, the history teacher and his wealthy schoolmates; he would now struggle against conservatives. Mao's objects of sympathy were no longer only the poor neighborhoods, the rebels and himself but the whole nation which suffered under the rule of the conservatives. His heroes were no longer only characters in novels or historical persons, they were the ones who promoted change. The idea of struggle was no longer to oppose oppression, it was to change conditions through education. Education could enrich the talent of the people which gave them the force to change. Political elements began to infiltrate Mao's mind.

After one year, he did not want to study in Dongshan Higher Primary School anymore. He wanted to study at the next level and went to Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. In 1911, at the age of eighteen, Mao entered the Xiang-Xiang Middle School.³⁰ The country was on the eve of the revolution. Revolutionary thought was popular in Changsha. Mao's mind was attracted by revolutionary ideas. Mao admired Sun Yatsen. From supporting reformation, Mao changed to support revolution. He did not yet know the difference, so he suggested that "Sun Yatsen must be called back from Japan to become president of the new government, [and] that K'ang Yu-wei be made premier and Liang Chi-ch'ao minister of foreign affairs!"³¹

Under the tide of the revolution, he cut off his pigtail.³² When the revolution broke out in October, he even withdrew from school and joined the new revolutionary army.³³ This showed that his stubbornness and self-assertion had not changed after one and half-years of education. They had become even stronger. His impulse also reflected that he was a man of action. Whenever he believed in an idea, he would immediately take action to support his belief.

After half a year, he thought the revolution was over, so he left the army and entered the First Provincial Middle School in Changsha. He studied in this school for half a year only. The only achievement he made in this school was that he finished reading Yupi tongjian (The Chronicles with Imperial Commentaries). This book contained imperial edicts and critiques by the Qing emperor, Qianlong.³⁴ This book enriched Mao's political knowledge and political strategy. It also shaped his critical

thinking about the contemporary political situation. After withdrawing from the First Provincial Middle School, he read books in the local library. There he read

. . . Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations, and Darwin's [The] Origin of Species and a book on ethics by John Stuart Mill. [He] read the works of Rousseau, Spencer's Logic, and a book on law written by Montesquieu ... with serious study of [the] history and geography of Russia, America, England, France, and other countries.³⁵

Most of these books had been translated by Yan Fu. In his translations, he emphasized the role of individual capacity, individual will and self-assertion in history. Yan himself, influenced by Huxley's theories in Evolution and Ethics, suggested that the political system should be reformed. He promoted civil rights and the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial functions of government. Most of these books also emphasized the same points. Frederick Wakeman concluded:

Mao's first systematic introduction to Western political theory therefore confused invention and discovery by combining legislative craft with spontaneous historical laws of evolution.³⁶

They acted as a foundation for Mao to accept more Western ideology in the future.

These three years from 1910 to 1912, although Mao's life was unstable, were a turning point. In some ways Mao found similarities between Chinese culture and Western culture and fused them in his mind. Chinese ideas of humanity, righteousness, and one world appeared similar to Western socialism. The idea of self-renewal appeared similar to the theory of evolution. Both cultures stressed the importance of the human factor in history. To Mao, history was the result of political activities; therefore, to change history meant to change politics. To change politics, one must first control

politics. Mao's mind began to turn to political struggle. After these three years' experience, he was more self-confident, self-assertive, stubborn and pugnacious than before. His ambition became greater.

But Mao was not studying in school, so his family refused to support him, and he ran out of money. He needed to enter school to regain the support of the family; so in spring, 1913, he entered the Hunan Provincial Fourth Normal School which later was absorbed by the First Normal School.³⁷ Mao was twenty.

Mao had a close relationship with one of the teachers, Yang Changji, who influenced his thinking.³⁸ Yang was familiar with both Eastern and Western culture. He had studied in Japan for six years and in Britain and Germany for four years.³⁹ Yang's ideas came from Kant, Rousseau, Spencer and also the Hunanese hero-patriot Wang Fuzhi.⁴⁰ His study concentrated on education and philosophy. Yang believed that everyone should have an independent spirit and a fighting spirit. Everyone should have lofty ideals, master an academic discipline or a craft, work with a serious purpose and serve society at large. Everyone needs to have a strong will. He placed stress on practice, early planning, perseverance in one's work, and caution and hard work in one's daily life. In handling affairs, one should be totally committed.⁴¹

Yang's teaching was a kind of summary of Mao's belief and past experience. Mao could change from a rustic to an intellectual because of his self-struggle process, and he needed independence and a strong fighting spirit to face obstacles. These would be backed up by a strong will to learn and tied to academic discipline and hard work.

All these years of learning and education fed his ambition to save his country. His impulsive character led him to be a man of action.

Under the direction of Yang, Mao further developed and practiced his beliefs. Mao continued to build his education. According to his schoolmate Xiao Yu, Mao used the summer vacation to study classical literature and history.⁴² During school time, he devoted himself to Chinese ethics, history and geography.⁴³ He always went to the library and read books on history and historical material in magazines. "The books that he read carefully and from which he learned a great deal were Sima Guang's Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government and Gu Zuyu's The Essentials of Geography for Reading History."⁴⁴ During this time, Mao read the articles of Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in Xinqingnian (New Youth). Both were founders of Chinese communism.⁴⁵

Yang suggested his students at least master one academic discipline; that is why, when we examine Mao's reading habits, we find he was interested only in social sciences and ignored natural science and other compulsory courses. He believed society was made and developed by the people, so changing the people's mind was the foundation to reform the society.

To realize his ambitions, Mao organized and joined many activities. He organized the Xinmin xuehui (New People's Study Society) in 1917.⁴⁶ The aim of this society as Xiao Yu, one of the founders recorded, was

. . . the betterment or improvement of each individual, strengthening his moral and spiritual fiber and improving his education, as well as bringing about needed reform in the country.⁴⁷

In 1919, to fulfill this aim, Mao and the society began the Student-Worker Movement in Hunan. This movement was to encourage the members and other schoolmates to study abroad, especially in France.⁴⁸ At the same time, Mao established an evening school to educate workers and peasants, to popularize education, and also to let his schoolmates have a chance to practice teaching and to maintain communication with society.⁴⁹ Earlier, in 1915, he had joined the Student Society, becoming the secretary, general affairs officer and later department head of educational research. The goal of the society was to "perfect morality, improve education, augment knowledge, develop an occupation, strengthen the body, and unite the feeling (in fellowship with others.)"⁵⁰ He even organized the students to form a voluntary army to protect the school from warlords.

Mao also started physical training to strengthen his fighting spirit. He himself practiced a six-part exercise which included jumping and striking-out movements of the hands, feet, trunk, and head. He liked swimming and hiking. He also took cold baths even in winter. Mao said, "In general, any form of exercise, if pursued continuously, will help to train us in perseverance."⁵¹ Mao also liked to study late at night and woke up early in the morning to develop perseverance.

Under the influence of Yang Changji, Mao and his schoolmates always went to the Chuanshan Study Society to listen to and discuss the works of Wang Fuzhi. Wang

believed that materialism came first and rationalism came second. Materialism was always in a changing situation therefore there was no absolute truth. There was only relative truth. Practice was the only way to get knowledge and know the truth.⁵² In the early days when Mao studied Liang Qichao's articles, he had already encountered the concept of change. It became easier for Mao to accept Wang's idea of change after he was enlightened by the theory of relative truth. Now, Mao's belief in action was not only to fulfill one's will, it was also to examine the truth and get real knowledge. Through Wang's theory, Mao began to think about materialism.

Tan Sitong's work Yenxue (Study of Benevolence) was another text that Yang Changji used to teach his students. Tan had a strong will to liberate minds and achieve freedom and equality. He emphasized that only the power of benevolence could achieve this.⁵³ This idea encouraged Mao to resist anything that restrained his mind and freedom. The idea of the force of benevolence gave positive support to Mao's mission. It made Mao feel like a savior. In Mao's diaries and notes, these words often appeared, "Tan Liuying's [Tan Sitong] genius filled the universe and can never be extinguished."⁵⁴

Amongst all the scholars that Yang Changji introduced, Mao admired Zeng Guofan the most. Zeng suggested one's belief must be in step with one's performance. He lived a simple and rewarding life. He stressed that one must achieve virtue, merit and edification. Mao followed the teachings of Zeng. Most of the articles Mao wrote were to edify others. Every activity he organized was to build his merit. His hard work and simple life were to achieve virtue. In his notebook, he quoted Zeng's words

as guidance. Yang Changji also introduced Paulsen's System of Ethics which emphasized the will of the individual.⁵⁵ This was also what Mao believed. Mao's thinking was full of the influence of the above scholars' ideas.

During these five years of study at the First Normal School, Mao learnt new knowledge, made many friends and had a chance to show his working ability. In 1918, Mao graduated. He was now full of lofty ideas and a sense of mission.

Mao's ideology was greatly influenced by his past experience, his self-education and his study at the First Normal School. Through his activities and his articles, we get to know his ideology. There is not, however, a detailed record of his articles and writings before 1913. Most have been lost. After 1913, the record is much better; but by comparison with materials written after 1918, only a relatively small amount of his earlier writing exists. After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the government published many of Mao's articles and writings, but none from the period before 1919.

Although articles of the period prior to 1919 have been published by foreigners, especially the Japanese; they are still incomplete. Mao's "Classroom Notes"⁵⁶ for example, has never been published. The author has read only parts of the early articles and writings, mentioned above, in other sources; thus, some modification of the preceding comment may be necessary if or when these articles are ever published. The articles of this period that have been published, include "Comment on A System of Ethics,"⁵⁷ "Three Letters to Li Jinxi,"⁵⁸ "Two Advertisements for the Night

School,"⁵⁹ "A Discussion of Physical Training"⁶⁰ and "Preface for Xiao Zisheng's notebook."⁶¹

From these limited writings and the comments of those who knew him we can examine his ideas more closely. People are important. People are the center of universe and the existence of the universe depends on people. Mao wrote:

People have infinite value and have different kinds of value. ... If there aren't any people, there is no universe. Therefore the value of people is greater than the value of universe.⁶²

So it is also true that the Nation and its society is made up of people and should serve the people.

People are important because people have minds. The minds of the people are the spirit of universe that exists inside people's minds. Therefore, people's minds and the universe's spirit combine and march with each other. In other words, everyone's mind is a universe. Each is independently important to the universe. Mao wrote: "People have a direct relationship with nature [universe] itself, people are part of it. Our minds communicate with nature's mind."⁶³ "I am the universe. If there is no me, there is no universe. Individuals gather together to form the universe. However, individual independence must exist. If there is no 'me,' there is no other individual."⁶⁴

Mao pointed out the significance of the individual. One's self is the only person that one should respect, fear and obey. That means one should not fear, follow and obey anybody else. Mao said, "My boundaries must be expanded so that the universe will become one great self."⁶⁵

People and people's minds are the universe and universal spirit; therefore, people and people's minds are the force for development. Will gives force and perseverance for man to realize his mind. Mao wrote: "If I have the will inside me, my will gives the order and my body follows. Good or bad depends on myself. If my will wants to realize humanity, humanity will be realized."⁶⁶ No external force can move one's will. To establish a will, one needs first to do research in philosophy and ethics, and then establish one's belief. One's mind can be changed and improved through continued learning. Mao wrote: "Research is always in progress, so my previous opinions may now seem ridiculous."⁶⁷ The foolish can become wise, cowards become strong and the mean become Saints.

The mind can change and improve through education. One may get education through schools or through self education. Mao stressed self-education. The school system is set by others and the teaching is the experience and knowledge of others. As we have seen before, Mao pointed out the importance of the individual. In learning, he also stressed the individual. He suggested one's knowledge should come from one's own learning, experience and thinking. An independent spirit is the main guideline in education. It is not just an article of faith. Mao practiced it, relating it to past experiences. Before 1913, self-education played a significant role in Mao's learning. Even after Mao entered the First Normal School, he continued to educate himself.

The aim of education is to guide one's wisdom and strengthen one's virtue. The nature of education is to expose the truth of the universe which exists in man's mind.

The means of education is to stimulate one's mind. Mao believed, "If you want to change the world, you should change the mind of the world first. . . . If the mind of the world is changed, how can the world not be changed?"⁶⁸ Moreover, education must be in tune with practical needs. Mao wrote in an advertisement for his night school, "... therefore, everyone should learn some knowledge. Then you can write some words, read some words and do some calculation. That is more convenient."⁶⁹

It is not an easy task to induce others to educate themselves and to improve their minds. "I used to dream that everyone's wisdom could be equal and they could become like Saints. Then every rule and law could be destroyed. Now I know that the dream cannot come true."⁷⁰ Not everyone is equal in wisdom. There needs to be leaders to guide them. Once Mao once said to his schoolmate Xiao Yu, "I believe people are like a flock of sheep and government should play the role of shepherd. If there is no shepherd, who protects the sheep?"⁷¹

If people need to have a leader for guidance, who should it be? It should be a Saint. Then who is a Saint? A Saint is one who grasps the universal truth which is inside the mind. Mao wrote: "Saints grasp the truth, and virtuous people grasp only part of the truth while the common people grasp nothing of the truth."⁷² Saints know the minds inside themselves and examine the details of the external situation.

As the Saints grasp the universal truth, so they achieve virtue and merit and having done so they preach. Their achievement guides others in both spiritual life and living. Mao wrote in the "Discussion of Physical Training," "Saints appear and

establish rites, then life has order."⁷³ Because Saints have wisdom, so Saints should have benevolence toward the weak and help them to achieve universal truth and to reach the level of true harmony. To Li Jinxi, Mao wrote:

The weak are the same race as me, part of my universe ... I need to help them, to guide their wisdom, to strengthen their virtue and to accompany them to the Saint level.⁷⁴

Of course, this idea of the Saints fits with Mao's ambitions to save the country. Clearly, Mao treated himself as a Saint. This was the motivation behind the establishment of the evening school. Only the Saints can and should save the country.

Realization of one's self is the aim of mankind. Mao said "The livelihood of man is his experience in universe."⁷⁵ "If you have a kind of knowledge, you will build a kind of belief. If you have a kind of belief, you will have a kind of behavior."⁷⁶ Practice means to realize one's thought and establish one's self. By this, one achieves merit. One must live by all one thinks and believes before he feels comfortable and good. Mao believed people are good to one another because it is a process of self-fulfillment.

To practice one's belief, one should begin from reality. Reality is the thing or situation that influence's both the life and the mind. Mao wrote in "Classroom Record," "If one does not do agricultural work, then one will not understand the difficulty of sowing and reaping. If one does not weave silk, then one will not understand whence clothes come."⁷⁷ "The learning that one obtains from behind closed doors is useless.

If one wants to learn from the myriad things of the world, then one must travel widely to the Nine Divisions [of ancient China] and to the Four Canopies of Heaven."⁷⁸

To Mao, practicing one's ideas is a long process. It takes a long time. Mao wrote to his friend Xiao Zisheng, "Today you record one thing, tomorrow you understand one reason. After a long time of this process, you build up your knowledge."⁷⁹ Because it is a long process, it needs one's perseverance and devotion.

If one can grasp these two, he will be able to achieve. Mao used an example in physical training to illustrate that the force of perseverance and devotion can turn weak to strong. The body is the means to express man's virtue and wisdom, so one should train his body. On the one hand feelings and passion will affect the health of the body; on the other, if you train your body to become strong, it can change your feelings and passion. A strong body can influence the absorption of knowledge and strength of will. To practice one's belief, the body is an important means, so man should take great care of his body.

These points of Mao's ideology are a series of processes. They relate to one another and are based on each for development. Mao's ideology is not limited to the above four points. Mao believed in change. Everything is changing and progressing; therefore, there is always something new. Mao also believed in the force of unity. If one's will and mind can change history, then the united minds and wills of many individuals can create a huge force to change even the universe. It seems contradictory to Mao's belief in individualism; however, Mao emphasized that the universe is realized

through the individual. Whenever there are contradictions between the individual and the universe, the individual must sacrifice.

It is remarkable that Mao's ideology was influenced by his past experience, especially the idea of human mind and will. His struggle against his father during his childhood, his struggle against his own background and ignorance in Dongshan Higher Primary School and his struggle against the confused situation at that time, all required Mao to have a strong will and a focused mind. Raymond L. Whitehead writes, "The dimension of struggle in Mao's thought is not simply a theory about conflict but reflects a whole style of life and action."⁸⁰ Struggle against all authority and challenging himself became part of his personality.

Through all these years of struggle, he became a man of action and practice. If he did not do the farm task quickly, he did not have time to read his books. If he did not gather money from friends, he would not be able to study. He practiced what he believed with confidence and courage. He never stopped until he achieved his goal. His education deeply influenced his ideology. His courage was developed from the traditional novels which led him to pay attention to society. Historical and contemporary works stimulated his ambition. Finally, the classical works led him to the idea of "Saints." He achieved great things because of his self-education and self-realization.

He dwelt too much, however, on his past experience and became more and more self-centered and stubborn. He could not have harmony with others because he could

not accept that there may be differences of opinion. He believed that good will and a good heart would lead to good results. He persuaded others to accept his good heart and follow him. His self-education led to an imbalance in knowledge. He depended more on his will, on the vicissitudes of learning in later years, only to reveal his self-centered and stubborn nature which was not corrected.

One will wonder why in Mao's later years he totally rejected traditional culture and became Marxist, especially since he was so deeply influenced by traditional culture when he was young. If we examine the scholars who influenced Mao, we discover that they were influenced both by traditional and by Western culture. They struggled to combine traditional and Western culture and succeeded in different degrees. Zheng Guanying's The Word of Warning emphasized Western technology. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao emphasized the Western political system. Yang Changji's teaching emphasized Western culture. Their works acted as a bridge for Mao and led him from traditional to Western culture. Nonetheless, he never totally rejected traditional culture. He only rejected the elements which he considered bad.

His ideology and his activities in later years can be shown clearly to originate from his early life. If we were to neglect Mao's early life, we would be studying his ideology without roots, we would only get to know him externally and never get inside the mind of one of the most influential men of the twentieth century.

NOTES

1. This was my own experience when I traveled through China.
2. Xiao Yu, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars (Syracuse, N.Y.: University Press, 1959), 4. Xiao Yu was a Hunanese.
3. Sima Changfeng, Mao Zedong pingchuan (Mao Zedong: Critique and Biography) (Xianggang: Wenyi shuwu, 1975). Chapter one discusses the character of Hunanese. Hereafter cited as Mao.
4. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars, 4.
5. Qin conquered the other six states and unified China in B.C. 221, but the Qin dynasty only lasted for fifteen years. The people of Chu were the main force of rebellion. They were led by a general called Xiang Yu.
6. Li Rui, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, trans. Anthony W. Sariti (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1977), 10-12.
7. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1981), 130.
8. Ibid., 130-131.
9. Ibid., 131.
10. Ibid., 132.
11. Ibid., 132-133.
12. Ibid., 131.
13. Ibid., 131.
14. Ibid., 133.
15. Ibid., 136.
16. Ibid., 135.

17. Ibid., 135.
18. Ibid., 132.
19. Ibid., 136.
20. Ibid., 137.
21. Ibid., 137.
22. Ibid., 137.
23. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars, 24.
24. Ibid., 23.
25. Ibid., 24.
26. Ibid., 195-199.
27. Snow, Red Star Over China, 138.
28. Ibid., 137.
29. Sima, Mao, 52.
30. Snow, Red Star Over China, 139.
31. Ibid., 140.
32. Ibid., 140.
33. Ibid., 142.
34. Ibid., 144.
35. Ibid., 144.

36. Frederick Wakeman, Jr., History and Will: Philosophical Perspective of Mao Tse-tung's Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 157. This book has a detailed description of the ideas of these books and how they influenced Mao. See chapters eleven to fifteen.

37. Snow, Red Star Over China, 145.
38. Ibid., 146.

39. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars, 38.
40. Ibid., 40.
41. Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung, 17-20.
42. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars, 67.
43. Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 22.
44. Ibid., 23.
45. Ibid., 25, and Snow, Red Star Over China, 148.
46. Snow, Red Star Over China, 147.
47. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were beggars, 61.
48. Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 90-91.
49. Ibid., 59-60.
50. Ibid., 54.
51. Ibid., 28.
52. Ibid., 323-324, note 24.
53. Ibid., 17 and 322, note 18.
54. Ibid., 18.
55. Ibid., 36-37.
56. "Jiangtanglu," in Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 34-36. This is Mao's notes about moral self-discipline and Chinese literature from the classes given by Yang Changji in 1913 or 1914.
57. "Lunlixue yuanli piyu," Supplement to Collected Writings of Mao-tse-tung, ed. Mo Takuto Shu Hokan (Tokyo: Sososha, 1983), vol.9: 20-47. This was written for Yang Changji's class in moral philosophy during 1917-1918. Hereafter cited as SCWMTT.
58. "Gei Li Jinxi di xin," Collected Writings of Mao Tse-tung, ed. Mo Takuto Shu Hokan (Tokyo: Hokubosha, 1972), vol. 1: 15-23. Hereafter cited as CWMTT.

59. "Gongren yexue zhaoxue guanggao," CWMTT, vol. 1: 49-50, and "Gongren yexue zhaosheng guanggao," CWMTT, vol. 1: 51.
60. "Tirou zhi yanjiu," CWMTT, vol. 1: 35-46.
61. "Wei Xiao Zisheng di yiqie ruyi zixue biji suo xie di xuyan," SCWMTT, vol.9: 17.
62. "Lunlixue yuanli piyu," SCWMTT, vol.9: 21.
63. Ibid., 63.
64. Ibid., 39.
65. "Jiangtanglu," in Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 34.
66. "Tirou zhi yanjiu," CWMTT, vol.1: 38.
67. "Gei Li Jinxi di xin," CWMTT, vol.1: 21.
68. Ibid., 20.
69. "Gongren yexue zhaoxue guanggao," CWMTT, vol.1: 49.
70. "Lunlixue yuanli piyu," SCWMTT, vol.9: 27.
71. Xiao, Mao Tse-tung and I were Beggars, 139.
72. "Gei Li Jinxi di xin," CWMTT, vol.1: 21.
73. "Tirou zhi yanjiu," CWMTT, vol.1: 36.
74. "Gei Li Jinxi di xin," CWMTT, vol.1: 23.
75. "Lunlixue yuanli piyu," SCWMTT, vol.9: 36.
76. Ibid., 38.
77. Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 35.
78. Ibid.
79. "Wei Xiao Zisheng di yiqie ruyi zixue biji suo xie di xuyan," SCWMTT, vol.9: 17.

80. Raymond L. Whitehead, Love and Struggle in Mao's Thought (New York: Orbis Book, 1977), 15.

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Mao left Beijing suddenly at the beginning of 1919. Having no idea he would leave in such a hurry, Mao had not saved enough money to travel further than Tianjin, which was not far from Beijing.. What pushed him to leave? Scholars have suggested that a feeling of humiliation forced him to leave.⁵ In Hunan, he was the leader of the students. Everyone admired and respected him. In Beijing, no one knew him. The Students of Beijing were busy and paid no attention to Mao. He felt he was ignored. Much later he explained, ". . . to most of them I did not exist as a human being. . . an assistant librarian speaking a southern dialect."⁶

However, I have another suggestion. Let us examine his motivation to leave in another way: his track record after he left Beijing. He did not go back to Hunan directly. After he borrowed money from a friend in Tianjin, he went to Qufu and visited Confucius' grave.⁷ Why did he visit Confucius' grave? What did he have in his mind at that time? .

Confucius was the symbol of traditional culture. Although Mao's ideology did not come from orthodox Confucianism, it was influenced by it. Those whom he admired were Confucian and he did not show any feeling of anti-Confucianism. Then he came into contact with the New Culture Movement. An article of faith of the Movement was opposition to tradition, which subverted a spirit of freedom. Freedom to Chinese in the New Culture Movement meant individual independence from traditional culture. It was not the kind of freedom that Westerners meant.⁸ Those intellectuals who were involved in this movement were patriots. They believed that the backwardness of China was

caused by the backwardness of the minds of the Chinese.⁹ Their minds were controlled by the traditional culture, which meant Confucianism. The only way to save China was to change the mind by means of Western ideology.¹⁰ Traditional culture and Confucianism had to be criticized and given up.

Although Confucius was not his hero and he did not support the traditional culture entirely, Mao felt uneasy in this anti-Confucianism atmosphere. His earlier education had taught Mao that the culture of East and West could be combined. They did not contradict each other. Now, his new experiences told him that the two cultures contradicted each other. Even more, holding to traditional culture meant being unpatriotic. Opposition to traditional culture and advocacy of Western culture was the only way to save China and be patriotic, too. Furthermore, anarchism also influenced him.¹¹ What he had believed in was proclaimed to be false, useless and even evil by this new movement. He was confused and frustrated. Maybe Confucius could comfort him? Denied by everyone, Confucius never gave up his ideals and held firm. Yan Hui, one of Confucius' best disciples, was famous for his poor but straight life. Mencius was the one who enhanced Confucianism. Mao might find his own shadow among them when he visited their relics.

He also climbed Tai Shan, the sacred mountain of China.¹² Beginning with Chin Shi Huangdi, nearly every emperor had climbed Tai Shan and offered sacrifices to Heaven. The emperors reported to Heaven that they had unified the country and fulfilled the will of Heaven. With his strong sense of mission, what would Mao think

when he was on the mountain top? Would he assume that he would become emperor someday? Or would he assume himself to be a second Confucius? Or would he assume himself to be the hope of China in the future?

