1994

Media treatment of World War II in Japan and the United States, 1931-1945 : a propaganda theory approach

Hideko Yoshimoto
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Yoshimoto, Hideko, M.S.

San Jose State University, 1994

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**MEDIA TREATMENT OF WORLD WAR II
IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1931-1945:
A PROPAGANDA THEORY APPROACH**

A Thesis

Presented to

**The Faculty of the Department of
Journalism and Mass Communications
San Jose State University**

**In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science**

by

Hideko Yoshimoto

May, 1994

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ABSTRACT

MEDIA TREATMENT OF WORLD WAR II IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 1931-1945: A PROPAGANDA THEORY APPROACH

by Hideko Yoshimoto

This study addresses the problem of propaganda that created mutually different perceived realities of World War II in the United States and Japan. It examines the coverage of *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* in a content analysis of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the surrender ceremony in 1945. It compares the coverage with current historical knowledge of these events and provides an understanding of the wartime propaganda that was generated by both sides. One of the study's contributions is the development of a theoretical framework for the identification and analysis of propaganda. The major findings are: (1) *patriotic appeal type* and *enemy image type* of propaganda existed in the media; (2) propaganda mobilized different symbols according to the pre-existing dispositions but used the same logical devices despite cultural differences; and (3) it empirically confirmed the mutually interactive relationship between war and propaganda.

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I am deeply indebted to Dr. Diana Stover, my primary adviser, for her intellectual and emotional support throughout this thesis project. The problems of propaganda have been closely related to the situation I personally experienced between the different cultures of the United States and Japan, but I learned how to approach the social and cultural differences through her earnest guidance and assistance. As a scholar and educator, Dr. Stover taught me the meaning of education which, in the original Greek, meant eliciting the individual's ability.

Journalism should work for truly internationally shared interests that transcend national borders and war memories; however, the present rapid technological development in mass communications appears to run ahead of the awareness of those who engage in journalism and appears to create unnecessary conflicts because of differences in nationality, race, religion, and culture. I hope this study might lessen the enmity through an understanding of how propagandistic frameworks function.

Dr. Zhou He and Dr. William Tillinghast gave me useful advice on method and Dr. Bruce Reynolds provided helpful comments on East Asian history. I would like to thank Izumi Ohsumi and Greg Dunnington for the coding they did for the intercoder reliability test and James Orr for his comments on Japanese history and for his editing help. I also appreciate the help given by Jo Whitlatch and the interlibrary loan staff at the San Jose State University Library, Hisayuki Ishimatsu of the East Asian Library at University of California at Berkeley, the staff at the East Asian Library at Hoover Institution.

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Hideko Yoshimoto

May, 1994

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CHAPTER 1

WAR MEMORY AS MEDIA EFFECT: AN INTRODUCTION

The coverage of war is constrained by such factors as military censorship and the requirement of mobilization and strategic secrecy. These special constraints distort the nature of news and give it propagandistic traits. Although the attributes of propaganda varies, wartime information control is directly related to military strategies. As a propagandist, the state disseminates the news of an event for its own purpose and for its own exclusive advantage. It is in such communication processes that the event acquires a strategic value.

Propaganda assigns a slanted logic that makes sense of situational change (George, 1959). It attempts to mobilize a large number of people and consists of "the elements of deliberate intent and manipulation along with a systematic plan to achieve a purpose that is advantageous for the propagandist" (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1992, p. 8). For this

purpose, the propagandist manipulates symbols (Lasswell, 1927).

However, a central problem of propaganda communication is that the propagandist is unknown (Lee, 1952). Especially in wartime, important military information remains confidential. Therefore, propaganda is hardly attributable even among top government officials, let alone at the level of the mass communicator and audience. The mass communicator, unwittingly utilized by the propagandist, often plays the role of the propagandist.

Even under the propagandistic framework of information control, the daily flow of news creates a *reality* of the war. The problem is that the deliberately manipulated reality for special wartime purposes is perceived as *the* reality and remains as a *collective memory* of the nation.

Lang and Lang (1990) contended that the media-perceived reality at the time of an event is an archetypal image that becomes the collective memory at a later time. The collective memory undergoes a process of reconstruction over a long period of time but does not necessarily accord with historical knowledge, which itself is rewritten whenever new evidence is unearthed.

This study explored the role of mass communications in Japan and the United States in creating *perceived realities* of World War II. Although the study did not go into the

domain of the collective memory, an underlying assumption is that the collective memory of the same war is different between Japan and the United States, and the divergence derives from the nature of the mutually distinctive wartime coverage. The United States and Japan fought against one another 50 years ago; therefore, each side's media respectively created a different reality of the war to be advantageous to its own side.

The beginning of World War II in the Pacific theater has been regarded as Pearl Harbor in 1941, and it is called the Pacific War; however, this perspective ignores the early stages of the Japanese-Chinese war particularly critical for propaganda analysis. This study called it the Pacific War since the term is most commonly used in both the United States and Japan but defined the start of the war as the 1931 Manchurian Incident, following Japanese historian Saburo Ienaga's (1979) definition in his classic book *The Pacific War*. Chapter 4 further discusses the definition of the war.

Three critical events of the Pacific War were selected as focal points of the study: the Manchurian Incident in 1931 as the start of the Japanese-Chinese war; Pearl Harbor in 1941 as the start of the Japanese-American war; and the surrender ceremony in 1945 as the formal end of World War II in the Pacific.

This study primarily focused on the relationship between the war as an event and the same event as news. It explored the nature of the power vector in what Lang and Lang (1990) called the *negotiation* between the state as the actor of the war and the mass communicators as those who reported it.

Chapter 2 is a literature review of propaganda as the theoretical basis for this study. Although Nazi propaganda during World War II has been well researched, propaganda in the Pacific theater has not received as much attention. This study explored this relatively unstudied area. Prior research on propaganda has made it possible to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of propagandistic patterns of war news.

Chapter 3 discusses the methods of this study: historical research and content analysis. One American newspaper, *The New York Times*, and one Japanese newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*, were selected for the analysis.

In Chapter 4, a historical approach was used to analyze the Pacific War as an event. Although even historical knowledge cannot claim to be entirely objective, a historical analysis undertaken a half century after the war allowed the researcher to examine quite a few propagandistic distortions of the past because much consensus has been established by historians in Japan and the United States.

Chapter 5 deals with the Pacific War as news by a qualitative content analysis and showed the crucial gap between the objective historical knowledge and the wartime perceived realities in the mass media of Japan and the United States. Chapter 6 utilizes a quantitative content analysis to examine propaganda in the two newspapers.

The research questions were:

- (1) What propagandistic framework of information control did each nation use?
- (2) How did *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* report the three critical events?
 - (a) What are the similarities and differences in the coverage of the two papers?
 - (b) Why did the differences in the coverage of the two papers occur?
- (3) What propagandistic attributes were observed in each paper?
- (4) What are the differences between the present historical knowledge and the perceived realities of each event at that time during the Pacific War and why did this gap occur?

A statement of UNESCO noted that "since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the mind of men that we have to erect the rampart of peace" (quoted in Keen, 1996, p. 10). War begins with propaganda in the human cognitive realm; the

military showdown is only one dimension of the war. An understanding of how the two perceived realities of World War II were manufactured in propagandistic frameworks of information control will contribute to the establishment of a pluralistic perspective.

