1994

Wittgenstein : the nature of philosophy

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.sv2v-uanf>
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Wittgenstein: The nature of philosophy

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San Jose State University, 1994

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WITTGENSTEIN: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Clyde Lee Davis

May, 1994

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ABSTRACT

WITTGENSTEIN: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

by Clyde Lee Davis

This thesis explicates Ludwig Wittgenstein's non-traditional conception of the nature of philosophy. It also offers a limited criticism of his doctrine which holds that any description of human mental features must be excluded from philosophy.

The nature of philosophy is not a topic that is located in discrete sections of Wittgenstein's works so the explication depends upon contrasts to establish a boundary between what philosophy is and what it is not for Wittgenstein. Traditional philosophy as exemplified by Immanuel Kant's ideas on the nature of philosophy and Wittgenstein's own comments on psychology and science work to separate out and clarify the boundary and, thus, Wittgenstein's conception of the methods and purpose philosophy.

The criticism of Wittgenstein's limitation to philosophy, his exclusion from philosophy of mental features as a basis for epistemology, is through John Searle, a like-minded, current philosopher who employs Wittgenstein's philosophical methods of dissolution.

List of Abbreviations

BB	<u>The Blue and Brown Books</u>
CJ	<u>The Critique of Judgement</u>
BT	<u>A Brief History of Time, From the Big Bang to Black Holes</u>
I	<u>Insight and Illusion, Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein</u>
MB	<u>Minds, Brains, and Science</u>
OC	<u>On Certainty</u>
P	<u>The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters</u>
PI	<u>Philosophical Investigations</u>
R	<u>Relativity, The Special and the General Theory, A Popular Exposition by Albert Einstein</u>
WC	<u>Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy</u>

Wittgenstein: The Nature of Philosophy

this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction. - The philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.

The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made...so that if you looked at them you could get a picture of the landscape. This book is really only an album. (PI p. v)

What, exactly, is the general topography which is suggested by the "sketches of landscapes" in the "album" of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations? What overall "picture of the landscape" do we construct from these various scenes which are composed "criss-cross" into a kind of visual (conceptual) latticework? What is it that in another philosopher we should understand the nature of philosophy? Well, the overall picture of the landscape is language cured of confusions by various "therapies" so that we can get a "clear view."

[W]e now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. - Problems are solved (difficulties are eliminated), not a *single* problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (PI S133)

[In the example of philosophy applied to the 'language' of mathematics:] It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of mathematics that troubles us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved...

The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow

the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). (PI S125)

Then what is it that we see in our clear view? We see a healthy language at work instead of merely idling.

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language.

Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstanding in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work. (PI S132)

But what is the work which the engine of language is supposed to be doing? If language is not used to construct philosophical theories then what is its relation to philosophy?

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question. (PI S133)

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it.

For it cannot give it any foundation either.

It leaves everything as it is.

It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it. [Mathematical refinements to logic do not also refine philosophy.] (PI S124)

The answer is that philosophy cleans up language so that we can work free from "confusions," from the pollutions and

diseases which seem to inhere in our natural language and, as we shall see, inhere in our psychology, in how we are inclined to use language. Philosophy allows us to see "distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook." The purpose of philosophy, then, is to maintain, through various therapies, an efficient engine of language, and the nature of philosophy consists in how it accomplishes this.

Most people trained in traditional philosophy rise up aggressively against the position that philosophy offers no body of knowledge, no philosophical theory or doctrine. Many traditional philosophers believe that philosophy discovers the principles which both found and guide all of our intellectual disciplines. For example, traditional philosophers might hold that the science of psychology is grounded on those fundamental principles of mind which make all experience possible in the first place. In this case philosophy might describe universal functions of the mind and their inter-relations (similar to Kant's categories perhaps) and, thus, guide physiological psychologists in their search for those physical brain structures and operations which correlate to specific, non-physical functions of the mind.

An important problem with the traditional philosopher's opposition to Wittgenstein's position that philosophy offers

no body of knowledge is that one may reject Wittgenstein's work generally. After all, if his position on the nature of philosophy is erroneous then of what value can his philosophizing be? Yet, Wittgenstein's investigations are profoundly and undeniably valuable. As we shall see, he attacks and successfully dissolves questions or parts of questions which traditional philosophers still labor to solve. The important challenge to traditional philosophy, then, is this. Does Wittgenstein, in his successes against philosophical questions, end by dissolving philosophy itself as a body of knowledge?

The answer to that question is that he does not dissolve philosophy as knowledge. My thesis is that although Wittgenstein achieves excellent philosophical work through his investigations, through his dissolutions, his conception of the nature of philosophy itself is, however, erroneously limited. Principles established by philosophy, based on *a priori* considerations, and not upon the empirical observations of science do indeed serve to found and guide the advancements of natural science, not the other way round as Wittgenstein would have it, where philosophy is merely janitor to science, dissolving and carting away the ills of a confused natural language.

To establish these claims both for and against Wittgenstein is not easy. To begin with, he is difficult to

understand.

Because of the novel nature of his philosophy and the aphoristic and cryptic style of his writings, Wittgenstein's work lends itself readily to all sorts of interpretations and misinterpretations. (WC 97)

With Wittgenstein it is not simply a matter of turning to the correct page in order to read what he says about the nature of philosophy. His idea meanders throughout the topography of the various topics under consideration in his Philosophical Investigations. As a mechanism to approach his conception of the nature of philosophy I will explore a boundary between the topic of philosophy on the one hand and the topic of psychology on the other. Wittgenstein often discusses what philosophy is not but rarely says much that is positive about what philosophy is. Thus, if we focus on a contrast between his remarks about the topic of psychology and those about philosophy then, at least, a boundary between the two will emerge. This boundary will be Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy. In the Investigations psychology is considered as a science and is treated under the related subtopic of *private language*.

Because the topics of psychology and private language comprise one of the "landscapes" in the overall "album" of Wittgenstein's topography, we may expect it to be one of his dissolutions and, thus, to exemplify his methodology through therapies appropriate to the topic. "There is not a philosophical method, though there are methods, like

different therapies" (PI S133). Of primary interest for this paper, the therapies Wittgenstein employs under the topic of psychology establish criteria for what he considers as qualifying and disqualifying for knowledge. Thus, I will argue that it is here that Wittgenstein gives short shrift to philosophy. His position is that if the science of physiological psychology cannot yet explain or model mental functions then philosophy has no interest in, nor contribution to make to, anything which traditional philosophy terms philosophy of the mind. This cancels the possibility of *a priori*, metaphysical principles of mind. So, if there is no body of knowledge, outside of natural science, concerning knowledge itself then little or nothing is left for which philosophy can be a body of knowledge. Wittgenstein's philosophy deals with linguistic problems and is not concerned with anything undiscovered. "It leaves everything as it is" (PI S124). "One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions" (PI S126). "If one tried to advance a *thesis* in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them" (PI S128). (The practice of philosophy upon a topic advances clarity for Wittgenstein, everyone agrees to something made clear).

This is our departure point for the criticism of

Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy. A most appropriate argument against Wittgenstein's restriction against philosophy as a body of knowledge is John Searle's precise and accessible essay "The Mind-Body Problem." Like Wittgenstein's investigations, Searle's piece is also a dissolution. The traditional mind-brain problem (What is the relation between mind and brain; how do the mindless particles and electro-chemical reactions of the brain produce our mind?) is not solved by Searle but dissolved. The problem vanishes so that a solution is not required. Searle establishes what can be termed a non-dualistic brain. Mind rises out of the physical machinations of the brain. For Searle mind is not an entity or a "substance" separate from the brain. Rather, mind is that account or description of the brain's operations on a level above electro-chemical reactions among neurons. Mind is a level of description of the brain according to its effects much like "wetness" is a level of description of water molecules according to their interactions. No one would call a single H₂O molecule wet. This cracks open the door for philosophical speculation as to the non-mystical yet metaphysical constituents of mind. The product of such philosophical speculation would be the brain's higher effects, mind considered under principles. It is just these constituents (as opposed to something like George Berkeley's "mental substance") described under

philosophically established principles that would guide natural science in its search for the brain mechanics or the natural causes which correlate to mental functions.

These introductory remarks serve as an overview of the claims and problems we shall be dealing with in detail.

I claim that Wittgenstein's limiting of philosophy, as a janitorial functionary to science and as no body of knowledge, is erroneously severe. In opposition to Wittgenstein's limitations, I want to say further that philosophy guides science by establishing the fundamental, non-empirical, metaphysics of mind which then invite scientific explanation as to natural causes.

The first problem in this criticism of Wittgenstein is not to misunderstand him. Understanding Wittgenstein takes a good deal of work because his style of writing makes it difficult for the reader to gather a topic and the author's general position together in his mind. Especially difficult to appreciate are the successes of Wittgenstein's therapies since they proceed in anti-traditional directions. So, a secondary claim is that Wittgenstein's janitorial philosophy is important and valuable. The main problem, however, is to argue for a reversal of Wittgenstein's position. A description of the nature of philosophy does indeed include philosophy as a body of knowledge together with its methodologies, not merely as methodologies alone.

What follows, then, will begin with an appreciation of Wittgenstein's work under the example or topic of psychology, specifically under the subtopic of private language. One goal is to establish a boundary so that Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy begins to emerge. Another is to see how the topic exemplifies Wittgenstein's philosophical attack on confusions in the language, i.e. to see a few of his therapies, how he goes about gaining a clear view. At the same time we travel through private language toward psychology generally, which then takes us to science generally and, in contrast to science, to Wittgenstein's subordinate position for philosophy. First, however, if we are to talk about Wittgenstein's therapies upon the problem of a private language, we should first gain some idea of what he means by language and by therapy generally. Finally, we can take a look at John Searle's essay in order to see why Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy should be expanded.

Looking at language from one of its fundamental elements, with the first sentence of The Blue Book Wittgenstein asks, "What is the meaning of a word?" One answer is that there is no essential meaning for a word. There is no the meaning.