He was back in Changsha by April. Although the experience had not been good, he was influenced by his time in Beijing, both negatively and positively. Let us look at the negative side first. His impression of the intellectuals was negative: ". . . to most of them I did not exist as a human being."¹³ We can feel Mao's outrage.¹⁴ Their impracticality was another reason Mao disliked them. Li Huang remembers:

We were discussing the work-study fellowship There was a lot of discussion. Up to the third time, Mao was impatient! He said: "Do not just sit over here and discuss. Let us do it. Please give your dirty clothes to me. I will wash each piece for one copper, no matter the size. Three days later, I will give them back to you and you give money to me."¹⁵

The positive influence was more visible. The influence of the China Youth Society was strong.¹⁶ Whatever plans the China Youth Society suggested, such as for work-study fellowships, or new village movements, Mao supported and tried to put them into practice. The principal influence on Mao was Li Dazhao. According to Stuart Schram, Li's pro-revolution sentiment, populist stance emphasizing on the peasants was accepted by Mao and affected him in later years.¹⁷ Also according to Schram, Li believed that Bolshevism was the means whereby the people could triumph over militarism and autocracy.¹⁸ Lenin's anti-imperialism deeply moved Li.¹⁹ Moreover, Li's ideal society bore the shadow of primitive communism.²⁰ This opened the way

for Li to accept Communism in later years. On the other side, because of the influence of Li on Mao, Li cleared the way for Mao to accept Marxism, too.

It is a fact that Li inspired Mao to accept Marxism. Even Mao himself recognized this.²¹ However, was it true that Mao rapidly moved toward Marxism under Li's tutoring during his time at Beijing University in 1918 as he told Edgar Snow in 1936? Li had set up a Socialism Study Group in 1917 (in March 1920, the name was changed to the Marxist Group), but this did not mean that Li was already a Marxist. The first article about Marxism, written by Li in two parts, was published in May and November, 1919 in the magazine New Youth.²² The title was "My Idea of Marxism." Mao remembered that he began to pay attention to Marxism after reading Li's "My Idea of Marxism" and "A Discussion of Problems of Doctrine."²³ So if Mao turned to Marxism, it should have happened after 1919 since the two articles were written in 1919. Even if Li had promoted Marxism during 1918, the influence on Mao would have been limited. Mao in his article "Manifesto of the First Issue of Xiangjiang Magazine,"²⁴ written in July 14, 1919, vigorously opposed violent revolution and preferred peaceful reformation.²⁵ This further confirms that Mao did not convert to Marxism during 1918 to 1919, nor support it. 1920 would be the earliest year that Mao first read Marx's A Manifesto of Communist Party.²⁶ Together with Kautsky's Class Struggle and Kirkup's History of Socialism, it converted Mao to Marxism.²⁷ So if Mao moved to Marxism, it would have been after 1920, not, before.

Besides the China Youth Society and Li Dazhao, the magazine New Youth had its influence on Mao, too. Under the direction of Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi, New Youth promoted the spirit of science and the spirit of democracy. Lin Yusheng, however, suggests that the Chinese intellectuals at that time did not understand democracy and science in terms of their Western meanings. The spirit of science, as Mao understood it, was scientific method, especially analysis; but it was not based on objective research, rather on subjective judgment. "The Great Union of All the People,"²⁸ "An Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society,"²⁹ and "An Analysis of Classes of Chinese Peasants and Their Attitude to Revolution"³⁰ are prime examples. The spirit of democracy meant anti-militarism and anti-imperialism. It was mixed with patriotism and nationalism. Mao also got to know how great was the force of public opinion to shape one's mind from New Youth and the Journalism Society.

Mao went back to Hunan in April, 1919, after five months in Beijing and four months wandering around China. He took a position teaching in primary school to earn his living.³¹ His peaceful teaching life did not last for long. A month later, he was completely involved in the May Fourth Movement.

The May Fourth Movement was a momentous moment for Mao. He was able to participate directly in a movement to save the nation. It was better than teaching because the result of teaching was small and unnoticed. The results of this movement were visible and great. Because of the control of the news by the warlord Zhang Jingyao,³² it was a few days before the Hunanese knew anything of the movement.

Nineteen days later, a representative of Beijing students arrived to discuss with Hunan students how to support the movement. It was never too late for Mao. He immediately organized students in Hunan and established the Hunan Students' Union. Utilizing the Union, Mao organized a series of activities.³³ The first action was to boycott classes and announce the boycott's manifesto.³⁴ At the same time there were boycotts of Japanese goods and demands to buy Chinese products. Students were the most active elements. They formed small inspection teams to make sure merchants stopped selling Japanese goods. They also organized lobby groups.³⁵

Although the May Fourth Movement was over by June in other parts of China, the movement in Hunan continued and reflected what some might call the extreme nature of Hunanese.³⁶ The anti-Japanese attitude of this movement however aroused the hostility of warlord Zhang Jingyao, who was pro-Japanese. Through the newspaper Dagongbao Zhang repeatedly insisted that the students should dissolve all organizations and end the movement. They should go back to school. Later, conflicts between the students and the police increased and the government became more stringent. The economic loss and complaints of the merchants who sold Japanese goods added further pressure on Zhang to take strong action. In July, Zhang forced the Hunan Students' Union to dissolve and all other political interest groups as well.³⁷ The first stage of the movement was at an end.

But it was not the end for Mao. It was only the beginning. As Li Jiu has noted, it was the first time that Mao utilized students to mobilize political action.³⁸ It was a

vivid experience for Mao. The people's power was impressive. Once mobilized and organized, the people's power was enormous and unlimited. Mao learned that it was public opinion and organization that lay behind the people's power. Through them, the people's power could fully engage in the fight against foes. They were, therefore, two very important weapons.

Now, he began to pay attention to organization. Before, he was an individualist and emphasized individual freedom. The May Fourth Movement taught him the importance of organization. In comparison, individual force was rather weak and useless. At this stage, however, he still tolerated different opinions and directions within the organization. The New People's Study Society would be his first attempt to practice using organization.

Mao called the members back for a meeting. They reformed the rules and the organization.³⁹ He hoped to utilize the Society to reform the nation as did the China Youth Society. The China Youth Society was the model for his organization. The only difference was that the China Youth Society prohibited members from joining any kind of political organization. The members of the New People's Study Society by contrast were deeply involved in politics. Involvement in the movement to expel Warlord Zhang Jingyao was one example.

The success of the pressure of public opinion in the May Fourth Movement inspired Mao to a new direction of struggle. Setting up the magazine Xiangjiang was part of the new direction. Mao hoped through it to influence public opinion. In an

article, "Manifesto of the First Issue of Xiangjiang Magazine," Mao pointed out that public opinion was a powerful, peaceful and legal force against brute power.⁴⁰ Whereas he had before only emphasized individual struggle, he now became interested in mass movement. Public opinion would be the means for mass struggle. The motivation of the May Fourth Movement, however, was neither organization nor public opinion. Because of exploitation and suppression by foreign powers, the patriotism of the people was induced to the highest point. Patriotism united the Chinese and resulted in the May Fourth Movement. Mao only saw the means but overlooked the motivation.

Xiangjiang had two functions. First, expose the problems of the society. Second, provide the solution.⁴¹ The article, "The Female Revolution,"⁴² illustrates the two functions of Xiangjiang. Mao hoped to attract the attention and support of the public. But people would have different opinions on the same matter. Not everyone would support Mao's opinion. Public opinion could only become a pressure if it coalesced. Otherwise, it would only bring out different opinions rather than what Mao wanted. Things did not go smoothly as Mao had expected. His criticism provoked the warlord and the conservatives to anger. The result was that Warlord Zhang closed down Xiangjiang after only one month. But Mao would not stop easily once he had made up his mind. Mao would struggle obstinately. He was immediately employed by a magazine company, Xin Hunan (New Hunan), as an editor. Not frightened by his first experience, he continued his criticism. The result was the same.⁴³

This really upset and angered Mao. He organized an Expel Warlord Zhang Movement which sought to mobilize all the Hunanese.⁴⁴ Mao never launched the movement because of selfish or personal reasons. He had a mission to open up the minds of the Hunanese through the magazine. Therefore, the closing down of the magazine was not only a personal matter for Mao, it was a loss for the Hunanese, too. With fresh experience and inspiration from the May Fourth Movement, he used it as a model to plan the Expulsion Movement. It was an extension of the May Fourth Movement in another form in Hunan.

At first, plans were carried out in secret. Mostly through different magazines and newspapers, Mao and others published their articles criticizing Zhang.⁴⁵ But the masses could not be mobilized in secret nor the movement be kept secret either. So the movement came out in the open in the beginning of November. First, Mao organized a boycott of classes at the beginning of December in Changsha. Then, he sent lobby groups to different cities to gain support. Japanese goods were burned on December 2.⁴⁶ To extend the movement to the national level, he himself led one of the lobby groups to Beijing.

The Expulsion Movement was less successful than the May Fourth Movement.

The one was for the good of Hunanese only while the other was for the whole nation. The one was driven by Mao's outrage while the other was driven by patriotism. The scale of the one was limited to the local, the other to the nation. Although he sent lobby groups to other cities, mostly only Hunanese gave support to the one, while the

Chinese throughout the nation gave support to other. The one died out quietly without any practical result, the other more or less achieved its goal.

This movement not only reflected the stubbornness of Mao, it also illustrated the influence of experiment and reform on Mao. At the beginning of this movement, letters from his friends raised questions about it. His friends believed that reforming the foundation of China was the only solution. The expulsion of Zhang was a small problem and a small event. It did no good in reforming the foundation of China. But Mao held a different idea. To reform the foundation, one should start by solving each basic problem, then the environment would get better for the reformation of the foundation. His movement tried to solve one of the basic problems. It was a way to and a means for the reformation of the foundation.⁴⁷

Mao did not discuss doctrine but only basic problems during this period of time. He wrote a lot of articles and most of them were about different kinds of basic problems. For example, there was a series of articles about the marriage system in the newspaper Dagongbao from November 16 to November 28. In these articles, he used scientific method to analyze problems and suggest how they could be solved. His dislike of Warlord Zhang and the discovery of the basic problems of the society began to have some degree of anti-traditional effect directed mostly against the traditional system and its customs.⁴⁸

In January 1920 Mao returned to Beijing.⁴⁹ More familiar than anyone else with Beijing, he led his lobby group to Beijing. Or, could there have been another

reason as well? His humiliation in Beijing remained in his memory. He waited for a chance for revenge. Now, the chance had come. He had been no more than an assistant librarian. Now he was a leader presiding over a movement. He had showed his ability. There was no more shame before Beijing's students and those back from overseas.

Life in Beijing was still hard. Mao went to different associations to speak. There were different kinds of lobbies and petitions. Articles and pamphlets were published for propaganda. At the same time, he needed to encourage those lobby groups in other cities to continue the struggle. Reports back to Hunan were also needed.⁵⁰ Progress was slow. No result was seen. The job was not easy. Frustration was everywhere.

Beside these activities, there was another side to Mao in Beijing. He visited his friends, especially those from the China Youth Society and Li Dazhao. During that time, the China Youth Society was practicing the idea of work-study fellowship. The idea had gone through a year of discussion and planning before it was implemented. The Society set up small scale book-stores, cafeterias, and craft unions to provide work for students.⁵¹ Because of poor management, the businesses closed down one by one after a short time and the work-study fellowships were dissolved. Mao was an eyewitness of the whole process. Although the plans failed, the experience left a good impression on Mao. When he went back to Hunan, he opened a bookstore in Changsha and set up a craft union with Lin Tsuhan in Changsha.⁵² He also agreed with Peng Huang to set up a work-study fellowship in Shanghai.⁵³ The suggestion of a New Life

Village by Li Dazhao was admired by Mao.⁵⁴ In his "Letter to Zhou Shizhao,"⁵⁵ he wrote about setting up a self-taught university as a kind of new life organization when he went back to Hunan. It is not accurate, as Wang Shupai and Zhang Shashi wrote, that Mao changed from idealist to revolutionary after witnessing the failure of the work-study fellowship in Beijing.⁵⁶

There was a Marxist Reading Room in Beijing University where Mao always did his reading. He read three Marxist books. He later told Edgar Snow, these

... deeply carved my mind, and built up my faith in Marxism, from which, once I had accepted it as a correct interpretation of history, I did not afterwards waver.⁵⁷

These three books were A Manifesto of the Communist Party, Class Struggle and The History of Socialism. As Wang and Zhang have noted, there were not many translations of Marxist works at that time; therefore, Mao could not systemically read about Marxism and manipulate its ideas.⁵⁸ Further more, it does not prove that Mao was a Marxist that he read some of its literature and claimed to be one. His mind and life need to be examined before one can be sure that Mao was a Marxist at that time.

It would be boring to stay behind in Beijing when there was no progress, especially since Mao was so impatient. So he went to Shanghai in May, 1920. There he met other lobby groups and members of the New People's Study Society. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Mao called for a meeting to discuss the direction of the Society. The content of the discussion was mostly about the morals and deeds of the members.⁵⁹ The Society still emphasized individual improvement rather than

reformation of the whole society. Mao later said to Edgar Snow, "By the summer of 1920, I had become, in theory and to some extent in action, a Marxist," ⁶⁰ If true, then there should have been some evidence during this meeting. No doctrine was mentioned, however. There was not even the slightest hint of Marxism. One might think that Mao might have advocated it and the others did not agree, and so he did not note it. Or, that he might have written the opinions that opposed Marxism in order to refute them. But it is possible Marxism was too new to Mao at that time and he may have needed time to absorb it. ⁶¹

The most important event in Shanghai was Mao's meeting with Chen Duxiu. They did a lot of talking. According to Mao, they talked about the plans for a league for the reconstruction of Hunan and the Marxist books that Mao had read. ⁶² He emphasized that under the influence of Chen, he turned to Marxism. If Mao's memory is correct, there are questions to be clarified. First, a representative from the Soviet Union arrived and met Li Dazhao in March, 1920 in Beijing. Only then did Li establish the Study of Marxism Society. We do not know if Mao joined the Society then. If Mao had been a suitable candidate, Li should have invited him to join and even asked him to establish a branch in Hunan. But Li did not do this. The Soviet representative arrived in Shanghai and met with Chen in May. Mao was in Shanghai then, too. Once again, the same questions arise. Why did Chen not invite Mao to join the discussion to set up a Communist party? Sima Changfeng has two suggestions. Mao was so eager about local reformation that Chen did not want to talk to him about the Party. Second,

Mao's Marxism was limited.⁶³ Although the above events do not deny Mao being a Marxist they induce suspicion about the correctness of Mao's own memory.

In May, two warlords in Hunan fought. Warlord Zhang lost and fled Hunan in June.⁶⁴ The victor, Tan Yankai, became the governor of Hunan. So the Expel Warlord Zhang Movement was ended. Mao went back to Hunan in July.

After all these events from 1918 to 1920, the basic ideology of Mao did not change much. He still believed the process of individual and social progress was in a single direction: toward self-improvement. For example, the process of social progress for Mao at that time was the struggle to change oneself from soldier to Saint. Warlords were at the outermost border of the society and of the universe. They were the worst human beings by any standard of morals and deeds in the society. They were, however, governors of the society. If they improved themselves, the society would follow them and go forward because of their real power. Again, the process of individual progress at that time was the struggle to free oneself from ignorance and pursue wisdom. Ignorance of oneself allowed evil and backwardness in society. If each person improved himself one by one, the society would be better bit by bit. This notion of social improvement through individual self-improvement was a traditional attitude of Confucian scholars. Improving oneself and thus changing society defined the traditional scholar's role and mission in society.

Mao's thoughts and struggles during these times reinforced his devotion to this idea. He also came to believe that in the process of individual progress, a spirit of

science and of democracy mixed with patriotism and nationalism would be an important motivating element. Acting with a core group instead of alone would be a better way to struggle for self-improvement. Reform and experimentation were the right means for social improvement. Propaganda and organization would be the means of struggle for a mass movement.

Opposing traditional customs was a new element added in this period. A prevailing misconception was that if Mao were against traditional customs, he would not belong to the traditional. But this was not so. His historical era molded him into a man who combined the modern and the traditional.

Finally, Mao was not yet a Marxist, though he had contact with Marxist ideas. His "Letter to Zhou Shizhao" provides a clear view of Mao's communism.⁶⁵ Few comrades lived together practicing their ideals and sharing all they had. That was Mao's idea of communism. His understanding was still far from Marxism. He did have a good impression of the Soviet Union. In the same letter, he praised Russia as the most civilized country in the world. Li Dazhao might be part of the reason why Mao was pro-Russia, as I have suggested above. Hence, the Russian "communist system" as Mao understood it was the main reason for his being pro-Russian.

Sima Chang-feng notes that the departure of Warlord Zhang had little connection with Mao's expulsion movement.⁶⁶ But would Mao accept this fact? He had put so much effort into this movement that he believed the result was in some degree due to his effort. When he went back to Changsha, he was welcomed and the new governor

treated him with courtesy.⁶⁷ This made him feel important and full of conceit. He thought that now was the right time and a chance for him to fulfill his mission and dream. He began to carry out a series of activities. The most important and the largest one was the Hunanese Self-government Movement. When he was in Beijing, he was already concerned about the reconstruction of Hunan. According to his "Letter to Li Jinxi,"⁶⁸ he had two blueprints by March, 1920.

After his farewell meeting with the New People's Study Society, he and the others set up the Promotion of Hunan Reformation Committee in May at Shanghai. They published a "Manifesto of Hunanese Self-government" on May 16.⁶⁹ This manifesto emphasized the involvement of the whole of China in politics. Not a sign of class struggle or revolution can be seen in this manifesto. Mao and the others still believed in peaceful reformation. At the same time, it reflected the idealism, the confidence and the naivete of that generation.

It was not easy to promote self-government among the Chinese because most had no interest in politics, especially since political education was so poor at that time. Usually only intellectuals and students were interested in politics. So to mobilize the Hunanese and to involve them in this movement, propaganda was used. Mao wrote a series of ten articles from September 3 to October 6 for the newspaper Dagongpao.⁷⁰ Mao presented a list of destructive acts by the Central Government against the pursuit of independence. Self-government was not a selfish attitude. National self-determination was a prevailing idea in world politics. Under this idea, Hunanese

Self-government was reasonable. On the other hand, self-government did not divide up China. Instead, each province would improve under self-government and would combine together to form a strong and prosperous China. Hence, reformation should start within each local government rather than in the whole nation. Furthermore, large equals good was a misconception. Small organizations would have more hope and energy. His last articles on October 5 and 6 used long paragraphs and detailed analysis to support the Self-government Movement from a legal point of view. Mao still believed in using legal and peaceful means to achieve political goals rather than revolutionary means and violent action.

The involvement of Hunanese was the foundation of self-government. Did they have the ability? Mao said yes. It was wrong to assume that only those who studied law and politics had the ability to be involved in politics. Self-government was a simple matter. The Hunanese must get back the right to govern Hunan and the right to speak their opinions. Everyone had the ability to become involved in politics and should do so. Here, Mao believed absolutely in the equality of the ability of human beings. Because everyone had the same ability, democracy was workable. Hence, he supported democracy, and no concept of classes and class struggle is evident. He used the Soviet Union as an example to illustrate a democratic society. This reflected his misconception of Soviet democracy. To Mao, the Soviet Union was a successful example of national self-determination and popular self-determination.

In these articles Mao mentioned a special group of people. The functions of this group were twofold. The first was to promote and mobilize the movement. How well they functioned in this area would directly affect the success or failure of the movement. The second was to act as a political pressure group to keep watch over the government. Whether The government ran well or not depended on the pressure of this group.⁷¹ A primitive concept of party was beginning to develop. In the article, "Comment about the Letter from Yi Liyong,"⁷² Mao pointed out that the members of the New Peoples' Study Society should lead promotion of democratic self-government. By members he meant students and intellectuals, as we can see⁷³ if we read this article together with two other articles about promotion.⁷⁴ Students and intellectuals occupied an important place in Mao's mind.

On October 10, after he had written this series of articles, he led ten thousand citizens of Changsha in a demonstration. They asked for dissolution of the provincial parliament and establishment of a people's assembly.⁷⁵ Tearing down the provincial parliament's flag resulted in suppression by the police. Mao took only three months, from July to October, to promote self-government in Hunan. The environment was not yet well prepared and the situation was not yet ripe for execution; but his impatience forced him to act immediately. Failure was the result.

It is easy to lose patience and confidence when there is no achievement by a movement. Luckily, a former warlord, Zhao Hengti, supported the movement. In return, Zhao wanted the Hunanese to support him to become the governor. In

November, Zhao successfully forced Tan out and returned as governor. Instead of keeping his promises, he kept the provincial parliament and listened to no opinions from Mao. To show his power, Mao organized a parade to celebrate the October Revolution of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the parade was suppressed by the police. Mao was angry and disappointed. He and others attacked the provincial parliament.⁷⁶

Knowing this situation, we can better understand the "Letter to Xiao Xudong, Cai Hesen and Friends in France," on December 1.⁷⁷ Based on this letter, Li Rui, Wang Shupai and Zhang Shashi concluded that Mao was diverted from reformism and democracy to revolution and class dictatorship at the end of 1920. Reading this letter does give support to their position. Mao talked about the means to reform China and the world. He wrote that education was of no use in reforming capitalists. There were two reasons. First, education was in the hands of the capitalists. Education would only promote capitalism, and no communism was taught. Second, when man was used to something, he would never change. Therefore, he suggested revolutionary means should be used rather than peaceful ways. In addition, it was unfair for the proletariat to have to wait. Moreover, once the proletariat became aware of its rights, it was impossible to ignore its demands.

But if we examine the meaning of the terms used in this letter and compare it with the events which happened later in November, then we will notice something else. Proletariat and capitalists were the two terms used by Mao. Proletariat did not only point at the working class as in the Marxist meaning. First, the proletariat included Mao

and his friends, who represented the students and intellectuals at that time. Second, Mao said that the proletariat had two-thirds of the population. It is clear that he did not only mean the working class because the working class was small at that time and could not reach two-thirds of the population. He had to include other classes.⁷⁸

Then who were the capitalists? Simply, they were the opposition to the proletariat. According to the stream of Mao's mind combined with the events in November, the capitalists were mostly those who used brute force, the imperialists and militarists. For example, Mao indignantly said that the "capitalists" had the army, police and bankers to protect him. In the society of the 1920's, only the warlords had this kind of power. He was using the warlord as the model to describe the "capitalist."

Mao said that the "capitalist" could not be educated, but the proletarian could be. So he did not give up reform, yet. Education was still useful. Revolutionary means were only used to deal with the "capitalists." But he did not define "revolutionary means." It was just a term without content. Thus, I cannot agree that Mao abandoned reform and turned to revolution. It would be better to say that apparently he was developing a strategy of revolution against capitalists and education for the proletarian. Thus, new concepts, classes and class struggle, were forming in a primitive way. Before, capitalists could be educated and diverted to the proletariat. Now they could not. So the two classes were independent of each other and against each other.

Traditionally, however, scholars would not become rulers. They liked to be advisors. They hoped for a good ruler who would implement their ideals. The warlord,

the "capitalist," was the ruler at that time. Mao had hoped that there would be a good ruler after the expulsion of Zhang. But Tan was not. So he hoped the one after, Zhao Hengti, would be. He was not, either. Since the "capitalists" had become the evil class, he could not find the Saint within this class. So Mao turned away from "capitalists" to the "proletariat" to find the Saint.

One month later, in a meeting of the New People's Study Society, (January 1 - 3, 1921) although Mao suggested revolutionary means again, he still did not mean it. At the same meeting, Mao told the others that education would be his practical means to achieve the goals of society. This further shows the co-existence of both doctrines within Mao's mind. He mentioned self-government no more. He had given up the Self-government Movement. This advocacy was continued by Zhao, however. In April, 1921, Zhao announced a provincial constitution. In August, it was passed and implemented in January, 1922.⁷⁹

Mao never gave up the idea of raising one's ability through education. The only difference was different means at different stages. Up to this time, he emphasized educating oneself through research and setting up bookstores and publishing newspapers to help educate others. All these ideas were formed while Mao was in Beijing and Shanghai.

The Cultural Bookstore was Mao's first step in education. It was established on July 31, 1920 in Changsha. In the article, "Establishment of the Cultural Bookstore,"⁸⁰ he wrote that the aim of the Cultural Bookstore was to provide new materials for the

people to do research. By doing this, hoped to achieve a new kind of idea and develop a new kind of culture. The Soviet Union was the only country that had developed this new kind of culture. So there were quite a few books discussing Marxism and the Soviet Union.⁸¹ Although, he did not identify the content of this new kind of culture, based upon what has already been discussed above, we can deduce his ideas about it. It was, on the one hand, democracy, that is, national self-determination and people's self-determination. On the other hand, it was anti-imperialist and anti-militarist. On August 20, Mao rented a store and on September 9, the bookstore was opened to the public.⁸² At the beginning of 1921, there were seven branches in different towns. After the establishment of the Hunan Communist Party in June, 1921, the bookstore became an instrument of the Communist Party.

Besides the bookstore, Mao established the Hunan tongsubao (Hunan Common Newspaper) on September 11, 1920, with He Shuheng as the editor-in-chief.⁸³ I could not find any materials about this newspaper; but as with the establishment of Xiangjiang and New Hunan, it no doubt aimed at mobilization and propaganda.

