1994

Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco : a seventeenth-century Spanish statesman

Patricia Lopes Don
San Jose State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses

Recommended Citation

Don, Patricia Lopes, "Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco : a seventeenth-century Spanish statesman" (1994). *Master's Theses*. 746.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.tcep-zd7f>

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/746

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 1358170

**Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco: A seventeenth-century
Spanish statesman**

Don, Patricia Lopes, M.A.

San Jose State University, 1994

U·M·I

**300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106**

DON BALTASAR DE ZÚÑIGA Y VELASCO:
A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SPANISH STATESMAN

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

By

Patricia Lopes Don

May, 1994

© 1994

Patricia Lopes Don

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Dr. George Vasquez

Dr. David O. McNeil

Prof. Irma Eichhorn

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

DON BALTASAR DE ZÚÑIGA Y VELASCO: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY SPANISH STATESMAN

by Patricia Lopes Don

This thesis recounts the Spanish statesman Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco's (1561-1622) early military career in Spain, Italy, and on the Spanish Armada, his diplomatic tenures in Flanders, France, and Germany, and explains his support for two critical policy decisions which led to Spain's involvement in the Thirty Years' War. The decisions were to suppress the Bohemian Defenestration by invading the Rhineland Palatinate in 1620 and to abrogate the Twelve Years' Truce with the Dutch Republic in 1621.

This research revises a previous thesis on the subject, Peter Brightwell's "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce" (1973). Contrary to Brightwell's argument, Zúñiga was prepared to exchange territory in the Low Countries and trading rights in the Portuguese East Indies to remain at peace with the Dutch in 1621.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was the product of research conducted in America, Spain, and England. I would like to thank the staff of the Humanities and Arts Library at the University of Deusto in Bilbao, Spain whose assistance during the academic year 1990-91 was invaluable. Thanks also goes to the archivists of the Archivo General de Simancas, who made the effort to prepare my large copy order of documents before I left Spain and, therefore, saved me the trouble and worry of having it sent by mail to America. I would like to extend a special thanks to Hjordis Madsen, head of the Interlibrary Loan Department at San Jose State University, whose marvelous diligence in locating old and rare books was much appreciated. Additionally, I wish to thank my husband Allen and my dear friend Donna Betts for their concern and assistance throughout the long months of research and writing. Finally, the encouragement, inspiration, and expertise of Professors Irma Eichhorn and George Vásquez of the History Department of San Jose State University have been so critical to the completion of this study that no thanks will ever be sufficient.

To my father

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Chapter	
1. THE EARLY YEARS	4
2. THE EMBASSY TO BRUSSELS	38
3. THE EMBASSY TO PARIS	76
4. THE EMBASSY TO PRAGUE AND VIENNA.....	102
5. THE COUNCIL OF STATE	141
EPILOGUE.....	192
WORKS CITED.....	198

INTRODUCTION

Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco is a name barely known even to historians of early modern Europe. A quick check of the court chronicles of the time would reveal that he was the Spanish diplomat to the Low Countries, France, and the Holy Roman Empire from 1599 to 1617 and Spanish councilor of State from 1617 until his death in 1622. Students of seventeenth-century Spanish history, or of the discomfiting interval of the Thirty Years' War, know Zúñiga, however, as the man most responsible for the decisions to send a Spanish army into the Holy Roman Empire in 1619 to suppress the instigators of the Bohemian Defenestration and to abrogate the Twelve Years' Truce, returning Spain and the Dutch rebels of the United Provinces to war in 1621. Both of these decisions presaged Spain's heavy financial and military involvement in the long and arduous war, and, according to some historians, hastened the decline of imperial Spain.

In attempting to explain why Spain turned to war at the end of the reign of Philip III and on the eve of Philip IV's rule, hispanicists have attempted to analyze the policy without the benefit of a body of biographical works to draw upon. Thus, Zúñiga has emerged as a simple character--a "Machiavellian . . . a natural schemer," the leader of a "war party," and a man "motivated essentially by considerations of *reputación*"--a Spanish word often used by seventeenth-century statesman that could mean national honor, international esteem, or just the ability to induce fear in others.¹ Indeed, the few

¹Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce" English Historical Review 89 (April 1974): 291; H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Spain and Europe 1598-1621," in J. P. Cooper, ed., The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years' War, vol. 4, The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 279; Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 71.

biographical details about his life that have emerged suggested a man who was a good deal more complex than this one-dimensional portrayal.

Ten years ago, the distinguished hispanicist John H. Elliott recognized that this lack of good biographical studies of Spanish statesmen hindered the effort to interpret larger historical questions. In a review article of several books that attempted to analyze Spain's involvement in the Thirty Years' War, he commented, "It is questionable whether we shall come close to understanding the policy until we know much more than we do at present about the men who made it."² The present study--a political biography of Don Baltasar de Zúñiga--was born of a desire to respond to that appeal.

Though Zúñiga's sudden death prevented him from writing the memoirs or publishing the collection of letters which immeasurably would have helped the effort to reveal his true political motivations, his official actions and sometimes his political reasoning are documented throughout the governmental record of those years in the Archivo General de Simancas in Spain. That record, a few extant letters, and the various fragments of biographical information that could be assembled from published contemporaneous accounts comprise the foundation for this political biography.

Don Baltasar's family background and connections, his education, his military experience and diplomatic career, and his experiences outside of Spain, in short, the context of his life, have been analyzed here with a view to explaining the two momentous decisions in which he played such an important part. The present study revealed that Zúñiga was motivated by far more than considerations of reputation in his foreign policy and proved himself willing to make substantial concessions, including territory, to the Dutch in order to continue the peace with the United Provinces. Therefore, a revision to

²John H. Elliott, "A Question of Reputation? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century," Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 483; see also Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years' War (London and New York: Routledge, 1984), 223, for a similar conclusion.

the territorial thesis of Peter Brightwell's influential essay on the subject, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce," is required.

CHAPTER 1

THE EARLY YEARS

The only portrait of Don Baltasar de Zúñiga y Velasco hangs in the Nelahozeves Castle in Czechoslovakia, one of the few great buildings of sixteenth-century Bohemia that reflected the influence of the Italian Renaissance.¹ He probably sat for the unknown artist sometime during the years he served there as ambassador to the Holy Roman Emperor and may well have commissioned the portrait on his return from Frankfurt in 1612.² Somewhat unexpectedly, Zúñiga smiled for the artist, unusual in portraits of that time. But in that year Don Baltasar had a good deal about which he could be satisfied. His efforts to ensure the election of an Austrian Habsburg at the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt had been uncommonly successful. The Spanish king had sent gifts of money--*mercedes*--to acknowledge Don Baltasar as one of Spain's premier diplomats and the master of the Byzantine politics of the Holy Roman Empire. He finished his successful mission to Frankfurt by traveling to the court of Brussels and marrying, after a long courtship, a youthful and attractive Flemish lady-in-waiting, Ottilie Claërhout.

A fashionable man and ever-vigilant about preserving the dignity of office, Zúñiga dressed for the portrait in an exceptionally wide doublet and coat with military epaulets,

¹Jan Biatostocki, The Art of the Renaissance in Eastern Europe: Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976), 78. The castle was built for the secretary of Charles V.

²This was strongly indicated by another portrait that hangs in Nelahozeves of Zúñiga's good friend, Zdenek Vojtech Popel of Lobkovic, painted in 1600 by the great German artist of Rudolph II's court, Bartholomäus Spranger. There is a copy of Lobkovic's portrait reprinted in Thomas DaCosta Kaufman, The School of Prague: Painting at the Court of Rudolph II (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 272.

proudly displaying around his neck (as Spanish statesmen usually did on such occasions) his insignia from the Order of Santiago--the most exclusive of the Spanish chivalric orders. One is struck with the youthful good looks for a man in his fifties which suggested ample reason for the reputation he had earned with the ladies throughout his bachelor years. Only the soft streaks of gray in his perfectly trimmed beard and the beginnings of a receding hairline hinted that he had managed to delay the pleasures of domesticity to a fairly late date. The firm structure of his long nose and high aristocratic forehead framed two perfectly nebulous eyes; no gleam of ambition or appetite for power escaped from under his half-closed lids. But, as the Count of La Roca, a contemporary historian who knew him, said of Don Baltasar, "although he seemed to be asleep, he was not asleep within."³ This phlegmatic expression never failed Zúñiga. In negotiations with intransigent foreign princes, under flailing attack from court enemies, or in eminent peril on the battlefield, the same remarkable composure and stolid calm met every affront.

In that moment not long before he ended his brilliant diplomatic career and took up the burden of running the vast Spanish Habsburg empire from Madrid, Don Baltasar could look upon the European world he had experienced so fully for half a century and believe that he understood it and the men in it perfectly well. He had, however, an incomplete understanding. For Zúñiga was the consummate European in an international empire. While the world changed around Madrid and himself, he comprehended the human details and the subtle manipulations of European power politics better than the larger economic and social purposes of the Spanish world empire he would feel so competent to guide. Perhaps to criticize the man for being such a perfect reflection of his experiences is unfair. Don Baltasar, however, punctuated his immense self-assuredness with numerous moments of intense pessimism throughout his career, as if he knew that the responsibilities left to

³Juan Antonio de Vera y Figueroa, Count of La Roca, *Fragmentos históricos de la vida de D. Gaspar de Guzmán*, in *Semanario erudito*, ed. Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor (Madrid: Don Blas Roman, 1787-91), 2: 162.

Spanish statesmen in the early years of the seventeenth century were more than reason could expect. Nevertheless, he could not bring himself to question the political assumptions he inherited from previous Spanish imperial generations and steadfastly, almost fatalistically, pursued. For him and the men of "Spain's last great imperial generation,"⁴ the most unimpeachable of these assumptions were the commitments of the Spanish state affirmed in his youth during the reign of that most Spanish of kings, Philip II.

In April of 1621, as he confidently strode the halls of the Royal Palace in Madrid, Philip IV's new minister of foreign affairs Don Baltasar de Zúñiga informed the Genoese ambassador of the goals of the new government of his young sovereign, Philip IV--"to restore everything to the way it was in the reign of Philip II."⁵ Nobles and common people alike embraced these pronouncements. In the last two decades Spaniards had become disgusted with the lax and corrupt government of the former king Philip III and his favorite, the Duke of Lerma Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas. By 1621 the people had invested a legendary stature to the austere rule of Philip II. Don Baltasar spoke with more authority on the subject of Philip II than the other half of the new government, his nephew and political colleague, the third Count of Olivares Don Gaspar de Guzmán, the much-favored confidante of the impressionable, young king Philip IV. Olivares was eleven when Philip II died, and, for him and the royal grandson, this Habsburg monarch was only an alluring metaphor for greatness. Don Baltasar, however, had lived thirty-seven of his forty-two years in Philip II's reign. The Spain he understood, the *Monarchia* (as the Spaniards called their empire), governed in the proper "way," was that of his youth.

⁴Elliott, 483.

⁵Archivio di Stato, Genoa, *Lettere Ministri*, Spagna, 2429, dispatch, 6 April 1621, quoted in John H. Elliott, The Count- duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), 82.

In 1559, Philip II returned to Spain after fourteen years spent at his father Charles V's side sorting out the problems of empire. He would never leave the Iberian peninsula again during the next thirty-nine years. Zúñiga was born two years into this long reign, and his youth and early manhood were spent under the careful and firm rule of the king whom the Spanish would soon refer to as "*El Prudente*"--the Prudent One. In 1561 Philip II was already well on the way to settling two matters which established the parameters of his future policy and distinguished it from that of his father.⁶ The first he had already accomplished with the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis (1559) which ended his father's interminable wars with the French. The second agreement was the third and final session of the Council of Trent convoked in 1561 and adjourned in 1564. Between the two matters, the royal patrimonial borders and religious boundaries of Europe were definitively set. These two agreements signaled that Philip would not try to take up the imperial manifest destiny of his father. As the perceptive Venetian ambassador Michele Suriano reported in 1559, Philip's aim was "not to wage war so that he can add to his kingdoms, but to wage peace so that he can keep the lands he has."⁷ But he might have added "and to make sure that others did the same." For ironically, while Philip's arrangement of this new political order and his return to Spain were tacit acknowledgments that he would not pursue his father's dream of a European and Catholic empire, his actions justified his role in European politics by requiring that the preminent Catholic and most powerful king in Europe could and would use his formidable governmental and military apparatus to maintain that political stability without change. Two generations of Spaniards in Europe, including many of Zúñiga's family, devoted their careers and lives to that purpose.

One of many nobles whom Philip was soon to call upon in his struggle to conserve and preserve the political and religious *status quo* of Europe was Zúñiga's own father Don

⁶Ibid., Table: "Houses of Guzmán, Haro and Zúñiga," between pp. 18 and 19.

⁷Peter Pierson, Philip II (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975), 131.

Jerónimo de Fonseca y Zúñiga, the fourth Count of Monterrey, a prominent noble of Galician ancestry.⁸ When in 1561 it appeared that the two other great Catholic lay powers--France and the Holy Roman Empire--wanted to relax the dogmatic positions of the Council of Trent's previous two sessions to make them more palatable to Protestants in their countries, Philip sent a flurry of special envoys, brilliant Jesuit theologians, and ambassadors, among them the Count of Monterrey. They persuaded, bribed, and prodded the Pope, the cardinal-representatives, and Philip's fellow Catholic princes into the uncompromising positions finally published in the Tridentine reforms.⁹ Instead of reconciliation with the Protestants, the third Council inspired the Counter-reformation which in the next three decades revived Catholicism in Germany and kept the French and Austrian secular governments in the Catholic camp.

Don Jerónimo, however, did not live to see the results of his contribution. He died in 1562 (whether in Spain or Germany is not known) at the age of forty leaving behind his wife, Doña Inés de Velasco y Tovar, and three children--eleven-year-old Doña María, Don Gaspar, who became the fifth Count of Monterrey at the age of two, and Don Baltasar.¹⁰ It was very likely that Zúñiga's father never saw his second son. Their mother began the arduous process of protecting her husband's estates and providing for the future of her three small children. In meeting these twin responsibilities, Doña Inés would depend heavily on her family.

Aristocracy in early modern Spain depended on two things--hereditary lands and marital connections with families at least as great as one's own, if not more powerful. The revenue from the first was of much more value to an older than a younger son since

⁸Emilio González López, Siempre de negro. Galicia en la contra-reforma: el reinado de Felipe II (Vigo: Editorial Galaxia, 1970), 207.

⁹For the particular relations of Ferdinand II with these ambassadors, see Bohdan Chudoba, "Las relaciones de las dos cortes absburguesas en la tercera asamblea del Concilio Tridentino," Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 103 (1933): 297-363.

¹⁰Elliott, Count-duke, Table between pp. 18 and 19.

Spain's hereditary laws were governed by the *mayorazgo*--the eldest son inherited all. In 1562, Don Jerónimo left to his son Don Gaspar a castle and lands near Monterrey, the family seat in the Galician province of Orense near the Portuguese border, as well as *estados señoriales*--noble family properties--in the province of Salamanca, including the towns of Linares and Santo Domingo, a cluster of seven small towns northeast of the city of Salamanca, and Tarazona on the road to Valladolid, as well as estates in the province of Zamora. Although Galician, the Monterrey resided in the old Castilian city of Salamanca. The splendid family palace lay halfway between the Cathedral and University districts and the main plaza on the *Calle de la Compañía* in the heart of one of the most beautiful and learned cities of Castile.¹¹

The Zúñigas were related to most of the principal families of Galicia--the Ulloa, Pimentel, Córdoba, Vélez, and Acevedo--and were second only in that province to the counts of Lemos in their wealth and influence.¹² In Salamanca and Zamora, however, their *señoriales* were dwarfed by the great estates of the dukes of Alba and Albuquerque, as well as by their kinsmen and the leaders of the Zúñiga clan, the dukes of Béjar and counts of Miranda.¹³

In the sixteenth century the counts of Monterrey aligned themselves with some of the principal families of Castile through advantageous marriages. Chief among these was Doña Inés' family, the Velasco, the dukes of Frías and Constables of Castile. The Velasco owed these exalted titles to the Trastámara kings--Juan II and Isabel the Catholic--and maintained them through their monopoly of the rich customs of the Cantabrian ports, which they administered through the family seat at Burgos. Over the course of the

¹¹Dolores Mateos, *La España del antiguo régimen: Salamanca* (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1966), *hoy num.* 10.

¹²*Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana*, 1930 ed., s. v. "Zúñiga (Baltasar de)."

¹³The Dukes of Béjar were among the largest sheep-owners in Spain, and the government-sanctioned monopoly on herding lands--the *mesta*--made them wealthy.

sixteenth century, their positions in Castilian society had been somewhat diluted by the policies of Philip and his ancestors.¹⁴ But the Velasco were still a family highly respected and could count themselves amongst the greatest of Spanish families--the *grandees*. The wealthiest magnate of Andalusia, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, married his eldest daughter Ana de Aragon to the fifth Duke of Frías Iñigo Fernandez de Velasco y Tovar. Their daughter Doña Inés was Zúñiga's mother. Given the early loss of her husband, Doña Inés very likely turned to her powerful father to help her administer the estates and arrange the marriages of her two elder children. In 1579, her daughter Doña María Pimentel de Fonseca married a rising star, Don Enrique de Guzmán, the second Count of Olivares, a close relative of the family of Don Iñigo's nephew, the seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. Shortly after, Don Iñigo married his younger daughter Doña Inés de Velasco y Aragon to his grandson, Don Gaspar, the fifth Count of Monterrey.

These extended family alliances of sixteenth-century Spain protected *señorial* property rights and helped their members to gain access to the King, therefore controlling patronage at court. When in the ascent, the family alliance brought its political and even cultural ideas to prominence at court and in Castile. The counts of Monterrey, through marital connections, strengthened their alliance with one of two factions which dominated the councils and court of the early part of Philip II's reign. These were known as the "Eboli" and "Alba" parties. The first was led by the Prince of Eboli, a good friend of the King in his youth, who married into the clan of the Mendoza which included the Dukes of Francavilla and Infantado and the Marquis of Mondéjar. Their allies were the Velasco, the Zúñiga of Castile which included the traditional enemies of the Alba, the Duke of Béjar and Count of Miranda,¹⁵ and the Guzmán of which the Duke of Medina Sidonia and the

¹⁴Ferdinand and Isabel excluded the greater nobility from the Council of Castile--one of the principal governing bodies--making the office of Constable more honorific than powerful. Philip II took the custom houses away from the Duke of Frías in 1559.

Count of Olivares were most important. The Alba faction included the house of Toledo, both the Duke of Alba and the Marquis of Villafranca, the Enríquez who held the hereditary rank of Admirals of Castile, the Enríquez de Guzmán known as the Counts of Alba y Liste, and the Pacheco who claimed the title Marquis of Cerralbo.¹⁶

John H. Elliott has suggested that, in the first two decades of Philip II's reign, such factions were an important element in the debate over the nature of Spain's relationship to the rest of Europe which he has called the "closed" and "open" Spain policy. The Alba party represented conservative or "closed" ideas, demanding that the King conform the various parts of his empire to Castilian law, employ and trust only Castilian representatives in those parts, concentrate on Castile and her economic and social needs, embrace Castilian ways and culture, and reject liberal, and specifically humanist, ideas from Europe. The Eboli party, with the Mendoza at its heart, favored an "open" Spain policy which adopted a more flexible political approach to the far-reaching parts of the empire by allowing non-Castilian communities their measure of independent laws or *fueros*, a commitment to see to the welfare of the Empire over Castile, and an esthetic which welcomed European, especially humanist, ideas.¹⁷

¹⁵Peter Pierson, Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989), 14. The Prince of Eboli's wife was a Zúñiga and related to the Béjar and Miranda.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁷Elliott has also suggested that the source of some of this factional tension may be located in the Succession Wars (1504-10) and the Revolt of the Communities (1520-21). See J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), 254-55. Helen Nader has criticized historians, including Elliott, for their easy acceptance of the notion that the origins of the Spanish Renaissance were Italian in origin and were imported by the Catholic kings and Charles V. She does, however, find Elliott's idea of the link between the political party of which the Mendoza were a part and the conception of the "open" Spain interesting. According to Nader, the members of the political elite who later adopted "open" Spain policy were those who followed the Duke of Infantado, leader of the Mendoza, and the Constable of Castile in their successful suppression of the rebelling community members who advocated an intensely nationalist and anti-European politics against Charles V. The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350 to 1550 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1979), 5; *ibid.*, 192.

Although Philip certainly tended toward the more conservative ethic and gave that party heart by removing his court to Castile in 1559 and spending the early years of his reign focused on Castile's problems, he never wholly employed one approach over the other. While he drove the Inquisition to an intolerant line on heresy, especially early in his reign, he allowed Dominican zealots and humanists to do enough political damage to each other to give both hope of his favor. His extremely formal sense of justice would not allow him to disregard the rights and privileges of the respective countries in his monarchy, but he appointed much larger numbers of Castilians viceroys and governors than his predecessors. Above all he was committed to his own compromise with his father's imperial legacy and was determined to leave to his successors a Europe in exactly the same division of patrimony and religion in which he had both found and arranged it at Câteau-Cambrésis and the Council of Trent.

By following policies which fluctuated between these two sides, Philip's early reign was a stage for this vigorous and complex debate which, as Elliott has correctly observed, continued as the *leitmotif* in Spanish politics throughout the Habsburg period.¹⁸ The men of the Eboli and Alba parties, however, did not hold pure positions. It would be too simple to characterize them as respectively "peace" and "war" parties, as historians have often done. The debate also was not a purely ideological one for its participants; they all either trimmed their sails as political expediency or their own survival required or advocated politics which combined elements of both policies.¹⁹ Nevertheless, Don

¹⁸Fernand Braudel has noted that Philip encouraged the contention between the parties in order to give himself a fuller view of problems in the Empire but never held firm to either position, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), 2: 1177.

¹⁹A good example of the way Eboli and Alba policies mixed is in John H. Elliott, Count-duke. A general thesis of Elliott's work was that Olivares was forced by the demands of the Thirty Years' War and his desire to keep Spain's hand in European politics to adopt the "Castilianization" of the Empire, though he himself believed that the government of the monarchy should be a composite of its parts rather than Castilian-dominated.

Baltasar grew up in a political environment where all the leading noble men of his family inclined toward an "open" Spain policy, most served in Europe, and many advocated the infusion of European culture and political ideas in Castile. Most important, while these men did not necessarily advocate Charles V's imperial dream of a Christian Europe under one monarch, they were dedicated to the preservation of the Spanish presence in Europe in both the Netherlands and Italy, a commitment, especially in the case of the Netherlands, which was often criticized. These "open" ideas were further reinforced by the education young Zúñiga received in his birthplace, Salamanca, the home also of Spain's greatest and most secular university--the University of Salamanca.

During the 1560s and early 1570s, partly due to policy of Philip II's making and partly to events themselves, Spain and especially the University of Salamanca went through a conservative period of intense introspection and intolerance. Four events influenced and formed the thinking of the time--the increase in the stridency of the Inquisition under Philip's direction, the revolt of Protestants in the Low Countries and the Duke of Alba's campaign to repress it, the first revolt of the *Alpujarras* (a Muslim movement in Spain), and the Ottoman campaign of attacks in the western Mediterranean. In this uncompromising and xenophobic climate, Salamanca suffered a great deal. Leading humanist professors at the University, such as Fray Luís de León, were imprisoned, and Teresa de Avila, always a target of the Inquisition, discovered that the founding of a house in Salamanca in the early 1570s was among her more trying ordeals, due to the infighting of various religious orders over instruction at the University.²⁰

But by the late 1570s the local threat of the *Alpujarras* revolt was eliminated, Philip defeated the Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571, and the Duke of Alba's oppressive campaign in the Low Countries (1567-74) failed to bring the Protestant rebels to heel.

²⁰Victoria Lincoln, *Teresa: A Woman. A Biography of Teresa of Avila* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1984), 150. She received a reprieve from the intense politics at Salamanca by staying at the home of the Countess of Monterrey.

And, most important for Salamanca, Cardinal Quiroga, a moderate loosely allied with the Eboli faction at court, became Inquisitor General and then Archbishop of Toledo. He freed León among others and even allowed Fray Diego de Zúñiga, a relation of the family born in Salamanca, to present the ideas of Copernicus on the movement of celestial bodies at the University, where it was both accepted and taught.²¹ Thus Zúñiga attended a University of Salamanca somewhat chastened but defiantly secular and still a leading factor in the Humanist movement in Spain.²²

The titled nobility of Castile did not generally send their sons to university, preferring to educate them at home. Occasionally, they sent a younger son for an ecclesiastical education, but, for the most part, viewed the universities as a place to train priests and lawyers. The counts of Monterrey, however, had a long tradition of sending their sons to university and usually to the University of Salamanca.²³ Perhaps the family, living in such close proximity with the institution, engendered this connection, and that may well explain contemporary historian Virgilio Malvezzi's curious play on words when he said that Zúñiga "studied where he was born because he was born where he studied."²⁴ As a leading noble family of the city, the Monterrey no doubt entertained both prominent members of the University and their eminent guests. But the Zúñiga of Salamanca also seemed to have a great love of books and education. Their family brought the printing

²¹Enciclopedia Ilustrada, s.v. "Zúñiga, Diego de."

²²Eventually, Salamanca and all the universities of Spain would succumb to both the domination of monastic orders and a professional and legalistic orthodoxy associated with obtaining good offices in the Imperial service, but this process had only just begun in 1550 and took a century to complete. Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modern Spain (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 196-230.

²³ *Ibid.*, 183.

²⁴Virgilio Malvezzi, História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV, with an "*estudio preliminar*" by D. L. Shaw (London: Tamesis Books, 1968), 86. This edition includes only the third and fourth books of Malvezzi's História.

press to Galicia.²⁵ Their family ancestor, Archbishop Alonso III (de Fonseca Ulloa) was a noted humanist who had corresponded with the great Erasmus. He founded colleges at both the Universities of Santiago de Compostela in Galicia and Salamanca and founded the influential Jesuit college in the town of Monterrey, the Zúñiga family seat in Galicia.²⁶ Zúñiga's older brother Don Gaspar supposedly studied with Jesuit teachers in his youth which, if true, implied that such instruction was also available to Don Baltasar since they were only a year apart in age.²⁷ Thus, Zúñiga from an early age absorbed culture and education in an urbane and sophisticated environment within a family circle richer in worldly ways than material goods.

In the 1570s the city of Salamanca was filled with students, for in this decade the University of Salamanca experienced the height of its enrollment. Don Baltasar probably enrolled at the University in 1579 when his brother and sister married.²⁸ If Zúñiga followed the usual course of study for the sons of the nobility, he did not take a degree but studied law for two or three years as a helpful preparation for a career in high office. Additionally, he enjoyed an aristocratic life at university which was in great contrast to the rest of the student body. Most university students were impoverished, pursuing degrees that would lead to careers in the legal profession and government. The young nobles, on the other hand, took a few years of education with no pressure to achieve a degree and hired tutors to assist them and attend their lectures if need be. Many indulged in whatever stimulating activity caught their fancy, which at the boisterous University at that time could be rakish and even dangerous behavior. In any given year the number of noblemen

²⁵González López, 210.

²⁶Enciclopedia Ilustrada, 1930 ed., s. v. "Fonseca (Alonso III de)."

²⁷Diccionario Porrúa de Historia, biografía y geografía de México, 1976 ed., s. v. "Zúñiga y Acevedo, Gaspar de."

²⁸Kagan, 176. This is based on Kagan's estimation that the median age was about 18 years.

could be as few as one or two, and students tended to emulate them in whatever they did.

Zúñiga, however, seemed to have been an attentive, if privileged, student. Though he left no account of his student days, his activities could be surmised by the list of instructions which Zúñiga's brother-in-law, the Count of Olivares, sent to the tutor of his son Don Gaspar de Guzmán in January of 1601, when he sent them to the University of Salamanca. The details of the instructions are such that one wondered how Don Enrique, who never attended Salamanca himself, became so knowledgeable. Very likely, Don Baltasar was the source of his information. In October of the previous year, the Count of Olivares was with Zúñiga in Brussels on a special mission for the King and, probably already having in mind his son's matriculation, discussed the matter with his brother-in-law.²⁹

Therefore, Don Enrique's letter was probably a good indication of those things that Zúñiga himself thought were most valuable about his Salamanca education. Olivares prescribed a strict regimen for the son with numerous warnings about the bad influences in the university environment. He emphasized diligent study in Latin "because everyone insists upon the importance of this."³⁰ And he insisted that his son "go to the cloister and hear the questions put by his fellow-scholars to the master at the pillar in order to get one's difficulties solved, and to understand the subject better, which will encourage him to study with care so that he too can argue with the master."³¹ Whether Zúñiga actually practiced at Salamanca what he advised to relatives is not known, but a mastery of both Latin and

²⁹Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Ambrosio Spínola, primer marqués de los Balbases (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico Fortanet, 1904), 25; Henri Lonchay and Julian Cuvelier, Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII siecle (Brussels: P. Kiessling, 1923), 1: 49.

³⁰Biblioteca Nacional Madrid MS. 10,846, f. 1-23, "*Instrucción que Don Enrique de Guzmán . . . dió a Don Laureano de Guzmán . . .*", 7 January 1601, quoted in Elliott, Count-duke, 16.

³¹"*Instucción que dio D. Enrique de Guzmán, conde de Olivares a D. Laureano de Guzmán*" in J. García Mercadal, Estudiantes, sopistas y pícaros, 71, quoted in Marcelin Defourneaux, Daily Life in Spain in the Golden Age, trans. Newton Branch (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1979), 167.

intellectual discussion were accomplishments that he displayed later in life and were probably developed by such studious standards and habits at the University.

If at Salamanca Don Baltasar already entertained aspirations of the politico-military career he later pursued, the formal education he received was not a necessity. The only means by which he could have obtained the wealth, prestige, and title that his older brother was born to and second sons of Castilian nobility usually aspired to was through the patronage of the king as a reward for exceptional service. A good example of this was Don Enrique's father, Don Pedro de Guzmán, who was made the first Count of Olivares by Charles V in gratitude for his services to the crown. But *secunderos*--second sons of the nobility--usually did this through military services. From medieval times noblemen in Spain were known as the class of *capa y espada*--the cloak and the sword--serving their king through military careers. Ferdinand and Isabel and their successors preferred to fill their government councils with *letrados*--the formally educated--provided by universities, especially the University of Salamanca. This did not tempt the aristocracy to obtain formal education, however, and the policy was known to have caused some tension between the kings and the aristocracy who naturally wanted all the offices for their relations. But the Spanish monarchs traditionally reserved the most prestigious offices--the Council of State and the offices of viceroy and governor--to the nobility, educated or not, and preferably with military background and experience. Certainly, education was of value in a diplomatic career where more *letrados* could be found, but Zúñiga probably could have obtained diplomatic posts with the assistance of his influential relatives with or without a formal education. Don Baltasar's tenure at Salamanca was more likely the family's expression of the humanist perspective (favored by the Catholic kings and the Habsburgs as well) which held that the man who combined letters and a life of worldly experience was the best civic leader--the cloak, the sword, and the robe.

Don Baltasar engaged in numerous activities throughout his life, demonstrating that he aspired to be just such a man. While on diplomatic assignment in Flanders at the

turn of the century, Zúñiga corresponded in Latin with the famed philologist and philosopher Justus Lipsius, who was widely regarded in his time as one of the successors to Erasmus. Lipsius preserved his extensive correspondence, and one of his four letters to Zúñiga proclaimed the Spanish diplomat to be the model of a civic man in the humanist tradition. "Whenever you have free time from the business of the King and the public, you dedicate yourself to letters and to your mind and, in turn, devote your efforts to the government or your leisure to the Muses."³²

Zúñiga who was known by his contemporaries as a "lover of men of study and letters in a grand style" may also have been the inspiration for the famous and large library which his nephew the Count-duke of Olivares collected in the seventeenth century.³³ Olivares' library contained the complete editions of Lipsius as well as the large number of philosophical works on Stoicism which probably came from the library of his uncle.³⁴ Not content to collect the works of and correspond with leading authors, Zúñiga also tried his hand at translating into Spanish the Essays of Michel de Montaigne.³⁵ Zúñiga was not the

³²Alejandro Ramirez, Epistolario de Justo Lipsio y los españoles 1577-1606 (Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1966), 320. Lipsius went on to elucidate the humanist thesis that the nobility would govern better if they were educated men. He bemoaned the sorry state of education of the nobility and the fact that formal education had become the province of the "vulgar classes." He pronounced Zúñiga a model for the aristocracy, "an ornament for them, a support for the country, and that matters would be administered with better prudence and certainty" by following his example. Unfortunately, Lipsius preserved only copies of letters which he sent to others, and Zúñiga's letters to Lipsius are not extant.

³³Real Academia de la Historia, "*Colección Salazar y Castro*," f. 121.

³⁴According to Theodore Corbett, "The Cult of Lipsius: A Leading Source of Early Modern Spanish Statecraft," Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (January-March 1975): 150, these books were published in Antwerp during the years 1599-1602. While Olivares' father Enrique de Guzmán was in Flanders on a mission for Philip III in 1600 for a few months, the publication dates of the books correspond more exactly with Zúñiga's tour in Flanders, which suggested that the books either belonged to Zúñiga or he purchased them for his brother-in-law. For Guzmán's mission, see Lonchay, 49.

³⁵Juan Marichal, "*Montaigne en España*," Nueva Revista de Filología Española 7 (1953): 260. Marichal's information comes from a later and more complete translation of the Essays which Diego de Cisneros completed in 1626. Cisneros referred to the previous translation by "Don Baltasar de Zúñiga from the King's Council of State."

first diplomat in Spain to make European classics more available to Spaniards. Bernardino de Mendoza, the brilliant ambassador to both the governments of Elizabeth I and Henry III, spent his last retired years in Spain translating Justus Lipsius' manual for the conduct of Christian princes, *Politicorum*, from Latin into Spanish. Mendoza made his own opinion on the subject of the education of the nobility well known by dedicating the book "to the Spanish nobility who do not understand the Latin tongue."³⁶ This was a pointed reference, for the factor which separated *letrados* from most of the nobility was literacy and fluency in Latin. Though Zúñiga's work did not survive, the portion of the *Essays* he seemed to have translated were from Montaigne's popular first book which was a virtual guide to the ideal politician and *cortesano*--gentleman of the court.³⁷

The esthetic of literature and philosophy may have attracted Zúñiga, but the reality of political ambition led him to a military career. And the early 1580s were a particularly heady time for Spanish arms. After two difficult decades, Spain seemed to move outward in everyway but especially in military adventurism. Revenues from the Indies dramatically increased in the late 1570s and early 1580s, the dramatic reforms of the viceroy system brought the colonies under better administrative control, and the domestic economy improved. The Duke of Parma Alexander Farnese, Philip's nephew, led a dogged campaign to subdue the Dutch rebels and seemed on the verge of victory in the early 1580s. In the worst period of her civil wars, Spain's archenemy France threatened nobody but herself. Finally, Philip II inherited the Portuguese crown in 1580, and, when the Portuguese proved to be reluctant subjects, he marched an army across the border in 1581 and conquered them. Zúñiga's brother Don Gaspar along with his fellow Galician nobleman the Count of Lemos Don Pedro Fernández de Castro raised troops which they

³⁶Henry Ettinghausen, *Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 13.

³⁷Marichal speculated that this was the portion translated because it was also the part of the *Essays* which was most popular among the nobility in France (261). The matter of the circumstances of the translation is discussed further in chapter 3 note 6 of the present study.

used to control the north of Portugal while the Dukes of Alba and Medina Sidonia marched into the south and Lisbon.³⁸

Thus, at the formative age of twenty, Zúñiga perceived a Spain which seemed capable of anything. His brother eventually chose a career which led him to the New World and a distinguished career as viceroy in both New Spain (Mexico) and Peru.³⁹ And perhaps had Zúñiga chosen to go west, he would have had a different perspective of the Spanish empire.⁴⁰ But instead he began his career in the east, in the Old World, influenced by the members of his family, the Constable and the Count of Olivares, who were masters of European politics and Spanish arms.

Zúñiga left Spain in 1582 for Naples in order to serve on the staff of the viceroy, the first Duke of Osuna Don Pedro Tellez Girón, his mother's uncle.⁴¹ In going to Naples, Zúñiga placed himself in the midst of Spain's vast military network in Europe which was situated in the Spanish-held kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (called the kingdom of the Two Sicilies) and the duchy of Milan. In Philip's reign, *presidios*--fortresses--were established in Spanish Italy to train troops for a year before they were dispatched to garrisons in the

³⁸González López, 207-10.

³⁹Philip named the Count of Monterrey viceroy of New Spain on 28 May 1595. Monterrey's tenure is primarily known for his efforts to extend exploration. He continued the excursions into New Mexico and sent Sebastian Vizcaino to *Alta California* (presently the state of California) in 1596. This first exploration was not a success, but the Count of Monterrey sent him again in 1602, and Vizcaino extended the Spanish territory as far as the Cape of Mendocino. He established a Pacific naval post at the bay and city he named for his mentor. The city of Monterrey in México is also named after him. In April 1604 Don Gaspar took over the office of viceroy of Peru. Though he established a reputation for honesty, he was unable to accomplish much because of his early death in March of 1606. Information about the fifth Count of Monterrey has been derived from the following sources: *Diccionario Porrúa*, 2354; *Enciclopedia de México*, 1970 ed., s. v., "Zúñiga y Acevedo, Gaspar de"; González López, 207-10.

⁴⁰The same type of discussion is made in Braudel, 2: 1184-85, concerning the historical importance of the conquest of Portugal, especially Philip's opportunity to orient his whole empire completely toward the Atlantic by moving his capital to Lisbon. Also see his discussion of the survival of the Spanish and Ottoman Empires and Spain's lost opportunity to "turn whole-heartedly to the Atlantic" (702-3).

⁴¹Malvezzi, 86; for Osuna's tenure, Feliciano Barrios, *El consejo de la monarquía española, 1521-1812* (Madrid: Consejo de Estado, 1984), 329.

Low Countries and naval ports in the western Mediterranean--the centers of Spanish hegemony in Europe. Zúñiga learned first-hand how to recruit, ready, and deploy troops, outfit navies, and, also, govern a subject empire.

By late 1586, however, unusual orders began to arrive from Madrid to gather supplies, commandeer ships, and prepare troops to be sent not to northern Europe but to Cádiz, the naval port on the southern coast of Spain, for the coming spring. Though the exact details of the mission were relatively secret, few did not comprehend that the Spanish king was readying an assault on England in retaliation for Elizabeth I's open support of the King's Dutch rebels in the Low Countries. In December 1586, the viceroys of Naples and Sicily gathered together troops from their garrisons and prepared four Neapolitan galleasses to send to the Duke of Medina Sidonia. They were to be accompanied by two greatships with the *tercio*--corps--of Don Alonso de Luzón from the Naples garrisons.⁴² While Medina Sidonia fitted out the Andalusian squadron of ships and awaited the rendezvous of the Levantine squadron, the English sea captain Sir Francis Drake attacked the gathering force at Cádiz in April 1587 and harassed shipping off the Azores in the following months, keeping the Atlantic fleet at sea. If, as seemed likely, Zúñiga was a part of the Neapolitan contingent, he did not arrive in Cádiz until July of 1587.⁴³ Medina Sidonia sent this squadron onto Lisbon, but the Great Armada did not sail in 1587 as had been planned. Drake's diversionary tactics succeeded in keeping it in port, and the "Enterprise of England," as Philip and his advisors referred to the plan, had to wait until the sailing season of the coming year.

In the spring of 1588, Zúñiga was assigned as a staff officer to the flagship of the Armada, a Portuguese galleon named *San Martín*. When Philip's best sea captain, the

⁴²Cesareo Fernández Duro, *La armada invencible* (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1884-85), 1: 335, "Instrucciones del virrey de Nápoles á Don Juan de Acuña."

⁴³Pierson, *Commander*, 74..

Marquis of Santa Cruz died in the winter of 1588, he selected a new commander for the Armada and captain for the *San Martín*, the Duke of Medina Sidonia Don Alonso Perez de Guzmán.⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, Medina Sidonia brought Zúñiga aboard the command galleon because he was related to the Duke not only through the Constable of Castile but also through Zúñiga's brother-in-law and Medina Sidonia's cousin, the Count of Olivares who at the time was ambassador to the Holy See and handling the secret negotiations for financing the Armada with Pope Sixtus V. The Duke also had selected Zúñiga's uncle and the younger brother of the Constable, Don Bernardino de Velasco, to serve with him as well.⁴⁵ In all, the *San Martín* had forty-three officers, twice the number of the other ships.⁴⁶ Zúñiga and Velasco were stationed on the aft castle along with a contingent of seven other nobles in order to be available to Medina Sidonia should the need arise.⁴⁷ Almost certainly, these men were also chosen to stand beside the Duke because of their loyalty through familial or personal connections with the him and their absolute dependability as fighting men to protect the lead galleon, its commander, and the standard of the fleet whenever they came into danger, inspiring a faith in Don Pedro that he would have to rely upon on numerous occasions during the horrible ten days the Armada spent in the English Channel.

The contemporary historian Virgilio Malvezzi said that Don Baltasar left the military profession "at his first encounter with a shipwreck."⁴⁸ The "shipwreck" he

⁴⁴Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker, *The Spanish Armada* (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 186.

⁴⁵Pierson, *Commander*, 102.

⁴⁶Fernández Duro, 1: 428, "*Relación de la gente del mar que se halló en los diez galleones . . . á 1 de marzo de 1588.*"

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 2: 47, "*Orden de defensa del galeón Real*"; Medina Sidonia also listed the number of members of household which the noblemen brought with them. In Zúñiga's case he brought six *criados* who could fight, see *ibid.*, "*Relación de las galleones, navíos, pataches y zabras,*" 67.

⁴⁸Malvezzi, 86.

referred to was the Armada. Zúñiga actually continued intermittently in military service for some time after 1588, but Malvezzi was not far wrong about the spiritual effect of the Armada experience on not only Zúñiga but the great number of Spaniards who participated in it. Within a the year, half of the 29,435 men aboard 130 ships which sailed out of Corunna on 21 July 1588 would be dead.⁴⁹ On the *capitana general San Martín*, of the 300 soldiers and 177 mariners who sailed, 180 would die either in battle or from the arduous conditions of storm and starvation on the voyage back to Spain.⁵⁰

While most of the men, and particularly the nobles, dreamed of the generosity and patronage that Philip II was bound to extend to them should they succeed in their great voyage, few realized that the "Enterprise of England" was a gamble beyond anything their ancestors had known in the fields of Granada, Pavia, and St. Quentin. Their disillusionment would be commensurately extreme. Medina Sidonia and experienced sailing men, however, had other visions. Those few who had experienced Channel crossings and noted the Armada's slow progress in the comparatively simple journey up the Portuguese and Galician coasts may have had premonitions of the Armada's future difficulties. Twice, due to storms, the unequal sailing qualities of the various ships on the open sea, and the difficulty of commanding the immense number of crafts, the Armada scattered before it was able to enter the harbor at Corunna. On 27 June a council of the ship captains and Medina Sidonia recommended that Philip abandon the "Enterprise," but the King, with his usual obstinacy once he determined on something, ignored them. The Armada sailed toward England and into ignominious history on 21 July 1588. In the next sixty days Zúñiga was both an observer and participant in that history. He stood next to Medina Sidonia as every message passed to the Duke's hands, as each council of war convened, and as the Duke commandeered the fleet over ten days of running battle in the

⁴⁹These are Martin and Parker's figures. See chart on pp. 34-5 of The Spanish Armada.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 213.

English Channel when the *San Martín* was the focus of every bombardment from the efforts of Howard, Drake, Hawkins, Seymour and the Royal Navy.

In the first seven days, as they fought their way toward their rendezvous point with Parma at Dunkirk, the Spanish received considerable damage from Lord Howard's ships in the battles off Plymouth, Portland Bill, and the Isle of Wight. But the English had only been able to "pluck off a few feathers," as Howard put it, without actually breaking up or destroying the heart of the Armada--the great galleons of the Portuguese squadron which the Duke of Medina Sidonia led himself. Throughout that week the superior sailors of the *San Martín*, *San Marcos*, *San Felipe*, and *San Mateo* kept their well-constructed ships intact as they fought their way toward Dunkirk to finally anchor off the coast of Calais at 4 o'clock on Saturday, 6 August 1588.

The previous seven days of battle had demonstrated, however, that the Armada had numerous fighting disadvantages against their enemies which many aboard the flagship realized, and historians have recently placed in their proper context.⁵¹ Though the Spanish had superior numbers and an exceptionally strong set of galleons anchoring the Armada, their gunnery was far inferior to the English. In addition, the Spanish tactics were wrong. They expected to employ their guns to damage English ships, come at close quarters by pulling the ships in with grappling hooks, and then defeat the enemy with their superior small-arms fire. The English, however, stubbornly refused to cooperate with that traditional strategy. Instead they came in close range, broad-sided the Spanish hulks with rapid and powerful cannon, and danced away as the Spanish vainly shot after them with their *arquebusses*--long-barreled guns. The evening of 6 August, Medina Sidonia

⁵¹The conclusions are derived from the latest analysis from Martin and Parker with which Pierson concurs, see their chapter "Anatomy of Failure," 162-83. The technical and strategic weakness which they identify are presented in Medina Sidonia's account delivered to the King, ". . . but failed to grapple with them, they using their great guns at very short range, and our men returning the fire with *arquebuss* and musket," which is translated and reprinted in Wm. Laird Clowes. The Royal Navy. A History from the Earliest Times to the Present (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company, 1897), 1: 578.

nervously sent another hurried message to the Duke of Parma at Dunkirk telling him to hurry his force, as he was uncertain how long he could maintain his position on Calais Road.

This worried message revealed another great weakness of the Armada campaign which made its impression on the young Zúñiga and certainly colored his opinion about the Spanish presence in the Channel. Unfamiliar with the conditions and sailing craft of northern Europe, Medina Sidonia was under the impression that Parma's own small flyboats would effectively augment his forces to gain control of the narrow straits between Dunkirk and Dover. But Parma knew that his small fleet could not come out at all unless the Armada effectively controlled the straits from both English and Dutch attack. This was far from the case. Dutch strongholds at Ostend and around the port of Sluys had prevented Parma from ever gaining control of the sea off Flanders. From his point of view, the reason for the Armada was to instantly reverse this long-running problem. Medina Sidonia had survived to make a rendezvous, but he had not made the rendezvous possible. Furthermore, with insufficient advance warning, Parma's forces were unprepared. The next day, Sunday, 7 August, he sent a message to Medina Sidonia that he could not be ready until the coming Friday.