K. T. Fann explains that Wittgenstein is arguing

against

the 'correspondence theory of meaning', the essence of which is this: the individual words in a language name objects, the object for which a word stands is its meaning.¹ The greater part of the *Investigations* is directed against this conception of language...[Note] 1It follows from this theory that one group of words (such as 'apple', 'chair', and 'red') name objects in the external world while another group of words (such as 'pain', 'pleasure', and 'belief') name objects in the 'internal' world. The problem of universals and the 'private language' problem are directly related to these two aspects of the correspondence theory of meaning. Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism and the private language can only be seen in the right light as the two-fronted attack on this particular conception. (WC 63)

A correspondence theory of meaning assumes that we can point to an object which is the meaning of the word in question, words have ostensive definitions. Wittgenstein argues that not all the words in our language are defined or even taught ostensively. Consider the order for five red apples. We know of apples from ostensive learning and we may define them by pointing, but how do we know red? Yes, things which may be pointed to are red but they are also apples, cherries, or noses. So we come to understand that red is a quality that some things have in common. Yet, no things have "five" in common, groups of things do. In the first stages of our life we also may come to understand and memorize this commonality from someone's pointing. Coming to understand red and five, however, result from something more than pointing. They result from more complicated training, for how else do we come to distinguish red apples

from five apples if those five apples are red? Meaning in the cases of red, five, this, there, now, and later, involves training in an overall social context. "Now" and "later" especially do not signify things. Instead, they signify use. We do not learn their meanings from someone pointing but by acting along with others and we demonstrate our understanding of them to others by our actions. In the case of these words, the test of understanding is not pointing out correctly but behaving correctly. As examples, take the activities of counting out the correct number things and of arriving for appointments on time. Groups of words gain their meanings in different ways, by different rules. They do different jobs. In Wittgenstein's terminology, they are different language-games (WC 63-67).

It is within the context of correspondence theory type thinking that the philosophical problems which Wittgenstein seeks to dissolve can arise. Questions come up like "What is the meaning of a word?", "What is time?", "What is knowledge?", or "What is beauty?" Such questions

produce in us a mental cramp. We feel that we can't point to anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something. (We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.) (BB 1)

The phrase 'the meaning of a word' exercises a certain spell which results in the idea that there must be a thing (either an object or a quality) corresponding to each noun and adjective, that this thing is the meaning of the word, and is named by it as an individual is

named by a proper name. (Compare 'the meaning of a word' with 'the colour of a flower'). To break this spell Wittgenstein first suggested that instead of asking "What's the meaning?" we should ask 'What's the explanation of the meaning?' This replacement brings the question down to earth and helps to cure us of the temptation to look for some object which we might call 'the meaning'... (WC 68)

In Plato's dialogue the Theaetetus Socrates struggles with the question "What is knowledge?" With young Theaetetus' help, he concludes that knowledge "is neither sense perception nor true opinion, nor true opinion with a rational explanation" (P 845). Wittgenstein's point is that Socrates and Theaetetus should expect to find no essential object or quality that is knowledge. Now, it might be objected, "Of course not, knowledge is no object. Rather, knowledge is something like mental ability, knowing how to do something." This, however, reduces to the true opinion in the dialogue which Socrates sees he must give up. Even if one is able to teach another how to do something (true opinion with an explanation), knowledge reduces to something like knowledge of a thing (skill in constructing a cart for example), not knowledge itself. What Socrates is after is in fact a kind of object, knowledge itself.

Wittgenstein's advice to consider the explanation instead of the meaning would indeed have profited Socrates' inquiry. If he had asked "How does knowledge actually function in the world?" then Socrates might have come up with knowledge as something like a process and, thus, saved

himself and his student Theaetetus much mind-cramping labor (though we should still want to have Plato's dialogue).

It seems that neither Plato nor Socrates was ignorant of the possibility that knowledge is a process, albeit a process unlike one consistent with Wittgenstein's recommendation. Socrates suggests then rejects a definition of knowledge as a process.

Theaetetus: Whereas, if...? The supposition you made just now implied that you would state some alternative. What was it?

Socrates: If the direction to add an 'account' means that we are to get to *know* the differentness, as opposed to merely having a notion of it, this most admirable of all definitions of knowledge will be a pretty business, because 'getting to know' means acquiring knowledge, doesn't it? Theaetetus: Yes.

Socrates: So, apparently, to the question, 'What is knowledge?' our definition will reply, 'Correct belief with knowledge of a differentness', for, according to it, 'adding an account' will come to that. (P 918)

Socrates' suggestion may be seen as getting to know differentnesses, as a process of acquisition which builds upon and modifies old knowledge. For the traditional philosopher there may yet be something essential about the nature of knowledge in that, though at any moment in a person's life knowledge is incomplete and though complete knowledge is not a possibility for a person, knowledge, if it is to be defined, may be defined as a building process. Socrates rejects this circular definition since knowledge of is used to define knowledge itself. The situation might be salvaged if we drop the idea of knowledge itself (an object)

in favor of knowledge as a process of transition, which is never an object except only in name. Still, we will see that Wittgenstein would reject all this as psychological and outside the province of philosophy. His interest in knowledge is as behaviour testable in a social context, as an explanation, a description of how knowledge actually works in the world. Notably, it is by explanation and description that we teach knowledge.

In an example from Philosophical Investigations, the distinction between asking for the meaning and asking for the explanation is simple and clear.

You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.) (PI S120)

Yes, you can point to both money, currency, and a cow as objects. Both can be employed ostensively. When you ask "What is money?" in a search for its essence, however, it is as if you were looking at a few bills in your hand and trying to get at their meaning, at some form beyond their physical phenomenon. If you ask for an explanation of money, however, and some one answers with remarks about a myriad of financial institutions then you get an idea about the uses of money that are not a thing separate from currency but directly tied up with it.

Here again there are several language-games involved

with the use of money. One employs money to trade for other objects. One trades in money alone: trading money at interest. One also manages the money of a business or of a nation. The games are similar and they are different. They have similar and different rules.

What emerges from all these considerations is an instrumentalist (or pragmatic) conception of language. 'Language is as instrument. Its concepts are instruments' (P.I. S569). It is like a working machine which gets jobs done - namely everyday activities of life. (WC 71)

The social nature of language is as important to Wittgenstein as its pragmatic value. Words and sentences function in a variety of language-games just as chess pieces function in a game of chess. Both are rule governed. Language is an activity governed by specific rules (WC 72-73).

we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties.
The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?" (PI S130)

We recall from the pragmatic nature of language that Wittgenstein is interested in the explanation of the meaning of a word where an "explanation of the meaning" comes down to a description of a word's overall social uses. Also, we saw that, within language, groups of words are used and taught in different ways according to different language-games with different sets of rules, but what does rule-following in language amount to? Why is the social nature

of rule following important?

Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? - This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule".
(PI S199)

By "grammar of the expression 'to obey a rule '"

Wittgenstein means that the previous question is to begin a logical analysis of the concept of following or obeying a rule.

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. - To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, institutions).

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. (PI S199)

Rules

presuppose a society, a form of life.

To understand rules it is necessary to understand the whole institution of 'following rules'. If the background of custom is removed, the rules embedded in this custom would also disappear. Wittgenstein shows this by the following example: 'What has the expression of a rule - say a sign-post - got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is there here? - Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way....But that is only to give a causal connexion; to how it has come about that we now go by the sign-post' not what this going-by-the sign really consists in. On the contrary;...a person goes by a sign-post only so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom'... (WC 74)

There are other characteristic elements, all still social, in following a rule. If we follow a rule then, logically, we can make a mistake. A deviation from a rule

is more than a deviation from a regularity. To deviate from a regularity is to do something merely unusual but to deviate from a rule is to be open to criticism, to be at fault. This implies that in following a rule we agree to "go on in the same way," we agree to follow convention according to the rule. "Correctness," then, is going by the rule. Rules must be teachable, there must be enough regularity between the speech and actions of others for us to learn the language (WC 73-77).

In chess we have one set of rules while with language Wittgenstein talks about several language-games. In this paper I want to contrast philosophy and psychology. We can see that Wittgenstein will consider the two disciplines as different language-games. Within language generally how are different language-games related?

Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all, - but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language". (PI S65)

Again, Wittgenstein uses the game analogy.

Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: there *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games' - but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious

relationships. Now pass to care-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group. but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family. (PI S66-67)

Thus, philosophy and psychology are just different games in our language. They share differences and similarities. Between them there is no common thread, they overlap in places within our language just as fibers overlap in a thread, with no fiber running the entire length of the thread (WC 80). However, Wittgenstein does draw a firm and important boundary between philosophy and language, between philosophy and psychology.

It is very important to keep in mind that Wittgenstein did not have a 'philosophy' of language. G.E. Moore, reporting on Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33, emphasized that although Wittgenstein discussed certain very general questions about language at great length,

he said 'more than once, that he did not discuss these questions because he thought that language was the subject-matter of philosophy. He did not think so. He discussed it only because he thought that particular philosophical errors or "troubles in our thought" were due to false analogies suggested by our actual use of expressions; and he emphasized that it was only necessary for him to discuss those points about language which...have led, or are likely to lead, to definite philosophical puzzles or errors.' (WC 80-81)

"[P]hilosophical puzzles or errors" are problems in the language which we need to clear away by applying the remedies of philosophy and if there is no common thread running through language-games or, more to the point, through even the elements of a single language-game then there will be no philosophy of... anything. Instead, philosophy in the forms of logical analysis, comparison, contrast, the pointing out of similarities and dissimilarities, etc. is brought up against the "puzzles and errors" that have worked themselves into our usages. Therapeutically, the tools of philosophy clear away linguistic entanglements so that we get our "clear view" and may operate with a healthy language.