At the same time, Mao himself became the principal of a primary school. He required labor by the students. He also organized a Students' Self-governing Society. Evening school was set up once again.⁸⁴ Furthermore, he set up the Xiang-Tan Promotion of Education Society on December 28, 1920.⁸⁵ In his article, "Manifesto of the Xiang-Tan Counties' Promotion of Education Society,"⁸⁶ he emphasized the

necessity of education for everyone so that both society and the individual could be improved.⁸⁷ Then reformation would be achieved.

Self-education was always an important element in Mao's mind. From an emphasis on reading he now turned to emphasis on research and the involvement of individuals in different movements. In the article, "Report on the New People's Study Society,"⁸⁸ he pointed out that the academic foundation of the members was still weak and their minds were simple. They should put more effort into academic research to determine the foundation upon which to build good and great achievements in the future. In other articles, he wrote about research in different fields. Some should concentrate research in academic fields. Others should do research on how to reform and improve society. And others should become involved in social movements. Mao emphasized that different persons should do research in different fields. Then they should combine their efforts to form a new society. The aim of education, no matter whether of the self or of others, he believed was to achieve the moral improvement of individuals in their purity, sincerity, bright character, enterprising spirit and mutual help. On society's side, he hoped to achieve reform and improvement. In this area, Mao was still an idealist.⁸⁹

In that generation, most students and intellectuals had a good impression of the Soviet Union and were interested in it. Mao was no exception. His information about the Soviet Union was mostly from Li Dazhao and Cai Hesen. Mao nevertheless formed his own concept of it.

First, the Soviet Union implemented democracy. Politics was governed by the workers and the peasants. For Mao, the terms workers and peasants did not mean only these two classes. They also included the other classes. For example, in the article, "Great Union of All the People,"⁹⁰ Mao used the Soviet Union as an example of a great union of the people. He explained that the people were the peasants, workers, students, women, teachers, police, drivers, and so on. Therefore, Mao's meaning of democracy was that politics should be governed by them. Moreover, the Soviet Union's kind of democracy was called a proletarian dictatorship. In Mao's understanding, proletarian dictatorship was the dictatorship of the above classes.

But, why should they implement dictatorship? Before I answer this question, we should know that the term proletarian dictatorship (in Chinese) was first used by Cai Hesen in the letter to Mao on August 13 and again on September 16, 1920. In these letters,⁹¹ Cai told Mao that the aim of a proletarian dictatorship was to eliminate the capitalistic parliamentary government, to preserve the revolutionary effort and to reform the society. What did all these mean to Mao?

"Capitalistic parliamentary government" meant the militaristic government in China at that time rather than the Western meaning. Therefore we can reason that in Mao's mind "capitalistic parliamentary government" meant governments like those controlled by Zhang Jingyao, Tan Yankai and Zhao Hengti. These three disappointed Mao again and again. Mao felt strongly that the revolution had been stolen. So he agreed with the idea of a proletarian dictatorship as Cai suggested. The Soviet Union

was an example of successful proletarian dictatorship and aroused Mao's admiration and praise. He often told his friends he wanted to visit the Soviet Union.⁹²

The Soviet Union was not only a model for China's reformation, it should be the model for world politics as well. There were two announcements from the Soviet Union to China. The first one was on July 25, 1919, and the second one was on September 27, 1920.⁹³ The Soviet Union announced that she would cancel all the unequal treaties, gave up all privilege and returned all concession under the post-1896 treaties to China though she might not mean them and take action. But this really won the hearts of the intellectuals. The article, "Sensation about the Establishment of the Study of Russian Society,"⁹⁴ was a typical example written by Peng Huang on August 27, 1920, in newspaper Dagongpao. He praised the Soviet Union's respect for China's equality and freedom. She aimed at world peace. She fought against imperialists and capitalists. It would not be wrong if we suggested that Mao had the same impression, too. Mao praised the Soviet Union for leading a new kind of culture. She was the first civilized country in the world. There is some truth to Mao's ideas when we compare other countries' foreign policies with those of the Soviet Union. It gave a new image and new hope to Chinese, Fitzgerald suggests, after their disappointment in the behavior of the Western countries after World War One.⁹⁵

The Russian Research Society and the Work-Study Group in Russian were established in this atmosphere. They were Mao's own idea and had no relationship with the temporary Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).⁹⁶ The

achievements of these two organizations are not clear to me since I can find no more information about them. Nevertheless, we can feel Mao's enthusiasm for learning about the Soviet Union and Marxism.

It is important to know how Mao understood and felt about the Soviet Union, because it directly affected Mao's acceptance of Marxism and the Communist Party. Mao's impressions and concepts of the Soviet Union might reflect how many Chinese intellectuals viewed the Soviet Union. We need to understand why so many of them were pro-Russian and even became Marxist in that generation.

How Mao understood the concept of party is also important because this also affected his acceptance of the Communist Party. As we have seen before, a party was something like a pressure group and its aim was to promote change and mobilize for it. Now, there was a new element added. In the article, "Comment about Yi Lirong's Letter,"⁹⁷ he wrote that some of the members should do research in planning and organization for reformation of the whole society, so that a foundation for reformation could be created. A party was a kind of organization; therefore, forming a party was a part of this foundation. So Mao viewed the Communist Party and studying Marxism as a kind of foundation and preparation. When the temporary Central Committee contacted him and invited him to form a Young Socialist Group and a Hunan branch of the CCP, he quickly accepted and became involved with them. He was full of hope and ideals when the committee called him to join a meeting for the establishment of the Communist Party in July, 1921.

From July, 1920 to July 1921, within this one year, Mao was involved in a lot of activities. If we do not count minor events, there were nine big events. He was a man who really worked hard and through working showed his ability.

These events did modify Mao's ideology a lot. The most important modification was the change in Mao's idea of human equality. Before, he believed the essence of everyone was the same. Now, their essence was not the same. Humans fell into two great categories. The first category was those who had good essence. Through education, they could achieve self-improvement. They had different names, such as proletariat, worker and peasant classes and the People. The second category was those who had bad essence. They could never change their bad essence. Their names were capitalists, imperialists, militarists (warlords) and those who used brute force.

Now there was a class of people who would never change. During the process of individual and social progress, self-improvement would be impossible for them. So, revolutionary means should be used. Mao's early belief in an essential harmony of interest among all the people was broken. There were two different classes and two different processes. The concept of class struggle became a key element in Mao's ideology.

Together with the irreconcilability of class interest, he developed the concept of party and union. When struggling against the other class, individual force seemed so weak and useless. Mao began to pay attention to the union of individual efforts.

Moreover, when facing the struggle, a lack of organization always brought confusion and inefficiency. Mao began to put the idea of a party in a dominant position.

After the establishment of the Communist Party, Mao became whole-heartedly involved in the party. He executed every order from the party. By doing so he hoped to implement the goal of Marxism in China: the expulsion of imperialists and militarists, and establishment of national self-government. He viewed Communism as the universal truth. The only difference was that before, Saints held the truth; now the party held the truth. By extension, that meant party members held the truth. So Mao was willing to obey orders from the party and hoped to establish the truth.

During the first half of 1920, a representative of the Communist Information Bureau, Grigorii Nanmovich Voitinsky, visited China and met with Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. Then, Li and Chen established the Marxist Study Society, the Communist Group and the Young Socialist Society in Shanghai, and also established a temporary Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party during the second half of 1920. Chen Duxiu contacted Mao to organize the Young Socialist Society and the Communist Group in Hunan at the beginning of 1921.⁹⁸

These arrangements were in preparation for the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In July, 1921 opportunity ripened. The temporary Central Committee called for the First Party Congress of the CCP in Shanghai on July 20.⁹⁹ Mao represented the Hunan Communists and brought with him his friend He Shuheng. He was disqualified and was not allowed to join the Congress because he had not been

invited. Mao was a conceited person. Because of his leadership in Hunan, he felt embarrassed. As Sima suggests, an inferiority complex developed again.¹⁰⁰ The He affair added to Mao's dislike of "intellectuals."

Few important decisions were made at this Congress. First, the immediate goal was to mix among the workers and encourage class struggle. Second, the CCP should isolate and strike the Kuomintang (KMT) from the political stage of China.¹⁰¹ They did not have details or practical guidance, so everyone according to his own understanding implemented the decisions. Chen Duxiu was elected General Secretary of the central committee. Mao was elected secretary of the Hunan branch.¹⁰² Now, the CCP was formally established. After this Congress, Mao went back to Hunan and set up the Hunan branch on October 10. In the next few years, Mao carried out a series of activities based upon the decisions of the party.

The Hunan Self-Education University was Mao's first step toward educating the workers. In the "Manifesto to the Hunanese Self-Education University,"¹⁰³ he criticized the school system and the traditional learning institutions. First, entrance examinations and qualifications were so high that many students lost the chance to study. Second, school fees were so expensive that not everyone could afford them. Third, existing schools only allowed special people to study and refused ordinary people. These created a "intellectual class" separated from society.

The good point of this university was its democratic policy. It was open to everyone who was interested in academic study. The teaching method was simple. On

the one hand, one studied and speculated by oneself. On the other hand, everyone gathered together to share and discuss their ideas and learning. The students had to be motivated to improve and to develop their personalities. The final goal of the university was "self-achievement and self-development of the special character and personality of the individual and of the whole society."¹⁰⁴

In this article, we see once again Mao's concept of two classes: the privileged and the oppressed. This time, the privileged class was the "intellectuals" who graduated from government universities. The oppressed class was the ordinary people. Although few workers studied in the university, Mao believed he had fulfilled the party's decision because, according to him, "worker" did not mean only workers. It included all the other classes that were not of the privileged class. Beside this, he had the idea to establish a self-study university for a long time. It also fulfilled his own ideal.

At the same time, we can see the shadow of Mao's past experience. Mao believed his own success and achievement were through self-study; therefore others could follow his example. On the one hand, he was proud of this, otherwise he would not have promoted it. On the other hand, his defiance of formally educated intellectuals can easily be discerned. It was related to his experience as a librarian in Beijing and at the congress of the Party in Shanghai.

"The achievement and development of a perfect character and personality;" a statement of "Manifesto to the Hunanese Self-education University," does it not sound familiar? As I have suggested in chapter one, Mao assumed that a universal spirit was

inside the human mind. Through education the spirit would be discovered. The improvement of oneself was the construction of the universe. The only difference was that before, Mao did not clearly define "universal spirit." Now the universal spirit was "democracy:" national self-determination, individual equality, freedom and anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, anti-capitalism. Marxism was the conclusion of these. So, the promotion of Marxism was the main policy of the university.

The function of the university was to cultivate those who had the potential to become members of the party. Mao hoped that they would be the ones who could seize the universal spirit, and lead others and society forward. For example, in "Foreword to the New Era Magazine,"¹⁰⁵ was a list of the achievements of students towards reformation of the nation, purification of politics, overthrow of the imperialists and militarists, and so on.

In the curriculum, he arranged a time for labor. The working class in China was small. Fitzgerald suggests that to fulfill the doctrinal meaning of worker, Mao often arranged work for the students when the educational institution was under his management. Then the students could claim to be workers and could justifiably lead and govern the working class.¹⁰⁶ However, I would rather suggest that it was also Mao's childhood experience that influenced this arrangement. This might also suggest that Mao defied the intellectuals because he sub-consciously assumed he was himself a worker.

Because there were not many workers who studied in the university and the standards were too high for them, in September, 1922, Mao established a supplementary school especially for workers. The standards were much lower and the curriculum also cultivated Marxism.¹⁰⁷

The Hunan Self-Education University and the supplementary school were forced to close in 1923 because of their pro-Marxist slant and because of the activities of the party in the school. Mao never gave up, though. On November 11, 1923, he established Xiang-jiang College to cultivate comrades again. A different kind of evening school for workers was set up, too. This was the Promotion of Hunanese Civilian Education Society which was utilized by the CCP for propaganda.¹⁰⁸

Besides the above activities, Mao also utilized the Cultural Bookstore to promote Marxism. According to a statistic in March, 1921, among the over two hundred books that circulated were Marx's Makesi zibenlun rumen (Capitalism), Shehui zhuyi (History of Socialism), Xin Eluosi xhi yanjiu (The Research of New Russia), Laonog chengfu yu Zhongguo (The Soviet Government and China), and Chenxing gushi (Morning Story), vol.1. The popular magazines were Xin shenghuo (New Life), New Youth, and Laogongjie (Labor Class).¹⁰⁹ They all promoted Marxism. The Bookstore was also used as part of the Party network. Even party meetings were held there.¹¹⁰

On July 16, 1922, the Second Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai. The party changed its policy. The spirit of the resolution of the Second Congress was anti-imperialist, anti-militarist, and in support of the unification and independence of the

nation. To achieve these goals, Maring, the Comintern representative persuaded the CCP to work with the KMT (i.e., national and petty bourgeoisie and landlords) which was the first step toward the national revolution against the imperialists. By joining the KMT, the CCP could preserve its own independence, too. It should continue to engage in the class struggle and strive to achieve the dictatorship of the proletariat.¹¹¹

As I have shown above, Mao accepted a Marxism which was mixed with nationalism and anti-imperialism. The spirit of the resolution surely won the heart of Mao; therefore, Mao followed the decision without any objection in the following few years. At the same time, Mao's concept of two classes always emphasized the unification of the oppressed class to struggle against the privileged class. This concept helped him to accept the party decision and to join the KMT, as Schram has suggested.¹¹²

A special meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the CCP in August confirmed co-operation between the two parties. Then, the Comintern representative, Maring, met with Sun Yatsen for a second time and discussed co-operation, once again.¹¹³ Sun allowed the CCP members as individuals to join the KMT. Li Dazhao was the first to join the KMT. In June, 1923, the Third Congress of the CCP passed a resolution to allow members to join the KMT as individuals. Many CCP members joined the KMT, including Mao.

In support of the party's decision, Mao wrote an article, "Foreign Powers, Militarists and Revolution," on April 10, 1923.¹¹⁴ The concept of two classes

remained, but now the imperialists and militarists on one side were opposed by the other class which was now called the revolutionary democratic party, with the KMT at its core. The radical communist party and the anti-revolutionary democratic party would join the KMT together and fight against the militarists.

This article was a reflection of the spirit of the Second Party Congress. If we hope to learn Mao's progress in learning Marxism through this article, then we can only conclude that Mao grasped only one basic principle: anti-imperialism. Up to that point, Mao had never identified the nature of brute force, militarists and imperialists, or the nature of the people, the oppressed class and the revolutionary democratic party. He was only emotionally anti-imperialist. He had tried to analyze the phenomena of society through economic explanations. But he was not successful.

The suggestion of the union of all the parties to oppose the militarists and imperialist, was the basic idea of this article. Mao had long had this idea. There was no new or special political view point. He only followed the CCP decision.

On January 20, 1924, the First Congress of the KMT was opened in Guangzhou. Mao attended the congress and became a candidate for the Central Committee of the KMT. He had already been elected to the Central Committee and was head of its Organization Department of the CCP. After the First KMT Congress, he went to Shanghai where he worked as a secretary of the organization department of the KMT. At the same time, many communists occupied different posts inside the KMT, and the KMT was heavily influenced by the CCP.¹¹⁵

Mao's activities in Shanghai are not clear. There are few materials about him in that period. According to Kung Zhu's memory, there were many communists using their membership in the KMT as a front to carry out communist activities.¹¹⁶ Logically, we can conclude that Mao was also doing something like that. After only eight months in Shanghai, however, Mao went back to Hunan in the beginning of 1925. The reason given by Mao was sickness. He needed to go back to Hunan to recuperate. For eight months while there he wandered around the countryside organizing peasant movements. He did not look like a sick man who needed to convalesce. So Sima and Han Zuo have suggested that Mao did not like the work in Shanghai and had an argument with Chen Duxiu,¹¹⁷ and so gave up the in job Shanghai and went back to Hunan.

Mao missed a lot of events when he left the political stage during those eight months. First, the Fourth Congress of the CCP was held in Shanghai in January, 1925. The spirit of the Fourth Congress was still anti-imperialist and anti-militarist. At the same time, there was a Protect the KMT Movement under the leadership of Feng Ziyou which was aimed at the expulsion of the communists from the KMT.¹¹⁸ On March 12th, 1925, Sun Yatsen died. On May 30th, British soldiers and Japanese soldiers shot demonstrators in Shanghai and provoked the anger of the whole nation.¹¹⁹ In July, the National Government was established by the KMT in Guangzhou.

In October, Mao stepped back onto the political stage as an editor of the magazine Zhengzhi (Politics) for the KMT in Guangzhou.¹²⁰ Just at this time, an important event occurred. The right wing of the KMT had always disliked the communists and were

dissatisfied with the left wing of the Party. So on October 23rd the right wing called for a meeting, the Western Hill Meeting, of the Inspectorate Committee of the KMT in Beijing.¹²¹ The Committee agreed to remove of all the communists from official duties. Mao wrote a series of articles in Politics in December.¹²² He attacked the right wing in Beijing, calling them a tool of the imperialists. On the other hand, he praised the left wing of the KMT as the real leaders of the anti-imperialists. On January 13th, 1926, the Second Congress of the KMT assembled. They agreed to continue to co-operate with the CCP and so the split between the left and right of KMT was widened.¹²³

Beside his responsibilities as editor, Mao was also director of the Peasant's Movement Training Institute,¹²⁴ under the Peasant Department of the KMT. The department head was Peng Pai who was a communist. Mao recruited many Hunanese peasants and trained them as communist cadres. Furthermore, Mao became the spokesman of the Propaganda Department.¹²⁵ He intensified the propaganda against imperialists and militarists during his term.

The patience of the KMT encouraged the arrogance of the communists. Finally it caused the "Zhongshan vessels incident" of March, 1926. Although there were different explanations, the problems pivoted around the communists. After the incident, Chiang expelled a number of Russian staff persons and consultants and on May 17th, the KMT passed a proposal to limit the activities of the communists.¹²⁶

Although the communists were suppressed, they still co-operated with the KMT. This does not mean they agreed with everything the KMT did. For example, they believed that they could gain no benefit from the Northern Expedition, so they did not support it.¹²⁷ In this hostile environment, Mao went to Shanghai in July and became the Secretary of the Peasant Department of the CCP.¹²⁸ From that time onward, although Mao did not break off from the KMT, he did not take up any duties with it. Instead, he more intensively and openly carried out his duties in the CCP. With the KMT's expulsion of the Communists in 1927, Mao formally broke off from the KMT.

Besides its co-operation policy, the CCP also had a policy for a workers' and peasants' movement. As early as the First Congress of the CCP, its aim was to organize workers and encourage class struggle. In a Second Congress proposal, the CCP planned to lead the workers' unions to fight for their rights and to achieve labor laws. Mao was a loyal follower. After the congress, he was involved in the workers' movement.

Upon receiving the policy from the Second Congress, Mao began to organize a series of strikes. Within the ten months from June, 1922 to April, 1923 there were twelve strikes. The procedure for each strike was different according to the situation. In one case, Mao sent two or more cadres to the workers. They contacted the most radical workers and established a workers' club to attract the workers to join. Then, through the club, they arranged talks to mobilize the workers. When the opportunity was ripe, they encouraged the strike with emotional slogans. In another case, Mao chose two or more workers to train them as cadres. They set up a new union to oppose the old

union. They criticized the feebleness of the old one to arouse the emotion of the workers. Following this, they would make proposals which favored the workers in order to gain their support in a strike. No matter what kind of procedure he used, Mao would first carefully research and then prepare a detailed plan. During the process, Mao would always meet with cadres and workers to discuss and correct the plan. He would encourage them until they won. So most of the strikes achieved good results.¹²⁹

At the Fourth Congress in January, 1925, the status of the peasants' movement became important. At the same time, Mao began to pay attention to the peasants' movement. It was hard to tell whether there was any relation between these two developments. The only reason I can suggest is that Mao discovered the revolutionary potential of the peasants; therefore, he turned to the peasants' movement.

During his time in Hunan from January to October, 1925, he wandered around the countryside and made enquiries for ten months. Based on his enquiries, he wrote two pamphlets, "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society" and "Analysis of Classes of Chinese Peasants and Their Attitude to Revolution," while he was director of the Peasant Movement Training Institute.¹³⁰

The second article emphasized peasants.¹³¹ Here, he tried to analyze peasant classes from an economic view because the basic principle of the class divisions of Marx was economic differences. The article is full of numbers and percentages. As Lowe suggests, Mao's concept of class at this time was not Marxist. He was only cutting the Chinese situation to fit Marxism.¹³² In the same article, we can see how Mao modified

his concept of two classes. The idea of sub-classes was added. His emphasis, however, was still on the union of different classes, not the domination of any one class.

In March, 1926, Mao went to Shanghai and became the secretary of the Peasant Department of the CCP. He promoted radical land policies which incurred the criticism of Chen. Chen even refused to publish his article, "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society" because of his radical views.¹³³

The unhappy relation between Chen and Mao forced Mao back to Hunan in December, 1926. When he was back in Hunan, he inspected peasants' organizations and political conditions in the countryside and wrote his famous, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan,"¹³⁴ in March, 1927. The aim of this report was to prop up Mao's radical land policy and defend himself against Chen's accusation. The report did not systematically analyze the importance of the Peasant Movement, the foundation of the Peasant Movement nor its relations with the Communists. The first part of the report just answered some accusations. The second part listed fourteen important events of the peasants' movement. The peasants' movement was developing in a fast and unstoppable direction. It would be an important element to push the revolution forward and to achieve success in the future. This idea permeated and unified the article. This report was a political article rather than theoretical one.

Unfortunately, his report was given little attention in the Fifth Congress on April 27, 1927 in Wuhan.¹³⁵ According to Wang's Zhonggong shigao, there was much argument about land policy and class struggle in the countryside during the convention.

Before the Fifth Congress, the peasant movements in Guangzhou and Hunan developed very fast and used radical means of land reform. Each time, the movement developed into riots and usually was suppressed by police. This caused a lot of losses for the local CCP and induced the hostility of the KMT. At the Congress, therefore, some of the members questioned the direction of the peasant movement. Finally, the Congress passed a moderate proposal about land reform.¹³⁶

Mao's stubborn character did not let him follow the adopted policy at this time, because he thought his was the right way for revolution. Long before the proposal of the Fifth Congress, his peasant movement had moved far away from the decisions of CCP. A few days before he arrived in Hunan from Shanghai in December, 1926, there was a Hunan Peasant Convention held in Changsha.¹³⁷ The Convention suggested using revolutionary means for political and economic struggle. The appearance of Mao encouraged this idea. After a month of inspection in the countryside, he went to Wuhan in early 1927. He moved the Peasant Movement Training Institute from Guangzhou to Wuhan. At the same time, he set up a special court to judge bad landlords and evil gentry.¹³⁸ In March, the CCP set up the National Peasant Union; Mao was a member of the central committee.¹³⁹

Because the workers' movement and the peasant movement provoked the anger of the army of the KMT, in May, 1927 coups d'état occurred in Changsha and Wuhan.¹⁴⁰ Their aim was to expel the communists from the KMT. Other parts of the KMT also wanted to drive out communists, too. To maintain co-operation, the

representative of the Comintern, M.M. Borodin, using his title of KMT consultant, issued three orders. First, the actions of the Party (KMT) and the government should be limited by the proposals of the Central Committee of the KMT to protect the interests of citizens. Second, peasants should stop attacking others' property, jobs and beliefs. Third, the Party (KMT) should protect the interests of the merchants.¹⁴¹

These orders could not calm anti-communist feelings, however. Pressures mounted one by one. At last, the left-wing of the KMT announced an end to co-operation with the CCP on July 15th, 1927.¹⁴² Because of a rebellion led by the CCP in Nan-chang in August, the Nationalist Government in Wuhan used force to arrest the communists. The Central Committee of the CCP immediately held a meeting on August 7th to deal with the situation and decided to continue their revolutionary tactics of rebellion and affirmed their radical land policy and class struggle.¹⁴³ This decision was welcomed by Mao.

Under this policy, Mao went back to Hunan to direct and arrange the peasants' movement. The Central Committee assigned him five duties: to make the CCP Hunan Branch independent of the KMT; to establish a workers' and peasants' revolutionary army; to confiscate land from landlords; to establish CCP influence and power; and to set up a soviet government.¹⁴⁴

Mao was pleased to take up these duties. In September, he planned the Autumn Harvest Uprising of September 9th.¹⁴⁵ Despite his detailed planning, the uprising was

suppressed because of a lack of enough military force. Luckily, Mao escaped to Jinggang Mountain.¹⁴⁶

As a result, the CCP in an enlarged meeting of the temporary politburo, on the one hand, gave up peaceful and legal struggle, and on the other hand, decided to continue the revolutionary way and suggested the establishment of a local soviet government. After the failure of the Uprising, Mao turned to revolutionary military struggle. After the Uprising, both Mao and the CCP entered a new stage.¹⁴⁷

The concept of class struggle of Mao was better developed and was strengthened after these years. During the early stage, there were two great categories of people. Within each category, everyone was the same. Now, within the same category, everyone was not the same. There were different kinds of people. There were different kinds of political groups. Their differences were based on their political viewpoints. The political power of a group would decide its presiding status. Co-operation with the KMT was to be an example. Later on, this concept changed. Differences were based on economic interests and differences. The means of struggle, at first, were peaceful and legal, such as strikes and demonstrations. Later on, the means became more revolutionary: uprisings, radical land policies and setting up courts to judge evil landlords and gentry.