CHAPTER 2

PROPAGANDA THEORY:

A LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is a literature review of propaganda theory. It classified past approaches to propaganda into four categories: structural-functionalist approach, logic-of-the-situation approach, systems approach, and historical approach. In so doing, it sought to utilize these theoretical frameworks as a systematic tool for propaganda analysis. The structural-functionalist approach and logic-of-the-situation approach primarily address the level of communications, while the systems approach and the historical approach address the societal level of analysis.

Structural-Functionalist Approach

The structural-functionalist approach categorizes characteristics of propaganda communications and attempts to distill the nature of propaganda. The theoretical framework allows communication researchers to systematically analyze the propagandistic attributes of communications.

Lasswell (1927), a pioneer of American propaganda studies, defined propaganda as the manipulation of symbols and observed that the nation was the most salient propagandistic symbol. Lasswell noted that the propagandist satanized the enemy, created the illusion of victory and, by these manipulations, made social control possible. The four major goals of propaganda are:

- (1) To mobilize hatred against the enemy;
- (2) To preserve the friendship of allies;
- (3) To preserve the friendship, and if possible, to procure the cooperation of neutrals;
- (4) To demoralize the enemy (p. 195).

To accomplish the four goals, the propagandist utilizes various rhetorical and logical techniques. Lee (1952) explained these propaganda techniques based on the research by the Institute of Propaganda Analysis. Lee contended that these propaganda techniques are easy to discern if the audience has a good understanding of the nature of these devices. It is important to know these techniques, Lee contended, because it is the only way for the general public to protect themselves from the propaganda manipulation.

According to Lee, the most basic procedures of propaganda are: (1) selecting the issues; (2) case making;

and (3) simplification. Selecting issues is the first step but at the same time is most difficult to discern.

The most sophisticated type of propaganda utilizes these basic techniques without telling the propagandist's real purpose and sets what McCombs and Shaw (1977) called the *public agenda*. Although facts are often used at this level, propagandists carefully choose the issues that are advantageous for their purpose.

The most blatant type of propagandist also engages in carefully selecting issues, using such techniques as distortion and omission of data and total fabrication. The narrowest definition of propaganda has often referred to this type of propaganda. However, these techniques are used not only in totalitarian states but also as a part of military strategy on the battleground to mislead the enemy.

Within the context of the carefully selected issues and cases, the propagandist manipulates *omnibus symbols* which are divided into *name calling* and *glittering generalities* (Lee, 1952). These refer respectively to the manipulation of negative and positive symbols.

In the United States, such words as Communist, Nazi, or Fascist are frequently used as *name calling* symbols, and democracy, science, or love as *glittering generalities*. However, what are considered *omnibus symbols* varies among different cultures. Therefore, Lee suggested, not only

content analysis but also survey research should be used to examine the exact implication of these symbols.

The logical devices connecting the *omnibus symbols* to other symbolic materials are called techniques of identification. Those are:

- (1) *Transfer*. Carries the respect and authority of something respected to something else to make the latter accepted. Also works with something that is disrespected to make the latter rejected.
- (2) *Testimonial*. Consists in having some respected or hated person say that a given idea or program or product or person is good or bad.
- (3) *Plain folks*. The method by which a speaker attempts to convince the audience that his or her ideas are good because they are of the people, the *plain folks*.
- (4) *Bandwagon*. Has its theme "everybody--at least all of us--is doing it!" and thereby tries to convince the members of a group that their peers are accepting the program, and that everyone should jump on the *bandwagon* rather than be left out (quoted in Jowett & O'Donnell, 1992, pp. 182-183).

Lee (1952) noted that these devices of propaganda are *types* and not mutually exclusive *categories*, and what the propagandistic symbols imply rests on the receiver's cultural predisposition. However, if the researchers carefully differentiate cultural variables from others, the structural-functionalist approach can be a useful measurement for various propagandistic attributes of communication.

Logic-of-the-Situation Approach

The logic-of-the-situation approach, focusing on political action and media treatment of that action, attempts to make some possible inferences on the relationship between them and, by doing so, attempts to discern the propagandist's intention behind it. In other words, this approach addresses what Lang and Lang (1990) called the relationship between an event and that event as news primarily based on the qualitative content analysis of communications.

The theoretical model of this approach was developed by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) during World War II. George (1959) explained, "During World War II all major powers obtained important information by monitoring the mass communications of the opponents, allies and neutrals . . . because the difficulties of obtaining information through

other channels made these mass media at times the exclusive sources of information about certain areas, notably the Far East" (p. vii). The material subjected to the propaganda analysis included purely factual information on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

The logic-of-the-situation approach attempts to discern "the game of strategy, as it is one of the tools each player in a conflict situation may use in attempting to improve his information about his opponent's intention, strategy, policy calculations, expectations, and estimates of the situation" (George, p. 5).

The approach involves two basic procedures: (1) to summarize the content of communication and what being said by the propagandist; and (2) to interpret the intent, strategy, and calculation behind the propaganda communications. George noted that these two procedures overlap the basic steps of content analysis: description of content and inferences from that description.

The approach focuses on various political actions such as: (1) actions to change the status quo may be taken by the propagandist's side; (2) actions to change the status quo may be taken by the opponent; and (3) other situational changes may occur as a result of an action initiated by a third party. The situational change implies a variety of the propagandist's intentions usually hidden behind factors such

as: (1) types of actions; (2) types of audiences; (3) types of goals; (4) types of communication channels; and (5) types of communication.

George divided propaganda into *preparatory propaganda* and *anticipatory propaganda*. The former is used by the actor of the event and the latter by the opponent of the actor as a preventive means against the action. The goals of propaganda change according to the audience addressed (domestic, neutral, or enemy) and the expected impact (indulgent or deprivational).

If the forthcoming event is expected to have a deprivational effect on the domestic audience, the propagandist attempts to manipulate information: (1) to reduce the possibility of shock; and (2) to reduce blame and responsibility for the deprivation. If the forthcoming action is expected to have an indulgent effect, the propagandist attempts: (3) to control the degree of public expectation of the deprivational effect; and (4) to increase the authority and prestige of the ruling elite.

Against the audience in the opponent's camp, the propagandist attempts: (5) to give prior justification for the forthcoming action; (6) to mask the forthcoming action if surprise is necessary; and (7) to justify the forthcoming action. In any case, the propagandist controls information

as an important part of strategy to strengthen the authority of the ruling elite.

It is often not easy to examine the interactive relationship between a past event and its coverage. Lang and Lang (1971) examined the relationship between MacArthur's return parade as an event and its television coverage in field research, but it is about an ongoing event. However, the logic-of-the-situation approach will provide a solution for historical events analysis. The framework offers a systematic guideline for making various inferences on the relationship between a past event and that event as news.

Systems Approach

The systems approach focuses on the relationship between propaganda and society and presents a system of the dynamics of propaganda in relation to economic and political systems, primarily addressing a social level of analysis. This approach is a useful basis of comparative studies between different political systems.

The systems approach analyzes a critical link between the inherently totalitarian nature of propaganda and modern democracy. Robin, Webster, and Pickering (1987) contended that "propaganda and information management are normative aspects of modern democratic societies" (p. 8) and that the inherent nature of the mass society necessitates propaganda.

Bytwerk (1989) compared totalitarian and democratic propaganda and delineated some similarities between them. No matter what the political system is, the purpose of propaganda is to convince the masses to accept a society and its system and to participate in it. Bytwerk argued that the audience in democratic nations also desires propaganda as a matter of identity.