Medina Sidonia was appalled. He knew that to stand off the English Navy that he had battled for seven days for another five off the dangerous shoals of Calais was a task next to impossible. But duty and the knowledge that so much money and prestige had gone into the plan required that the effort must be made. At midnight the English attacked the anchored fleet with fireships. Panic spread and the fleet scattered throughout the night. At dawn, a remarkable scene unfolded. The various and mostly useless fleet of Armada ships chaotically roamed the waters of the Channel to the east seeking formation, while a disciplined *coterie* of five galleons, most from the Portuguese squadron--*San Martín, San Juan, San Felipe, San Mateo, and San Marcos*--stood defiantly between the English Navy and the disoriented fleet. Though the rest of the fleet was finally able to

form around the quintet of ships, most of the "Battle at Gravelines" that day was fought against this group of vessels, and at times, as Medina Sidonia later complained, the great galleons seemed alone.⁵² Drake on his *Revenge* with his squadron close behind led off the battle by sailing directly for the Spanish flagship. At one point a staff officer aboard counted seventeen English ships to port and seven to starboard of the Duke's *capitana*. The *San Martín* felt the brunt of almost two hundred direct hits in the course of the day,⁵³ and according to the account of the ship priest, Father de la Torre, "it rained bullets on all the leading galleons."⁵⁴ The *San Felipe* and *San Mateo* ran aground in the fighting and were captured. Both lost three-fourths of their crews.

For eight hours the English Navy mauled the Armada with close cannon. One thousand Spaniards died and another eight hundred were wounded.⁵⁵ Finally, relief came in the form of exhausted English ammunition stocks, and fighting ceased at about four or five in the afternoon. But the men aboard the Armada still had more troubles ahead. All day a southwesterly pushed the fleet eastward and away from her rendezvous point. As fighting left off, the ships were obliged to sail before the wind toward the unknown and treacherous waters off Zeeland in the Low Countries. Certain that the Spanish would wreck off that coast, the English left them to their fate. Equally certain that they would run aground, the men aboard the *San Martín* did not sleep all that night, "crying to the Virgin to save them," according to Father de la Torre, as he gave them confession.⁵⁶

At mid-morning the next day, their prayers were answered. The wind veered west-southwest, and the Armada pulled away from the dangerous banks of Zeeland. They

⁵²Pierson, *Commander*, 162.

⁵³Martin and Parker, 158.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 159.

⁵⁵Fernández Duro, 2: 405, quoted in *ibid.*, 160.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

now looked to the east toward the North Sea and to the west to the Channel and the English Navy. Medina Sidonia called for a council of war to decide the Armada's next move. Arguments for and against another encounter flowed back and forth. The Duke was clearly reluctant to leave off any of three conflicting duties--to complete his mission or to leave the coasts of Spain defenseless or to squander the bulk of Philip II's navy on useless attempts to gain control of the Channel, especially when the Duke of Parma was still three days from readiness. With such pressures, the Council decided not to decide or rather to let the wind decide for them. If it kept them in the Channel, they might stay. If it blew them into the North Sea, they would head back to Spain via the north route around Scotland.

The indecision left a great strain between officers and sailing men in the fleet, as chivalric values contended with sailor's prudence. The tension was evident the next morning, when the English fleet appeared to approach the Armada. Medina Sidonia ordered the cannon fired to signal the Spanish fleet to formation. Though the English pulled away, the Duke was furious, for some of the Spanish ships did not respond to the formation call. He ordered the tardy ship captains aboard the *San Martin* and demanded an explanation. When nobody could offer an honorable response, Medina Sidonia ordered one of them hanged. That afternoon a *patache*--small ship--sailed through the fleet with the hanging corpse of an unfortunate Andalusian captain swinging from the yard arm. While discipline was restored, Don Pedro returned to his cabin seriously ill from persistent sea-sickness and equally disturbed with a situation in which there seemed no way to retain honor. As the fleet drifted before a wind which steadily took them north for the next ten days, the course of action gradually became obvious. The Duke charted a course with his pilots which would take the fleet around Scotland and Ireland and on to Galicia, ordered the rations shortened, and dictated his famous account, which he aimed to deliver to the King ahead of the fleet. At some point while writing his explanation, Medina Sidonia decided that Don Baltasar de Zúñiga would be its courier.

The young staff officer may have been chosen for several reasons. The most obvious was that he had not been wounded in the battles and was fit enough to make the journey. Second, the destination of the sailing instructions which Don Pedro had given to the Armada ship captains was the ports of Galicia, where Zúñiga's brother and the Count of Lemos were in charge of supplies for the Armada.⁵⁷ In addition to giving Philip II timely news of the Channel defeat, the Duke wanted to alert the Galician ports of the condition of both the men of the fleet and their ships, so that they could be properly provided for on arrival. Third, Zúñiga had seen everything, was apparently witness to the Duke's most intimate thoughts and decision-making, and concurred with Medina Sidonia's analysis of the problems. Medina Sidonia mentioned to the King several times in his account that Zúñiga would be able to provide the details of various actions and decisions.⁵⁸ Last, and probably most important, the Duke took into account that someone would be blamed for the disaster. His personal disaster could easily become a disaster for the family. The campaign to salvage both his reputation and perhaps his fortune would begin with a reliable messenger and loyal family member who could put a decent face on ugly facts before a king whose reaction was unpredictable in that moment.

On 21 August he decided to set ashore at the Shetland Islands for provisions and give Don Baltasar de Zúñiga a fast pinnace to make his way to Spain. It has traditionally been assumed that Zúñiga arrived well ahead of the fleet, but he did not. In fact, the same storms which wrecked a further nineteen of the Duke's vessels off Ireland hindered Zúñiga's small ship from reaching Spanish shores with enough lead time to prepare for the Armada's arrival.⁵⁹ He actually reached the court in Madrid on 23 August, two days after

⁵⁷González López, 208.

⁵⁸Fernández Duro, 2: 225, "*El Duque noticia á S.M. el mal suceso de la jornada, enviándole relación.*"

⁵⁹AGS Estado 165 f. 149, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 27 September 1588, quoted in Martin and Parker, 216, note 6.

the Duke of Medina Sidonia landed at Santander with the first group of ships which struggled into port and the very moment when the captain of the Armada was well enough to sit down and compose his first letter to the King on Spanish soil.

There was no account of Zúñiga's own odyssey at sea, what delayed him and where he landed. The delay was extremely unfortunate, because word did not reach the northern ports of Spain to prepare to feed and care for the sick and starving men of the Armada. Even if Zúñiga had arrived in time, however, the message of support was intended for the ports at Galicia. Unfortunately, the storms had pushed the Armada to ports from Santander in the north of Spain to the Basque countries near the French border. Last-minute efforts to get provisions to the port towns from inland staved off a greater catastrophe.

Equally unknown was Zúñiga's audience with the King, though it was certainly dramatic. The King received scant word of the fate of his ships prior to Zúñiga's arrival at the royal palace at Escorial. There were a few encouraging reports early, but Parma's pessimistic letter of 10 August which the King received on 31 August was enough to dash some of the King's hopes. Still, Parma only reported that the fleet was unable to rendezvous with him and was headed north. Philip's first response as always was to sit down at his desk and compose a useless letter that Medina Sidonia had no chance of receiving: "that God will have allowed some improvement, and that the reputation of everyone (which is now so compromised) may be recovered." Then he underlined the passage and instructed his secretary "to delete what I have underlined, because in what God does, and in what we do for God, there is no gain or loss of reputation. It is better not to speak of such things."⁶⁰ To stand before a king so torn by contrary impulses must have been a harrowing experience.

⁶⁰AGS Estado 2219 f. 84, Philip to Parma, 31 August 1588, quoted in Martin and Parker, 214; *ibid.*, f. 87, Philip to Medina Sidonia, 31 August 1588.

Indeed, Philip's secretaries only summoned the courage to bring him one more discouraging report from a French source which they presented to him with great trepidation on 3 September. Again, his only response was a kind of denial. "I hope that God has not permitted so much evil, for everything has been done for His service," he wrote to the Count of Olivares in Rome.⁶¹ After three weeks of silence, on 24 September, they brought the exhausted Don Baltasar into the King's presence with his letter from Medina Sidonia. The account told only of the battles in the Channel and of the subsequent decision to sail home but did not relate the even worse news of the Irish disaster. The Duke's rendering of the fatal saga at sea, however, could not help but destroy any optimism the King may have had as to the condition of his returning fleet. The first line of his letter read: "This Armada is in such a shattered and ruined condition that it seemed that the best service which could be done now for Your Majesty was to salvage what remained of her."⁶² Zúñiga now saw the King in perhaps one of his greatest moments of despair. Shortly after Zúñiga's interview at court, the King received a letter from Archduke Albert, the governor of Portugal who assisted Medina Sidonia in outfitting the Armada while it was in Lisbon, inquiring after the whereabouts of the Armada. According to the court chronicler, Philip replied, "By this account that the Duke has sent me, you will see what has become of the dream."⁶³

For himself, Don Baltasar decided at the age of twenty-seven to change the direction of his future to a safer occupation--diplomacy. But the personal knowledge he had gained as witness and participant in Spain's greatest naval disaster was not forgotten.

⁶¹AGS Estado 951 f. 97, Philip to Olivares, 5 September 1588, quoted in Martin and Parker, 214.

⁶²Fernández Duro, 2: 228, "Diario": "*Esta Armada quedó tan destrozada y desbaratada, que pareció ser el mayor servicio que se podía hacer a V.M. el salvarla.*"

⁶³Cabrera de Córdoba, História de Felipe Segundo, rey de España (Madrid: Impresores de Cámara de Su Majestad, 1877), 3: 302.

First, there was the folly of sending a force of ships unsuited for sailing conditions in the north and with outdated gunnery. The Spanish had also paid heavily for the lack of a port on Flemish shores. Then there was the contradiction of one of the greatest armies in European history--the Army of Flanders standing on the coast, useless without sufficient naval transports to embark them. In addition to the military problems and almost as important as these was the diplomatic and even psychological loss which Philip II had referred to. The inherently cautious Don Baltasar, who later as diplomat carefully weighed risk ounce for ounce against the political advantage gained, could not have failed to notice that by having gambled too much and losing, Spain also lost a little more of the "reputation" that held one's enemies at bay and one's allies in line. The Armada disaster did not break Spain financially. She in fact sent two more failed armadas to England in the coming decade, stubbornly wanting to erase the defeat of 1588. But now Elizabeth, having tasted blood, was forever more insufferable, Henry III of France less controllable, the Dutch virtually ungovernable, and the Papacy more fickle an ally than ever. The Armada proved that the absolute necessity for a great power such as Spain to win great wars meant that her leaders could neither over prepare nor overestimate the amount and the quality of the force required to do the job.

In 1589 Zúñiga joined his sister and brother-in-law, the Count and Countess of Olivares, at the Spanish embassy in Rome.⁶⁴ The Count had held this position since 1582, and after 1585 had done dogged battle with the irascible Sixtus V to extract one million ducats from the Holy See for the Enterprise of England. The fractious cardinals' disappointment over its failure was intense.⁶⁵ Though the Spanish king had magnanimously forgiven his two commanders, Medina Sidonia and Parma, their partisans across the Catholic world did verbal battle. Now, with his brother-in-law the eyewitness

⁶⁴AGS Estado leg. 1865, *consulta*, 9 September 1617.

⁶⁵Martin and Parker, 97.

to the whole episode, the Count of Olivares defended his cousin Medina Sidonia from the criticism of the argumentative Italians who reveled in the failure of their Spanish master.⁶⁶

For Zúñiga, the trauma of the Armada incident interrupted a long internship in the problems of this contentious Italy. On the one hand, Italy was a portion of Europe thoroughly bound up in the history of Spain from the late medieval period when the kings of Aragon began to extend their sovereignty across the western Mediterranean. Not only did the Italians share history, they shared common goals, including similar languages, the defense of Catholicism, and a common enemy, the Ottoman Turk. Furthermore, Philip had managed the Spanish dominance in Italy in such a way that for the first time in generations the Italians finally enjoyed a few decades of relative peace.

Ironically, the Italians' acceptance of Spanish hegemony began to sour partly because of Philip's success in meeting some of these goals. After the Council of Trent settled the internal struggles over ecclesiastical doctrine and the threat of Ottoman invasion subsided in the 1580s, Italians began to feel the weight of Spanish dominance with a new surliness. Zúñiga witnessed first-hand the new-found discord while in Naples. Bread riots had broken out in the city in May of 1585. The Duke of Osuna, Philip's viceroy, began a systematic repression of the participants, arresting eight hundred and twenty Neapolitans. Panic spread and 12,000 people fled the city.⁶⁷ This and other incidents may have contributed to Zúñiga's more moderate opinions about the ways that subject peoples and allies should be handled. Unlike many Castilians, he was less likely to take an overbearing stance and seemed genuinely concerned with the poor opinion that Europeans had toward Spaniards.

The papacy also had the most ambivalent of relations with Philip II. Seven popes had come and gone during his reign, and the major political problem that Philip and the

⁶⁶The Constable of Castile also supported his cousin by accompanying him on his journey from Santander to Madrid in October of 1588. Pierson, Commander, 174.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 75.

successive popes had, as Roger B. Merriman noted succinctly, was that they were "mutually indispensable."⁶⁸ The popes needed the arms of the only dependable, Catholic lay power in Europe, and Philip needed the revenue of the "Three Graces"--taxes on Spanish ecclesiastical property collected in Spain--which the popes allowed him to retain in order to finance military expeditions on behalf of the Church.⁶⁹ The primary responsibilities of the Count of Olivares, like all Spanish ambassadors to the Holy See, was to continue the flow of such funds to the Spanish treasury as well as insure the independence of the Spanish Church from the Pope.

Enrique de Guzmán had found this job particularly difficult during the tenure of Pope Sixtus V (1585-1590), primarily because of negotiations over the Great Armada. Sixtus dreaded his reliance on Philip to carry the Catholic cause, and when an assassin claimed Henry III's life in 1589, he did not, as Philip supposed he should, automatically support the Catholic League against the Protestant Henry of Navarre. If the future Henry IV could be induced to accept the Catholic faith and end the religious wars of France, Rome would have an effective and powerful counter-balance to Spain. Though he professed only to want to see France remain Catholic, the last thing Philip wanted was a strong and revived France, the only country with the potential to unseat Spanish power in Europe. Don Enrique, therefore, had the extremely important job of seeing that Sixtus' successor in 1590 was not in favor of this plan. In fact Philip, who had only exercised veto power over previous conclaves, now insisted that his ambassador ensure the selection of his personal choices. Unfortunately for Olivares, each of the next three popes selected

⁶⁸Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New, vol. 4, Philip the Prudent (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), 61.

⁶⁹The "Three Graces" was the popular name given to Church taxes which successive popes had given to Spanish kings, including the *subsidio*, the royal "third" of all tithes which the Church collected in Spain, the *cruzada*, yearly income for war against the heretics, and the *excusado*, the full tithe of the richest property in each parish in Spain.

in a period of eighteen months, all Philip's choices, died in quick succession. His last two years as ambassador were spent negotiating the intrigues of the conclave process which provided his brother-in-law with valuable insights into the relations between the Papacy and Spain and into the machinations of post-Renaissance diplomacy.

Guzmán did not negotiate the conclave which selected Clement VIII, the pope who would finally accept Henry IV's conversion to Catholicism in 1594 and welcome him into the Catholic political community, despite Philip's objections. Olivares was made viceroy of Sicily in 1592,⁷⁰ and Zúñiga went to Milan to serve with his uncle Don Juan Fernández Velasco y Tobar, the Constable of Castile, who held the post of governor of Philip's duchy of Milan.⁷¹ Zúñiga's uncle was regarded as one of the best administrators Philip II appointed to this difficult assignment. Milan was the key to two great defense systems which the Habsburgs (and before them the Aragonese) had developed in Europe. The first was the arc of Spanish territories and allies around the western Mediterranean extending from Milan to Naples. This system was a guard against the Ottomans but also prevented French incursions into Italy, and Milan's value was proved in the Habsburg-Valois wars. The second system was for the defense of the Low Countries. As the English and Dutch effectively controlled the Channel, preventing reinforcements by sea to the Army of Flanders, the Spanish became more reliant on land-based supply routes. Milan and Genoa formed the entrance to the "Spanish Road"--a long column of nations made up of Spanish territories and allies which allowed the Spanish to march troops and money to Flanders all within miles of France's eastern and northeastern borders. Both systems were created to defend what belonged to Philip, but they also had the salutary effect of suppressing French expansion. The Constable was responsible not only for maintaining the security of Milan and the aperture of the Spanish Road, but also for

⁷⁰According to Barrios, 342, he later served as viceroy to Naples from 1595 to 1598.

⁷¹Gregorio Marañón, El Conde-Duque de Olivares, 3d ed. (Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1952), 18-19.

training mercenary troops from adjacent provinces, such as Lombardy, a principal recruiting ground for Italian *tercios*. In addition, the governor of Milan maintained close connections with the contingent of families which made up the Genoese banking system, Philip's principal source of finance. Zúñiga was a member of the Constable's staff from 1592 until shortly before his appearance in Madrid, possibly in 1597 or 1598. During this long period of time, he learned, as a soldier, the strategic importance of this corridor, so that later, as a diplomat, he consistently evidenced a predominant concern for protecting it.⁷²

In the 1590s Philip put an incredible strain on this superb military network and his treasury. He was unwilling to accept Henry IV's offers to convert to Catholicism and regarded the French king's sovereignty as a violation of the carefully defended *status quo*. He spent more than in any other decade and extended his troops to more battlefields than he could afford.⁷³ Frustrated by Philip's intransigence, in January of 1595, Henry IV declared war against Spain and immediately made threatening gestures toward the Franche-Comté, part of the Burgundian inheritance on the French border. Zúñiga, as a captain of infantry in Milan marched with his uncle's army of 15,000 over the Alps from Milan to face this threat and join forces with the Catholic League near Dijon.⁷⁴ While the Constable's counterpart, the Count of Fuentes, had had remarkable success in the north of France that spring, the French king's forces under Marshall Biron defeated the Constable's army and the League in June 1595. In retrospect, this defeat was perhaps the most decisive psychologically of the protracted struggle between France and Spain, because

⁷²As Parker has pointed out in *Spanish Road*, 265-66, the Spanish were far ahead of any power in Europe at the time in the deployment and support of armies in the field and were the only nation at the time who could support such a long, permanent supply line.

⁷³As Parker has demonstrated in *ibid.*, 264-65, the periods in which France was engaged in the war in the Netherlands were each time the most expensive.

⁷⁴According to Braudel, 2: 1211, the Constable had been assembling the army in 1594, suggesting that Philip wanted to provoke the declaration of war; on Zúñiga's participation, see Cabrera de Córdoba, *História*, 4: 238.

within a short time the discouraged League forces began to surrender to Henry and join his side against Spain.

Still, Philip pressed the military solution and, now under the Cardinal-Archduke Albert, Philip's nephew and the man Philip chose to replace Fuentes, the Army of Flanders in the north responded extremely well. They captured Calais--the port on the Channel which could have saved the Armada in 1588--and throughout 1596 attacked the citadel at Amiens. Zúñiga again participated in the opening stages of the siege of Amiens in the summer of 1596, which was finally successful in March 1597.⁷⁵ But the financial strain of war with France was too much for the Spanish treasury, and Philip declared bankruptcy in 1597. When Henry led his army in a siege of Amiens, the Spanish could not relieve the beleaguered troops inside and finally surrendered the fortress in September 1597.

Zúñiga did not participate in the final defense of Amiens but was probably in Milan with his uncle. The Constable was deeply worried about another problem which came upon the heels of the defeat at Dijon and Amiens. He had information that several Italian states, traditionally sympathetic to France and encouraged by Henry's success, were inviting the victorious French king to march into Italy and help them throw off the Spanish yoke. But bankruptcy tied the Constable's hands, and now he had genuine concerns that he might be trapped in a two-front war with Henry and the northern Italian states. On 16 November 1597, he wrote to Philip:

It pains me to the bottom of my heart to see so much movement of arms in Italy. I shall remain here without taking action apart from manning our frontier until I receive orders from Your Majesty. Indeed, even if I had orders to the contrary, I should be forced by necessity to adopt the same course.

Our salvation can only lie in more troops, money and above all dispatch, which I leave to the great prudence of Your Majesty.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Cabrera de Córdoba, *História*, 4: 238.

⁷⁶AGS Estado 1283 f. 2, quoted in Braudel, 2: 1219

None of the Constable's request was about to be delivered. There was neither more money nor more troops, in a hurry or otherwise, which the prudence of Philip II could conjure up. To add to all this, Philip was about to die and knew it. By December of 1597, he had decided to make the peace that would end the war with France.

The result of the negotiations begun that winter, the Peace of Vervins, has been considered a Spanish retreat by contemporaries and historians. And from the view of the militant decade of the 1590s, there was good reason to come to that conclusion. But from the perspective of Philip's whole reign, it was only a return to the beginning of a circle. The Peace of Vervins was simply a reiteration of the terms and the boundaries in the Treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis.⁷⁷ Spain had not lost one of foot of its great patrimony in Europe, though the Dutch rebels had successfully delayed their day of reckoning. At the same time, Henry's conversion to Catholicism, genuine or not, kept France in the family of Catholic lay states with the Holy Roman Empire and Spain. In both these senses, Philip had simply reaffirmed the conservative and preservative themes of his reign. But the horizon was ominous. To Zúñiga's generation, Philip II left a task that had only become more difficult by forty years.

⁷⁷ As Juan Roco de Campofrío, *España en Flandes: Trece años del gobierno del Archiduque Alberto 1595-1608* (Madrid: Ayuntamiento de Alcántara, 1973), 198-99 recognized, Vervins was "word for word" the same as Câteau-Cambrésis.

CHAPTER 2

THE EMBASSY TO BRUSSELS

The image of Philip II sitting at his desk in 1588 and writing an agonized letter to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, while somewhere in the North Sea the commander of the Armada struggled to bring his king's navy home, highlighted both an essential problem of the Spanish Habsburg government and a fundamental difficulty in the transition from the reign of Philip II to his son Philip III. The immense expanse of Philip's empire constantly conspired to prevent him from governing it with the secretarial efficiency that he so preferred. As Fernand Braudel has pointed out, space was Philip II's "first enemy."¹ But his indomitable will compelled him to try to minutely control all circumstances and situations which arose in any case. To be certain, his ambassadors, governors, and viceroys complained bitterly about the slowness of the mails and the interminable deliberation in Madrid before their instructions were sent. Nevertheless, they could be very sure that whatever actions they took independently of or contrary to royal expectations would eventually come under the diligent King's scrutiny at some point; and they were just as likely to be recalled for a lack of obedience as a lack of success. The King's legendary suspicion of subordinates--their loyalty and their competence--led him to develop a style of government which was heavily centralized.²

¹Braudel, 1: 355.

²Pierson, Philip, "Bibliographic Essay," disagrees with Roger Merriman's portrayal of Philip as primarily motivated by his inability to trust in subordinates but agrees that this personal inclination contributed to the type of government he developed.

Philip II knew, however, that his son and namesake did not have the discipline nor the will needed to control the vast governmental apparatus. Try as he did to introduce his pliable and pious son to government, he reputedly expressed the opinion in his last years to his confidant Don Cristóbal de Mora that others would rule his son.³ Already, the languid prince was very much under the influence of the fifth Marquis of Denia Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval y Rojas, a charming, courteous and affable nobleman whose main interest in the crown was not so much to wield political influence as to acquire lucrative patronage, which he did with an alarming speed in the first five years of Philip III's reign. While the nobility were more welcome at Philip III's court than his father's, Don Francisco, later Duke of Lerma, carefully controlled access to Philip III. Very early in the reign, he developed a circle of assistants, many of low birth, which the haughty Spanish *grandees* heartily despised. Lerma, however, truly needed this group of lackeys. He shared with his prince a kind of aversion to rule firmly or to take responsibility for difficult choices. And he generally disliked the discipline required to run the vast governmental apparatus created by Philip II.⁴

For an empire with numerous separate governmental structures and institutions which had become accustomed to detailed management at the top, this created a double problem. Lerma inherited Philip II's excellent diplomatic and viceregal network but irritated the nobility of which it was made by conspiring to put his kinsmen in posts that in

³There were several colorful expressions which Philip was supposed to have confided to his favorite Don Cristóbal de Mora, such as "Don Cristóbal, they will rule him," and "God, that has given me so many states, has denied me a son with the ability to rule them." *Enciclopedia Ilustrada*, s. v. "Mora, Cristóbal de." Given the enmity which Philip III felt toward the austere Mora and the fact that within a few years he arranged for Mora to be away from Madrid and the court, these expressions may have been colorful fictions; yet, it seemed likely that Mora's reflections echoed Philip II's sentiments.

⁴The best work on the life of the Duke of Lerma has been done by Patrick Williams. For his account of Lerma's governmental habits, see his article, "Lerma, 1618: Dismissal or Retirement?" *European History Quarterly* 19 (July 1989): 307-32; Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714: A Society in Conflict* (London, New York: Longman Group, 1983), 198, noted the same problem: ". . . for twenty years Spain lived under the curious dualism of a split between government and court."

El Prudente's time would more likely have gone to men of proven merit and experience. Zúñiga's own brother was almost a victim of this subtle larceny during his tour in New Spain. Traditionally, the viceroy of New Spain filled the lucrative post of viceroy of Peru when it became vacant; the former was a kind of training ground for the latter. Thus, the Count of Monterrey fully expected to be posted to Peru when Don Luis de Velasco retired. But as early as August 1601, Lerma spoke openly of placing one of his relatives in that office, which caused great resentment among the relatives of Monterrey.⁵ Lerma backed down, as he often did and named Don Gaspar to Peru in 1604.⁶ Such examples, however, of both covetousness and easy capitulation bred grudges and contempt among the nobility who were not of his family or patronage circle.

Lerma tried to compensate by, in turn, enlarging that patronage circle, flattering recalcitrant noblemen with desired posts or titles, marrying his children into the families of *grandees*, or sending his opposition as far away from Madrid as possible. Unfortunately, the last remedy placed powerful men in important positions abroad who both disliked Lerma and received very little guidance from him while there. Thus, Philip III's reign was known as an age of great diplomats who were prone to aggressive diplomatic tactics independent of Madrid.⁷

Philip II anticipated some of the son's leadership problems and completed arrangements, in addition to the peace with France, which would alleviate the burden. For many years a scheme for marrying a Spanish *infanta*--daughter of the Crown--to a close ally of Spain and then endowing her with the old Burgundian inheritance--the Low Countries and the Franche-Comté--had been passed around in both Madrid and Brussels.⁸

⁵Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 111.

⁶*Ibid.*, 215.

⁷Barrios, 122.

⁸Merriman, 662-63.

After Henry IV recaptured Amiens in the fall of 1597, Philip announced his intent to marry his eldest daughter Isabel Clara Eugenia to his favorite nephew the Archduke Albert of the Austrian Habsburgs, endow her with the inheritance, and renew peace overtures to Henry IV.⁹ Between 10 December 1597 and 10 January 1598, the French king agreed to negotiate.¹⁰ Both the English and the Dutch were angry. Henry had promised them he would not make a separate peace. When he sent them a spurious invitation to come to Vervins, the site of negotiations, to make a general peace, they declined but did send observers.¹¹ The English eventually agreed to future negotiations but refused to untie themselves from the Dutch.¹²

Actually, Henry was satisfied with the mix of guests at Vervins. He did not want the Spain's two other enemies to make serious peace and over the next decade worked diligently against it. While Philip II would have welcomed the English at Vervins, he never considered making peace with the Dutch. In his view, a Spanish king did not make treaties with rebellious subjects.¹³ The intent of Philip's foreign policy was to return the Dutch to the Spanish empire by isolating them from their powerful allies and providing them with a palatable interim leadership which was separate from Spain in name, if not in fact.¹⁴ When Philip signed over the royal testament to his daughter on 6 May 1598, he

⁹Roco de Campofrío, xxiii, stated "according to the influential councilor (Mora), the pacification of the rebellious provinces would only be possible if they were given their own sovereign."

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 188-89.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 194.

¹²*Ibid.*, 263.

¹³Charles Carter explained the Spanish view well in *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs* (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1964), 43: "Spanish policy toward the self-proclaimed United Provinces was not, in the Habsburg view, foreign policy at all, though outside intervention made this internal problem an international one."

¹⁴This policy was reiterated in a *consulta* of December 1600, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* (hereafter CODIN), ed. Julian Páz, (1930), 3: 95.

specified that should his daughter and new son-in-law die without a child and heir, the Low Countries would revert back to the Spanish royal line. In addition, the Spanish retained the right to keep *tercios* in three garrisons at Antwerp, Ghent and Cambrai.¹⁵

Therefore, in the year before he died on 13 September 1598 in his beloved *El Escorial*, Philip had solved a number of problems for his son. Not only had he completed a peace with France, begun a peace process with England, and rearranged the sovereignty of one of his inheritances, he also left specific instructions for the marriage of his daughter to Archduke Albert and his son's marriage to Margaret of Austria, Albert's niece. According to the account of a court chronicler, he also left instructions for the appointment of an ambassador to the Archdukes Albert and Isabel and specifically named Don Baltasar de Zúñiga. Apparently, Zúñiga had expected the appointment, for some time before his death, Philip II sent Don Cristóbal de Mora to tell Zúñiga that the King "had his eyes on him for important work."¹⁶

Philip's eyes were probably attracted to Zúñiga for three reasons. First, Don Baltasar had spent sixteen years of service in Europe under the careful tutelage of his uncle, the Constable, and his brother-in-law, the Count of Olivares, both men whom Philip respected and knew to be able diplomats and administrators. Their *protégé* was now in his late thirties--an appropriate age for elevation to the higher ranks of the diplomatic corps. Philip also could not have forgotten the extraordinary service Zúñiga had done for him in the Armada campaign and the personal qualities needed to make his solitary voyage through enemy waters to deliver the Duke of Medina Sidonia's letters to the King. But it was probably Zúñiga's experience as staff officer in Milan and in the French wars which convinced Philip. The embassy to the Archdukes required that the occupant have both

¹⁵Joseph Lefèvre, "Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne à Bruxelles sous le règne de l'archiduc Albert (1598-1621)" *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* 2 (1923): 67.

¹⁶AGS Estado 7038 s. f., "Elogio a don Baltasar de Zúñiga por el cronista Antonio de Herrera, 1622."

diplomatic skills and knowledge of military procurement. The terms of the donation continued Spain's expensive military commitment in Flanders, and the money would now have to be funneled through the Spanish ambassador.¹⁷

After the court at Madrid spent the winter in mourning for the dead king, Philip III proceeded to fulfill his father's instructions. Don Baltasar learned of his appointment as ambassador to the government of the Archdukes in May 1599.¹⁸ On 29 June, he received the official appointment and the portfolio for handling renewed peace negotiations with the English.¹⁹ He traveled with the wedding party of Philip and Isabel from Madrid as it met Albert and Margaret in Valencia.²⁰ He was with Albert and Isabel as they crossed the border into their new dominions and took their first tour of Flanders and Brabant in September of 1599.²¹

Despite these cordial ceremonies, Zúñiga's diplomatic correspondence was sprinkled throughout the next three and one-half years with his efforts to settle the tensions among the Archdukes, Philip III (which was also to say Lerma), and the Spanish contingent in Flanders. Albert did not care for his brother-in-law and nephew, Philip III.²² The animosity arose from a personal source. Philip III had been a very sickly child, and throughout his first twenty years, the Habsburgs of both Spain and Austria had awaited his imminent demise. Had this happened, Albert and Isabel would have inherited the Spanish throne and possibly the Austrian as well since Albert's older brothers either had died or did

¹⁷Lefèvre, 74, states that Zúñiga was the conduit for military finances which came from Madrid.

¹⁸Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 23.

¹⁹Lonchay, 29, Philip to Zúñiga, 29 June 1599; Roco de Campofrío, 263.

²⁰Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 14.

²¹Lonchay, 31n.

²²Charles Carter, *The Western European Powers, 1500-1700* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), 301.

not have children.²³ In addition, Albert was much older and more experienced in government than his brother-in-law, Philip, and as devoted to the service of Philip II as was Isabel, his new wife. Though all were closely related and Isabel and the younger Philip were quite fond of each other, the the Archdukes possibly felt Philip II's small regard for his son, and this may have influenced their low opinion of his leadership qualities. In any case the Archdukes seemed to compensate for their lack of good fortune by taking their sovereignty over the Burgundian lands much more seriously than Philip III wanted.²⁴ For the first time the kings in their own kingdom these two Habsburgs, Albert and Isabel, who were groomed to lead, clung tenaciously to their independence, though they were completely dependent on Spanish money and might.²⁵

In Madrid Philip III could bring to the newly-imposed relationship a profound disappointment that his father had given away such a prized inheritance.²⁶ Periodically, he suggested schemes to Zúñiga which would return the inheritance to him and that Zúñiga politely discouraged.²⁷ Moreover, the Spaniards who remained in Flanders did not find it

²³According to Geoffrey Parker, *Philip II* (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 64, Philip II had long held in his will that should he die without male heir, one of his Austrian nephews would inherit his empire.

²⁴According to Simon Contarini, "*Relación de la corte de España en 1605 por Simon Contarini, Embajador de Venecia*" in Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 565, Albert's expressed desire "to die in Flanders" caused a great deal of consternation in Madrid.

²⁵Trevor-Roper, 263.

²⁶In the margin of this *consulta*, Philip wrote that he understood what his father had intended by giving the Low Countries to his sister, but then explained at length that he was in the impossible position of spending vast amounts of money on provinces which he could only hope to be his own someday, in Lonchay, 75, *consulta*, 16 August 1601.

²⁷Perhaps the most bizarre suggestion was contained in a letter which Philip wrote to Zúñiga in February 1601. He told Zúñiga to investigate the possibility that his sister Isabel might inherit the English crown on Elizabeth I's death which Philip proposed to support on condition that Isabel return the Low Countries to him. See Lonchay, 63, Philip to Zúñiga, 28 February 1601. Zúñiga did not respond immediately. In fact he waited until June before he wrote a carefully-worded letter in which he doubted that the Archdukes would agree to the scheme (*ibid.*, 71, Zúñiga to Philip, 22 June 1601). Probably the matter was pressed on him again, for in October, he wrote to the King again representing the numerous objections to the plan, among other things that Isabel, as Queen of England, would be allied with "all the

easy to share power with the Flemish members of the Archdukes' cabinet, especially Lewis Weyrenken, the justice minister, and Jean Richardot, president of the Privy Council. Early in his embassy, Zúñiga found it necessary to defend both Richardot's and Weyrenken's character and loyalty to the King.²⁸ In fact Zúñiga quickly developed close friendships with many non-Castilians in the Archdukes' court including Albert's confessor, Fray Iñigo de Brizuela, who handled the arrangement of Zúñiga's marriage years later while he was in Germany. With Richardot, he had almost a filial relationship, telling friends that Richardot was "a man from whom I have learned much."²⁹

Zúñiga may also have been the instrument for the heavy involvement of the Spinola family, Genoese bankers, in the affairs of the Low Countries. His relations with the Spinola probably dated back to his service in Milan, where he certainly must have dealt with them in both the financing and transport of troops. (Genoa was the Mediterranean port where Spanish and Italian troops heading for Milan disembarked.) He was an early supporter of Frederigo Spinola's military campaigns and intervened with the King on his behalf.³⁰ After the Nieuport campaign in 1601, when Madrid wanted to replace Albert as head of the army with a military man, Zúñiga argued in favor of Federigo over a Castilian commander.³¹ He had already convinced the Council of State to make Gaston Spinola governor of the garrison at Cambrai.³² Also, he was the very good friend of Ambrosio

principal heretical realms of Europe." Almost condescendingly, Zúñiga explained that he could not pursue the subject, as he found the matter so sensitive that he only spoke of it with his associate, Don Fernando Carrillo. See *ibid.*, 86, *consulta* on the letter from Zúñiga of 24 October, 17 November 1601.

²⁸British Library, Egerton 2079 f. 239, "*Relación de las cosas de Flandes y de las personas de importáncia que sirven*," undated.

²⁹AGS Estado 2324 f. 141, Zúñiga to Brizuela, 28 January 1612.

³⁰AGS Estado 617 f. 94, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600.

³¹Lonchay, 101, Zúñiga to Philip, 23 April 1602.

³²*Ibid.*, 69.

Spinola, Federico's older brother and the man who later would take over the campaign at Ostend and eventually bring the Army of Flanders an important victory there in 1604.

Don Baltasar's open-mindedness toward the Flemish and the Italians and his early willingness to vouch for Albert's men no doubt helped establish the rapport which he and no subsequent Spanish ambassador enjoyed with the Archdukes' court. As Joseph Lefèvre described Zúñiga's embassy, for the Archdukes, "he was an everyday counselor, whose advice was always followed," and, for the King, he was an "agent of information."³³ This dual role was bound to lead to occasional discontent in Brussels and most of this centered on the talks that Zúñiga conducted with the English and the Dutch at Boulogne.

The English had agreed to meet with the Spanish under the auspices of the French king first at Lille and then at Boulogne, France. The Archdukes' representatives were Richardot and Weyrenken and the Spanish representatives, Zúñiga and Don Fernando Carrillo. Zúñiga had specifically requested that Don Fernando take the place of his original associate, Don Diego de Ibarra, the inspector-general of the army until 1599. The Council of State agreed in December 1599, an indication of the respect which Zúñiga's requests had from the beginning of his embassy.³⁴ Carrillo was a very good friend but also a government official, not the soldier that the Spanish preferred to send to most peace negotiations. In addition Don Fernando's stuffy and formal demeanor did not please many of the Flemish, and Lerma, who did not trust his reputation for honesty, tried to remove him from the negotiations at the slightest affront. Only Zúñiga's staunch defense kept him at Boulogne.³⁵

³³Lefèvre, 64.

³⁴Lonchay, 35, Philip to Albert, 10 December 1599; Guido Bentivoglio, The History of the Warres of Flanders, trans. Henry Earl of Monmouth (London: D. Newman, 1678), 334. Bentivoglio reported that Carrillo and Zúñiga both arrived in Boulogne about the beginning of May 1600.

³⁵AGS Estado 617 f. 109, Zúñiga to Philip, 25 October 1600. On Carrillo's character, see Williams, 312.

When the word came out that the Spanish ambassador would conduct peace negotiations with the English on French soil, the Flemish greeted the news with great enthusiasm.³⁶ But after the preliminary discussions in Lille and even before the conference officially opened in Boulogne in May, Zúñiga's dispatches showed he was highly skeptical of a favorable outcome. From February until his trip to Boulogne in May, he wrote to Philip that Elizabeth was not trustworthy and was a master of "dissimulation." While they negotiated in Boulogne, she encouraged the rebels "to infest the route of the Indies." In addition he had received word that the Dutch were sending numerous ships that spring to the Orient and also to "an island of salt in the West Indies."³⁷

It was evident to him that Elizabeth (against whom he harbored a barely controlled contempt, probably born of his experience in the Armada) would not make a separate peace, which was the whole point of the conference. She insisted on Dutch representatives at the conference, though Zúñiga's instructions would not allow him to talk with them. Even before they sat down to the table, the Queen's representatives presented letters from her "which in effect signify the impossibility on her part to concede the three points." The three points were that the English would end diplomatic relations with Holland and Zeeland (now named the United Provinces), stop all commercial relations with the Dutch, and restore to the Archdukes the forts on the Dutch coast which the Dutch had given Elizabeth for signing the mutual-defense treaty of Nonesuch in 1585. Zúñiga reported that Archduke Albert was "most displeased with this kind of negotiating where one negates all the points of discussion before sitting down to the table."³⁸ If the

³⁶Ramírez, 293.

³⁷AGS Estado 2288, s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 7 April 1600; AGS Estado 2288, s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 7 February 1600; AGS Estado 619 f. 94, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600. The last comment was a reference to the *Punta de Araya* in Venezuela. The Spanish took this last threat very seriously. By 1605 Don Luis Fajardo, admiral of the Atlantic squadron, rooted out the Dutch encroachers and effectively ended the Dutch presence in the Caribbean for twenty years.

³⁸AGS Estado 2288 s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 17 April 1600.

English seemed to hold the conference hostage from Zúñiga's point-of-view, the Flemish grumbled that they were handcuffed by Spanish interests. That spring the Flemish States General tried to persuade Albert to force two concessions out of the Spanish. First, they wanted direct negotiations with their Dutch counterparts. Second, they wanted a reduced Spanish military presence and to rid themselves of the persistent problems caused by mutinies in the Army of Flanders.³⁹

Mutinies, normally due to a lack of pay, had been the bane of both Spain's military and political aims in Flanders. Between 1598 and 1604, mutinies had stalled or undermined every military action the army undertook and destroyed the confidence that the Spanish previously had enjoyed in the loyal provinces.⁴⁰ Zúñiga wrote often to Philip in 1600 warning him that the mutinies caused serious problems for the morale of the army and the success of the campaigns.⁴¹ That spring Zúñiga had to report the double mutiny at Crèvecoeur and St. André, where Walloon soldiers actually gave their positions to the enemy in protest over their lack of pay.⁴² He blamed much of the problem on the Walloon soldiers and insisted that the loss of St. André required that the King send "a good number of Spanish and Italian soldiers from Milan" because of "the reputation which the enemy had gained there." He did not trust the soldiers who ended their mutiny at Diest and were brought up to reinforce the campaign at Nieuport, for "one can see by the actions of the Walloons that gave up the fort at St. André and from other experiences the little trust one can have of them." But the frustrations of the Boulogne conference had already opened up a sore wound with the Flemish. It was a small step from suggesting they be allowed to

³⁹AGS Estado 617 f. 93, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600.

⁴⁰Parker, *Spanish Road*, 249.

⁴¹AGS Estado 617 f. 86, Zúñiga to Philip, 7 April 1600; AGS Estado 617 f. 234, Zúñiga to Philip, 17 July 1600; Rodríguez Villa, 41.

⁴²AGS Estado 617, f. 86, Zúñiga to Philip, 7 April 1600.

deal with the Dutch more directly to demanding that their own nationals should be placed in charge of the forts where the Army was stationed.⁴³

Albert was sympathetic but not persuaded, for he remained committed to a point of view which he held from the beginning of Zúñiga's embassy until he signed the Twelve Years' Truce ten years later. Either Philip must support him "to make all-out war or a peace with whatever terms were necessary."⁴⁴ For Zúñiga the mutinies and the intransigence of the English had created a fluid and uncertain atmosphere around the negotiations which made it difficult for him to fully comprehend Philip's policy. On his way to Boulogne at the end of May, he asked the King for further clarification. Zúñiga reminded the King that in a letter the previous October Philip had told him that "although in my powers there is a clause which gives me the power to conclude a peace or a truce with the Queen, I am not to use the power to make a truce for it was not agreeable to His Majesty." But, as he told the King, a lot of things have happened since then, and he needed further advice. He continued, "I am of the opinion that it would be appropriate to make a suspension of arms with the English in order to bring the Dutch to the discussion without which one can hope for little in the dealings."⁴⁵ Though this was part of the overall strategy to "untie" the Dutch from their English suppliers, it also seemed the first time that talk of a suspension was introduced into the discussions. Clearly, the bad state of the Army of Flanders and the unlikelihood that sufficient money and troops were forthcoming led Zúñiga to try to shape the discussion in Madrid.

Though the reports were bad, Philip and Lerma were still uncertain what to do. But by July 1600, discouraged by the lack of success at Nieuport which Albert reported to

⁴³Lonchay, 69, *consulta*, 5 June 1601.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 80, *consulta*, 26 September 1601.

⁴⁵AGS Estado 617 f. 94, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600.

the King on 13 July 1600 and the Archduke's demands for more troops and money,⁴⁶ they quickly concluded that there had to be a stop to the drain of money into the loyal provinces.⁴⁷ In the meantime, however, in order to appease Albert and with the hope that it might force the English and the Dutch to make more concessions at the negotiating table, Philip promised the Archduke more money and troops and sent the message with the Count of Olivares, Zúñiga's brother-in-law, in August 1600.⁴⁸

In the autumn the conference at Boulogne had reached an impasse, and the negotiators had returned to their respective countries. Perhaps, feeling the King's lack of support, Zúñiga tried to encourage him. In October he wrote that while the talks with the English lacked a good result, "it was so important and so effective a means of bringing the Dutch to the table through the Queen, that however little hope we have, it is necessary to follow it."⁴⁹ At the end of November, he reported the good news that Albert dissolved the complaining States General.⁵⁰ Again he suggested to the Council of State, apparently without Albert's knowledge, that the Spanish seek a suspension of arms with the English. At first, the Council seemed inclined only to discuss a full peace (with the usual unreasonable terms), though councilors remarked that a suspension might give them the time to "effect a real defeat of the Provinces."⁵¹ Each winter, however, an assessment of finances and military resources dampened wild hopes, and, in February the Council arrived

⁴⁶Ibid., f. 234, Albert to Philip, 13 July 1600: "The Army has to be much more numerous than the one here now in order to make progress against the enemy."

⁴⁷Parker, Spanish Road, 249.

⁴⁸Lonchay, 49, "Instructions for Olivares from the King," 9 August 1600; according to Marañón, 19, Olivares had returned to Spain in 1599.

⁴⁹Ibid., 51, Zúñiga to Philip, 17 August 1600; AGS Estado 617 f. 109, Zúñiga to Philip, 25 October 1600.

⁵⁰Lonchay, 59, Zúñiga to Philip, 30 November 1600.

⁵¹CODOIN (1930), 3: 95, *consulta*, December 1600.

at the conclusion that an immediate suspension would be acceptable with the provision that it last "for the longest time possible."⁵²

Though pecuniary reality kept dogging the Spanish, they constantly entertained projects which might affect the negotiating process favorably. Zúñiga himself favored three such traditional measures--hindrance of trade, fomenting rebellion in Ireland, and regaining control of at least a portion of the Flemish seacoast from the Dutch. From the 1570s the Dutch and a group of pirates originally from Zeeland had been able to harrass Spanish and Flemish shipping enough that Flanders and the province of Brabant, although they possessed long coasts, were almost landlocked commercially and militarily.

Governmental manipulation of commerce as a tool of foreign policy was not new to Madrid. Philip II had become infamous for import and export taxes on Iberian goods and the abrupt seizure of foreign ships and merchants in Iberian ports. But in the new negotiations, the English were adamant that they would not discontinue trade with the Dutch for any concession.⁵³ Without the ability to compel the English by direct force, the only alternatives available to the Spanish were to foment further Irish rebellions or fight the English-Dutch juggernaut of commerce with another commercial network. The Spanish ambassador suggested that Spain do both.⁵⁴

Zúñiga was particularly interested in the formation of exclusive trade agreements between the Hanseatic League and Denmark and Spain. From Boulogne he encouraged Philip to send an agent to these countries in order to formalize relations.⁵⁵ It was

⁵²Ibid., 110, *consulta* on letters from Zúñiga and Albert, 10 February 1601.