'We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order'...In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein established an order in our knowledge of the use of language, - i.e. the pragmatic or instrumentalist conception of language, with a particular end in view - that of solving, or rather, *dissolving* philosophical problems...Wittgenstein advises us to look at the ordinary uses of language as a machine doing work. We may say that the general criteria by which the later Wittgenstein judges [traditional] philosophical utterances to be nonsense is the pragmatic criterion of

meaning. This is shown by submitting philosophical statements to questions such as: 'What use can we make of that statement?' 'What practical consequences is it supposed to have?' 'Under what circumstances, to achieve what, would you say that?' and so on.
(WC 84-85)

A few examples should bring into focus an understanding of just what are the kinds of problems in our language which obstruct our view, just what kinds of things are nonsensical "philosophical utterances" which require dissolving, and how the questions at the end of this quotation help to bring the organ of our language back to health.

To begin with, accustomed usages in spoken and written language tend to blur and to confuse our thinking.

'We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike'...This is a very important point which Wittgenstein wants to remind us of over and over again in the *Investigations*. He distinguishes the 'surface-grammar' from the 'depth-grammar' in the use of words. The 'surface-grammar' is 'What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word..., the part of its use-one might say - that can be taken in by the ear'...The 'depth-grammar', then, is the *application* of the words...Compare the propositions: 'I have a beautiful hat' and 'I have a terrible tooth ache'. The similarity in their surface-grammar is obvious but their uses are quite different...The difference in their depth-grammar may be brought out by comparing, e.g. 'Is this my hat?' and 'Is this my toothache?' - (nonsense). ["nonsense" because it has no use, enjoys no application in our language, our grammar] (WC 89)

Now, beyond these considerations of language and therapy generally, in this paper I am particularly interested in Wittgenstein's position as to the "philosophical puzzles and errors" of metaphysics.

Specifically, will his dissolution of metaphysical problems lead to the consequence that philosophy of mind is also dissolved? Well, we can be sure that Wittgenstein would think so since, as we saw, for him there is no philosophy of... anything! For Wittgenstein philosophy is a collection of janitorial tools and techniques, and the janitor is a successful and important craftsperson. Let's glance at the language-game of metaphysics of mind and at a general example of a cleanup or therapy.

'The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual investigation'...Compare:

- (1) Only one person can play patience.
- (2) Only one person can sit on a bench six inches wide.
- (3) Only one person can feel my pain.

The 'surface-grammar' is quite alike, but their 'depth-grammar' is utterly different. (2) states a physical impossibility and (1) states a 'grammatical' impossibility - it makes no sense to speak of playing patience with another person. (3) has an experiential form; - a philosopher who says this may well think that he is expressing a kind of scientific truth. However, can we imagine its opposite? What would it be like for someone else to feel my pain? When we say 'One cannot feel another's pain', the idea of an insurmountable physical barrier suggests itself to us, while the impossibility is really logical. - It states a grammatical rule governing the use of the word 'pain', much in the same way that (1) states a grammatical rule...

What Wittgenstein does when he meets the word 'can' in a metaphysical proposition is to show 'that this proposition hides a grammatical rule. That is to say, we destroy the outward similarity between a metaphysical proposition and an experiential one'... (WC 91-92)

From language and therapy and metaphysics generally, I want to move to a solid understanding of Wittgenstein's

conception of the relationship or boundary between mind and philosophy. It will be seen that the study of mind, or psychology as Wittgenstein terms it, falls to the province of a science of the brain, and that philosophy is retained as a janitorial or cleanup functionary. Thus, for Wittgenstein a metaphysics of mind is not something for philosophical speculation. Instead of metaphysics, a study of the mind would fall under a supremely subtle science of the brain not yet perfected. Finally, with Wittgenstein's relationship between science of the brain and philosophy fairly understood, I will try to show that, contrary to his doctrine, science owes more to philosophy than mere housekeeping. I want to show that science owes philosophy a debt of bringing to light those functions of mind, those metaphysical principles, which determine just which natural causes science is to pursue. For example, if philosophy determines that our experience of the world is possible only through the mental constructs of space and time, or even something simpler such as color, science, then, may want to search out those systems of neurons in our brain dedicated to space, time, and color. As the first link in this complicated chain we shall consider Wittgenstein's specific topic of private language.

Wittgenstein easily imagines that a person can talk to himself, either silently or aloud, and, if aloud, that we

could interpret his language through his actions.
Consistencies between what he says and what he does would
lead to correct predictions, to our understanding him.

But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? -- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (PI S243)

He continues by elucidating the above ideas of referring, private sensations, and identity. He also offers an explication of his method of analysis as it is used on an example within the topic. The overall idea is to demonstrate that it makes no sense to speak of one's ideas as either objects of knowledge or as the proper referents of one's words. In the case of objects of knowledge, one cannot be said to know nor is one ignorant of one's thoughts. Instead, thoughts are experienced and then compared. They are not known or perceived. Knowing and perceiving are analogies mistakenly imported from language-games different from the language-game of thinking. In the case of proper referents, there is, in the existing science of psychology, no adequate access to those brain functions which are the causes of discrete thoughts. Philosophy does not speculate upon empirical causes, thus, it makes no sense to speak of our ideas as referents at all.

Pain is an example of private sensation. Let's contrast the private sensation of pain with its public expression. Our first natural expression of pain is crying. As we grow older we substitute a word, "pain," for the crying. Neither crying nor the word pain describes or explains the private sensation. Instead, each is merely a public expression of the private sensation or "image" (PI S300) which we call pain. Both expressions are a form of pain-behavior, what we do when we refer others to the private experience of pain. The meaning of the word pain, which is taught to us by others and is not something we experience privately, is its use in referring to the private sensation.

In what sense are sensations private? People say, "'Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it'" (PI S245).

This is wrong because others often do know if you are in pain. Further, they often know if you are simulating the pain. You could argue: "Still, others don't really know if I am in pain; they might misunderstand me as simulating." We answer that you confuse the word games. The concept to misunderstand simulating is different from the concept that only I can know. In the case of severe pain, it is clear that others can know one's pain (PI S246-250).

To say, "Only I can know that I am in pain," is

nonsense in our grammar because if you can know something then surely you can either doubt it or be ignorant of it whereas doubt or ignorance about the private sensation of pain makes no sense. In contrast, it does make sense to say that others can doubt or be ignorant of my pain (PI S246).

To say that only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it reduces to: I am in pain. The important contrast is not that I know something and you do not. Rather, the important contrast is whether I am in pain or am not in pain. If I am then I may show or express it. The question is not one of epistemology but one of experience and its communication to others. There is no point in repeating: "I have a private sensation and you do not have my private sensation, only I can have my private sensation," etc. Keep your privates to yourself. Say instead: "I am in pain."

We glimpse the method of analysis Wittgenstein uses in this section. If he smells something fishy in a proposition then he considers an opposing formulation, statements about private sensations being private for example. Consider another example: every yard or every mile has a length and every body has extension. Analyze using Wittgenstein's method: No yard or mile has length. That is nonsense, a kind of redundancy. A yard or mile is some standard of length, neither has a length. In the case that every body

has extension the redundancy sounds like, gives the impression grammatically of, a metaphysical statement. Analyze again by asking whether a body can be produced that has no extension? No, if there is a body in the first place then it is extended. There is no instance of an explanation of body that excludes the idea of extension. Concerning a body, extension is not something that is added. To such redundancies as these we are inclined to say: "But of course!" Of course there is extension. Since such statements are wrong and nonsensical, it would be better to say simply: "Nonsense!" (PI S251-252).

The idea of identity is important because we want to know what it means to say my pain or sensation. "Another person can't have my pains." Let's analyze. Does it ever make any sense to say that another person can have my pain? Yes it does, but barely. Lets see if we can discover a use for the statement that another can have my pain - "Siamese twins, for instance." There could be pain at the twin's juncture which could be felt in the same way by both persons. Otherwise, there is not much application of identity in this sense. In the instance of everyday objects, identity in the sense of similarity does not seem to apply to sensation: "This one is exactly the same as that one." In another sense: "But surely another person can't have THIS pain!" We are back to redundancy. Yes, the pain

is private. If, pressing further, you distinguish your pain as located particularly there, in that location on your body, then what sense would it make to say, using the test of opposition, that another person could feel your pain in some other particular place on your body? (PI 253).

We said that others can know you have pain; that they can also know when you are simulating it. We learn about another's sensations from the experience of our own sensations and from our expression of them, all coupled with our noticing the expression or behavior of others in similar circumstances. We learn of pain within a social context. But there is a possibility of identity in this which Wittgenstein wants to deny. If I know that someone who has just torn a fingernail is in pain, am I surmising that I know it because I have experienced equal degree or quantity of pain myself? Lets analyze with the test of opposition: "I have not experienced equal degree and quantity of pain." Now, how would you measure any part of this nonsense?! Looking upon a person badly wounded, I might cringe and say to myself, "I have never experienced such pain as he is in," but whenever would you want to say, "His pain is exactly equivalent to what I felt on January twelfth, two years ago!" Wittgenstein's example of time on the Sun is better. We know why it is 5 o'clock in San Jose, it has something to do with the rotation of the Earth in relation to the Sun.

We also know that it can make sense to say that it is 5 o'clock on the sun when it is 5 o'clock here, but what would be the application (use) of San Jose time to any spot on the Sun? (PI 350).

The conclusion to the concept of identity in this topic of private language is that there is no application beyond: sensations are private.

We are now ready to consider how private language works, how we would name things, how we would define words, and how we would use a private language? Then, finally, Wittgenstein draws some general conclusions about the topic.

What if someone has a sensation but has no name for it? Can he name it? Yes, he could call it "S." That name will certainly be private because no one else will find it intelligible. But will the namer himself find it intelligible; in what sense? The act of naming usually includes normal grammar. We usually look for the "right" name, which means the name that others show us that best fits what we sometimes can only haltingly describe. They show us a word with a use and a grammar appropriate to our description. Naming, thus, normally presupposes a grammar. The private S, in contrast, has no grammar. It merely has an association in one person's mind (PI S256-257).