Although this approach is primarily addressed by critical theorists, it was Lasswell--the structural-functionalist--who first paid attention to the critical relationship. When he observed the formidable power of propaganda in World War I, Lasswell (1927) noted that propaganda is the dilemma of the modern state and the internationalization of propaganda was deeply intertwined with the expansion of democracy in which freedom of speech is nominally permitted.

Especially in wartime, the democratic government has to engage in propaganda against its own democratic ideal because of the necessity of mobilization. Propaganda in democratic nations becomes subtler and subtler since it must cloak the internal contradiction. Therefore, Lasswell wrote, the success of democratic propaganda depends upon how the propagandist can reorganize *traditional prejudices* potentially pervasive in the society and take advantage of them without his audience realizing it. As Lasswell noted:

Propaganda is a concession to the rationality of the modern world. . . . All the voluble men of the day--writers, reporters, editors, preachers, teachers and politicians--are drawn into the service of propaganda to amplify a master voice (p. 221).

Propaganda was also being discussed in early public opinion studies. Lippmann (1922) observed: "A group of men, who can prevent independent access to the event, arrange the news of it to suit their purpose" (p. 27). Although the focus of Lippmann's classic work, *Public Opinion*, was not propaganda, what Lippmann called the "barrier between the public and the event" (p. 28) meant propagandistic information screening that generates the pseudo-environment. In doing so, the propagandist manipulates what Lippmann called "pictures in our head" (p. 3).

Ellul (1965) theoretically analyzed multiple dimensions of propaganda. Ellul argued that propaganda is a political necessity for mass society: "Propaganda is needed in the exercise of power for the simple reason that the masses have come to participate in political affairs" (p. 121). Propaganda must be total; therefore, Ellul argued, the effectiveness of propaganda is determined by how the propagandist can mobilize potential cultural predispositions

of the society and activate the *pre-propagandistic* situation for his own purpose. The dilemma of modern states reveals itself particularly in terms of foreign policy as propaganda mobilizes deep-seated societal biases. Taking advantage of these biases, the propagandist explains to his audience that they are all victims, presumes an enemy and, makes the enemy a scapegoat. Ellul called this process an *enemy-victim-scapegoat cycle*.

Carey (1988) explained: "Gessellschaft society, the society regulated by utility and contract, could not work without the integrative mechanisms of Gemeinschaft society: nonutilitarian [sic] values, beliefs, traditions, and so forth" (p. 109). The irrationality of human beings creates a niche of propaganda. Propaganda is a *raison d'être* for the masses--a necessary defense for mental security for the mass audience who tends to lose its identity in the loneliness and uncertainty of mass society. Propaganda functions within self-justification processes of the individual, although its purpose is to mobilize the masses for the interest of an organization (Ellul, 1965).

Technological development is another important factor of internationalization of propaganda (Fortner, 1993). The global media systems are deeply intertwined with each other as a single complex cybernetic model. The systems of mass society are globally expanding, as are the systems of

propaganda. The systems approach makes it possible to analyze the theoretical link between propaganda and mass society in different media systems.

Historical Approach

The historical approach focuses on a specific context of propaganda phenomenon and attempts to present an epistemological understanding of the subject. It differs from the preceding approaches in that the focus lies in the specific instead of generalizations. It focuses on specific periods of time, institutions, events, individuals, media, religion, and speech. However, this approach allows researchers to address the societal level of analysis. It is also well suited to examining a propaganda-building process as a long-term effect of communication.

From remote antiquity, propaganda has existed whenever there has been a war. In ancient times, architecture such as a pyramid was a form of propaganda showing off the power of the regime (Thomson, 1977). In the Middle Ages, Christian propaganda used biblical symbolism and mobilized a large population. The Crusade was the result of a mass campaign (Cohen & Menache, 1986). In the Enlightenment Age, well known figures such as Rousseau, Paine, Milton, Hobbes, and Locke were all propagandist-philosophers (Thomson, 1977).

Thomson contended that capitalism and materialism are the most salient propaganda promoted on the basis of the

Christian tradition of saving money. From this perspective, propaganda is the repetition of words that gradually form a certain socially shared, symbolic meaning.

Historical analyses often focus on institutions. Winkler (1978), focusing on the Office of War Information during World War II, found that American propaganda techniques became much more sophisticated during this period. Shulman (1990), focusing on the Voice of America during World War II, examined the impact of the broadcasts on the postwar American foreign policies.

Ivie (1984) analyzed Ronald Reagan's speech and determined how his rhetorical efforts contributed to establishing basic assumptions about the Soviet Union. Herman (1985) examined the American media coverage of the strife in Cambodia and East Timor and elections in El Salvador and found that a propagandistic framework of the mainstream media marginalized the diversity of opinion and gave the news American biases. Basinger (1986) analyzed World War II combat films and described propagandistic traits of these movies.

Keen (1986) examined the visual presentation of the enemy's face in newspapers, magazines, and posters and found that the enemy's face presented in these visuals was depicted as stranger, aggressor, barbarian, criminal, torturer, rapist, animal, and faceless man. Keen concluded

that the enemy image is a reflection of the enmity in the creator's self.

Often the generalization risks marginalizing important specific nuances and the particularity of each event, but a strength of historical research is that it can pay much attention to these specifics. Historical analysis can be a starting point of propaganda analysis.

Application of the Four Approaches

The application of the four approaches discussed above can be a systematic tool for propaganda analysis. The historical approach is useful to present a whole picture when it is not fully presented in the past research. This study used the historical approach in Chapter 4 to provide an understanding of the background of critical events and the role of propaganda.

The logic-of-the-situation approach can be a systematic tool for the examination of what Lang and Lang (1990) called the relationship between the events and those events as news. It can be used as a guideline for inferences as it is combined with the qualitative content analysis of media content. This study used this approach in Chapter 5.

The structural-functionalist approach is useful to quantify data because it provides a systematic tool to categorize the qualitative nature of propaganda. This study applied the structural-functionalist approach, created five

thematic categories, and analyzed propagandistic attributes in mass media.

The systems approach can be used as a theoretical basis for the analysis of the relationship of political systems and mass media. This approach explains the crucial link between democracy and propaganda.

The four approaches can be applied to propaganda during the Pacific War if the researcher carefully differentiates cultural variables from others, what Ellul (1965) called *pre-propaganda*. This study attempted to present similarities and differences between Japanese and American propaganda. The next chapter further discusses how the four approaches to propaganda can be used for this study.

CHAPTER 3

METHOD

This study adopted a combined method of historical analysis and content analysis. The historical method can approach a societal level of analysis, while the result of the content analysis remains at the level of communications and cannot be generalized at a higher level. Therefore, this study used the historical approach for the societal level of propaganda analysis, and the content analysis for the media level. Although content analysis is a useful method for mass communication research, the historical approach was effective as propaganda is closely intertwined with the social level.

Historical Approach

The historical approach examined the Pacific War as an event to establish a basis for comparison with the Pacific War as news, which was addressed by the content analysis. One of the most important roles of historical analysis is to present an understanding of a series of events in a

narrative style (Startt & Sloan, 1989). This study adopted the historical narrative and briefly discussed the historical background of three critical events of the Pacific War. Chapter 4 deals with the historical approach.