⁵³AGS Estado 2288, s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 17 April 1600.

⁵⁴AGS Estado 2288 s.f., 17 August 1600, Zúñiga to Philip. Zúñiga told the King that "the only thing that forces the Queen to the table" was the Irish diversion. In April 1602, he was still reiterating the importance of pouring money into the Irish diversion, CODOIN (1930), 3: 190.

⁵⁵Lonchay, 45, Zúñiga to Philip, 13 June 1600; AGS Estado 617 f. 92, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600.

important that the Portuguese take a hand in this, according to Don Baltasar, and he suggested that Don Cristóbal de Mora, the Portuguese viceroy, should go to Denmark himself.⁵⁶ Though he disclaimed experience in matters of trade, Zúñiga maintained that only good could come of establishing trade with the north as it was critical to replace the Dutch middleman in the Iberian-Baltic trade.⁵⁷ So important was this issue in Zúñiga's estimation that he vowed that, in the negotiation, he would "not concede this point for anything." He pressed both Albert and Philip to stringently enforce prohibition of trade with the Dutch in both Spanish and Flemish ports and claimed that "all that can be done here and there is very well done, because if an end can be had of this very great damage [to the war effort], it has to be by this method."⁵⁸ Zúñiga held this belief right into his years as both a councillor of state and a minister of government.

Initially, he also favored support for English exiles in Brussels and their various plans for military excursions in Ireland. On 7 April 1600, he sent a copy of a secret military plan from such a group of adventurers which had been presented before to the Council of State. The Council's reaction was tepid.⁵⁹ After the conference at Boulogne broke down in the fall, the exiles pressed for their case to be made again. This time, Zúñiga understood the exact nature of relations between Madrid and Brussels a little better. He presented the English Catholics' case again, but warned that "for this a large

⁵⁶AGS Estado 617 f. 237, Zúñiga to Philip, 13 June 1600: Castel Rodrigo served as viceroy in Portugal from 1600-04 and again from 1608-1612. This was probably not the first memo from Zúñiga on this idea. Another letter, AGS Estado 617 f. 22, 24 May 1600, which he sent to Philip says that Albert is not taking the Philip's request for an agent in Denmark as seriously as it ought to be.

⁵⁷José Alcalá Zamora y Quiépo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el mar del norte 1618-1639* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1975), 140, has suggested that the Spanish were trying to do this very thing in their treaties with England in 1604 and with the Hanse, German commercial cities, in 1607. In effect the Spanish were inviting the other commercial powers of the north to take over the Iberian-Baltic trade.

⁵⁸AGS Estado 617 f. 237, Zúñiga to Philip, 13 June 1600.

⁵⁹AGS Estado 2288 s.f., in Albert J. Loomie, *The Spanish Elizabethans. The English Exiles at the Court of Philip II* (London: Burns & Oates, 1963), 165-6.

amount of money is needed. We will be running the risks that similar dealings always involve."⁶⁰ The Council was anxious to echo Zúñiga's skepticism in its advice to the King. By now the King's mind, slowly formulating a decision after June 1600, was evident and he voiced his predicament in the margins of a *consulta*--summary of a Council discussion--of 16 August 1601: "Like my father I know the importance of Flanders for the rest of the kingdoms and thought that giving them to the Archdukes would bring them back into the fold and that I want to do so but at less cost than is anticipated by the Archduke."⁶¹

While the Irish diversion was a pipedream and the commercial agreements a long time in developing, the traditional Low Countries' remedy of winning concessions for the negotiating table on the battlefield was planned again. This time the Archduke and Federico Spinola planned a siege of Ostend, another port on the Flemish coast between Nieuport and Sluys, the Flemish harbor on the Scheldt River and the entrance to Antwerp. The capture of Ostend would allow the Flemish to obtain control of this strategic position on the coast and help relieve the stranglehold which the Dutch had established in the North Sea around Sluys. The castle at Ostend was also critical because it allowed the Dutch to exact duty from the villagers in the surrounding territory and was an encroachment on the Archduke's political control and authority in Flanders.

Though voices in Flanders spoke against the wisdom of conducting a siege of the heavily-fortified Ostend,⁶² Zúñiga was committed to the strategy behind it. Partly he knew from personal experience the importance of obtaining control of the Flemish seacoast for both Spanish military purposes and Flemish trade. Federico Spinola and he had encouraged Madrid to develop a fleet in the Channel.⁶³ Zúñiga wrote exhortations to

⁶⁰AGS Estado 617 f. 110-18, quoted in *ibid.*, 167.

⁶¹Lonchay, 78, *consulta*, 16 August 1601.

⁶²Ramírez, 304, Lipsius to Zúñiga, 28 December 1600.

⁶³Lonchay, 31, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 September 1599.

Madrid opportunizing them to assist Spinola in his struggle to recruit troops and requisition ships in Portugal. He insisted that the troops must come by way of sea to begin a naval buildup in the area beginning with Dunkirk to the south which was virtually occupied by Dutch pirates.⁶⁴ Without a passage into the Scheldt River, the only means of getting troops into Flanders was via the Spanish Road. He knew from his experiences in the French wars that Henry IV would not rest easily with the Road along his border and would do everything in his power to destroy the delicate alliances and unprotected frontiers which made the Road possible and prevented him from expanding his influence.

But, while the strategy of Ostend made sense strategically, Zúñiga underestimated the finance necessary for conducting this particular siege, as well as the discord the long campaign created between Madrid where money was the issue and Brussels where resolution or peace was paramount. Only part of the troops and money Philip had promised through the Count of Olivares trickled in over the winter. In April 1601, hoping to obtain funds from the Flemish to sustain the war, Albert took the risky move of convocating the angry States General again.⁶⁵ The parliamentary body immediately began demanding concessions for their money, insisting especially on ridding Flanders of the army of mercenaries.

Albert and Isabel themselves did not approve of the Castilian military culture which had developed in Flanders.⁶⁶ While the Council of State ignored Zúñiga's suggestion to place Federico in charge of the army, Albert had no confidence in the

⁶⁴AGS Estado 617 f. 94, Zúñiga to Philip, 24 May 1600; Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 32.

⁶⁵According to Roco de Campofrío, 264, the convocation was in response to the mutiny at the village of Carpen at the beginning of April.

⁶⁶, "*Correspondencia Alberto con D. Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, marqués de Denia (1598-1611)*," in CODOIN, ed. M. F. Navarrete (Madrid: Impresores de la viuda de Calero, 1849-75), 2: 50; *ibid.*, 127; A. Rodríguez Villa, ed., *Correspondencia de la Infanta Archiduquesa Doña Isabel Clara Eugenia de Austria con el duque de Lerma e otras personas* (Madrid, 1906), 170-71, 196-97, quoted in Jonathan I. Israel, 28.

Castilian that Madrid left in charge of the campaign, the Admiral of Castile.⁶⁷ The Admiral's cousin, the Count of Fuentes, had been less than helpful in Milan in providing Federico's brother, Ambrosio, with the troops and assistance he needed to bring armies up to Ostend in the summers of 1601 and 1602.⁶⁸ Differences about military strategy on every side hid deep personal animosities. Part of Fuente's and the Admiral's hostility was the rebuke that their families felt when Philip II replaced Fuentes as *maestro del campo*--head of the Army--with Albert in 1595. And the defense of Flanders had been an even deeper wound for the two men because it had been the grave to the reputation of the leader of their clan the Duke of Alba in 1574. Therefore, they were not only sensitive to the family's history in Flanders, but also deeply hostile to foreign or non-Castilian views on military strategy and politics.

In all, the reluctance to finance the campaign in both Antwerp and Madrid and internal personal grudges and jealousies conspired to turn the siege of Ostend into a major embarrassment for the Army of Flanders. The long months from the summer of 1601 to the fall of 1603 saw the worst of the mutinies.⁶⁹ On the one hand, Zúñiga lamented to his king the terrible state of affairs, continuously requested troops and money and warned that the King had better "repair the damage that is done to the reputation of the Monarchy" by the mutinies.⁷⁰ In the midst of the fray, Zúñiga complained bitterly to Richardot that the States General "did not want one more Spaniard to remain beyond the ambassador."⁷¹

⁶⁷Ibid., 49. The Admiral of Castile was a member of the Enríquez clan, and the Count of Fuentes was an Alba y Liste. Both were closely related to the Duke of Alba.

⁶⁸Rodríguez Villa, Spínola, 50

⁶⁹Parker, Spanish Road, 186 and 249.

⁷⁰Lonchay, 111, Zúñiga to Philip, 9 September 1602; CODOIN (1930), 3: 225.

⁷¹AGS Estado 2288 s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 15 September 1601.

And in the same dispatch to the King, he ominously predicted that the Army of Flanders had to take Ostend, "for better or worse."

Throughout the turmoil of Ostend, Zúñiga pursued the instructions of the Council of State to obtain a suspension of arms with the English negotiators. In May 1601 the second round of talks began and broke down again. A dejected Zúñiga wrote to the King that the time had come for direct negotiations of the suspension between the rebels and the Archdukes, because, as he said resignedly, "through the [English] Queen one can hope for little result."⁷² In Madrid, the King's councilors considered the problems and risks involved in allowing Albert (about whom they had serious doubts) to deal directly with the crafty leadership in The Hague. While gains on the battlefield of Ostend were still possible, it was no time to squander any advantages at the table with an over-compliant Archduke. The Archduke, however, reiterated his position. He would not speak to the Dutch without Spanish support for "serious war or peace on whatever terms are necessary."⁷³ In July the exasperated King told Zúñiga to remind the Archduke of the terms of the act of donation--"to have peace or war with whomever I have peace or war"--and suggested that Albert would prejudice the King's eventual inheritance of the Low Countries with a "hasty peace."⁷⁴ Still paramount for the King was his view that Albert and Isabel were mere stewards of his property. Again, Philip's and Lerma's obsession with legal title in Flanders revealed that they observed matters in Europe not from the political reality of the seventeenth century but from an almost feudal, dynastic context lacking a healthy respect for the political power of subject peoples. The Spanish court was so alarmed, they began to discuss the possibility of concluding a separate suspension of arms

⁷²AGS Estado 2288, Zúñiga to Philip, 22 June 1601.

⁷³Lonchay 80, *consulta* on Zúñiga's letter of September, 26 September 1601.

⁷⁴Lonchay, 73, Philip to Zúñiga, 23 July 1601.

with the English and Dutch in order to head off any of Albert's possible overtures of peace.

Sensing that an open break between Albert and his royal brother-in-law was in the future, Don Baltasar wrote a letter to Philip on 15 September 1601 which strongly counseled caution. It also hinted at the torn loyalties Zúñiga was now experiencing as both a counselor for the Archduke and an ambassador for the King. Zúñiga did not want to press the Archduke, and, in his letter, he encouraged the King to take a more conciliatory stance. Don Baltasar agreed with the King that a "hasty peace" should be avoided. But, perhaps more than Madrid, Zúñiga wanted the suspension of arms. The King and Lerma could not see that the great Army of Flanders was suffering such deprivation and was in such chaos that in its current state it did more harm to Spain than good as a tool of policy.

In this same letter, Zúñiga politely informed Philip and his councilors isolated in Madrid that they could not simply make a suspension of arms with the Dutch separately from the Archdukes. The Flemish states were a sovereignty unto themselves, he explained, and the best thing to do was "to treat these states as Brothers and friends of Your Majesty but not as your own with the effect of estranging them." To emphasize this danger, Zúñiga told them that he had already heard that Albert may have promised certain "principal gentlemen that he will get strangers out of the country." He reported that he naturally complained vehemently to Richardot, who assured him that the problem was only with the mutinied soldiers in the garrisons. Again, the lack of funds for mutinying soldiers seriously undermined the King's reputation in Flanders. But, if the Archduke followed through on his promise, there was little that could be done about it. On the other hand, Zúñiga reassured Madrid that he thought the Archduke was inclined to the suspension but, at the same time, feared it was nothing more than "a state of perpetual war." Don Baltasar suggested two intermediate solutions. First, the King should consider "a significant reduction in the forces at Ghent and also in Antwerp but keep Cambrai and Cambrésis as

they were," and, second, allow Zúñiga to discuss with the Archduke a suspension of arms which would last throughout a negotiation for peace.⁷⁵ The letter had the tranquilizing effect intended. After much discussion, Philip wrote Carrillo in December that he would not attempt a separate armistice with the Dutch but would work with the Archduke, as Zúñiga had suggested.⁷⁶

The King's December letter had hardly reached his representatives in January when they wrote back that the Archduke seemed to have had a sudden change of mind and now was open to the suspension of arms.⁷⁷ But Zúñiga and Carrillo also had reason to suspect the Archduke's turn-about. Jean Richardot, Albert's close adviser, had secretly told Zúñiga that certain princes in Germany had asked the Emperor Rudolf to intervene in the peace talks.⁷⁸ This was somewhat unusual, for, while the Low Countries were technically a part of the Holy Roman Empire, the Austrian Habsburgs had always shown deference to the Spanish Habsburgs' rights and interests there and had never tried to interfere before. The only possible reason Rudolf would do so now was that Albert had asked his brother to intervene. When Albert requested to begin direct negotiations with the Dutch for a suspension of arms, Zúñiga and Carrillo feigned pleasure but privately worried in what direction the connection with the Holy Roman Empire might take Albert.⁷⁹

Within two months their concerns were answered. In April Zúñiga wrote Madrid that Albert had approached him about two extraordinary ideas. First, he suggested that one of the princes of Savoy could possibly become the Archduke's successor. Second, Albert told Zúñiga that he would like to pursue the idea of a neutral Holland incorporated

⁷⁵AGS Estado 2288, s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 15 September 1601.

⁷⁶Lonchay, 90, Philip to Carrillo, 15 December 1601.

⁷⁷Lonchay, 93, Carrillo to Philip, 20 January 1602.

⁷⁸AGS Estado 2288 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 20 January 1602.

⁷⁹Lefèvre, 67.

into the Empire, and he wanted to put off the suspension until they heard back from Vienna on the proposition.⁸⁰ Zúñiga and Carillo met this news with calm indifference so as not to convey the alarm which they were certain would greet the proposal in Madrid.⁸¹ Indeed, the King and his councilors were mightily upset. Philip wanted nothing done which would prejudice his future ownership of the seventeen provinces, and Albert's present state of mind was about as prejudicial as could be. He encouraged Zuniga to push hard for the suspension and to bribe whoever could influence Albert, including Richardot.⁸² Fortunately for Don Baltasar, matters did not move completely out of his control. By July he could report to the King that the trial had passed. Things were going so slowly in Germany, particularly with the troubles Rudolf was having there in his war with the Turks, that Albert would probably give up hope of any resolution through the Emperor's help.⁸³ In addition he reported with even greater relief that he had been able to convince the Archdukes and their advisors to allow the Spanish to maintain the garrisons at Antwerp, Ghent, and Cambrai with small reductions in force.⁸⁴

It was the autumn again and the time for the usual summation of results from the spring and summer. The second year of disappointments, with successive mutinies at Ostend and no gains on either the military or the negotiating front, had strained tempers in Brussels. On 1 September 1602, Albert called Don Baltasar in for a meeting and suggested that someone in the Spanish delegation "had told the King that he [Albert] had absolutely refused a suspension of arms."⁸⁵ It was an oblique accusation and one to which

⁸⁰Lonchay, 102; CODOIN (1930), 3: 104, *consulta* on the letters from Zúñiga of 23 April and 18 May 1602.

⁸¹AGS Estado 2288 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 18 July 1602.

⁸²Lonchay, 104, Philip to Zúñiga, 8 June 1602.

⁸³CODOIN (1930), 3: 212, *consulta* of Zúñiga's letters of July, 17 August 1602.

⁸⁴AGS Estado 2288 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 18 July 1602.

Zúñiga, who had done more to resolve differences between the King and his brother-in-law than anyone knew, took considerable offense. Zúñiga continued to work closely with the Archduke throughout the winter of 1602-03, which he himself described as "desperate,"⁸⁶ and assisted him in resisting the efforts of the States General to conduct direct negotiations with the rebels.⁸⁷ But he continued to feel bitter about the September accusation and the strange discussions of the summer and fall when Albert seemed to have misplaced his loyalty to Spain. In February of the next year, he wrote to Philip,

I think that with his Highness [the Archduke] it is as Tacitus said of Tiberius Caesar that of none of his good parts did he have as much abundance as his ability to dissemble, and perhaps for he who was leader of the world it was appropriate, more so than in the present case of his Highness for whom I take it to be very detrimental.⁸⁸

The winter was a season of similar recriminations. While the Flemish had suggested for some time to the Archduke that he did not have "obligations other than the garrisons" to Spain,⁸⁹ the Spanish in Flanders now began to express the opinion that the King "had only to help the Archdukes as brothers," but not to finance their military campaigns. Zúñiga must have feared that a similar sentiment was developing in Madrid. In one of his most strongly-worded dispatches he denounced these comments as "a very exorbitant opinion which conforms with a prudence unrelated to the real state of things."⁹⁰

A critical juncture had been reached in Spain as well. On 26 November 1603 the Council of State met in a very long meeting designed to remedy the problem of Flanders. At the outset the Council made it clear that the Archduke's recent actions favoring the

⁸⁵Lonchay, 109, Zúñiga to Philip, 1 September 1602.

⁸⁶Ibid., 111, Zúñiga to Philip, 10 September 1602.

⁸⁷Ibid., 114, Zúñiga to Philip, 28 October 1602.

⁸⁸Ibid., 128, Zúñiga to Philip, 5 February 1603.

⁸⁹AGS Estado 2288 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 15 September 1601.

⁹⁰Lonchay, 116, Zúñiga to Philip, 22 November 1602.

neutrality of Holland prompted the meeting. Don Juan de Idiáquez, the leading member of the Council of State and a man who had long served Philip II, set the parameters of the discussion by outlining four alternatives--"make a great exertion, arrange a treaty or a peace, continue as now, desist from the enterprise."⁹¹ Don Juan rejected the first and last proposals outright and inclined against the arrangement of a peace which he also viewed as the avenue by which the Spanish "could be thrown out of Flanders." The only reasonable proposal, according to Idiáquez was the suspension.⁹² As Zúñiga presented it and the Council knew, the suspension was not a policy but an interim between the other three alternatives which were real, if unpleasant, solutions. Intermittently in the future, they would make the "great exertion" at Ostend from September 1603 to September 1604. When they were unable to sustain the exertion, they tried peace but with such terms--freedom of Catholic worship and obedience to the Archdukes as sovereign--that the United Provinces would never agree. In the winter of 1606, they even considered "to desist from the enterprise" but were saved from that humiliation by the timely arrival of The Hague's terms for peace which began the two years of negotiations which led to the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609.⁹³ But in the winter before the 1603 campaign season, the Council had no remedy for their King other than the stopgap measure proposed by his harried ambassador.

An impasse in the relations between Spain and its former territory had been reached. The years of pitiless military campaigns, disappearing treasure, and fruitless negotiations had taken their toll. Ambivalence reigned on both sides. Perhaps only the

⁹¹CODOIN (1930), 3: 252, "Council on the general remedy of Flanders," 26 November 1602.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³AGS Estado 634 f. 93, *consulta* of the special committee on foreign affairs, the *junta de los tres* (Franqueza, Idiáquez, Miranda), 14 December 1606, quoted in Parker, *Spanish Road*, 251. Two of the members of this *junta* were Lerma's henchmen, and the proposal appeared to be secret, not coming before the full Council of State, though Philip gave his approval.

determination of Zúñiga to make the new relationship work and ultimately the loyalty of Albert and many of his advisors to the numerous sacrifices that Spain had made in money and men to keep the southern provinces in the Catholic fold prevented a complete breakdown in relations. In addition, the loyal provinces themselves had inspired a loyalty in Zúñiga. The Archdukes' semi-independent sovereignty in Flanders and Brabant had already created an atmosphere of nationhood which set their peoples apart from the rebellious provinces. While the Spaniards wanted to "bring back" the rebels in the north, it was by no means certain in 1602 that they would be able to hang on to the loyal provinces in the south, though the present boundaries of both camps had been maintained since the Duke of Parma's reconquest of the south in 1589-92. Large numbers of Protestants had relocated to the United Provinces and were a noisy lobby for "unification" in the far northern provinces of Friesland and Utrecht. But the Archdukes, in the meantime, had revived the Catholic, aristocratic culture of Flanders, and it was a culture beloved by those who lived there and served the Archdukes. Cardinal Bentivoglio, the papal nuncio during the first decade of the Archduke's reign and a friend of Spinola, Zúñiga, and Zúñiga's future wife, was charmed by the climate, the culture, and the sense that he was in the heart of the Catholic world and lamented his having to return to Italy after his long tour.⁹⁴ Throughout his service in other capitals, Zúñiga was attached always to his friendships, the intellectual culture, and later his marital connection to Flanders. The defense and preservation of the Archdukes' little state was not just a matter of Spanish reputation or strategic necessity but a personal devotion.

After the November Council debate, Philip grew increasingly agitated with the progress of the military campaign conducted by the Admiral of Castile.⁹⁵ On 18 January

⁹⁴Guido Bentivoglio, A Collection of Letters written by Cardinal Bentivoglio, during the time he was Nuncio in France and Flanders, trans. unknown (London, 1753), Letter 19, Cardinal Bentivoglio to Lady Frances Clarus, Ambassadress from Spain at Prague, 26 September 1615.

⁹⁵Rodríguez Villa, Spinola, 59n.

1603, while commenting on a *consulta* about a plan for purchasing, at considerable cost, the English-held forts in the Low Countries, he abruptly insisted that someone come from Flanders to acquaint him with matters there more directly. Suddenly, he demanded, "better yet, I think Don Baltasar should come, and so I order him, and tell my uncle [Albert] that it should be as quickly as possible."⁹⁶ On 2 February 1603, Philip wrote to Zúñiga to come to Spain.⁹⁷ Don Baltasar left Brussels around 21 March 1603.⁹⁸ Though the relationship had been strained in the fall and winter, the Archduke wrote a highly complimentary letter about Zúñiga to the King which did not in anyway seek or indicate that he anticipated a replacement.⁹⁹ For all intents and purposes Zúñiga's trip to Madrid was nothing more than a report of the situation before serious negotiations and military activities could continue in the spring and not the recall of the Spanish ambassador.

But on 2 March 1603, two weeks before Zúñiga left Brussels, Elizabeth I, the Dutchmen's staunch defender and ally, died. Nobody in Flanders, however, had the news before Zúñiga's departure. At about the time of his arrival at the King's court in the beginning to middle of April, Philip had already heard from his ambassador in Paris that the queen was dead.¹⁰⁰ Robert Cecil, Elizabeth's first minister, had successfully withheld the news of her death to avoid a succession crisis and, in the meantime, maneuvered the son of Mary Stuart, James VI of Scotland, onto the throne. The Spanish were doubtful of

⁹⁶Lonchay, 125, *consulta*, 18 January 1603.

⁹⁷Lonchay, 127, Philip to Zúñiga, 2 February 1603.

⁹⁸Lonchay, 138, *consulta* on Zúñiga's letter of 5 February, 14 March 1603. This *consulta* indicated that Zúñiga had not left yet, but, according to Cabrera de Córdoba (172), he had arrived in Valladolid by 19 April 1603; Real Academia de Historia, "*Colección Salazar y Castro*," f. 149, 21 March 1603, Archduchess Isabel to Lerma. Isabel also sent a letter of this date praising Zúñiga, which indicated that he was carrying it with him.

⁹⁹Rodríguez Villa, *Spínola*, 82.

¹⁰⁰Lonchay, 140, Albert to Philip, 15 April 1603.

the new King's sympathies, but, fortunately, they shared this uncertainty with the Dutch. While the disarray had all been in the Spanish camp in the winter of 1602-03, now the hesitation appeared to be on the Anglo-Dutch side.

Zúñiga, however, was not destined to be a participant in the new turn of events, for Philip had already made up his mind to make him ambassador to France. The current Spanish ambassador to Henry IV's court, Don Juan Baptiste de Tassis, was experienced in that post but did not meet the Council's expectations. During the French civil wars from 1581 to 1584, he had served adequately. But, as soon as Elizabeth dismissed the brilliant Spanish ambassador, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, from her court in the midst of the Spanish-English conflict, Mendoza traveled to Paris, simply set Tassis aside, and took over the direction of Spain's relations to the Guise and the Catholic League in France with astounding success. Mendoza had the talent for deftly handling spies, negotiating with Spanish sympathizers, and coordinating policy with other Spanish diplomats in the capitals of Europe.¹⁰¹ His strong, aggressive personality made the amiable Tassis look particularly weak. But the comparison was not entirely fair. While Mendoza enjoyed the benefit of a besieged Henry III and a disoriented France to manipulate, Tassis had to contend with the aggressive Henry IV, who gained power with everyday and did all he could to disrupt Spain's steady supply of intelligence. Apparently, the irreverent French king also made regular sport of his Spanish ambassador and, from the time Don Juan arrived in 1598, encouraged the rest of the French court to do the same.

On 27 May 1600 after the Council received a series of letters from Tassis recounting several such episodes, they advised the King that the Spanish ambassador in Paris was "not appropriate for the place he has, for the French have little respect and estimation of him and he is of less than the resolution and brilliance that is required for the

¹⁰¹De Lamar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), 94. Mendoza worked most closely in his tenure in France from 1584-91 with Gaspar de Guzmán, the ambassador to the Holy See.

kind of arrogant humor of that king and his nation." The Council recommended a stronger personality, a Castilian, and a diplomat with good espionage skills, "as there is no excuse for a lack of intelligence there."¹⁰² Though they advised the King to act with the "greatest speed possible," it was more than two years before the Council got around to naming possible replacements. When they did, their obvious choice was Don Mendo Rogríguez Ledesma, the Spanish ambassador to Savoy--a strategically important duchy located between France and Milan whose alliance with Spain was a critical link in the Spanish Road.¹⁰³ In January of 1603 everybody seemed prepared for Ledesma's appointment.¹⁰⁴ But on 6 February 1603, the Council met again to discuss further problems. Ledesma had declined the position for an unspecified reason, and they faced the task of finding a suitable replacement for Tassis. Some members preferred Don Iñigo Vélez de Guevara y Tassis, the fifth Count of Oñate, or Don Iñigo de Cárdenas, ambassador to Venice, for their "knowledge of French matters and understanding of Flanders." The Count of Olivares, whom the King had just appointed to the Council in September of 1602, was adamant that the new ambassador must be a man with background in the Flanders War which was "essential for that embassy."¹⁰⁵

The list, however, did not contain Zúñiga's name and, as late as 29 April 1603, the Council was unaware of the King's desire to send Zúñiga to Paris, advising the King that he ought to send Zúñiga back to Flanders as soon as possible "for his absence there is deeply felt."¹⁰⁶ Yet the King had already decided to name Zúñiga to the embassy shortly

¹⁰²AGS Estado K1426 f. 5, *consulta*, 27 May 1600.

¹⁰³Lonchay, 112, Philip to Albert, 8 October 1602.

¹⁰⁴AGS Estado K1426 f. 46, *consulta*, undated. At this time, the Council authorized the usual payment of expenses for Tassis' journey home.

¹⁰⁵AGS Estado K1426 s.f., *consulta*, 6 February 1603.

¹⁰⁶Lonchay, 143, *consulta* on Elizabeth's death, 29 April 1603.

after he received the *consulta* dated 6 February containing the list of recommendations, four days after Zúñiga's orders to return to Madrid. On the folding sheet which enclosed the *consulta*, he wrote, "name Don Baltasar de Zúñiga to this office for the satisfaction that I have in his talents and competency but tell him later when he gets here."¹⁰⁷

The King, apparently, did not want the appointment to become common knowledge. Initially, he may have been concerned that the Council would discourage him, seeing Zúñiga as an essential medium in the relations between Spain and the Archdukes. Perhaps the tension of the previous fall, when Zúñiga and Albert had exchanged harsh words over the negotiation, led Albert to request a replacement or Lerma and Philip to believe a change was needed. By the middle of April it was common knowledge that Philip was going to send the Constable of Castile to Flanders to help the Archdukes get control of the military situation, but the Constable's mission to Flanders was in response to Zúñiga's request of the previous September for an envoy "to relieve the morale of the Archdukes" on the military front.¹⁰⁸ Not until the late spring did the Constable's instructions involve the peace negotiations with the English that he took charge of later.¹⁰⁹ In addition the Archdukes wrote Lerma complimentary letters about Zúñiga's services to the crown in Flanders and their hope for his speedy return.¹¹⁰ The Council's advice to the King at the end of April to send Zúñiga back to Brussels "as soon as possible" must have been made in response to the Archduke's request.

¹⁰⁷AGS Estado K1426 s.f., *consulta*, 6 February 1603.

¹⁰⁸Lonchay, 112, Philip to Albert, 8 October 1602.

¹⁰⁹Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 172. In fact Córdoba reported that the Constable's role was supposed to have been larger than Zúñiga suggested, stating that the Constable's mission was "to deal with war matters and the defeat of those provinces, while the Archdukes take shelter in Burgundy, because according to what they say, the Archduke is alienated from the soldiers and the country, and with his presence he could not remedy things agreeably; which they say His Highness does not want to admit, being that it is against his reputation." While this had the sound of court gossip, it did not suggest that Philip was dissatisfied with Zúñiga's services.

¹¹⁰Rodríguez Villa, 82. Also, see note 97 above, for Isabel's complementary letter.

On the whole, it appeared that Philip and Lerma made the appointment because, in a hasty moment, they realized that Zúñiga fit the qualifications that the Council had specified in the *consulta* of 6 February, and, after all, they had prophetically ordered him to Madrid at the right time. In addition, France and Flanders were still very interrelated problems, as Olivares had emphatically noted, because, despite the Peace of Vervins, Henry IV had never stopped his financial and military support of the United Provinces.

Therefore, deteriorating Franco-Spanish relations urgently required a stronger ambassador, and uncertain opinions about James I only confirmed this necessity. When the councilors of State met to discuss the new English sovereign, they clearly did not have a good measure of the man. Though James had no great love for his Catholic mother, Mary Stuart, many Spaniards harbored the belief that he had a deep sympathy for the Catholic faith. What they did not realize until later was that he had a deeper hatred of republicanism, a great awe of Spanish power, and a profound commitment to a policy of peace at all costs which would eventually make his monarchy friendly to Spanish interests. In April 1603, the Council was more concerned about James' friendly relations with Henry IV.¹¹¹ Within a few months, however, James calmed Spanish fears by making peace overtures to Spain which quickly changed the fundamentals of the debate in Madrid over the war in Flanders.

The new attitude in London made the summer months, which the Spanish king normally spent in festivities at his favorite residence at Aranjuez, busy with foreign policy decisions. In a short time Philip decided to send Tassis from Paris to Brussels and from there to London where he would present his papers as Spanish ambassador to the new English king and conduct renewed peace negotiations with the Constable. In addition he decided to appoint the Marquis of La Laguna de los Cameros, Don Sancho de la Cerda, to Brussels as ambassador *extraordinaire*, suggesting that he wanted La Laguna there in a

¹¹¹Lonchay, 143, *consulta* on Elizabeth's death, 29 April 1603.

temporary capacity.¹¹² Seeing that a considerably weaker diplomat was about to take Zúñiga's place and probably only in a temporary capacity, Albert wrote to Lerma requesting the power to correspond with the members of the Council more directly, particularly with Olivares, the Constable, and Idiáquez.¹¹³ It seemed that his request was granted, because La Laguna remained in Brussels three years as Spanish ambassador, yet the King did not send one letter to him. Instead, the correspondence went directly between Lerma and the Council in Madrid on the one side and on the other Albert and the members of his cabinet, especially Ambrosio Spinola.¹¹⁴

Spinola's entrance into the good graces of Madrid began with that autumn and the decision that was made to capture Ostend at all cost. Deeply affected by the death of his brother in May and anxious to have his revenge, Spinola promised the King that he would take Ostend within the year, if the King would allow him to have complete control of the troops and to arrange his own financing, in other words to make him both *maestro del campo* and head of the *junta de la hacienda*, an unprecedented position of power for a foreigner. Whether Zúñiga was one of the King's counselors in this matter was not known. But he was at court in September when the King and Council discussed Spinola's offer, and he was sure to support his good friend as he had done in Federico's case. As the man in the court at that time who was most knowledgeable about the war in the Low Countries, Zúñiga was certain to tell the King, as he had in previous dispatches, "a total peace is not possible without the willingness to war and the nation will have wasted all the money it has spent before"¹¹⁵ Spinola was the only man anywhere in the empire who combined the military experience, the financial expertise, and the confidence of the

¹¹²Ibid., 165, Instructions from Philip to Laguna, 24 July 1603.

¹¹³CODOIN (1930), 3: 460, Albert to Lerma, 12 July 1603.

¹¹⁴Lefèvre, 69.

¹¹⁵Lonchay 116, Zúñiga to Philip, 22 November 1602.

Archdukes to pursue such a policy. Thus, by October, Philip renewed his commitment to the original aim of the Low Countries policy--a separate peace with the English and victory on the field. At the same time, the King officially appointed Zúñiga to the French embassy and his uncle to the English peace negotiations and ordered them both to Brussels via Paris.¹¹⁶ At the end of October, Zúñiga and the Constable left Valladolid for Paris and arrived shortly before Christmas.¹¹⁷

Despite the cautious enthusiasm for war in the council of September and October 1603, the Constable's journey to Brussels was the beginning of the second phase of the long process of making peace with the Dutch. While Zúñiga championed the great stand at Ostend, he did not do so because of an unrelenting militant point of view which characterized many Spaniards of the time and which some historians have as well attributed to him. As has already been seen, Zúñiga had steadily moved the King and Council of State toward a more conciliatory stance with the Dutch. But he also knew that English and French support for the Dutch were the primary obstacles to an advantageous peace, which was always better than a disadvantageous one. With the death of Elizabeth and the arrival of Spinola, an opportunity arose to create that more advantageous position. While it was highly doubtful that Zúñiga, knowing the defense structures of the rebellious provinces as he did, believed Spain would ever bring the Dutch "back into the fold" with a new military campaign, he firmly believed that peace was usually won on the battlefield.

The question arises whether he would have supported the peace treaty signed with the English in 1604 and the Twelve Years' Truce signed with the United Provinces in 1609. Zúñiga did not say anything about the two events in his diplomatic correspondence from France or Germany, neither was he involved in the negotiations nor the Council of

¹¹⁶AGS Estado K1426 s.f., *consulta*, 18 September 1603; AGS Estado K1606 f. 101, *consulta*, 18 September 1603.

¹¹⁷AGS Estado K1606 f. 115, Zúñiga to Philip, 21 December 1603.

State discussions. But the man he accompanied to Paris in the winter of 1603, the Constable of Castile, and his good friend Ambrosio Spinola were both heavily involved, and Zúñiga's opinion may be gauged by the statements and actions of these two who so often shared his thinking.

Many of the criticisms leveled at the Truce at the time it was negotiated indicated that Spaniards had felt that it had become a Flemish affair. Indeed, a contemporary historian has suggested that Lerma left the peace initiatives in Albert's hands because he wished to distance the difficult but necessary peace initiatives from himself and Spain.¹¹⁸ While not disputing the reasonableness of this point, it may be suggested that from September 1603 until April 1609 Lerma also left the matters of Flanders in Spinola's hands because he believed he, and only he, could bring resolution to the costly Flanders war. And, in turn, the very fact of Spinola's presence in both peace processes gave the necessity of resolution to the war primacy over all other matters. Since Zúñiga supported Spinola's expanded role and consulted with him from Paris,¹¹⁹ it may be asserted that Zúñiga shared Spinola's opinion that to conclude the war in Flanders in the most satisfactory way that the King's money would allow overrode many of the minor details of both negotiating processes. In fact Zúñiga himself may have convinced Lerma and Philip while at court in September of the "desperate" circumstances in Flanders, of which he had often written, and the absolute necessity of ending the war one way or another. For both the citizens of Flanders and the King and his counselors, the war in Flanders was like a ferocious tiger

¹¹⁸Roco de Campofrío, 337. Trevor-Roper, 263, among others has suggested that Albert dragged the unwilling Spaniards to the negotiations. Further support for this thesis was the absence of the Spanish ambassador in Brussels during this time. Zúñiga's departure in March of 1603 and Laguna's arrival in November of the same year left Albert free to respond to many of the initial overtures of the English without a Spanish representative. And, as has demonstrated by Lefèvre, 69-70, Laguna's embassy was passive in the extreme. Moreover, Lerma recalled Laguna from Brussels in July 1606, shortly after he provided Spinola with secret negotiation instructions in April which would concede the volatile point of recognition for the United Provinces. He did not fill Laguna's absence until Don Felipe Cardona, the Marquis of Guadaleste, arrived in July 1607, two months after Albert and Spinola concluded the suspension of arms which led two years later to the Twelve Years' Truce.

¹¹⁹Rodríguez Villa, 92-93.

that drove out all other competing menaces, yet they could not get off the tiger's back until either he gobbled up their enemies, or they had succeeded in putting him into a cage. In all cases, the logic of the compelling circumstances of the loyal provinces and the King's treasury always seemed to put the resolution to the war and its adherents ahead of all other considerations, the most important of which were religious toleration in the Dutch provinces and Dutch encroachments in the East Indies. But while Zúñiga and Spinola understood the problems of the Low Countries and the condition of the Army of Flanders better than Madrid, and the religious question was of itself gradually moving to the background of the debate as secular concerns predominated, they knew a great deal less than Madrid about the problems that aggressive Dutch commerce created for the Spanish empire in the Portuguese East Indies.

When the Constable went to Brussels with Zúñiga, his instructions for the peace conference with the English had been extremely clear. He was not to concede English navigation either to the East or West Indies on any account, "even though for this the war may break out."¹²⁰ The Constable surely wanted to hold the English to those commercial limitations. But, throughout the spring and summer of 1604, while James refused to budge on the issue of free commerce, in Brussels, the tantalizing prospect that a separate peace with the English in August followed by the impending victory at Ostend (which happened in September) might lead to a serious defeat of the Dutch, encouraged the Constable, on behalf of the Spanish government, to sign an Anglo-Spanish Treaty in August 1604 which had thirty-four articles, none of which explicitly mentioned commerce in the Indies.

Spinola tried to drive the advantage he gained at Ostend in the next campaign year with the support of Philip and the Council of State. But when he arrived in Madrid in the

¹²⁰ AGS Estado 842 f. 164, "Instructions to the Constable from Madrid," quoted in K. R. Andrews, "Continental Rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604," *History* 59 (February 1974): 12.

winter of 1605-06, he realized that the "spirit had gone out of the King and his ministers, especially Lerma."¹²¹ The Venetian ambassador Simon Contarini noted the same reluctance. "Those who are close to the King abhor [the war]," he said. With the King's finances in horrible condition and impending bankruptcy looming, he noted, "resolution is not taken, nor is money provided."¹²² Like Zúñiga, Spinola wanted to press the war to a complete defeat of the Dutch or to the point of a very advantageous peace. But both men realistically knew that the nature of siege warfare made it extremely expensive, and if the will to finance it wasn't there, peace was the only alternative. While Zúñiga and Spinola may not have shared Albert's insistence on "peace at whatever terms are necessary" or Madrid's reluctance to finance the campaigns, the bankruptcy of 1607 had made all objections moot.¹²³ Spinola and Albert negotiated a suspension of arms in 1607, and, in the next two years, they arduously dickered with the Dutch for the terms of an extended truce.

Councilors still voiced concerns, bringing forth the religious issue again and the trade issue--Dutch incursions into the Portuguese East Indies. But this last objection, which historians have certainly highlighted in recent years (because of the numerous documents that exist in the government record demonstrating the heavy involvement of the Councils of the Indies and Portugal in the discussion), was something of an artificial issue. At the time, Spinola was able rather easily to quiet fears by arguing that, when the Dutch had access to Spanish markets, they would leave off the trade with the East Indies. Two other factors, however, have been ignored. The first was the interminable attacks of

¹²¹Jan den Tex, Oldenbarnevelt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 2: 352.

¹²²Contarini in Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 570 and 579.

¹²³Jaime Carrera Pujal, História de la economía española (Barcelona: Bosch, 1943), 1: 340-41, has stated that the bankruptcy which was finalized at the end of 1607 concerned 12 million ducats of debt for the King which he was obliged to pay back over nineteen years at one million per year toward principle and interest. Six million of this debt was in Flanders alone.

Dutch pirates on the Spanish and Portuguese coast. In these years the Duke of Medina Sidonia had his hands full protecting the southern coasts, and there were considerable fears that the Dutch were combining their activities with Algerian pirates in the Mediterranean.¹²⁴ The second factor was the concern which the Spanish had that Dutch activities in the West Indies would threaten their silver fleets and the equal concern which the Portuguese had for the Dutch presence in the southern Caribbean near their colony of Brazil. During the first two decades of the seventeenth century, Portuguese merchants as a whole had a greater stake in the Brazil sugar and African slave trade and enterprises in Spanish South America than they did in the East Indies and India.¹²⁵ The latter trade was especially moribund because Philip III had given a considerable part of the royal trade to the leading Portuguese noble, the Duke of Braganza.¹²⁶

Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Dutch leader, always understood that what he exchanged for Spanish recognition of Dutch independence, the key point which brought him to the table in 1607, was the abandonment of the fledgling West Indies trade, not any retreat from the East. The Spanish recognized that they could not protect the East Indies and made little effort, except in Tidore near the Spice Islands because of its close approximation to Spanish territories in the Philippines. With the development of the route of the Manila galleon, the trade between Spanish America and Japan and China through the Philippines was fairly secure and lucrative during Philip's reign. Thus, both the Spanish and Portuguese tacitly acknowledged they could not protect the *carrera de las Indias*--the old Portuguese East route around Africa--but tried to protect their stronger

¹²⁴Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 352, reported that in 1608 the Spanish had to form a special fleet under Medina Sidonia's command just to deal with the Dutch who menaced the strait of Gibraltar "and which had been the cause that the treasure fleet had not left [from American ports]."

¹²⁵James C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Madrid Court, 1626-1650* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1982), 12-13.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 15.

interests in the west. As Charles Carter has noted, all three treaties with France, England, and the United Provinces were about Europe, not the Indies.¹²⁷ They were made for Europe, and they were broken for Europe.

In November 1608 the Council of State, composed of Lerma, the Marquis of Velada, the Constable, the Count of Alba, and Don Juan de Idiáquez, met in the royal palace in Madrid to discuss whether to accept the terms of the Truce. Opponents had written letters to the King from everywhere in the empire arguing the disadvantages of the Truce. From Milan, the Count of Fuentes sent his estimation of the situation to the King:

I cannot refrain from pointing out to Your Majesty that it will appear good neither to God nor the World if Your Majesty goes about begging for peace with his rebels . . . If we lose our reputation only God by a miracle would be able to remedy the situation.¹²⁸

In the debate, the Constable also expressed his fear for the future dangers that the Truce imposed on the empire. But perhaps he remembered strikingly similar conditions from more than a decade before (November 1597) when, as governor of Milan, he witnessed the futility that another bankruptcy had created. As Philip II's prudence could not produce money or troops then, the present governor of Milan's haughtiness could not provide the resources to remedy the situation now.

In the end the Constable agreed with the Council, as Cabrera de Córdoba reported, "there was no possibility of returning to war because of the lack of money."¹²⁹ Zúñiga, with his intense focus on European problems, his concern for the security of the loyal provinces, and his tendency to resolve issues from a realist rather than an ideological point of view, would probably have agreed had he sat on the Council that day. As he said with

¹²⁷Charles Howard Carter, The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), 37.

¹²⁸AGS Estado 1297 f. 42, Count of Fuentes to Philip, 5 November 1608, quoted in Parker, Spanish Road, 133-34, n. 1.

¹²⁹Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 354.

characteristic pessimism during the early negotiations for peace with the English and Dutch, "sometimes things can come to a point where nothing else can be done."¹³⁰

¹³⁰Lonchay, 116, Zúñiga to Philip, 22 November 1602.

CHAPTER 3

THE EMBASSY TO PARIS

When he arrived in Paris at Christmas, Zúñiga did not find the former Spanish ambassador as expected, for Don Juan, anxious to be gone from his tormenter Henry IV, had already taken up residence in Brussels on 11 November 1603. Tassís and Zúñiga returned to Paris within two days and, by the end of January, were able to have an audience with the French king.¹ Zúñiga reported that the interview went very well. It was an important consideration, for Henry regarded personal relationships as essential. In his appearance and conduct, he respected no convention and regularly walked about in tattered and dirty clothes and draped his arms around strangers with little regard for their positions. If he did not like a man, such as Tassís and Sir Thomas Parry, the English ambassador in 1602-05, he belittled him or ignored him. If he preferred a man, however, as he did the next ambassador from England, Sir George Carew, he would invite him for personal and casual meetings outside the court, oftentimes without proper concern for internal security.² It was unlikely that in a time of Franco-Spanish tensions that Henry was as familiar with Zúñiga as he was with Carew.³ Still, there was no indication of a personal animosity between them, and it seemed that Zúñiga had earned the King's respect, if not his friendship.

¹AGS Estado K1606 f. 115, Zúñiga to Philip, 21 December 1603; M. Van Durme, Les archives generales de Simancas et l'histoire de la Belgique (Brussels: Palais des Academies, 1966), 3: 571.

²David Buisseret, Henry IV (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 136.

³Buisseret, 204, reported that he had no familiarity with either Tassís or the ambassador who took office in 1608, Don Iñigo de Cárdenas.

Concerning his reassignment from beloved Flanders to tumultuous France, Zúñiga probably felt as did his friend Cardinal Bentivoglio, the papal nuncio to Flanders during Zúñiga's tour, when he lamented his posting to France in 1616: "During the many years I have lived in Flanders, I have observed nothing upon that neighboring shore but storms, shipwrecks, and disturbances, which continually agitate the French ocean"⁴ Nevertheless, Zúñiga seemed to have a high regard for French literature and culture and learned French well enough (unlike his predecessor or successor)⁵ to complete his translation of Montaigne's Essays shortly after his embassy was done.⁶ But Parisian society could not have been as entertaining as Flemish society. From Brussels to Paris, Zúñiga went from an outpost of the best of Spanish and Italian culture to a hostile embassy. Given his experiences with Mendoza, Henry probably had Zúñiga watched carefully for evidence of espionage activity, and Parisians may have shunned his company to avoid the impression of colluding with him.

In addition, Zúñiga was a correct man, sensitive to protocol and decorum and somewhat "distant," as Bentivoglio said of him.⁷ He probably did not care for the informal style of the Parisian court under Henry. The tone of his correspondence indicated that he,

⁴Bentivoglio, Collection, Letter 27, Bentivoglio to Fray Francis Riviero, 18 April 1616.