Next, it will be impossible to formulate a definition of S since it is the first word in X's private language. An

ostensive-like definition may seem possible, however. X can inwardly point to his sensation by the act of concentrating on it when it occurs and then associate it with S. A difficulty is that, as the years roll on, the association could become confused or even mistaken (assuming for discussion's sake some possibility of an objective check of either deterioration or deviation toward another meaning). S could end by gradually referring to a different sensation. There is, however, no objective check, no outside criterion of correctness (PI S258,S293). Now, since no objective criterion applies to private definition, deterioration of or deviation from the original definition may occur for X in the very next association rather than, say, years down the line. Error may not require a long decay. Regardless, since there is no objective test for error, be it soon or late, it makes no sense to talk about error in private definition because neither X nor his friends are aware of his mis-association if it occurs. X's seeming ostensive-like pointing to S is no pointing at all since there is nothing objectively stable at which to point.

Disregarding the problem of gradual change, what if X says that he knows alright what he means by S, that there is no error? What does that mean to us? The it to which he refers could be a something or it could be a nothing, it could be "an empty till." We simply do not know. In our

language game it cancels out. An elucidating contrast is that S is neither red nor pain. We can talk about red and pain and we can talk about the possibility of X's particular experience ("image") of red or X's particular experience of pain thanks to our grammar. But if all we have is S referring to X's private thing, again, we don't know whether X even has a thing (PI S293-294). The rest of us certainly have red and pain. Neither of those is private.

In what sense can X use S privately? He can concentrate on the association once or many times but where, even privately, is the use here and what is the purpose? Can he develop an inner technique for using the word or must he depend on a public technique or a modification of a public technique? X could, for instance, construct translation tables in his mind and translate one of his private languages to another. Again, there is no check for him to know whether his translation is correct or not, or whether it continues to deteriorate. All his languages may shrink as memory falters (PI S262,S265). Or, again, his meanings may change.

Wittgenstein's remarks about practical consequences comprise a general conclusion to the topic of private language. If what X refers to by S cancels out in everyone else's language game and if whatever X does with S privately is suspect since there is no verification for correctness

then the practical consequences of S, even for X himself, are going to be minimal. Wittgenstein compares a private definition to one hand making a gift to the other. The exchange is possible, in a sense, but is the gift possible under these criteria? It is not. Similarly, giving oneself a private definition of a sensation by inwardly pointing to it, by concentrating on it, will not have any practical consequences (PI S268). No definition is actually given in this case. Again, one is merely making an association.

Compare the case of private language to the following things which have decided uses and practical consequences.

there are certain criteria in a man's behavior for the fact that he does not understand a word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the word right. (PI S269)

Together these combine to undermine the idea of a private language when considered under the test of opposites. In the first case, "that he can do nothing with it," X can say and write S as if it means something to him but if he says it to the rest of the world it will mean nothing so that it has no application. In the second case, thinking that he understands but doesn't, he may well think he understands an "empty till" or he may misunderstand a word in public language, still, however, thinking it correct. Lastly, we have public use or communication, something inapplicable to

a private language and something the private linguist will avoid if he would maintain privacy (PI S269).

Private language is, therefore, inconsequential. Thus, naming objects, defining words, and otherwise using language privately all amount to nothing of philosophical consequence.

Also, we cannot refer to private sensations as words refer to behavior or objects. Words may refer to pain behavior for example but the pain behavior, in turn, only points to an experience or image which is private and is, thus, only showable and has no explanation. Private sensations are characterized by the fact that you cannot know whether this is what another experiences. Thus, the privacy of sensations comes down to either you have a sensation or you do not, no epistemological distinction between individuals is relevant. Lastly, it does make sense to talk about my pain but the usual "philosophical" distinctions of identity dissolve so that all that remains is: sensations are private. Nothing is added by "knowing" sensations, by distinguishing between the sensations of particular individuals, or by comparing degree and quantity of sensations among different people.

We as it were turned a knob which looked as if it could be used to turn on some part of the machine; but it was a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism at all. (PI S270)

Here, in the topic of private language, the main idea

to pull from Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the "boundary" between psychology and philosophy is that what the reader might see as ontological denials are instead misinterpretations. Wittgenstein is not saying that mental processes, or meanings which I cannot express, or actual sensations, or private images - he is not saying that these things are nonexistent or that they are only meaningful in language as behavior. What he is saying is that they are of no practical consequence in philosophy, they drop out as unimportant. This gives the reader a healthy perspective which allows for less confusion.

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?--The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them - we think...So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looms as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't deny them. (PI S308)

We are pragmatically ignorant of psychology so we must deny its processes philosophical importance. These processes have been material for traditional philosophy and they have been explored in the dark. Thus, we make statements concerning things we know nothing about, things we should "pass over in silence."

A few remarks concerning inclination will help us understand our propensity to exceed our knowledge when we do philosophy.

If you look at the sky and exclaim privately because of the gorgeous color there is no thought in you concerning philosophical questions about personal sensations. You point at the sky, not at a state of consciousness.

you have not the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private language'. (PI S275)

When we do point into ourselves, however, especially in the case of an intense sensation such as pain, we are inclined to say that whatever accompanies the cry of pain is that which is really important (PI S296). We feel that, yes, but it has no philosophical use (PI S297).

Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of a pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of a pot? (PI S297)

The trouble we get into is that we allow this inclination to force us into "an assumption, or [into thinking that we are] having an immediate perception or knowledge of a state of affairs" (PI S299).

Concerning inclination, the boundary between philosophy and psychology is important here:

The image of pain is not a picture and *this* image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture. - The image of pain certainly enters into the language in a sense; only not as a picture. (PI S300)

By "image" Wittgenstein means sensation and by "picture" something in our language which may only refer to an image

such as a word, a sentence, or a collection of mathematical symbols for example. Pictures convey public meanings, their explanations and descriptions. Wittgenstein's point is that there is no explanation for the private image of pain in the sense that images are not conveyable because there is no customary use nor grammar in our language for conveying private images. There is, however, talk about private images, and this is the sense in which "the image of pain certainly enters into the language." This acknowledges real pain in the subject which Wittgenstein restricts, however, as only showable. Here the psychological status of sensation, of an image, is affirmed. What is denied is that we can philosophize about the state of pain, exactly what our inclination sometimes forces us to mistakenly do. When we say the word red we can think of a distinction: a public use of the word and our private sensation, or image. No one experiences another's sensations so what is important philosophically is not my experience but the fact that we cannot know whether others have mine or something else.

(Another reason why I cannot know that only I feel *my* pain.) When we talk about the private sensation or the image of red we cannot grasp the function (meaning, explanation) of our term "red" so we are more comfortable in saying that red "refers to" our image rather than "means" our image since we have seen that meaning as use is nonsense in private

language. "Refers to" "is the more psychologically apt expression for a particular experience in doing philosophy" (PI S272-274). The context, here, of the word refer is one of psychology, not philosophy. We "refer" ourselves to a private image or we talk to others about having a private image which we cannot know "whether other people have *this* or something else." "Refer" in this context has no philosophical consequence, it is used as a psychological term when we do philosophy.

The boundary of psychology here, then, has two important elements which distinguish psychology from philosophy: our ignorance about psychology and our "philosophical" inclinations. We know so little of psychology that we must deny its mental processes philosophical importance. (Instead of "philosophical importance," "philosophical consideration" might be a better term if by consideration, as in "considering the opposite formulation," we mean manipulation of our perspective, for a clear view, of things already known.) Secondly, our inclination drives us to make mistaken assumptions about things (sensations or images for example) which we take for perceptions and knowledge.

Wittgenstein's defense against certain condemnations of his philosophy now seem readily acceptable.

"'But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is

no pain, for example, without *pain-behaviour*?' (PI 281). Only people and other things which react to sensations, which exhibit behavior, can be said to have pain. Can things which do not behave or react be said to have pain? Is it our body or soul that has the pain? Analyze again. Does it make sense to say that neither has pain? That, instead, an inanimate object has pain? Of course it hasn't, nonsense! Or, rather, it is just: Nonsense! It comes down to expression or behavior being our only philosophical access to sensations.

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?" - Admit it? What greater difference could there be? - "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing." - Not at all. It is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here. (PI S304)

This is difficult Wittgenstein! But now we can handle it. Remember the empty till? It was important that S was not pain or red. If S is something altogether private then it cancelled out. We could not say in a philosophical or psychological context whether S was something or nothing because we did not know. Philosophically, since S was private, something or nothing is the same: it must be treated as nothing. Psychologically it was something all along, even if it were only a delusion...and we do not know

even that. Again, our inclination tries to force assumptions. We want to think that we can say something about inner processes (PI S304-306). We want to say that there is pain without behavior being necessary. Well, Wittgenstein allows that, he never denies it. But what are you going to say of philosophical consequence about that image? We cannot picture it in language because it is private and unsayable. It is a psychological fact if it is a fact. Regardless, it is just too slippery for philosophy.

The topic of private language serves as a good introduction to Wittgenstein's concept of the nature of philosophy. The idea of boundary allows us to see distinctions between philosophy and psychology. We gain perspective by prising apart a global theme from a local topic. Thus, we are able to approach just what Wittgenstein means by philosophy. We glimpse something of his methodology. He attacks formulations in traditional philosophy such as, "Only I know..." then reveals their absurdity by constructing opposite formulations. He does not equate thoughts with behavior and he is not guilty of radical ontological assertions. He does not deny mental processes at all, but only their philosophical importance. Later, we shall extend the contrast between philosophy and psychology to one between philosophy and science generally. Finally, with the help of John Searle, we shall see that

Wittgenstein's denial that philosophy is concerned with mental states is a mistake. But for now to help orient us with the distinction between Wittgenstein and "traditional philosophy" it will be instructive to consider two contrasts with Wittgenstein's conception of the nature of philosophy: his own earlier conceptions in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and a traditional view of the divisions of philosophy by Immanuel Kant in the introductory section of his Critique of Judgement. The idea is to gain a perspective in the sense of against what is Wittgenstein arguing against on the subject of the nature of philosophy specifically?