The role of propaganda was directly intertwined with historical development. Although the main purpose of the historical approach was the presentation of the Pacific War as an event, at the same time, it described the role of propaganda on the historical development. The historical approach discussed in Chapter 2 focused on the propaganda impact on the historical process. This study applied the theoretical framework to the Pacific War and analyzed the role of Japanese and American propaganda on the war development. The systems approach discussed in Chapter 2 explained the critical link between propaganda and democracy. This approach was used as a theoretical basis for understanding the socio-political background.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the historical knowledge that has been rewritten whenever historical evidence was unearthed differs from what Lang and Lang (1990) called the collective memory that has been generated through communication processes. This study operationally defined the historical evidence as non-mass communication artifacts such as government documents or individual diaries to clearly differentiate the event as history and the same

event as news, but it was primarily based on secondary sources as the reach of this study was limited.

Although Chinese language is usually spelled in Pinyin, this study used Wade-Giles for historical terms prior to 1941 as commonly used in historical literature on this period, but current geographic names are provided in Pinyin in parenthesis if the historical geographic names are no longer used in China. The historical analysis of this study used a surname first style as customary used in China and Japan and in historical literature in the United States. Elsewhere, in attributions and references, a first name first style is used even for Japanese and Chinese authors.

Qualitative Approach

On the basis of the historical analysis of the Pacific War as an event, the qualitative content analysis examined the Pacific War as news and presented the critical gaps between the event and the same event as news. Applying the logic-of-situation approach framework to the Pacific War, it analyzed what Lang and Lang (1990) called the interactive power relationship between the media and the news source and presented some problems of propaganda.

Pauly (1991) stated that the qualitative researcher investigates the symbol construction process and decodes the meaning building processes. The qualitative content analysis explored the meaning building process at the media level and

showed the propagandistic framework of information control in relation to the historical, societal level of propaganda analysis.

Chapter 5 deals with the qualitative content analysis. It examined the media coverage of three critical events of the Pacific War and compared the events as news with the same events as historically analyzed. Finally, it discussed some problems of propaganda based on the questions of why the gaps occurred.

Quantitative Approach

The quantitative content analysis examined propagandistic attributes in the media content based on the structural-functionalist approach framework discussed in Chapter 2. A variety of propagandistic attributes have been discussed in past research, but these approaches did not necessarily address the media level. This study aimed at applying the past approaches into the media level by narrowing down the original definitions of the structural-functionalists.

The propaganda techniques used in the content of mass communications can be an indicator of the nature of propagandistic traits. On this premise, this study quantitatively analyzed what kinds of propaganda attributes and techniques are presented in the coverage of the Pacific War.

For the purpose of operationalization, this study focused on the following thematic categories:

(1) authoritarianism; (2) patriotic appeal; (3) self-image; (4) enemy image; (5) morale manipulation. The operational definitions were as follows:

- (1) Authoritarianism: the sample article's posture vis-à-vis the government or position on an authoritarian versus libertarian scale.
- (2) Patriotic appeal: a stimulus aiming at the individual's identity and attempting to mobilize the person to serve the larger group the person belongs to such as the nation.
- (3) Self-image: an idea often expressed in such terms as *we*, *us*, and, *ours*, and that helps present a black-and-white contrast between self and enemy to preserve the cooperation of the domestic and/or allied audiences.
- (4) Enemy image: an idea often expressed in such terms as *they*, *them*, and *theirs*, and that helps present a clear contrast against the self-image to mobilize hatred against the opponent camp.
- (5) Morale manipulation: a surface presentation of the tone of what George (1959) called anticipatory and preparatory propaganda that attempts to cushion the deprivational or overjoyous impact of a forthcoming

action either for the allied or enemy audience (see Chapter 2 for detail).

On the basis of the definitions above, the coding categories for this study were constructed. The persuasion technique *testimonial and transfer* was operationally defined as an indicator for authoritarianism; *bandwagon* for patriotic appeal; and *plain folks* for self-image and enemy image. In Lee's (1952) original definitions, the above propaganda techniques were not necessarily the indicators of such thematic categories as above and included broader implications. However, this study redefined these techniques to make them more clearly attributable for the coding purposes. Specific coding guidelines are described in the codebook in the Appendix.

An intercoder reliability test was conducted for 10% of the total sample. The reliability in the morale manipulation category was relatively lower than the other categories: It indicated that the coding in this category tends to be more subjective than the others. However, the reliability in the enemy image category was .85, the highest of the five categories. As shown in Table 1, the average reliability for all categories was .80.

Table 1

Intercoder Reliability Test

Thematic Category (Question #)	Asahi Shimbun	New York Times	Average
Basic Data (Q9-11)	.99	.98	.99
Authoritarianism (Q12-13)	.75	.79	.77
Patriotic Appeal (Q14-16)	.77	.74	.76
Self-Image (Q17-20)	.82	.77	.80
Enemy Image (Q21-26)	.87	.83	.85
Morale Manipulation (Q27-32)	.67	.71	.69
Average Reliability	.81	.79	.80

Note. Q9-32 are the question numbers in the codebook in the Appendix. The co-coders were Izumi Ohsumi for Asahi Shimbun and Greg Dunnington for The New York Times.

Selection of Newspapers

One American daily, *The New York Times*, and one Japanese daily, *Asahi Shimbun*, were selected for the media level of analysis. The rationale was that the newspapers are both what Merrill (1968) called *elite papers* that have been read by policy-making elites and intellectuals in each nation. Although the content of each paper is often criticized as an example of intellectual mediocrity, this study presumed that such criticism occurs because each paper well represents the

political and media systems of the nation: The two newspapers would be appropriate materials for this study.

Merrill divided the elite papers into two categories: *quality papers* in an open society where freedom of speech is permitted and *prestige paper* in a closed society where the government controls information flow. Although *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* are both quality papers today, *Asahi Shimbun* during the Pacific War tended to be a more prestige paper that disseminated the news of the government. *The New York Times* can be understood as a quality paper even during the research period.

The New York Times, established in 1851 in New York City as a penny press, became a quality newspaper under Adolf S. Ochs' ownership at the turn of this century. Although it is basically a regional paper, it is respected nationally and internationally. The paper is also a good example of the American business-based, free press. Although many American newspapers called Japanese "Japs" during the war, *The New York Times* did not use the derogatory term unless it was used with quotes (Yamamoto, 1973). From 1914-1941, *The New York Times* special correspondent in Tokyo was Hugh Byas, who was also writing for the *London Times*. After Byas left Japan in 1941, Otto Tolischus took over his place (May, 1973).

Asahi Shimbun, first established in 1879 in Osaka, a western center of Japan, later moved to Tokyo and became a

commercially successful large circulation paper. The paper grew into a Japanese elite newspaper at the turn of this century, but its circulation remained the second largest before and during the war. *Asahi Shimbun* remained an elite newspaper but also became a target of the criticism of small opinion magazines as the media faced the threat of the escalating militarism of the nation because *Asahi* journalists maintained a close relationship with government bureaucrats. The readership included political, military, and business elites (Haruhara, 1987).

The national edition of *The New York Times* was available in microfilm at Clark Library, San Jose State University. The Tokyo edition of *Asahi Shimbun* was available at the East Asian Library, Hoover Institution.

Critical Events Selection

Three critical events of the Pacific War have been selected as focal points of historical and qualitative content analysis and the sample periods of the quantitative analysis. As discussed in Chapter 1, this study defined the period from the Manchurian Incident of 1931 to Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945 (see Chapter 4 for detail).