⁵Buisseret, 174.

⁶Marichal, 260, states that Diego Cisneros, the next Spanish translator of Montaigne's Essays referred to Zúñiga as the "ambassador in France and Flanders." At the time of his death, Zúñiga was certainly better known as ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire and councilor of State, a fact that Cisneros, writing in 1636, oddly did not mention. Probably when alluding to the previous translation of Zúñiga, he had the work (which was in manuscript-form) before him, and, in the fashion typical for the time, it listed the offices and honors which the author had possessed up to the time of the work's publication. In 1607, Zúñiga held only the two ambassadorships Cisneros mentioned. Cisneros certainly had seen a copy of the work, for he criticized it for having "so many mistakes and errors, that one can not understand or gain anything by the reading." Zúñiga's manuscript has not survived to allow others to judge whether Cisneros was correct in his assessment. But, if the judgment was fair, this indicated that Zúñiga had a passable knowledge of French acquired by experience, rather than by formal training.

⁷Bentivoglio, Collection, Letter 19, "Bentivoglio to Lady Francis Clarus, Ambadress from Spain at Prague," 26 September 1615.

like George Carew, had little regard for Henry's famous wit or his intelligence which consisted mostly of "*repartees*" on the issues, as the English ambassador said, rather than substantive discussions.⁸ But Zúñiga, unlike his predecessor, had developed a talent for deflecting the King's little interrogations without giving offense. In one of the last audiences Zúñiga had with the French king to congratulate him on the birth of his daughter, he amusedly described for Philip III the interview. According to Zúñiga, Henry began with a long conversation "on the subject of everybody" and ended up in an unsuccessful, oblique attempt to pull information out of Zúñiga about Spain's relations with the son of the Duke of Savoy.⁹ On this occasion, as with others, Henry met an affable gentleman with an intriguing smile, an extremely well-guarded tongue, and opinions he had learned from experience to keep to himself.

Of greater concern than court protocol and the battle of *repartees* to gifted diplomats, such as Carew and Zúñiga, was Henry's unpredictable foreign policy. Though Carew's king was technically a friend and Zúñiga's informally an enemy, both diplomats, trained in the conservative tradition of political prognostication, found Henry's tendency to ignore his treaties, befriend traditional enemies, and provoke traditional friends, with an apparent jovial disregard for the destabilizing effect it had on European politics, extremely dangerous and highly unpredictable--the twin evils of Renaissance diplomacy. Though Henry had regarded George Carew as a friend, when the English ambassador ended his service in France in 1609, he warned James I that the French rather than the Spanish "are

⁸John Lough, France Observed in the Seventeenth Century by British Travellers (Stocksfield, Boston, Melbourne, Henley, London: Oriel Press, 1985), 126 (no reference to the original text). Carew was supposed to have said, "Touching the strength of his apprehension and conceit, it is held rather to consist in certain starting holes and short ends of wit, than any sound sufficiency of discourse. And therefore those of his court say of him, that for *defaites* and *repartees* he is excellent, but that he is nobody at enterprises or consultations *de longue haleine*; the which, in mine own negotiations with him, I have observed to be true."

⁹AGS Estado K1460 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 26 February 1606.

the most dangerous neighbors we have . . . gathering force as it were to wrestle with some body."¹⁰

In the first dispatches between Philip and Zúñiga, the King expressed his satisfaction that Zúñiga's stature and presence provided Spain with the respect he believed was due in Paris. But the correspondence also suggested a profound anxiety, similar to Carew's, as well as an inordinate amount of confidence in Zúñiga's powers to discern and sort out the confounding intricacies of Henry's aggressive foreign policy. Lerma and Philip, as usual, saw the problem from a more personal perspective than Zúñiga would be inclined to do. They confused Henry's indifference to Tassis' numerous complaints over the violation of the Peace of Vervins as a personal rebuke and distaste for the ambassador (which they were sure Zúñiga would remedy) rather than a deliberate policy. In Zúñiga's instructions, Philip naively ordered Zúñiga to apply his own "excellent talents" to discourage Henry from aiding the Dutch. Philip complained that his father had made the treaty that Henry now violated "to keep the peace in Christianity," by which he meant Catholic Christianity. This was only a little disingenuous. Philip II had made the peace because he had no choice. But both the King and his *valido* respected the traditional confessional tenet that monarchs at peace should not undermine the political stability of the lands of monarchs who shared the religion. The long years of war with France in the 1590s had at least fought Henry to a standstill and forced him into the Catholic fold. Philip II's successor naturally assumed that in peace Henry would observe the confessional standard as well. But, as all the world knew, the French king's religion was ambiguous, and, as Zúñiga had quoted the ancients about Tiberius, "of none of his good parts did he

¹⁰Sir George Carew, "A relation of the State of France with the character of Henry IV and the principal persons of the Court," in Thomas Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels, from the Year 1592 to 1617 (London: A. Millar, 1749), 522-23.

have as much abundance as his ability to dissemble."¹¹ Zúñiga's job, therefore, was to monitor the man who was by 1605 the most unpredictable factor in European politics

If Philip had had the benefit of a few more years of experience and the *Mémoires* of Henry's chief minister and closest adviser, Maximilien de Béthune, the Duke of Sully, in hand, he might have had some very good ideas of the French king's intentions. After Henry IV's death, the Duke of Sully published the account of his years with the King, the last chapter of which contained a treatise called "The Great Design of Henry IV."¹² According to Sully, Henry only shared the "design" with Elizabeth I and the Duke himself. In brief, it was a plan for the dismantling of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburg empires for the "happiness of Europe in general." Henry's motives, Sully insisted, were "not inspired by a mean and despicable ambition, nor guided by base and partial interests."

But a quick perusal disputed Sully's assertions that the plan was not in France's particular interests. According to Sully, Henry would have allowed Spain to keep Iberia, a few islands around the peninsula, and her colonies "as just compensation" to keep her a great power, while divesting her of everything else. The Austrian Habsburgs would be dispossessed of most of their meager territorial possessions, and the Germans could continue the election of the Emperor as long as "the election should not be made successively out of the same family," thus destroying the true source of Habsburg power. After Elizabeth assured him that the occupants of the British Isles lived in great harmony (which was news to the Irish), he determined that they would be left alone for the English to deal with.

While the states in Germany and Eastern Europe would remain small powerless fiefs or be divided into even smaller units, those states near the French border from the

¹¹AGS Estado K 1451 f. 123, Philip to Zúñiga, 21 March 1604.

¹²Maximilien de Béthune, the Duke of Sully, "The Great Design of Henry IV in *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, 1559-1611*, ed. Claude Bernard Petitot, vol. 9 (Paris, 1820-21) in Franklin Charles Palm, *The Establishment of French Absolutism (1574-1610)*, Landmarks in History Series, ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1928), 57-79.

North Sea to Italy would be combined into larger units. The Pope, an erstwhile Spanish ally, would be made a "secular prince" and receive Naples. Venice, a former Spanish ally, would be rewarded with Sicily, despite centuries of effort of the Neapolitans and Sicilians to avoid this fate. The Duke of Savoy (by the time of Henry's death, an emerging ally) would finally have his wish to be elevated to the first rank of European powers, obtain the duchy of Milan, and preside over the new nation of "Lombardy." The already independent Swiss Confederation would be enlarged by the Franche-Comté and Alsace. The real trouble spot of Europe, the Low Countries, finally would be "unified," but in a slightly different way than the Dutch might have wanted. Several of the Catholic dependencies of the Low Countries would go to princes of France, while Luxembourg and several border towns would become Henry's. And the province of Flanders and the the United Provinces would merge into an independent state (not republic) under the Prince of Orange.

Sully noted that France really received "nothing for itself but the glory of distributing [these states] with equity." If Henry in life couched the motive for his plan in such illustrious terms as his adviser did after his death, then he displayed the "true want of magnanimity" which the English ambassador George Carew accused him of.¹³ Actually, in the "Great Design," Henry granted his two most powerful rivals--Spain and England--spheres of influence distant from central Europe, emasculated the Austrian Habsburgs and returned their neighbors to their usual political disarray, and made several of his current and potential allies around his border both powerful and dependent upon him, thus, creating his own sphere of influence in the heart of Europe. Historians have suggested that the "design" was more a product of Sully's analytic than the King's quixotic imagination.¹⁴ Taken in its totality, the plan is perhaps too systematic for Henry's intellect

¹³Lough, 125.

¹⁴Palm, "Introduction," in French Absolutism, 10.

and had the benefit of geopolitical hindsight. But the section which deals at length with the political solutions of the small nations on the periphery of France corresponded too well with Henry's activities in the first decade of the seventeenth century to ignore.

Venetian diplomats recognized the critical importance of this arc of small nations that extended from the North Sea to the Adriatic. They included from north to south the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Alsace and Lorraine, the Swiss Cantons and their confederate states, the duchy of Savoy, several small states across the north of Italy, and Venice. Strategically placed along the route was the inheritance of Charles V--the southern provinces of the Low Countries which Spain still held, the Franche-Compté and the duchy of Milan. These nations also formed a geographic buffer between France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire. The Venetians referred to the nations as the *stati liberi* which indicated their non-affiliation with the great powers.¹⁵ But the states, as the Venetian strategists knew well, were hardly liberated. They were constantly drawn into the political concerns of the great powers for four reasons--strategic and military location, juridical considerations, religion, and local, usually dynastic, politics. First, they hemmed in France, a problem in itself, but they also were located along the major military supply routes of all three powers. In addition, many belonged to the Holy Roman Empire and were obliged to the judicial authority of the Emperor--a problem for those who had either religious or dynastic affiliations different from the Habsburgs. Their difficulties were further compounded by the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist majorities and minorities which waged battle for secular control in their boundaries, according to the principle of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555--*cuius regio euis religio*--which relegated the religion of the country to that of its prince. And to add to all of this there were a host of local political problems, especially between the various princes and their nobility and

¹⁵Roland Mousnier, The Assassination of Henry IV. The Tyrannicide Problem and the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the Early Seventeenth Century, trans. Joan Spencer (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), 122-23.

exasperated by familial connections with the royal houses of Bourbon and Habsburg. For nations who had some concerns about internal stability, such as France, and empires, such as both houses of the Habsburgs, or that also had concerns about the internal stability of their extended territories, political and physical control of the *stati liberi* was axiomatic.

This was already evident in the years between 1599 and 1604, before Zúñiga arrived in Paris. Besides allowing the Dutch to recruit soldiers in France, Henry permitted the French merchant community, primarily Huguenots, to act as a conduit for the sale of Dutch merchandise in Spain. To counteract this deception, Philip had ordered a *cédula*--royal directive--on 23 February 1603 which placed a thirty percent tax on French merchandise coming into his dominions.¹⁶ In a pique, Henry informed Tassis that, according to his interpretation of his treaty with Spain, the French were prohibited only from going to places in the New World where the Spanish were actually present. As far as the Spanish were concerned this was a veiled threat to the West Indies and possibly Portuguese territories in the Amazon.¹⁷ But probably more worrisome to Madrid was the constant state of tension along the Spanish Road bordering Henry's eastern provinces, which in 1600-01 involved the unpredictable actions of the Duke of Savoy.

The Peace of Vervins left unresolved the sovereignty of the marquisate of Saluzzo--the small French enclave in Piedmont--which the Duke of Savoy had occupied in 1588 and refused to give up to the French at negotiations in 1598. In retaliation Henry invaded Savoy in 1600 and captured all the Duke's territory west of the Rhone. Savoy still refused to part with Saluzzo, presenting Spain with a double problem. Philip did not want

¹⁶This was part of an overall commercial strategy which was partially successful. Though Henry responded with a 30% tax on Spanish merchandise in January 1604, both Spain and France decided to repeal the royal orders in September 1604 since they were ruinously expensive for trade. The English apparently picked up the Dutch trade to Spain in the future. Philip tried the same tactic again with the Hanseatic League. In October 1605, he applied the tax to the seventy-two cities of the Hanseatic League. The issue was resolved in 1607 with the treaty that the Hanse made with Spain. According to Alcalá-Zamora, 140, in reality the Spanish were looking for either the English or the Hanse to replace, not supplement, the Dutch trade.

¹⁷AGS Estado K1426 f. 43, *consulta* of letters by Tassis in December, 28 January 1603

Saluzzo to fall into Henry's hands, as that would provide him with a base from which to march into Italy someday. On the other hand, the Spanish needed the Savoyard territory west of the Rhone which was adjacent to their Franche-Comté territories in order to keep the serpentine Spanish Road intact. Acting as a mediary, the Pope gave Henry the territories he had conquered and left Saluzzo to Savoy, but he also allowed the Duke to keep a small valley--the *val de Chézery*--between his territories and the Franche-Comté in order to satisfy Spanish concerns for the integrity of the Road. Unfortunately, the valley possessed only one narrow bridge--the *pont de Gresin*--which allowed passage over the Rhone and this was now, by the negotiated terms, within a very short distance of French territory. The Spanish objected, knowing that Henry could easily destroy the bridge at any time to disrupt their communication and troop movements, but they signed the Treaty of Lyon on 17 January 1601 anyway. Clearly they judged the threat to Milan and northern Italy with Saluzzo in Henry's hands to be more detrimental to Spanish interests than the reduced security of the "preferred" route to the Low Countries which could probably be redirected to other passes through the Alps, if necessary.¹⁸

It did not take Henry long, however, to act on the advantage he had gained. In August 1602 he destroyed the *pont de Gresin* before Ambrosio Spinola could take across his second large contingent of troops, 8000 Italian infantrymen, intended to reinforce the battle of Ostend. Henry made the dubious charge that the Italian commander actually intended to assist Henry's governor of Burgundy Marshall Biron in one of the many

¹⁸Buisseret, 85; Mousnier, 122; Parker disagrees, *Spanish Road*, 70, and has stated that "the unfavorable terms accorded to Spain by the Treaty of Lyon were an early manifestation of the waning of Spanish power." Alcalá Zamora differed, "Iniciativa, desaciertos y posibilismo en la política exterior española bajo Felipe III," *Estudios del departamento de historia moderna* (1976): 205, and stated that the "preferred" route was still used by six-sevenths of Spanish-Italian infantry who marched to the Low Countries until 1620.

conspiracies which Henry's nobles periodically planned against him.¹⁹ Though several months passed, he eventually allowed Spinola to pass too late to employ the troops in the summer campaign. In the meantime, Philip received numerous dispatches from the Count of Fuentes in Milan that Henry intended more provocations on the Road.²⁰ The Duke of Savoy, shaken by the ease with which Henry overran his country, recognized in him a stronger ally and began to move more and more into the French camp as the decade progressed. This conjunction of problems may have been the real reason Ledesma did not want to leave Savoy in February.

In addition to the overtures he made to Savoy, Henry also encouraged Venice to sponsor an alliance of the independent Italian states across the north of Italy and within the arc--Turin, Florence, Parma, Modena, Mantua, and Mirandola--to which he offered protection in case of Spanish aggression. On his Alpine border, he successfully renewed an alliance with eleven of the thirteen cantons of the Swiss confederation in 1602. Among these was a very special agreement with the three Grisons, Protestant lords of the Grey Leagues, for the somewhat restricted license to march troops to Venice through the Tyrolean Alps which they dominated, especially the all-important Valtelline valley. The Valtelline was a strategically important bone of contention. With the Swiss confederation on the west and Venetian territories on the east, it was Henry's only route to Italy, now that he had conceded Saluzzo, and yet it was also Spain's only alternate route to the Low Countries whenever Henry deprived them of the *pont de Gresin*.

Further north, Henry married his sister to the Duke of Lorraine, another of the small states, and was in such a hurry that he didn't bother to convert her to Catholicism or

¹⁹Actually the Milanese governor, the Count of Fuentes, was strongly implicated in the conspiracy against the French king, Buisseret, Henry IV, 113, but some other pretext would have done for the destruction of the bridge which was the goal.

²⁰CODOIN (1930), 3: 238, *consulta*, 22 October 1602; Lonchay, 112, Philip to Albert, 8 October 1602.

seek a papal dispensation, angering the Pope and many Catholics. Furthermore, he encouraged the Protestant German states of the Rhineland, particularly the Palatinate, to settle their Calvinist-Lutheran differences and make a loose political association to confront the Austrian Habsburgs which they began in the formation of the Directory at Speyer in 1600.²¹

The most formidable response which Spain offered to this busy diplomacy was from the Count of Fuentes, the governor of Milan. Acting often on his own to salvage the strategic integrity of Milan, he bullied and bribed six of the Swiss Catholic Cantons to give his troops passage through their territories to the Rhine, and built "Fuentes Fort"--a powerful military base in Lombardy which was at the mouth of the Valtelline valley. This effectively prevented Henry from exercising his option to send troops through that region. Fuentes also took over the port at Finale Liguria to ensure the flow of troops should nearby Genoa become threatened, and his troops captured the fort at the harbor of Monaco ostensibly to provide "protection" but also to hold military supplies for the Spanish armies near France.²²

The Spanish king, however, became more timid as the decade progressed. Discouraged by the lack of success in the Low Countries and the interminable cost of war, he was ready to pull away from European concerns, and this opinion became even more fixed after the armistice with the Dutch. In addition, Lerma was an Aragonese and tended to see Spain's strategic concerns from the point of view of the western Mediterranean. This was a safe policy, if a dated one, for the western Mediterranean by the end of the sixteenth century, as Fernand Braudel has demonstrated, was less important to Spain's strategic and economic concerns than the Atlantic. Lerma was no soldier and had sent most of the competent soldiers who would speak against him away from Madrid. He

²¹Mousnier, 123-5.

²²AGS Estado 1293 f. 25, Fuentes to Philip, 5 May 1604, quoted in Parker, Spanish Road, 72.

inclined to a policy of neutrality and preferred to use the methods of dynastic alliance to those that would involve his king in the vigorous defense of the most vulnerable territories along the *stati liberi*. Therefore, while Lerma bribed Fuentes to keep him in Milan, he also discouraged him from some of his more belligerent policies, especially his effective control of the Valtelline. He allowed Savoy to slip off the King's list of *mercedes* and into a pension from Henry. And, while Lerma paid a fortune for intelligence about Henry's discussions with the German Protestants, he did very little to disrupt them.

Zúñiga, on the other hand, observed with great concern Henry's aggressive diplomacy. Two incidents impaired his ability to keep track of the details of Henry's policy. The first concerned a highly-placed spy, named Nicholas L'Hoste, in the office of the foreign minister Nicholas de Neufville, the *sieur* of Villeroy. Since 1601, he had been delivering first-rate information about Henry's foreign policy. At the beginning of his tour, Zúñiga was able to report specific information about Henry's attempts to discourage the Dutch from signing a treaty with Spain, Henry's internal discussions with his ministers about the thirty percent tax, the activities in Paris of the Prior of Crato, the pretender to the Portuguese throne, Henry's contacts in Italy, and his dealings with James I.²³ But in April 1604, L'Hoste was exposed by a French ex-patriot living in Spain hoping to buy his repatriation. The loss of L'Hoste was a blow to the embassy. After this affair Zúñiga's dispatch to Spain was not as rich with information as it had been before, and he had to recruit anew a number of informants in both France and Flanders.²⁴

Shortly after this came a rather comic affair involving an attempt by the family of Henry's mistress to kill him. Henriette d'Entragues' family had made her affair with Henry

²³AGS Estado K 1606 f. 132, Zúñiga to Philip, 23 February 1604; AGS Estado K1451 f.123, Philip to Zúñiga, 21 March 1604; AGS Estado K 1451 f. 125 & 127, Philip to Zúñiga, 19 May 1604.

²⁴AGS Estado K1426 f. 28, *consulta*, 1 June 1604, quoted in Loomie, 61. The Council of State was concerned that Zúñiga recruit the spies in such a way that there could not be any public connection with the embassy.

IV conditional upon the legitimacy and inheritance of any male heir which she had by Henry. Of course, the "agreement" was set aside when Henry married Marie d'Medici and was presented with the *dauphin* Louis in 1601. Tassis had given Henriette's father and her brother, the Count d'Auvergne, his assurance that Spain would finance their efforts and recognize Henriette's son young Henry in the event of the overthrow or death of his father. Several discontented nobles were drawn into the plot and in June 1604, Henry learned of it and had them arrested. In November the conspirators were tried, and in February 1605 the *parlement* of Paris gave the verdict of guilty and condemned them to death. Eventually, Henry pardoned all, but the fact that some papers in the Spanish king's cipher were found in Entragues' home did not endear the Spanish ambassador to his host.²⁵

After a year and a few months in Paris, Zúñiga came to the conclusion that merely observing Henry's bewildering activities and reminding him of his treaty and his obligations as a Catholic monarch were of little use. On 2 April 1605 he sent a ciphered letter which summed up the problems Spain had in France and recommended a more aggressive response.

The French king will help [the Dutch] as much as Your Majesty helps His Highness [the Archduke] and no more The friendlines that this king has with the Hollanders is as fixed as a stain and it seems that it will last without doubt throughout his life with things as prosperous and peaceful as they are here.²⁶

Moreover, he insisted that the French king had managed things so well that the "heretics of Holland are his confederates." He boldly stated that "only the death of the French king will forestall France's power to block Spanish policy in the Netherlands." And he coldly

²⁵Buisseret, 127; *ibid.*, 125.

²⁶AGS Estado K1460 f. 6, Zúñiga to Philip, 2 April 1605.

estimated that this act alone would have the added benefit of "hindering France for many years."

Though assassination had become a regular feature of French politics by that time, regicide in the seventeenth century was an extremely serious subject, and it may seem surprising that the Spanish ambassador actually recommended it even in an hypothetical context. But as Roland Mousnier pointed out in his book on the subject, Henry IV underestimated the reaction of his own subjects and Europeans in general to his policies which regularly crossed confessional lines. "It was the whole of Henry's foreign policy, rather than a specific part of it, which provoked Ravaillac to assassinate him. It may be summed up as a constant support for heretics against Catholics."²⁷ Given the pessimistic outlook concerning Henry and the improbability (Zúñiga would admit inadvisability) of Philip III directly confronting a king who had managed more and more each day to marshal the advantages of his country, Zúñiga recommended that the King emulate Henry's risky alliance policy himself.

In September 1601 during his tour of Flanders, Zúñiga had informed the Spanish king that the Stadtholder Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange, could be turned or at least made more amenable to Spain's interests. At the time an intermediary of the Stadtholder had met with Zúñiga suggesting that Maurice would be inclined to a closer relationship with Spain. Traditionally, the king of Spain had numerous secret financial relationships with nobles in the United Provinces and France which at least helped create discord and suspicion in the opposing camp if it did not always guarantee loyalty to Spain. But Zúñiga believed that the overture was something more than a typical small subterfuge. For some time animosity had cooled relations between the army and frustrated aristocrats led by Maurice and his brother and the burgher merchant class of Holland and Zeeland led by Oldenbarnevelt. Maurice's aristocratic yearnings chafed under the yoke of the moneyed

²⁷Mousnier, 137.

class who financed the army and dictated the campaigns. He was often times openly derogatory of the States General, referring to them as the "worshipful States"²⁸ and to the members as "longcoats." The more international circle of soldiers that surrounded him admired his brilliant generalship and agitated for the day he would become the sovereign of the Netherlands. The States General, on the other hand, followed Oldenbarnevelt's lead closely and feared Maurice's hunger for position and authority.²⁹

Zúñiga encouraged the King to provide Maurice with financial gifts and advised him to strongly consider Maurice's rather unexpected suggestion that he marry an Austrian princess.³⁰ Philip cultivated the relationship as far as gifts of money. Six months later Maurice showed up in Madrid to congratulate Philip and Queen Anne on the birth of their daughter and was rewarded for his fliety with a significant amount of *merced*.³¹ But Philip ignored the idea of obtaining a papal dispensation for a marriage to one of his nieces which was probably as much due to his concern that such a marriage would relate Maurice to Albert, threatening his own future inheritance of the Provinces, as to religious scruples. Albert, however, continued the courting of Maurice in 1607 by declaring the county of Namur south of Flanders neutral, which allowed Maurice to inherit it from his aunt, and

²⁸Peter Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609, 2d ed. (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1958), 243-44.

²⁹Many of these problems have an historical basis in Maurice's father, William the Silent. Brought up as a Lutheran, William converted to Catholicism to inherit lands in the Low Countries. He was an ally of Charles V and Philip II and sat on the privy council of Margaret of Parma when she led the regency of Flanders for her brother Philip II. Alienated even before Alba's "terror," he led the Calvinist side in the revolt for which the rebellious provinces named him Stadtholder, and he married the daughter of the Lutheran Maurice, Elector of Saxony. Their son Maurice inherited his father's lands in Hesse-Nassau, near Wiesbaden, in the Netherlands and in France. But the estate was in great debt with the military expenses his father took upon himself.

³⁰AGS Estado 2288 s.f., Zúñiga to Philip, 15 September 1601.

³¹Lonchay, 98, Philip to Albert, 6 March 1602.

Maurice responded by assisting the Archduke and Spinola in arranging the suspension of arms.³²

Now Zúñiga wrote the King that another opportunity awaited to bring Maurice into the Spanish camp. For two years Maurice had sent representatives to the court in Paris trying to obtain Henry's support for the restoration of his estate of Orange, a small principality in the south of France. The estate had been taken over by a zealous Catholic named Blaçon who spoke of reinstituting the Catholic bishopric. Henry IV had wanted to assist Prince Maurice, but so far had not found the way to do so either diplomatically or by force. This time Zúñiga approached one of Maurice's representatives and learned that Maurice was dissatisfied with Henry's half-hearted efforts. Perhaps, Zúñiga suggested, Philip himself could see that Blaçon backed down and restored Orange to Maurice's control. This of course would put the Spanish king in the position of supporting a Protestant over a Catholic in a proprietary matter for the sake of Spain's strategic interests in the Low Countries. And the fact that Zúñiga adopted the scheme again demonstrated that he viewed the importance of effective alliances in the troubled areas as more important than the dynastic anxieties of Philip III. Though he did not advocate a systematic rejection of confessional politics in the style of Henry IV, Zúñiga made his thinking on the subject of crossing confessional lines in this case perfectly clear for the King. "Without the death of the French king, we must take a hand in playing in the heretics' camp and use the Prince of Orange to our own purposes."³³ Again, Philip arranged *merced* but would not act on Zúñiga's suggestion to pressure Blaçon.³⁴ Henry also was unable to resolve the problem in Maurice's favor. Not until 1618 did the Prince

³²Roco de Campofrío, 335.

³³AGS Estado K1460 f. 6, Zúñiga to Philip, 2 April 1605.

³⁴CODOIN (1930) "Preface," 3: ix, Zúñiga was able to arrange a payment of 100,000 escudos for Maurice in 1605.

of Orange actually become master of the principality of Orange, and, by that time, it would prove too late to cultivate him, as he already headed a party of Calvinist reformers in the United Provinces.

Zúñiga continued the policy of wait-and-see. In the effort to restore the Spanish network of spies in France, he sent his secretary of languages, Jacques Bruneau, who had come with him from Brussels, into Provence to gauge the amount of disaffection among the nobility there. But, in the summer of 1605, Henry stepped up his investigations into the nobility of the southern provinces--a hot-bed of conspiracies--and discovered Bruneau's activities. In August, Henry had Bruneau arrested and, despite Zúñiga's efforts of four months, would not release him.³⁵ The prolonged imprisonment of a member of the Spanish ambassador's staff was a very serious matter. As the Constable sitting on the Council of State complained to the King, Bruneau was a member "of the family of your ambassador in France," and as such was entitled to immunity. At the very least the King ought to "suspend the diplomatic office in his royal name."³⁶

Philip, however, had very little firm ground on the matter, which was why Henry had been so daring with Zúñiga's diplomatic immunity. In July 1601, the French ambassador in Spain, Antoine de Silly the *sieur* de La Rochepot, had a dispute with some local citizens in Valladolid. Philip foolishly ordered the *alcalde*--sheriff--to arrest the French ambassador, which clearly violated his immunity and turned the incident into an international dispute. The Bruneau affair was not only the result of Henry's justifiable suspicion that the Spanish encouraged plots against his life but also another chapter in this long-running dispute.

By December Zúñiga was irritated enough that he asked Lerma, through his brother-in-law Olivares, for an audience in order to explain the Bruneau problem to him

³⁵AGS Estado K1460 f. 64, Zúñiga to Philip, 8 December 1605.

³⁶AGS Estado K1421 f. 83, Constable to Philip, 22 February 1606.

personally.³⁷ In a meeting of 22 December 1605, the Council thought that they might need to recall the Spanish ambassador to send a signal to Henry that they would not accept the continued imprisonment of Bruneau, and the King agreed. In the meantime, however, Lerma was able to resolve the matter through La Rochepot, and Henry released Bruneau on 9 January of the new year.³⁸ Nevertheless, Zúñiga left Paris in the spring. His request to return from Madrid was motivated not only by the desire to send a message to Henry, but also because his family desperately needed him to come home and fight a lawsuit which had been brought against the estate of his brother.

Zúñiga's brother, Don Gaspar, was serving Philip as viceroy in Peru, when the Count of Lemos brought a court case against him challenging the *mayorazgo* of one of his Monterrey estates, Viezma.³⁹ In January, the countess of Monterrey, the mother of both Don Gaspar and Don Baltasar, made a personal appeal to the King with her brother, the Constable of Castile, to allow Zúñiga to come home in order to represent his brother and the family in the case.⁴⁰ At the end of January the King agreed and wrote Henry IV on 14 February requesting that he give Zúñiga license to come home temporarily and allow his secretary Diego de Irarraga to handle affairs in his absence. Henry agreed at the end of February, and Zúñiga left for Spain on 2 March 1606 after having served just over two years in Paris.⁴¹

The swiftness of these arrangements was remarkable considering that Spain and France had narrowly avoided an international incident over the Bruneau affair. But Lerma was in no position but to expedite matters. Even though the challenge in court had been

³⁷AGS Estado K1426 f. 36, *consulta* on Bruneau affair, 22 December 1605.

³⁸AGS Estado K1460 f. 67, *consulta*, 10 January 1606.

³⁹Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 269.

⁴⁰AGS Estado K 1451 f. 153, Philip to Henry IV, 14 February 1606.

⁴¹AGS Estado K1460 f. 70, Zúñiga to Philip, 27 February 1606.

brought by Lerma's brother-in-law the Count of Lemos,⁴² and on countless occasions Lerma used his powers to manipulate matters to his relatives' advantage, Zúñiga had relatives in the Council of State, his mother and the Constable intelligently directed their appeal to the King, and his beleaguered brother had been a tireless viceroy in both New Spain and now Peru. The court case, in fact, was a nuisance to the evasive Lerma for it was not too many months before he began to talk of getting both participants out of town--Lemos to become viceroy of Naples and Zuniga as ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire or the viceroy of New Spain.⁴³

But Zúñiga would not leave soon. Once in Spain, family problems and crises dominated his time. In September he received word that his brother had died the previous spring in Lima leaving behind a youthful, inexperienced and hot-tempered son, Don Manuel, to take over the family. Don Gaspar de Zúñiga had died in such poverty in Peru that for the only time in the history of the office, the *audiencia* had to pay the expenses of the burial of a viceroy.⁴⁴ In addition to the usual problems that the landed Spanish aristocracy had in keeping up with the price inflation of the sixteenth century and the ostentatious living decreed by Renaissance standards, they were often forced into poverty by the expenses of holding office. Don Gaspar held several offices which probably contributed to his financial problems--raising troops in both the Portuguese and Armada campaigns and the office of viceroy in New Spain which he held for nine years. He had developed a reputation for liberality in México, which no doubt cost him a great deal of money. The lucrative office of viceroy in Peru which he held for less than two years should have brought some relief, but, by that time, Don Gaspar's generosity and the years of interest payments had probably already over-burdened his estate. At his death, his debt

⁴²Diccionario histórico de España, 1968-69 ed., 682; Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 269.

⁴³Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 292; *ibid.*, 298.

⁴⁴González López, 210.

was reported to be 80,000 ducats, 25,000 of which he had incurred in the sixteen months of his stay in Peru by generous alms-giving which explains why he "was well-loved by everyone," according to the stories at court.⁴⁵ It was not unusual for the nobility to be in debt, but this was a serious amount for the relatively small estate of the Monterrey, though not as crushing as the debts incurred by other Salamancan families, such as the Duke of Béjar and the Count of Móndejar.⁴⁶

A greater personal loss for Zúñiga, however, was the death of Don Enrique de Guzmán on 26 March 1607. The two years that Zúñiga spent in Spain at this time were the opportunity for him to grow close to the son Guzmán left behind, Don Gaspar. Zúñiga would become Olivares' mentor as Don Gaspar's father had been for him. Fortunately, Don Enrique had left his financial estate in excellent condition for his son, despite the fact that he had had a long career in the service of the King and had served for ten years in the most expensive diplomatic office in the King's service, ambassador to the Holy See.⁴⁷ In order to tie the more ancient lineage of the Counts of Monterrey with the money and political background of the Olivares, Zúñiga took a leading hand in 1607 in arranging the double marriage of the two young counts, his nephews, with each other's sisters, thus tying together the Zúñigas and the Guzmáns in the next generation.⁴⁸ The troubles of the family, however, did not end there. After the happy event of his marriage in August 1609, the young Count of Monterrey ordered the beating of a bailiff on his

⁴⁵Ibid., 286.

⁴⁶Charles Jago, "The Influence of Debt on the Aristocracy in Seventeenth-Century Castile," *Economic History Review* 26 (May 1973): 230-31.

⁴⁷Elliott, *Count-duke*, 13-15.

⁴⁸Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 297; *ibid.*, 303; according to Elliott, 19, the importance of this marriage can not be underestimated. In Real Academia de la Historia, "*Colección Pellicer*," f. 9, biography of Olivares, the unknown writer noted, "by reason of his marriage to the daughter of the old Count of Monterrey, he was allowed to enter in the Palace and later secure his appointment to the Prince's chamber."

property, possibly in an intemperate response to troubles arising from the lawsuit.⁴⁹ The Council of Orders, in January 1608, harshly sentenced him to two years banishment from his estates and the court.⁵⁰ And in the midst of this crisis, Zúñiga's mother died.⁵¹ In two brief years two great families and fortunes passed the helm to a younger generation unprepared for its responsibilities and with only the guidance of an uncle whose career would sooner or later take him away from Spain.

As the court case dragged on, Lerma worked languidly to make the arrangements to send Zúñiga to the Holy Roman Empire. The councilors of State recommended his appointment though they noted that Zúñiga did not "have the rank usually required in that office."⁵² Zúñiga knew, however, that the Holy Roman Empire was something of a backwater for a diplomatic career. Don Guillen de San Clemente, the current ambassador was not of titled rank and had been left in the office little-disturbed and little-consulted for the unusually long period of more than twenty-five years.⁵³ Zúñiga delayed and negotiated the terms of his salary, evincing the characteristic, noted by a famed contemporary, of a man "for all seasons and for his own business."⁵⁴ He insisted on taking with him four to six thousand ducats, if he was to accept the post.⁵⁵ From his tour of Flanders, "outside of the Holy See, the most expensive office" in the diplomatic service, he

⁴⁹Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 309; *ibid.*, 321.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 323. He also had to pay one thousand ducats of court expenses.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 323.

⁵²AGS Estado 2323 f. 26, *consulta*, 24 May 1608.

⁵³According to Bohdan Chudoba, *Spain and the Empire 1519-1643* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 170, San Clemente was ambassador from the early 1580s.

⁵⁴Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas, "*Grandes anales de quince días*," in *Obras completas*, ed. Feliciano Buendía (Madrid: Aguilar, 1966), 1: 735.

⁵⁵AGS Estado 2323, f. 37, *consulta*, 19 April 1608.

had learned it was best to take the money with you and to get commitments before you took an office.

Zúñiga was wise to drive a hard bargain. At the time Lerma seemed to have considerable difficulties getting members of the nobility to take offices.⁵⁶ The King's bankruptcy had given most potential office-holders notice that they might not receive compensation for services rendered. But this also suggested that Lerma did not have the sternness to crack the whip of patronage which the Count-duke of Olivares later had.⁵⁷ In both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Spanish king had the judicial power to allow debts to be encumbered on entailed estates--a practice prohibited by law without the King's exemption. In the majority of circumstances, the Spanish kings would allow the encumbrance if it was related to a service to the state; therefore, it was dangerous to decline an office. If the Monterrey's needed to borrow money against the new Count of Monterrey's estate to settle his father's debts, Zúñiga could barter, but it would have been unwise to turn down the King when he sent Andrés de Prada in February 1608 to ask if Zúñiga would accept the embassy to the Holy Roman Emperor.⁵⁸

Zúñiga's long stay in Spain and reluctance to leave may also have been related to political developments at court. Given that Olivares died leaving a position open on the Council of State, Don Baltasar could have hoped to be considered for it. His relatives were not of the Duke of Lerma's political camp, but this did not automatically eliminate him from consideration. Lerma exercised power, even when he was at the heights of his influence in a rather ambivalent way. He abhorred controversy and did not move to quash his opponents but instead tried to neutralize them with persuasion, bribery, or offices distant from Madrid. It was indicative of Lerma that after Olivares died, he tried to

⁵⁶Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 293; *ibid.*, 298.

⁵⁷Jago, 234.

⁵⁸AGS Estado 2323 f. 36, "*junta de los dos*," 17 February 1608.

cultivate the young count with the embassy in Rome (which he did not take) and later offered him a position in the chamber of the young prince Philip which he did--a move Lerma would later regret.

In addition Lerma's power waxed and waned in the years when he served as *valido* to Philip from 1598 to 1618. Patrick Williams, his biographer, has identified three crisis periods--1606-08, 1611-12, and 1618. The first crisis coincided with Zúñiga's residence in Spain. With the problems in Flanders and the bankruptcy weighing heavily on him in 1606, Lerma began to speak of retiring from court.⁵⁹ His base of power was severely shaken in early 1607 when the King arrested his *troika* of ministers--Alonso Ramirez de Prado, the Count of Villalonga, and Pedro Alvarez Pereira--for gross financial mismanagement.⁶⁰ In July, his closest advisor, a man whom the nobility roundly despised, Rodrigo Calderón, was arrested.⁶¹ A despondent Lerma now openly neglected governmental affairs. This explained in part the lack of initiative in Madrid during those years as Spinola took control of the negotiations with the Dutch, Zúñiga's embassy in Paris languished in the hands of his secretary, and the ailing Don Guillen's pleas for a replacement were ignored. With Olivares' death in 1607 and the Count of Chinchon's in 1608, the Council was now reduced to four members and remained so until 1610-11.⁶² Lerma had been careful to keep strong and outspoken men who would have been considered for the Council of State at this time, such as the Count of Fuentes, Don Pedro de Toledo, and Don Agustín Mexía, away from Madrid and was prevented by the

⁵⁹For an excellent account of the fluctuations of Lerma's power and interest in government, see Williams, 307-20.

⁶⁰Ibid., 309-10.

⁶¹Ibid., 307.

⁶²Patrick Williams, "El reinado de Felipe III," in *La crisis de la hegemonía española*, vol. 8, *Historia general de España y América* (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1981), 435; the four members were Idiáquez, the Marquis of Velada, the Constable, and the Duke of Infantado.

scandals from appointing members more loyal to him. This effectively meant that no replacements were made. As a whole the government was severely weakened, for Lerma had devised the movement of papers among the councils so that all the *consultas* of other councils went to the Council of State for deliberation before they were sent to the King. This reduced and slowed down the paper load, which usually swamped Philip II's desk, to a volume and pace that Lerma and the King were prepared to handle, but it burdened down the Council of State with matters outside the foreign policy sphere to its detriment.⁶³ Moreover, Philip and Lerma went through a period now where neither wanted to spend time in Madrid, and, if action was taken in the Council, it was not always given an executive resolution. The inactivity of the Council and the weakness of the *valido* form of government had become an open scandal.

While Lerma struggled, some of Zúñiga's friends were on the rise. Don Fernando Carrillo, his compatriot at the Boulogne negotiations, had been appointed chief judge in the case against Villalonga and his cohorts and sat on the tribunal which dealt with Rodrigo Calderón.⁶⁴ As Carrillo prosecuted a successful case, the forces for a reform of the government began to gather around him.⁶⁵ Under the circumstances, Zúñiga and others would not have unreasonably assumed that a new *valido* or a shake-up in the government was forthcoming; therefore, he stayed near Madrid, handled family matters, corresponded with the King on foreign affairs of which he had some knowledge, especially on Flanders, and completed his translation of Montaigne's *Essays*.⁶⁶

⁶³Francisco Tomás y Valiente, *Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII* (Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1963), 74.

⁶⁴Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 307.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 312.

⁶⁶Lonchay, 234, Zúñiga to Philip, 7 October 1606; AGS Estado K1452 f. 9, Philip to Zúñiga, 30 April 1607; AGS Estado K1460 f. 136, Andrés de Prada to Zúñiga, 12 June 1607.

But Lerma was not destined to fall in 1607. In the summer, faced with the threat of the retirement of a man he considered his dearest friend, the compliant King capitulated to Lerma's wish and agreed to pardon Calderón. By August 1607, Lerma was back in court arranging a flurry of appointments--Cárdenas to France, Zúñiga to Germany, and Don Felipe de Cardona, the Marquis of Guadaleste, to Flanders.⁶⁷ In May 1608, he was able to take the King away from the court for over six months on a personal tour of his *estado señorial* in Lerma.

Each successive crisis that Lerma survived, however, contributed little by little to his ultimate downfall. In 1608-09, he made two serious mistakes. First, he encouraged the King to take Fray Luís de Aliaga for the powerful and influential position of the King's confessor. Lerma obviously did not know the true character of the ambitious Dominican who in quick succession gained the confidence of the Queen and then Lerma's own son, the Duke of Uceda, inducing him to turn against his father. By 1614, Aliaga, who knew how to manipulate the pious Philip very well, was appointed Supreme Councilor of the Inquisition and sat on the Council of State. Second, after Fernando Carrillo successively prosecuted the three remaining members of Lerma's circle, Lerma allowed the King to appoint him president of the Council of Finance on 23 December 1609, a position of increasing importance as foreign policy became more dependent on the ability to finance it. Moreover, responding to the King's insistence on a public demonstration of his commitment to a clean government, Lerma agreed to the development of a *junta* to reform the Council of State and appointed Carrillo and the dukes of Infantado and Albuquerque to it. The *junta* proved to be an effective committee modifying procedures, unraveling the backlog of affairs, and recommending the appointments of Mexía and Toledo to the Council in March 1611. The King even brought back the Marquis of Castel

⁶⁷AGS Estado K 1452 f. 10, Philip to Henry IV, 12 August 1607.

Rodrigo, Lerma's old enemy, to serve from the end of 1612 until his death in December 1613.⁶⁸

Along with the appointment of his nephew, the Count of Olivares, to the Prince's chamber in 1614, all of these developments served Zúñiga very well but the tide had turned too late. In May 1608 he journeyed to the court of Emperor Rudolph II in Prague on the other side of the European world. There he would remain for nine years, earning the shrewd maxim that Francisco de Quevedo gave him: "He knew to suffer, for he gained with patience."⁶⁹

⁶⁸Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 435; John Lynch, Spain Under the Habsburgs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1: 35.

⁶⁹Quevedo, 1: 735.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMBASSY TO PRAGUE AND VIENNA

As Zúñiga traveled via Paris and Brussels through the German states on his way to Prague, he entered a cauldron of inconstant politics, religious faction, and family enmity that was in many ways as mysterious to Spaniards as a witch's brew and was now boiling to the top. Over the years, to win "elections," settle the innumerable disputes between small princes of different religions and factions within those religions, and to rally all to the defense of Christianity against the Turks, the Austrian Habsburgs employed a brand of politics that Spaniards alternately conceded was probably necessary and condemned as possibly heretical. Relations between the two branches of the family had drifted steadily since the Council of Trent, and Madrid was not in the habit of paying much attention either to the German situation or their ambassador there. Probably no Spanish diplomat of the time comprehended German politics as well as did Zúñiga by the time he left Prague nine years later. But he was aided in his immediate grasp of the situation in Holy Roman Empire because he was already well-schooled in the relations of the Austrian Habsburgs with Europe, and he understood this integration of politics far better than the Spanish king or his *valido*.

Nevertheless, in 1608 there was a problem among the Austrian cousins that Philip III and Lerma understood, if they did not quite understand what to do about it--a succession crisis in the Habsburg's hereditary lands. Unlike so many other difficulties the Habsburgs had in the Empire, this one was of their own making. At his death, Ferdinand I inadvisedly divided his vast hereditary lands among his three sons. The eldest, Maximilian,

received Upper and Lower Austria and became "elective" king of Bohemia and Hungary. These last two kingdoms came under the suzerainty of Ferdinand in 1526 when their native hereditary house died out at the same time as the Turkish threat to their security mounted. He cleverly exploited their weakness until the Habsburg hereditary right was largely accepted, if not actually legally transferred to the family. He gave to his second son, Ferdinand, the Tyrol, and to his youngest, Charles, Inner Austria or Styria. This diluted the power that Maximilian as Holy Roman Emperor could command. Yet he and his son Rudolph II were able generally to keep the peace in both the hereditary lands and among the German princes by observing the Peace of Augsburg.

This policy, of course, worked best in the Emperor's lands, if he did not pay too much attention to the religion of his subjects, which Maximilian did not. But his brothers, Ferdinand and Charles, did. Frustrated by the success of Protestant politicians and inspired by the Tridentine movement, in 1579, they held a secret meeting in Bavaria with their brother-in-law Albert, the Duke of Bavaria, and agreed that in their respective lands, they would begin to resist Protestant demands for more political concessions "not with sound and fury, but surreptitiously and slowly."¹ With the help of an intense Jesuit education, the result of successful policies at Counter-reformation in their lands, the Archduke Charles and Duke Albert passed on a similar rededication to Catholicism to their respective heirs the Archdukes Ferdinand of Styria and Maximilian of Bavaria. By the turn of the century the two cousins presented a strong Catholic front to Protestantism and plenty of children to carry on their legacy.

The Counter-Reformation had also been fairly successful in Maximilian's and later

¹W. Schultz, Landesdefension und Staatsbildung: Studien zum Kriegswesen des innerösterreichischen Territorialstaates (1564-1619) (Vienna, 1973), 70, n. 119, quoted in Parker, Thirty Years', 6.