We can read in the Tractatus that, through therapeutic investigation, logic can help language picture reality in a one-to-one correspondence. Logic can not explain reality but a precise representation is possible, as in the case of an equation or a drawing (both of them kinds of pictures) representing a circle (reality as a relation: all the points in a plane of a specific distance from a specific location or center). Given its nature, together with the restrictions of language, the relation of reality to logic (language) can not be stated but only shown. The nature of philosophy in the Tractatus is as symbolic logic, an ideal language which compensates for the faults of natural language and which pictures reality in such a way that we

began to understand the truth of the possibility of a correspondence between reality and a "net" of logic, of propositions, which fits reality at significant points of difference. Thus, philosophy "suggests" reality through its propositions. The methods of suggestion, however, are only pictures and not explanations.

But in the later Philosophical Investigations,

We see that what we call "sentence" and "language" has not the formal unity that I imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related to one another. - But what becomes of logic now? Its rigor seems to be giving way here. - But in that case doesn't logic altogether disappear? - For how can it lose its rigor? Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigour out of it. - The *preconceived idea* of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.)

The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life...

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note in margin: Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties.

The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?" (PI S108)

Here Wittgenstein is limiting the logic of the Tractatus. Instead of showing a mystical, phantastical, correlation between reality and a symbolic language, we now ask logic, in the form of grammar and syntax, to function as ordinary language does, in spatial and temporal ways. The mistake we make in traditional philosophy is to confound one

game with another. Consider the game of chess. Chessmen have various "powers." They also have different physical characteristics. Do they "have" their powers and their physical characteristics in the same sense, in the same language-game? The answer is both yes and no. In the game of chess and in the game of general ontology, chessmen have the same physical characteristics. And, in a game-in-progress the chessman's powers function even as it stands unmoved upon its square. Further, in theory, in the theory of chess, the pieces have their powers. But both in play and in game theory "having power" makes sense only in the context of a game-in-progress, not in the different game of general ontology. Now, consider words, sentences, or propositions; consider any sign or picture. Do they correlate in some mystical way with general ontology, with reality? No, they simply function, have power, within their own game. Like chessmen, however, words also exist as objects, but only in the nonmystical sense of as stains on paper.

We have established that logic in Philosophical Investigations is limited to the same functions as ordinary language. It does not somehow get outside or above ordinary language so that it may reach to a greater purity. Wittgenstein imposes another limitation on logic (and, in doing so, makes one more criticism of the Tractatus).

we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone who is using language *must* be playing such a game - But if you say that our languages only *approximate* to such a calculi you are standing on the very brink of a misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an *ideal* language. As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum. - Whereas logic does not treat of language - or of thought - in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we *construct* ideal languages. But the word ideal is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took a logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looked like. (PI S81)

Logic for a vacuum would be a logic outside or above our language, something different than signs or pictures, which, of course it is not. The mistake that Wittgenstein made in the Tractatus is that symbolic logic was thought an ideal language better than our common one. The problem is that we can only construct ideal languages and we construct them from the materials of our common language.

In contrast, we do use language to approximate phenomena when we hypothesize models of description in natural science. The scientific model can align in points of measurement with a phenomenon and, if found to be mistaken, realigned. Logic cannot align with language since it is the same game, it cannot approximate itself since it does not have the "power" to get outside itself. Perhaps another way to see this is through the concept of an ideal model. In natural science an ideal model would align with

the characteristics of our solar system, for example, so well that future discoveries can be predicted. A symbolic logic, on the other hand, reaches the ideal only so far as it eliminates flaws in ordinary language, which is to say, so far as it restricts language. With this you might say that something which is logically necessary will be inferior in the sense of being more restricted, less valuable as a source of knowledge, than ordinary language which is itself, with all its ills, inferior to natural phenomena. This is to say that language does not somehow capture or explain our private images or sensations, it only allows us to refer to them. Also, natural laws expressed in mathematical symbols do not capture the natural causes at work in the universe, they merely describe them, at least until a better description is formulated. Isn't it said that logic as mathematics is tautology?

The perception of logic as an ideal language which has philosophical power to describe ultimate reality is a mistake. Logic is disqualified for that job since it is limited in two ways: it is empowered only within the common language game and it is even more restricted than the game in which it makes sense. What Wittgenstein tried to accomplish with logic in the Tractatus became, in Philosophical Investigations, just another disease requiring therapy.

The second contrast is taken from Kant's Critique of Judgement. The quotations are used merely to illustrate the kinds of things Wittgenstein opposes. Since we are trying to gain an understanding of the nature of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations, we eliminate distraction by deliberately interrupting Kant's line of argument.

For Kant, philosophy is mainly an analysis of cognition, our mental processes which he divides into two parts. On the one hand he describes the formulation of scientific laws. This division is natural philosophy which he calls theoretical. On the other hand he talks about the formulation of the laws of freedom (our ability to modify and/or interrupt natural causal chains). This division is moral philosophy which he calls practical. Kant develops a particular sense of the word "practical" in his Critique. It is based on a priori reasonings from what he thinks is our presupposition of the concept of freedom. In no sense, then, is practical philosophy empirically grounded. Neither is theoretical philosophy empirically grounded. Therefore, since both theoretical and practical philosophy are a priori they are prior to science which is concerned with material contingency, a position clearly opposed to Wittgenstein. Here and throughout "prior" means a more important source of knowledge.

Philosophy may be said to contain the principles of the rational cognition that concepts afforded us of

things (not merely, as with logic, the principles of the form of thought in general irrespective of the objects), and, thus interpreted, the course usually adopted, of dividing it into **theoretical** and **practical** is perfectly sound. (CJ 464)

With Kant philosophy looks from the inside of ourselves to a world we perceive as outside. *A priori* concepts give us the ability to understand objects in the case of the material world; and responsibility and obligation in the case of morality. As we know, Wittgenstein relegates cognition to philosophically inconsequential psychology. About *a priori* belief he says, "'I know what I want, wish, believe, feel,.....' (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers' nonsense, or at any rate **not** a judgment *a priori*" (PI S221).

Now there are but two kinds of concepts, and these yield a corresponding number of distinct principles of the possibility of their objects. The concepts referred to are those of nature and that of freedom...Hence the division of philosophy falls properly into parts quite distinct in their principles - a theoretical, as philosophy of nature, and a practical, as philosophy of morals (for this is what the practical legislation of reason by the concept of freedom is called). (CJ 463)

Where Kant bases a thick volume of close reasoning upon the concept of freedom, we can imagine Wittgenstein asking you to point to freedom and, when you try to indicate a distinction between natural causal chains and those you willingly effect, he might say that freedom is just what you do (If he doesn't first ask about causal chains and...about willing?). Perhaps he would say that there need be no

mystical medium such as freedom which differentiates what you do on the one hand and what results from natural forces on the other hand.

the morally practical precepts, which are founded entirely on the concept of freedom, to the complete exclusion of grounds taken from nature for the determination of the will, form quite a special kind of precepts... These, too, like the rules obeyed by nature, are, without qualification, called laws - though they do not, like the latter, rest on sensible conditions, but upon a supersensible principle - and they must needs have a separate part of philosophy allotted to the theoretical part, and termed practical philosophy... (CJ 464)

This "supersensible principle" is freedom, this time in a form probably more obnoxious to Wittgenstein than something like a private sign to which you point with your attention. "With what do you associate the word freedom?" he might ask. It is not a sign for an experience but a sign for an abstraction of many vary diffuse experiences.

The employment of our faculty of cognition from principles, and with it philosophy, is coextensive with the applicability of a priori concepts... The function of prescribing laws by means of concepts of nature is discharged by understanding and is theoretical. That of prescribing laws by means of the concept of freedom is discharged by reason and is merely practical. (CJ 464)

By now we have an idea what Wittgenstein would think of terms like "faculty of cognition" and "understanding." Here please notice them together in this context because they will reappear in a similar vein at the end of the paper when it is suggested that perhaps there is room for both faculty and understanding in philosophy in the form of John Searle's

mental features.

The solution of the problems of pure geometry is not allocated to a special part of science, nor does the art of land-surveying merit the name of practical, in contradistinction to pure, as a second part of the general science of geometry, and with equally little, of perhaps less, right can the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or of observation be ranked as a practical art of the science of nature, or, in fine, domestic, agricultural, or political economy, the art of social intercourse, the principles of dietetics, or even general instruction as to the attainment of happiness, or as much as the control of the inclinations or the restraining of the affections with a view thereto, be denominated practical philosophy - not to mention forming these latter in a second part of philosophy in general. (CJ 464)

We may gather from this that anything concerned with "experimentation" and "observation" will fail, in Kant's view, as knowledge under either practical and theoretical philosophy. Instead, "...they are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries of theoretical philosophy (i.e., as corollaries of natural science)..." (CJ 464). For Wittgenstein, however, we will see, as with his limiting of logic in comparison to natural science above, that he reverses Kant's priorities. We see in Philosophical Investigations that science is prior to philosophy in affording understanding.

Hopefully, we can see by contrast something of what, for Wittgenstein, philosophy is not. Philosophy does not "suggest" reality by revealing an hidden correspondence between language and the world as he once thought himself. And philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, does not discover

a *priori* knowledge about two cognitive divisions, the theoretical and the practical, as Kant thinks. Nor is science a discipline and body of knowledge which is secondary to philosophy, again, as Kant believes.

Science is hypothetical and philosophy is not.

It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It is not of any possible [philosophical] interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such' - whatever that may mean...And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be any thing hypothetical in our considerations...problems are solved [in philosophy], not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language. (PI S109)

Remember, earlier, when we were contrasting Wittgenstein with himself, we saw, in the limitation of the logic of the Tractatus by Philosophical Investigations, that "logic does not treat of language - or of thought - in the sense in which a natural science treats of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we *construct* ideal languages." Thus, philosophy is not science: it is not empirical and it is not hypothetical. But how is it not these things? The key lies in the idea of a model. Consider the following pregnant section.