Mao understood Marxism as ideas of national self-determination, individual equality, freedom and anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, and anti-capitalism. These ideas were viewed by that generation and Mao also as universal truths. As long as their

understanding of Marxism was thus, they would consider Marxism as universal truth. Under this circumstance, Mao viewed Marxism as the universal truth or ideal that he longed for.

Two questions need to be considered to help our understanding of Mao's ideology at this time. First, why and how did Mao change into a communist? Second, how did Marxism practically influence and modify Mao's ideology? These two questions however are intricately woven together. So solving one of them helps to solve the other one.

To solve the first question, we need to know what kind of Marxist materials Mao read. Beside learning Marxism through Li Da-zhao and Cai He-sen, Mao told Snow that he turned to Marxism because of three books: A Manifesto of the Communist Party,¹⁴⁸ Class Struggle and History of Socialism. The first two were translated and published in 1921. The last one was translated and published in 1923.¹⁴⁹

The contents of these books explained Mao's own experience to him and gave him hope for the future. By explaining the phenomenon of capitalist society, they pointed out that capitalists destroy themselves. Furthermore, capitalists had to be destroyed before evil could be eliminated. Socialist society would follow the capitalist. It would be a total reversal of the capitalist one. It would bring happiness and a blissful life. The core of the capitalist evil was that it destroyed man's dignity and his love for his fellow man. This touched Mao's heart the most. The best of socialism was that it recovered man's dignity and one's loving relationship with others. Moreover, it would achieve a communist society. There, everyone's need could be fulfilled. People would be freed

from different kinds of oppression. There would be no more sadness and misery. Hopes and dreams filled Mao.

In the following two figures, figure 1 lists the evils of capitalist society as described in these books and compares them with the society at that time and Mao's experiences in it. Figure 2 list the ideal society as set forth in these books and compares it with the ideal society of the traditional culture.

From these two tables, we can reason out Mao's acceptance of communism; it was because of identification. He identified the evils of capitalist society as those of the society he was facing. He identified the ideals of socialism with his hopes and ideals.

There are two points that these figures do not show. First, both Class Struggle and History of Socialism, emphasized using legal political means for struggle and neglected revolutionary means. Second, both Class Struggle and A Manifesto of the Communist Party emphasized the importance of a party to lead the struggle. Surely, these two points influenced Mao considerably.

Should we call Mao a communist because he identified with the things discussed in these books? These books mostly introduced the basic theory and the development of socialism rather than communism. We might better call Mao a socialist rather than a communist. But should we say Mao changed to socialism? I don't think so. "Change" means to change from his own ideology to a totally new one. "Identify with" means to accept the characteristics of the other as equivalent to his own with minor modifications.

In answering the first question, we should say Mao identified as a socialist sub-consciously while consciously he thought himself changed to a communist.

Why did he think he was a communist or Marxist, not a socialist? As long as Marxism and communism were prevailing terms to represent the ideas of the intellectuals of that generation Mao would call himself Marxist, or communist, since he had identified Marxism as universal truth.

Now, we come to the second question. How did the above practically influence and modify Mao's ideology? In Chapter One we examined four main points of Mao's ideology: the human mind and will, education, the role of Saints, and practice. Mao's ideas still emphasized the willpower of human beings to struggle against all obstacles and to improve both self and society. The force of the evils in society, however, was strong and stubborn. The achievement of individuals could easily be eaten up by social evils and be lost. Hence, all individuals should unite together to form a great power to improve oneself and society. The idea of Great Unity (Datong) developed.

At first, the idea of Great Union was based on the union of small groups. The division of groups was based on job types. Later on, the Great Unity was based on the union of different political groups. The division of groups was based on differences of political viewpoints and political power. Finally, the Great Union was based on the union of different classes in which the division was based on economics and attitudes toward revolution. In the first stage, every individual was unique and developed differently from others. They did not need to compromise. In the second stage,

<u>The Evils of the Capitalist Society</u>	<u>Mao's Experience of Chinese Society in the 1920's</u>
1. Contradictions rose among classes: capitalism vs. the proletariat. (CM, 9)	1. Warlords vs. the people.
2. Capitalism destroyed old system and values. (CM, 11)	2. Monarchy overthrown & traditional culture opposed.
3. Broken families, prostitutes, idlers increased. (CS, 19-28)	3. Broken families, prostitutes, idlers increased.
4. Small merchants, workers and peasants were suppressed and their lives were miserable. (CS, 2)	4. Mao's father suppressed his neighbors.
5. Workers always feared losing their jobs. (CS, 27)	5. Mao and his friend Cai's experience. Mao needed to go to Beijing in 1918 to find a job, while Cai could not find any job after he graduated.
6. The morals of the merchants degenerated. (CS, 29)	6. Mao's father.
7. Education became a commodity. (CS, 30)	7. Mao became dissatisfied with the education system.
8. Army and constitution were used to protect the capitalist.	8. The Army and government were controlled by warlords to protect themselves; e.g., Zhang Jing Yao, Tan Yankai & Zhao Hengti in Hunan.
9. Capitalists prohibited the further development of production forces and brought confusion.	9. Warlords brought confusion and division to China and prohibited Chinese progress forward.
10. Capitalists would occupy international markets to satisfy their interests.	10. Imperialists overran China.
11. Capitalists had to be eliminated before society could be saved. (CS, 74 and CM, 20)	11. Militarists had to be eliminated before China could become strong.

Fig. 1. A Comparison of the Evils of Capitalist Society with Chinese Society in the 1920's.

CM: A Manifesto of Communist Party

CS: Class Struggle

HE: History of Socialism

individuals needed to join others according to job types. Although they were divided into different job groups, they were united by having to face the same foe. They had the same attitudes towards the foe and sought to achieve the same goals, so they were equal.

In the third stage, individuals were divided into different political groups. They were

<u>The Ideals of Socialism</u>	<u>The Ideals of Mao & of Traditional Culture</u>
1.Small merchants,craftsman,peasants,small capitalists & nobleman turned into proletariat while communists unite them to overthrow the capitalists. (CM,19-20)	1.Mao sought the union of all the People (Min-chong da-lian-he) opposed to the militarists.
2.Man has will power & physical power to achieve happiness; therefore, man should join the revolution rather than wait for change.(CS,78)	2.Mao believed by improving oneself, the whole universe could be changed and advanced.
3.The function of the ideologist was to discover,recognize & point out the truth. (CS,106)	3.Mao advanced the idea of the Saint.
4.The living of the worker was falling too low. Therefore capitalism could not be maintained. It would be eliminated. (CM,20)	4.In traditional Chinese history, whenever the living standard fell too low, rebellion would break out and overthrow the dynasty.
5.Different kinds of exploitation would be eliminated.(CM,27 and HE,91)	5.Anti-imperialists & anti-militarists.
6.In the new society workers manage the capital and fair distribution of materials & goods.	6.The Traditional idea of Great Unity (Datong) in which all under heaven is share by all the people. (Tienxia wei gong) ¹⁵⁰

Fig. 2. The Comparison of the Ideals of Socialism and the Ideals of Mao & Traditional Culture.

CM: A Manifesto of Communist Party

CS: Class Struggle

HE: History of Socialism

no longer equal or similar because of their different political viewpoints. Facing the same foe bonded them together. Sacrifice was needed for each group under this Great Union. In the final stage, individuals were divided up into different classes. They did

not have the same attitude toward the foe and achieved different goals. Sometimes, they did not even have similar foes. Their union was based on temporary interest. Only one or two classes would be the core, while the others would be assistants in the Great Union. Individuals became less important while the union became more so. The process of social progress would be the continuation of gathering individual comrades to struggle against the common foe.

Previously, education was seen as a means for self-improvement to strengthen the will power of oneself. Individual self-study could achieve the whole and the perfect. As soon as individual will power was weakened under the evil society, self-study could no longer achieve the whole and the perfect. Education needed to appear in another form. It had to exist in the division of labor. Everyone was a part of the whole. When combined together, they formed the whole. The process of individual progress would be the continued gathering of the efforts of individuals to construct the truth as a whole. Previously, moreover, education had been for everyone. Everybody, through education, could change and improve himself. Now, there was a small proportion of people who would never change. Their essence was counter-revolutionary.¹⁵¹ No matter what kind of education they went through, it would do them no good. Instead of education, revolutionary means must be used to control them.

Mao's understanding of Saints did not change. They were the ones who knew and held the truth. For the ability of the Saints to fully function, they needed to unite to form a core group. The function of the core group was to educate, mobilize and lead

the masses to go forward. Later on, the idea of a core group of Mao developed into the formation of a party. The party was a group of comrades who held the truth and knew the way to achieve it.

To Mao practice was to achieve the truth. Previously, Mao was not clear how to practice, or how to achieve the truth. Now, there were different ways to achieve the truth. For example, public opinion, movement organization, establishment of a constitution, propaganda and the like were the peaceful means. On the other hand, land reform policy, class struggle, uprisings, strikes and the like were revolutionary means.

By comparison with Mao's thinking before 1918, its content after clearly became richer. He believed that inequality caused the change. Inequality pointed to essence. The essence of everyone was different. Some were bad, and some were good, and some were between bad and good.

The concept of class struggle was developed along with the concept of inequality in essence. As long as the good and the bad lived within the same society (or universe), their interests would contradict each other. To win over the other, each side must ally with comrades to struggle against the foe. Here, Mao's concept of comrades and foe was developed. At first there was no difference in essence among the comrades. Later on, as a result of economic analysis, there were differences. Some were at the center and some were near the edge.

The development of history and the phenomena of the society were a series of struggles between comrades and foes according to the concept of class struggle. To

eliminate the foe, the comrades should unite solidly and co-operate with those who stand at the borderline in order to isolate the foe bit by bit. Finally, the foe will be eliminated. Then, the class struggle would come to an end. Society would arrive at the stage of Great Union.

Previously, Mao emphasized the freedom of individuals to achieve their own truth. Now he emphasized the union of the individual under the leadership of the party to establish themselves as a communist society. The value of the individual depended on his stand-point. If he stood on the comrades' side, he would have value and would have status within the universe. If he stood on the foes' side, he would have no value and would finally be expelled from the universe. To have a valuable life and to establish the universal truth, there must be no more absolute freedom. Only obedience and guidance are left.

Finally, had Mao changed to a Marxist? If for convenience we classify Mao's ideology as Marxist, and also call him a Marxist, we should remember that he accepted Marxism with a feeling of identification rather than reasoning. Besides the three books mentioned above, he read few books about communism or Marxism. He did no research, either. Should we say he was a Marxist because some of his ideas contained primitive communism? The traditional culture which was handed down to him and which formed his ideology coincidentally matched Marxism and so he assumed himself a Marxist. He only knew a few basic concepts of socialism and viewed them as the whole

of Marxism. He did not really understand Marxism or communism. Although he called himself a Marxist, he was not a true Marxist.

NOTES

1. Sima, Mao, 100.
2. Ibid., 152.
3. Li Rui, Mao Zedong di zao-qi ge-ming huo-dong (The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Zedong) (Hunan: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 176. Hereafter cited as Mao ge-ming huo-dong.
4. Snow, Red Star Over China, 151, and Li Huang, "Wusi yundong yu shaonian Zhongguo xuehui" (May Fourth Movement and the China Youth Society), Mingpao yuehkan (Mingbao Magazine) (June 1969): 40.
5. Sima, Mao, 104.
6. Snow, Red Star Over China, 151
7. Ibid., 152.
8. Lin Yusheng, Sixiang yu renwu (People and Thought) (Taibei: Lianjian chubanshiye gongsi, 1983), 142.
9. Lin, Sixiang yu renwu, 184.
10. In his book Sixiang yu renwu, Lin used Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi as examples to illustrate the spirit of the Movement. They both were radical and strongly criticized traditional culture. However, they unavoidably fell into the trap of traditional ideology. Confucius believed that the mind was the most important part of a human being. If one improved his mind, the society would follow him to improve. Both Chen and Hu had the same concept.
11. Snow, Red Star Over China, 152.
12. Ibid., 153.
13. "Intellectual" throughout this thesis means those who learnt Western knowledge, had special skills and might study overseas. In general, he disliked most of

the "intellectuals", but there were exceptions. However, I consider that Mao was an intellectual in the traditional definition.

14. Snow, Red Star Over China, 151.
15. Li, "Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui," 41.
16. Ibid., 37.
17. Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tze-tung (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), 31-32.
18. Ibid., 32.
19. Ibid., 29.
20. Li, "Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui," 38.
21. Snow, Red Star Over China, 157.
22. Li Dazhao, "Wo di Makesi zhuyiguan" (My Idea of Marxism), Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao (A Reference Book of the Chinese Communist Party's History), ed. Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao dangshi jiaoyanshi (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), vol. 1: 123-158.
23. Li Dazhao, "Zailun wenti yu zhuyi," Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao, 117-122.
24. Wang Shupai and Zhang Shashi, Mao Zedong zaoqi chexue sixiang tanyuan (Research into Mao Zedong's Early Thought) (Hunan: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 147. Hereafter cited as Mao sixiang tanyuan.
25. "Xiangjiang ping-un chuangkan xuanyan," CWMTT, vol. 1: 53-55.
26. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 158.
27. A Manifesto of the Communist Party was translated by Chen Wangtao and published in 1920. This was the first Marxist book published in Chinese.
28. Snow, Red Star Over China, 155.
29. "Minchong di dalianhe," CWMTT, vol. 1, 57-60.
30. "Zhongguo shehui ge jieji di fenxi," CWMTT, vol. 1, 159.
31. "Zhongguo nongmin zhong ge jieji di fenxi ji qi duiyu geming di taidu," CWMTT, vol. 1, 153-159.
32. Li, Mao geming huodong, 180.

32. Sima, Mao 116.
33. Before the establishment of the Union, there were spontaneous activities to support the Movement. But the activities were not well organized and were disjointed.
34. "Hunan quanti xuesheng bake xuanyan"(Hunan Students' Manifesto of Boycott), Wusi shiqi Hunan renmin geming douzheng shiliao wuanbiao (A Reference Book of Hunanese Revolution History During May Fourth Movement) , ed. Hunansheng zhaxue shehu kexue yanjiusuo ciandaishi yanjiushi (Hunan: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), 102-3. Hereafter cited as Wusi Hunan geming shiliao.
35. Ibid., 100-77.
36. Li, Mao geming huodong, 98, 102. The Movement was joined by workers on June 5th. Three officers of the government, Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu and Zhang Zongxiang, were denounced as traitors and resigned. So the students began going back to school on June 12th.
37. Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 186-187.
38. Li, Mao geming huodong, 198.
39. Some members were in Beijing, therefore not all attended this meeting.
40. "Xiangjiang pinglun chuankan xuanyan," CWMTT, vol.1: 54.
41. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 142.
42. "Nuzi geming," CWMTT, vol. 1: 79.
43. Li, Mao geming huodong, 198.
44. Sima, Mao 120.
45. According to the source cited in Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, there were ten charges against warlord Zhang, 190-233.
46. Sima, Mao, 122.
47. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 149, and Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 234-235.
48. Li, Mao geming huodong, 132. Li Rui suggests that Mao began to turn away from experiment and reform during the second visit to Beijing.
49. Li, The Early Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 129.

50. Li Zonglie, "Quzhang yundong di zongji" (The Record of the Expel Warlord Zhang Movement), Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 244-254.
51. Li, "Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui", 38.
52. Snow, Red Star Over China, 155, footnote.
53. "Gei Tao Yi di xin," March 1920, CWMTT, vol. 1: 183-186.
54. The New Life Village was based on the ideal of self-support for study through cultivation. Li, "Shaonian Zhongguo xuehui," 38.
55. CWMTT, vol. 1: 191-4.
56. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 163.
57. Snow, Red Star Over China, 155.
58. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 166.
59. Mao Zedong, "Xinmin xuehui huiwu baogao" (The Report of the New People's Study Society), CWMTT, vol. 1: 308-309.
60. Snow, Red Star Over China, 155.
61. Wang and Zhang, Mao sixiang tanyuan, 163..
62. Ibid., 154.
63. Sima, Mao, 150.
64. Ibid., 125.
65. "Gei Zhou Shizhao di xin," SCWMTT, vol. 1: 193.
66. Ibid., 125.
67. A letter from Zhou Shizhao (Wu si Hunan geming shiliao, 297) illustrates how his treatment pleased Mao.
68. CWMTT, vol. 1: 187.
69. "Hunan renmin zijue hui xuanyan," CWMTT, vol. 1: 195-196.
70. Dagongbao, September 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 26th, 27th, 28th and October 3rd, 5th and 6th, 1920.

71. The two articles written on September 26th & 28th, were about The Promotion Movement. In these articles, there was a clear message that there needed to be a special group of people involved, though the term "group" was not used.

72. "Wai Yi Lirong gei Mao Zedong, Peng Huang di xin jia anyu," SCWMTT, vol. 1: 285-286.

73. According to Song Feifu, Xinmin xuehui, (New People's Study Society) (Changsha: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), in the appendix of members on p. 119-131, all were students and intellectuals. None was from other classes. In some ways, this suggests that Mao was concerned about the educational background of the members. We could conclude that in the mind of Mao the members were intellectuals.

74. See note 69.

75. Sima, Mao, 130.

76. Snow, Red Star Over China, 154. Mao in an article published on December 1st, 1920, declared that he had not done it. There is a contradiction. Had he done it or not? We might surmise that he needed to protect himself by saying no in 1920. But by 1936, Mao could safely tell the truth. He might not have led the attack, but based on his character, he might very well have been involved in the attack.

77. "Gei Xiao Xudong, Cai Hesen bingzai Faguo zhuhuiyou di xin" (Letter to Xiao Xudong and Others in France), SCWMTT, vol. 1: 289-296.

78. CWMTT, vol. 1: 294.

79. Mao Zedong, "Xinmin xuehui huiwu baogao; January 1st - 3rd, 1921," Wu-si Hunan geming shiliao, 462-485. The goal of the Society was "Reforming China and the World."

80. "Faqi wenhua shushe," CWMTT, vol. 1: 205-206.

81. Li, Mao geming huodong, 281, and Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 328-329.

82. Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 327.

83. Li, Mao geming huodong, 281.

84. Ibid.

85. Sima, Mao, 151.

86. "Xiang-Tan jiaoyu cujinhui xuanyan," Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 356-357.

87. Ibid.
88. "Xinmin xuehui yuiwu bugao," CWMTT, vol. 1: 299-315.
89. These concepts can be found in "Gei Tao Yi di xin," (see note 53) "Wai Yi Lirong gei Mao Zedong, Peng Huang di xin jia anyu," (see note 72) "Gei Xiao Xudong, Cai Linbin bingzai Faguo zhuhuiyou di xin," (see note 77) and "Xinmin xuehui huiwu baogao" (see note 59).
90. "Minzhong di dalianhe," CWMTT, vol. 1: 58.
91. Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao, vol. 1: 190-203.
92. Eric Chou, Mao Tse-Tung: The Man and the Myth (New York: Stein & Day Publishers, 1982) 43.
93. "Sulian diyici duiHua xuanyan" (The First Announcement from the Soviet Union to China), Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 21-22, and "Sulian direci duiHua xuanyan" (The Second Announcement from the Soviet Union to China), Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 23-24.
94. "Duiyu faqi Eluosi yanjiuhui di ganyan," Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 486-488.
95. Charles Patrick Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 55.
96. Both the Work-Study Group and the Society were established during August, while the CCP in Shanghai did not contact Mao until September. Mao formed these groups for his own interest.
97. "Wai Yi Lirong gei Mao Zedong, Peng Huang di xin jia anyu," SCWMTT, vol.1: 285-286.
98. The dates of these activities are different according to different writers. Mostly I base my narrative on Wang Jianmin, Zhongguo gongchandang shigao (The History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taipei: National Chengchi University, 1965). Hereafter cited as Zhonggong shigao.
99. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 36.
100. Sima, Mao, 161-162.
101. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 41.
102. Ibid., 41-3, and Sima, Mao, 163.

103. "Hunan zixiu taxue chuangli xuanyan," CWMTT, vol. 1: 81-84.
104. Ibid., 84.
105. "Xin shidai fakanci," CWMTT, vol. 1: 85-86.
106. Fitzgerald, The Birth of Communist China, 144.
107. Li, Mao geming huodong, 337.
108. Ibid., 338.
109. Song, Xinmin xuehui, 86.
110. Wusi Hunan geming shiliao, 328-329.
111. "Zhongguo gongchandang dierci quanguo daibiao dahui jueyan," (The resolution of the Second Congress of the CCP) quoted in Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 57-67.
112. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, 42. "The Great Union of the Popular Masses," was written in 1919, as Schram suggests, not in 1922. Also see SCWMTT, vol.10, The Chronicle of Mao's Writing: 20.
113. In 1921, when Maring met Sun the first time in Guilin. Sun refused Maring's suggestion of unification. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 578.
114. Mao, "Waili, junfa yu geming," Xin shidai (Hunan: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), 5-7.
115. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 105.
116. Kung Zhu, Wo yu hongjun (The Red Army and I) (Xianggang: Nanfeng chubanshe, 1954), 24.
117. Sima, Mao, 190 and Han Zuo, Mao Zedong pingchuan (Mao Zedong, Critique and Biography) (Xianggang: East & West Culture Publishing Co., 1982), 124.
118. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 129.
119. Ibid., 168.
120. Han, Mao Zedong pingchuan, 127.
121. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 132
122. CWMTT, vol. 1: 113-140.

123. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 143.
124. Han, Mao, 127.
125. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 143.
126. Ibid., 154.
127. Ibid., 155.
128. Sima, Mao, 199.
129. For detailed information regarding each strike, see Li, Mao geming huodong, 377-415.
130. Snow, Red Star Over China, 160.
131. CWMTT, vol.1: 153-159.
132. Donald M. Lowe, The Function of China in Marx, Lenin and Mao (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 122.
133. Snow, Red Star Over China, 160.
134. "Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha bugao," Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Writings of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1953), 13-46.
135. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 359.
136. "Zhonggong wuquan dahui nongye wenti jueyian" (The Proposal of the Agricultural Problem at the Fifth Congress) quoted from Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 373-378.
137. Ibid., 422.
138. I have not been able to establish whether the court was set up in Hunan or Wuhan.
139. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 422-431.
140. Ibid., 442-444.
141. Ibid., 452.
142. Han, Mao Zedong pingchuan, 91. The right wing of the KMT had ceased cooperating in 1925. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.1: 583.

143. See the documents "Baqi huiyi gei quandang dangyuanshu," (Letter from August 7th Meeting to All Party Members) and "Zuijin nongmin douzheng di yijuean" (Proposal concerning the Recent Peasant Struggle), Hongse wenxian (The Red Documents), Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 511-514.

144. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 1: 555.

145. Han, Mao Zedong pingchuan, 91.

146. Sima, Mao, 231.

147. From 1921 to 1927, the actions of Mao were closely linked with CCP activities. So it is unavoidable to talk about the CCP. However, Mao was the center; therefore, when I talk about the CCP, it will be about the events that related to Mao. Hence the discussion of the events of the CCP will not be complete or with continuity. For example, I talk about the labor movement up to 1925 because from that time onward, Mao changed his attention; but this doesn't mean the CCP did not promote the labor movement any more. It is also true that it does not mean that the peasant movement only started in 1925 when Mao began to work for it. In Guangdong, Peng Pai organized many successful peasant movements some years ahead of Mao.

148. I have not been able to locate the one published in 1921 which Mao read. The one I am using is quoted from Makesi Engesi wenxuan (Selected Writings of Marx & Engels) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1961), 9-41.

149. During this period, Mao read only a few Marxist books because there were few translations and because of Mao's busy life. He himself did not suggest that he had read any other Marxist materials besides these three.

150. Confucius, "The Age of Grand Unity and the Rise of Dynastic Rule," Li Chi, quoted from Theodore De Bary, et al., eds. Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), vol.1: 175-176.

151. Counter-revolution meant any opposition to the interests of the People.

CHAPTER THREE

HIATUS IN THE PROCESS OF LEARNING MARXISM

The failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising forced Mao to retreat from Changsha to the countryside. By September 19, the Worker and Peasant Revolutionary Army which Mao had organized, was left with only one thousand.¹ To preserve his own life and the remaining troops, Mao needed to find a base for preservation and development. In Mao's eyes, Jinggang Mountain was the ideal place.

Jinggang Mountain was a strategic location on the provincial border between Hunan and Jiangxi and was occupied by a gang of bandits headed by Wang Zuo and Yuan Wencai. To win them over, as Laszlo Ladnay and Sima Changfeng suggest, Mao used traditional methods.² He flattered them and even swore into brotherhood with them. In the end, the bandits and the army with Mao at the head, established a revolutionary base on Jing-gang Mountain.

Although Mao was accused and punished by the Central Committee,³ his life up in the mountain was rather happy at the beginning.⁴ A soviet government was established and he was the chairman.⁵ The army was regrouped and he exercised high authority. During the wars among the warlords, the Jinggang Mountain's Soviet Base had the chance to grow and consolidate. In April, 1928, Zhu De led his army, which had nine hundred troops, to join Mao and organize the Fourth Red Corps which had

roughly three thousand troops.⁶ In Autumn, Peng Dehuai led eight hundred troops to join Mao. The Fourth Red Corps grew to nearly four thousand.⁷

When the base grew larger, it was not easy to manage. According to articles written during this period, there were four main problems.⁸ First was the military. Mao needed to maintain a large army; however, there was neither enough proper training nor weapons. Second was resources. He needed more capital to support the base where the economy was poor. Third was political education for the troops and the people in support of the soviet government and the revolution. Fourth was a good relationship between the peasants and the Red Army as an important factor for the consolidation of the base.⁹

Besides these, there was pressure from the party and from the KMT. Since the CCP emphasized control by the party, the Central Committee wanted to control all bases, especially one like Jinggang Mountain which had a large number of troops.¹⁰ To ensure the Jinggang Mountain base was under control, it was under the authority of three committees: the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, the Hunan Provincial Committee and the Xiangnan Special Committee.¹¹ These committees always issued many orders, which brought confusion and were detrimental to the base. Mao pointed out their mistakes and incurred their anger, creating many enemies and much trouble in later years.