Rudolph's lands as well, though it did not always have the Emperors' unqualified support.² Counter-Reformers, in concerted actions supported by small groups and independent of the Emperors, enticed the high nobility back to the Catholic fold in large numbers in the last half of the sixteenth century.³ The Spanish ambassador, Don Guillen de San Clemente, became part of one such circle of influential Catholic nobles which centered itself in Prague, the capital of Bohemia and the city to which Rudolph moved the court by 1583. His desire to have the court in Bohemia reflected its economic, geographic, and political significance. The last was extremely important because, of the seven traditional electors who selected the Emperor, three of which were Catholic and three Protestant, Bohemia was the seventh and tie-breaking vote. San Clemente's circle included himself and his Spanish associates, the papal representatives at court, several influential Jesuits, most important of whom was Cardinal Dietrichstein, the Prince-Bishop of Olmütz in the marquisate of Moravia attached to the Bohemian kingdom, and several prominent Bohemian families with strong Catholic sympathies, such as the Lobkowitz, Liechtenstein, Slawata, and Martinitz families. The most outstanding figure of this group was Zdenko Vojtech Popel of Lobkowitz who became Chancellor of the kingdom of Bohemia in 1599. From this office, he exercised significant political control, as the royal representative to the diets of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as Silesia and Lusatia. To Protestants and Catholics alike this group was known as *la facción española*--the Spanish faction.

Maximilian's male heirs, on the other hand, presented a rather different picture to the solidarity of their cousins. His second eldest, Ernest, died in the Low Countries, and the remaining--Rudolph, Matthias, Albert and Maximilian--were well advanced in years and without legitimate children. His daughter Anne did have a son, but this was Philip III;

²R. J. W. Evans, Rudolf II and His World: A Study in Intellectual History, 1576-1612 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 50-54.

³Parker, Thirty Years', 44.

discussions of his possible succession were privately held in Prague and Vienna, if they were held at all. To add to this, Rudolph II was severely weakened politically after 1600 by his slow descent into madness. After years of fairly competent rule, he had mismanaged policies throughout the Long Turkish War (1593-1606), aggravating the Protestants in Hungary and Bohemia who had previously submitted complacently to their Catholic king. Rudolph had caught the Counter-Reformation fever to suppress Protestantism as did his cousins, but his policy of strict and sudden enforcement of Catholicism on almost totally Protestant territories seemed on the verge of losing Hungary in the early years of the century. His isolation in his castle *Hradschin* at Prague and refusal to designate an heir frightened Catholics and the royal family. Attention naturally focused on Matthias, the next in line, but Catholics were uncertain of his views. In 1577, against the wishes of his family he went to Brussels to become the titular head of the Dutch rebels against Philip II. Though he returned to the family in 1581 and became governor of Upper Austria for his brother, he still possessed considerable sympathies for Calvinist teachings. Only after moving to Vienna and coming under the tutorship of Cardinal Melchior Khlesl did he renounce Calvinism. But to the *facción española*, Matthias' true religion was no mystery. It was ambition. If his religion was unreliable, at least his motives were predictable.

In April 1605, Archduke Maximilian, Rudolph's youngest brother and governor of the imperial fiefs in the Tyrol, and Archduke Ferdinand, the most likely successor outside of the immediate heirs of Maximilian, met secretly with Matthias and agreed to salve his hunger for power by offering to support his inheritance of the Bohemian and Hungarian crowns, if he were able to pacify Hungary and make peace with the Turks. Without telling Rudolph about their plans for his crowns, they persuaded him to give his brother the license to deal with the Hungarian leaders. Initially, Matthias had made good progress and obtained a cease fire from the Hungarians. In April 1606, the same family group met again and decided that, given the worsening mental condition of the Emperor, Matthias

should be designated head of the family and their next candidate for the Imperial throne. The King revealed in his secret instructions to Zúñiga that, without Rudolph's knowledge, his cousins had sought Philip's compliance on this second occasion and that he had given his approval to the plan "for God and the House."⁴ Believing he had the unqualified support of the family and the mandate for an expeditious resolution of the crisis, Matthias negotiated the Peace of Vienna (June 1606) which pacified the Hungarians by promising them liberty of religion, and concluded a peace with the Turks which accorded them generous terms.

Members of the family, especially the pious Ferdinand, suddenly became suspicious of Matthias' quick concessions to the Hungarian Protestants and were not completely satisfied with the terms of the Turkish peace either. Responding to this discontent, San Clemente made the serious error of rallying the more ardent Catholic members of the family to publicly criticize Matthias for his management of these matters, giving Rudolph, who had become intensely jealous of his brother, the encouragement he needed to rebuke Matthias. In January 1608, against the advise of his counselor, Cardinal Khlesl, an angry Matthias, stung by the criticism and ever-quick to anger, formulated an alliance with Protestants in the heart of the hereditary lands--the Danubian counties of Hungary, Austria, and Moravia and granted them full freedom of worship in exchange for ratification of his treaty with the Turks. Recognizing the danger and knowing Matthias better than San Clemente did, Cardinal Dietrichstein tried to mediate between Rudolph and his brother, but Matthias would not be reasoned with. He demanded the immediate resignation of his brother and that same month began a march on Prague in order to depose him.

⁴AGS Estado 2862 s. f., "*Instrucción secreta . . . Don Baltasar de Çúñiga aveis de hazer en Alemania donde os embió por mí embaxador,*" undated.

While the leadership of the Habsburgs was contested in their hereditary lands of the east, another incident in the German lands of the west contributed a new twist to the family saga and posed a whole new threat to the peace of the Empire. In 1607 Laurence of Brindisi, a leading Capuchin monk, had complained loudly to Rudolph that Lutherans consistently prevented Catholics from worshipping in the Imperial "free" city of Donauwörth near Maximilian of Bavaria's border but in the legal jurisdiction of the Lutheran Duke of Württemberg. Rudolph had no faith that Württemberg would impose the Augsburg edict which expressly allowed both faiths freedom of worship in the city and decided to give the license to enforce it to Maximilian of Bavaria. The Archduke entered Donauwörth in December 1607 and restored the peace with gusto. Protestants were inflamed by this illegal usurpation of Württemberg's authority, and Catholics were equally angered by Calvinist and Lutheran efforts to persecute Catholics in the Rhineland. The hostility spilled over into the Imperial Diet which was supposed to meet in January 1608 in Regensburg. Angry delegates could not even agree to the terms of seating the parliamentary and judicial bodies. On May 3, the Emperor's representative, Archduke Ferdinand, reluctantly dissolved the raucous session of the Diet.

The leader of the Protestant protest in the Diet had been Christian Anhalt, the first minister of the Palatine government and governor of the Upper Palatinate--a small territory separate from the main principality in the Rhineland but strategically located next door to Bohemia. For the third generation, Calvinist princes had led the Palatinate to become one of the premier centers of Calvinist learning; their capital of Heidelberg was, by that time, a center of Calvinist education and politics. The current prince, Elector Frederick IV, was an alcoholic, however, and gradually allowed Anhalt, a dogmatic Calvinist with a talent for confessional politics, to take over the foreign policy of the principality. Nine days after the Diet adjourned, the fiery Anhalt persuaded five leading Protestant princes--the dukes of Neuberg and Württemberg, and the margraves of Ansbach, Kulmbach-Brandenburg (the brother of the elector of Brandenburg), and Baden-

Durlach--to form the Protestant Union, a confessional alliance for mutual defense to last ten years. Though they could not at first attract the really powerful princes, such as the elector of Brandenburg or the landgrave of Hesse-Kessel, and later actually alienated the elector of Saxony, the alliance drew Zúñiga's quick attention. The six members geographically formed the heart of the Protestant Rhineland in the midst of the *stati liberi*. He also knew from intelligence he had in his embassy in France that these were exactly the members that Henry had been steadily pressuring to form an alliance,⁵ and he had reason to believe that the Union signaled that most dreaded of political developments--anti-Habsburg sentiment inspiring Calvinists and Lutherans to bury their differences in a permanent alliance. Though the Union specified that it would last for ten years, Zúñiga had good reason to worry that the alliance would last longer than this, for, as Geoffrey Parker pointed out, these same princes, except Neuberg, would defy Ferdinand again when he became Emperor more than a decade later.⁶

As the Protestants united in Regensburg, Anhalt sent representatives to the Bohemian Protestant leaders influencing them to ignore Matthias' promises for a surer legislative guarantee of religious liberty from the Emperor. In May Rudolph, embittered and isolated and with his brother about to march to his door, agreed to sign at the next Diet a "Letter of Majesty" allowing extensive religious liberty to Protestants in Bohemia. The Bohemian Protestants promptly announced their withdrawal of support for Matthias and prevented him from entering Prague. Finally, the ailing San Clemente came to his senses and, before any more concessions could be made to the Protestants, sent his secretary to the outskirts of Prague to negotiate a settlement with Matthias. Matthias agreed to stop his march in exchange for Rudolph's immediate cession of Austria,

⁵According to Buisseret, 141, Henry's action against the Protestant Duke of Bouillon in Sedan in March of 1606 was an effort to have more influence with this group. Bouillon had been "spreading mistrust among the German princes."

⁶Parker, *Thirty Years*, 24.

Hungary, and Moravia to Matthias and his acceptance of Matthias as successor to the remainder of the Bohemian kingdom. With San Clemente and the Catholic leadership pressuring him, the bewildered Rudolph agreed.

Zúñiga arrived in Prague a few days before San Clemente's death in August.⁷ Both the succession in the east and the German problem in the west were at once settled and unsettled awaiting another opportunity to explode. As was clear from the secret instructions Philip and Lerma drew up for Zúñiga, they perceived only the dynastic difficulties, and for them the solution lay in reassuring Matthias of Madrid's commitment and encouraging Rudolph to name his brother as heir.⁸ Of course, as Zúñiga would soon realize, and the events of that spring had made apparent, the problem was more complex than the succession that San Clemente had barely patched up. Unlike his predecessor who concentrated on the politics of Bohemia or his Spanish king who only worried about the Bohemian crown, Zúñiga's experience across western Europe gave him a more global perspective. In the fall he helped solidify Matthias' position with Spanish money.⁹ But in January he traveled to the Styrian capital of Graz to visit Archduke Ferdinand.¹⁰ Characteristically, he turned this short trip into a longer tour of the political landscape of the German states and Austria, later visiting a representative of Maximilian of Bavaria in Munich, Archduke Maximilian in the Tyrol, and the Archduke Leopold, bishop of Passau and Ferdinand's youngest brother, the only member of the family Rudolph was still communicating with.¹¹

⁷Chudoba, Spain, 50.

⁸Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 340.

⁹AGS Estado 2323 f. 35, *consulta* on letters from Zúñiga, 6 November 1608.

¹⁰Ibid., f. 66, Philip to Zúñiga, 2 January 1609. Philip ordered Zúñiga to Graz to convey the Spanish king's regrets on the death of Ferdinand's mother.

¹¹Chudoba, Spain, 195.

When he returned to Bohemia at the end of the spring, he had concluded that the succession had to be settled not only on Matthias but in the next generation on Ferdinand as well in order for stability to be restored to the family. And he began to comprehend and speak of the empire and its problems in two parts exactly as they presented themselves to him when he first arrived in August--"the dominions," or the hereditary lands of the east and "the principalities of Germany."¹² Quickly Zúñiga perceived the double conundrum. Spain's strategic, political interests lay in the *stati liberi*, especially the Rhineland, which held the security of the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Italy. Its familial and religious obligation was to ensure the Imperial election of a Habsburg who would continue the Counter-Reformation in the German states and pass his crown on to sons. If he succeeded in accomplishing the latter, it would fan the flames of militancy between Rhenish Catholics and Protestants, further destabilizing the very region which was so strategic to Spain and which unfortunately had been arming itself steadily for ten years with no sign of abatement. Three of the Catholic ecclesiastical electors were now threatened by an alliance which included two of the three Protestant electors, all in the Rhineland. But each day the succession over Bohemia (and therefore the Empire) remained unresolved, it weakened the Habsburgs and lessened their authority in the German states. While Saxony fortunately had not been drawn into the alliance and seemed content to sit on the sidelines, Lobkovic now had to work mightily to keep Bohemia in the Catholic and Habsburg camp. The question was whether a Protestant alliance could hold, militarily and politically, something that the German Lutherans and Calvinists had never managed before. In the spring of 1609, Zúñiga believed it would not hold, but, if it did, he told his friends in the *facción español* who regularly met in the Capuchin monastery behind Hraschin castle, the Habsburgs had better be ready with a heavy dose of force to discourage it. "The

¹²Ibid., 208, also noted that Zúñiga made this distinction.

Protestants will forget all their intentions and decisions as soon as they see a fire in the distance,"¹³ he arrogantly assured them.

As spring became summer, however, two events convinced him that the alliance was a force to contend with and a military response might be in order. The first was in Bohemia itself. From January to May 1609, the Bohemian Protestants waged a protracted legislative struggle with Rudolph as he tried to resist signing the "Letter of Majesty" that he had promised the previous spring. Christian Anhalt himself showed up in Prague to advise the Bohemians how to proceed against the beleaguered Rudolph. Under intense pressure Rudolph gave up and signed the "Letter" in July 1609. The second and more alarming signal was in the crisis created by the disputed succession of Cleves-Jülich in 1609-10. The provinces of Cleves, Mark, Berg, and Jülich lay along the northern reaches of the fracture of the *stati liberi* bordered by the Low Countries to the north and west, Alsace and Lorraine on the south, and, to the east, the German Rhineland. The four provinces of the duchy possessed all the problems inherent to the *stati liberi*. They were divided among Lutherans, some Calvinists, and Catholics; the latter were congregated in Jülich. They also stood at the military crossroads of Europe spanning the territories both east and west of the Rhine river. The area west, between the Meuse and Rhine, called the "over-Meuse," contained Jülich, as well as Cologne and Limberg--all friendly to the Spanish Netherlands and strategic to their security. Contemporaries recognized that if a general European war were to break out, these duchies were probably the place where it would begin. Unfortunately, the Duke of Cleves-Jülich, a Catholic, died without sons in March 1609, and since the Duke was a vassal of the Holy Roman Emperor, Rudolph was technically the judge in the ensuing dispute over the succession.

The two strongest contenders were both Lutherans, Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg and Philip-Ludwig, Duke of Pfalz-Neuburg. The duchess of Cleves-Jülich

¹³Ibid., 198.

and her Catholic relatives, on the other hand, opposed the possibility of imposing Lutheranism into Jülich and appealed to Archduke Albert in Flanders for his protection. Albert, concerned that the "untimeliness" of the Duke's death would cause a problem for the signing of the Truce in April, charged Zúñiga with persuading the Emperor to intervene quickly and prevent anyone from claiming the title, in a vain hope that speedy resolution might prevent the duchess from being overwhelmed.¹⁴ In the light of the Donauwörth incident and Rudolph's infirmity, however, the pretendants--Brandenburg and Neuburg--were not about to trust the Emperor to settle the problem. When, on 2 April 1609, Rudolph announced that the duchess would remain as regent until a judicial tribunal could form and named his cousin Archduke Leopold his representative, the Protestant Union decided to support both Brandenburg and Neuburg with arms. In July, as Leopold took control of the Catholic fortress in Jülich, he found himself surrounded by troops raised by the Protestant forces of both Lutheran dukes.

The willingness of the Union to employ ready arms alarmed both the Rhineland Catholics and the Spanish ambassador. The Archbishop of Cologne's lands sat between Jülich and the other three territories and was critical to the passage of the Army of Flanders into the Catholic Rhineland should it require the Archduke's assistance. For some time Maximilian of Bavaria had entreated his Catholic neighbors in the Rhineland to join him in a Catholic League for mutual defense. He had tried to persuade the Spanish king to support the idea but both San Clemente and Zúñiga, in the first days of his embassy, had the same fear as the small Rhineland princes--that Maximilian's League was a vehicle for his ambitions to become either Emperor himself or dominate the German states. Though the Emperor had given Archduke Albert the license to support Leopold with the Army of Flanders, he hesitated from taking a step which certainly would have undermined the Truce. The Dutch also backed away from the treaties they signed with

¹⁴AGS Estado 2868 s. f., Albert to Philip, 3 April 1609.

Brandenburg in 1605 and the Palatinate in 1604 and declined to enter the dispute. Nevertheless, Zúñiga felt a strong signal had to be sent to those who might interpret Leopold's situation as Habsburg weakness. When Maximilian proceeded with the mutual defense treaty of Munich on 10 July 1609, Zúñiga asked the King to support the League with a subsidy and persuaded the bishops of Speyer, Worms, Bamberg, and more importantly the Electors of Cologne and Mainz to join in the fall.¹⁵ In fact the latter two dropped their French pensions for Spanish ones at this time.¹⁶ It was evident later that their support had been contingent on moves that Zúñiga made in the next year to include Archduke Ferdinand's participation in the alliance over Maximilian's strong objections.¹⁷

The Cleves-Jülich crisis escalated in the fall and winter of 1609-10. Anhalt traveled Europe seeking the aid of the English, the Dutch, and Henry IV in France. Fearing a general European war, James I and Oldenbarnevelt rebuffed him, but not the dashing Henry. To the surprise of all, except those who understood the close connections he had with the Rhineland Protestants and his affinity for risky foreign policy, Henry agreed to support Protestant claims to Cleves-Jülich.¹⁸ Just as he was about to march an army into Jülich in May 1610, however, he was assassinated. If he had marched in and the Dutch had followed his lead, as seemed possible at the time, Spinola would have had to respond, as would Maximilian and the Catholic League. The result would have been a general war, but at least the Catholics of the Rhineland would have been able to defend themselves. After this display of brinksmanship, the "possessing princes"--Brandenburg

¹⁵Chudoba, Spain, 196.

¹⁶J. Kessel, Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten am Rhein während der Regierungszeit der Infantin Isabella (1621-1633) (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1979), 66, quoted in Parker, Thirty Years', 31.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 34-5.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 30, contends that Henry's motive was not a mystery and that he was only trying to keep his hand in the politics there and lend support, though his entrance was a highly ambitious scheme.

and Neuburg--signed a hasty arrangement between themselves to share Jülich temporarily and encouraged the major powers to go away.

The *status quo* was a mild rebuke to Spanish interests, but the situation in Cleves-Jülich was not without future remedy. Neuberg's son and heir, Wolfgang William, was already known to have sympathies toward Catholicism. In addition the Lutheran elector of Saxony was unhappy with the destabilizing politics of Anhalt in the affair and would soon become an open enemy to the Union. Moreover, the crisis had helped Zúñiga bring the League into existence, and with brilliant political maneuvering he had gained the confidence of the disoriented Catholics in the Rhineland, persuading them to take a unified position without enhancing the Bavarian prince's power. And most important of all, the death of Henry took away a main support of Protestant and anti-Habsburg interests in the *stati liberi*. France was sure to be "hindered for many years" just as Zúñiga had predicted in 1605.

Within two years of his arrival Zúñiga had become an effective power broker in German politics. From that point, he made every effort to stay close to the small principalities in the Rhineland and to work toward the succession of Matthias followed by a secure family member, most preferably Ferdinand. Rudolph stubbornly refused, however, to submit to his brother's succession until he lost both authority in Prague, almost his last remaining outpost, and his mind. In February 1611 Archduke Leopold, having surrendered at Jülich in the summer, returned to Prague with his 5000 undisciplined and unpaid troops. Knowing from experience the destruction such a rabble could make, Zúñiga lent the Emperor forty thousand guldens to pay the troops off.¹⁹ But Rudolph did nothing, allowing the troops to rampage the city and set off a small civil war between Catholics and Protestants in the suburbs of Prague. It was, as Zúñiga said, the

¹⁹Chudoba, *Spain*, 203.

"worst thing that could happen for the cause of religion . . . which turned the Catholics into rebels and instigated hatred against them."²⁰

Recognizing that the succession would have to be accomplished sooner than expected, he moved quickly to diffuse the situation. He dissuaded Colonel Marradas, the commander of the Imperial guard, from assisting Leopold in any way, sheltered a Protestant noble in his home to save him from the Catholic mobs, and told Madrid that Matthias' succession had to be negotiated now. The approach of Matthias' troops finally forced Leopold's troops to flee, and Zúñiga loaned the Protestants the funds to pay their troops, so they could be sent home as well. Within the year he negotiated Rudolph's resignation of the crown of Bohemia to his brother.²¹ On 20 January 1612, Rudolph died. Zúñiga used the unexpectedness of the Emperor's death, his close relations with the ecclesiastical electors in the Rhineland, the dissatisfaction of Saxony, and the fast work of Lobkovic to bring the Bohemian diets into order to arrange Matthias' quick election before he even arrived in Frankfurt in July 1612. He even suggested that Saxony might join the Catholic League,²² thus extending it beyond a confessional alliance and reaffirming his view that Spain "must take a hand in playing in the heretics camp." Christian Anhalt and the Union were caught off guard, and the Diet at Frankfurt was generally acknowledged as a great victory for "God and the House." The only unfortunate factor in this good turn of events was that Rudolph died before Zúñiga could barter with Matthias and Ferdinand over the inheritance of Bohemia. And the arrangement of the succession into a minor branch of the Habsburg house proved to be a more difficult problem than he had anticipated, not only in Vienna (where Matthias held court) and Graz, but also in Madrid.

²⁰Ibid., 205.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

Zúñiga had already found that when Philip and Lerma attended to German matters, it was usually to investigate dynastic claims. Despite previous declarations that he was prepared to renounce the Bohemian crown in favor of Matthias, in January 1610, Philip had ordered Zúñiga to prepare the Spanish king's claim. On 30 January 1610, Zúñiga wrote to Madrid strongly discouraging this solution which, he reminded them, did not work out in Charles V's time and was even less likely now. By March the Council agreed with Zúñiga and endorsed the original plan.²³ Lerma, however, had not given up on the dynastic solution, and this time he found an effective proponent in an unexpected quarter--Zúñiga's friend Ambrosio Spinola. Spinola had been in Madrid most of the year 1611 and through the following winter to receive not only the title of Marquis of Los Balbases and the designation of *grandee* but also to discuss the advantages to Spanish foreign policy made possible by Henry IV's death.²⁴ While he was in Spain, Lerma concluded the negotiations for the Spanish-French double marriage alliance--the *infantes*, Spanish royal princes, with the *dauphin* and his sister--the apogee of his dynastic policy. Though this alarmed the English king and encouraged him to marry his daughter into the Calvinist royal house of the Palatinate, Lerma anticipated the problem and intelligently selected an extremely competent diplomat Don Diego de Sarmiento Acuña (the future Count of Gondomar), a good friend of the Monterreys and a fellow Galician. Lerma correctly calculated that English anxiety was not so great that a good diplomat could not calm it. Besides, he was already considering an English match for one of the younger *infantas*.

Before he went to Madrid, Spinola had already expressed the belief that the Imperial Dignity was safer in the hands of Archduke Albert or the Spanish king himself than some extended branch of the Austrian family--an opinion with which Lerma heartily

²³Ibid., 202-3.

²⁴Rodríguez Villa, *Spinola*, 279. In February 1612, the French marriages were announced, and in June 1612, Don Diego de Sarmiento de Acuña (the future Count of Gondomar) was made ambassador to England.

concurred.²⁵ In order to gauge the situation for himself, Lerma sent his close associate Rodrigo Calderón with Spinola when he left Madrid in April. At the time, Calderón had to be sent away from court because he had again become the lightning rod for Lerma's troubles. The death of Philip's queen, Margaret, in July 1611 had depressed the King enormously, and his confessor, Fray Luís de Aliaga, as a way of undermining Lerma, used his grief to turn the King vehemently against Calderón.²⁶ When Calderón arrived in Flanders, the Archdukes had misinterpreted his coming and suggested he go to Frankfurt to give the King's congratulations to Matthias on his election.²⁷ But the King fiercely opposed the idea, and the Council, which had just added Toledo and Mexía to the group composed of Infantado, Idiáquez, La Laguna, and one Lerma stalwart his cousin the Cardinal of Toledo, decided to send Spinola instead. Nevertheless, Lerma considered Calderón's mission important enough that it was worth risking the King's anger and had managed to get the King's permission for Calderón to travel with Spinola as far as Brussels and Cologne.²⁸ Spinola and Calderón left Spain in April but delayed their journey to the Holy Roman Empire until August. They had agreed to await Zúñiga in Brussels who was travelling there from Frankfurt in order to attend another kind of wedding--his own.

On 28 January 1612, Zúñiga had written to his old friend Fray Iñigo de Brizuela, the confessor to the Archduke, asking him to act as his intermediary in the arrangement of his marriage to a lady in the chamber of Archduchess Isabel, a Flemish woman named Ottalie Claërhout.²⁹ There has been some small controversy about the role that Doña

²⁵Chudoba, Spain, 199.

²⁶Williams, "Lerma 1618," 313.

²⁷Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones, 488.

²⁸Rodríguez Villa, Spínola, 285; AGS Estado 2324 f. 146, *consulta*, 3 August 1612.

²⁹AGS Estado 2324 f. 141, copy of letters between Zúñiga and Brizuela, 28 January 1612.

Francesca (her Spanish name) played in Zúñiga's life. She was reputedly an attractive woman, of good intellect, and a favorite in the Archdukes' court.³⁰ Later, when the couple lived in Madrid, there was the suggestion that Zúñiga's affection for her was so strong and her ambition so great that she ruled him. In fact a contemporary historian suggested that her forwardness was the source of some personal difficulties between Zúñiga and his nephew, the Count-duke of Olivares.³¹ But perhaps Doña Francesca was simply of a more lively and liberal wit than the members of the Spanish court were accustomed to in a woman. Don Baltasar, who was more familiar with the exuberant Brussels court and the gregarious Renaissance traditions Doña Francesca grew up with, may also have been more tolerant of her vivacious personality than the Castilian nobility supposed was correct. Cardinal Bentivoglio, who had been the papal nuncio in Brussels and a good friend of all the members of the Archdukes' court, suggested the couple's convivial relationship when he corresponded with her in Prague, expressing his hope to be in her company and his pleasure in her "most obliging manner."³²

But Zúñiga gave the impression in his unusually personal letter to Brizuela that, while he may have been very fond of Doña Francesca, he also married for some very practical reasons. At fifty he had begun to sense his own mortality. As he looked to the future, he told Fray Iñigo, he realized he might never return to Spain where his family could make a marriage arrangement for him. Furthermore, at his age, it was not easy "to find a woman of good background who would marry, and those who do, want to marry

³⁰Ibid., 11 February 1612.

³¹Malvezzi, 85-6; more likely, also, was that Malvezzi, an intense partisan of the Count-duke Olivares, who did not know either Zúñiga or his wife, and wrote his history about fifteen years after the event, accepted the Count-duke's characterization of the relations of Zúñiga and his wife, in order to explain disputes that Olivares had with his uncle in the last months before the latter's death, rather than acknowledge that there were probably some differences in the way Zúñiga and Olivares chose to conduct foreign policy.

³²Bentivoglio, Collection of Letters, 32.

with a gentleman who is well provided with an inheritance." He confided in Brizuela that he had hoped for a better financial prospect, and the rumors that he might be sent to the embassy in Rome had given him reason to believe that he could marry a wealthy widow. But in such cases, as he said, the women were usually old and ugly, and he admitted with some humor that he "could not face up to that."³³

Doña Francesca had similar pragmatic cause to leave the charming court of Brussels for Bohemia and marriage to an older man. Don Baltasar had told Brizuela that he had "carried on" with her for some time, which may have meant he met her during his embassy in Brussels, and she could very well have been in her thirties at the time of her marriage. This would not have been considered too old in that day; Zúñiga's older sister had married Don Enrique at about the age of thirty. But Doña Maria had brought a dowry of 60,000 *escudos* and ancient noble lineage to her marriage, which the Claerhout family did not have. Doña Francesca's father had been a loyal vassal to Philip II though not among the principal nobility, as Zúñiga explained to Philip III in a letter he wrote asking permission to go to Brussels.³⁴ She and her family would certainly have regarded her marriage to a Spanish ambassador an honor regardless of his age. Therefore, Don Baltasar's marriage may have been a love match, but it was also a smart match and a last chance for two people who grew increasingly devoted to each other in their last years. After months of requesting leave from the electoral Diet in Frankfurt to travel to Brussels, Zúñiga finally arrived there at the end of July and probably married his intended in the Archdukes' court in early August.³⁵

As the Spanish ambassador traveled from Brussels to Frankfurt to Prague with his new Flemish wife, his good friend Spinola, the Italian hero of Spanish arms, and later his

³³AGS Estado 2324 f. 141, copy of letters between Zúñiga and Brizuela, 28 January 1612.

³⁴Ibid., f. 140, Zúñiga to Philip, 30 April 1612.

³⁵Rodríguez Villa, *Spinola*, 281 and 285.

French-speaking secretary Jacques Bruneau,³⁶ Germans were reminded that the quick election of Matthias was not an accident but an example of just how well the Spaniards in Europe and their allies had mastered European politics. For Zúñiga, his multi-national contacts, friendships, and associations were a way of life, and few knew how he spent most of his career fighting a running battle with the King and councils in Madrid and their xenophobia of non-Castilians. The presence of a diplomat like Zúñiga inspired in Catholics and aristocrats an admiration which in the case of some in Prague bordered on hispanophilia. But among the Protestants and the French, it foreboded a vast conspiracy and prompted renewed hatred for the Spanish and their arrogance which even among Spain's friends of the times were "inseparable concepts."³⁷

If the Protestants perceived an interconnectedness among Catholic and Habsburg axes in Brussels, Prague, and Madrid during Zúñiga's embassy, it was because the crisis over Cleves-Jülich, the succession crisis, and Zúñiga himself automatically drew the affairs of Prague closer to Brussels. Zúñiga's dispatch to Madrid often went through Brussels, and he kept the Archdukes informed of everything that happened in the embassy in Prague, especially concerning the Rhineland.³⁸ This may well have reminded Protestants how Bernardino de Mendoza had kept a close internal correspondence with Olivares in Rome when they manipulated the affairs of France during the 1580s. In addition Albert, as a loyal family member, could not help but be deeply involved in the problems of the succession, though he was always sensitive to public opinion on his loyalty. Madrid was

³⁶Zúñiga had arranged for Bruneau to come with him to Prague in 1608, in AGS Estado 2323 f. 34, Zúñiga to Andrés de Prada, 27 September 1608.

³⁷M. Herrero García, Ideas de los españoles del siglo XVII (Madrid: Editorial Voluntad, 1928), 59-66.

³⁸Rodríguez Villa, Spínola, 236.

also more than aware of these connections and regularly requested copies of the internal correspondence between Zúñiga, Albert, and Spinola.³⁹

While Matthias obtained his long-sought prize in Frankfurt, Zúñiga, Spinola, and Calderón conferred over the summer in Brussels and Cologne about the unfinished succession business again.⁴⁰ Unlike 1610, when Matthias had the undeniable claim to the crown of Bohemia, this time, Matthias' two brothers and Philip III had a stronger claim than Ferdinand of Styria. Calderón's job was evidently to test opinion in Brussels to see if Philip had any chance for the imperial throne himself, and, if not, to determine what concession he should demand before he set aside his claim. While Calderón returned to Spain, Zúñiga and Spinola went to Vienna in October 1612 and held a series of meetings with the Emperor's advisor, Cardinal Khlesl, and his brother, the Archduke Maximilian. On the advice of his counselor, Matthias deferred the problem of naming his heir to the opinion of his brothers, as they had first right of refusal. He had not wanted to endorse Ferdinand anyway, since he personally detested him. But Maximilian, as he had in 1605-06, preferred the stability of the empire to his own ambition and strongly endorsed his cousin, Ferdinand. Spinola still wanted the King to induce Albert to accept the crown, but on his way back from the Holy Roman Empire at the end of October, he met Albert in Marimont. To his disappointment the Archduke agreed entirely with his brother that the crown should go to Ferdinand for the advantages he had in his youth and his sons which would stabilize the succession.⁴¹

After the October meetings, the course was clear. Ferdinand had the logical support of the younger Imperial brothers, but his claim was still weak because Khlesl and

³⁹AGS Estado 2865 f. 17-19, copies of Zúñiga-Spinola correspondence at request of Philip, 23 July 1613.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, f. 146, *consulta*, 3 August 1612.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, f. 43, Summary of two letters from Spinola to Lerma, 4 and 23 October 1612.

Matthias would not support him. Therefore, Ferdinand's claim to the crown of Bohemia, the key to his election as Emperor, was still fragile and dependent on the Spanish who naturally expected something for their support. Philip would set aside his claim to the Bohemian throne (as Albert and Maximilian offered to do), support Ferdinand's election as Holy Roman Emperor, provide him with a substantial one-time pension, and negotiate the marriage of a Spanish *infanta* to Ferdinand's son Juan Carlos, but only in exchange for a substantial concession of territory in the *stati liberi*. These, in substance, were the terms of the secret Treaty of Graz that the Count of Oñate, Zúñiga's successor, concluded with Ferdinand in March 1617. It was an important diplomatic development in the years preceding the Thirty Years' War because it tied Philip to Ferdinand in such a way that he was obliged to support Ferdinand in 1618 when he fought the insurrectionists of the Bohemian Defenestration.

José Alcalá Zamora has suggested that the treaty was entirely of Oñate's making, a feature of his aggressive diplomacy, and independent of Madrid,⁴² but the treaty was a long time in the making with several hands in the process, principally Zúñiga's. Philip had suggested a similar arrangement in the secret instructions which he gave to Zúñiga in 1608. At the time he wanted to purchase the investiture of the small enclave of Finale Liguria in order to legitimize the Count of Fuentes' possession of it in 1605.⁴³ The purchase of Finale Liguria would settle the problem which began with Fuente's aggression, and the addition of Piombino, which the King also had suggested as a possible purchase, helped secure the Spanish naval presence in the western Mediterranean. But Philip had not suggested this for consideration in a treaty at that time; he only wished to take advantage of Rudolph's poor financial condition. Naturally, the small Italian ports came up in the first discussion of a possible treaty with Ferdinand. But Zúñiga believed that

⁴²Alcalá Zamora, *España*, 144.

⁴³AGS Estado 2862 s. f., "*Instrucción secreta . . .*," undated.

Alsace was a better prize, since it was a key to keeping France out of the Rhineland, helped protect Cologne and the Rhenish Catholics with Jülich in question, and formed a valuable link in the Tyrolean route of the Spanish Road. The latter was especially important since Savoy had concluded a mutual defense treaty with France shortly before Henry IV's death and showed no sign of reneging on it. In addition, it was the stepping stone that linked the Army of Flanders to the countries that formed the Catholic League. Spinola did not entirely agree. He feared that "it would provoke the jealous fears of all the Catholic powers on the Rhineland."⁴⁴ But Zúñiga's intimate knowledge of the Rhenish Catholics led him to believe that they feared the allied Protestant threat in the Rhineland more than the presence of Spain, as later events would prove,⁴⁵ and convinced the others to negotiate for Alsace. The Spanish had every reason to believe that Ferdinand would embrace a deal where he gained so much distance on the path to the Imperial crown for so little.

On 29 June 1613, Ferdinand came to Linz to have a meeting with Matthias, and Zúñiga was able to have his first face-to-face meeting with Count Ecktenberg, Ferdinand's advisor.⁴⁶ The purpose of his meeting was formally to announce Philip's intent to claim a right to the throne, but as Zúñiga told the King in cipher he "did not want to expressly discuss the treaty, although Echtenberg touched upon it in parts . . . , " suggesting that Ferdinand's adviser understood very well what was going on. The technical issue was whether Anne of Austria, Maximilian's daughter, had renounced her claim to her father's Bohemian possessions when she married Philip II. Zúñiga claimed that she had not and Ecktenberg that she had. But Ferdinand rather surprisingly had decided that he was

⁴⁴David Maland, Europe at War, 1600-1650 (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), 61.

⁴⁵See note 53 for the Jülich campaign in 1614; see note 84 for the Elector of Mainz' assistance in the treaty negotiations in March 1617.

⁴⁶AGS Estado 2865 f. 20, *consulta*, 14 September 1613.

having none of the claim or a possible treaty. His adviser abruptly presented Zúñiga copies of Anne of Austria's renunciation of her rights to the Bohemian crown and insisted that Ferdinand would send a representative directly to Madrid to discuss the matter with Lerma himself.⁴⁷

Obviously, the Archduke also had determined that Zúñiga was acting independently of his master. But the manner in which the correspondence concerning the Treaty of Graz was handled in Prague, Brussels and Madrid over the next year indicated that it had the direct support of Philip and Lerma with Calderón as a filter. Zúñiga and Spinola corresponded between themselves concerning the progress of the negotiation and then sent copies of their correspondence to the King. This was not unusual, but the correspondence then went to a secret *junta*--small committee--composed of two men whom Lerma trusted, Juan de Idiáquez and Calderón.⁴⁸ At Zúñiga's request Madrid assigned a lawyer to investigate Philip's claim in the government archive at the Simancas castle near Valladolid.⁴⁹ Zúñiga also sent his personal secretary Jacques Bruneau to Madrid with the papers concerning the inheritance that he had diligently collected in the the Holy Roman Empire, as well as the document Echtenberg had given him..

⁴⁷Ibid., f. 19, copy of a letter from Zúñiga to Spinola, 4 July 1613. Zúñiga's intent was made clear in another document, AGS Estado 710 s. f., "*Opinión de marqués de Velada*," April 1616, which said that "Don Baltasar is of the opinion that the King will have to eventually renounce his right to Hungary and Bohemia but should try to control the situation with the threat."

⁴⁸Ibid., f. 17-19, Copies of letters between Spinola and Zúñiga, 4 July, 20 July, 23 July, f. 22, 5 August 1613; *ibid.*, f. 20, "*consulta del comendador de León [Idiáquez] y el conde de Oliva [Calderon]*," 14 September 1613; *ibid.*, f. 24-5, 31 December 1613; *ibid.*, f. 36-7, 1 February 1614. Also, the Duke of Infantado admitted that the King had allowed Zúñiga "a long hand in the matter" in a paper he submitted to the council which is located in AGS Estado 710 s. f., "*El papel del duque de Infantado sobre la materia del sucesión*," April 1616. And the council of Idiáquez and Calderón indicated that they would approve of Spinola's going a second time to Germany to work with Zúñiga, as long as Spinola would "conform with Don Baltasar and not the other way around." See AGS Estado 2865 f. 36, "*consulta del comendador de León y el conde de Oliva*," 1 February 1614.

⁴⁹AGS 2865, f. 19, copy of letter from Zúñiga to Spinola, 4 July 1613. This same *legajo* contains the large volume of evidence that Gabriel de Trexo gathered which dated back to the medieval period in support of Philip's claim to the throne.

The investigation of the documents, however, delayed the progress of negotiations. In June 1614, Zúñiga complained that the Habsburg and German princes were about to meet in July, and Bruneau was still not back with Madrid's legal case for the Spanish ambassador to present.⁵⁰ This unfortunate delay for almost two years and Ferdinand's legendary obstinance wore on a Spanish court that had hoped to settle the problem quickly. Spinola felt that Ferdinand's insistence that the King had no claim and that therefore he owed no concession was extremely "unreasonable," meaning Ferdinand was not necessarily wrong, but he was shooting himself in the foot. Zúñiga, however, assured the King that the election of the Emperor was a "delicate negotiating affair" and counseled patience because Alsace "so close to Burgundy was well worth it."⁵¹ But Madrid did not have patience and sometimes even avoided dealing with the treaty, fearing that the news of the secret negotiations would leak. By the end of 1614, Zúñiga had already lowered the stakes to a negotiation over Finale Liguria, and there the treaty negotiations remained, Ferdinand with his obstinance and Madrid with its lethargic hand-wringing.⁵²

After more than two years, the reluctant partners would finally agree. It was not reasonableness, however, which brought them to the papers but the compulsion of events. From May 1614 until just before Zúñiga left the Holy Roman Empire in March 1617, three such events raised the level of tension in Europe, encouraged a proliferation of alliance-directed militancy, convinced Ferdinand that he could not become Emperor or stay Emperor without Spanish support, and persuaded the Spanish that their territories in Europe were more threatened by the "general peace" than they had been in war. The

⁵⁰Ibid., f. 50, Zúñiga to Philip, 29 June 1614.

⁵¹AGS Estado 2326 s. f., Spinola's comment on a copy of a letter from Zúñiga to Philip, 19 September 1614 in Rodríguez Villa, *Spínola*, 308-9.

⁵²Ibid., f. 66, *consulta*, 15 January 1615.

second Cleves-Jülich crisis in 1614, the battle for Monteferrat in northwest Italy in 1615-16, and the Uskok war on the border between Venice and Ferdinand's Adriatic territories in 1616-17, erupted like a series of small rolling earthquakes, the instability in one area undermining the equilibrium in another and collapsing like an earth slide across each border.

The first Cleves-Julich crisis had, on the surface, not been resolved in Spain's favor. The two Lutheran claimants of 1610, however, had begun to have their predictable differences over Jülich, and almost equally predictably changed their religion to gain allies. The new Duke of Neuberg had become a Catholic and married a Bavarian princess and Brandenburg converted to Calvinism. As part of the compromise they made in 1610, the two dukes had agreed to allow a Dutch commander, Colonel Pithan, to head their joint forces in Jülich, but Neuberg now distrusted this arrangement. Soon Brandenburg's and Neuberg's troops disputed with each other, and, to restore order, Colonel Pithan decided to call in reinforcements from the United Provinces. Neuberg complained loudly and called on Albert to assist him. Allowing the Dutch to remain in control of the over-Meuse land was completely unacceptable, but the Council of State was still concerned with any action which could break the truce with the Dutch. Albert and Spinola wanted to intervene. As Council members acknowledged, their position in Jülich gave the Dutch an excellent recruiting ground and Cologne--a Catholic province strategically located on a long stretch of the Rhine--would be sandwiched between Cleves and Jülich "having to obey and follow the dictate of the Islands"--Holland and Zeeland.⁵³ Zúñiga, however, saw that the threat of the Dutch in the over Meuse might be even greater in the long run not just for Flanders but also for any drive the Dutch might choose to make into the heart of the Rhineland which affected the welfare of the Austrian Habsburgs. On 30 May 1614,

⁵³AGS Estado 2028 s. f., "*Sobre lo que contienen las cartas del señor Archduque Albert y marchés de Espinola en lo de Juylers*," 11 June 1614.

Zúñiga shot off a letter to Albert's foreign minister Juan de Mancicidor telling him that in his opinion the situation could be resolved diplomatically, for everybody still wanted to avoid the war in Cleves-Jülich "that will be very long and dangerous." But Albert should not expect much from the Emperor this time. Since the stakes were too high in the Rhineland and the "insolent" Dutch behaved in so bold a fashion, "nobody would feel obligated to obey the Emperor . . . If the province is left in their hands, Cologne and after that all three ecclesiastical electorates will go quickly . . . talking without the support of arms would be the failure of everything."⁵⁴

The Dutch had apparently believed that Spinola would not respond. This time, however, the Spanish could be more bold and had less to fear from the French quarter now that that government was led by a regency of Marie d'Medici on behalf of her son Louis XIII and wanted no part of a foreign policy that would jeopardize a Spanish-French match. Spinola moved quickly in September to mobilize his 15,000 troops, take over several towns in the province of Jülich, and over-run the garrison town of Wesel, the critically important post across the Rhine river in Cleves. The ambassadors of the ecclesiastical Electors accompanied the army on its campaign in Jülich along with Cardinal Bentivoglio of the Holy See, thus giving the impression, as Bentivoglio said, of "a confederacy of all the Catholick powers united."⁵⁵ Though the Dutch dug in and held Jülich, the capital of the province, Spinola's possession of Wesel separated the Dutch from the forces of the Protestant Union and was an important capture for the military control of the Rhine. Again, in November, the instigators of this new crisis, Neuberg and Brandenburg, called off their powerful supporters and quickly settled another

⁵⁴AGS Estado 2500 f. 79, Zúñiga to Juan de Mancicidor, 30 May 1614.

⁵⁵According to Bentivoglio, Collection of Letters, Letter 16, Cardinal Bentivoglio to Chevalier Tedeschi, the joint appearance was intended in order to "suppress the confidence of the Hereticks, who had already in Idea devoured the Empire, and got into their Hands the ecclesiastical States bordering upon the Rhine, particularly those belonging to the Electors."

unsatisfactory peace with the help of the French. But both the Dutch and Spinola maintained their forces exactly where the war had left them, each checkmating the other.

Further south in the *stati liberi*, another dispute over succession on the edge of the Empire, flared. Duke Francis of Mantua, an Italian province between Milan and Venice, died leaving no male heirs. Again two claimants came forth--his brother Duke Ferdinand and his daughter. While no one doubted Ferdinand's claim to Mantua which denied succession to the female line, the hereditary province of Montferrat, which was part of the inheritance of the dukes of Mantua and located on the other side of Milan bordered by Savoy on the west, had no such entail. Duke Francis' daughter claimed Montferrat and called on her grandfather, the ambitious Duke of Savoy, Charles Emmanuel, to occupy the neighboring Montferrat in June 1613 on her behalf. Mantua was an Imperial fief and the Mantuan dukes were distantly related to the Habsburgs; therefore, Duke Ferdinand, confident of a favorable ruling, asked Matthias to intervene and Philip III to give him the forces from Milan to force Savoy out of Montferrat. After an unsuccessful negotiation, hostilities began in June 1614. Despite combined Habsburg assistance, the Duke was unable to reconquer all of Montferrat by the summer of 1615. The French, whose new foreign minister the Bishop of Luçon (the future Cardinal Richelieu) was the behind-the-scenes supporter of Savoy, genially offered to negotiate a truce which Lerma's cousin, the Marquis of La Hinojosa, governor of Milan, accepted. The wily French bishop had made the terms of the Peace of Asti so disadvantageous to Milan, however, that Lerma was forced to replace his cousin in the critical office. The exasperated Council of State recommended that one of their own members go to Milan to put up a stronger military front--Don Pedro de Toledo, a man in the Alba tradition, by which the Spanish meant an uncompromising soldier, except that in Don Pedro's case, he also happened to be a nephew of the great Duke of Alba.

Along the southeast section of the half moon of troubled states a further difficulty arose. For some time a group of Serbian refugees displaced from the Turkish war, known

as "*uskoks*," had stationed themselves in the several ports of the Adriatic making a living by preying on Venetian shipping. After years of trying to bribe them, fight them, and appeal to the Archduke to control them, the Venetians suddenly decided in December 1615 to protest the matter by attacking Ferdinand's territories. The fact that the Venetians went to war suddenly over a long-standing problem, that the attack came on the heels of the Peace of Asti, and that the Venetians did not settle for border retaliation, but drove deep into Ferdinand's lands to his southern city of Gradisca, indicated to the Spanish that the Uskok war was part of a concerted effort to harass Habsburg interests.