For we can avoid ineptness in our assertions only by presenting the model as what it is, as an object of comparison - as, so to speak, a measuring rod; not as a preconceived idea to which reality *must* correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy.) (PI S131)

Just here, with this section, it would be easy to get lost and ramble. Much of the theme of the nature of philosophy swings about the ideas in this section. We can see that "our assertions" are those of science, not philosophy, because of the sentence in parentheses. "Model" and "measuring-rod," thus, also refer to science, not to philosophy. Science models in a one-to-one correspondence with an object's points of measurement, philosophy does not. That it was thought to do so was the mistake of the Tractatus. Family resemblances comprised of games and, then, both of them confined to language take the place of logical correspondence to reality in Philosophical Investigations (PI S76). Science is, then, related as a contrast to what we here may term the disease of transference (where an analogy from one language-game is mistakenly imported into another language game), the "dogmatism," we suffer under the "preconceived ideas to which reality *must* correspond" which plagues us in much of traditional philosophy. Thus, in Section 131 Wittgenstein establishes important relationships between large themes: science to philosophy and the Wittgensteinian brand of philosophy to the common mistakes, transferences, of traditional philosophy. But lets snap back to a focus on the idea that the model in science clarifies how philosophy is not empirical and not hypothetical.

We are using the idea of model to get at the idea of hypothesis and, then, using both ideas together against philosophy in order to see the boundary between science and philosophy. From Hacker's Insight and Illusion,

Hertz intended to eliminate the concept of force from mechanics as anything other than an abbreviating convenience...By displaying the logical structure of the theory, he dispelled the illusion that physicists had not yet been able to discover the true nature of force...This became for Wittgenstein a classical, concise, and beautiful statement of the philosophical elimination of pseudo-problems...

Unlike Hertz, Boltzmann emphasized the importance of model-building in science. A fruitful model is not an explanatory hypothesis, nor is it, as Hertz suggested, a mere colourful wrapping for bare equations. Rather is it an analogy, which unlike a hypothesis, need not be rejected if it fails perfectly to fit the facts. (I 4)

A model, then, is a description of a phenomenon much as a blueprint is a representation of a machined turning, for example. With each change in the turning's diameter there is a corresponding indication (pointing out) of another dimension on the blueprint. The difference between a scientific model and a blueprint, however, is that new data may be discovered about a phenomenon in natural science so that scientists will change the model, a workably plastic "analogy" or description. An hypothesis, on the other hand, cannot afford to be plastic, if it suggests nothing useable it must be rejected since it would likely contaminate both model and covering theory. One employs hypotheses to build models. One hypothesizes a new alignment then tests,

experiments, to see whether it is compatible with the rest of the model.

Thus our philosophical considerations cannot be described, modeled, or hypothesized about because no ideal language such as symbolic logic or the calculus of theoretical physics, which, please remember, is relatively very restricted, can get outside our everyday language to measure them, a case of language measuring itself. In contrast, the phenomena of natural science exist outside of language so we may bring language up to phenomena in order to measure them, to describe them, and to understand them. The psychology Wittgenstein keeps silent about is a mechanistic model of the mind/body relation. This can be demonstrated but first let us capsulize how we understood psychology when we studied the topic of private language.

Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of human psychology. What readers can misconstrue as a denial of mental processes results from Wittgenstein's investigative technique of "turning his face against" the various disciplines, psychology and metaphysics for example, as he pursues his philosophical investigations, his cures, which must not speculate beyond existing scientific knowledge. Speculations about mental activity are philosophically inconsequential (PI S269,S308).

If psychology is philosophically inconsequential and if

it is concerned with things about which we are ignorant,
"Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them - we think."
(PI 308), then what is psychology in positive terms? Do
dreams tell us anything about our psychology? do archetypes?
does introspection? No:

Here we have a case of introspection, not unlike that
from which William James got the idea that the 'self'
consisted mainly of 'peculiar motions on the head and
throat'. And James' introspection shewed, not the
meaning of the word "self"..., nor any analysis of such
a thing, but the state of a [diseased?] philosopher's
attention when he says the word "self" to himself and
tries to analyze its meaning. (PI S413)

And psychology is not the analysis of cognition which Kant
proposes. Instead, what "Sometime perhaps we shall know
more about" is something like electro-molecular activity and
its consequence on thinking, something mechanical, something
physiological. This is the way in which science can "know"
"more." It is an empirical way which can be tested by
experiment.

Certainly this works to harden the boundary between
philosophy and what is unknown in psychology, especially
since philosophy adds no new knowledge. To repeat,

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and
neither explains nor deduces anything. - Since
everything lies open to view there is nothing to
explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what
is possible before all new discoveries and
inventions. (PI S126)

The point to press is the mechanical or scientific one.

Granted, Wittgenstein's philosophy rejects the philosophical importance of psychology but it also affirms the existence of psychology. The "nature" of the "processes and states" which we leave "undecided" (PI 308) is something scientific, empirical, and mechanical. Mechanics (cause and effect), then, is another sort of boundary. Very strictly speaking, since the specific boundary of psychology which we are considering here is not any natural science of psychology which currently exists but, notice, with the unknown in psychology then it is the same as a boundary of the pursuit of science generally: what may be called the pursuit of mechanics, the pursuit of natural causes. This hardens the boundary between philosophy and psychology to something near rigidity. Anything at all which may be classified as unknown in psychology, then, falls into the province of science and definitely not into the province of philosophy. The constituents of the mind will not result from speculations as to philosophical principles but, instead, will be hypotheses and theories resulting from scientific experimentation.

The maddening thing in all this, the challenge to traditional philosophy, however, is what Wittgenstein accomplishes within the restrictions of his conception of philosophy and, especially, what those accomplishments point to by way of ramifications.

We can consider cases of four diseases - -
inclination/prejudice, misuse of language, superstition, and
muddled view; and, again, two major kinds of curatives - -
opposite case therapy and use therapy.

From the topic of private language we remember that in
traditional philosophy we have a tendency to point into
ourselves, to point with our attention (PI S275). In the
case of intense sensation, pain for example, we are inclined
to think that what is important is our private feelings
about the pain rather than its public expression (PI S296).
Though Wittgenstein affirms that the private image of pain
exists (PI S300), he says that the image cannot make the
transfer into language (PI S297). Our inclination to force
this transfer, however, prods us into delusions about a
priori knowledge and other "philosophical" assumptions
(PI S299).

Superstitions also force us into mistakes. We often
err by proceeding from particular and contingent cases to
universal and necessary cases. This is the "transference"
problem of mistakenly importing analogies from one language-
game to another that we saw in the contrast example where
Wittgenstein limited the Tractatus' logic. R or B may
sometimes be a word and sometimes a proposition. An example
of a philosophical superstition would be: Therefore, R or B
must only be either a proposition or a name. Or: Therefore,

R or B must only be a name because a name is simpler and more fundamental than a proposition. Yet it could be that nothing is named except in the nexus of a sentence, in the nexus of a proposition (PI S49). Just as we might mistakenly think that chessmen "have" their powers outside a game-in-progress, might have power in the ontological game as well, we might mistakenly "transfer" the status of ontological phenomenon to words and propositions. We might mistakenly consider them as objects in a sense beyond that of stains on paper.

Things get muddled when,

we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of). (PI S125)

It shows a fundamental misunderstanding, if I am inclined to study the headache I have now in order to get clear about the philosophical problem of sensation. (PI S314)

"Headache," of course, can be an analogy for a philosophical perplexity, a place in language or philosophy where "I don't know my way about," where "things do not turn out as we had assumed." Like the "problem" of the power of chessmen, we have confounded the rules of different games. We sense a perplexity, an affect of a rule violation, then stupidly try to solve it with further violations, we are "inclined to study the headache I have now in order to get

clear about the philosophical problem..."

Emotions, significant emotions such as conviction, also muddy our understanding,

When we do philosophy, we should like to hypostatize feelings where there are none. They serve to explain our thoughts to us.

'Here explanation of our thinking demands a feeling!' It is as if our conviction were simply consequent upon this requirement. (PI S598)

When an argument convinces us, we seem automatically to *feel* convinced. Then, confounding the game of logic with the game of emotion, we think that the feeling is requisite for, perhaps even prior to, conviction.

It was in private language also that we encountered the therapy of considering opposite cases. "I can only *believe* that someone else is in pain, but I *know* it if I am"

(PI S303). The therapy or analysis can proceed: In an obvious case of someone hurting, we can know that another person is in pain. We are unable to doubt their pain. But what would it mean to say that I doubt that I am in pain, that I do not know that I am in pain? Such statements mean nothing, and their opposite, "I know I am in pain," means nothing beyond "I am in pain." There is no knowledge.

The idea of use in Philosophical Investigations is complex. For Wittgenstein it is a powerful tool when he talks about how we mean and how we understand. In a smaller context it also works well to clean up our language where it tends to philosophical error.

What are the simple constituent parts of reality, of a chair for example? Is it wood, or are the fundamental parts of a chair molecules, atoms, and quarks? In one sense these are increasingly smaller, though no simpler, constituents of a chair. In another sense they have nothing to do with chair except as raw material. In the second sense, legs, back, seat, stile, and, perhaps, tenon are more appropriate. The point is: of what sense of complexity are we speaking or making statements? How are you defining composite? In the case of a chair, which composite do you mean, parts that make a chair or parts that comprise its raw material? If you do not specify then the question as to ultimate constituents is meaningless. Whereas, if you do specify then the question is an empirical one. In the first case, philosophy, the idea of use, how you are using the word composite, shows the meaninglessness of the question; and in the second, it is simply not a philosophical question (PI S47). As for the ultimate element of reality, we do not know so we keep silent in philosophy. What is a quark? Is a quark? Is it matter or is it energy? Is matter or is energy? Shhh, silence is best for we simply cannot say.

A philosopher says that he understands the sentence "I am here", that he means something by it, thinks something - even when he doesn't think at all how, on what occasions, this sentence is used. (PI S514)

Where are you? Why, I am here, in this direction, and proximate to you. Otherwise, what can the statement mean in

a metaphysical sense? I am rather than I am not? I am here rather than I am there? The therapies of use together with that of the opposite case dissolve this perplexity readily.