The KMT troops gave Mao much trouble, too. The Fourth Red Corps always disturbed the villages and cities near by, and this attracted the attention of the KMT.

When soviet bases all over the nation grew, the KMT could no longer tolerate their existence. The KMT began an elimination movement and Jinggang Mountain was one of the targets. At first, both sides had losses and victories. But, when the battles became intense, Mao faced a more difficult situation. Food, manpower and weapons were exhausted. By the end of 1928, these problems became more serious. The living standard was so low that even the poor peasants could not sustain themselves. Ordinary necessities were in serious shortage. It was difficult to get recruits for the Red Army and the life of the troops was the worst of all.¹²

To preserve their power, Mao and Zhu decided to escape elimination by the KMT, and left Peng behind to guard the base. They intended to return if Peng could defeat the enemy and preserve the base, but if unfortunately the base were eliminated, they could still save some of their army. Thus, in December of 1928, they fled from Jinggang Mountain.¹³ They wandered around the borders of Hunan, Jiangsi and Fujian, making guerrilla warfare. In April, 1929, Peng abandoned the base, too.

Between the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the end of his wanderings, Mao was absorbing knowledge and searching the way to the truth. In this period he began to develop his own theory to explain how things happened and developed, and the relation among classes and revolution. An article, "A Speech for an Emergency Meeting," on August 7, 1927, marks the beginning of Maoism.¹⁴ In this article, he pointed out three important roles in the revolution: the role of the masses, the role of the military and the role of the party.

During this year and a half, running his administration, tasting military life and circling around in power struggles all shaped his ideas about these three roles. He summed them up in four articles, "Why is it that red political power can exist in China?" "The Struggle on Jinggang Mountain" and "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party"¹⁵ on December 14, 1929 and "Letter to Comrade Lin Biao" on January 5, 1930.¹⁶

The role of the masses fell under the policy of the mass line. What was the mass line? The whole idea of the mass line was that the party and the government should gain most of the masses in support of the policy. To achieve this, the policy had to be concerned about the interest of the masses and serve it well. Then they would support the policy. In order to know what they were interested in, their opinions and their ideas for policy making, there should be some sort of organization, such as the soviet government, the workers' and peasants' representative committee, the people's committee, and so on, to act as media through which the masses could express their opinions. In return, committees should collect and sum up their opinions for policy making. This kind of policy would create great force for change in the society.

Although the idea of the mass line did not originate with Mao, he was the only one who talked about methods to win the support of the masses and actually succeeded.¹⁷ To win their support, the first thing was to make clear who were the masses. According to Mao, the masses were mainly the peasants. Then what were their main concerns? Their main concerns were farm lands and rent. Catering to these

concerns, Mao established policies such as cancellation of rent and redistribution of farm land. But these were not enough to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses; therefore, side by side with these policies came the liquidation of landlords and rich peasants.

Under this policy, landlords and the rich peasants were slandered and accused as the enemies of the masses. The government and the party would encourage the masses to hate their enemies and fight against the landlords and rich peasants. By doing this, the party could encourage the enthusiasm of the masses to surface.¹⁸ But this method inspired only emotion and no reason. There was only propaganda and no truth. There was only class struggle and no peace. There were only enemies and no friendship.

To maintain and continue the enthusiasm of the masses and to protect their interests was the job of the government and the party. Mao's article "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," shows his belief that the masses were often foolish. They did not know how to express their emotions and opinions. They did not know how to do good things for themselves, either. So the governors, who were elected by the people and the party members should represent the masses to express their opinions and to protect their interests. Thus democracy should be centralized.

This kind of democratic centralization was very dependent on the motivation of the party and the government to communicate with the masses. For instance, different kinds of mass meetings organized by the government and the party were a means of communication. If masses were passive, then communication would be blocked which

would lead to the loss of their support. Therefore, under democratic centralization, the role and the function of the party became more important than before.

In the idea of the mass line, the role played by the peasants was important. This was the result of a series of failures that Mao experienced. Before 1928, the party had arranged uprisings in cities which all failed. During the period in Jinggang Mountain, there were numerous attacks on the cities, which all failed, too. Mao speculated on the reasons for the failure of the uprisings in the cities. He concluded that the environment for revolution in the cities was not yet ripe, and the force of the workers was weak. The revolution in the countryside, on the other hand, was so successful by comparison that Mao inclined towards the force of the peasants and the environment in the countryside for revolution. In his "Letter to Comrade Lin Biao," which summed up his experience in Jinggang Mountain, he looked upon the peasants as the main force of the revolution. The role of the peasants and the function of the countryside later on developed into the tactics of "using the countryside to surround the cities." However, Mao had not given up on all the others. The grand union of several classes was still needed to isolate the prime enemies, now the KMT as well as the imperialists.

The army also played an important role in the revolution. The army had two functions. The first function was a traditional one. It defended friends and attacked enemies. The second function was administrative. It assisted the party and the government to educate and to organize the masses. In his article "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," Mao listed more details about the administrative function

of the army.¹⁹ If we compare the function of the intellectuals in Mao's thinking with the function of the army, then we discover that they played quite similar roles. Step by step, the traditional role of the intellectuals as administrators was assumed by the army. In order to take up the job of the intellectuals and to function more efficiently, political education became part of the training of the army.

Although the army took up part of the administration, the role of the army had not changed. The army was still an army. However, the concept of the army was a bit different from the traditional one. Traditionally, the army was the private property of the emperor, the royal family or the warlord. The army was a means for them to consolidate their power. In Mao's thinking, since the Red Army was part of the masses, theoretically they were the instrument of the masses and were to be used to consolidate the political power of the masses. Practically, they were the means by which the party implemented the revolution; therefore, the army had to be firmly under the party.

Now we come to the role of the party in the revolution. Earlier in Mao's thinking the party presided over the masses to find the truth. It needed the masses to unite and cooperate with the party. Now, it represented the masses to find the truth. It only needed the masses' support and submission. Because the masses were weak and prone to folly, the party should control the administration and the military for the good of the masses.

The relation among the party, the army and the masses within the revolution was that the party would be the leader at the top to preside over the revolution, the army

would be the administrative middle to support the party and organize and consolidate the masses, while the masses would be the base and serve as the reserves and force of the revolution. After one and a half years, by the beginning of 1930, these ideas were well formed. From that time onward, his ideas of these three roles guided Mao in revolution.

Mao's military theory started to develop in this period, too. His military theory is so unique that it must be dealt with separately. Tactics were the first part developed. He absorbed four principles of guerrilla tactics from working with Zhu De. If the enemy advances, we retreat. If the enemy halts and encamps, we harass. If the enemy seeks to avoid battle, we attack. If the enemy retreats, we pursue.²⁰

Mao also developed his own kind of strategy. When the enemies were squabbling, the soviet government (including the Red Army) should assume an active status. Conversely, when the enemies were cooperating, the soviet government should be in a passive status. This strategy was well summed up in the "Letter to Comrade Lin Biao." Meanwhile, in the same article, he realized that the support of the masses was an important part in winning the war. He had not yet, however, developed the policy of the mass line that typically related to the military. His letter to Lin Biao discussed the policy of the mass line that typically related to administration. Not until later years was this point well developed for the military.

Mao's attitude towards his superiors changed during this period, too. Many times, he submitted to orders from higher levels; this only led to failure and exhaustion.

Mao looked down on them, and his self-assertion and self-confidence grew. He firmly believed that his ideas were the right way to the truth. Unfortunately, he was suppressed and lacked a chance to carry out his ideas. According to Sima's research, from September, 1927 to November, 1928, Mao's job was changed ten times, reflecting his unstable status.²¹ He fully realized that if he wanted to implement his ideas, he must have absolute power by controlling the army and the administration (that is, the party and the government).

Finally, Mao's Fourth Red Corps established another soviet base in southeastern Jiangxi in January, 1930. It was named the Jiangxi Soviet and Ruijin was its capital. A new era began. The very first thing Mao did was to strengthen his force. In March, Mao became one of the Front Committee members of the Fourth Red Corps, the Fifth Red Corps and the Sixth Red Corps.²² In June, the Fourth Red Corps combined with the Twelfth Red Corps and the Twenty-first Red Corps to form the First Red Army. The Fifth Red Corps combined with the Eighth Red Corps and the Sixteenth Red Corps to form the Third Red Army. In August, the Two Red Armies combined to form the First Red Army Group, and Mao was one of the General Front Committee members of the First Red Army Group.²³ Mao succeeded in controlling the army and commanded the strongest armed force within the CCP by the end of 1930.

This strong armed force caught the attention of the Central Committee again. Moreover, from the end of 1929, his enemies, such as the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, the Hunan Provincial Committee, the Xiangnan Special Committee and even

Zhu De, sent reports to the Central Committee complaining about Mao. These warned the Central Committee that there was a danger of losing control of Mao. In addition, the Central Committee disliked Mao because of Mao's outright criticism earlier.²⁴ Now, the Central Committee had its own reasons to deal with Mao. Early in April, 1930, the Central Committee sent a number of letters to Mao asking him to come to Shanghai.

By observing the motivation behind those letters, the Central Committee had the idea to imprison Mao in Shanghai and to remove him from his military force. One of them, "Letter from the Central Committee to the Fujian Provincial Committee to be forwarded to the Front Committee of the Fourth Red Corps and the General Front Committee of the Third Red Corps, the Fourth Red Corps and the Fifth Red Corps," on April 16, 1930, clearly illuminated the intentions of the Central Committee.²⁵ The Central Committee was trying to lure Mao to Shanghai. At the same time, they refused to recognize the General Front Committee having sufficient ability to command the army. Thus, a military command needed to be set up. Zhu De would be the Commanding General. There should be a person to replace Mao on the General Front Committee during Mao's stay in Shanghai.

Mao was not stupid. He was warned by these letters not to go. Besides, he had worked in the Central Committee before; he knew all the power struggles and tricks. It was not easy to lure him into the trap. Moreover, he knew that as long as he held

the army in his hand, the Central Committee could do nothing to him. He ignored their letters and refused to go to Shanghai.²⁶

At the end of 1930 there was the Futian Incident. It was the result of the movement to eliminate anti-Bolsheviks. The CCP believed that the KMT had set up an anti-Bolshevik League (The A-B League) which had been absorbed into the CCP; therefore, the CCP started an elimination movement to purify the Party. Wang has suggested that whenever the communists wanted to get rid of their enemies, they would find different kinds of excuses.²⁷ This movement was one of them. According to Zhang Guotao, at the very beginning it was the Southwestern Jiangxi Bureau of the Chinese Young Communists (CYC) who suspected that some of their members had joined the A-B league. Mao utilized this to enlarge the elimination movement and defeat his enemies, which caused confusion and fear within the Jiangxi Soviet.²⁸

To deal not only with Mao, but with all the other soviet bases, the Soviet Areas Central Bureau (SACB) was set up to inspect and direct all the soviet governments, at the Third Central Committee Plenum in September, 1930. Under the SACB, Xiang Xing and Gu Zuolin were sent to Ruijin to inspect Mao and inquire about the movement to eliminate the A-B League.²⁹

Mao knew the SACB would be an obstacle to his power. The only way to resist the SACB, was to consolidate his power. So he intensified the elimination movement within the Jiangxi Soviet. According to Sima and Stephen Uhalley, the Jiangsi Provincial Committee was Mao's main target because they favored Li Lisan's line which

Mao opposed.³⁰ Most of people who were eliminated were from the Twentieth Red Corps. Mao even captured the secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, Duan Liangbi, and some others in Futian, which brought about the rebellion of the Twentieth Red Corps in December, 1930.

The aims of the rebellion were resistance against Mao's dictatorship and the wish to establish another soviet base independent of Mao. Their slogan was "Support Zhu [De], Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Gonglue], and defeat Mao Zedong." Unfortunately, the rebellion was not at the right time. On December 19, 1930, KMT troops began the First Encirclement Campaign. All the army forces had to solidify to face the enemy. So, on December 17, Zhu, Peng and Huang made a declaration against the rebellion, and supported Mao. On December 18, they sent out a letter once again condemning the rebellion.³¹ Although they might not have wished wholeheartedly to support Mao, they had to at that critical moment.³²

The First Encirclement Campaign ended on January 3, 1931, which gave Mao the chance to suppress the rebellion. Moreover, on January 8, 1931, with the enlargement of the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, Li Lisan's line was liquidated. On January 16, the SACB in a notice about the Futian Incident announced support for Mao. These events encouraged Mao to eliminate his enemies totally. Roughly 4,400 people were killed.³³

From that time onwards the intention of the Central Committee to eliminate Mao was intensified. In the Fourth Central Committee Plenum, the Central Bureau of the

Jiangxi Soviet (now referred to as the Central Soviet) was established to replace the General Front Committee so that Mao lost control of the army.³⁴ This was the first step. At the same time, the Second and the Third Encirclement Campaigns and mutinies by Xiang Zhongfa in June and Gu Runzhang in November impelled the Central Committee to move to the Jiangxi Soviet. Mao was now under the direct scrutiny of the Central Committee. In the SACB Congress on November 1, 1931, Xiang Xing criticized Mao's economic policy causing him to lose his positions as the Central Committee Secretary and on the Central Military Committee.³⁵ This was the second step.

Sometimes the Central Committee blamed him, but at other times they comforted him. On November 7, 1931 the Chinese Soviet Republic (CSR) was established in the Central Soviet with Ruijin the capital. Mao was elected the chairman of the temporary government. Zhang Guotao and Xiang Xing were vice-chairmen. Mao also became the chairman of the People's Committee. The Central Committee let Mao become chairman because Mao was well respected by the peasants, and his followers still occupied various positions within the Central Soviet. They needed to soothe Mao and avoid rebellion.

Although Mao was the chairman of the Republic, he did not exercise much power. Both of his assistants had more authority than he. Zhang and Xiang held higher positions than Mao in the CCP. After the cancellation of the General Front Committee, Mao was only a political supervisor of the First Red Army Group. Even this position

was eliminated on the principle that the CCP should guide the Soviet Government, and Chairman Mao should take the advice of the party leaders, Zhang and Xiang.³⁶ This was the third step.

Even though Mao lost military force and executive power, he still had the support of the peasants and his followers at the capital who wanted him to be reinstated. The Central Committee needed to defeat Mao overwhelmingly. Rooting out his followers became the "must" step.

Mao's guerrilla warfare and land policy were prevailing ideas among his followers. To open a door to defeat them, in the enlarged SACB meeting in August, 1932, Zhou Enlai criticized Mao's military theory as backwards.³⁷ In 1933, Fujian Provincial Secretary Luo Ming, who agreed with Mao's guerrilla warfare, showed pessimism about the Bolshevik Movement in a letter. With this as an excuse, the Central Committee removed Mao's followers, especially the ones in local government and the military force. This effort was called as Anti-Lou Ming line. The result was that Mao lost his influence not only in the military force entirely, he also lost his influence as a military theorist. Instead of his guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare was used against the KMT armies in its Fourth Encirclement Campaign.³⁸

A Land Investigation Movement aimed at liquidating Mao's land policy so as to defeat his followers among the peasants. Mao's land policy was to destroy the rich peasants and to conserve the mid-level peasants.³⁹ This policy, on the one hand won the support of the mid-level peasants; on the other, it preserved the village economy, thus

enriching the mid-level peasants. According to "The Inquiry in Mukou Village,"⁴⁰ on November 21, 1930, under the land policy, mid-level peasants gained the most. After several years, most of the mid-level peasants became rich peasants. Thus, they became targets.

In January, the Land Department of the CCP issued a notice to confiscate all land from landlords. This was the prologue of the movement. To open a door for the movement, on March 15, 1933, there was an announcement, "The Problems of the Suppression of the Internal anti-Revolutionary," from the Central Executive Committee of CSR.⁴¹ It pointed out that there were anti-revolutionaries within the soviet base. They were the rich peasants and the merchants. Then, in June, Mao published two articles which marked the beginning of investigation into the activities of "counter revolutionaries."⁴² It brought a lot of confusion and struggle within the soviet bases.

This was not the end of Mao's misfortunes. At the end of 1933, there was the Fujian Incident. The Nineteenth Corps of the KMT in Fujian rebelled. Headed by Chen Mingrui, they established the People's Revolutionary Government and asked help from the CCP. For reasons of safety and in order to consolidate the Soviet Government itself, Mao would not agree to aid the People's Revolutionary Government, causing its collapse in July, 1934. Because of this Mao was severely punished by the CCP. He was removed from all positions and was kept under surveillance. This punishment was a hard blow. According to Kung Chu, Mao was sick and went to Yudu to recuperate.⁴³

He was in deep depression. He had nothing now but his wife until the Long March on October 18, 1934, when he emerged again from obscurity.⁴⁴

Because he was suppressed during this period, Mao's thinking staggered in its development. His experience and theory did not have a chance to be fully exercised and tested. Furthermore, he was so busy dealing with all the criticism and with government affairs, that he had no time to develop his own theory thoroughly. Most of his writings were reports, announcements and notices of the government before he had been removed from all offices rather than theoretical ones, and that adds to the difficulty of his refining his ideology.

These articles, however, did indirectly reflect Mao's ideology. The idea of the mass line was developed. To get as much support of the people as possible from different classes meant the enemy classes would be reduced in size. Mao had only talked about defeating the landlord and rich peasant class, because these were the smallest classes. In his early writings, such as "The Problems of Rich Peasants," "Land Policy," and "Land Laws,"⁴⁵ Mao only defined the rich peasant class. There were no definitions for mid-level peasants, poor peasants, idlers and so on, because there was no need. Only the rich peasants were the enemy, all the others were friends, especially the mid-level peasants. The mid-level peasants were the largest in numbers and had more economic power than the other classes. Getting their support added capital to the revolution.

Within the policy of the mass line and to mobilize the masses, emotional methods were used. By emotional method he meant utilizing their own interests to urge them to support the revolution. After the Japanese occupied Manchuria, elements of patriotism and nationalism were added to this method. "Announcement to the KMT's Soldiers about the Occupation of Manchuria by Japanese Imperialists,"⁴⁶ on September 25, 1931, was one of the first articles that used both patriotism and class interest to persuade others to support the CCP and the revolution.

Mao became more and more aware of the importance of patriotism. He saw it as a strong force to defeat both the Japanese Imperialists and the KMT, and win others to his side; therefore it is prominent in his later articles.⁴⁷ Mao even announced that

The Soviet Government and the Red Army are the only political power and military force that resist all imperialists.⁴⁸

Only the Soviet Government and the Red Army really resist the Japanese Imperialists and preside over the national revolution.⁴⁹

In other words, the Soviet Government was patriotic. From that time onwards, Chinese Communists mixed patriotism in their propaganda.

Side by side with the idea of the mass line was the policy of Union of the Home Front. This slogan first appeared in a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in October, 1932. Then, on April 10, 1934, the Central Committee of the CCP raised this slogan. It emphasized the union of all forces except the KMT to fight against the Japanese Imperialists. The difference between the mass line and the Union of the Home Front was that the first one was used within the soviet bases to deal with

internal problems, while the second one was used within the nation to deal with national problems. One was developed as a result of the experience of Mao, the other one was the policy of the Cominform and the CCP. They had a common intent: to unite the less important enemies to fight against the most important enemy. Later Mao combined his idea of mass line with the policy of Union of the Home Front.

The army was still an important element in supporting the revolution. Since Mao lost his influence and power in the military forces, he talked less about mass line in the military. The only point he made was that the Red Army was the means to implement revolutionary duty.⁵⁰ The Red Army was not an independent entity. It was under the control of the party.

The role of the party was always the most important factor in revolution. Its importance would never diminish. As long as the CCP accepted Democratic Centralization, however, there was the danger that the CCP's members and the government would lose the motivation to communicate with the masses and therefore lack input to plan a good policy. Unfortunately, this happened during this period. His two articles, "The Work of Investigation,"⁵¹ in May, 1930 and later "No Right for Speech if You have not Done Investigation and Correct Investigation,"⁵² reflected this problem. Mao emphasized that the CCP members had to make inquiries. These inquiries would provide solutions to problems and information for planning. Once again, these reflected his pragmatism and experimentalism.

Because of Mao's pragmatism and experimentalism, he suggested that the victory of the Chinese revolution was dependent on the understanding of the Chinese situation by all comrades.⁵³ He inclined toward the development of a theory that was suitable for the situation in China rather than to preserve orthodox Marxism. This inclination foretold the development of Maoism.

What was the role of the intellectuals that occupied so important a status within Mao's mind in the past? For the good of the party, the CCP should utilize those intellectuals that were not trained under communism. At the same time, the CCP should train new generations of intellectuals under communism. This new generation of intellectuals would become party members and support the revolution. So in the eyes of Mao, the first type of intellectuals had a temporary status. As soon as the second type of intellectuals had developed well, the first would lose their value. Education was always a useful means to the truth, but in the past it encouraged individual thinking to search for the truth while now it taught only the "truth," Marxism.⁵⁴

In the Jiangxi period, before he had lost all his military forces, Mao had a chance to develop his military theory, especially guerrilla warfare. In "Eight Conditions for Victory," on December 22, 1930,⁵⁵ he emphasized the relationship between warfare and politics. By politics, he meant international politics, national politics and the political works of the soviet government. The condition of politics affected the outcome of the battle. Previously, he had used this idea in a different context. In the "Letter to Comrade Lin Biao," he had related the success of the revolution to the situation of

national and international politics. In "Eight Conditions for Victory," he discussed four new tactics for guerrilla warfare: lure the enemy deep into the soviet base and then eliminate him; prolong the war so that the enemy cannot sustain it; besiege the enemy; and concentrate military force to eliminate individual units of the enemy. Moreover, we can see here the foreshadowing of: "Defy the enemy on the strategic level; pay attention to the enemy on the tactical level."⁵⁶ which later became widely practiced. After the end of the first anti-encirclement effort, his guerrilla warfare was suppressed by the Central Committee.

Mao never thought that he had a chance to be restored to military command and political power. According to one of his guards, he left all the military maps behind at the beginning of the Long March. He only brought some traditional novels with him.⁵⁷ The Long March resulted from the failure to defeat the KMT's fifth encirclement campaign. Unable to hold the Soviet base any longer, the Red Army was forced to escape.⁵⁸ Before the Central Committee officially announced the retreat, preparation for it was already under way.⁵⁹ On October 16, the First Red Army Group began the Long March while Mao moved on October 18.⁶⁰ The strategy of the Long March involved more than just retreat by the First Red Army Group from the Central Soviet. The Central Committee ordered Xu Xiangqian with the Fourth Red Army Group from the west of Sichuan to prepare the way in Sichuan and Shanxi for them. They also ordered Ho Lung and Xiao Ke with the Second Red Army Group and Sixth Red Army Group to restrain the enemy in Hunan and Sichuan.⁶¹

The Long March can be divided into three stages. The first was from Juichin to Zunyi. During this stage, the strategy was defensive; that is retreat was the only objective. Even when they had a chance to win, they would not take it. They avoided any kind of battle. Thus, most of the time they were being pursued, and attacked.

The battle of the Hsiang River on November 30, 1934 was significant because it opened the way for Mao to be reinstated. The enemy had two corps guarding Quanzhou and Xingan in front of the Red Army and three corps guarding Daxian, Guanyang and Xiuwei at the rear of the Red Army, hoping to envelop the Red Army and annihilate them. The enemy had 400,000 troops, which were well trained and with good morale. Moreover, they were well prepared to wait for the Red Army, while the Red Army was exhausted, not good at positional warfare, and was being chased. Now, the Red Army was in a dangerous position. The battle lasted for two days. Although the Red Army successfully crossed the Hsiang River, they had roughly sixty per cent casualties.⁶²

The failure of the Fourth and Fifth anti-encirclement and the heavy casualties of the last battle led to an ill feeling against positional and conventional warfare and its defensive strategy among the troops. In this environment, people began to miss Mao's guerrilla warfare which brought hope of survival. The conference in Liping on December 15, 1934 amended past mistakes and once again Mao's guerrilla warfare was used.⁶³ Immediately, Mao played his role. He sent the Second Corps up to the north to confuse the enemy. The enemy thought that the Red Army was moving directly to

the north, so they concentrated their forces in the north, while the main force of the Red Army moved west to Kweichow which was the weak point of the enemy and where there was less resistance.⁶⁴ A series of victories raised the status of Mao and won the support of the army. When the Red Army arrived at Houchang, they had another conference (at the end of December, 1934) which reflected the popularity of Mao among the Red Army. This surely gave Mao the confidence to fight for military power.⁶⁵

To seize military power again was an urgent task. On January 5, 1935, there was a conference at Zunyi where Mao got a chance to defeat his enemies and seized power. Traditionally, historians believed that after this conference, Mao became Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee (RMC) and the Politburo's Standing Committee, while Zhang Wentian replaced Qin Bangxian as the General Secretary of the CCP.⁶⁶ However, according to Laszlo's research, this was not the case. Zhang only assumed Qin's duties, not his title, while Mao did not become the Chairman of the RMC. He was only one of the members of the three man military committee which was formed in March.⁶⁷ Han argues that Mao only became chairman of the three-man military committee in 1936.⁶⁸

No matter which one is correct, they all indicate that Mao's enemies were defeated. This was the turning point in Mao's reinstatement at the power center, but it was a long time yet before Mao was able to gain absolute authority. This was just the beginning. Officially, he still worked under Wang Ming, the representative of the Comintern, and Zhang Wentian, the deputy of the General Secretary of the CCP.