Although the start of the Pacific War has been defined as Pearl Harbor by mainstream historians both in the United States and Japan, this is the logic of the major powers. This definition cannot present an essential element of the

war: The series of battles began with Japan's invasion of China and not with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

Just as the start of World War II has been defined as Hitler's invasion of Poland that precipitated the declaration of war by Britain and France, the beginning of the Pacific War has been defined as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor that precipitated the American declaration of war. Such definitions excluded the involvement of weaker nations: Hitler had annexed Austria, Italy had invaded Ethiopia, and Japan had invaded China before the major powers participated in the war. World War II started with the Axis nations' invasion of weaker nations both in the Atlantic and Pacific theaters; however, the starting point was later determined to be the point at which the major powers reluctantly became involved in the war.

Especially in propaganda analysis, it is not sufficient to examine the nominal period of the war because of the non-military dimension focuses. Propaganda analysis regards the military showdown as the final phase of the *propaganda war* that would have already started long before.

On the basis of the definition of the Pacific War and propaganda war, critical events selected for analysis were: the Manchurian Incident, September 18, 1931; Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941; and the surrender ceremony, September 2, 1945. The three critical events are all crucial turning

points that dramatically changed the international situation at the time.

The Manchurian Incident was selected because it marked the beginning of the Japanese invasion of China and also meant Japan's first offense against the Washington Treaty and the Kellogg Peace Pact.

Pearl Harbor was selected because it precipitated American participation in World War II and marked a crucial turning point in the power balance in the Pacific.

The Surrender Ceremony was selected because it formally ended the war and because the researcher expected there to be a certain shift in the Japanese and American mutual images in comparison with their wartime images.

Although Emperor Hirohito's statement on Japan's defeat on August 15 has been seen as the end of the war in Japan, the number of related issues were not sufficient for a quantitative analysis since it was not extensively covered in *The New York Times*. Although Hiroshima was another interesting opportunity for the analysis, the amount of related news was not sufficient since it was simply covered as "Power of New Type Bomb Seems Enormous" in *Asahi Shimbun*.

Other turning points such as, the Panay Incident, the ratification of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, Japan's invasion of Indochina prior to Pearl Harbor, the major battles such as Midway, Attu, Saipan, Leyte, and Okinawa,

and the Tokyo Air Raids, could have been examined for a more detailed analysis. However, only the most critical events were selected for examination in this study.

Sample Periods Selection

The sample periods for the quantitative approach were selected based on the three critical events. These were:

- (1) Manchurian Incident Period, (2) Pre-Pearl Harbor Period,
- (3) Post-Pearl Harbor Period, (4) Surrender Ceremony Period.

This study considered Pearl Harbor to be a turning point in the Japanese-American propaganda and mutual images; therefore, the preceding and succeeding weeks were separated into independent sample periods to examine the change before and after the event. The Manchurian Incident Period was studied because it was important to determine the mutual images long before the Pearl Harbor showdown. The Surrender Ceremony Period was selected to examine the impact of the end of the war.

The Manchurian Incident Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period were defined as seven-day periods including the date of the events and the three preceding and three succeeding days. However, the same event was usually reported with a one-day time lag since Tokyo time is 20 hours earlier than New York time. Therefore, the sample periods for *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times* were

determined based on the date in which the event was first reported.

For example, Pearl Harbor as an event was December 7 in the United States and December 8 in Japan, but the event was first reported on December 8 in *The New York Times* and on December 9 in *Asahi Shimbun*. As the Post-Pearl Harbor Period, this study selected the seven days beginning with December 8 for *The New York Times* and the seven days beginning with December 9 for *Asahi Shimbun*.

The four sample periods selected were as follows:

(1) Period 1: Manchurian Incident Period

The New York Times: September 16-22, 1931

Asahi Shimbun: September 17-23, 1931

(2) Period 2: Pre-Pearl Harbor Period

The New York Times: December 1-7, 1941

Asahi Shimbun: December 2-8, 1941

(3) Period 3: Post-Pearl Harbor Period

The New York Times: December 8-14, 1941

Asahi Shimbun: December 9-15, 1941

(4) Period 4: Surrender Ceremony Period

The New York Times: August 30-September 5, 1945

Asahi Shimbun: August 31-September 6, 1945

A total of 28 days, 7 days for each sample period, were selected for the analysis.

Sample Items Selection

The recording unit was defined as an article. The sampling frame was determined as all the page one articles and editorials related to all war news and the news about Japan for *The New York Times* and the United States for *Asahi Shimbun*.

Sampling rules were determined as follows:

- (1) Each news article including its jump was counted as one item.
- (2) Each editorial was counted as one item.
- (3) If an article had some related headlines and/or visuals such as photographs, cartoons, or maps, the article plus these attachments were counted as one item.
- (4) A large headline across page one was included as part of the most related article on the same page and counted as one item.
- (5) *The New York Times* had only the morning issue but *Asahi Shimbun* had both morning and evening issues; *The New York Times* had jumps but *Asahi Shimbun* had no jumps. Therefore, the stories on page one plus their jumps for *The New York Times* was regarded as equivalent to the

stories on page one in both the morning and evening issues of *Asahi Shimbun*.

- (6) *The New York Times* ran an average of ten page one articles and several editorials each day, while *Asahi* had 20 to 40 short or long articles on the morning and evening page ones combined and one or two editorials each day. For comparative purposes, since *Asahi Shimbun* ran short pieces as compared with the *Times* relatively long pieces, if a series of *Asahi* pieces dealt with the same subject, the series as a block was counted as one item.

A total of 455 sample articles for *Asahi* and 291 samples for *The New York Times* were selected for the analysis. Since the sample of *Asahi* editorials for the Manchurian Incident and the Surrender Ceremony Periods was too small to analyze, the sample periods were enlarged so that the researcher could oversample both of these time periods.

CHAPTER 4

THE PACIFIC WAR AS AN EVENT: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter is a brief historical analysis of the Pacific War as the basis for comparison between the event itself and the same event as news. It first defines the Pacific War and then traces the war in a historical narrative, focusing on the role of propaganda and the three critical events of the Manchurian Incident, Pearl Harbor, and the surrender ceremony. The present chapter is primarily aimed at the societal level of analysis, while the next two chapters are concerned with the media level of analysis.

Defining The Pacific War

World War II was waged in two theaters: the Atlantic and Pacific. The former has been called the European War and the latter the Pacific War. During the war, the Japanese called it *Daitoa Senso* or Greater East Asian War, a term which connoted Asia's liberation from Western colonialism;

however, the post-war Allied Occupation Force called it the Pacific War in order to avoid the Pan-Asiatic ideological connotations of the *Daitoa Senso*.

Calling it the Pacific War, however, encouraged the tendency to look at only the Japanese-American war after Pearl Harbor in 1941 and to ignore the Japanese-Chinese conflict that began in 1931. Some historians have called all the phases of the war Fifteen Years War, dating its beginning from the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

The Greater East Asian War, as the Japanese originally named it, could cover all the phases of the war, but the term is less used in part because it is still frequently used by Japanese patriots who support the state's wartime aggression. Japanese and American historians have used the term with emphasis on wartime Japanese expansionism.

Taking the Fifteen Years War perspective, Eguchi (1978) suggested that it be called the Asia-Pacific War. Ienaga (1979) called it the Pacific War but defined it as the period between 1931-1945, dating its start from the Manchurian Incident. As discussed in Chapter 1, this study used the Pacific War since the Pacific War is a most commonly used term in both the United States and Japan, and defined its start as the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

The rest of this chapter discusses the historical background of the Pacific War, focusing on the three

critical events of the Manchurian Incident, Pearl Harbor, and the surrender ceremony. It also briefly describes Japanese and American approaches to propaganda.