Shall we consider a test of non-use? "Deaf-mutes inwardly say a vocal language as they sign." How is that to be understood? It smells fishy. We do not know how to understand it. It seems an English sentence in good order - until one wants to do something with it, "'but everyone who has not become calloused by doing philosophy notices that there is something wrong here'" (PI S348). The worst smelling fish of all is "vocal" or aural. For how can deaf-mutes construct an analogy to sensations which they have not experienced?

So, even though Wittgenstein severely restricts philosophy and "turns his face against" metaphysics so that philosophy affords no body of metaphysical knowledge, he still affects traditional philosophy profoundly to the good with the therapies which he practices upon its diseases. Now, however, given Wittgenstein's rigidly constructed boundary between philosophy and psychology, can we crack open an entrance to philosophical principles of non-empirical mind and then go even further toward establishing philosophy's role in guiding scientific discovery with such principles?

In his attack or dissolution of the mind-body or mind-

brain problem in philosophy, John Searle, like Wittgenstein, believes that his first difficulty is rooted in language.

I am convinced that part of the difficulty is that we persist in talking about a twentieth-century problem in an outmoded seventeenth-century vocabulary. When I was an undergraduate, I remember being dissatisfied with the choices that were apparently available in the philosophy of mind: you could either be a monist or a dualist. If you were a monist, you could be either a materialist or an idealist. If you were a materialist, you could be either a behaviourist or a physicalist. And so on. One of my aims in what follows is to try to break out of these tired old categories. (MB 14)

And, like Wittgenstein, Searle wants to be consistent with science (MB 14). But there is a somewhat ironic difference. Modern science tends to devalue mental states just as Wittgenstein does with his philosophy. Searle, the philosopher, argues that they, along with the brain, should be recognized, "...I want to say, they are all real features of our mental lives" (MB 17).

[H]ow can we account for the relationships between two apparently completely different kinds of things? On the one hand, there are mental things, such as our thoughts and feelings; we think of them as subjective, conscious, and immaterial. On the other hand, there are physical things; we think of them as having mass, as extended in space, and as causally interacting with other physical things. Most attempted solutions to the mind-body problem wind up by denying the existence of, or in some way downgrading the status of, one or the other of these types of things. Given the successes of the physical sciences, it is not surprising that in our stage of intellectual development the temptation is to downgrade the status of mental entities. So, most of the recently fashionable materialist conceptions of the mind - such as behaviourism, functionalism, and physicalism - end up by denying, implicitly or explicitly, that there are any such things as minds as we ordinarily think of them. That is, they deny that we do really *intrinsically* have subjective, conscious,

mental states and that they are as real and as irreducible as anything else in the universe.

Now, why do they do that? Why is it that so many theorists end up denying the intrinsically mental character of mental phenomena? (MB 15)

Searle holds that there are four features of the mind that the materialist world of empirical science finds very difficult to fit into its "scientific conception" or model -

- consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation.

It is just a plain fact about the world that it contains such conscious mental states and events, but it is hard to see how mere physical systems could have consciousness. How could such a thing occur? How, for example, could this grey and white gook inside my skull be conscious? (MB 15)

He, in fact, reverses Wittgenstein's priority of language over mental states, regarding consciousness at least.

Consciousness is the central fact of specifically human existence because without it all of the other specifically human aspects of our existence - language, love, humour, and so on - would be impossible. I believe it is, by the way, something of a scandal that contemporary discussions in philosophy and psychology have so little of interest to tell us about consciousness. (MB 16)

Intentionality is a difficult concept. With this mental feature the basic relationship is between the mind and the rest of the world. Relations of intentionality obtain when our mental states are concerned not with themselves but with "objects and states of affairs in the world," including other people's mental states.

Intentionality "refers," mentally (not through action or practice as Wittgenstein would limit it), to external objects. The hard question for science and philosophy is how can the gook inside one's head refer to anything, "Now how, to put it crudely, can atoms in the void represent anything?" (MB 16).

With subjectivity, I am aware of my mental states such as pain and thinking in a way that you cannot be aware of them; and I differentiate them and myself from you and your mental states.

Since the seventeenth-century we have come to think of reality as something which must be equally accessible to all competent observers - that is, we think it must be objective. Now, how are we to accommodate the reality of *subjective* mental phenomena with the scientific conception of reality as totally *objective*? (MB 16)

Perhaps most difficult to accommodate to physical science is mental causality. Clearly, our thoughts and feelings make a difference in the material world. In one example we sometimes say and do things at night that embarrass us and result in effects which we would quickly undo in the morning if we could. But if, as Searle wants to say, that mental states are immaterial then how do such things causally affect the material brain and end by exciting sometimes unfortunate motor responses in our muscles.

Are we supposed to think that our thoughts and feelings can somehow produce chemical effects on our brains and

the rest of our nervous system? How could such a thing occur? Are we supposed to think that thoughts can wrap themselves around the axons or shake the dendrites or sneak inside the cell wall and attack the cell nucleus?
(MB 17)

At this point it might seem that Wittgenstein's account, that is, not to take account of undiscovered psychology, is clearly better than trying to find an explanation for the impetus of thoughts upon neurons. But Searle labors to find a causal connection between the mind and the brain. As we expected, his solution is a dissolution of the problem. He begins with the thesis:

Mental phenomena, all mental phenomena whether conscious or unconscious, visual or auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by processes going on in the brain.
(MB 18)

Fortunately for our purposes, Searle illustrates his thesis with the example of a mental state familiar to us from our work with Wittgenstein. Pain occurs in the brain. Although pain is usually caused by the stimulation of peripheral nerve endings, we know from the phenomena of phantom-limb pain suffered by amputees, from the pain caused by direct, low voltage electrical stimulation of the brain itself, and from the fact that local anesthetic is effective in completely blocking sensation from peripheral sources that if an event is not registered in the brain then we do not experience it. Also, we know that mental events occur even if the brain is only artificially stimulated. Thus,

"everything that matters for our mental life, all of our thoughts and feelings, are caused by processes inside the brain" (MB 18-19).

Searle's next thesis is,

Pains and other mental phenomena just are features of the brain (and perhaps the rest of the central nervous system). (MB 19)

So, mental phenomena are caused by processes in the brain and mental phenomena just are features of the brain. Searle wants both things to be true together. If they are, then that will spell the end of the mind-body duality. The philosophical problem will dissolve.

The first obstacle to his goal is an overly simple conception of causality. We tend to think of effects and causes as being discrete from one another. On this model the brain may cause the mind but we couldn't accept the other hard disjunct that the mind causes the brain. This leaves us stuck with dualism, or, worse, with no mind conceived as "mental" but, rather, one modeled on "behaviourism, functionalism, and physicalism," and, clearly, it leaves us without mental agency and freedom (MB 15).

Searle's bridge over this causality problem is elegant; we leave everything as it is. He considers the common examples of impenetrability and the wetness of water. Such things are "features" of micro-structures. Books do not

penetrate tables. Water is wet. But, is the micro-latticework of a table "impenetrable" or are molecules of water wet? No, photons and electrons easily pass through the spaces in the molecular structure of wood and other "hard" materials. More obviously, a single water molecule is not "wet," it merely so vibrates and interacts with other water molecules as "wet" or "frozen" or "gaseous" when taken in groups. Impenetrability and wetness are global features of smaller scale causes. They exist on a different level of description, they *just* are features of the very systems in question" (MB 21).

An objection to this is that the features which Searle speaks of can be defined as identical to the micro-structure. Impenetrability is the lattice-work. Wetness is molecular action. But, if we go further down the scale in size, what is a molecule, what is a proton, or a quark? Are molecular structures merely features of yet smaller structures? The point is not for a metaphysical and ultimate cause or some "simple." Instead, the point is for different levels of description, "one can say that solidity consists of such high level features as rigidity and resistance to touch and pressure and that it is caused by the behaviour of elements at the micro-level" (MB 21-22).

Like the case of the "wetness" of a water molecule, is this brain neuron in pain, is that one hungry or that one

thirsty, or, in clusters, are these neurons in pain, hungry, or thirsty? No, that is nonsense. The neurons are only firing so far as we know. Pain, hunger, and thirst are mental states at a different level of description, a different language-game Wittgenstein might say if he were to agree to talk about mental states in this way. "Nothing is more common in nature than for surface features of a phenomenon to be both caused by and realized in a micro-structure, and those are exactly the relationships that are exhibited by the relation of mind to brain" (MB 22).

So now, how are consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation possible?

The best way to show how something is possible is to show how it actually exists...It should seem no more mysterious, in principle, that this hunk of matter, this gray and white oatmeal-textured substance of the brain, should be conscious than it seems mysterious that this other hunk of matter, this collection of nucleo-protein molecules stuck onto a calcium frame, should be alive. The way, in short, to dispel the mystery is to understand the process. We do not yet fully understand the processes, but we understand their general *character*, we understand that there are certain specific electro-chemical activities going on among neurons or neuron-modules and perhaps other features of the brain and these processes cause consciousness. (MB 23-24)

Secondly, how can matter have intentionality, how does matter come to refer to other matter? How does intentionality actually exist? Via enzymes, the kidneys communicate to the hypothalamus of the brain a "request" for water. One result of this is the intentional mental state

called thirst.

As with the 'mysteries' of life and consciousness, the way to master the mystery of intentionality is to describe in as much detail as we can how the phenomena are caused by biological processes while being at the same time realized in biological systems. Visual and auditory experiences, tactile sensations, hunger, thirst, and sexual desire, are all caused by brain processes and they are realized in the structure of the brain, and they are all intentional phenomena.

I am not saying we should lose our sense of the mysteries of nature. On the contrary, the examples I have cited are all in a sense astounding. But I am saying that they are neither more nor less mysterious than other astounding features of the world, such as the existence of gravitational attraction, the process of photosynthesis, or the size of the Milky Way.
(MB 24)

Does the real world include subjectivity? Yes, "it is just a plain fact about biological evolution that it has produced certain sorts of biological systems, namely human and certain animal brains, that have subjective features." And, extending the use of the word feature, the features of my consciousness "are not accessible to you," nor are yours to me. You do not feel my pain, nor I, yours.