However, after the Zunyi conference, Mao regained his influence over military force and political decision, and the Long March entered its second stage. Now his guerrilla warfare was fully implemented.

Mao planned for the Red Army to take a circuitous route to the north to confuse the enemy. The enemy would exhaust themselves in chasing around. At the same time, the Red Army would avoid combat with the enemy to preserve its forces. If they got a chance to annihilate the enemy force, however, Mao would favor an attack. Swift action was the basic requirement of Mao's strategy. All unnecessary things, such as documents, typewriters, machinery, tools and so on, were thrown away. Only necessities were carried.

To strengthen the army force, there was enlistment along the road. Everywhere they went, they tried to win over the local peasants and negotiated with local tribes; thus, on the one hand they could avoid much combat, while on the other, they could gain much support.

The Red Army had a long rest in Zunyi because the enemy was lured to the north. After 15 days of rest, the Red Army started the Long March again. Once again Mao fooled the enemy. The Red Army moved north to Tongzi and Songkan. Five corps of enemy troops were concentrated north of Zunyi. Then suddenly the Red Army moved west through Tucheng, Chishui and reached Zhasi. All the enemy troops were chasing the Red Army to Zhasi and the rear force of the enemy was weak.

Mao took the opportunity to annihilate the rear force of the enemy. The Red Army turned quickly to the east and back to Tongzi. At that time, two divisions of the enemy, led by Wang Jialie, separated to attack Tongzi from Zunyi. The Red Army did not wait for the attack. They went south to Zunyi and met the enemy in Loushanguan. The Tenth Brigade and the Thirteenth Brigade of the Red Army attacked the two flanks of the enemy from the highland. While the Twelfth Brigade of the Red Army made a frontal attack, the Eleventh Brigade moved south and occupied Banqiao which prevented the retreat of the enemy back to Zunyi. The two divisions of the enemy were totally defeated.

Another two enemy divisions, led by Wu Qiwei, came to assist Wang's army. Mao did not give the enemy time to reinforce and prepare. While the enemy was still marching, Mao ordered the Red Army to attack Wu's divisions. The two divisions were also defeated. Now, the main force of the enemy still remained in Zhasi while their rear force, all four divisions, were annihilated. The Red Army could move freely with no resistance.⁶⁹ This was the victory of Mao's strategy.

From Zunyi onward, before Wuchichen was reached, Mao used the same tactics to fool the enemy again and again. The Red Army won most of the battles and arrived in Wuchichen on October 19, 1935, in the district of the Shaanxi Soviet.

At Wuchichen, it could be said that the Long March came to an end. Although the First Red Army Group was still facing the enemy and had a number of battles, they had already reached their goal which was to join the Shaanxi Soviet. It took them one

year to march from Juichin to Wuchichen. They went through eight provinces. The First Red Army Group only had seven thousand troops left when they reached the Shaanxi Soviet.⁷⁰

Mao's military theory and strategy occupies a significant place within his ideology. They were developed before and during the Long March when Mao had a chance to practice and examine them. Thus they became well developed.

Mao's military theory was summed up in the three articles: "Why is it that red political power can exist in China?", "The Struggle on Jinggang Mountain," and "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party." He believed that the army was the political means to implement policy, therefore warfare was related to politics. Thus, in his military theory, the first principle was to understand the political situation. The second principle was to consolidate by using the policy of the mass line.

For instance, in the 1920's, the workers' power was weak, the environment of the cities was not yet ripe for revolution and the military force of the enemy was strong. The CCP did not have the ability to occupy and establish political power in the cities. Furthermore, they were not really popular. Meanwhile, the countryside was the weak point of the enemy. As a result, revolution and to set up a soviet government should take part in the countryside, rather than in the cities. Mao called the kind of political structure (i.e., self-governing soviet) he and others established in remote areas on provincial borders a "border polity," often translated also as "border region government."⁷¹ Whenever the enemies were stable and unified, the soviet government

should remain in a defensive position. Conversely, whenever the enemies fought among each other, the soviet governments should expand. This was a transference of Mao's guerrilla warfare tactics to political strategy.

Before and during the Long March, Mao preferred a defensive strategy. At that time, the Red Army was weaker than the enemy. It did not have the ability to attack the enemy, so it was better to be in a defensive position where it could have a chance to grow, both in military and economic power. According to Mao, however, being defensive did not mean standing still and being inactive. When the enemy attacked, the Red Army should not wait for the enemy to come. The Red Army should initiate the attack before the enemy was prepared. Mao was a firm believer in the old maxim that "an offense is the best defense." But to achieve this goal, there must be good preparation.

Long before making war, Mao had already begun the preparation. He educated the masses, trained the local militia and collected detailed information on the enemy.⁷² At the dawn of the war, he collected information on the number of enemy troops, their route and their combination. Then he planned the attack and the retreat. During the war, the Red Army would usually retreat at the beginning to lure the enemy into the communist base. Once the enemy entered their base, they were surrounded by the masses. The enemy was encircled.

Before the encirclement, the enemy was stronger than the Red Army. After the encirclement the Red Army was stronger and had a better position. The enemy would

be attacked on all sides. While the enemy was being encircled, the Red Army would concentrate all its forces to attack the weak point. The weak point was the unit that had fewer troops, lower combatant ability and lower morale. The Red Army used the whole force to face one unit of the enemy army, making itself the stronger one. As the enemy had more troops and modern weapons, it would be unwise to engage them in conventional warfare, so the Red Army used guerrilla warfare and emphasized swift action: that is, swift attacks and swift retreats. Thus, the enemy did not have time to prepare for battle and to reinforce for pursuit. As a result, it was difficult for the enemy to get exact information about the guerrillas. Due to lack of information, the enemy army would only exhaust itself chasing around without engaging the Red Army.

Throughout the period from 1927 to 1935 internal struggle and external fighting occupied most of Mao's time. The rest of the time, he dealt with government affairs. The busy and difficult life of this period did not allow Mao to read much, not even Marxist books. This, however, led him to develop his own theories. These theories stuck strongly in his mind so that when he studied Marxism again, they influenced his absorption and explanation of Marxism.

There were three elements that formed the structure of Democratic Centralism: the ideas of mass line, the role of military force and the role of the party. Within this structure, there were two theories. The first one was the foundation of power. Mao believed power originated from the masses. Within government, the masses elected the committees and the governors, and granted them the power to run the government. The

military force would be under the government acting as a means to exercise power. Within the party, the members elected the committees and granted them power to run party affairs, while the military force also acted as a means to exercise the power.

The second one was the execution of power. As Mao believed that committees were elected by the masses, so the committee was the representative of the masses and would do good for the masses. Since the masses were too ignorant to be able to do good for themselves, the committee should exercise absolute power to achieve good for the masses. Once again the military force would be the means to implement the policy.

Comparing the two theories, contradictions can be seen. Theoretically, the masses were at the top of the power structure and were the origin of the power. In reality, however the masses were at the bottom. They were the ones who exerted the least power.

Mao believed that the party had two functions. The first function was that the party's intellectuals should and were the ones who really grasped the truth. They acted as the spirit and the model for the masses. The second function was that the party should preside over the masses to enable them to understand the truth. The masses provided input to the party, such as support, opinions, and so on, and they acted as an energy reservoir of the party. Then the military force was a means to implement the truth. The truth was Marxism.

The internal power struggle during the Soviet period and period of the Long March diverted Mao into dictatorship. The Zunyi Conference marked the beginning of

Mao's dictatorship. This was going to influence the ideas of Democratic Centralism, the idea of power struggle and his ideology in the following period.

NOTES

1. Snow, Red Star Over China, 166.
2. Sima, Mao, 244, and Laszlo Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism; 1921-1985; A Self-Portrait (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 32.
3. In the Central Committee of the CCP, Qu Qiubai became General Secretary. According to Zhang Guotao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928-1938; Volume Two of the Autobiography of Chang Kuo-tao (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1972), 48, Mao had been accused of being a military adventurer and an escapee. He was dismissed from the Politburo and the General Front Committee. Hereafter cited as The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party.
4. According to Kung Zhu, Wo yu hongjun (The Red Army and I) (Xianggang: South Wind Publishing Co., 1954), 124-125, when he first met Mao in Jinggang Mountain, Mao was in high spirits and fine fettle.
5. According to Andres D. Onate, Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party (Chicago: Melson-Hall, 1979), 138, the establishment of soviet governments was against the policy of the Central Committee.
6. The remaining 1100 troops were comprised of the bandit gang and peasants.
7. Snow, Red Star Over China, 169.
8. There are two main articles that discuss the problems up in Jinggang Mountain. They are Mao Zedong, "Zhongguo di hongse zhengquan weishenmo nenggou cunzai" (Why is it that red political power can exist in China?), CWMTT, vol. 2: 15-23, and Mao Zedong, "Jinggangshan di douzheng," (The Struggle on the Jinggang Mountain) CWMTT, vol. 2: 25-67. The articles were written on October and November of 1928.
9. SCWMTT, vol. 10: 63-68, records the slogans used during this period. Most of these slogans deal with the relationship between the Red Army and the peasants.

10. Sima, Mao, 258. There were eleven Red Corps and nine soviet bases.
11. "Jinggangshan di douzheng," CWMTT, vol.2: 27-28, 30.
12. Ibid., 61-64.
13. Most scholars agree that the date of Mao and Zhu's escape from Jinggang Mountain was December, 1928. Only Wang Jianmin in Zhonggong shigao, vol.2: 678, says that the date was January 17, 1929.
14. "Zai jinji huiyishang di fayan" (A Speech for an Emergency Meeting), SWMTT, vol. 2: 197-198.
15. "Guanyu xiuzheng dongnei di cuowu sixiang" (Correct the Incorrect Ideas within the Party), CWMTT vol. 2: 77-125.
16. "Gei Lin Biao tongzhi di xin" (Letter to Comrade Lin Biao), CWMTT vol. 2: 127-141.
17. As far back as the Spring and Autumn period (B.C. 722 to B.C. 481), many scholars wrote about the importance of winning the support of the masses.
18. During this period, Mao wrote quite a few articles, trying to win the support of the other classes: for example, "Gao shangren ji zhishi fenzi," (Announcement to the Merchants and the Intellectuals) on March 16, 1929, and "Gao quanguo shibing dixiong shu," (National Announcement to all the Soldiers) on 1929. SCWMTT, vol. 10: 65-73.
19. CWMTT, vol.2: 79.
20. Kung Zhu, Wo yu hongjun, 133.
21. Sima, Mao, 261-262.
22. Another name for Front Committee was the Political Committee. At first, the duty of the Front Committee was just to deal with affairs other than military, until in December, 1929, the Central Committee of the CCP issued an order that all military actions needed the approval of the Front Committee; therefore, the Front Committee was given the authority to control the army and military affairs.
23. Sima, Mao, 186. The Red Army organization was as follow: squad (ban), platoon (pai), company (lian), battalion (hing), brigade (lu/tuan), division (shi), corps (jun/lu), army (juntuan) and army group (fangmian jun). The CCP system within the military was as follows: individual members of the CCP in squads and platoons, a cell

of the CCP in companies, a communist front committee in divisions, corps and armies and a general front committee in the army group. Sima, Mao, 242, Tsai Hsiao-chien, Studies on Mao Tse-tung's Military Thoughts and the People's War (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1971), and Shi Chengzhi, Lun Zhonggong di junshi fazhang (The Development of the CCP's Military) (Xianggang: Youlian Press, 1952).

24. In "Qianwei zhi zhongyang di xin" (Letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee), SCWMTT vol. 3: 37-45 April 5, 1929, Mao criticized the Central Committee policy for being wrong, that it was wrong to be pessimistic.

25. "Minwei suzhuang sijun qianwei bing zhuan sansiwu jun zongqianwei," Zhonggong shi-gao vol. 2, 281.

26. Mao did not attend the National Congress of Soviet Area Delegates, May 31 to June 4, 1930, because he refused to go to Shanghai, fearful of being imprisoned by the Central Committee.

27. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 2: 528. According to Wang, there was no A-B League.

28. Zhang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party vol. 2, 168. According to Sima, the elimination movement existed not only in the Jiangxi Soviet, but it also happened in others soviet bases.

29. Ladany, The Communist Party, 35.

30. Sima, Mao, 326, and Stephen Jr. Uhalley, A History of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 44. Li Lisan's main objective was the proletarian revolution in the cities while Mao's was the peasants' revolution in the countryside. From June to September, 1930, Mao received orders to attack cities but all failed. This further confirmed that Mao was right and Li wrong. Furthermore, if he allowed the pro-Li Jiangxi Provincial Committee to exist and issue orders this would devastate the Jiangxi Soviet foundation and Mao's power; therefore, the Jiangxi Provincial Committee became the main target to eliminate.

31. For the Futian Declaration and the letter, see Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 2: 533-537.

32. According to Kung, Wo yu hongjun, Zhu De disliked Mao's policy in the Futian Incident and showed sympathy with the rebellion.

33. According to Mao's article "Ba-ge sheng-li di tiao-jian" (The Eight Conditions for Victory), SCWMTT, vol. 3: 197, on December 22, 1930, he had executed roughly four thousand members of The A-B League. The number four thousand four hundred was taken from Chou, Mao Tse-tung: The Man and the Myth, 96.

34. Wang, Zhonggong shigao vol. 2, 503.

35. Ladany, The Communist Party, 35.

36. "Suweiai zhengfu di zhengquan he zuzhi jueyian" (The resolution of the authority and organization of the Soviet Government), in the Sixth Congress of the CCP in 1928; see Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 2: 349.

37. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.2: 349.

38. Han, Mao Zedong pingchuan, 207. Mao only presided over the first anti-encirclement campaign. The other four were presided over by Zhou Enlai and Xiang Xing. The Fourth Encirclement Campaign took place before the anti-Luo Ming line which shows that Mao's guerrilla warfare was already suppressed before the anti-Luo Ming line.

39. According to Mao's articles "Tudi zhenggang" (Land policy), CWMTT, vol. 2: 177-178 in 1930, "Tudifa" (Land Law), CWMTT, vol. 2: 179-184 August, 1930, "Funong wenti" (The Problems of the Rich Peasants), SCWMTT, vol. 3: 115-134 June, 1930, rich peasants were those who owned lands and had additional foodstuff. Sometimes they employed someone to work for them; at other times, they rented the land out.

40. "Mukoucun tiaocha" CWMTT, vol. 2: 173-175.

41. "Guanyu zhenya neibu fan geming wenti" CWMTT, vol. 3: 203-205.

42. According to Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol. 2: 703, Mao wrote two articles, one on June 14, 1933, titled "Chatian yundong" (Investigation Movement), and the other on June 20, 1933, titled "Chatian yundong diyibu" (The First Step of the Land Investigation Movement). Mao needed to preside over the movement by himself and liquidate his enemies.

43. Kung, Wo yu hongjun, 398.

44. His wife Yang Kaihui was killed; the one who stayed with him in the Jiangxi Soviet and the Long March was his third wife He Zizhen.

45. See note 38.
46. "Wei Riben diguozhuyi qiangzhan Manzhouguo baijun shibing xiongdi shi," CWMTT, vol.3: 13-15.
47. "Linshi zhongyang zhengfu gei Fujiansheng diyici gongnong suweiai dahui di zhizhi" (Guidelines from Provisional Central Government [of Chinese Soviet Republic Government] to the First Soviet Congress of the Fujian Province), CWMTT, vol. 3: 107-113. March, 1932.
48. "Linshi zhongyang zhengfu yu gongnong hongjun geming junshi weiyuan di xuanyan" (A Declaration from the Chinese Soviet Republic Government and the Revolutionary Military Committee), CWMTT, vol. 3: 117. April 15, 1933.
49. "Linshi zhongyang zhengfu guanyu dongyuan duiRi zuanzhan di xunling" (Announcement from the SCR Government: Mobilize the People to Resist the Japanese), CWMTT, vol. 3: 117. April 15, 1932.
50. "Zong Zhengzhibu di renwu he hongjun zhongzhengzhibu yu zhengzhi weiyuan di guanxi" (The Relation among the General Front Committee, the Front Committee of the Red Army and the Political Committees), CWMTT, vol. 2: 253-254. February 17, 1931.
51. "Tiaocha gongzuo," retitled "Fandui benben chuyi," Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Writings of Mao) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1953) vol.1, book 1, 17-28.
52. "Buzuo tiaocha meiyou fayantuan, buzuo zhengque di tiaocha tongyang meiyou fayantuan," CWMTT, vol. 2: 255-257. April 2, 1931.
53. "Tiaocha gongzuo," Mao Zedong xuanji, vol.1, book 1: 24, the Sixth Headline.
54. These points about the intellectuals are from "Guanyu tudi douzhengzhong di yixie wenti di jue ding" (Resolution of Some Problems of the Land Struggle), CWMTT, vol. 4: 43-66, October 10, 1933 and "Jiaoyu wenti" (About the work of Education), CWMTT, vol. 4: 29-33, September 15, 1933.
55. SCWMTT, vol.3: 193-200.
56. Tsai, Studies on Mao's Military Thought and the People's War, 35.
57. Chen Chongfeng, Gensui Maochuxi changzheng (Accompanying Chairman Mao on the Long March) (Xianggang: Xianggang chao-yang Press, 1971).

58. For detailed information, see Dick Wilson, The Long March 1935 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971).

59. Ai Ping, "Diliuge wanshang" (Sixth Night), Zhongguo gongnong hongjun di yifangmianjun changzheng ji (The Long March of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1958), 61, and Wilson, The Long March, 1935, 61.

60. The first army was the vanguard, the third and ninth armies were the center. The thirteenth division was the rearguard. There were six thousand left behind to protect the main force from enemy attack. There were also twenty thousand wounded left behind and sheltered among the peasants.

61. Snow, Red Star Over China, 189, and Zhu Lifu, Cong Jiangxi dao Shaanxi erwan wuzian li changzhengji (From Jiangxi to Shaanxi: The Twenty-five Thousand Li Long March) (Shanghai: Kangzhan Publisher, 1937), 19.

62. Dai Jingyuan, Changzheng huihi (The Long March) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1960), 12-15.

63. Ibid., 25-29.

64. Ibid., 30-34.

65. Sima, Mao, 384-386.

66. Zhang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, vol. 2: 378, and Sima, Mao, 399.

67. Ladany, The Communist Party, 40-41.

68. Han, Mao Zedong pingchuan, 206.

69. Dai, Changzheng huihi, 34-37; Zhu, Cong Jiangxi dao Shaanxi: erwan wuzian li changzhengji, 23-25.

70. Snow, Red Star Over China, 433. This number does not include the other troops joining them during the Long March.

71. "Zhongguo di hongse zhengquan weishenmo nengguo cunzai," was full of this idea and this name.

72. The Nationalist army was formed from the troops of different warlords. "Zhongguo di hongse zhengquan waishenmo nengguo cunzai," CWMTT, 15.

CHAPTER FOUR

MAOISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE AND MARXISM

In October 1935, Mao and the First Red Army Group with only seven thousand troops remaining, finally arrived at the Shaanxi Soviet Base.¹ To consolidate his power, Mao made use of every opportunity to seize the troops of the Shaanxi Soviet and expel their leaders.²

Shaanxi was but a short rest. There was not enough food to support the soviet base because Shaanxi was poor. Once again, at the beginning of 1936, Mao found it necessary to invade neighboring towns.³ The invasion failed, however, and his army fled before the local military force.⁴ Mao and the Red Army wandered between Shaanxi and Gansu to escape. The wandering finally came to an end during the Xian Incident at the end of 1936.

An examination of the Xian Incident, requires a description of the situation at that time. In July, 1935, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, when the resolution for a United Front was passed. Wang Ming, who was in Moscow at that time, announced the "August First Manifesto" on behalf of the CCP and proclaimed the policy of a National United Front. The main theme was to ask for the cooperation of the KMT to fight against the Japanese invaders.⁵

According to Wang Jianmin, in the Autumn of 1935 the KMT representative, Chen Lifu, had already contacted Zhou Enlai in Xiang Gang to discuss cooperation. In May 1936, they contacted each other once again.⁶

During the same period, the CCP also lined up with several other different forces, such as the warlord Yan Xishan, the Gelao Society, Song Ziwen, Cai Yuanpei, and Zhang Xueliang.⁷ Among them, the CCP had the closest relations with the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang.⁸ The CCP was keen on cooperation under cover of the policy of United Front from Moscow so that they could take a badly needed rest from all the running.

On December 12, 1936, Zhang Xueliang seized Chiang Kaishek, who was visiting Xian. Zhang demanded that Chiang abandon the civil war against the CCP and concentrate on fighting the Japanese. The CCP claimed no connection with the Xian Incident. Instead they hoped to act as peacemaker between Zhang and Chiang. According to Wang Jianmin's and Zhang Guotao's research, Mao and Zhou Enlai were the string-pullers of the Xian Incident.⁹ Wang said it more explicitly, saying that Zhang Xueliang planned the incident under the influence of Mao.

Mao was so careful and so clever that Zhang fell into his trap. For example, in the "Letter to Zhang Xueliang" on October 5, 1936, Mao exploited the nationalism of Zhang and the gravity of the situation to mobilize Zhang. Mao had hoped for Zhang indirectly to convey the CCP's opinions to the KMT and to Chiang. Mao never suggested what method Zhang should use; rather, he just persuaded Zhang that he needed

to do something.¹⁰ This letter was written before Chiang visited Xian on October 22. Under this sort of pressure and persuasion, Zhang initiated the Xian Incident.

How can we be sure that Zhang was influenced by Mao? An announcement by Zhang on December 14, 1936 provides a hint.¹¹ The spirit of this announcement was similar to Mao's idea. Even the wording and tone were similar to Mao's. The most significant evidence was the eight points of opinion on such questions as a cease-fire, united front, and freedom of assembly. These were copied directly from Mao's ideas.¹²

The end of the Xian play was also directed by Mao. Following directives from Moscow, Mao instructed Zhou to negotiate with Chiang and the KMT under the policy of United Front. An agreement was reached and Chiang was subsequently released and left Xian on December 25, 1936.¹³ Zhang accompanied Chiang to Nanjing where Zhang was put under house arrest which lasted over fifty years.¹⁴

After the Xian Incident, the CCP moved to Yanan, in January, 1937, and thus began the Yanan period. On the national stage, it was to be called the United Front period. Mao and the CCP finally had a relatively peaceful time to rest and grow.

Because of frequent wandering, Mao had not had time and motivation to develop his theories on Communism. Most of his articles were narrowly focused on particular situations. They were full of passion and sentiment. Only two articles did reflect changes in Mao's ideology. They were "The Strategies of Anti-Japanese Imperialists," and "The Strategies of Chinese Revolutionary War."¹⁵

By the end of this period, strongly stimulated by the Japanese invasion, nationalism was absorbed into Mao's ideology. Thus the spirit of the mass line appeared as the National United Front. The first article mostly discussed this. The aim of the mass line was to achieve socialism and communism while the National United Front was to achieve national independence, freedom and unity. The target of the mass line movement was national capitalists, while the target of the National United Front was Japanese imperialists. The constituents of the mass line were workers, peasants and small capitalists while those of the National United Front also included other classes who were willing to join the national revolution (i.e., the war against the Japanese). These changes provided the backbone to Mao's theory, and ground for Mao to cooperate with the KMT in the near future. The goal of the mass line was to get as many supporters as possible while isolating the prime enemy. However, relations would be based on utilization only according to the situation. Mao knew he was using the relations among classes during the war against Japan. Everything would change when the situation and the advantage changed. Only outsiders did not understand Mao's theory and considered the United Front as the permanent policy. So, when the policy changed, they viewed Mao as opportunistic and utilitarian. Surely Mao was opportunistic and utilitarian.

The second article, "The Strategies of Chinese Revolution War," reflected Mao's learning process and methodology, although this article was actually a summary of the military experiences of Long March. Mao applied his knowledge from those experiences to practical situations. The sequence of Mao's learning process started with

investigation, then analysis, judgment, synthesis, decision and action. Mao followed this sequence to develop his theory.

At the beginning of 1937, both parties prepared for co-operation. On February 10, 1937, the CCP sent a telegram to the KMT requesting cooperation.¹⁶ On February 21, 1937, at the Third Conference of the Central Committee of the KMT, a resolution was passed to allow the CCP to be absorbed into the Nationalist Government.¹⁷ On July 7, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident accelerated the process of cooperation.

On July 15, the CCP announced a cooperation manifesto of the CCP and the KMT, while the KMT announced the manifesto later in September. In January 1938, the Nationalist Government gathered together remnants of the Red Army in southeast China and regrouped them as the New Fourth Army. There were five thousand troops commanded by Ye Ting. The Eighth Red Army Group was also regrouped by the government in February, 1938, and Zhu De was the commander with three divisions.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Shaanxi Soviet was re-organized by the government as the Border Government of the Shan-Gan-Ning Region.