The Situation in China

As a result of the Versailles Treaty of 1919, after World War I, Japan acquired former German concessions in China and its colonies in the Western Pacific because Britain and France, the victors of the war, wanted to reduce German influence in Asia. However, the decision disillusioned China (Thorne, 1972).

Japan had gradually expanded its presence in Manchuria, the northwestern part of China, since its bitter victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Japanese expansionists considered Manchuria as Japan's lifeline; the South Manchurian Railway was one of its major concessions. The Western powers allowed the Japanese army to station along the Railway. Japan and the Western powers shared the colonial interest and ignored China's claim of territorial sovereignty.

Britain and France attempted to maintain their own interests in China by suppressing the Chinese claim. The United States stood upon the open door policy, insisting that rights in China should be open to all nations. However, the American policy did not necessarily admit Chinese autonomy (Thorne, 1972).

In 1915, Japan compelled China to accept renewal of the South Manchurian Railway concession in the Twenty-One Demands. China had no effective central government, and many local warlords had been engaged in struggles over their territorial interests ever since the Ch'ing Dynasty had fallen in 1912. However, Japan's unilateral Twenty-One Demands sparked a series of Chinese nationalist movements (Thorne, 1972; Usui, 1974).

In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek established his pre-eminence and that of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party. However, Chiang still took a relatively generous attitude toward the Japanese because Chiang believed war against Japan would only exhaust his power and bring no gain. Chiang decided to wait, avoiding the war that would be disadvantageous to his political status in China (Cobles, 1991).

The Kuomintang's non-resistance policy, however, in effect poured gasoline on the flame of Chinese nationalism at the grassroots level. Japanese products and money were boycotted, and anti-Japanese movements arose. Tension between the Chinese and Japanese increased: Two million Japanese immigrants had already built some Japanese-residential areas in the major cities along the Manchurian Railway (Usui, 1974).

A Japanese immigrant group insisted that they should be more completely guarded by the Kwantung Army, the Japanese army in Manchuria. Otherwise, they claimed, the Japanese population could not live safely in the midst of the anti-Japanese movements escalating in China (Matsuzawa, 1983).

Kwantung Army officers, taking advantage of the petition, requested the government in Tokyo to expand its influence in Manchuria. However, the government and Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijuro stood against the military-led expansionism and insisted on following the Washington system that attempted to maintain the status quo and the military balance between major powers in the Asia-Pacific regions (Hatano, 1988; Thorne, 1972).

The military clique criticized the Washington Treaty of 1921-1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which were central pillars of the Washington system. They claimed that the treaties unfairly determined the possession of naval forces of Britain, the United States, and Japan. In November 1930, Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi, who signed the London Naval Treaty, was assassinated in Tokyo.

Disappointed with the Japanese government's way of dealing with the international situation, Ishihara Kanji and other Kwantung Army officers had been looking for an opportunity to expand their power both over China and the government of Tokyo. The Manchurian Incident can be

understood as a military coup attempted by the Kwantung Army officers (Hata, 1993).

The Manchurian Incident

On September 18, 1931, a Kwantung Army group set a bomb on the Manchurian Railway near Mukden (Shenyang) and attempted to assassinate Chang Hsueh-liang, governor of Manchuria. The bomb exploded at 10:20 p. m., but the assassination failed because Chang found out about the plot. However, the Kwantung Army, asserting that the bomb was planted by a group of the Chinese Army, advanced into the major cities of Manchuria on the rationale of protecting Japanese civilians.

At 10:40 p. m., the Japanese General Consulate in Mukden received a communication from the Kwantung Army that a group in the Chinese army had blown up the Manchurian Railway tracks near Mukden and that the Japanese army had been dispatched (Usui, 1974).

In the confusion, at 11 p. m., Colonel Itagaki Seishiro ordered an attack on the Chinese army stationed at Peitaying Barracks and Inner Mukden Defense Works near the explosion. The order was Itagaki's arbitrary action but marked the starting point of the succeeding Japanese deployment. Following Itagaki's order, the heads of the Japanese battalions, who had already prepared for the forthcoming order as they heard gunfire, launched their attacks on the

Peitaying Barracks and Inner Mukden Defense Works (Usui, 1974).

Between 1:30 a. m. and 2 a. m. on September 19, the Supreme Commander of the Kwantung Army, General Honjo Shigeru, issued several crucial orders to deploy the Japanese troops across Manchuria. By these orders, the incident developed into an abrupt Japanese occupation of all the regions along the Manchurian Railway (Usui, 1974).

Confronted with the news of the incident, Chang Hsueh-liang took a non-resistance policy and ordered rigid adherence to it. Chang's policy was relayed to the Japanese Consulate General of Mukden over the telephone. The Consul-General Hayashi Hisajiro requested that Itagaki take a non-expansionist policy and seek a diplomatic solution. However, taking advantage of the Chinese non-resistance, the Kwantung Army ignored the Consulate's request and occupied the major cities of Manchuria. The Chinese at Changchun resisted. Although such resistance was the exception, the Kwantung Army used this example to insist on the necessity of increasing the number of the Japanese troops in Manchuria (Usui, 1974).

At the League of Nations in Geneva, European nations and the United States reluctantly intervened in the Manchurian Incident. The League suggested that Japan retreat to the line prior to the Manchurian Incident, and the Japanese

delegates at Geneva accepted this. However, the Kwantung Army not only did not withdraw from the occupied areas but also launched another attack in the Jincho region, the west of Mukden toward Beijing.

Foreign Minister Shidehara was compelled to resign because of his failure to control the Japanese army. The United States Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, first relied upon Shidehara and the Japanese government's ability to control their army but realized that the Japanese army was out of the control of its government (Thorne, 1972).

The cooperative diplomacy of the Washington system, which Shidehara had championed, ended, and the Japanese isolation in the international community began. In 1933, Matsuoka Yosuke, the Japanese delegate at Geneva, decided on Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations.

The Manchurian Incident of 1931, as a military coup, led to the expansion of the influence of the Japanese military cliques in politics. Several military coups were plotted even after the Manchurian Incident. In the 1936 February 26 Incident, the military cliques assassinated top civilian officials. The Tokyo office of *Asahi Shimbun* was attacked. Although the coup itself failed, military domination in politics began.

In 1937, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident near Beijing opened a full-scale war between China and Japan. The same

year, the Imperial Headquarters in which the military clique, bureaucrats, and imperial family controlled politics, launched its operation. Although parliamentary politics continued, the Imperial Headquarters gradually strengthened its authority over civilian officials.

Japanese Approach to Propaganda

The military regime emerged in part because the Japanese public had reason to support it (Takahashi, 1989; Yoshimi, 1979). General distrust of parliamentary politics led to the public support for military domination, and the media played an important role in creating the grassroots perception of the nation and its foreign policy.

From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Japan underwent rapid industrialization under Western influence; the rapid social change victimized much of the agricultural population as the state-led economy systematically invested agricultural profits into new urban factories. Economic depression descended upon the rural communities. The military cliques, mostly from the lower and middle classes, took advantage of the public discontent, pinned all the blame on the political party leaders and elite bureaucrats, and insisted on an emperor-led, radical transformation of the Japanese society (Barnhart, 1988; Hatano, 1988).