Nevertheless, Zúñiga did not realize this at first, believing that the problem was just a local dispute until the Venetians were half-way to Gradisca in Ferdinand's duchy of Carniola. On 18 March 1616, he informed the King that he had, on his own authority in support of Ferdinand, raised six companies of Germans and 500 calvary under the leadership of Colonel Baltasar de Marradas y Pallas, a member of the Army of Flanders who had been attached to the Emperor's household as commander of the guard and a relative of San Clemente. While he spent the subsidy that the King provided him for the Catholic League, he assured Philip that it was charged to both the Emperor and Archduke Ferdinand and Ferdinand's brother Maximilian Ernest. He informed the King that

. . . it is seen that they intend to conquer all of the Archduke's state. Under the circumstances, it will be necessary to send him a large sum of money, and that Don Pedro de Toledo become involved . . . and to decide what avenue to take in the matter of the succession for there is great danger in waiting much longer.⁵⁶

Less than a month later, he informed the King that the fortress at Gradisca, Ferdinand's southern capital, was now under siege and the provinces in the area were being pillaged and ransacked.⁵⁷ And on 16 April he practically begged the King to forward the money

⁵⁶AGS Estado 710 s. f., Summary of three letters by Zúñiga, 18-19 March, 9 April 1616.

⁵⁷Ibid.

necessary to pay the expenses of the war.⁵⁸ As usual Zúñiga had probably also communicated his frustration with the King's delay to Albert and Spinola, because, within a day of each other, they sent letters asking the King to respond to the situation as soon as possible.⁵⁹

The King's first reaction to Zúñiga's news that he had raised troops for Ferdinand was not good. In the margin of the summary of Zúñiga's letters he wrote sardonically, "It would be well if Don Baltasar had advised me of this before executing it . . ." and then gave permission for a smaller number of troops. But Lerma was clearly unhappy with Zúñiga's expensive activities. At least in the north, the Army of Flanders had Wesel to show for the great amount of treasure Spinola spent on the campaign. And in Mantua a quick peace had prevented vast expenditures of sums in Milan, for it was unlikely that Hinojosa acted without Lerma in settling the weak accord at Asti. But to open the King's pocket to the miserly Archduke of Styria who would not even concede a little territory that he did not even own yet for the sake of the Imperial crown was more than Lerma could abide.

For the first and only time, for he seemed to respect Zúñiga as a valued diplomat and had not yet come to distrust him, Lerma tried to undermine Zúñiga. First, the King and Lerma sent an order to the Spanish diplomat telling him to stop assisting Ferdinand. Zúñiga apparently ignored it, requiring the King to send him another dispatch 22 June 1616 expressly ordering him to desist in the expenditure of funds.⁶⁰ Second, though it had been rumored for some time that Zúñiga would be going to Rome, a selection had not been definitely made. It was well known that Rodrigo Calderón had wanted the embassy

⁵⁸Ibid, s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 16 April 1616.

⁵⁹Ibid., s. f., Albert to Philip, 20 April 1616; *ibid.*, Spinola to Philip, 21 April 1616.

⁶⁰Ibid., s. f., *consulta*, 3 September 1616.

to Rome, and perhaps Lerma had tried to save the office for his lackey until he could find a good moment to take up the matter with the King.⁶¹ Suddenly, on 26 May 1616, almost certainly at Lerma's instigation, the King ordered the Council of State to provide him with a list of recommendations for Rome. From the list that included both Zúñiga's and Calderón's names, the King selected Zúñiga.⁶² Finally, Lerma began to question Zúñiga's negotiations of the treaty of Graz and orchestrated a debate in Council. At the end of April, Lerma presented the Council of State with a paper from the Duke of Infantado on the secret treaty and ordered them to consider the paper and advise the King.⁶³ Infantado's paper recommended that since Zúñiga might move on to the embassy of Rome, the King ought to order the Count of Oñate, his probable replacement, to the Holy Roman Empire "as soon as possible" and give him the further instructions in the matter without sharing them with Zúñiga or Spinola for the sake of confidentiality. According to Infantado, Oñate should pass through Milan and discuss the states of Finale Liguria and Piombino with Don Pedro. Then he was to inform the Archduke and his relatives that Philip was prepared to renounce the Bohemian crown, expecting the "consideration" of the investiture of the Italian states, including them as part of the King's duchy of Milan. And that done, Oñate could then write Archduke Albert to act as intermediary for the arrangement of the marriage of Philip's second daughter Margaret with Ferdinand's eldest son.⁶⁴ The Council of State finally accepted Infantado's suggestions on 14 June and drew up special instructions for Toledo to begin peace negotiations between Ferdinand and Venice.⁶⁵

⁶¹Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 536 and 558.

⁶²AGS Estado 1865 f. 271, *consulta*, 26 May 1616.

⁶³AGS Estado 710 s. f., "*Haviendo visto Su Majestad . . .*," 27 April 1616.

⁶⁴*Ibid.* s. f., "*El papel del duque de Infantado . . .*," April 1616.

⁶⁵*Ibid.* s. f., *consulta*, 14 June 1616.

Zúñiga, who understood that he had lost some of the support of the King, nevertheless wrote an impassioned letter to him at the end of July that explained why he was "obligated" to assist Ferdinand, and might have, by its wording, aroused in the Council a sense of foreboding for the state of Spanish affairs in Europe. Zúñiga emphatically told the King, "if Your Majesty had not helped the Archduke it would have been the loss of everything and if the hand is not extended now to help him he will lose without doubt." He encouraged the King to provide Oñate with the 100,000 ducats he had requested, even if they had to be "devoted from the next silver fleet." And he reported that the negotiations over the succession were in complete confusion; they had to be resolved. The Council agreed to continue supporting Ferdinand,⁶⁶ but the King still hesitated.

Zúñiga was right that the Venetians probably would have gone all the way to Graz, if he had not helped Ferdinand. Since they were prevented from this, the Venetians cleverly conspired to draw Spain into a second front. With the assistance of the bishop of Luçon, they offered Savoy the funding to attack Montferrat again in September 1616. And both Catholic states approached the Protestant Union who agreed to recruit Germans for Savoy's army. The Venetians now used the Montferrat war as an excuse to attack Mantua, sandwiching Milan between enemies on both sides. Toledo was able to muster the forces to defend the threat to Milan, Mantua, and the territories the Duke of Mantua still held in Montferrat, but he was unable to assist Ferdinand. In the middle of November, Zúñiga urgently reported what that he now had evidence that the Dutch were about to give direct military assistance to the Venetians.⁶⁷ At this news, Philip immediately agreed to a larger loan for Ferdinand's defense and called a Council of War.⁶⁸ The Spanish were

⁶⁶Ibid. s. f., *consulta*, 3 September 1616.

⁶⁷Ibid. s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 19 November 1616.

⁶⁸AGS Estado 2326 f. 108, *consulta*, 16 November 1616.

beginning to see in the isolated instances along the *stati liberi* a vast international, multi-religious, organized effort of the Dutch, French, German Protestants, Savoyards, and Venetians to menace Spain's patrimony in Europe.

On 26 December 1616, Lerma attended a Council of War's debate for the first time since 1599. He admitted that if the Dutch involved themselves in the war with Ferdinand and Savoy, as seemed likely at the end of 1616, the preservation of Italy had to be maintained over the preservation of the Truce. This political collusion which could result in the introduction of Calvinist troops in Italy, as reported by Zúñiga and Toledo, was intolerable, the Duke said.⁶⁹ The money question also was beginning to bother Lerma. According to Don Fernando Carrillo in a meeting of the Council of Finance in 1615, the Spanish king now was spending eight to nine million ducats a year, most of which went to military expenditures.⁷⁰ In 1616 Don Fernando again made the very pointed criticism that the damage to the King's treasury in the case of war was not greater than the "peace" of the last few years had been,⁷¹ suggesting that Spanish weakness might have invited aggression. By the time of the Council of War debate, this rationale was beginning to take hold, and Lerma, bending to the public sentiment, said, "war could be made with little more than the current expense." In a statement that would become more frequent from 1616, the Council of War ended its proceedings with an ominous conclusion: "Religion and reputation . . . are the two great matters which sustain states."⁷²

Of course, religion and reputation could be set aside periodically as Philip II had done himself. And war could be made for a great deal more expense than peace, as the

⁶⁹AGS Guerra Antigua 808 s. f., *consulta*, 26 December 1616, quoted in Williams "Lerma 1618," 319.

⁷⁰Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 350.

⁷¹Williams, *História general*, 440.

⁷²AGS Guerra Antigua 808 s. f., *consulta*, 26 December 1616, quoted in Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis 1598-1648* (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980), 156.

years ahead would prove. But Lerma was an Aragonese dedicated to the preservation of Spanish Italy, and he shared the general fear of the Spaniards in those days, as one contemporary historian succinctly put it, that "there was a danger of making of Italy, a Holland; or at the very least Holland in Italy."⁷³ In Madrid men now perceived that while the Dutch might never allow them peacefully to govern the Spanish Netherlands, the whole world was testing their resolve to hang onto Spanish Italy. Their fear swept away the shaky support for Lerma's dynastic and neutral policies like a wave, and he knew it. Later, he would lament the turn of events and the failure of his policies of peace, dynasty, and neutrality: "all of the world has placed itself against this crown."⁷⁴ Still he pressed Don Pedro de Toledo to make the peace to end the war of Italy, though Toledo, anxious to wipe out the Peace of Asti and fight the Savoyards all the way back to France, disagreed.⁷⁵ Eventually, Lerma was able to negotiate a peace through the nervous offices of the Holy See, with Don Pedro and the Duke of Osuna, the new viceroy of Naples, speaking against it every step of the way.⁷⁶ In Jülich, Montferrat, and Styria, however, sometimes directly against his wishes and sometimes with his benign consent, Spain became more and more involved militarily and financially in the unstable corridor of the *stati liberi*. The pressures of these three wars on top of the many scandals of Lerma's ministry created a tide of renewed energy and public opinion in Spain that was manifestly against peace and corruption and for war and austerity. Moreover, the first serious admission in Philip's ministry that the Twelve Years' Truce might be unsustainable was

⁷³Virgilio Malvezzi, História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV, libro segundo, in Memorias para la historia de Don Felipe III, rey de España, ed. Juan Yáñez Paladorio (Madrid: N. Rodríguez Franco, 1723), 106.

⁷⁴Williams, História general, 440.

⁷⁵Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/22 f. 86, Cottington to Winwood, 4 December 1616.

⁷⁶Jerónimo Dalmao y Casante, "Cartas a los diputados del reino de Aragón, participandoles noticias de la corte de España," Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas, y Museos no. 1 (1878): 123 (first series).

made in response, not to the problems of the New World, but to long-standing rivalries and their new wrinkles in the Old.

Patrick Williams has suggested that Lerma put Zúñiga in the Rome embassy because he recognized him as a rival and tried to ruin him financially.⁷⁷ If this were the case, Zúñiga demonstrated a strange enthusiasm for the appointment. He already knew there was a good possibility he would go there at the time of his marriage in 1612 and certainly did nothing to prevent it. In April shortly before the official declaration he referred to it as a "promotion" and seemed to regard it as the height of his diplomatic career.⁷⁸ He told the King that many prominent individuals at the court in Rome had written to him suggesting that Zúñiga might be an ambassador, not only for Spain, but also for the Emperor which he said might be "a good idea" and send a clear signal "that the houses [of Habsburg] are in conformity."⁷⁹

At the time of the final decision in May 1616, Lerma certainly was perturbed at Zúñiga but also had other reasons for changing the mix of diplomats in Italy, involving enemies and friends at court, always his main concern. Perhaps the second height of Lerma's power (after 1598-1606) were the ceremonies surrounding the double marriage of the *infantes* of Spain with Marie de Medici's children in May 1615. After the ceremonies in the north of Spain, Lerma did not return to court for six months, leaving many of his duties in the hands of his rather indifferent son, the Duke of Uceda. When he returned at the beginning of 1616, he directed all officials, foreign and domestic, to his son, refusing to take audiences.⁸⁰ In the meantime, he spent considerably more time with the prince and

⁷⁷Williams, "Lerma 1618," 320.

⁷⁸AGS Estado 710 s. f., Zúñiga to Philip, 16 April 1616.

⁷⁹AGS Estado 2502 f. 156, Zúñiga to Philip, 7 May 1616.

⁸⁰Dalmao y Casante, 171 (second series); Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/22 f. 1, Digby to the Secretary of State, 14 January 1616.

appointed the members of the prince's household from among his loyalists in an obvious effort to extend his family's influence into the next generation, while his son retained the hold on the current one. And, if his son had trusted him, this strategy might have been very successful, but Luís de Aliaga and Fernando Carrillo, on whom Uceda had become dependent, and Rodrigo de Calderón who reported their activities to Lerma and who obviously was not anxious for Lerma to step aside, fanned the discord between father and son.⁸¹ By the summer of 1616, Lerma recalled his son-in-law, the Count of Lemos from Naples, ostensibly to place him in the Council of Italy, but, actually, to move him into the prince's household to counteract his son's and Aliaga's power in the palace.⁸²

Unintentionally, the various personnel shifts that Lerma had to make in the offices of Italy in order to bring Lemos home, placed the testy and hot-tempered second Duke of Osuna in Naples and Zúñiga in Rome

Lerma had little to fear from Zúñiga who had been away from court for years and had little influence there since his brother-in-law died in 1607 and his uncle the Constable in 1613. Besides, Lerma regarded Olivares, Zúñiga's nephew, as one of his creatures. (The Count of Olivares could have won his appointment to the Prince's chambers in 1614 only if Lerma had been confident in his loyalty.) But by this time, the Count of Olivares began to shift his allegiance from Lerma to the Uceda-Aliaga alliance and convinced them to bring Zúñiga to Madrid before he went to Rome.⁸³ By December 1616, Zúñiga received the King's license to return to Madrid before going to Rome, ostensibly to apprise the

⁸¹Mateo Escagedo Salmón, "Los Acebedos" *Boletín de la Biblioteca Menéndez y Pelayo* 1 (January-March 1625): 63.

⁸²Dalmao y Casante, 77 (first series); *ibid.*, 281, also noted that Lerma returned to giving audiences, Uceda left Madrid, and there was also talk of Lerma arranging a seat on the Council of State for Lemos.

⁸³Matías de Novoa, "*Historia de Felipe III, rey de España*," in *Colección de Documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, ed. M. F. Navarrete (Madrid: Impresores de la viuda de Calero, 1845-75), 61: 159.

King and Council of affairs in the Holy Roman Empire.⁸⁴ Zúñiga and Olivares must have believed, by this time, that Lerma's fall was imminent and Olivares' position in the prince's chamber secure. But Oñate was a long time in delaying his trip to Vienna. In November Zúñiga was so impatient for Oñate to replace him, he wrote to him complaining of his delay, suggesting that the Count's son precede him to take over matters, and telling him that he had arranged for a friend in Barcelona to place a galleon at the Count's disposal to take him to Genoa.⁸⁵

Though the Count of Oñate's progress to the Holy Roman Empire was slow, once he arrived in Habsburg lands, he moved events expeditiously--a characteristic very much a part of his diplomatic style. He arrived in Vienna by the middle of February, consulted with Zúñiga, and had his first audiences with Matthias.⁸⁶ In the meantime, he had sent his son ahead to Graz to greet Ferdinand at the end of January and present him with the tentative treaty that conceded the territories of Finale Liguria and Piombino to the Spanish king. Ferdinand agreed to both the terms and the arrangements for him to go to Prague in March in order to finalize the treaty. By the end of February, Oñate and Zúñiga parted ways--Oñate to Prague and Zúñiga to Spain. But before Zúñiga left, he received a letter from the bishop of Speyer, one of the small Catholic princes with whom Zúñiga had developed a relationship since the days of the negotiation over the Catholic League in 1610. The bishop had told him that the time was right to approach Ferdinand again on the concession of Alsace. Since the younger Oñate already had Ferdinand's signature on the Finale agreement, Oñate and Zúñiga decided that Oñate should only raise the point in Prague but not necessarily insist on it. But on the journey home, Zúñiga ran into the ecclesiastical Elector of Mainz, who offered to talk to Ferdinand himself about conceding

⁸⁴AGS Estado 2502 f. 1-4, Zúñiga to Ciriza, 21 December 1616.

⁸⁵Ibid., f. 13, copy of letter Zúñiga to Oñate, 14 November 1616.

⁸⁶AGS Estado 2326 f. 30-31, Oñate to Philip, 16,17, and 18 February 1617.

Alsace.⁸⁷ In view of the situation, Zúñiga decided to leave his personal secretary, Jacques Bruneau, to act as Oñate's liaison to the Rhenish electors.⁸⁸

A conference to discuss the Treaty convened in Prague from the middle of March to the middle of April and included Khlesl, three councillors and a secretary of the Emperor, a gentleman of the court of Archduke Maximilian, and the Baron of Echtenberg, besides Ferdinand and Oñate. By this time, Ferdinand's stubbornness met with the proverbial deal he could not afford to refuse. The Archduke was already in a difficult situation because he was so beholden to Spain for the help that Zúñiga had given him in fighting the initial Venetian invasion. The Uskok war had also left him in difficult financial shape. In addition Matthias was not well, and it was imperative to the family to have an heir to Bohemia and a candidate for the Imperial crown before his death. Now the elector of Mainz, who had developed something of a leadership position among the Rhenish Catholics, signaled to him that their safety and maybe their vote depended upon placing Alsace in Spanish control, securing the link between the Army of Flanders and the Catholic League in case the Protestant Union were to trouble them in the future. Characteristically, Ferdinand made them talk him into the deal for a month before he did the inevitable and signed away Alsace. When Oñate wrote the King, he informed him gleefully that he literally "had a choice between the two treaties"--the first one signed in January for the Italian provinces and the second one signed in April for Alsace. The Council decided that they would wait to make a final decision until Zúñiga had returned from the Holy Roman Empire.⁸⁹

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, f. 38, *consulta*, 9 July 1617. This was further indication that the Elector of Mainz and the other ecclesiastical Catholic states had developed a confidence in Zúñiga and Spanish protection greater than that for the Austrian Habsburgs or Maximilian of Bavaria.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, f. 35, *consulta* on Oñate's letters, 1 June 1617.

While Zúñiga passed through Brussels on his three-month journey home,⁹⁰ events in the Holy Roman Empire proceeded at a rapid pace. In May 1617, Mathias fell dangerously ill, forcing Cardinal Khlesl to authorize a convocation of the Bohemian Diet. By 9 July 1617, the same time as Zúñiga's arrival at court, Oñate sent word that the Bohemian Diet agreed to accept Ferdinand as King of Bohemia upon Mathias' death. Overjoyed with the turn of events, Zúñiga said that the Council ought to offer congratulations to Oñate for "reducing the negotiation to perfection" and also to the Bishop of Speyer, "an esteemed and prudent man," for the parts they played in the business. "Without a doubt," they should accept the second treaty and provide Oñate with the 100,000 ducats promised to the Spanish embassy in Prague, as soon as possible.⁹¹

Throughout the month of July, Zúñiga attended several council meetings on the subject of the Holy Roman Empire and gave a good account of himself. He did not, however, sit on the Council yet.⁹² Since 1611-12 there had been no new members appointed to the Council of State, but Zúñiga had arrived at a propitious time. It was well known that the Duke of Lerma wished to retire and take up a religious calling in his final years. For this he had applied to the Pope for a cardinal's hat and was constructing a massive number of buildings dedicated to his legacy in his *señorial* estates at Lerma in the north of Spain. He had believed, however, that his son, even though his loyalty to his father wavered, should inherit his offices, including the seat on the Council of State. Rumors of the amount and value of the Duke's acquired wealth on his retirement, however, had created something of a scandal at court that July. In a fit of consternation over the criticism of his government and the manner in which it was linked to the Duke's

⁹⁰AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Sobre lo de Auditor General para el ejército de Flandes*," 27 September 1618.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, f. 38, *consulta*, 9 July 1617.

⁹²A review of other Council business for the month of July revealed that Zúñiga only sat at those sessions concerning German affairs.

venality, the King was distinctly at odds with his much-beloved minister at that point. He was highly receptive to the idea of appointing someone of high reputation among the nobility and unconnected to Lerma's faction to the Duke's former seat on the Council. Zúñiga and Olivares could not have chosen their moment better. On 3 August 1617, the Council informed the King that they would be providing him with a list of names for the Rome embassy, "having understood the resolution that Your Majesty has taken that Don Baltasar de Zúñiga remain here, and with this has vacated the ambassadorship of Rome."⁹³

⁹³AGS Estado 1865 f. 272, *consulta*, 3 August 1617.

CHAPTER 5

THE COUNCIL OF STATE

When Don Baltasar de Zúñiga returned to Madrid in the summer of 1617, he was about fifty-six years old. Of those fifty-six years, more than twenty-seven, eighty percent of his adulthood, had been spent outside of Spain, serving a Spanish king renowned for his travels around the confines of New and Old Castile but rarely beyond those boundaries. The reforms of 1611-12 had brought two new members with extensive military backgrounds to the Council of State--Don Augustín Mexía and Don Pedro de Toledo, the Marquis of Villafranca. At that time, they joined men knowledgeable about the course of international politics, directly experienced in the government of the monarchy beyond Castile, and representative of a continuity with the old regime of Philip II--the Constable of Castile, the Marquis of Velada, Juan de Idiáquez, and the Marquis of Castel Rodrigo. In the middle years of the decade, however, these men died one-by-one and were not replaced.¹ A Council of State was left that contained a mix of men who had experience in war or court politics but lacked the foreign policy expertise of their deceased comrades and were divided in their support for Lerma's hesitant foreign policy.

Lerma could usually count on the votes of two relatives he had maneuvered onto the Council in the early days of the reign--Don Sancho de la Cerda, the Marquis of La Laguna, related to Lerma through his wife's family, and Don Bernardo de Rojas y Sandoval, his uncle, who was both the cardinal-bishop of Toledo and *inquisidor general*--the King's representative to the Inquisition. La Laguna had warmed the ambassador's chair in Brussels in 1604-08, while Spinola conducted business with Spain during the

¹Barrios, 331-34, 342.

negotiations for the Truce and returned to the Council in 1608 to provide a steady vote for Lerma. Don Bernardo infrequently attended meetings but could also be counted on to support his nephew faithfully, when needed.

The Council members active against Lerma were Don Pedro de Toledo and the King's confessor, Fray Luís de Aliaga. Don Pedro was a blustering, loud war-hawk, talented in the art of soldiering but of an intolerant nature, poorly-suited for diplomacy. He was related not only to the Duke of Alba, but to others in the austere and militaristic traditions of Spain--the late Marquis of Velada and the Count of Fuentes. He saw himself in their heroic mold and vilified Lerma's scattered peace policies. In 1617, however, Toledo was in Milan, remaining there until August 1618, and so did not participate in the crucial first year of Zúñiga's tenure on the Council of State.² While Don Pedro was the loose cannon of the Council, Fray Luís, the King's Dominican confessor, had proved to be an adept court politician. As the confessor to a king whose religious piety was legendary, Aliaga was probably one of the few people who could get close enough to the King and influence him enough to do Lerma harm. But Fray Luís was less than knowledgeable about foreign policy. His forum was the King's conscience and the venality of the Sandoval clan; therefore, he depended upon and allied with a member of the Council with greater experience in foreign affairs, Don Agustín Mexía.³

Don Agustín's was one of two votes on the Council that remained somewhat independent. The other belonged to Don Juan Hurtado de Mendoza de la Vega y Luna, the Duke of Infantado. While Mexía more often sided with Lerma's enemies, Infantado leaned toward Lerma's opinion. Mexía was similar to Toledo--a crusty old soldier who had been brought on board to give the sound of guns to a Council dominated by the friars, *letrados*, and courtiers whom Lerma preferred. Like Toledo, he was extremely distrustful

²Ibid. , 350.

³M. Devèze, L'Espagne et le Portugal dans le règne de Philippe III (1598-1621) (Paris, 1965), 63.

of non-Castilians, criticizing the government in Flanders, especially Spinola, and was accustomed to saying "there is nothing secure there except that the Spanish actually control it."⁴ Unlike Toledo, however, Don Agustín was of a taciturn nature, methodical in his analysis, and did not opt for military solutions to every problem. As an accomplished and experienced soldier, he favored a more aggressive military posture after the wars of Italy but tempered his opinion with a cautious attitude toward foreign military adventures. Mexía's opinion had, up till the time of Zúñiga's entry on the Council, carried considerable weight.⁵

Don Juan was the son of the Marquis of Mondéjar and became the sixth Duke of Infantado by his marriage to his cousin, the heiress of the Infantado fortune. He was also related to Lerma by marriage and was appointed in the early days of Philip III's reign. But, while Infantado owed his many high political offices to Lerma, he was afforded a little independence from Lerma by virtue of the fact that he was head of one of the most powerful *grandee* families of Spain. He participated in the reform of the Council with Fernando de Carrillo, Lerma's sworn enemy, but was also amenable to representing Lerma's policies when called upon, as he did in April of 1616 when Lerma wanted to put a stop to Zúñiga's financial support of Ferdinand in the Uskok war. Infantado was very clever at reading the political winds, however, and as the Duke of Lerma's fortunes fell, he slowly settled himself into the political center of the Council and kept his distance from Uceda, resenting some of the activities of the son against his father.⁶

Up to 1615, it often mattered little what happened in Council meetings. The King generally reviewed the *consultas* with Lerma, infrequently commented on the

⁴AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "Sobre lo de Auditor General para el ejército de Flandes," 27 September 1618; for Mexía's distrust of Spinola, see Lonchay, 397, *consulta*, 14 February 1613.

⁵Williams, "Lerma 1618," 328, note 21, has also asserted that the role of Mexía has been underrated and that his opinion carried considerable weight.

⁶Escagedo Salmón, 1 (January-March 1926), 17.

recommendations, and usually acted only when Lerma perceived a need to act.⁷ Several elements after 1615, however, had served to revive the importance of the Council as a counterweight to Lerma's power.⁸ Besides the new blood of Mexía and Toledo, Aliaga put an unrelenting pressure on the King to deal with the *consultas* and the Council himself without Lerma as a guide. Aliaga was motivated not only by a sense of personal rectitude, for many were highly opposed to the whole idea of a *valimiento*--the institutionalization of the King's favorite--but also by the recognition that a king who listened to a broad base of counselors only had his confessor for spiritual and personal guidance.⁹ These strategies succeeded the more Aliaga was able to discredit Calderón, Lerma's henchman, and the more Lerma was absent from court--a frequent occurrence in the years since the Franco-Spanish marriage. As Aliaga gained influence, Lerma suffered a severe personal crisis over his retirement. Although it was his greatest desire to pass on the *valimiento* to his son and the next generation of his family, he knew that Uceda did not have the political skills and intelligence to gauge and neutralize the influence of persons such as Aliaga; in fact they tended to dominate Uceda as much as the King. Therefore, Lerma regularly postponed his retirement, remained at court, and waffled between supporting his son, his son-in-law, and his favorite Calderón--whoever could manage the heavy duties of the *valimiento* best. This only served to alienate the jealous Uceda and irritate the King, who was uncomfortable with the constant and steady court intrigue, especially in the prince's chambers.

⁷Tomás y Valiente, 70.

⁸Barrios, 125.

⁹Tomás y Valiente, 11-12, noted that "despite the tendency to want to believe that there was a simple change from one *valido* to another, actually, the beginning months of Philip IV's reign in the King's own thinking, in his court, and probably also in that of his eventual *validos*--Olivares and Zúñiga, that the *valido* was both unnecessary and harmful. Therefore, the King should elevate the bureaucratic role of the '*buen consejero*'--good counselor"; Santa María told the King that even though Zúñiga was a person of great prudence, inside of a few months the King himself would be handling the papers. British Library MS Additional 10236 f. 323 ff., Santa María to Philip IV, 1621 (no specific date).

In addition, a general dissatisfaction in both domestic and foreign policy characterized the last years of Philip III's reign and occasionally moved the King to act petulantly against Lerma.¹⁰ On the domestic front, the *letrado* class led the opposition. The Cortes--Spain's parliamentary chamber of the townships of Castile--met in 1617 as they always did, only when the King wanted an increase on the local taxes of consumable goods, called the *millones*. Fueled by a persistent recession in Castile, the Cortes of 1617 was the most contentious session of the chamber in recent memory. Overburdened with taxes, the Castilians loudly demanded reform of the King's government for the new revenues he wanted. Ironically, it was war, especially in Italy, that required the new taxes, but the towns tended to blame the corruption and lethargy of the court for their financial troubles.¹¹ At court the complaints were led by other members of prominent *letrado* families. Don Fernando de Carrillo had been on the Council of the Treasury since 1609, led the reform commission for the Council of State, and was a regular critic of Rodrigo Calderón. The latter activity endeared him to Uceda. Fray Juan de Santamaría, who was close to the court at the Escorial, wrote a famous book, *República y política cristiana*, published in 1615, that condemned the practices of the *valido* and the *valimiento*. The book became very popular and an important subject of conversation at the very moment when Lerma was attempting to perpetuate the *valimiento* in his family. They were later joined by Don Francisco de Contreras, a former member of the Council of Castile and an austere and righteous figure from the days of Philip II who, although officially retired,

¹⁰I. A. A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620* (London: The Athlone Press, 1976), 97, stated that his perusal of the documents of the Councils of War and Finance in the second decade of the seventeenth century indicated "a frustration and hopelessness that have no parallels even in the worst years of the sixteenth century."

¹¹There was good reason to suspect Lerma, for in these years, while the Duke was regularly spending from his personal estate 50,000 ducats a year on ceremonial buildings for his own personal edification and over the course of the reign over a million ducats on ecclesiastical foundations in his name, the King struggled to find as little as 100,000 ducats to finance major foreign policy initiatives. Williams, "Lerma 1618," 323.

stood on the sidelines denouncing the corruption and laxness of the Lerma government. He was later talked into sitting as judge in Rodrigo Calderón's trial for corruption and took over the Council of the Castile in 1621. In addition, in 1618 Carrillo moved to the Presidency of the Council of the Indies, and Zúñiga's uncle, Don Bernardino de Velasco, the Count of Salazar, took over the Presidency of the Council of the Treasury.¹²

The nobility who were immune from the new taxes tended to focus on the perceived failures in foreign policy and the weakness of the peace-time army. While no one wished to war against France and England, and most were hesitant about a renewed war with the Dutch, the problems in Italy had demonstrated that Lerma's distaste for war as a tool of statecraft had given a group of small states, acting in concert and sometimes as the proxy of the great powers, the courage to challenge Spain at its heart--primarily in the defense of Flanders and Milan and secondarily in the support of the Habsburgs' choice for Emperor.¹³ Furthermore, a new group of exceptionally spirited and beligerent Spanish viceroys and diplomats in Europe constantly pressured the Council to take more aggressive actions. Lerma had tried to remedy this situation by moving them. He replaced Toledo with the Count of Feria in Milan only to find that Feria was equally spoiling for a fight. He moved the pugnacious Count of Bedmar from the embassy of Venice to Brussels, where the Count only succeeded in angering Spinola and the Archduke with his imperious ways. The aggressive Duke of Osuna remained in Naples working behind Madrid's back to send his troops to the Holy Roman Empire and Venice. And Oñate, while highly competent, tended regularly to exercise "the long hand," as Lerma described the tendency of Spanish diplomats to make foreign commitments and get their king's permission later. The members of the Council of State themselves were not of

¹²Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War," European Studies Review 9 (October 1979): 429.

¹³Parker, Thirty Years' War, 42, for the importance of the Uskok war in galvanizing public opinion against Lerma; also, Williams, História general, 447, discussed that Spain "could be humiliated by an alliance of small and weak states that acted in concert."

a political make-up that was dangerous for Lerma. In fact, the case could be made that the Council from 1611-14 was more hostile to him, but, at that time, Lerma had more influence with the King and the wars along the *stati liberi* had not weakened his credibility. The Council of 1617, however, was under much greater pressure, both at home and abroad, and often times found itself split, bemoaning the expense of an assertive foreign policy but more and more favoring the actions of the new assertive breed. In early 1617 Lerma had tried to control the Council and reduce its visibility by forming a small junta that would deal with the actual affairs of state, but he failed.¹⁴

Thus, when Zúñiga arrived, the Council was already becoming the voice not only calling for the end of Lerma's *valimiento* but also for the beginning of the policy of reform at home and a stronger stand abroad. The years from 1617-22 were also one of the few times in Spanish imperial history when the politics of Spain were more dominated by the conciliar process than a king in concert with a principal advisor.¹⁵ Thus, neither of the major foreign policy decisions of the last years of Philip III's reign--the decision to support Ferdinand's repression of the Bohemian insurrection or the decision to abrogate the Twelve Years' Truce--was solely the product of Zúñiga's political will or of the ascendancy of a "war party."¹⁶ Nevertheless, to the uncertainty of the court, the government, and the Council, Zúñiga added a distinct voice and a clear opinion born of relatively superior foreign policy background, recent experience in both Flanders and the Holy Roman Empire, and an active political imagination.

Zúñiga managed to articulate the anti-Lerma position by advancing four policy concepts--maneuverability, alliance, linkage, and crisis. First, he argued that Spain, unlike

¹⁴Barrios, 125.

¹⁵Elliott, *Count-duke*, 37.

¹⁶This was essentially the thesis of Trevor-Roper's essay, "Spain and Europe, 1598-1621," which has been highly influential in the historical treatment of the last few years of Philip III's reign.

the period from the treaty of Nonesuch in 1585 to the assassination of Henry IV in 1610 had much greater maneuverability to deal with the Dutch and the small countries that harassed her. By 1617 it was evident that France and England, under the peace-loving leadership of James I and regency government of Marie de Medicis, were in a full retrenchment. While they had done a little aiding and abetting of Spain's enemies, the French had refused to become directly involved or provide full-scale support for many of the activities during the second crisis of Cleves-Jülich and the wars of Italy. Therefore, war, as a tool of foreign policy, would not necessarily lead to a generalized conflict, if Spain kept an eye on these powerful neighbors and handled matters in such a way as not to draw them in.¹⁷

In addition, Zúñiga asserted that Spain, during the Lerma years, had neglected the first line of defense for the Spanish patrimony in Europe which was the fostering and support of strategic allies. This was not an unusual opinion. Spain's talented diplomat in London, the Count of Gondomar, tried to explain this to the King in a letter of March 1619, as if to school the King, recently liberated from Lerma's influence, in the standards of foreign policy:

The wars of mankind today are not limited to a trial of natural strength, like a bull-fight, nor even to mere battles. Rather, they depend on losing or gaining friends and allies, and it is to this end that good statesmen must turn all their attention and energy.¹⁸

¹⁷As early as 17 March 1614, Gondomar was telling the King that international affairs among Spain's traditional nemeses were turning in Spain's favor--the death of Henry IV, the passive James I, and the civil unrest in the Dutch Republic, as well as the growing enmity between the Dutch and English over commerce. CODOIN (Madrid: Tipografía de Archivos, 1936-47), 4: 35, Gondomar to Lerma.

¹⁸Ibid., (Madrid, 1943), 2: 140, Gondomar to Philip, 28 March 1619, quoted in Parker, *Thirty Years'*, 220; Zúñiga's policy in the Holy Roman Empire from the development of the Catholic League to the timely support of Ferdinand in the Uskok war, was geared toward the propagation of alliance, as can be seen by his comments at the Council meetings in July 1617: that Spain could not allow the Calvinists to put a barrier between them and Maximilian of Bavaria, "that it was important to ally in every way with Ferdinand and the ecclesiastical electors who are allied closely with the Imperial interests," "that Spain has many friends among the ecclesiastical estates," and that it "was not a good idea to separate from

Lerma had, of course, pursued an alliance policy by dynastic marriage. The difference between him and experienced diplomats, such as Zúñiga and Gondomar, lay not in the value of making alliances but in the obligations of the alliance once made and the strategic value of alliance systems. Zúñiga believed that Lerma, with his stubbornness to avoid the expense of war, had undermined the confidence of some allies during the reign of Philip III, and he had underestimated the importance of maintaining the alliance system in the *stati liberi* to the detriment of the defense of Flanders and Italy.

Moreover, Zúñiga not only linked the effective defense of the Spanish patrimony in Europe--the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Italy--to an effective dominance of the politics of the *stati liberi*, he maintained that the defense of the Spanish patrimony was critical for the defense of Spain and the colonies abroad. In short, he advocated a domino theory.¹⁹ Lastly, Zúñiga was convinced that Spain had come to the point, in the last years of Philip III's reign, where her patrimony in Europe was at stake. This was his most emotional argument. While he could make the argument for linkage in the first step of the domino theory on the grounds of strategic necessity, the argument for the second step--that Spain's and the colonies' security rested on the security of the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish Italy--was strictly one of tradition, reputation, and personal commitment. Thus, it was a short step from there to conclude that a crisis was at hand, and he was able to convince others that the one obstacle to Spanish defense--money--had to be met no matter what the long-term consequences.²⁰

[Cardinal Khlesl] but to control him with money," even though he had betrayed some of their interests. AGS Estado 2326 f. 60, *consulta*, 8 August 1617.

¹⁹The first espousal of the domino theory was in his dispatch concerning the Cleves-Jülich crisis in 1614, when he suggested that the real object of Dutch encroachment might be control of the Rhine, as shown in AGS Estado 2028 s. f., "*Sobre lo que sostienen los ultimos despachos de Flandes, Inglaterra, y Alemania tocante a Juliers*," 30 June 1614; Spinola later used the domino theory to support the initiative to march the Army of Flanders into the Rhineland Palatinate, as discussed in Maland, 68.

²⁰Zúñiga discussed the "great quantity of money to remedy the crisis" view in the Cleves-Jülich crisis, in AGS Estado 2028 s. f., "*Sobre lo que contienen los últimos despachos . . .*," 30 June 1614; in

By the winter of 1619, the Council would decide in favor of the two policies that dominated discussion in the last years of Philip's reign--to provide full support for Ferdinand to suppress the Bohemian insurrection and to not renew the Truce of 1609 on the existing terms. The first was a policy born of crisis upon crisis, reactive and intermittent, incomprehensible, as all German problems seemed to the Spanish. The second was diligently analyzed and methodically considered, an old problem that demanded anew to be researched, examined, and dissected in as many ways as there were advisors in the government. But as Zúñiga and others applied the rationale of maneuverability, alliance, linkage, and crisis to each development in each policy, by the end of eighteen months, the two merged into one policy and one conclusion. Spain must rearm and reassert herself, if she wanted to survive as a great nation.

In Bohemia, there could be no doubt that the energetic and highly manipulative practices of the Count of Oñate were instrumental in closely involving Spain in Ferdinand's struggle to obtain the imperial crown. But Zúñiga had, over twelve years, opened many of the channels--diplomatically, militarily and financially--that his successor needed in order to have room to manipulate. Besides the Graz treaty which had more firmly linked Ferdinand's fate to Spain and which Zúñiga had had such a direct hand in formulating, Oñate was heavily dependent on Zúñiga's secretary Jacques Bruneau to maintain the good will between himself and the numerous pro-Spanish sympathizers among the Rhenish Catholics that Zúñiga had fostered during his nine-year embassy.²¹ Zúñiga also had opened the pipeline of Spanish funds to Ferdinand, by talking the Council into giving Oñate the 100,000 ducats promised to Zúñiga's embassy. Oñate was very clever in the next year in making so many claims on this windfall of funds that Philip III was gradually

one of the first Councils which dealt with the money needed to fund armies in Europe, Zúñiga exhorted the King to remember that the "money is very well employed " in his interests, as shown in Rodríguez Villa, *Spínola*, 26 August 1617.

²¹AGS Estado 2326 f. 60, *consulta*, 8 August 1617.

drawn into a much larger financial commitment than he had intended. In addition, the troops that Zúñiga had recruited for the war in Carniola--500 cavalry and a Spanish foot regiment--were important, not only as a chess piece that Oñate could move around, but also as a rationale for adding more troops. Even though Ferdinand signed a peace accord with the Venetians in December 1617, Oñate asked that the force remain in Friuli on the Venetian border for Ferdinand's disposal should he experience difficulties in the Diets of Hungary and the Bohemian provinces over his election as their king-designate.²² Finally, Zúñiga was adept at keeping Spanish military officers, such as Marradas, Dampierre and Buquoy (who would later lead Ferdinand's army) stationed in the Holy Roman Empire, in case of need.²³ Therefore, until well after the Bohemian Defenestration in May 1618, Oñate did not have substantially more troops, money, or commitment from allies than Zúñiga already had developed in his tenure as ambassador. Oñate used them to great advantage, however, for he soon developed a relationship to Philip III whereby the Spanish ambassador made commitments, spent money, or raised troops and then asked for the King's acceptance or negation of what he already had done. Fearing that he would be condemned before God if he let his cousin and brother-in-law down, Philip usually found it easier to approve.

²²Ibid., f. 43, *consulta*, 16 December 1617.

²³Buquoy was a good example of this policy. He was a commander in the Army of Flanders and had first come to Austria in 1612 with Zúñiga and Spinola, as shown in Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*, 488. He remained in the Holy Roman Empire a number of years, at Zúñiga's request, since there were few senior military officers in there of his quality. In 1614 Zúñiga also convinced Matthias to give Buquoy the office of the head of the army to be paid out of the Spanish king's subsidy, as can be seen in AGS Estado 2028 s. f., "*Sobre lo que contienen los últimos despachos de Flanders . . .*," 30 June 1614; *ibid.*, "*Sobre lo que escrito el marqués de Espinola tocante al conde de Buquoy*," 11 October 1614; *ibid.*, "*Inclusa una consulta tocante al sueldo del conde de Buquoy*," 24 December 1614. Count Buquoy did not remain long in the post, however, returning to Flanders some time before 1616. In August 1618, Albert sent Buquoy again to the Emperor to help salvage the situation after the Bohemian Defenestration, as noted by Chudoba, *Spain*, 218. Another Flanders officer, the Count Tilly also commanded Maximilian of Bavaria's army. Therefore, in 1620, when Ferdinand finally defeated the Bohemians, all three armies were led by officers of the Army of Flanders.

The issue of whether to renegotiate the terms of the Truce, however, was almost a foregone conclusion by the time Zúñiga arrived in the middle of 1617, as Lerma already had acknowledged in the Council of War the previous year. The opinion was now widely held that Spain had negotiated the Truce when she was weak but was now in a more advantageous position and should renegotiate the terms. Brussels was sending reports informing the King of the difficulties the Dutch were having with their English allies over commerce.²⁴ The Spanish ambassador in London also wrote often about the relative advantages of English and French passivity at the same time that internal disputes brought the fragile Dutch republic to the point of civil war.²⁵ The latter was of particular importance. Two opposing sectarian groups that followed the religious interpretations of Calvinism, according to Arminius and Gomarus, theological professors at the University of Leiden, extended their previously minor debate over religious doctrine into the tension-filled political arena during the years of the Truce. The potent combination of religion and politics led to the formation of political parties known as Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants. The former, also known as Arminists, supported the oligarchy in the Dutch States General led by Jan van Oldenbarnevelt and professed religious tolerance as well as a less aggressive foreign policy, while the latter, Gomarists, were a more puritanical group, advocating a policy of eventual unification with the southern provinces and were strongly opposed to the renewal of the Truce.

The debate also contained a good deal of self-interest. Many members of the Counter-Remonstrants were anxious to settle and commercialize the West Indies in the same way that the Dutch East India Company had done in the Portuguese colonies. When Oldenbarnevelt signed the Truce in 1609, he refused to sign a charter for a West India

²⁴AGS Estado 2028 s. f., "*Lo que contienen sumariamente los avisos de Juan de Mancicidor*," 14 January 1614.

²⁵CODOIN (Madrid, 1936-47) 4: 35, Gondomar to Lerma, 17 March 1614.

Company and resisted its partisans, believing that to do so would automatically break the Truce. The Stadtholder Maurice, without actually believing in either their political or religious views, cleverly decided to lead the side of the Counter-Remonstrants in order to regain the political prominence that he had lost with the years of peace in the Low Countries and to suppress the merchant class who stood in the way of his acknowledgment as sovereign. The civil war between the two groups that periodically flared in the United Provinces in the years from 1616-19 came to a head in the winter of 1617-18. Oldenbarnevelt was about to lose to Maurice and his party--a development that the Spanish clearly welcomed, believing that a treaty with a prince was both more reliable and to their credit than the one they had with the commercial warriors of The Hague.²⁶

The last was an important point, because one of the major problems with the Truce lay in the execution of the terms which restricted commerce in the colonies. Even before 1609, the Dutch and English were so numerous in the Portuguese East Indies that the Truce was hardly enforceable then and had become less so now. Neither the Dutch nor the English recognized commercial restrictions in the colonies that the Portuguese and Spanish did not actually physically occupy with a *presidio* and a contingent of troops. Furthermore, the Dutch East India Company did not always recognize an occupying force, preferring to test Spanish and Portuguese resolve with the Company warships that both protected their commercial centers and raided others. The real concerns for the Spanish were not these continuing encroachments in the Portuguese East but new Dutch encroachments in areas where they had stayed out prior to 1615--the Spanish West Indies, Portuguese Brazil, and the Philippines. Up to that time, the Dutch had reached the East by way of the horn of Africa. But, in the last few years of the Truce, Dutch ships of the East India Company were sighted with ever more frequency in the straits of Magellan. In

²⁶AGS Estado 632 f. 107, "Avissos de la Haya," 3 October 1617; AGS Estado 2031 s. f., "Inclusas las cartas que se han recibido de Flandes," 20 October 1617.

1615 the Company sent one of its admirals, Joris van Spilbergen, westward around the tip of South America to attack a Spanish naval squadron at Cañete near the port of Callao on the Peruvian coast, then to Acapulco on the west coast of Mexico to destroy some of the defensive fortifications in the harbor, and on to the Philippines to menace the shipping there as well.²⁷ The Spanish were deeply disturbed by this; to that point the Pacific had been their ocean. If the Dutch were able to menace the trade on the Manila run on both ends (Acapulco was the *entrepôt* for Far East trade in America), they could break what little safe Eastern trade the Spanish had left.²⁸ And, as always, the Spanish dealt immediately with any threat, no matter how minor, to the annual trek of the King's silver which sailed from Callao to Panama, crossed the isthmus in pack trains, and sailed on to Cuba and Spain. Spilbergen's raid forced the viceroys of New Spain and Peru to spend hundreds of thousands of ducats on the fortifications along the Pacific coast at a time when Spain needed these funds desperately in Europe. The English were also engaging in worrisome behavior. Gondomar worked diligently to prevent Sir Walter Raleigh from going to Guiana in South America, from where it was feared he would launch overland expeditions against the valuable silver mines of Peru or attempt to control the burgeoning sugar trade in Portuguese Brazil.²⁹

By the winter of 1617, the Spanish were managing a number of very good agents inside Holland, including Gabriel de Roy and Manuel Sueyro, who gathered information about further expeditions to the West Indies, a proposed commercial treaty with the English that would join efforts to seize more of the spice trade, and Oldenbarnevelt's

²⁷Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/22 f. 46, Cottington to Carleton, 3 July 1616; Dalmao y Casante, 281 (second series) noted that there was ". . . particular happiness on the arrival of the fleet from Panama this year because of the raid on Peru where 25 ships attack Callao."