Mao and Chiang had different understandings about cooperation. For Chiang, it meant that the CCP would abandon ideology and independence. They would be absorbed into the Nationalist Government, hence be under government control. Chiang viewed this as the surrender of the CCP. For Mao, the CCP sacrificed only part of its principles to achieve cooperation. The CCP had never surrendered, nor given up its

independence. Even more, Mao believed that the KMT needed the CCP to motivate it toward the anti-Japanese movement¹⁹ and capitalist democracy. Mao said:

The CCP will never abandon the idea of socialism and communism. The CCP needs to go through capitalist democracy before it can reach the stage of socialism and communism.²⁰

Conflicts were unavoidable. These conflicts were most obvious in the attempts at cooperation by the two armies. They often received different guidelines and directions from their high commands. In some cases they even attacked each other.²¹ To avoid more conflicts, on July 16, 1940, the Military Committee of the Government proposed to limit the activities of the Eighteenth Army Group and the New Fourth Army to certain areas.²² Not only did the proposal fail to achieve its purpose; rather, it stirred up greater conflict. The New Fourth Army did not obey the command to cross the Yangtze River to the north. They continued to be active in Jiangsu and Anhui. Thus on January 12, 1941, the Nationalist army eliminated a portion the New Fourth Army and seized the commander Yi Ting.²³

There were also conflicts between the Border Region Government (BRG) and the local government. The BRG at first governed fifteen counties (hsien). Then, the BRG expanded and invaded other counties which created much discontent in the neighboring governments. As a result, the Nationalist army besieged the BRG in 1939 to guard against further expansion.²⁴

Despite the conflict, cooperation did bring some benefits to the CCP and Mao. The CCP in Yanan had a relatively stable base. Only in this period did Mao have time

to read and study again, especially Marxism. Scholars have given different explanations of the study habits of Mao at that time. For example, Mao needed to defeat those who studied Marxism in Moscow and those who claimed themselves as orthodox Marxists. Donald M. Lowe suggests that Mao needed a new theory to support the United Front Policy.²⁵ Eric Chou suggests that there were many scholars who gathered in Yanan and criticized the CCP. Hence Mao needed to overcome them.²⁶ Raymond F. Wylie suggested that Mao needed to defeat the KMT's New Spirit Movement.²⁷ I suggest that he needed to modify Marxism so that Chinese could accept communism and so that the communists could accept Mao as the leader of CCP.²⁸

All these reasons created great pressure on Mao; he studied Marxism diligently.²⁹ He also studied traditional philosophies and books that criticized traditional philosophy in terms of Marxism.³⁰ He organized philosophical talks and invited different members to join in for discussion.³¹ Moreover, he established different kinds of educational institutions to train and control the ideology of the CCP members and the other scholars. Those institutions included the Central Committee's School (1937), the Border Region School (1937), the Anti-Japanese University (1936), Yanan University and the Lu Xun Academy (1938), among others.³² In addition, he gathered together some Marxist scholars, such as Chen Poda, Ai Siqi and Zhang Ruxin, to form a theoretical core group.³³

These measures provided good conditions for Mao to further develop the theory which led to the formulation of Maoism. Meanwhile, these measures, matched with the

propaganda of Mao, influenced the development of political and ideological movements.

The theory first appeared in public as the Sinification of Marxism in 1938. As Wylie suggests, this movement

. . . represented the first serious attempt by the CCP to deal in a popular way with the problem of introducing a complex foreign ideology to the broad masses of China.³⁴

Between 1936 and 1940, Mao wrote many articles. The content of these articles fall into three main categories. The first was about the United Front. The second was about the CCP. The third was about his own theory. They were all written with two motives: first, to condemn the KMT and establish the reputation of the CCP and, second, to attack his enemies and consolidate his authority and power. With these two motives in mind, let us examine his articles.

In articles about the United Front, on the one hand, Mao tried to answer the questions and the suspicions of the outsider. On the other hand, he defended himself against accusations from CCP members of being right wing. Outsiders doubted the sincerity of the CCP inside the United Front. They also questioned the communists on reasons for supporting the Three Principles of the People (Sanmin zhui), the ideology of the KMT.³⁵

The CCP was the follower of the will of the people. During the invasion of the Japanese imperialists, the will of the people was anti-Japanese and pro-solidarity of the nation.³⁶ Therefore the CCP was willing to cooperate with the KMT, other parties and all the classes. The sincerity of the CCP should not be suspected. Meanwhile, Mao

never gave up the chance to accuse the KMT. The KMT had obviously abandoned the will of the people, since they encircled the CCP, cooperated with the Japanese, and suppressed student movements.³⁷

Did communism conflict with the Three Principles of the People? The answer was "no" according to Mao. In two different articles, Mao explained the similarities of the these two ideologies.³⁸ The Three Principles of the People were nationalism, democracy and livelihood. According to Mao, the anti-imperialism of communism was equivalent to nationalism; the people's representative congress of communism was equivalent to democracy; and the land reform of communism was equivalent to livelihood.

If they were similar, why should there be two? This was because of their different nature. The Communist nature was proletarian while the other was capitalist. Because Mao accepted the historical view of Marxism that history developed from feudalism to capitalism and then finally to communism, the Three Principles of the People were necessary before society could change to communism. Thus Mao never gave up the principles of communism, though he gave up some of its policies during the United Front.

This answer was also valid for resisting accusations from the members of CCP. He accused those who did not accept change of being doctrinal and those who questioned the United Front of being closed minded. They belonged to the leftists. Meanwhile,

adventurers, militarists and pessimists were rightists within the party. They all should be eliminated.³⁹

There was a tricky concept developed under the above answer. Since, the CCP was nationalist, whoever was anti-communist would be accused of being a traitor by the CCP.⁴⁰ Whomever was not anti-communist was nationalist. Mao would classify the nationalist as the friend or supporter of the CCP. As a result, Mao came up with an assumption: whether or not you are anti-communist determines whether or not you are nationalist. Clothed with nationalism, the CCP was more willingly supported by the Chinese, who could then identify with it.

What was attractive about the CCP that others should support and identify with it? The second category of Mao's articles answered this question. Mao praised highly the CCP's members. They were aggressive, loyal, humble, disciplined and brave. They were willing to sacrifice, were fair, honest, and prescient. They loved the people and the nation. Therefore, they were loved and supported by the people.⁴¹ Usually in the same articles, Mao would have another type which was the opposite of the CCP's members. They were traitors, adventurers, pro-Japanese people, spies, and so on.⁴² They belonged to the group of the militarists and the great capitalists. This group was usually identified as being the ruling class.⁴³ By this kind of comparison, the CCP's members were elevated. The CCP was formed by these good members and that made the CCP a great party.⁴⁴

Furthermore, the CCP always captured the main issues of an era; therefore, the CCP always stood in the leading position.⁴⁵ During the nineteen thirties and forties, the CCP's main task was to lead the nation to fight against Japanese imperialists and to achieve a capitalistic democratic revolution.⁴⁶ Instead of the capitalists leading the democracy, it was the CCP. Because of the economic weaknesses of the capitalists, they failed to fulfil their function.⁴⁷ Meanwhile the proletariat had developed into a progressive class.⁴⁸ The capitalists could only achieve the democratic revolution with the support of the proletariat which consisted of the peasants and their allies the intellectuals, led by the CCP.⁴⁹

On the one hand, the CCP's members and their supporters were good people. Mao used positive moral terms to describe them. On the other hand, those who did not support the CCP were the enemy, were bad. Mao used negative moral terms to describe them.⁵⁰ Supporting the CCP or not became a moral issue. In traditional China, moral behavior was used to judge a person. When most of the people, especially the intellectuals, believed that supporting the CCP was good moral behavior, then all the others would follow.

Now we come to the third category: Mao's theoretical articles. Some of them are about military issues. Others are about political situations and about communism. Military theories were the most practical because they dealt directly with issues of life and death. Mao believed theories are developed from practice.⁵¹ Practice brought solutions to problems. Hence by understanding his military theories, one can understand

his political theories and, therefore, his communist theories. Three articles, "The Strategies of the Chinese Revolutionary War,"⁵² "A Durable War,"⁵³ and "The Strategies of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,"⁵⁴ are used here to examine Mao's military theory.⁵⁵

The first and the most important theme was the understanding of China. In his articles, Mao talked repeatedly about the situation of China and emphasized that all military decisions made were based on a particular situation.⁵⁶ To understand China, he introduced a method of thinking: that is, to observe, to synthesize, to judge, to decide and to deploy. Practice united all these steps. There were two sides of practice: to learn and to use.⁵⁷

During the process of understanding, thinking and practice, the ability of man in right thinking and right analysis greatly influenced the decision and the outcome.⁵⁸ The spirit and the morale of the people and the army were also decisive factors,⁵⁹ Mao did not clarify what made differences in the thinking ability of man. He also did not explain what made up spirit and morale. There is a hint of idealism.

Under Mao's observation and synthesis, war had a objective rhythm. In the main rhythm, war was the result of the contradiction of classes. War ended when one of the classes dominated. It started again when new contradictions emerged. So the history of mankind swung to and fro between war and peace. The alternation between war and peace was normal. Within war itself, victory and loss was the rhythm.

However, if confrontation was a normal stage, then it would fall into the traditional fatalistic or cyclical Yin-Yang theory. Here, Mao had a breakthrough. He suggested that action be taken first instead of simply following the cycle. Acting first created a better condition to achieve victory and to produce a chance to weaken the enemy.⁶⁰ A change in quantity that was winning more battles, created a better condition for victory. They both stirred up a change in quality of the battles. The goal was to achieve decisive victory. So, he argued, "The life of mankind is composed of three great phases -- a peaceful phase, then a warfare phase and in the end a peaceful phase again."⁶¹ He believed that an everlasting peaceful livelihood of mankind lay in the future. There would be no more confrontation between foe and friend, war and peace.

Mao believed warfare was the extension of political affairs. The aim of warfare was to achieve political goals, therefore he brought his military theory into his political theory.⁶² His political theory was mainly summarized in "On New Democracy." But we cannot ignore the fact that other articles reflect his ideas, too. Combined they form a complete political theory. First, he pointed out that given the special historical and cultural background of China and the special situation of China in that era, a special political doctrine, a new democracy, was needed. The development of a new democracy began with understanding China. New democracy appeared to be the combination of communism and the Three Principles of the People. Its essence was anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, anti-capitalism and land revolution to build a communist society. Why did China take the form of a new democracy and not the "capitalist democracy?" The

Russian revolution in 1917, was an important reason. The Revolution was led by the proletariat and resulted in building a socialist country. Mao assumed that all other revolutions after 1917, including the Chinese Revolution would take the form of the Russian revolution and would be assisted by the Russians.⁶³

Democratic centralism would be the political system of this new democracy. Under this system, everyone would have the right to vote.⁶⁴ Through this right, people would select their representatives to sit in the democratic National Convention. The National Conference would write the constitution under which a democratic National Congress would be established. Under the National Congress, a democratic government would be formed and would centralize all power to carry out democratic policy.⁶⁵

It sounded ideal. But what did it really mean to Mao? For Mao, democracy only meant the right of the people to speak out their opinions.⁶⁶ Although he said that people had the freedom to influence and support government, that was only an ideal.⁶⁷ He never had a detailed blueprint of how democratic centralism should work, how to guarantee that opinion would reach the governors, how to have a fair election, what were the rights to resist government and what were the rights of the people besides the right to vote.

Because the government was elected by the people, Mao assumed that the government would definitely represent the people and definitely respond to the people. Thus he emphasized the entire support of the people and the centralized power of the government. Therefore, he did not have the concept of inspection by the people and the

rights of minority.⁶⁸ As a result, he refused to accept criticism or opposing opinions from the people.

Since the government was perfect, it should own all power. Centralism was the best system. As he suggested, the power of the government would be strong under this system. It could thus best exercise its political and military abilities.⁶⁹ He thought that this system was best suited for the war period and was also good for peaceful times. Here, interestingly, is reflected Mao's belief that his military experience was also useful in peaceful time.

Overall, from "On New Democracy," we know that Mao's understanding of the nature of democracy was different from the West. Thus, his democratic theory was primitive and not well developed. He was limited by his own administrative and military experiences. Besides this, his motivation to write this article was to argue with other ideas.⁷⁰ He was such a practical man and so emphasized experience that his theory was developed under the pressures of his circumstances.

His communist articles were also written under the immediate needs of his times. To resist his enemy, Wang Ming,⁷¹ he wrote "On Contradiction,"⁷² "On Practice,"⁷³ and "On Dialectical Materialism."⁷⁴ Many scholars have offered persuasive suggestions about the motivation, the signification and the special character of these articles.⁷⁵ These articles also made Mao famous in the Marxist field. Here, I will focus on how his own experiences affected his Marxism.

There are two aspects of Mao's Marxism. One aspect originated from his past ideas now dressed up with Marxist terms. The other aspect was theories which might have been absorbed from the reading of Marxist books and from his own Marxist core group.⁷⁶

Theories of practice and contradiction originate from his own ideas. Practice includes the process of production, class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic activities.⁷⁷ From practice, man develops the process of learning. First, from practice man gets impressions from different things. Continued practice strengthens impressions from which, as a result, concepts develop. A concept is the essence of the thing. From concept, a theory will develop. Then by practice, the truth of theory will be tested.⁷⁸ Thus practice is the guideline of truth; meanwhile knowledge that develops from practice is truth.

The origin of practice is production.⁷⁹ Production is the result of a human basic need. By inference, all other kinds of practice are only to fulfill the needs of humans. Therefore truth is to fulfill human needs. The needs of the Chinese at that time were through anti-imperialism to expel and suppress all imperialist powers. Marxism fulfilled the needs of the Chinese; therefore, Mao accepted Marxism as truth. He tested his knowledge by practice. Practice only proved the viability of the theory or knowledge. This kind of knowledge was only part of the truth, not the whole body of the truth. He also mixed up the viable with truth. He also limited truth by basic need. There was a danger of falling into two extremes. Truth changes constantly according to the change

of basic needs. If truth remain unchanged when the basic need was changed, then truth would become doctrinairism.

Closely related with the theory of practice was the theory of contradiction. Practice developed the process of learning; meanwhile, the theory of contradiction was the learning method, or the thinking method. Under the theory of contradiction, everything or every event had two sides. These two sides contradicted each other but also depended on each other to exist.⁸⁰ The development of all things was the resistance from each side against the other.⁸¹ Mao named it the movement of contradiction. To find out the contradiction was the main issue of observation and analysis. When contradiction appeared, it pushed people to think and solve the contradiction.⁸² By solving the contradiction, he meant transferring from one side to the other. For example, landlords would be transferred to landlessness while landless would become landowner.⁸³ Contradiction was a general principle within every thing and every event, but each contradiction was different in content from the other.⁸⁴

There were two shortcomings to this theory. First, if the existence of each side was dependant on the other, and if either disappeared, the existence of the other would have no meaning and it could not survive. Mao also could not explain why A could exist in the contradiction of A and B, and also could exist in the contradiction of A and C. For instance, capitalism contradicts feudalism but it also contradicts the proletariat. Unless A and B are independent of each other, his theory could not hold.⁸⁵

Another shortcoming was the idea of transfer which fell into the traditional cyclical Yin-Yang theory. It was a step backward when compared with the same ideas in his military theory. This dead end could only be solved when A and B were independent of each other. If they were independent, Mao could not explain the "necessity" of their contradiction.

According to the movement of contradiction, everything was always in a process of development. There was no ending. Since the theory of contradiction was the learning method of practice, knowledge was changeable all the time. Because Mao assumed this kind of knowledge was truth, he accepted relative truth.⁸⁶ At the same time, he accepted absolute truth. We must know that Mao understood truth as having two parts. The first part was the thinking method and the analytical procedure. He treated them like a formula.⁸⁷ This part was unchangeable and was the eternal truth. The second part was the content or the resources. This part was changeable. No matter what resources or information you put into the formula, the truth would come out. Truth was the combination of the right formula and resources. Thus Mao accepted both absolute truth and relative truth.

Relative truth acted as a foundation for Mao to explain why Marxism could and should change in different situations. At the same time, he emphasized that he had not changed Marxism in terms of the absolute side. This was why Marxism was useful in Russia; at the same time, it was also useful in China, and even the whole world.

It was a tricky point. Mao accepted the analytical method of Marxism only, not the content of Marxism. However, Mao himself also fell into the trap of this tricky point. He claimed himself as a Marxist without noticing that he himself only accepted part of it, not the whole theory. Thus when Mao talked about Marxism, we must know in what sense he meant it.

Dialectic Materialism was a newly developed theory in Mao's mind. There were seven characteristics within this theory. First, material existed independently. Second, it was always in a process of change or development. Third, it had to exist in space and time. Fourth and fifth were that ideology was the result of the objective material world and it reflected the material world. Sixth, the objective material world was the only source of Truth. Last was practice.⁸⁸

This new theory was the fruit of an old experience. "On Protracted War" is a good example to illustrate this idea clearly.⁸⁹ Japan was a strong imperialist country with limited raw materials. Meanwhile, China was a weak country with abundant natural resources. These were objective facts that no one could change by his own will or mind. However, this situation changed. After a series of offenses, because of the consumption of weapons and ammunition, the strength of Japan began to fail. On the contrary, China was being strengthened because of more consolidation and the higher morale of the nation. The situation developed in this direction because of a special setting. Japan's invasion happened at Japan's strongest moment and at China's weakest. Moreover, this

took place in China which was a vast country and has a large population in comparison with Japan which is a small country and with a small population.

Because of the above objective situation, one could sense that Japan could not win the war while China would not lose. Therefore, the argument of a long war was a reflection of the truth of the objective world in a more systemic and logical way. The conclusion of this argument was that China would win the war at last. Since this argument was based on objective fact and rule, the statement "China would win the war" thus became a truth. To practice this truth, Mao suggested using guerrilla tactics, anti-encirclement strategies, envelopment and so on.

Though "On Protracted War" was a good example to explain dialectic materialism, there was one point in his article that had no relationship with materialism, or even contradicted it. This point was the human factor, or will power. Mao emphasized that will power was decisive in winning or losing the war. The human factor or will power still occupied a significant position in Mao's mind. Though he tried to explain will power by using materialism, it could not cover the fact that it was derived from traditional morals and ideals.

By the end of this period, the CCP in Northwestern China was in its most peaceful time. Mao utilized this time to consolidate his authority within CCP. A series of movements began. In May 1941, Mao urged his fellows in one of his articles to "Remodel Our Learning."⁹⁰ That started the famous rectification movement. There were a few waves within this movement. It first started as an educational movement

which aimed at right education for CCP members. Though this movement was a means for struggling, Mao still believed in changing a man by education. Correct ideas resulted from the right education.

By September, in the enlarged plenary session of the Politburo, Mao accused the past leaders of wrong policies, hoping to push Wang Ming down.⁹¹ After this session, the education movement was transformed into the rectification movement. Xu Quanxing and Wei Shifang suggest that the target of this movement was remodelling the non-proletariat's ideas into Marxism.⁹² In February 1942, Mao appointed Liu Shaoqi to direct the movement.

In March, 1942, Wang Shiwei published a story, "Wild Lily" which reflected the corrupted life of CCP members. At the same time, he also published another article suggesting that there should be no control of literature by politics.⁹³ These articles stirred up the movement. Mao focused more on incorrect ideas among the members. As a result, in April, the party's school was reformed, a learning committee was set up, and twenty-two documents were assigned by the committee, for the students to learn. Moreover, in May, Mao held a Yanan Literature Talk in which he emphasized the control of literature by politics. Later, an inspection committee was set up to inspect the minds of all the members. When Wang Shiwei and four others were accused of being anti-party in September, the movement had become a device to spy within the party instead of merely being a means of discovering the incorrect ideas of members.⁹⁴ By April, 1943, the movement promoted both goals, spying and inspection.⁹⁵ Then, in

June, there was the "honest movement" and in July, there was the "rescue movement."⁹⁶

These series of waves all focused on the mind and the motivations of the individual. Both mind and motivation determined the quality of members. Both incorrect ideas and wrong motivation would lead to bad quality members. But wrong motivation was more serious than incorrect ideas. Incorrect ideas might result from wrong practice and wrong information. They just needed to be corrected. However, motivation represented one's standpoint. If one's standpoint was wrong, then all the rest which followed would be wrong. Then, what was the right standpoint? It was the proletarian one. It did not matter which class one was from, as long as one viewed the world from a proletarian standpoint. Marxism summed up the proletarian standpoints and Mao's theory was the final footnote of it. Thus Mao's status was raised after all these movements.

Then Mao re-wrote the CCP history. As Raymond Wylie suggests, Chinese view history as a way to know the truth.⁹⁷ Therefore, in the content of the re-written history, Mao always stood with right ideas, right lines and right leadership. His history tried to demonstrate that Mao was the truth. In this environment, Mao's status was raised significantly. At the beginning of 1944, nearly every leader of the CCP praised Mao. After a year of consolidation, in June, 1945, in an enlarged plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee, Maoism was broached. In the Seventh Congress of the CCP,

Maoism was settled as the truth. The rectification movement was finally over after the convention.

The rectification movement pointed especially to the mind and to the motivation of the individual. Mind was more important than material in affecting an individual. That idea violated the theory of Marxism that the material influenced the spiritual life. Chinese tradition emphasized the human mind and history. This movement reflected the influence of tradition.

During the Yanan years we can say that Maoism ripened. Ripening has two meanings. The political one is that his ideas triumphed over all the others, especially orthodox Marxism in which his ideas dominated not only the political field, but also the economic and cultural fields as well. He achieved all these by the rectification movement which we have just examined. The ideological meaning is that he successfully persuaded himself and the others to believe that his ideas were the practical explanation of Marxism. But they were not. Instead of Marxism, his ideas were infused with traditional Chinese spirit, ideals, theory and system.

Basically, his ideas were founded on the traditional agricultural culture because he grew up in a village. This kind of agricultural culture resulted in a spirit of practicality and self-sufficiency. Both were in his blood naturally. Using cooking to compare with learning is a good example to illustrate his practical character.⁹⁸ Knowledge of cooking is more useful than knowledge from books until the latter can be practiced. Meanwhile, the spirit of self-sufficiency is seen in his economic policy. For

example, he viewed every unit of the party as a village. Using the economic model of a village, he urged every unit to be self-sufficient in food and other daily necessities.⁹⁹ His ideal economic system, the cooperative system, was quite similar to the traditional ideal "well field system." Moreover, he suggested that the army should engage in farming. This suggestion was derived from the traditional "Tuntin" system.¹⁰⁰ Not only the economic system was adapted from the traditional village's model, even the bureaucracy was adapted from the village's authoritarian system and the spirit of parenthood. On the one hand, he insisted that the leader fully understand and care about his subordinates as a father. On the other hand he emphasized the authority of the leader to govern over his subordinates.¹⁰¹

As Marx suggested, the economic system determined the appearance of the culture. Since the agricultural economy depended upon the cycle of the season, the theory of "yin-yang" was widely accepted. This theory emphasized the harmonious co-existence of two different things. Their co-existence brought a better development. Mao absorbed this theory in explaining the co-existence of everything. For example, he used this theory to illustrate the importance of the co-existence of special and ordinary orders.¹⁰² He even used it to illustrate the development of literature.¹⁰³ He differed from the tradition by using it to explain all other fields rather than using fate. He also believed cycles could be broken.

The theory of Yin-Yang was a means for Mao to figure out the best way, the best direction and the best development. What did he mean by best? Not going to extremes

was the first requirement. Then, finding the 'mean' of everything was the second. As De Bary explains: "The 'mean' suggested the fundamental moral idea of moderation, balance, and suitableness."¹⁰⁴ This was what Mao always tried to search for: moderation, balance and suitableness. But he did not set guidelines for himself of what kind of means he could use to achieve them; therefore he could use different kinds of means, even including violence. As a result, it appeared that his aim and his behavior contradicted with each other.

In an agricultural culture, the highest ideal of society was a Grand Unity and the highest ideal of man was a Saint. "The Age of Grand Unity" in the Book of Rites has been accepted by the Chinese as the best definition of the ideal society.¹⁰⁵ It shows that Chinese desired a harmony and a perfect order among humans and every thing. However, the problem is that we are not told the way to achieve harmony and order. Traditional Chinese believed that if everything sought one direction, one aim, one guideline, and one order, harmony and order could be achieved. Mao believed it, too. Whenever there were other opinions besides the everlasting direction, or aim, or guideline, or order, he considered it disunity. Disunity finally would bring damage to and elimination of the Party. His confidence in harmony and order went to such an extreme that he set a direction for every field, especially in ideology.¹⁰⁶

Another classical source, "The Great Learning,"¹⁰⁷ has long been considered to have the best description of a Saint. A Saint was a man of self-examination, humbleness, and always eager to learn. His attitude toward life would affect not only his family, but

also his society, his nation and even his whole world. Here, traditional Chinese hoped to use morality to govern the political world. Mao strongly demanded self-examination and a constructive criticism of others during the rectification movement.¹⁰⁸ There was no better way to save the other and oneself. Those evil men who did not change were irresponsible and would badly influence the others, the party and the nation and would as a result obstruct the revolution.¹⁰⁹

Mao launched so many movements and developed so many theories, that we might ask, what were these all about? I would like to use Mao's own words to reflect his own motivation. He said, "Classes disunited the society. Upon the elimination of all classes, the society will be united, and there will be true human love," ¹¹⁰ Can't we see that he wished for a Grand Unity?

But becoming the prime ideologist of the Party was only half of Mao's victory. To overthrow the KMT and become leader of the nation was his ultimate goal.