Parliamentary politics had been introduced to Japan as had the industrial revolution, but the government, in contradictory fashion, was encouraging political participation at the same time it was suppressing freedom of speech. In 1925, Japan adopted universal suffrage, but the same year enacted the Peace Preservation Law, speech control legislation originally aimed at communists and subversives (Haruhara, 1987; Kasza, 1988).

The Peace Preservation Law allowed government authorities to control all the anti-establishment elements. The *thought police* and military police, the former called *Tokko* and the latter *Kenpei*, were formidable weapons of thought control that gradually increased their power in pre-war Japan (Iritani, 1986).

The modernization of Japan also had included the centralization of the government power. The government controlled information through various means. The Emperor was purposefully situated at the top of the government structure for the effective mobilization of national power. The state-controlled educational system encouraged respect for the Emperor. The municipal agencies worked as the end unit for the completing of the state's policy (Iritani, 1986).

The radical militarists were born out of a backlash to the state's centralization policy which created rapid social

change at the grassroots level. The militarists, using a national web of veteran's organizations, the Military Reserve Association, developed a series of campaigns to establish their status in rural communities, taking advantage of the public sense of respect for veterans and families of the deceased soldiers (Oe, 1978).

The militarists, including the Kwantung Army officers, rationalized their militant approach against the civilian government with the logic that the army had superseding privileges because it belonged to the Emperor. The Constitution of Imperial Japan indicated that the supreme commander of the Japanese army was the Emperor, not the civilian authorities. The militarists, extending the constitutional logic, tried to persuade the public that the military cliques had a superior authority over civilian officials (Oe, 1979). The militarists successfully expanded their power, brandishing the name of the Emperor as an *omnibus symbol*.

In the surge of jingoistic fervor created by the Military Reserve Association's patriotic campaigns, the Manchurian Incident was presented by the Japanese mass media as a reaction against the violent Chinese attack on the Japanese, the Kwantung Army's deployment as necessary self-defense. Some suspected that the explosion might have been plotted by the Kwantung Army (Hata, 1993), but the suspicion

was suppressed. Not until after the Pacific War was this account of the Manchurian Incident modified.

The Japanese media tended to report only news the government allowed and not to report the Japanese aggressions in China such as the 1937 Rape of Nanking. Japan was becoming an informationally closed society. In 1936, once the Cabinet Information Committee was established, information coming and going was controlled by the state's censorship (Purdy, 1987).

Although the Japanese media had expressed an anti-militarist stand in the 1920s, a content analysis of the Japanese media found that they turned into a mouthpiece of national propaganda by the early 1940s: Noelle-Neumann's (1973) spiral of silence effect was observed in the mid-1930s (Tsuchida, 1988).

Pearl Harbor

On September 6, 1941, as a result of compromise between the radicals in the Imperial Army and the moderates who had worked to avoid the war, the Imperial Conference secretly decided three critical national policies as follows:

- (1) The Empire of Japan would complete preparations for war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands by late October.

- (2) Along with the above, Japan would also insist on the demands of the Empire against the United States and Britain through all available diplomatic means.
- (3) If the above diplomatic talks had not succeed by early October, it would decide on war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands (Oe, 1991).

The diplomatic talks above referred to the U. S.-Japan negotiations in Washington between Japanese Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. However, the talks had been interrupted since the Japanese occupation of French Indochina on July 23 and the ensuring United States oil embargo against Japan on August 1. The Japanese-American negotiations had come to a deadlock (Maddox, 1992).

In Tokyo, Prime Minister Konoye Fumimaro, trying to suppress the radicals in favor of the war, requested that American President Franklin Roosevelt hold a summit conference. American Ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew, supported Konoye's idea, considering that the Konoye-Roosevelt conference could undermine the position of the radicals in the Imperial Army if it were successful. However, Roosevelt and Hull did not accepted Konoye's request and insisted that basic issues such as Japan's

withdrawal from French Indochina should be determined first, before the summit conference (Hatano, 1993).

On October 17, Prime Minister Konoye and his cabinet resigned. Konoye and his subordinates carefully avoided taking responsibility for the decision to go to war with the United States. The Army Minister of the Konoye Cabinet, General Tojo Hideki, who had a great influence over the Imperial Army, became prime minister. The radicals in the Imperial Army insisted on the war against the United States and Britain. However, because of his status in the Imperial Army, the moderates expected Tojo to suppress the radicals (Hatano, 1993).

As the moderates expected, Tojo worked for the repeal of the September 6 decisions to avoid the war against the United States and Britain. Although the Japanese-American talks had not found any solutions by early October, the decision for war was postponed from late October to late November. However, the pressure from the radicals strengthened since the diplomatic talks had not produced any solutions.

As a result of another compromise between the moderates and radicals, on November 20, Tojo proposed to the United States that Japan would withdraw from French Indochina in exchange for the removal of the oil ban. However, on November 26, the Hull Notes demanded that Japan also

withdraw from China to the line before the Manchurian Incident.

Tojo did not want the war against the United States and Britain, but the Imperial Army's withdrawal from Manchuria was the last thing he wanted. Japan's withdrawal from China would mean that Tojo and the Imperial Army would lose almost all their influence over Japan's politics; the Imperial Army had expanded its power in politics since the Manchurian Incident based on defense of colonial interests (Barnhart, 1993). Japan decided on war against the United States and Britain.

The complicated power relationship among the political decision makers played an important role in the decision for war (Aruga, 1993). In the end, the decisions of the September 6 Imperial Conference were given preference and were used as the final rationale by those who insisted on war.

The final decision to attack Pearl Harbor was made at the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941. On November 26, the Pearl Harbor attack task force had already left Japan for Hawaii. The Navy insisted that the war should start without a formal declaration because surprise was necessary, but Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori opposed the surprise attack as it would be against international law. The Foreign Minister's claim was partially accepted, but it was

determined that the message announcing Japan's abandonment of the diplomatic talks should arrive in Washington just slightly before the attack (Hata, 1993).

In Washington, however, Ambassador Nomura and his staff, who did not even know that such attack had been planned. Japan's ultimatum was delivered to Hull slightly after the Japanese Navy's attack on Pearl Harbor (Hata, 1993; Maddox, 1992).

The United States had intercepted the Japanese diplomatic codes and succeeded in deciphering them, but had not succeeded in deciphering the Japanese naval codes. The American radar in Honolulu had detected the Japanese attack planes, but none of these reports reached the top because the communications officers in charge of relaying them did not take them seriously. The signal indicating the Japanese attack was not correctly understood because it was too unexpected (Wohlstetter, 1962).

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and the American-Japanese war in the Pacific started. The Japanese aircraft destroyed several U. S. battleships, three cruisers, and three destroyers anchored at Pearl Harbor. Nearly 3,000 Americans were killed, and another 1,000 were injured (Maddox, 1992). When Nomura handed the Japanese ultimatum to Hull, Hull had already received the deciphered

message and had heard the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Buchanan, 1964).

Pearl Harbor united a nation that had been long divided. On December 8, the House of Representatives voted in favor of American participation in World War II with only one dissenting vote. President Roosevelt called December 7, 1941, the "Day of Infamy," and Pearl Harbor became part of what Lang and Lang (1990) called the collective memory for Americans. Various mythologies have developed around Pearl Harbor, as conspiracy theorists have claimed that Roosevelt had forewarning and that he and others at the top were to blame for the unpreparedness. It also created an American archetypal image of Japanese (Dower, 1986).