²⁸The Spanish had been able directly to deal with China and Japan without depending upon the Portuguese control of the *carrera da India*--the route from the Cape of Good Hope to Japan. Therefore, the Spanish had little incentive to spend precious resources protecting the Portuguese east beyond Macao.

²⁹CODOIN (Madrid, 1936-47), 1: 62-63, Sarmiento de Acuña to James I, 30 March 1617.

impending fall from power.³⁰ There had also been persistent rumors, since Zúñiga's first report in November 1616, that the Dutch, in addition to their colonial campaign, were about to involve themselves militarily in Italy. Finally in the middle of February 1618, Juan de Mancicidor, Albert's foreign minister, sent a report that confirmed the rumors. The Dutch were about to send twelve warships to Venice with an escort of twenty-four smaller ships. There were to be Calvinist soldiers, perhaps 4,000 in all, in Catholic Italy; the Dutch had chosen to violate the heart of Spain's sphere of influence in Europe.³¹

In light of this news, a minister would have been foolish to recommend to his King to renew the Truce on the old terms, and Lerma was no fool. His credit had sunk with each Dutch transgression, and his strategy to fill the chambers of the prince with his relatives and extend the life of the *valimiento* was failing. Already, the future Philip IV demonstrated that, if he had a favorite, it was the one man around him who was no longer attached to the Lerma *valimiento*--the Count of Olivares. Lerma could have left town with his money, consoled himself with the dignity of the cardinal's hat that the Pope was sure to give him, and resigned the fate of the family *valimiento* to the wit of his son. But certain knowledge that Uceda was not up to the task, that the King and prince had raised no other member of his family to the esteem or office where they could take the initiative, and that his own pride was at stake, forced him to defend the future of the precious *valimiento* with his legendary political skills in the sessions of the Council of State in March 1618.

³⁰AGS Estado 632 f. 107, "*Avissos de la Haya*," 3 October 1617; AGS Estado 2307 s. f., "*Inclussas de las cartas que se han recibido de Flandes*," 20 October 1617; AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Sobre lo que ha escrito Manuel Sueyro en cosas de Flandes*," 18 January 1618.

³¹AGS Estado 2326 f. 45, *consulta*, 29 August 1619; AGS Estado 1865 f. 261, Juan de Ciriça to King, 7 November 1617; AGS Estado 633 f. 34.1, "*cartas de Juan de Mancicidor*," 14-16 February 1618; Israel, 24-5, stated that the Venetian ambassador Suriano openly side with Maurice in his dispute with Oldenbarnevelt, and the troop commitment may have come in response to this.

Though he was no longer on the Council officially and, even when he was, attended its sessions an average of once a year,³² Lerma still had the license from the King to remain at court in the winter and spring of 1618 and attend what court business he wished. On 2 March, Juan de Ciriza, secretary of the Council of State and a Lerma appointee, composed an internal memo to the King that reminded him that the Truce was due either for renewal or abrogation in April 1621.³³ But the memo also went a little further than routinely reminding the King that the matter ought to be dealt with. First, Ciriza stated that it was generally acknowledged that the terms of the Truce ought to be improved upon. Spain had suffered more at the hands of the Truce than the Dutch. Then he noted that in the Dutch Republic there were also differences of opinion about whether the Truce ought to be renewed, the towns on the coast wanting war and those in the interior wanting peace. He suggested that the King immediately ought to begin consultations with Flanders and the Councils of Portugal and the Indies for their opinions in order to determine what terms the Spanish required for renewal. Lerma almost certainly was behind Ciriza's memo. It was typical of the Duke's style of introducing business to the Council by directing others to present his initiatives and responding favorably to them, as if they were someone else's idea. Moreover, Ciriza's last suggestion that extensive consultations be held on the terms of the Truce among the councils was a clear response to those who had criticized Lerma for allowing the negotiations of 1607-09 to be held secretly and controlled in Brussels.

³²Williams, *História general*, 425, counted the number of Council meetings Lerma attended as 22 of 739 from 1600 to 1618.

³³Brightwell, "Spanish System," 277, suggested that the Ciriza memorandum was a product of the conciliar bureaucracy, but Brightwell did not carefully observe the timing of the memo, the comparison with Mancicidor's intelligence of February, the conclusions drawn in the memo, and the references to in Lerma's speech at the Council of State the very next day, as well as his long letter to the King which was submitted the same day as Ciriza's memo as can be seen in AGS Estado 634 f. 318, Juan de Ciriza to Philip, 2 March 1618.

Lerma, in effect, had conceded the point of the unacceptability of the Truce, as it was currently composed. The same day as the Ciriza memo, Lerma wrote his own memo to the King on possible tactics and strategies that the Spanish ought to employ should the Truce not be renewed.³⁴ He included a letter from the Baron von Roos, Albert's envoy to Rome and an important participant in the original negotiations for the Truce, in which the Baron suggested that the Spanish begin a major naval construction campaign in anticipation of the end of the Truce, should it not be renegotiated. Lerma also attached a letter from Hurtaño Urizar, formerly the *veedor*--overseer--of commerce in Flanders, who also suggested the construction of a new navy for Ostend should the Spanish return to war at the end of the Truce. Urizar also recommended a strategy for conducting a commercial war against the Dutch instead of the usual siege battles in the Low Countries. Finally, Lerma outlined a surprising strategy to conduct a war against Argel--Algiers--in order to rid the western Mediterranean of the Algerian pirates who had both disrupted commerce and harassed the Iberian coasts. This strategy would, according to him, combine the necessity of a new campaign of naval construction in anticipation of the end of the Truce with the defense of beleaguered Italy threatened by Dutch troops, as Juan de Mancicidor had reported.

The next day Lerma entered the Council of State and, with the privilege of speaking first, as the councilor with the longest term, presented his plan for an "enterprise of Argel."³⁵ He admitted that the Spanish had lost reputation with the problems they had had in Italy and insisted that they had an equally dangerous problem in the western Mediterranean with Algerian pilots attacking Spanish shipping in the straits of Gibraltar and along the Iberian coast, "even far into the interior." Now with an armada of Dutch

³⁴AGS Estado 2847 s. f., Lerma to Philip, 2 March 1618.

³⁵AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Consulta sobre que contienen las últimas cartas de Juan de Mancicidor*," 3 March 1618; this is the fair copy, and the actual minutes can be found in AGS Estado 633 f. 34.20.

ships in the Mediterranean, Spain could expect further difficulties and had to protect the peace of Italy. Lerma showed the Council the paper from Urizar that recommended a massive naval construction program and his letter from the Baron von Roos which nominated a good man who could lead an augmented Spanish Armada in the Mediterranean. The best solution for the present, according to the Duke, was a naval strategy for the western Mediterranean and a campaign to attack Argel. Moreover, Lerma pointed out that money was tight, must be prioritized, and, therefore, the importance of Argel was such that the revenue from the *millones* should not be used for anything else at that time. Furthermore, he contended that the Truce ought to be studied in detail, as Ciriza had said, "and improved in all points and it is better that we anticipate the time than the time anticipate us."

Enthusiastically, the Duke of Infantado and Marquis of La Laguna agreed with Lerma. Aliaga, also, seemed supportive of the defense of Catholicism in Italy. Mexía, however, was more circumspect, fearing that chasing the pirates out of the Mediterranean was a difficult task and that the Spanish should not advertise such an intent in a campaign "and then come back with nothing to show for it." Clearly, Mexía understood that the source of Lerma's enthusiasm for the strategy was good public relations. Zúñiga also treated the initiative as a rather odd military commitment to make when matters in the Holy Roman Empire were better but not yet settled. The suggestion of a wide debate on the terms of the Truce was welcome to him, however, as was the idea of a strategic commercial war in the Low Countries and an armada at Ostend--concepts that Zúñiga had endorsed as long ago as his embassy in Flanders. But the problems of the Low Countries were little related to pirates in Algiers. In fact the Algerian pirates had been an on-going problem for some time. As Mexía had said, there had been three unsuccessful attempts to run them out of the Mediterranean in recent memory. Additionally, the pirates were just

as much a problem for Dutch and English shipping as they were to Spanish shipping.³⁶ Zúñiga made some non-committal comments about the fact that "it would be good to throw the pirates out" but that the provisioning for the suggested fleet was, in his opinion, inadequate and that the Baron von Roos' man was a good candidate but inexperienced in the management of fleets of this size.³⁷

Peter Brightwell, in "The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War," has suggested that the Argel initiative was Lerma's effort to divert Spain's militancy way from German affairs and toward the Mediterranean.³⁸ Indeed, if this is what Lerma intended, it would have been a clever plan. The dichotomy of the northern vs. Mediterranean strategy had been a debate throughout the sixteenth century, and, though the Turk was no longer a direct threat, many Spaniards were still focused on the western Mediterranean as Spain's most sensitive strategic and economic arena. If this was Lerma's gambit, Zúñiga's nonchalant attitude at the Council session of 3 March was surprising. But it was unlikely that Lerma intended to divert policy away from the Holy Roman Empire at that time. In fact Ferdinand's situation was remarkably improved in the spring of 1618 from where it was two years before. The war between himself and Venice was concluded with his reputation intact, as he had asked, and this gave him the ability to approach the Diets of Hungary and Bohemia for his pre-election as king-designate to the crown of Wenceslas. By that time, he was also relatively confident that, in addition to the Bohemian vote and the Catholic ecclesiastical electors, he could add the vote of the Protestant Elector John George of Saxony to his certain election as Emperor on Matthias' death. There was little

³⁶Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 424, stated (without citing) that both the Dutch and English had offered to cooperate in this enterprise when they heard of it but had been refused.

³⁷AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Consulta sobre que contienen las últimas cartas de Juan de Mancicidor*," 3 March 1618.

³⁸Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 424.

indication in the spring of 1618 that Spain had a possible major military commitment in the Holy Roman Empire in its future.

The inner dynamics of court politics in Madrid were almost certainly more pertinent to Lerma's motive than concerns for the direction of German policy at that time. Lerma's goal was to defend his clan from accusations of leading Spain toward weakness and to separate the family's fate from that of the Truce. What better strategy could there have been than, first, to propose means by which the Truce could be renegotiated or the war resumed on advantageous terms before anyone else had suggested it and, second, author an offensive against a traditionally well-hated enemy? The latter had the political advantages of incorporating the latest advice on naval construction from all quarters, responding to the immediate crisis of Dutch warships in the Mediterranean, and satisfying all those Spanish viceroys and diplomats in Italy eager for a fight to enhance their own reputations, as much as Spain's. Zúñiga certainly knew, as Lerma's opinion in Council made clear, the King's finances were such that only one major initiative was possible at a time. If Zúñiga believed that Lerma was trying to redirect Spain's attention from the north, he probably believed that Lerma was redirecting it from Flanders rather than the Holy Roman Empire. Zúñiga might have realized that the Argel initiative was Lerma's personal project and, as such, would live or die as he rose or fell in the esteem of the Spanish king; at the time, the Duke's fall looked like a distinct possibility. After the March meeting, the King allowed some naval construction for the "enterprise of Argel" to begin. It was not long, however, before Zúñiga and others on the Council attempted to steer these funds away from Argel to an armada in Ostend.

Intermittent deliberations on the Truce question also began in the Councils of Portugal and the Indies and Albert's special *junta* on the Truce question in Brussels. The official reintroduction of the Truce, as a policy debate, launched discussion of several critical issues that impinged upon the Truce--the nature of the Flemish government when the Archduke died, the question of negotiating with Maurice who looked as though he

would take over the United Provinces, and the war strategy should negotiations with Maurice fail. The first issue was seriously discussed because Albert had been very ill most of the month of March 1618 and nearly died. Zúñiga tried to shape this debate by arguing in a paper of 7 April 1618 that the Flemish still resented Philip II's attempts to make their government more Spanish by replacing Charles V's German and Burgundian counselors with Spaniards. He maintained that the Archduke's government had reintroduced the stability and harmony that had been lost and strongly advised that Archduchess Isabel, "well-loved by the people," remain in office, should the Archduke die. In order to assist her, the King ought to appoint a strong ambassador and an officer from Naples or Milan in the office of *auditor general*--superintendent of finances in the army.³⁹ Though the Council made it clear that it would prefer to return the administration "to the way it was in the time of Parma," they agreed to Zúñiga's measures to strengthen Spanish control in the meantime.⁴⁰

The Council took the memo of Hurtaño de Urizar, suggesting both a naval buildup in anticipation of the end of the Truce and a defensive war using mostly commercial blockades and restrictions to strangle the United Provinces instead of the traditional siege war, very seriously. Although Lerma used parts of Urizar's paper to justify his Mediterranean buildup, Zúñiga began to develop papers and consult people in order to further develop a strategy for commercial war and divert the funds for naval construction

³⁹ AGS Estado 633 f. 39.1, "*Parecer de Zúñiga en las cosas de Flandes*," 7 April 1618; Lefèvre, 75, noted that the previous ambassador the Marquis of Guadaleste had died in October 1616 and had not been replaced yet, though even before his death the Council had been concerned that the Archduke might die and that they needed a stronger ambassador in Brussels in that event.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 39.2, *consulta*, 7 April 1618; Philip appointed the Marquis of Bedmar in July as Lefèvre, 76-7, noted; in the fall Zúñiga and the Council engaged in a prolonged discussion in which Council members, especially Mexía, argued for more Spanish control while Zúñiga tried to compromise as if he were speaking on behalf of Spinola and the Archduke's government. AGS Estado 633 f. 60, "*audiencia de Flandes*," 20 September 1618; AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Sobre lo de auditor general para el ejército de Flandes*," 27 September 1618, AGS Estado 633 f. 144, *consulta*, 16 October 1618; AGS Estado 2031 s. f., "*Inclusas las cartas que se han recibido de Flandes . . .*," 20 October 1618; AGS Estado 633 f. 142.2, *consulta*, 5 December 1618.

to an armada for Ostend.⁴¹ Gondomar, who was in Spain from the summer to the winter of 1619, was also a great proponent of the development of a naval program. As early as November 1616, he had written the King that an improved navy stationed in Ostend or Dunkirk was an absolute necessity.⁴² In September 1617, before Urizar's memo on naval power was seen in Council, the King asked that a paper written by Gabriel de Roy be sent to Zúñiga for his opinion. Zúñiga noted that the paper had a number of good ideas, "the most substantial would be in the augmenting and sustaining of a maritime force which is a thing well-known, it would seem to me."⁴³ Shortly after the March meeting on Argel, Zúñiga wrote a separate opinion in which he strongly endorsed Urizar's suggestion for arming in Flanders, especially by sea, and conducting a war that would effectively harass Dutch commerce. According to Zúñiga, the papers on this subject should be sent to Spinola in Brussels in order to obtain his opinion.⁴⁴

Money for an armada was an issue that the King would have to embrace early, if the ships were to be ready for the end of the Truce. The King's pattern was to deny any new expenditures out of hand, unless he was convinced otherwise. Zúñiga, Mexía, and Aliaga decided to press Philip right away for authorization of such a naval construction program in Flanders. Unfortunately, for the proponents of the Ostend armada, Spinola wrote back in May that Archduke Albert did not like the idea of an armada, believing that a commercial war of blockades was not a tenable solution. The Council was concerned

⁴¹One of the individuals he consulted was Francisco de Retama, AGS Estado 2847 s. f., Retama to Philip, 11 May 1624. Retama reported that he first came to Madrid in 1618-19 to confer with Zúñiga and Juan de Ciriza about strategies for conducting a commercial war against the Dutch;

⁴²Pascual Gayangos, Cinco cartas político-literarios de D. Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, primer conde de Gondomar (Madrid: La Sociedad de Bibliófilos, 1869), 67.

⁴³AGS Estado 2307 f. 75, "Zúñiga paper on the letter from Gabriel de Roy to the King," September 1617.

⁴⁴AGS Estado 633 f. 36, "*Voz de don Baltasar de Zúñiga sobre armar en Flandes*," no date, in March correspondence.

that the King would use Albert's advice as an excuse for denying this new claim on his treasury. They presented a strong recommendation for the Ostend armada again in July.⁴⁵ The King rejected the recommendation as too expensive, and, had Lerma been safely ensconced at court, the policy issue probably would have died at that point. But Lerma was slipping away from the King's side, and a Council of Zúñiga, Mexía, and the Aliaga met again in August to exhort the King to take the initiative: "The Council again represents to Your Majesty that the having of the Armada there is absolutely necessary for reputation and to conserve the truce or make the war with advantage."⁴⁶ The Armada remained on the table but still in deliberation, awaiting the fate of the enterprise of Argel. If Bohemia had remained calm, the Argel expedition may have proceeded as Lerma planned. But, more likely, it would have shared the fate of its mentor, Lerma, who was about to fall out of the King's grace in September 1618. With so many councilors anxious to redirect funds to Flanders, only Lerma's personal and rigorous advocacy could have saved it in any case.

The problem in the Austrian Habsburgs' realms, however, refused to die down. During the winter of 1617-18, Ferdinand used his election as king-designate to introduce harsh measures to reestablish the primacy of Catholicism in Bohemia, provoking violent reactions among the Protestants. On 23 May 1618, Heinrich Matthias, Count Thurn, a Protestant leader, brought a group of friends into Hradschin palace, seized two Catholic officers, Martinitz and Slavata, and threw them out of a window to the chants of a crowd below. Within two weeks the Protestants seized all the vital centers of the kingdom of Bohemia with the intent to deny Ferdinand the right to the Bohemian throne. Though this development caused much consternation in Madrid, it was by no means clear to the Council when it received the first news what direction the situation would take or whether

⁴⁵Ibid., f. 46.1, *consulta*, 17 July 1618.

⁴⁶AGS Estado 2032 s. f., "*Sobre lo de la Armada de Ostende*," 18 August 1618.

the Spanish king was obligated to respond. But Oñate believed that the King had an obligation and, of course, knew earlier than the Council the seriousness of the Bohemian revolt. First, he raised a debt of 130,000 florins without the King's express permission.⁴⁷ Then he wrote the King requesting that the troops in Friuli be brought to Prague under the command of Dampierre. He also informed the King that he was writing to Archduke Albert to send Colonel Buquoy to Vienna to take over Ferdinand's troops.⁴⁸ And again he left to the King the privilege of either accepting or negating his actions.

The Council of State received the news of the "defenestration" on 6 July 1618 and met in session the same day.⁴⁹ Lerma chose to attend and speak against Oñate's activities. He insisted that with the Argel campaign in deliberation, the King's treasury could not sustain another adventure. In fact, the treasury could not even now afford the 100,000 ducats that Oñate wanted. In addition he reasoned that, if Ferdinand were assured of extensive financial support, he might not make a reasonable settlement with his rebels. Furthermore, he asserted that the case could not be made that helping Ferdinand put down a rebel insurrection was in the Spanish king's interest. These were all effective arguments which in the past would have encouraged the King to back away from a foreign adventure. Nevertheless, there was a nagging concern hanging over the Council of State that the Bohemians had only staged this revolt because they expected other Protestant and Catholic nations hostile to Spain to come to their assistance as had been done for Brandenburg, Savoy, and the Venetians in previous years.⁵⁰ As expected, Zúñiga supported Oñate and pointed out that besides the obligation to an ally and member of the

⁴⁷Maland, 63.

⁴⁸AGS Estado 2503 f. 7, "*Paracer que dió el conde de Oñate en 30 Mayo 1618*," quoted in Brightwell "Spanish Origins," 415.

⁴⁹Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 423-5.

⁵⁰Parker, *Thirty Years'*, 46, suggested that the pattern of alliance had encouraged the Bohemians to believe that they would be the recipients of the kind of support they saw in Venice.

family, there were excellent state reasons for putting Spain's hand in Bohemia. First, without Bohemia, the key seventh vote, the Habsburgs could not hold on to the Imperial Dignity. Second, Italy and Flanders were both fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire, and the legal problems that a hostile Emperor could create for them was considerable. Third, as had been seen in the late wars of Italy, the German states were a principal recruiting grounds for troops, and, without the Emperor's permission to recruit in the future, Spain could not defend its patrimony in Italy.⁵¹

In July the King was still reluctant and cautious, reasonably suggesting that he alone should not be responsible for ensuring the election of a Catholic Emperor. He wanted further consultation. But gradually, over the course of the next three months, Bohemia came to dominate Spain's foreign policy concerns. Peter Brightwell has posited that the Council meetings of July and the beginning of August were a turning point for Spanish foreign policy--first, in directing policy toward the north and away from Argel and second for the ability of Zúñiga to persuade the King of his duty to defend his coreligionists and cousins despite serious opposition on the Council.⁵² As has been seen, the Argel campaign was not as settled or serious a policy as Brightwell suggested. In addition, the actual decision to provide Ferdinand with substantial support came later, corresponding closely with more alarming news from Bohemia and Europe that reached Spain at the end of the summer and Lerma's rapid fall from grace in the middle of September.

In the beginning of July, the Spanish only knew that Bohemian rebels had revolted and no doubt hoped that it was only a minor affair. But, by the middle of September, they

⁵¹AGS Estado 711 f. 201, *consulta*, 6 July 1618, quoted in Staub, *Pax et Imperium*, 133n.

⁵²Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 426: "The King's oldest and most trusted advisers were quite prepared to leave Ferdinand to face the revolt unaided. Zúñiga had to fight hard to see that his point of view prevailed"

already had received news that the Bohemians, in order to interest the Protestant world in their plight, were offering Ferdinand's crown to various European princes, including Frederick of the Palatinate, the son-in-law of James I and the brother-in-law of the Stadtholder Maurice, the dukes of Saxony and Savoy, and Bethlan Gabor, leader of the Hungarian Protestants. In July Frederick began to disrupt the activities of the bishop of Speyer and other Rhenish Catholics who were trying to prepare their defenses in case the Bohemian struggle should spread to the Rhineland.⁵³ Christian Anhalt, acting as though he were the Bohemians' representative, was busy encouraging many of the participants in the wars in Italy to back the Bohemians. In August, the Duke of Savoy offered troops left over from his war in Mantua to help the Bohemians. Moreover, by the end of the summer, the revolt had spread to Lusatia, Silesia, and upper Austria and was no longer just a revolt of the Bohemians but included much of the Habsburgs' hereditary lands. As Zúñiga's development of the alliance between Spain and Austria gave Oñate the tools to draw Spain a little closer to central Europe, the vigorous alliance activities of small Protestant nations over the years had primed the situation in such a way as quickly to make the Bohemian affair an international incident. It was unlikely that the Spanish, faced with the possibility that Ferdinand might lose Bohemia and the imperial crown to an anti-Habsburg cartel, ever would have given the Bohemian policy problem second place to an initiative to rid the Mediterranean of pirates. Though Zúñiga was outspoken on the importance of Bohemia, his opinion was not a minority. The bishop of Cologne gave the best contemporary opinion on the subject:

If it be true that the Bohemians intend to depose Ferdinand and choose another king, we may expect a war of twenty or forty years; for Spain and the House of Austria will stake all they hold in this world sooner than relinquish Bohemia.⁵⁴

⁵³Chudoba, *Spain*, 220.

⁵⁴Maland, 67.

The Argel initiative, however, had also died because, by the end of September, it had lost its voice in the Duke of Lerma. It was no coincidence that money--the lifeblood of foreign policy--was found for Bohemia at the very moment that the Duke lost his battle for influence. Two hundred thousand ducats had been promised for Bohemia in a Council meeting at the beginning of August, but this was no guarantee that it would ever get to Vienna. Until the contract for a loan from the King's bankers was made, the money and policy simply did not exist. The actual decision to take out a substantial loan and fulfill the pledge of funds was not made till the middle of September. Shortly before this, a palace revolution had taken place. The King had dismissed Fernando de Borja, a relative of Lerma who had been placed in the prince's chamber in 1614 to secure Lerma's influence there.⁵⁵ When Lerma's son-in-law, the Count of Lemos, also a member of the prince's chamber, complained about the dismissal to the King, he was sent from court as well. On or slightly before 20 September, the King agreed to sign a large contract with his bankers which raised 500,000 ducats, most of which went to Bohemia.⁵⁶

Lerma discerned that he had lost his struggle with Aliaga for total command of the King's heart and mind, but, whether temporarily or permanently, he did not know. He held a conference with the Sandoval clan on 22 September 1618 and shortly after asked the King for permission to retire from court. At the beginning of October, he received permission, went to Valladolid, and, though he probably would not have believed it at the time of his departure, never saw the King again.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Lerma's departure did not signal a whole hearted adoption of the defense of Ferdinand. At the end of the

⁵⁵Williams, "Lerma 1618," 324.

⁵⁶AGS Hacienda 555 f. 420, *consulta*, 21 September 1618, quoted in Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 425, note 50.

⁵⁷Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/23 f. 74, Cottington to Carleton, 8 October 1618.

Spanish Council's three-month debate, the only assertive decisions that the King made were to assure Oñate of the 100,000 ducats that already had been promised to pay the troops at Friuli to use as Ferdinand needed and to divert 200,000 ducats that would have headed for the Argel expedition to Oñate's embassy in Vienna.⁵⁸ The King, Council, and Zúñiga were extremely cautious of even this small financial commitment, insisting that Ferdinand concede religious questions in order to make the peace with the Bohemians, which would help to isolate the Bohemian rebels politically.⁵⁹

Events in Bohemia throughout the fall and winter continued at about the same rapid pace as in the summer. Protestant troops that the Bohemian insurrectionists had mustered proved more successful than had been expected. Under Count Thurn, they immediately began an offensive campaign and laid siege to Matthias' capital of Vienna in the late fall. The old Archduke Maximilian, who had tried hard with both Zúñiga and Oñate to effect a smooth transfer of the Imperial throne to the next Habsburg generation, died in November 1618. He left the leadership of the northern portion of the Catholic League in the hands of his brother, Archduke Albert, which automatically drew Spain a little closer to the problems in the Holy Roman Empire. Savoy and Venice formed a mutual defense pact in March 1619, assuring the Spaniards that, if they retaliated against Savoy for his support of the Bohemians, they may well have another war in Italy on their hands.

A few developments on the international scene, however, went Ferdinand's way. Gondomar by now was in Spain for a short respite and informed Philip that James I's close adviser and favorite, the Duke of Buckingham, had written him on 30 September 1618

⁵⁸Brightwell, "Spanish Origins," 425.

⁵⁹J. V. Polisensky, *War and Society in Europe, 1618-1648* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 78, stated that the publication of Buquoy's military chancery in the second volume of the *Documenta Bohemica* demonstrated that the Austrian Habsburgs were saved by the money that was channeled to the Empire through Oñate and Albert in the Netherlands.

that on no account would the English king extend support to the Bohemian rebels, despite his son-in-law's complicity.⁶⁰ The Duke of Monteleon, ambassador in Paris, also gathered information on Louis XIII's frame of mind which was highly favorable to Ferdinand.⁶¹ Although Maurice originally had encouraged his brother-in-law Frederick to accept the Bohemian crown, he was not able to deliver the financial and military support when Frederick needed it. Maurice was heavily preoccupied with the furor that the arrest of Oldenbarnevelt in August 1618 raised and was busy rooting Remonstrants out of both government and army. While he was able to convince the reluctant States General to give Frederick a monthly subsidy, it was highly conditional and could be revoked at any time. The Bohemians despaired even further when, despite their promise of possible sovereignty, John George of Saxony began to distance himself from their cause. Thus, by the spring, the Spanish could be assured that their traditional enemies would treat the Bohemian revolt as a minor incident, as long as Spain did not tread too heavily.

Zúñiga understood the importance of international opinion; therefore, in the next year, he did not recommend many measures beyond the financial commitment made in September and worked hard to localize the conflict. There was much discussion of sending troops left over from the wars in Italy to the Holy Roman Empire, but Zúñiga was adamant that the army commanders should recruit in the German states no matter what the cost.⁶² The lack of French and English support, the disarray in the Protestant Union, and the distraction of the Dutch gave the Spanish time. Zúñiga believed that it was worth using that time and the extra expense involved with recruiting in the German states rather than risk strong international reaction to Spanish troops in the Rhineland or Bohemia. Furthermore, there were considerable difficulties getting the large number of Spanish

⁶⁰Chudoba, Spain, 222.

⁶¹Bentivoglio, Collection, Letter 5, Bentivoglio to the Duke of Monteleone, 7 April 1619; *ibid.*, Letter 10, Bentivoglio to the Duke of Monteleone, 1 October 1619.

⁶²Chudoba, Spain, 223.

troops out of Italy and into Bohemia. They could be shipped to the Low Countries and marched across the Rhineland, but that was a difficult and provocative measure. They could risk the peace with Venice by shipping troops through the Adriatic Sea to Trieste in Ferdinand's territory. Or the King could pay the severe indemnities that the Grisons charged to move troops through the Valteline to the Tyrol and on to Bohemia.

Unfortunately, recruitment efforts in the German states over the winter had not been successful. The Italian wars may have used up all the available mercenaries at the time. But it also seemed that Oñate, an impatient man with all the urgency of someone at the scene, always counted on getting troops out of Italy and may not have pressed for local recruitment as much as Zúñiga hoped. After the beginning of the year, the Duke of Osuna, viceroy in Naples, possibly in consultation with Oñate, communicated his willingness to send troops stationed in his *presidios* to the Holy Roman Empire, and Spinola also indicated his willingness to spare a large contingent of troops from the Army of Flanders. Again the Council of State reluctantly took up the matter, and Zúñiga, though acknowledging the necessity of Spanish reinforcements, again recommended caution before moving troops into Alsace to reinforce Buquoy.⁶³ Though he had bargained long and hard for Alsace precisely because it was a stepping stone between the Army of Flanders and the Catholic League, Zúñiga was concerned that the introduction of foreign troops near the Palatinate or the involvement of the Catholic League would immediately inflame the Rhineland and had to be avoided at all cost. If the Italian troops were needed, he much preferred the transfer of troops through the Valteline.⁶⁴ But as these considerations were debated in Madrid, yet another crisis interrupted the Council's cautious planning. Matthias, who in his driving ambition to become Emperor began the

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴AGS Estado 1867 f. 341, *consulta*, 8 July 1619, quoted in Brightwell, "Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 1619," European Studies Review 12 (April 1982): 136-7.

succession crisis that had so many adverse ramifications for his kinsmen, died on 23 March 1619. The one thing Zúñiga and Oñate had wanted to avoid--a contested sovereignty over Bohemia on the eve of an Imperial election--had occurred.

Madrid received the news of Matthias' death shortly before the King and court journeyed to Portugal for a much-publicized state visit. The fact that the court had made such extensive plans for a royal visit before Matthias' death indicated that the Spanish were not unduly alarmed about Ferdinand's circumstances as the military season of 1619 approached--late June until November. They apparently believed that he had the support he needed to put down the wide, but still local, insurrection. In Spain, Philip III had been promising the Portuguese for some time that he would visit Portugal but during the two decades of his reign had never managed it.⁶⁵ Uceda and Aliaga now seized upon this long-standing promise as an opportunity to move Philip III away from Lerma, fearing yet another political comeback for the persistent Duke.⁶⁶ In addition, Aliaga probably also had in mind that it was wise to take the naive Uceda away from his father as well in order to prevent Lerma from regaining the confidence of his son again.⁶⁷ Many individuals in court already had spoken against the trip, believing that a grand tour was not good for the King's health or the well-being of his treasury. After Matthias' death, Zúñiga and Toledo argued vociferously that the King ought not to distance himself from his government apparatus in Madrid at such a critical time. Zúñiga suggested that the King delay his trip until the fall after the military season was over.⁶⁸ But, ultimately, the King agreed with

⁶⁵Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones*.

⁶⁶Escagedo Salmón, 2 (April-June 1925): 218; Michel Devèze, *L'Espagne et le Portugal sous le règne de Philippe III (1598-1621)*, 37.

⁶⁷Roca, *Fragmentos*, 165, recognized that Aliaga already had surmised what Uceda did not realize; Lerma was Uceda's best asset.

⁶⁸AGS Estado 2327 f. 65, *consulta*, 19 April 1619, quoted in Brightwell, "Spain and Bohemia," 118-19.

Aliaga that it was too late to cancel the plans and unwise to disappoint the Portuguese again. In any case, there was little more that could be done for Ferdinand. Oñate could help him negotiate his election, and, if more troops were needed from Italy, the Council which he was taking with him to Portugal could make further recommendations on the tour.

In the seven months between the fall of Lerma and the trip to Portugal, considerable differences in the make-up of the court emerged which allowed Zúñiga and those who agreed with him to have more say in foreign policy. Within a few days of his father's departure, the Duke of Uceda, who foolishly believed that the power of *valido* would now accrue to him, tried to exercise his father's method of intervening between the Council and the King, ordering the Council to give him an opinion on a matter.⁶⁹ Aliaga and Fray Juan de Santa María, who was now attached to the court as an ecclesiastical adviser, convinced the King to revoke Uceda's powers and order measures that would prevent the continuation of the *valimiento*.⁷⁰ From that point Uceda became a simple favorite of the King and never again was to attempt to interfere in politics or foreign policy.⁷¹ In the meantime, Aliaga rose steadily in power. When Lerma's uncle the Cardinal-bishop of Toledo died in December 1618, the King decided to appoint Aliaga to the powerful post of *inquisidor general* and allow him to keep his post of King's confessor.⁷² Uceda's curious complacency to these developments was a combination of his own personally laconic nature and his satisfaction that Aliaga's goals met his own. Uceda had developed certain jealousies toward rival members of the Sandoval family and

⁶⁹AGS Estado 633 f. 143, Uceda to Ciriza, 11 October 1618.

⁷⁰Williams, "Lerma 1618," 324.

⁷¹Tomás y Valiente, 70.

⁷²Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/23 f. 198, Cottington to Carleton, 6 June 1619. The English ambassador said of Aliaga that he was "now the powerfullys."

household, especially his brother-in-law, Lemos, and his father's favorite, Don Rodrigo Calderón, who was for some time thought by many as a rival for his father's *valimiento*.⁷³ Calderón retired from court at Christmas 1618, but, on 8 February 1619, Aliaga and Uceda convinced the King to sign the order for his arrest on charges of corruption.⁷⁴ The son, in his burning ambition to bring down the father's favorite, underestimated his ally in the enterprise and learned too late of the error, if he ever realized it.

By the time of his trip to Portugal, the King was satisfied that his palace had been purged of all taint of corruption and scandal. And in many ways, he displayed the fervor of one who wanted to revive his government. He had spent the summer of 1618 with Santa María talking about the value of an appropriate relationship between the King and his advisers--the concept of the "*buen consejero*"-- and it was natural that Philip should come to focus on one whose opinions stood out in the *consultas* for their prudence and clarity.⁷⁵ The King began to pen a familiar refrain in the margins of *consultas*--"*como lo dize D. Baltasar*"--as Don Baltasar says." Shortly before the trip to Portugal Philip dismissed another of Lerma's appointments to the prince's chamber, the Count of Paredes, and replaced him with Zúñiga.⁷⁶ In addition, Philip appointed the Count of Benavente, Don Juan Alonso Pimentel, Zúñiga's cousin and close associate in matters of policy, to the Council of State.⁷⁷ He also named Zúñiga godfather and tutor to his son and provided him with the very rich *encomienda* of the *comendador de León*--commission of the commander of León in the Order of Santiago.⁷⁸ The significance of the last two offices

⁷³Williams, "Lerma 1618," 322-23.

⁷⁴Escagedo Salmón, 2 (April-June 1925): 186; *ibid.*, 188.

⁷⁵Williams, "Lerma 1618," 324.

⁷⁶Novoa in CODOIN, 61: 196.

⁷⁷Lonchay, 544-45.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*

was not lost on old court hands. Don Juan de Idiáquez, Philip II's close adviser in the last twenty years of his reign and a man whom Philip III highly respected for his foreign policy expertise, held both of these offices before his death in 1614. With Lerma's absence, Philip may well have thought of his or perhaps even the prince's relationship to Zúñiga as of the same nature as that of Philip II with his trusted adviser, Don Juan.

This perception of Zúñiga as an invaluable councilor was evident in the Council business concerning the Truce question just before the trip to Portugal. Maurice had been passing information to the Spanish side through the French that contrary to what some of his supporters may have been saying he was willing to renew the Truce.⁷⁹ In response to this news, Zúñiga wrote a remarkable opinion about possible responses to Maurice and the problems of war in Flanders.⁸⁰ Zúñiga noted that while "these Provinces have been able to conserve themselves notably since the beginning of their State," they now suffer from "religious troubles that have commenced to break the concord they have among themselves." While the Spanish should "keep eyes open" for the possibility of new negotiations that might arise from the rebels' difficulty, they must also continue to move troops from Italy into Flanders and construct the armada for Ostend. But the "best news of late," he maintained, "was the recognition that Maurice intends to make himself lord of those Provinces," rather than their protector.

He went on to consider the consequences of this development. Several people in the government, he said, had seen the recent Dutch turmoil as an opportunity for undermining whichever ruler came to power, whether Maurice or Oldenbarnevelt, by

⁷⁹Archives Générales du Royaume, Secrétairerie d'Etat et de Guerre, Brussels (hereafter ARB SEG) 182 f. 256, Albert to Philip, 5 April 1619, quoted in Israel, 74.

⁸⁰Peter Brightwell uncovered this paper and translated parts of it in his article, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce," 289; note 1 indicated that his source was ARB SEG 183 f. 170, Zúñiga to Ciriza, 7 April 1619 and Brightwell also cited a French translation published in P. Gachet, *Lettres inédites de P. P. Rubens* (Brussels, 1853), 20. The copy of the letter quoted here was British Library MS Additional 14015 f. 128-33 and varies only slightly from the translation that both Brightwell and Gachet have made of the Spanish original.

negotiating with and bribing the various towns, especially in the interior, to return them to the obedience of the Spanish king--a strategy employed with much success in Parma's regime. But now, he maintained, this kind of negotiation would be

full of obstacles and delays . . . and, considering everything, it would be better to deal with the Count [Maurice] himself. Indeed, for not having done this in France in the time of the Catholic League, a mistake was made, and if we would have dealt with . . . King Henry IV at the beginning, it would have been more advantageous to us, instead of dealing with the various towns which resulted in giving the [French] crown to that king.

He suggested that they approach Maurice with an offer, not to continue, but to renegotiate the Truce "in a form and with conditions that would be good for everyone." On the Spanish side, this would involve substantial concessions of lands in the rebellious provinces over which Maurice would become "lord in perpetuity" and his sons, heirs. Though Zúñiga was not specific, he implied that Maurice could be made prince owing allegiance to the King in the manner of the Archdukes. Though Zúñiga admitted that this was difficult, he reminded doubters that the problem with making treaties with the States General or deals with the townships was that they were not duty-bound by the nobility's code-of-honor to keep their word.

With persons of such quality [as Maurice], one can have assurance that they will observe their word and one can have a good and reciprocal correspondence of peace . . . it is understood that to have this, the King must secede and renounce a great part of the country because for this there can be no thought that [Maurice] had to negotiate for little or less than seems to him sufficient . . .

This costly cure takes a great resolution, but the illness has arrived at such a state that it is necessary, for we cannot reduce by force of arms those provinces to their former obedience. Whoever looks at the situation attentively and dispassionately will take into consideration the great forces of those provinces by sea and land, their location so strong surrounded in all parts by the sea and close to France, England and Germany, and the fact that that state is near the apex of its greatness while ours is on the downhill. He will find that to contend with them is impossible, and he flatters himself who promises to conquer the provinces. There are those who blame all our problems on the current Truce and see great benefits in breaking it. One can be

certain that whether we break it or not, we will end up badly. Things can arrive at such a point where, whatever resolution one takes, things turn out for the worse, not for lack of a better counsel, but because the state of matters is so bad there is no remedy and whatever remedy is applied is discredited.

The second paragraph above has often been quoted out of context and incompletely in the historical literature, since Peter Brightwell used it as evidence to support his thesis, outlined in "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce." He suggested that the reason the Spanish were unable to prorogue the Truce in 1621 was because Zúñiga and the Spanish statesmen viewed the kingdoms and territories of the Spanish monarchy as an interrelated whole possessing a territorial integrity which they could not reasonably violate. As has already been seen, a complete reading of Zúñiga's paper reveals that giving up a portion of the Spanish inheritance for perpetual peace in the Low Countries was precisely what he was suggesting. Brightwell and other historians have correctly noted that Zúñiga was a very pessimistic realist, but he was also a positive strategist, and, in this paper, he was actually trying to make the case for a feasible solution which could have avoided another war in the Low Countries and still have kept the Spanish in control of the southern provinces. His solution was not to throw up his hands or make a dreamy speech about defending to the death Spain's reputation but to discuss difficult concessions for major defensive goals. His policy paper also demonstrated that an important consideration in the negotiations, which has not been highlighted adequately before, was the reliability of the Truce terms and the trustworthiness of the negotiating parties. Whether true or not, Zúñiga and the Spanish elite regarded the merchant class who negotiated the last Truce as lacking the good faith that they considered the ultimate guarantee of the provisions of any treaty.

Zúñiga went on to say that, whether they were able to deal with Maurice or not, they still should seek a new treaty that acknowledged freedom of religion, continued to recognize the independent sovereignty of the United Provinces, contained mutual alliance responsibilities, and outlined strict commercial provisions, though he did not specify what

the nature of those provisions would be. And no matter what the treaty looked like or who it was with, the Spanish should not make the mistake again of depleting their military forces. They had to guarantee the enforcement of the terms not with words and faith but with a readiness to make war. This, according to Zúñiga, not the terms, was the major problem with the current Truce. In a meeting on 13 April 1619, the Council of State strongly endorsed Zúñiga's opinion and recommended that a copy be sent to Flanders for consideration, as it "shows Don Baltasar's prudence and wisdom in these matters."⁸¹ Apparently, the King also ordered that copies of the paper should be sent to other statesmen in the Spanish government who advised him on the Truce question, including the Count of Gondomar.⁸²

While the King was in Portugal, the various Councils discussed the terms of the Truce in earnest throughout the spring and summer. Again, the question was not whether to prorogue the Truce but on what terms to renegotiate. The Council of Portugal had already met the previous spring, not long after Ciriza and Lerma had suggested the process. They strongly had recommended that the King refuse to make a Truce unless the Dutch quit the East India trade immediately, complaining that "the Spanish empire will lose what the Portuguese had built through many generations."⁸³ Albert and his councilors, in their meetings of spring 1619, were concerned that there was enough time adequately to renegotiate the Truce and wanted, not only an extension, but also the assurance that Flanders "would not have to go to war for lack of negotiable points," by which they clearly implied that the Portuguese demand was unrealistic.⁸⁴ But the Council

⁸¹AGS Estado 634 f. 319, *consulta*, 13 April 1619.

⁸²British Library MS Additional 14015 ff. 128-33 which is entitled "*Papel de Don Baltasar de Zúñiga comunicado con el conde de Gondomar para Su Majestad*."

⁸³AGS Estado 634 f. 345, "*Consulta del consejo de Portugal*," 28 May 1618.

⁸⁴*Ibid.* f. 347, *consulta*, 29 May 1619.

in Flanders knew their Spanish compatriots very well. The Spaniards and many Portuguese were equally certain that the initial demand from the Council of Portugal was tantamount to non-negotiable terms for the Dutch. Their real concern was not the territories the Dutch already had dominated in the East Indies, but the threat that unrelenting and aggressive Dutch commercialism might impose on Portuguese Brazil, the Spanish West Indies, and the trade that the Spanish had in the East via the Manila galleon. The route from the Cape of Good Hope to the East already had been lost or was well on its way to being lost before 1609. Therefore, in their meetings of 25 and 29 May 1619, Albert and his ministers suggested that if the trade provision of the Truce were to be stiffened, the Spanish should divide the trade in half, prohibiting the Dutch in the West and in the Philippines trade with the Orient and leaving the area from the Cape of Good Hope to possibly Malacca in the Spice Islands in a kind of "free commerce zone."⁸⁵

The value of this medium solution would soon be fortified by intelligence of Dutch activities in Spanish territory. Already there was mounting evidence that the Dutch, perhaps in collusion with the English, were targeting the Philippine trade and possibly Pernambuco, Portugal's increasingly profitable sugar plantations in the north of Brazil, should the Spanish not renew the Truce. The Spanish had just learned in January 1619 that the Dutch already had attacked and destroyed a major portion of the Philippine armada in the summer of 1618, and, on 5 May 1619, the Council of Indies learned of another armada leaving Holland for the Philippines.⁸⁶ Intelligence from Flanders in August confirmed that the Dutch and English had made a new commercial treaty,⁸⁷ and that a Dutch armada was indeed bound for the Philippines and would again follow the

⁸⁵Lonchay, 532, "Council on the Truce," 25 May 1619; AGS Estado 634 f. 347, "*Consulta en Flandes*," 29 May 1619.

⁸⁶Archivo General de Simancas, *Catálogo de las consultas del consejo de Indias*, ed. Antonia Heredia Herrera (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial, 1983), 4: 172; *ibid.*, 184.

⁸⁷AGS Estado 2307 f. 50, Gabriel de Roy to Philip, 7 August 1619.

route through the straits of Magellan, which meant it certainly would take another swipe at the defenses at Callao.⁸⁸ By November 1619, the Spanish learned from their agents that the English and Dutch had made plans to send a joint armada in the coming spring with the express intent of "beating the Spanish out of Asia" and attacking their fleet in the Philippines.⁸⁹ Of course, the Dutch were constantly attempting to feed the Spanish false information, but there were enough actual aggressive acts to force the Spanish to take every rumor seriously.

In August and September the Councils of the Indies and Portugal met, as well as the Council of War under the leadership of Carrillo. It was evident that both the Indies and War councils wanted the Portuguese to accept the Flanders solution--to stand firm in the west at the expense of the east. At their 23 September 1619 meeting the Council of Portugal agreed that the Truce ought to apply to America and Europe and leave everything "beyond the Cape of Good Hope in a state of war."⁹⁰ And by the spring, Albert demonstrated that he was willing to back up these negotiable terms with a war that emphasized naval blockades and commercial strangulation of the north.⁹¹ Therefore, by the fall of 1619, the Spanish not only had decided that they would be willing to war for the renegotiation of the Truce, they were prepared to make substantial territorial concessions in the colonies and in the Burgundian inheritance in order to protect the Spanish

⁸⁸Ibid., f. 25, "*Relación sacada de carta para Padre de San Juan*," 11 September 1619.

⁸⁹Ibid., f. 116, "*Relación descifrada de las nuevas de Olandes*," 20 November 1619.

⁹⁰ARB SEG 183 f. 138-45, *consulta*, 23 September 1619, quoted in Israel, 67.