When "A Resolution on Some Problems in History" was passed during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CCP,¹¹¹ the anti-Japanese War was almost over. Praise for Mao was heard throughout the whole party. It was the right time and a good chance for Mao to push forward Communism upon the whole nation. Knowing the desires of the people and the needs of the party, he presented himself as a peacemaker before the people and the KMT. From September to October, 1945 Mao held peace talks with Chiang Kaishek in Zhongqing and became a new star.

On the national political stage after this peace talk, everyone paid attention to Mao and the CCP. For Mao, the peace talk was successful and a great promotion for him and his party. The influence of every word and every movement of Mao was felt throughout Yanan and the liberation area and the whole nation. As a result, the CCP had equal authority with the KMT in the minds of the people.

Mao's goal was not just equal status with the KMT, but overwhelming victory over the KMT's reputation. On the one hand, he accused the KMT of preparing for civil war. He described it in detail so that it seemed real. On the other hand, he launched an anti-American movement.¹¹² Americans became invaders and replaced the Japanese, thus people hated Americans.

Assaulted by all these accusations, the KMT would certainly defend themselves and fight back. Unfortunately for the KMT, however, more and more people believed in the CCP rather than the KMT. The causes for this situation can be summed up as four factors. The first was, as Chalmers Johnson has suggested, the anti-Japanese policy of the CCP was welcomed by the people and they also accepted communism as a consequence. The CCP became an influential power during the war because of its nationalism.¹¹³ The second reason was that people were unfamiliar with the CCP while they were familiar with the KMT. The people knew about the corruption of the KMT. Their unfamiliarity with the CCP added a little purity to the CCP. Moreover, the third reason was that communism gave hope to that generation. When the CCP represented nationalism, purity and hope for that generation, the hostile gestures of the KMT against

the CCP aroused the ill feelings of the people against the KMT and pity for the CCP. This was the fourth reason.

The encirclement of Yanan in 1947 was the turning point for both the CCP and the KMT. People turned to the CCP and abandoned the KMT. At the beginning of 1947, America withdrew its troops from China. Then there was anti-civil war movement by the students. There followed the efforts of the American government to strengthen the Chinese government. In 1948, one by one, the large cities of northern and central China fell into the hands of CCP. People lost confidence in the KMT.¹¹⁴ The Red army won China from the KMT and presented it to Mao. On October, 1949, Mao proclaimed the victory of the CCP and the establishment of a new China. This date also celebrates Mao's victory!

NOTES

1. Uhalley., A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 51.
2. Wang, Zhong-gong shi-gao, vol 3: 117.
3. Ladany, The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 47.
4. Shaanxi was under the control of the warlord Yan Xishan, not the Nationalist Government.
5. Wang Ming, "Bayi xuanyan" in Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 42-45.
6. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 83.
7. SCWMTT, vol.10: 110-120.
8. Zhang, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, vol 2: 451.
9. Zhang, The Rise of the CCP, vol.2: 477, and Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 97.
10. Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji (Selected Correspondence of Mao) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), vol.1: 78-79.
11. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 101.
12. For reference, one could compare the announcement with Mao's and CCP articles, such as "Lun fandui Riben diguochui di celue," (On Strategy Against Japanese Imperialism) Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Writings of Mao) (Hereafter cited as MZDXJ) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1953), vol.1: 147-155 and "Zhonggong zhongyang wei chuangli quanguo gedang gepai di kangRi renmin zhenxian xuanyan" (The Manifesto of the Central Committee of the CCP Establishing the National Anti-Japanese United Front), Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 55-56.

13. At this point, the CCP declared that Chiang had accepted their suggestions. Wang Jianmin states, however, that Chiang had agreed to nothing. I would suggest that they had an oral agreement which later needed official confirmation. I believe that the CCP, however, could not wait to show their achievement and published the news in the Xian Daily July 15, 1937. If there was an oral agreement, this oral agreement had not passed through the KMT, so Chiang and the KMT denied that they had made such an agreement.

14. After fifty-four years under house arrest, Zhang was set free in 1991 to go to New York. He is a ninety year old man now.

15. "Zhongguo geming zhanzheng di zhanlue wenti" CWMTT, vol.5: 83-169.

16. "Zhongguo gongchandang gei Zhongguo guomindang sanzong quanhuo dian" (Chinese Communist Party's Telegram to Kuomintang's Central Committee Plenary Meeting) Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 102-103.

17. "Guanyu genjue chihuo zhi jueyan" (The Execution of Chinese Communist Party's Resolution), Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 103-104.

18. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 115 and Zhang, The Rise of the CCP, vol.2: 532.

19. Mao Zedong, "Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui gei quandang tongzhi shu" (Letter from the Central Executive Committee of the CCP to all members), Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 107-111 (April 15, 1937), and Mao, "Guanyu Zhong Ri wenti ji Sian shibian di tanhua" (Comments on the Sino-Japanese Problem and the Sian Indicant), CWMTT, vol.5: 175-188.

20. "Zhongguo kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian zai muqian jieduan di renwu" (The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan), CWMTT, vol.5: 198.

21. In these conflicts, the CCP accused the KMT of being anti-communist, while the KMT accused the CCP of stirring up the conflict.

22. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 200.

23. Ibid., 210.

24. Ibid., 223.

25. Lowe, The Function of China in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, 113.

26. Chou, Mao Tse-tung: The Man and the Myth, 151-152.
27. Raymond F. Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism: Mao Tse-tung, Chen P'o-ta, and the Search for Chinese Theory, 1935-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), 101.
28. Mao was a wealthy peasant's son. According to Marxism, only a proletarian could be the true leader.
29. Xu Quanxing and Wei Shifeng, Yanan shiqi di Mao Zedong shixue sixiang (Mao's Ideology at Yanan) (Gansu: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe: 1983), 16; Xin, Zhong, "Maozhuxi dushu shenghuo jishi" (History of Chairman Mao's Study Life Style), Shihui kexue zhanxian (Social and Science Journal), vol.10 (1981): 1-15; Vsevolod Holubnychy, "Mao Zedong di weiwu bianzhengfa" (Mao's Dialectic Materialism), trans. Min Zhi, Mingpao yuehkan (Mingpao Magazine), Jan 1968: 40-46.
30. Mao, Zedong, "Gei Chen Boda di xin" (Letter to Chen Boda), (on Feb. 1, 1939) "Gei Zhang Wentian di xin" (Letter to Zhang Wentian), (on Feb. 20, 22, 1939) Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, 140-152.
31. Xu and Wei, Yanan Mao sixiang, 17.
32. Wang, Zhonggong shigao, vol.3: 278-282.
33. Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism, 47.
34. Ibid., 98.
35. The Three Principles of the People are nationalism (minzu), democracy (minquan) and livelihood (minsheng).
36. The people might ask for anti-Japanese actions but might not ask for the cooperation of the parties. Here, Mao used the will of people as an excuse to support the role of the CCP in the United Front.
37. "Guanyu Zhong Ri wenti ji Sian shibian di tanhua," CWMTT, vol.5: 175-188, "Wei zhengqu qianbaiwan qunzhong jinru kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian er douzheng" (Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front), CWMTT, vol.5: 207-218, and "Guo gong liangdang tongyi zhanxian chengli hou Zhongguo geming di pojie renmu" (Urgent Tasks Following the Establishment of Kuomintang-Communist Co-operation), CWMTT, vol.5: 261-274.

38. "Guo gong liangdang tongyi zhanxian chengli hou Zhongguo geming di poqie renmu," and "Yu Yanan xinZhonghuapao jizhe tanhua" (Interview with a New China Daily Correspondent on the New International Situation), CWMTT, vol.5: 305-321.
39. "Zhongguo gongchandang zai minzu zhanzhengzhong di diwei" (The Role of the CCP in the Nationalist War), CWMTT, vol.6: 241-264.
40. "Xin minzhuzhuyi lun," (On New Democracy), CWMTT, vol.7: 147-206.
41. "Wei zhengqu qianbaiwan qunzhong jinru kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian er douzheng," CWMTT, vol.5: 202, and "Zhongguo gongchandang cai minzu zhanzhengzhong di diwei," CWMTT, vol.6: 242-249.
42. "Zhongguo gongchandang cai minzu zhanzhengzhong di diwei," CWMTT, vol.6: 246.
43. "Zhongguo geming he Zhongguo gongchandang" (The Chinese revolution and the CCP), CWMTT, vol.7: 117.
44. "Wei zhengqu qianbaiwan qunzhong jinru kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian er douzheng" (Win the Masses in Their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front), CWMTT, vol.5: 214.
45. "Shijianlun" (On Practice), MZDXJ, vol.1: 285.
46. "Xin minzhu zhuyilun," CWMTT, vol.7: 160, and "Banzhengfa weiwulun" (On Dialectical Materialism), CWMTT, vol.6: 274.
47. "Wei zhengqu qianbaiwan qunzhong jinru kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian er douzheng," CWMTT, vol.5: 201 and "Xin minzhu zhuyilun," CWMTT, vol.7: 161.
48. "Banzhengfa weiwulun," CWMTT, vol.7: 272, and "Zhongguo geming he Zhongguo gongchandang," CWMTT, vol.7: 126.
49. "Wusi yundong" (May Fourth Movement), CWMTT, vol.6: 321. The allies of the proletariat were the peasants and intellectuals.
50. The terms used to describe the enemy were suppressor, waverer, pro-Japanese and so on. These terms in Chinese had negative and immoral meaning.
51. "Shijianlun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 273.
52. "Zhongguo geming zhanzheng di zhanlue wenti," CWMTT, vol.5: 83-168.

53. "Lun chijiuzhan," CWMTT, vol.6: 49-145.
54. "KanRi youjizhan di zhanlue wenti," CWMTT, vol.6: 7-47.
55. There are other military articles, but my comments are based on these three as central.
56. In "Zhongguo geming zhanzheng di zhanlue weinti," one heading is, "The characteristics of China's revolutionary war" and the sub-headings include "The importance of this issue," and "What are the characteristics of China's revolutionary war?" In "Lun chijiuzhan," there is a heading, "The foundation of the issue" and one of the sub-headings is "China's side."
57. "Zhongguo geming zhanzheng di zhanlue wenti," CWMTT, vol.5: 93-98.
58. Ibid.
59. "Lun chijiuzhan," CWMTT, vol.6: 137-141.
60. Ibid., 109-21.
61. "Zhongguo geming zhanzheng di zhanlue wenti," CWMTT, vol.5: 88. The second peaceful phase is a new phase that is different from the one before.
62. "KanRi youjizhan di zhanlue wenti," CWMTT, vol.6: 9, and "Lun chijiuzhan," CWMTT, vol.6: 99-101.
63. "Xin minzhu zhuyilun," CWMTT, vol.7: 154-156.
64. Ibid., 166, and "Yu Yingguo jizhe Beitelan zhi tanhua" (A Talk with the British Journalist James Bertrum), CWMTT, vol.5: 301.
65. "Wei zhengqu qianbaiwan qunzhong jinru kangRi minzu tongyi zhanxian er douzheng," CWMTT, vol.5: 195.
66. "Zhongguo gongchandang zai minzu zhanzhengzhong di diwei," CWMTT, vol.6: 254.
67. "Yu Yingguo jizhe Beitelan zhi tanhua," CWMTT, vol.5: 298.
68. Mao always considered the minority to be the enemy. It was a negative term to him. It was not a democratic meaning of minority.
69. "Yu Yingguo jizhe Beitelan zhi tanhua," CWMTT, vol. 5: 299.

70. When we look at the headings of "Xin minzhuzhuyi lun," we understand his motivation.

71. Shuang Shan, Studies on Mao Zedong Thought (Hong Kong: Sincere Publishers, 1972), 80, 197, and Chi Wenshun, Ideological Conflicts in Modern China: Democracy and Authoritarianism (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 232.

72. "Mao-dun-lun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 287-326.

73. "Shijianlun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 271-286.

74. "Banzhengfa weiwlun," CWMTT, vol.6: 265-305.

75. Chou, in Mao Tse-tung, the Man and the Myth, 134, suggests Mao used his own experience to explain Marxism; therefore he became the one and only Marxist professional. The significance of these articles, as Ladany in his book The Communist Party of China and Marxism, 82, suggests that this was the beginning of the assimilation of Marxism into Chinese culture. According to Donald Lowe in The Function of China in Marx, Lenin, and Mao, 128, Mao's theory was changeable according to different situations.

76. Wylie, in The Emergence of Maoism, has detailed research about Mao's relation with the Marxist core group and the formation of Maoism.

77. "Shijianlun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 271-272.

78. Ibid., 274-275.

79. Ibid., 271.

80. "Mao-dun-lun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 293 & 316.

81. Ibid., 295.

82. Ibid., 294.

83. Ibid., 310-7.

84. Ibid., 298-308.

85. Kuang Zhiren, "Ping Mao Zedong shijianlun yu maodunlun" (Critique of Mao's "On Practice," and "On Contradiction"), Mingpao yuehkan, no.130 (October 1976): 17-24, has a detailed analysis of "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," and points out the shortcoming of Mao's theory.

86. "Shijianlun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 284.
87. "Maodunlun," MZDXJ, vol.1: 310.
88. "Banzhengfa weiwulun," CWMTT, vol.6: 28 et.seq.
89. "Lun chijiuzhan," CWMTT, vol.6: 49-144.
90. "Gaizao womin di xuexi," CWMTT, vol.7: 315-24.

91. Wylie in The Emergence of Maoism, 166, writes that Wang Ming and all the others were pushed down. Meanwhile Chen Yungfa in his book, Yanan's Shadow (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1990), 10, said that Wang Ming had not been pushed down. I prefer Chen's suggestion because of Mao's continued efforts. If Wang Ming and the others were down, Mao had no need to promote different kinds of movements.

92. Xu, Yanan Mao sixiang, 190-192.

93. Chen, Yanan's Shadow, 39.

94. Ibid., 55.

95. Ibid., 70.

96. Ibid., 81.

97. Wylie, The Emergence of Maoism, 226.

98. "Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng wenfeng" (Rectification of the spirit of learning, the spirit of the party and the spirit of the culture), CWMTT, vol. 8: 70.

99. "Jingji wenti yu caizheng wenti" (Economic and financial problems in the Anti-Japanese War), CWMTT, vol.8: 183-354; "Zuzhi qilai" (Get Organized), CWMTT, vol. 9: 85-94; "Quanjun shengchan zigui jinnian yingshi pubian tuixing di yinian" (On production by the army for its own support and on the importance of the great movements for rectification and for production), CWMTT, vol.9: 277-283.

100. "Zuzhi qilai," CWMTT, vol.9: 85-88; "Jingji wenti yu caizheng wenti," CWMTT, vol.8: 186.

101. "Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu lingdao fangfai di jueding" (The resolution of the method of leadership from the Central Committee of the CCP), CWMTT, vol.9: 25-31.

102. Ibid., 29.
103. "Zai Yanan wenyi zuotanhuishang di jianghua" (The Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art), CWMTT, vol.8: 111-148.
104. De Bary, et al, eds. Sources of Chinese Tradition, 117.
105. Ibid., 175-6
106. "Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng wenfeng," CWMTT vol.8, 63-85.
107. De Bary et al, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 155-6.
108. "Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng wenfeng," CWMTT vol.8, 67-68.
109. "Fai-dui dang-bai-guo" (Against the Party Conservative), CWMTT, vol.8: 101-102.
110. "Zai Yanan wenyi zuotanhuishang di jianghua," CWMTT vol.8, 140.
111. "Guanyu ruogan lishi wenti di jueyi," Zhong-gong shi-guo vol.3, 150-60.
112. Wang, Zhonggong shiguo, vol.3, 669-70.
113. Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and the Communist Party (California: Stanford University, 1967), 10, 19.
114. Wang, Zhonggong shiguo vol.3, 709.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TRUE FACE OF MAOISM

Mao's ideology was developed from the combination of his own experience, traditional culture and, after 1935, Marxism. By 1945, his ideology was well formulated.

Mao believed that universal truth was already inside the mind of everyone. It only awaits for someone to explore it. Of course, this responsibility fell on the shoulders of the Communists. Meanwhile among the Communists, Mao was the one who had achieved the truth. So he stood at the center of the truth and led the party. No one had the same authority and power as Mao; therefore he became the only one whom everyone should follow. In return he educated those who followed him. To educate the mass was a huge process, therefore Mao needed a group of people to help him; that was the CCP. The CCP was a way to implement Mao's ideology. The CCP was the channel which would lead the masses to the truth; i.e., Mao's ideology. The CCP was a peaceful means to practice truth.

The main difference in Mao's thought between 1918 and 1945 was the status of the masses. In 1918, Mao emphasized the leadership only, while in 1945 Mao also focused on the force of the masses as a kind of leadership.

The function of the Red Army was to protect those who were practicing the truth and their achievement. In addition, the Red Army was a revolutionary means to practice the truth.

Marxism filled the universe. Marxism was the only truth in the universe. Therefore, when one understood Marxism, one could understand the universe.

Is there any difference between the beliefs of Mao in 1918 and in 1945? Yes, there is. The view of humans was essentially different. Before 1918, Mao believed the essence of all men was the same and they were good. The environment and education, however, prevented men from exploring their essence. This was why the society needed Saints. Saints were those who had a better chance to explore their own essences; therefore, they could help others through education to explore their own essences. Thus, all men can become Saints. At this stage, he viewed the leadership of the Saints as a kind of help and enlightenment. Human beings were all equal.

After 1918, this point of view changed. The essences of human beings were no longer the same. There were good and bad, high and low. Human beings were not equal. Those who were good and high become the leaders while those who were bad and low would be led. Because the essence could not change, men fell into different levels or classes and were limited within them. Among those who were good, there were good, better and best. The best would be outstanding among all classes. Thus all should be under the domination and leadership of the best. So, only the best had the power, the authority and the mind. All others became the means to implement the best.

There was another theory developed by Mao at the same time which contradicted the above. This theory claims that men could be changed by rectification. This was different from Mao's education theory in 1918. In 1918, he believed that education could **explore** a man's essence. With this theory, he believed rectification could **transform** a man's essence. According to Marxism, a man who was born and raised up in a capitalist family belongs to the capitalist class. Meanwhile, Mao believed that through rectification, one's mind and essence could be transformed into a proletarian no matter what his background. However, he did not define clearly when a man would be transformed. It depended entirely on Mao's own judgement.

Although these two theories contradicted each other, they were both used by Mao in different situations to justify and consolidate his power and authority. For example, when he was facing his two prime enemies, Japanese Imperialists and Chiang Kaishek, Mao emphasized their unchangeable bad essences. Meanwhile, those who were unimportant enemies, he accepted and absorbed to his side. He also used these two theories during the party's struggles. On the one hand, he emphasized transformation, so that he, who came from a wealthy peasant family, could establish a theoretical foundation for himself to become the leader of a proletarian party. On the other hand, he used the un-changeable theory to consolidate his unique status so that no one could replace him.

What is the relationship, then between Mao's ideology and the traditional culture? We are not going to discuss the entire traditional culture here. We will only concern

ourselves with that which affected Mao. Historical records, documents and books occupied a significant position in his ideological development. So did neo-Confucianist articles. Through these two channels he absorbed traditional culture.

All traditional Chinese historians had the same goal when they recorded history. By reviewing the past, one should foresee the future and react in the right way. For instance, an empire should review the histories of past dynasties. By doing so, errors of the past could be avoided, good examples could be followed. Everyone should be able to find his own role model in history. As a result, history becomes the last judgement of a man and an issue. So, Chinese respect history and hold it in esteem. During the rectification movement, Mao was keen about rewriting the CCP history. He believed that CCP history would influence his consolidation in the future. Therefore, if the resolution of a few historic problems was made, his leadership status would be consolidated. In the same way, when Mao criticized the KMT, he emphasized the comparison of the past history of both parties. He also used the past history of peasants' rebellions to achieve a legal status for Marxism and the CCP in Chinese society.

Doing the right thing within your position and having the correct relationship among different statuses are in the spirit of traditional Chinese values. Chinese historians seldom talk about the legal way to change the social status, especially during the period of the downfall of the old and the rise of a new dynasty. "When you succeed, you become an empire. When you fail, you are a rebel," as the saying goes. This is the general guideline for changing social status. There is a large blank area for anyone to

use different methods to achieve the goal. The historian would call you a savior when you have successfully achieved the goal.

As a result, Chinese history trains two kinds of people. The more conservative type emphasized loyalty to their own social status and position. Their aim was the greatest achievement within their status. The more aggressive type emphasized changes of their own social status and the society. The typical example was Mao himself. Mao's emphasis on himself as a savior, might classify him as a traditional rebel rather than a revolutionary.

Not only did Chinese history train Mao to become a rebel, it also trained him to become a skillful strategist. His strategies were excellent. The struggle and competition within and outside the party gave him a chance to show his strategic ability.

Contemporary articles by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao introduced the concept of change to Mao. However, such modern Confucianists were still limited by traditions. They found support within Confucianism for changes. Although they promoted changes within the political and social system, and imitated the Western system, these were only superficial changes. Within the core of the change, there was no democratic or scientific spirit. They still emphasized the good deeds and good leadership of the governor.¹

Mao absorbed the idea of change and he also tried to find support for Marxism in it. Even though on a theoretical level, he used Marxism to support his ideas, it was only a cover. I believe in his heart Mao believed that the good deeds and the leadership of a governor was most important. This is straight-forward Confucan teaching.

These ideas influenced his policy making in later years. From policy and system changes, his emphasis shifted towards the change of a man's spirit and nature. The changes began with the CCP's members and the cadres, then ordinary people and even the surrendered enemy. He sought an ongoing improvement of human spirit and nature through education, re-education and rectification.

As long as Mao was influenced by traditional culture, he could not avoid accepting the by-product of this culture, which is the ego of traditional scholars. The spirit of "Great Learning" (Daxue) was self-education and self-improvement. As a result, Chinese scholars believe one can find the truth alone without the help of others. This idea encouraged egoism. Criticism, repulsion and partyism were the common practice of Chinese scholars. These shaped the development of dictatorship. The dictatorship of the emperors was the highest manifestation of egoism. An examination of Mao's attitude toward his opponent shows that he strongly maintained the practice of traditional scholars. In later years, when he achieved power, he acted more like a traditional emperor, using a different kind of political means to execute his opponents. His egoism expanded following the expansion of his power.

Because of traditional egoism, he believed truth was inside his heart and fate was controlled by his hand. He was ambitious but stubborn. He started from the worst situation and achieved the most in the end. Yet the same egoism brought him to dictatorship. He accepted no other opinion, no other policy and no other truth. He was the truth and there were no mistakes inside him. Any criticism of Mao was considered

slander. As a result, most Chinese followed Mao uncritically, even when he was mistaken.

We cannot neglect the impact of Marxism on Mao. At the beginning, Mao learnt Marxism through others. Li Dazhao acted as a channel, and led Mao to know Marxism. This was only the beginning. Reading Class Struggle, History of Socialism and A Manifesto of the Communist Party was a turning point for Mao. They reasoned out the situation that Mao's faced. Li and these three books turned the attention of Mao from traditional culture to Marxism. In between his first and the second visits to Beijing, Mao struggled with the contradictions between traditional and Western cultures. Now, he broke through this struggle to focus on Marxism.

Although we do not know exactly what others Marxist books he read, through his articles we can detect the influence of Marxism was still limited before he went to Jinggang Mountain. Because he had opened a bookstore, it is reasonable to believe that Mao would be in touch with a lot of communist and socialist books and magazines since the bookstore emphasized the promotion of Marxism and communism. But Marxism still occupied a small proportion of Mao's ideology. Reading through his articles between 1918 and 1926, we note that Mao's idea of communism was based on primitive Chinese village communal life-style and the idea of Grand Unity.

His practical character pushed him to take action rather than to do research. As a result, between 1918 and 1926, he was busy carrying out all the plans of the CCP rather than carefully studying Marxism and communism. What Mao learned about

Marxism and communism was only some fundamental statements rather than the core of the theory.

Unfortunately, the following eight years from 1927 to 1935, the chance to study Marxism and communism was totally lost. The competition and struggle among those students who had studied in Soviet Union and their ignorance and errors in both political and military decisions acted as a negative influence on Mao in his study of Marxism in later years.

What he learnt during 1927 to 1935 were the means for struggle, especially military ones. The traditional military theory was primitive dialectical materialism. Based on his limited learning of Marxism and communism, it was easy for Mao to identify this primitive dialectical materialism and his own experience as the sum and substance of Marxism and communism. The strong and assertive language in his articles shows that he did not question his experience and knowledge.

Leadership in ideology is a determining factors in any power struggle, Mao could not accept those more orthodox Marxists he met in Yanan during 1938 to 1945. Although he had a chance to get in touch with an abundance of Marxist materials, he no longer had an open mind to study objectively. Struggle inside the CCP did not allow him to do research objectively, either. He selected those materials that supported what he believed and put away the others.

This kind of learning only led him to see part of Marxism and communism. A limited understanding of Marxism and Communism, traditional ideology and past

experience were the tripod supporting his own ideology, "Maoism." In Marxist clothing Maosim appeared to the world as Marxism. But it was not the true face of Maoism since we know there were two other legs which formed major parts of Maoism.

Mao's ideology was a shrewd and thoughtful blending of traditional Chinese values with Marxism in such a way that most Chinese could accept it because it allowed them to change without changing, to find the new in the old, to face the future without abandoning the past.

NOTES

1. See, for example, De Bary, et al., eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 33.

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