Finally, can mental events cause physical events? How do thoughts exist? In micro-structure thoughts are not immaterial, instead neurons are working. Electrical charges transfer and chemical reactions cycle. These causes result in muscle contractions, then in effects external to the body. Are volition and the mind reduced, then, to the deterministic operations of bio-electronics and bio-chemistry? No. At the level of description of mind

thoughts are states and desires, intentions and volitions. For how much does a desire weigh? At the speed of light is volition infinitely massive? Such propositions are nonsense. They exist in a different language-game. A feature of the mind is only a feature of matter, not matter itself on the level of micro-structure. The latticework structure of iron, for instance, is and is not impenetrable, depending on the size and energy of the penetrate. The universe is and is not continuous depending on whether we are looking at our solar system or at the quantum mechanics of an atom. The relationship of mind to matter is one of identity and it is a relationship on a level that operates above this and that neuron.

Now, because mental states are features of the brain, they have two levels of description - a higher level in mental terms, and a lower level in physiological terms. The very same causal powers of the system can be described at either level...At the higher level of description, the intention to raise my arm causes the movement of the arm. But at the lower level of description, a series of neuron firings starts a chain of events that results in the contraction of muscles.
(MB 26)

To summarize: on my view, the mind and the body interact, but they are not two different things, since mental phenomena just are features of the brain.
(MB 26)

Like Wittgenstein, Searle considers the present state of knowledge, reorganizes some of its elements, and changes our perspective so that an age old problem, a philosophical mistake, is dissolved. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, Searle

insists that mental states must be accounted for. This is one of the points we needed against Wittgenstein. Another is that philosophy guides science. Isn't it clear that if Searle is correct then science benefits from his realignment? Mental states must be accounted for in science. The computer model of switches and gangs of switches no longer suffices. Empirical science is now directed to discover physical causes for mental features.

Still, isn't this merely an example of Wittgenstein's original position? To repeat a quotation, "One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions." Isn't Searle's elegant work just another clean-up before science discovers further causes and invents the necessary models to include mental existents along with the new physical causes?

The answer to this objection is a firm "No" on two counts.

The first is that while it is true that things like consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, and mental causation exist still they do not exist as objects, even as non-empirical objects. (Berkeley's mental "substance" would qualify as a non-empirical object.) Wittgenstein rejects such things because they are, like private language, an "empty till." They do no work but merely idle or, worse, engender prejudices. Searle, on the other hand, is talking

about features not substances. Features exist not as objects but as experiences of the mind, we might say, experiences like Wittgenstein's image of pain which he held as unsayable.

Second and more interesting, with Searle's work mental features of the brain can be organized into principles of mind through the work of philosophy. They become the philosophical principles (altogether, a body of knowledge) which work to guide empirical researches in science. Now, the door is definitely cracked open. More can be asked about John Searle's four mental features, and about principles of mind in general.

Following some suggestions from Kant, this time from his Critique of Pure Reason, and following the approach of Searle: it is a plain fact that space, time, and logic exist in the universe. How do they exist? Einstein, the physicist, says that, in his scientific model, space does not exist.

The purpose of mechanics is to describe how bodies change their position in space with "time"....

It is not clear what is to be understood here by "position" and "space." I stand at the window of a railway carriage which is travelling uniformly, and drop a stone on the embankment, without throwing it. Then, disregarding the influence of air resistance, I see the stone descend in a straight line. A pedestrian who observes the misdeed from the footpath notices that the stone falls to earth in a parabolic curve. I now ask: Do the "positions" traversed by the stone lie "in reality" on a straight line or on a parabola? From the considerations of the previous section [one discussing Cartesian co-ordinate systems] the answer is self-

evident. In the first place we entirely shun the vague word "space," of which, we must honestly acknowledge, we cannot form the slightest [scientific] conception, and we replace it by "motion relative to a practically rigid body of reference." The positions relative to the body of reference (railway carriage or embankment) have already been defined in detail in the preceding section. If instead of "body of reference" we insert "system of co-ordinates," which is a useful idea for mathematical description [modeling], we are in a position to say: The stone traverses a straight line relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the carriage, but relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the ground (embankment) it describes a parabola. With the aid of this example it is clearly seen that there is no such thing as an independently existing Trajectory (lit. "path-curve"¹), but only a trajectory relative to a particular body of reference....Note: ¹That is, a curve along which the body moves. (R 9-10)

Still, space does exist as a principle of mind, For our empirical perceptions are experienced as in space, even our perceptions of the brain itself. It is only in scientific theory, in a model produced by the mind, that space is described as irrelevant. If we perceive an object then we always experience it in space. Wittgenstein would allow the certainty of this proposition for experience allows no instances in support of doubt. It is sufficiently proved for Wittgenstein. It looks as if space is a principle of mind and not a rule or law of empirical science. Is time also a principle of mind, is logic? How does logic work? Neither space, nor time, nor logic idle in the world. Neither logic nor time are empirical objects. If these things are principles of mind can we analyze them and determine their scope and their limitations? Wouldn't such

determinations constitute a body of philosophical knowledge?
Immanuel Kant thinks so in his Critique of Pure Reason.

We recognize mental principles as a branch of metaphysics in philosophy. What objection does Wittgenstein make against the metaphysics of mental processes?

To say "Red exists" is to say nothing about our experience or image of red. It is not a proposition about the color red but one about the grammar of our language. The proposition about our grammar holds that the word "red" has a meaning. It seems, however, as if we were saying something about the color red but if it were the case that red never did exist upon objects and, therefore, in our minds, then exactly what would we be able to say in the case of this color concerning its existence or nonexistence? Clearly, we would have no conception of the color. Again, the mistake is a transference, an importation from one language-game to another. It looks as if, from the language-game of empirical existents, red exists in its own right. This would be a mistaken metaphysical statement (PI S58).

When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? -

What we do is bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI S116)

"I know that is a book." What does I know add to "that

is a book?" We can think of circumstances where it would indeed have an added meaning, if you are expressing a degree of certainty instead of guessing. The view is obscured but from before, when you were next to the table upon which it rests, you remember that the object is a book. In an epistemological context, however, it sounds fishy. It expresses the same as "red exists." It expresses nothing. Think of this circumstance. Walking in the woods, I see a cabin. "I know I should be able to get some water there," I say. Arriving in the clearing, I see that the cabin is the backdrop for a play. Apart from a drink of water, I did not know that even a cabin was there. The opposite case dissolves the epistemological significance. "It is as if 'I know' did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis" (OC S482).

In these three examples Wittgenstein "turns his face" against philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics. If we are not careful we will read him as condemning all three. He is not. As we have seen before, he is attacking a bit of erroneous grammar in each case and the type of mistake that it represents. He says nothing against metaphysics per se here. We can infer, however, from his doctrine of philosophy being no body of knowledge that he would not turn his face toward metaphysics. Wittgenstein is too much the empiricist for that. He would, thus, erroneously relegate and restrict Kant's metaphysics, along with Searle's

philosophy of mind, his "mental features," to that which is as yet unknown in psychology.

The physicist Steven Hawking asks of philosophy much more than guidance in the area of the metaphysics of mind. He wants philosophy to provide a metaphysics for the whole of the empirical world.

Up to now, most scientists have been too occupied with the development of new theories that describe *what* the universe is to ask the question *why*. On the other hand, the people whose business it is to ask *why*, the philosophers, have not been able to keep up with the advance of scientific theories. In the eighteenth century, philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science, to be their field and discussed questions such as: Did the universe have a beginning? However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher of this century, said, "The whole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language." What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant! (HT 174-175)

Now, Steven Hawking is a great physicist and he may be forgiven a slight misunderstanding of some of philosophy's most difficult texts. Kant, in arguing against traditional metaphysics himself, held that metaphysics must be confined to our experience of the universe. We cannot explain its *why* because we cannot get outside our own experience to its beginnings in any way beyond the poor hints provided by empirical evidence. Wittgenstein's analysis of language is not merely a study in linguistics. As philosophy it is a cleansing of our thinking, of our concepts, of our

tendencies to posit things about which we can really only be silent, the *why* of the universe for instance. The point is that Hawking asks for too much guidance from philosophy. Wittgenstein imposes too little. On a middle ground, there needs to be room in philosophy for work like that of Searle and Kant.

In this essay there are three broad goals - - to explore a way which helps to make Wittgenstein's writing comprehensible to a new reader, to appreciate the value of what he does say about the nature of philosophy, and to offer a limited criticism about how he restricts the discipline of philosophy. The idea of a boundary, first between the nature of philosophy and psychology, then between the nature of philosophy and science generally, is explored to help penetrate the difficulties of Wittgenstein's style of composition. Between the section on psychology and the section extending psychology into natural science, there is a contrast between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and two examples of traditional philosophy. These are meant to help focus on what Wittgenstein argues against and to exemplify traditional philosophy. For the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is already a break with the older metaphysics, as is Kant's work. They exemplify a kind of reasonable continuum away from the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. Finally, Wittgenstein is

not refuted here nor is he likely to be later on. One hears students in class decry on how he is mistaken on this point or on that point and they care to go no further. They effectively reject the author they are reading along with their own misinterpretations of that author's work, a good thing in respect of students' misinterpretations but a bad thing in respect of their learning. We should understand before we criticize.

A pupil and a teacher. The pupil will not let anything be explained to him, for he continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of things, the meaning of words, etc. The teacher says "Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far your doubts don't make any sense at all."
(OC S310)

The point is not that the student must not be wrong but that he has not listened well enough to learn the context of his questions, much less of his objections. With Wittgenstein, if one understands then one will appreciate. Finally, the criticism that Wittgenstein gives philosophy short shrift may at first sound like a serious charge but even if it is true it still does not accomplish much beyond establishing that philosophy can provide principles to guide scientific enquiry and to establish a foundation for epistemology, itself concerned only with mind and, thus, impacts little upon the topics and themes Wittgenstein investigates.

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