⁹¹Lonchay, 556, "*junta de état*," 3 April 1620.

Netherlands and the western colonies.⁹² In September Philip gave permission for the Council and Albert to ask the French to act as intermediaries in overtures to the Dutch.⁹³

In the meantime, the Elector of Mainz called for the convocation of the Imperial electors in Frankfurt for the summer. As the Protestants in Bohemia had made clear they would probably select Frederick, other small nations who had been their benefactors began to withdraw. The Duke of Saxony continued to talk with the rebels but also began to discuss possible concessions with the Habsburgs in exchange for his vote for Ferdinand. Bethlan Gabor in Hungary withheld his assistance in the hopes of pressuring his selection. The Duke of Savoy, once he realized he was also out of the running, reduced his subsidies in the spring which had been considerable for a small state. And Anhalt could not encourage the other members of the Protestant Union to support the Protestants in Bohemia or make their support conditional on Frederick's selection as king. By June, members of the Protestant Union openly expressed the opinion that "one should not oppose the House of Austria lightly . . . without either troops or money from England."⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the rebels fought on, and the political and military struggle went back and forth. As soon as the snows melted in May, Thurn marched his army to Vienna again to hold it under siege. Buquoy quickly came to Vienna's relief in June. But the Protestants of Moravia and Lower Austria joined the battle in the summer, and the Hungarian leader Bethlan Gabor decided to end his boycott in August by attacking the Habsburg lands in Hungary. The general atmosphere of rebellion may have worked in Ferdinand's favor, however, frightening the electors enough, so that when they met in

⁹²This refutes the major thesis of Brightwell's thesis presented in his essay "The Spanish System," that the Spanish could concede no portion of the Spanish inheritance because of an insistence on their reputation.

⁹³AGS Estado 2307 f. 23, Albert to Philip, 28 September 1619; AGS Estado 634 f. 330, Albert to Philip, 30 October 1619.

⁹⁴Magen, Reichsgräflichte Politik in Franchen (Schwäbisch Hall, 1975), 190, quoted in Parker, Thirty Years', 60.

Frankfurt, they decided by unanimous vote on 28 August to make Ferdinand Emperor. Even the Elector of the Palatinate decided to cast his vote for Ferdinand, though the Bohemian Protestants had decided on 22 August to elect him their king. James I had strongly advised his son-in-law to reject the crown, but, after a month's consultation with his conscience, Frederick decided to accept. The Bohemians now had new hope. To an international community who had nearly isolated their cause by the spring of 1619, they presented a legitimate and well-connected prince.

When the Spanish court learned of the nearly simultaneous elections of Ferdinand to the Imperial Dignity and Frederick to the crown of Bohemia, the King abruptly ended his visit in September to rush back to Madrid.⁹⁵ In Vienna, Ferdinand and Oñate knew that the next year's military campaign against Frederick would have to be much larger than previously had been expected. In October, they traveled to Munich to discuss Maximilian of Bavaria's involvement. The Bavarian prince believed that he could drive a hard bargain and did. He agreed to revive the Catholic League with his substantial economic support, if Albert would promise him extra cavalry from Flanders, Spinola would attack the Palatinate from Flanders, and Ferdinand would allow him to keep whatever of Frederick's lands he captured as well as Frederick's electoral vote. The Emperor and the Spanish ambassador had little choice and agreed to sign the Treaty of Munich on 8 October 1619, subject to the Spanish king's approval. By the time Philip III safely arrived in his palace at Escorial again after a nearly fatal illness in his rapid journey home from Portugal, he and the Council were left with the usual decision--to accept or reject what Oñate already had negotiated. And this they had to do in an environment that was more belligerent every day. In November the Protestant princes held a council at Rodenberg to conclude how to assist the pretender to the Bohemian crown.⁹⁶ That same month Thurn and Bethlan Gabor

⁹⁵João Baptiste Lavanha, Viagem da Catolica Real Magestade del Rey D. Filipe II N. S. ao Reyno de Portugal (Madrid: T. Iunti, impressor del rei, 1622), 72.

⁹⁶AGS Estado 2307 f. 135, *consulta*, 3 December 1619.

joined forces to lay Vienna under a formidable siege. In December, the Venetians and Dutch agreed to make a mutual defense pact with each other. And the Turks had approached the Dutch, inquiring whether the powers arrayed against the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs would like to make a mutual defense pact with them as well.

In the fall and winter, the two policy questions--the Truce and Bohemia--that had danced around each other through the conciliar process for two years--the first methodically and the second bouncing from crisis to crisis--finally merged into one. Frederick's claim to the throne of Bohemia compelled both the Dutch and Spanish to use his success or lack of success as a gambit in order to obtain more advantageous positions in the Truce negotiations the following year. On the other hand, their preoccupation with German affairs severely delayed serious negotiations throughout 1620. As long as Maurice hoped that his brother-in-law might attract England, perhaps France, and the Protestant Germans to his cause, and thereby weaken the Spanish, he was inclined to wait before negotiating the Truce.⁹⁷ On the Spanish side, the situation in the Holy Roman Empire appeared to be a test of their resolve to meet the challenge that Frederick and Maurice by proxy had made. If Ferdinand did not attack Frederick in the Rhineland or if the Spanish did not help him to do it, their enemies would interpret that as weakness. But if they marched the Army of Flanders into the Rhineland Palatinate, Spain took a tremendous risk.

Over the course of the next month, Zúñiga argued that the Spanish had to honor the Treaty of Munich and stressed the importance of linkage as a rationale for Spanish policy. At the end of November, he told the Council, "Even as the Archduke ponders the

⁹⁷According to Maland, 70, Maurice was supposed to have told one of his agents (presumably the one he sent to Frederick) that he "wanted to see the Habsburgs challenged by strong enemies and hoped that Frederick would not lack vigor in defending his title;" According to AGS Estado 2307 f. 116, "*Relación descifrada de las nuevas de Olandes*," 20 November 1619, Maurice and the States General argued throughout the fall about whether to spend funds on defending merchants from the pirates or pay for aid to Frederick in his war against Spain.

risk that Flanders and Italy run if Germany is lost, it would be possible then to consider the next step, that having lost them [Flanders and Italy], the Indies and Spain itself would remain in manifest danger" He reminded the Council that Maurice had the son and nieces of Dom Antonio, the prior of Crato and pretender to the Portuguese throne, and in marrying his own family with them might return to war to help them reclaim the Portuguese crown.⁹⁸ Spinola in Flanders saw the matter similarly:

If we do not do so, it is quite possible that the House of Austria may be turned out of Germany bag and baggage. If the Protestants succeed in doing this they will then join the Dutch in an attack upon these provinces, not only as a return for the help which they are getting from them, but because they will imagine that whilst your Majesty's forces are here, they will not be left undisturbed in the enjoyment of their possessions. If all the German and Dutch Protestants were to unite in attacking us after a victory in Germany, it would be hopeless for us to attempt to resist them.⁹⁹

In a Council meeting five days later, Zúñiga continued to encourage action on the grounds that Spain had room for maneuverability and had to meet the crisis head on. The English would remain neutral as they had from the beginning of the conflict, if Spinola went into the Palatinate. The only problem, he assured the King, was to find the money for the armies.¹⁰⁰ On 10 December he pleaded crisis. The commitment in the Treaty of Munich was the only reasonable proposal, he said, and Spain had to make "all those supreme efforts that one normally makes when confronted with total disaster."¹⁰¹ Finally, at the end of December, Zúñiga dealt directly with the consistent problem that Spain had with virtually all foreign policy--money. He claimed, passionately, "the times are urgent with the forces in Germany, together with Holland and the negotiations, and Venice and

⁹⁸AGS Estado 712 f. 14, *consulta*, 25 November 1619, quoted in Straub, 166.

⁹⁹Maland, 68.

¹⁰⁰AGS Estado 2033 f. 9-15, "*Sobre lo que contienen lost últimos avisos . . .*," 30 November 1619.

¹⁰¹AGS Estado 1897 f. 375, "*Parecer de Zúñiga*," 10 December 1619.

the power of the Turk with whom they correspond, all goes badly with this monarchy and even with these reigns." The King had no choice but to "pull out a great sum of money from the treasury proportionate to the occasion." If the money was not immediately available, the people had to accept new taxes. He went so far as to suggest that taxation of the Church be considered as an option and even melting down the silver and gold artifacts of the chapels. The Council conceded that while the remedy Zúñiga recommended had to remain a last resort, the King would do well to consider seriously what he had said "before things arrive at a state of total breakdown."¹⁰²

Though Zúñiga's exhortations and the Council's reaction may have been pessimistic and even alarmist, the Spanish statesmen of 1619 recognized that the answer to their problems constantly pointed to an increased level of militancy and military readiness. This meant more money, more men, and more risk with no assurance of a good result, as they had seen many times previously. Though they may not have liked Lerma's methods, these were not men anxious to bankrupt their king in foreign adventures.¹⁰³ They seemed to

¹⁰²AGS Estado 634 f. 328, "*Parecer de Zúñiga*," 25 December 1619.

¹⁰³As has already been seen, Brightwell's territorial thesis--Zúñiga and the Spanish statesman were unable to concede any portion of the Spanish empire in order to sign a truce with the Dutch--has been refuted. In order to illuminate Zúñiga's mind on this question, however, Brightwell also depended heavily on evidence provided in Virgilio Malvezzi's História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV, the second volume of which appeared in Juan Yañez Paladorio, Memorias para la História de Don Felipe III, rey de España (Madrid: N. Rodríguez Franco, 1723) which described discussions at a Council meeting (allegedly held in 1619) which was also contrary to the thesis outlined in this work. Brightwell indicated that Malvezzi's account was probably accurate and "based on written opinions that he had actually seen and, later, for literary purposes, embellished with Tacitean balance and irony" (276-77).

This thesis disputes that assertion for the following reasons. D. L. Shaw, who edited the third and fourth volumes of Malvezzi's História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV (London: Tamesis Books, 1968), said, in his "*Estudio preliminar*," that the work, published in 1639, was the effort of about three to four years, when Olivares, who asked Malvezzi to write the history, allowed him full access to the documents. Malvezzi was a partisan of the Count-duke of Olivares, who, at the time, was under great pressure to defend himself (he was ousted in 1643) and his war policies against his critics. Many were criticizing him for abrogating the Truce which they believed doomed the Spanish to interminable war. In the Nicandro, published shortly after 1643, the Count-duke reminded his accusers that in 1621 there had been little support for the Truce and his uncle, Zúñiga, had been the most important councilor in foreign policy at the time, in any case. Therefore, Malvezzi had motive to embellish his account. The portion of his history, which Brightwell used and is disputed here, is of a Council of State meeting which was supposed to have taken place specifically on the question of the Truce before it expired in April 1621. It has been well established that the documents of such a meeting do not exist in the Archivo General de

need arguments of desperation in order to convince themselves that no other alternative was available. Nevertheless, while they took comfort from the postulate that their back

Simancas (Polisenshy, 77). Unfortunately, as Shaw noted, xvii, when Malvezzi returned to his home in Bologna, Italy sometime after 1651, he took some of the documents he used for his books with him. Philip IV made some efforts to get the documents back, but Malvezzi's cousin informed him that Malvezzi burned all of his papers shortly before he died in 1654. Therefore, whether Malvezzi used actual government documents to support his story about the Truce question is not known for certain.

There are three major problems, however, with Malvezzi's story of the Council meeting concerning the Truce decision. First, Malvezzi clearly indicated that the Council met before Philip III to make its decision. The timing of this meeting is difficult to ascertain. He indicated that the Council of State already had heard from both the Councils of Portugal and the Indies which would mean that the meeting took place after September of 1619 (Malvezzi, 109). Furthermore, he indicated that Don Pedro de Toledo was there and offered an opinion (108). Toledo, however, had been banished from court in August 1619 and remained banished until May 1621, after Philip III's death. The banishment was the result of taking the side of his nephew, the Marquis of Velada, in a dispute with the Duke of Uceda on the King's trip to Portugal (Escagedo Salmón, 1 [January-March 1926], 20-22; Public Record Office, State Papers [Spain] 94/24 f. 175, Edward Wilson to James I). Furthermore, Spanish documents indicated that in 1620, Zúñiga and Aliaga were dealing with the Truce question in secret *junta* and not before the Council of State (Lonchay, 580, Philip to Albert, 8 March 1621). Malvezzi may have seen documents and allowed himself great latitude (as was usual for the time) in fabricating a single dramatic Council meeting at an unspecified time to explain the intricacies of the Truce decision, but this must necessarily bring into question the coherence and context of the reasons given for the abrogation of the Truce.

Second, as regarded Zúñiga, the tone of the speech Malvezzi attributed to him was out of character with any other record of Zúñiga's speeches in Council. The speech was exceptionally long, impassioned, and rambling. It contained statements which unfortunately have been attributed to Zúñiga but were not reflective of his thinking. Malvezzi had Zúñiga say, "When reputation has been lost, even though there is no loss of state, it is like a sky without light; a sun without rays, without spirit, a corpse." This statement has misled historians into believing that Zúñiga had an emotional "politics of reputation," when most of his speeches before the Council of State indicated that he invoked the specter of loss of reputation as much or less than other councilors. Another statement he attributed to Zúñiga which has been used by historians to characterize Zúñiga's politics was the insistence that the Truce "would succeed in losing the two Indies, then Flanders and Italy, and finally Spain itself" (117). Unfortunately, the impression that this quotation has left was that Zúñiga and the Spaniards were primarily concerned about the Dutch in the Indies and has taken focus away from developments on the European continent about which other documentation has demonstrated Zúñiga and most other members of the Council of State were more concerned.

Lastly, some of the attributed statements in this speech were contrary to Zúñiga's stated positions elsewhere. When Malvezzi had Zúñiga say that the Spanish had to make of the Dutch their conquered subjects or their enemy (117), this ran contrary to the opinion that Zúñiga had stated in April 1619. Moreover, the passages of the speech which seemed to dispel the risk involved with maintaining armies in Flanders without sufficient money were not those of the man who had witnessed the worst of the army mutinies in Flanders during 1600-03 and had worked diligently for a military strategy which would primarily employ sea force and commercial aggression to avoid such land battles.

It was entirely possible that Malvezzi did not use primary documentation to support this portion of his account. As Shaw pointed out (xlvi), Malvezzi used secondary sources. His supposed quotation of the "loss of the Indies" leading to the loss of Flanders, Italy, and then Spain was almost the same word-for-word as a quotation attributed to Zúñiga by Mercurio Siry in Anecdotes du ministère du comte duc d'Olivarés, tirées et traduites de l'Italien de Mercurio Siry, par Monsieur de Valdory (Paris, 1722), 134-85, quoted in Carrera Pujal, 1: 488, note 1.

was against a wall, there were also positive, rational arguments for greater militancy in both foreign policy theaters.

In the case of the Truce, much would depend upon whether events in the Holy Roman Empire would turn to Spain's advantage. The King's illness had delayed further discussion of the papers submitted by the Councils of the Indies and Portugal and Albert's *junta* on the question, though the Spanish position was already pretty much formed. The urgency of events in Bohemia obviously dominated Council of State meetings in November and December and there is no evidence that the Truce was specifically discussed at the time, though concerns for the outcome of the Bohemian situation were very much informed by worries about whether Maurice would be willing to renegotiate the Truce. In any case, a renewed military force to threaten the Dutch to a more stringent, or at least verifiable, compliance was necessary.

In Bohemia, the stalwarts of the insurrection would not be defeated as long as they had a glimmer of outside help, and it was clear that Frederick and the Protestant Bohemians would not settle for less than the Bohemian crown, which meant the imperial crown in the future. For this reason, the Spanish Council saw more advantage in acting decisively and massively and taking the risk with international reaction than continuing with the half-measures of the previous campaign seasons. If such a campaign were successful, it would, first, discourage any supporters among the great powers from changing their minds and aiding the rebels and their new prince and, second, allow the Spanish to come to Truce negotiations by the following winter with Maurice on the defensive.

Therefore, in Spain, the Council decided to coordinate a three-pronged attack on the Protestant forces in the Rhineland and Bohemia--Spinola to march the army of Flanders into the Rhineland Palatinate, Buquoy to lead the attack of Ferdinand's army from Lower Austria, and Tilly to move Maximilian's Catholic League from Bavaria to join Buquoy in a simultaneous attack on Prague. In July and August 1620, the Catholic

armies moved and began a rout of Frederick's forces in the east. That campaign ended in a plain outside Prague, called White Mountain. Tilly decided to engage Frederick's forces in November 1620 in a surprise attack that lasted an hour and destroyed his army. Spinola had managed by November to overrun most of the Rhineland Palatinate but was unable to capture the capital, Heidelberg, before he was forced to return to Flanders with the bulk of his army in order to man the Spanish garrisons in expectation of the expiry of the Truce. Nevertheless, a large Spanish contingent remained, and Frederick with his wife were forced to take up residence-in-exile at The Hague beginning in April 1621.

As Spanish arms won victory after victory in the Holy Roman Empire, the outstanding question in 1620 was the Truce. The Spanish government was building up forces in Flanders to prepare for the end of the Truce. Juan de Villela, a former member of the Council of the Indies, directed the development of an armada of twelve ships, constructed by Adrian van der Walle beginning in June 1620. All were designed to the latest naval specifications, costing 323,000 ducats each with another 144,000 ducats each for guns. In all, the investment was over five million ducats, demonstrating the seriousness of the enterprise.¹⁰⁴ At the end of the year the Spanish sent envoys to the Hanseatic League, making sure that they understood the terms of their Truce with the Spanish which excluded them from doing business with the Dutch, in the event that the Truce was abrogated.¹⁰⁵ The success in the Holy Roman Empire invariably encouraged the opinion for abrogating the Truce no matter what. Among those holding this opinion were three men close to Zúñiga--Don Carlos Coloma, Don Luís de Velasco, the Marquis of Belvedeer, and the Count of Benavente. In 1620, Coloma, a leading military strategist, for nine years head of the military garrisons located on the Balearic island of Mallorca (in the western Mediterranean), who was stationed in Flanders at the time, wrote an opinion

¹⁰⁴ARB SEG 184 f. 106, 185, quoted in Israel, 25.

¹⁰⁵AGS Estado 634 f. 531, *consulta*, 1 December 1620.

for the Council in which he asserted that the Spanish should not attempt to renegotiate. It had been a good idea in 1609, he admitted, to make the Truce with the Dutch, because of Spain's exhaustion and need of respite from financial burdens at the time. But, he maintained, it was the Dutch "now who are in more need of quiet," and that the strategy to go after the Dutch by sea and restricting their commerce was correct. In fact, he believed that the King should divert funds from the defense of the Indies to Holland, since this was a more efficient use of the money and would hurt the Dutch in their heart.¹⁰⁶ Luís de Velasco, one of Spinola's top military commanders, had expressed a similar opinion that "we shall force them to guard their homes and lands so that they shall not sail to do us damage in the Indies nor assist our enemies as they do now."¹⁰⁷ And Benavente, Zúñiga's belligerent cousin, asserted that war with the Dutch would divert them from the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁰⁸

Zúñiga, however, had not given up on the possibility of negotiating secretly and directly with Maurice. For most of 1620 and all of 1621, the few contacts made with the Dutch were exclusively dealt with outside of the Council in private *juntas* that only included Zúñiga and Aliaga.¹⁰⁹ In October 1620, Zúñiga received a letter from Henrique Condé, a French Protestant nobleman, who suggested that Maurice was receptive to such private negotiations. The King gave permission for Zúñiga and the Archduke Albert to deal privately with Maurice.¹¹⁰ For several months, Maurice seemed to greet these

¹⁰⁶British Library MS Additional 14005 f.59 ff., "*Discurso de la forma en que debía hazer la guerra a los Hollandes*," 1620 (no specific date).

¹⁰⁷AGS Estado 634 s. f., Velasco to Philip, 11 February 1619, quoted in Israel, 72.

¹⁰⁸British Library MS Additional 14005 f. 35, "Discourse of Benavente," 1620 (no specific date).

¹⁰⁹AGS Estado 2138 f. 167, *consulta*, 3 March 1621; Polisensky, 77, suggested that the proceedings that decided the Truce question have not survived and therefore, it might never be known what the motivation for the abrogation of the Truce was. But the reason for this was a lack of formal proceedings in 1620 and the fact that the few proceedings that dealt with the question were in this *junta*.

¹¹⁰Lonchay, 570, Philip to Albert, 20 October 1620.

overtures with some ambivalence. He was in a difficult position, for the Truce was very unpopular with his supporters, and he probably feared exposure. At the last moment, however, Albert reported in February that a Madame T'Serclaes, a noble woman with contacts both in Brussels and The Hague had also spoken with those who were close to Maurice and told the Archduke that the Stadtholder was open to negotiations. Zúñiga was enthusiastic about the new contact.¹¹¹ Albert wrote back that he wanted a suspension of arms and extension of the Truce until they could figure out where Maurice stood in the negotiations. Fearing that Maurice might be delaying in order to gain an advantage, Zúñiga, nevertheless, agreed to a suspension "for the briefest period possible."¹¹²

Though the French and English ambassadors wrote to their kings in March that the Spanish were not likely to renew the Truce and that the mood in Madrid was for war,¹¹³ this did not accurately reflect the tentative and hesitant feeling of the real power brokers on both sides that spring. The expiration of the Truce passed and neither the Spanish nor the Dutch resumed the war. It is not entirely clear whether Albert had been successful in arranging a suspension or both sides played a waiting game.¹¹⁴ Evidence suggested that Maurice wanted to make some kind of a deal with Spain, especially of the kind that Zúñiga outlined in his paper of April 1619.¹¹⁵ Given the climate in the United Provinces, however, Maurice probably always recognized that the States General would not accept a truce on any terms other than those of 1609. Maurice made this clear to Spain in May and

¹¹¹ARB SEG 185 ff. 88-9, Philip to Albert, 8 March 1621, quoted in Israel, 76.

¹¹²AGS Estado 2138, f. 202, *consulta*, 19 March 1621.

¹¹³Public Record Office, State Papers 94/24 f. 97, Aston to Carleton, 24 January to 23 February 1621; *ibid.*, f. 107, Aston to Nethersole, 1 March 1621; Maland, 84, uncited letter from Basompierre to Louis XIII.

¹¹⁴Roca, *Fragmentos*, 163, indicated that at the time of Philip III's death in March 1621, there were "only five months left in order to complete a truce." This would mean that the Spanish and Dutch suspended hostilities until September, and, indeed, as Israel noted, 80, the war did not officially resume until September 1621.

¹¹⁵Israel, 84-5.

June 1621. Once Zúñiga, the Archduke, and the Council of State came to understand this, the return to war was more likely than not. The Spanish had resolved two years before (perhaps there was even a body of opinion broad enough in 1616) that the 1609 terms were no longer acceptable. As the Count of La Roca said, it was

a truce of such quality that in the *consultas* before in the time of Philip III it did not seem that the Duke of Lerma or others of the Council had voted for it, nor the King agreed to it, and that the Archduke Albert was excused for having taken part in it. In the end, it seemed it continued for fourteen years without anyone having adopted the action.¹¹⁶

The Dutch-Spanish peace, in short, was dead before all the men who made it had died or left the political scene. Oldenbarnevelt had been executed in August 1618. Lerma was deposed from court at about the same time. Philip died on 30 March 1621, three weeks before the Truce ran out, from a fever, according to the English ambassador, induced by his physicians' attempt to lance a large boil on his neck.¹¹⁷ He had not lived to become lord of the provinces that his father had denied him because of his weakness and yet condemned him to spend the wealth and the well-being of his reign in order to keep in the possession of a relative who disparaged him almost as much as his father. Albert outlived him by only a few months and died in July 1621. The Archduke, who had been the principal architect of the Spanish peace, negotiating the treaties with the French, the English, and finally with the Dutch rebels, had lived long enough to see the small country that he had treasured with his heart and vowed to spend the rest of his life serving brought yet again to the brink of war. In one of the many ironies of his reign, the last public act of

¹¹⁶Roca, *Fragmentos*, 163, refers to the fact that hostilities ended between the Dutch and Spanish in 1607 through a suspension of arms which was negotiated two years before the beginning of the Truce which lasted twelve years.

¹¹⁷Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/24 f. 134, Edward Wilson to James I, last March 1621; according to Wilson, the King was brought down by corpulence or "*caninus appetitus*" and an effort to lance a boil on his neck which infected and led to a fever from which he died.

this man who wore the garland of peace was to dutifully, in a sorrowful parody of his whole reign, proclaim a state of war between himself and the United Provinces, according to an Aragonese nobleman at court in Madrid, "by throwing out the ultimatum to Maurice to surrender his principality of Orange, and, if he did not, the Archduke would proceed against him as if he were a bandit in those states."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸Andres de Almansa y Mendoza, Cartas de Andres de Almansa y Mendoza, novedades de esta corte y avisos recibidos de otras partes 1621-1626 (Madrid: Imprenta de Miguel Ginesta, 1886), 45.

EPILOGUE

In *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*,

Fernand Braudel took up the question of the decline of the Ottoman and Spanish empires in the seventeenth century. Braudel suggested that historians may well have been correct in purporting a connection between Ottoman and Spanish dependence on the declining Mediterranean economy and their own political fortunes. "But it was more than that," he asserted. "For Spain had every opportunity to turn whole-heartedly towards the Atlantic. Why did she choose not to?"¹

To choose, of course, is a human decision, and the purpose of this study has not been to answer Braudel's question, but rather to examine one who was in a position to choose for Spain and obviously did not choose to direct Spain's attention to the west. But what if Zúñiga and other policy makers had been able to live in the early seventeenth century and yet catapult their historical consciousness fifty years ahead rather than fifty years into the past as men are more wont to do? The conclusion they may well have arrived at was that Spain should give up its patrimony in Europe, especially Flanders and Milan, in favor of concentrating on Iberia and her overseas territories. To Spanish historians, the nuance of such a remarkable and unlikely transformation of historical consciousness would mean that Spain had abandoned the dream of Ferdinand and Aragon for the destiny of Isabel and Castile.

This transformation, however, was neither as improbable nor far-fetched as it might seem now. Numerous Spaniards, especially the *arbitristas*--members of the *letrado* class who submitted opinions to the Spanish king on better governmental methods--often

¹Braudel, 2: 703.

suggested to Philip III to abandon Flanders.² (There did not seem to be a similar call to leave Italy.) Their voices, however, were not represented well in the power centers of the Spanish government--the Council of State, the diplomatic and viceregal corps, and the court--and they were usually not members of the nobility. Needless to say, it was not an opinion Zúñiga shared. Historians have suggested he and other policy makers were primarily concerned about the overseas territories and advocated a war with the Dutch as the only recourse they had to protect Dutch encroachment in the Indies, especially the East Indies. For Zúñiga, a premier policy maker, this was not the case. In contemplating a war with the Dutch, Zúñiga arrived at decisions based on a whole matrix of developments, involving Bohemia, the previous wars in Italy, the internal politics of the United Provinces, the pacifist policies of France and England, the strong reaction in Madrid against the politics of Lerma which had become so identified with the Truce, a new faith in sea-power as an antidote to the stasis that siege warfare had created in the Low Countries, and the threat to the West Indies. There was little reason to believe that Zúñiga saw the decisions in the Holy Roman Empire and the Low Countries as anything other than an attempt to adjust European politics to Spain's advantage.

After Philip III died, his son Philip IV ascended to the crown with the Count-duke of Olivares at his side. Philip's first act was to give the foreign policy papers to Olivares' uncle, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga. From the spring of 1621 until his death in the fall of 1622, Zúñiga's efforts were directed to controlling the fall-out from the two decisions to abrogate the Truce and to send the Army of Flanders into the Rhineland. In the Low Countries, despite numerous bellicose acts, such as the Archduke's, he delayed Spain from taking any military actions against the Dutch until the summer of 1622.³ All the time he

²For a discussion of this debate, see Elliott, *Count-duke*, 65-69.

³AGS Estado 2138 f. 197, *consulta*, 3 June 1621; D. L. Shaw, "Estudio preliminar" to Malvezzi, *Los primeros años*, xxxix.

negotiated with Maurice seeking a political remedy that would meet Spain's criteria for a successful peace and avoid war. When the war began, the Spanish employed the strategies of commercial war and naval blockade which Zúñiga favored. These strategies, as Jonathan I. Israel demonstrated in The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661, were highly successful in the early years of the conflict in damaging Dutch commerce without waging an expensive land war on the Dutch-Flanders frontier.

In Bohemia, Zúñiga followed up Spinola's aggressive and risky occupation of the Rhineland Palatinate with a three-pronged diplomatic strategy aimed at England and France in order to assuage their concerns and deflect their involvement. First, though Oñate had more or less promised the Archduke Maximilian the Elector Frederick's land and electoral vote--and some argued that the Spanish should hunt down and kill Frederick--Zúñiga strongly opposed both measures. He favored eventual restitution of Frederick's principality and vote, recognizing that to do otherwise would only coalesce an opposition around the deposed prince.⁴ Second, the French were very disturbed that the Count of Feria, the Spanish governor in Milan, had occupied the Valtelline in July 1620, shortly before Spinola's entry in the Rhineland. Zúñiga was anxious to negotiate a treaty and was able to work out an accord with the Pope as intermediary in April 1621, but neither Feria nor the Catholics in the Valtelline would agree to the terms.⁵ He was negotiating another treaty until shortly before his death, meeting often with the French ambassador.⁶ Don Baltasar and several members of the Council, however, were thwarted in this effort by the aggressive actions of Feria, who incited the Catholics and refused to

⁴On killing Frederick, AGS Estado 2138 f. 183, "*Sobre lo que contienen unos papeles de Colonel Semple*," 16 March 1621; on Zúñiga's opinion on what to do about the Palatinate, Straub, Pax et Imperium, 176; Parker, Thirty Years', 67.

⁵Chudoba, Spain, 256.

⁶Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/25 f. 79, Aston to Carleton, 18 May 1622.

cooperate with the negotiated peace treaty much to Zúñiga's frustration.⁷ Unfortunately, Zúñiga was unable to complete his second set of negotiations with the French before he died, and the effort languished until the French made an agreement with the Venetians and the Duke of Savoy in February 1623 to recapture the Valtelline. Finally, to keep the English neutral throughout the proceedings on the continent, he and Gondomar had courted James assiduously with the possibility of marrying his heir, Charles, to a Spanish *infanta*.⁸ Again until just before his death, Zúñiga was trying to negotiate the match, but constantly ran into an immobile obstacle--the objection of the Spanish *infanta*.⁹

These activities did not so much prove Zúñiga to be a peace maker, as they demonstrated the great faith he had in political schemes and intrigues to solve larger foreign policy problems. From the edges of the empire, on-the-scene diplomatic manipulations were always more possible than from the center, where politicians could only observe as their policies either succeeded or failed for innumerable, unpredictable reasons. The ministerial decision in Madrid had to be whether the advantage gained, if everything went as planned, was worth the cost should almost everything go wrong. And much did go wrong with the decision to occupy the Rhineland. Whether Zúñiga's opinion to restore Frederick's possession to him would have produced a better result could only be speculated. Ultimately, Zúñiga could not even control Spain's ally, Archduke Maximilian, one of her viceroys, the Count of Feria, or even a Spanish *infanta*, residing at court, let alone the avalanche of problems that the occupation of the Rhineland eventually created.

⁷J. Garcia Mercadal, Viajes de extranjeros por España y Portugal (Madrid: Aguilar, 1959) Basompierre to Puizieux, 2: 351.

⁸Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 31/8 f. 198, "Instructions from James I to Digby," 23 May 1621.

⁹Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/25 f. 79, Digby to the Prince of Wales, 30 June 1622.

In this respect, Zúñiga earned Virgilio Malvezzi's judgment of his ministry--"the most highly esteemed diplomat and not the most highly praised minister."¹⁰

With regard to Zúñiga, however, Braudel's question--why did Spain not turn to the west--is still unanswered. Zúñiga was a gifted and intelligent man who attempted rational and methodical approaches to problems more often than he demonstrated irrational and brash behavior. The irrational, however, steadied the center of his very rational political compass. It was not possible for this man at that time to do otherwise than to defend the Spanish patrimony in Europe. The legacy of Philip II, the years he spent in Europe learning a politics that had for its whole purpose the defense of Flanders and Italy, his intellectual inclinations toward European culture, his own deep personal and emotional attachments, especially to Flanders, everything created in him a mind that looked east. Whether it was a fatal vision is for someone else to say.

On 28 September 1622, John Digby, the English ambassador to Spain, sent specifically to negotiate the Spanish match, hurriedly sent a dispatch to James I:

The very next day after the receite of your dispatch [on the 26th] Don Baltasar de Çuñiga, buy the violence of some few days sickness was on the sudden taken from us; of whom as this state cannot but finde a great extraordinarie losse so without doubt we like wise shall now miss him in our proceedings here.¹¹

Later Digby reported that the body had been removed from the palace in Madrid, where Zúñiga had died, and taken to a monastery in Segovia "to be buried in a chapple there built for that ende."¹² A nobleman at court reported in November that the King had asked Doña Francesca, Zúñiga's wife, to remain at court and continue to serve the queen.¹³

¹⁰Malvezzi, *Los primeros años*, 87.

¹¹Public Record Office, State Papers (Spain) 94/25 f. 232, 28 September 1622.

¹²*Ibid.*, f. 241, 8-18 October 1622.

¹³Almansa y Mendoza, 150.

Doña Francesca, however, was not long for the world nor was much of Zúñiga's family. Don Fernando de Acevedo, a distant relative of Zúñiga's but an ally of Lerma (who had just been removed from his office as President of the Council of Castile), recorded in his journal that, shortly after Zúñiga died, his wife, his mother-in-law, his infant son and heir, and one of his two daughters died as well. This, according to the acerbic estimate of the witness, was the fate of all--ambitious or not. For, he wrote, "the secret judgment of God, whom we serve, is only to prevail, the rest is a deception."¹⁴

¹⁴Escagedo Salmón, 2 (April-June 1927): 169.

WORKS CITED

Manuscript Sources

Archivo General de Simancas (AGS).

Estado. Flandes 617, 619, 632, 633, 634, 2028, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2138, 2288, 2307, 2847, 2862; Francia K1421, K1426, K1451, K1452, K1460, K1606; Alemania 710, 2323, 2324, 2326, 2500, 2502, 2503, 2865, 2868; Inglaterra 7038; Roma 1865; Milan 1297.

Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid.

Colección Salazar y Castro.

Colección Pellicer.

British Library, London.

Additional MS, 14015, 14005.

Egerton MS, 2079.

Public Record Office, London.

State Papers, Spain 94/22/23/24/25; 31/8.

Printed Sources

Alcalá Zamora y Quiapo de Llano, José. España, Flandes y el mar del norte 1618-1639. Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1975.

_____. "Iniciativa, desaciertos y posibilismo en la política exterior española bajo Felipe III." Estudios del departamento de historia moderna (1976): 191-223.

Almansa y Mendoza, Andrés de. Cartas de Andrés de Almansa y Mendoza, novedades de esta corte y avisos recibidos de otras partes 1621-1626. Madrid: Imprenta de Miguel Ginesta, 1886.

Andrews, K. R. "Continental Rivalry and the Anglo-Spanish Peace of 1604." History 59 (February 1974): 1-17.

Archivo General de Indias. Catálogo de las consultas del consejo de Indias, ed. Antonia Heredia Herrera, vol. 4. Sevilla: Diputación Provincial, 1983.

Barrios, Feliciano. El consejo de la monarquía española, 1521-1812. Madrid: Consejo de Estado, 1984.

Bentivoglio, Guido. A Collection of Letters Written by Cardinal Bentivoglio, during the time he was Nuncio in France and Flanders. Translator unknown. London: G. Stiedel, 1753.

_____. The History of the Warres of Flanders. Translated by Henry, Earl of Monmouth. London: D. Newman, 1678.

Béthune, Maximilien, Duke of Sully. "The Great Design of Henry IV." In Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, 1559-1611, ed. Cláude Bernard Petitot, vol. 9. Paris: Foucault, 1820-1. In Franklin Charles Palm, ed. The Establishment of French Absolutism (1574-1610). Landmarks in History Series, ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1928.

Biatostocki, Jan. The Art of the Renaissance in Eastern Europe: Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Boyajian, James C. Portuguese Bankers at the Madrid Court 1626-1650. New Bruswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1982.

Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Translated by Siân Philips. Vol. 1-2. New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.

Brightwell, Peter. "Spain and Bohemia: The Decision to Intervene, 1619." European Studies Review 12 (April 1982): 117-41.

_____. "The Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War." European Studies Review 9 (October 1979): 409-31.

_____. "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years' Truce." English Historical Review 89 (April 1974): 270-92.

Buisseret, David. Henry IV. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.

Cabrera de Córdoba, Luís. História de Felipe Segundo, rey de España. Vol. 3-4. Madrid: Impresores de Cámara de Su Majestad, 1877.

_____. Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la corte de España desde 1599 hasta 1614. Madrid: J. Martin Alegría, 1587.

Carew, Sir George. "A relation of the state of France with the character of Henry IV and the pincipal persons of the Court." In Thomas Birch. An Historical View of the

Negotiations between the Courts of England, France, and Brussels, from the year 1592 to 1617, 522-3. London: A. Millar, 1749.

Carrera Pujal, Jaime. História de la economía española. Vol 1. Barcelona: Bosch, 1943.

Carter, Charles. The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625. New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1964.

_____. The Western European Powers, 1500-1700. New York: Cornell University Press, 1971.

Chudoba, Bohdan. "*Las relaciones de las dos cortes absburgesas en la tercera asamblea del Concilio Tridentino.*" Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 103 (1933): 297-363.

_____. Spain and the Empire, 1519-1643. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

Clowes, Wm. Laird. The Royal Navy. A History from the Earliest Times to the Present. Vol. 1. London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company, 1897.

Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España. Edited by Julián Paz. Vol. 3. Madrid, 1930.

_____. Vol. 1 and 4. Madrid: Tipografía de Archivos, 1936-57.

Contarini, Simon. "*Relación de la corte de España en 1605 por Simon Contarini, Embajador de Venecia.*" Reprinted in Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas en la corte de España desde 1599 hasta 1614. Madrid: J. Martín Alegría, 1857.

Corbett, Theodore G. "The Cult of Lipsius: A Leading Source of Early Modern Spanish Statecraft." Journal of the History of Ideas 36 (January-March 1975): 139-152.

"Correspondencia Albert con D. Francisco de Sandoval y Rojas, marqués de Denia (1598-1611)." In Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, ed. M. F. Navarette, vol. 2. Madrid: Impresores de la viuda de Calero, 1847-75.

Dalmao y Casante, Jerónimo. "*Cartas a los diputados del reino de Aragón, participandoles noticias de la corte de España.*" Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas, y Museos, no. 1 (1878): 76-78, 121-23 (first series), 170-71, 278-84 (second series).

- Delprat, G. H. M. Lettres inédites de Juste Lipse, concernant ses relations avec les hommes d'etat des Provinces-Unies de Pays-Bas, principalement pendant les aneés 1580-1597. Amsterdam: Konenklyke Akademie van Wetenschappen Afdeeling Letterkunde, G. G. Van der Post, 1958.
- Den Tex, Jan. Oldenbarnevelt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
- Devèze, Michel. L'Espagne et le Portugal sous le règne de Philippe III (1598-1621). Paris: Centre de documentation universitaire, 1965.
- Diccionario histórico de España. 1968-69 ed.
- Diccionario Porrúa de historia, biografía y geografía de México, 1976 ed. S. v. "Zúñiga y Acevedo, Gaspar de."
- Elliott, John H. The Count-duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986.
- _____. Imperial Spain 1469-1716. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963.
- _____. "A Question of Reputation? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century." Journal of Modern History 55 (September 1983): 475-83.
- Enciclopedia de México. 1970 ed. S. v. "Zúñiga y Acevedo, Gaspar de."
- Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana. 1930 ed. S. v. "Zúñiga, Baltasar de" and "Mora, Cristóbal de."
- Escagedo Salmón, Mateo. "Los Acebedos" Boletín de la Biblioteca Menéndez y Pelayo, no. 1 (January-March 1625): 50-64; no. 2 (April-June 1625): 15-29; no. 1 (January-March 1626): 181-88; no. 2 (April-June 1627): 144-69.
- Ettinghausen, Henry. Francisco de Quevedo and the Neostoic Movement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Evans, R. J. W. Rudolf II and His World: A Study in Intellectual History, 1576-1612. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Fernández Duro, Cesáreo. La armada invencible. 2 vols. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1884-85.
- García Mercadal, J. Viajes de extranjeros por España y Portugal. Vol. 2. Madrid: Aguilar, 1959.

- Gayangos, Pascual. Cinco cartas político-literarios de D. Diego sarmiento de Acuña, primer conde de Gondomar. Madrid: Sociedad de Bibliófilos, 1869.
- Geyl, Pieter. The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555-1609. London: Ernest Benn, 1958.
- González López, Emilio. Siempre de negro. Galicia en la contra-reforma: el reinado de Felipe II. Vigo: Editorial Galaxia, 1970.
- Herrero García, M. Ideas de los españoles del siglo XVII. Madrid: Editorial Voluntad, 1928.
- Israel, Jonathan I. The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606-1661. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.
- Jago, Charles. "The Influence of Debt on the Aristocracy in Seventeenth-Century Castile." Economic History Review 26 (May 1973): 218-36.
- Jensen, De Lamar. Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League. Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press, 1964.
- Kagan, Richard L. Students and Society in Early Modern Spain. Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.
- Kamen, Henry. Spain 1469-1714: A Society in Conflict. London, New York: Longman Group, 1983.
- Kaufman, Thomas DaCosta. The School of Prague: Painting at the Court of Rudolph II. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- Lavanha, João Baptiste. Viagem da Catolica Real Magestade del Rey D. Felipe II N. S. ao Reyno de Portugal. Madrid: I. Iunti, impressor del rei, 1622.
- Lefèvre, Joseph. "*Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne à Bruxelles sous le règne de l'archiduc Albert (1598-1621)*." Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire 2 (1923): 61-80.
- Lincoln, Victoria. Teresa: A Woman. A Biography of Teresa of Avila. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1984.
- Lonchay, Henri and Julian Cuvelier. Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII siecle. Vol. 1. Brussels: P. Kiessling, 1923.
- Loomie, Albet J. The Spanish Elizabethans. The English Exiles at the Court of Philip II. London: Burns & Oates, 1963.

- López Olivan, Juan. Repertorio diplomático español. Madrid: "Diana" Artes Gráficas, 1944.
- Lough, John. France Observed in the Seventeenth Century by English Travellers. Stocksfield, Boston, Melbourne, Henley, London: Oriel Press, 1985.
- Lynch, John. Spain Under the Habsburgs. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Maland, David. Europe at War 1600-1650. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980.
- Malvezzi, Virgilio. História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV. With *Estudio preliminar* by D. L. Shaw. London: Tamesis Books, 1968.
- _____. História de los primeros años del reinado de Felipe IV. Libro segundo. In Memorias para la historia de Don Felipe III, rey de España, ed. Juan Yáñez Paladorio. Madrid: N. Rodríguez Franco, 1723.
- Marañón, Gregorio. El Conde-Duque de Olivares. 3d ed. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1952.
- Marcelin Defourneaux. Daily Life in Spain in the Golden Age. Translated by Newton Branch. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979.
- Marichal, Juan. "*Montaigne en España*." Nueva Revista de Filología Española 7 (1953): 259-78.
- Martin, Colin and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988.
- Mateos, Dolores. La España del antiguo régimen: Salamanca. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1966.
- Merriman, Roger Bigelow. The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New. Vol. 4, Philip the Prudent. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.
- Mousnier, Roland. The Assassination of Henry IV: The Tyrannicide Problem and the Consolidation of the French Absolute Monarchy in the Early Seventeenth Century. Translated by Joan Spencer. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973.
- New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967 ed. S. v. "Trent, The Council of."
- Nader, Helen. The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350 to 1550. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1979.

- Novoa, Matías de. "*História de Felipe III, rey de España*." In Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, ed. M. F. Navarette, vol. 61. Madrid: Impresores de la viuda de Calero, 1847-75.
- Palm, Franklin Charles. Introduction to The Establishment of French Absolutism (1574-1610). Landmarks in History Series, ed. Bernadotte E. Schmitt. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1928.
- Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- _____. Philip II. The Library of World Biography Series, ed. J. H. Plumb. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978.
- _____. Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659. Short Hills, New Jersey: Enslow Publishers, 1979.
- _____. The Thirty Years' War. London, New York: Routledge, 1987.
- Pierson, Peter. Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1989.
- _____. Philip II of Spain. London: Thames and Hudson, 1975.
- Polisensky, J. V. War and Society in Europe, 1618-1648. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Quevedo y Villegas, Francisco de. "*Grandes anales de quince días*." In Obras completas, ed. Feliciano Buendía, vol. 1. Madrid: Aguilar, 1966.
- Ramirez, Alejandro. Epistolario de Justo Lipsio y los españoles 1577-1606. Madrid: Editorial Castalia, 1966.
- Roco de Campofrío, Juan. España en Flandes: Trece años del gobierno del Archiduque Alberto, 1595-1608. Madrid: Ayuntamiento de Alcántara, 1973.
- Rodríguez Villa, Antonio. Ambrosio Spínola, primer marqués de los Balbases. Madrid, Establecimiento Tipográfico de Fontanet, 1914.
- _____, ed. Correspondencia de la Infanta Archduquesa Doña Isabel Clara Eugenia de Austria con el duque de Lerma y otras personas. Madrid, 1906, 170-1, 196-7. Quoted in Jonathan I. Israel. The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World 1606-1661. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, 28.

Straub, Eberhard. Pax et Imperium: Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635. Paderborn, Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1980.

Thompson, I. A. A. War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620. London: The Athlone Press, 1976.

Tomás y Valiente, Francisco. Los validos en la monarquía española del siglo XVII. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982.

Trevor Roper, H. R. "Spain and Europe 1598-1621," 260-82. In J. P. Cooper, ed. The Decline of Spain and the Thirty Years' War. Vol. 4, The New Cambridge Modern History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Van Durme, M. Les archives generales de Simancas et l'histoire de la Belgique. Vol. 3. Brussels: Palais des Academies, 1966.

Vera y Figueroa, Juan Antonio de, Count of La Roca. Fragmentos históricos de la vida de D. Gaspar de Guzmán. In Semanario erudito, ed. Antonio Valladares de Sotomayor, vol. 2, 145-296. Madrid: Don Blas Roman, 1787-91.

Williams, Patrick. "Lerma, 1618: Dismissal or Retirement?" European History Quarterly 19 (July 1989): 307-32.

_____. "El reinado de Felipe III." In La crisis de la hegemonía española. Vol 8, Historia general de España y América, 419-43. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1981-89.