American Approach to Propaganda

Prior to Pearl Harbor, a variety of war news reached the United States and captured the attention of the American media as Britain and France had declared war against Germany in 1939. The United States faced a very different problem from that of a closed society such as pre-war Japan: The Americans worried about being manipulated by enemy propaganda in an open society.

The inability to control incoming enemy propaganda, the Americans believed, would jeopardize their democracy and reveal a weakness of democracy in confronting totalitarian propaganda. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis,

established in 1937, warned the public of propaganda manipulation by analyzing some attributes of propaganda (Sproule, 1989). However, enemy propaganda for the Americans primarily meant Nazi propaganda, and propaganda from Asia tended to be overlooked (Lasker & Roman, 1938).

Roosevelt had prepared for the forthcoming war, but at the same time he had confronted the isolationist sentiment of the nation. Roosevelt managed the ambiguous situation by closely communicating with the American people through twice-a-week presidential press conferences and, in so doing, succeeded in creating what McCombs and Shaw (1977) called a public agenda at the cognitive level: the idea that the United States might be dragged into war in the near future (Steele, 1985).

A relatively large amount of public information created what George (1959) called *anticipatory propaganda* and led to the American perception that war might be necessary. However, Americans thought that Japan would attack the United States and British forces in Southeast Asia and never expected that Japan would attack the U. S. force in Hawaii.

Five American organizations engaged in propaganda campaigns during World War II: the State Department; the Office of War Information (OWI); the Office of Strategic Service (OSS); the propaganda branch of the Army (G-2); and the Special Warfare Branch of Office of Naval Intelligence

(Op-16-W). Although the above agencies shared various responsibilities, OWI primarily engaged in white propaganda using factual news, and OSS engaged in disinformation and black propaganda designed to mislead the enemy (Sparagana, 1990).

In June, 1942, OWI was established to centralize all the war information under a single authority, but the American propaganda agency still did not have the absolute power of fascist regimes and had to seek a consensus among various divisions of the government. Winkler noted that "no one American possessed the powers of German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels" (1978, p. 8).

Confronted with antagonism against propaganda, OWI decided to use truth as the basis for propaganda. For this purpose, journalists, writers, and poets were drawn into OWI propaganda campaigns. Those who served OWI included Pulitzer Prize winning playwright Robert Sherwood and journalist Elmer Davis.

The journalist-propagandists successfully formed the basis for a new American way of propaganda presentation obviously different from that of Goebbels. Two major themes for American propaganda emerged: the American way of life and democracy. As a result, American propaganda became much subtler and more sophisticated through World War II (Winkler, 1978).

Once the war started, the Institutes of Propaganda Analysis foundered and was compelled to cease publication of its periodical *Propaganda Analysis*. The researchers were drafted into the government's propaganda analysis programs for the war (Sproule, 1989).

While some journalists were brought into the government propaganda programs, the mature mass communication industry also played an important role in amplifying the state's war propaganda while remaining in the private sector. The mass communicators did not like being overtly controlled, but once information was arranged in the way the journalists liked it--such as in press releases and other public relations materials--they willingly propagated the state's policy. The propaganda at home was much more successful at the non-governmental levels. Not only the government and soldiers but also newspapers, radio stations, the music industry, Hollywood and Madison Avenue went to war (see Dick, 1985; Fox, 1975; Shull & Wilt, 1987).

Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall summoned Hollywood movie director Frank Capra and asked him to prepare a series of orientation films for American soldiers, "Why We Fight" (Dower, 1986). In addition to the government's project, more than 200 combat movies were voluntarily produced in Hollywood during the war from 1941-1945 (Basinger, 1986).

The films created the mythical, stereotypical enemy image of Japanese. In the films, Japanese soldiers were regularly referred to as monkeys or mad dogs attacking unwary Americans. In such films, "the Japanese soldier" typically "hides in the jungle or in caves like a cunning animal, snipes from trees, invades camps to kill" (Dower, 1986, p. 21). The combat films presented the Japanese image in propagandistic terms, as subhuman figures. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was seen as typical of Japanese treachery and the cause of the war in most of the films. The song of "Remember Pearl Harbor" was released soon after Pearl Harbor and was popular in the streets and in combat films across the nation. The media created a powerful enemy image that mobilized American hatred (Basinger, 1986; Dower, 1986).

Japanese-Americans became victims of the anti-Japanese propaganda. For the majority of Americans, the Japanese-Americans were not regarded as part of us and were regarded as dangerous enemies. On February 19, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that eventually detained all Japanese and Japanese-Americans on the West Coast in relocation camps. The West Coast newspapers advocated the relocation of the Japanese-Americans, carrying anti-Japanese columns and editorials (Daniels, 1973; Yamamoto, 1973).

In Europe, the Voice of America was established in February, 1942, and started its operation. John Houseman, a famous ex-radio producer of the Mercury Theater, led the project. He stated: "The job of the Voice of America was to tell the truth, as closely and objectively as possible" (Shulman, p. 170). However, its information was carefully selected and arranged, following the American foreign policy line, stressing America as "the last bastion of liberty and freedom, the world's democratic hope" (p. 74). The Voice of America continued even after the war and became the official mouthpiece of American propaganda.

Demoralizing Japan

In the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur had claimed the necessity of propaganda campaigns such as leaflet distribution and broadcasting to counter Japanese propaganda. However, the American government's propaganda campaigns in the Pacific became sizable only in the last year of the war as Roosevelt took a Europe-first policy (Winkler, 1978). Short-wave broadcasting from San Francisco and sporadic dropping of leaflets in 1941 were exceptional (Sparagana, 1990). The American propaganda effort in the Pacific primarily was aimed at persuading the Japanese to surrender.

After the American return to the Philippines, an Office of War Information (OWI) team published the first Leyte-

Samar edition of the *Free Philippines*. Radio broadcasts carried MacArthur's voice. After the Army moved toward Manila in the early 1945, a Philippines chapter of OWI was established. It tried to create distrust and doubt within Japanese populations at home, broadcasting radio messages emphasizing Japan's economic difficulties (Winkler, 1978).

The American messages urged the Japanese leaders to surrender, stressing that Japan's defeat would not mean its people's defeat nor the end of Japanese culture. Although Japanese soldiers chose to commit suicide rather than being captured, the American psychological warfare had a partial effect on the demoralization of the Japanese soldiers at the individual level (Sparagana, 1990). However, it did not succeed in making the Japanese leaders decide to surrender (Winkler, 1978).

On March 10, 1945, U. S. forces dropped incendiary bombs on Tokyo and initiated a series of B-29 air raids which devastated Japanese cities. On May 7, Germany unconditionally surrendered. On June 22, the United States and Allied Forces occupied Okinawa. Japan's impending defeat was obvious, but the Japanese population was not informed that the country was losing the war. The Japanese media had not correctly reported the Japanese military losses in the Pacific. Often the number of losses were distorted with the

emphasis being placed on the heroic stories of the Japanese soldiers (Matsuura, 1984).

In Tokyo, the Japanese decision makers were indecisive again on Japan's surrender, just as they had been on the decision to attack Pearl Harbor. Japanese leaders were so concerned with the future of the Japanese imperial system that they could not make the final decision. They were concerned that the Emperor and his system might not survive if Japan surrendered, and this was the last thing they wished to happen. The fate of the Japanese imperial system was closely related to the fate of the leaders who had been working under the system. Even after the Allied occupation of Okinawa, some army officers insisted on a final showdown in mainland Japan.

A Japanese arrangement to end the war secretly started among civilian members of the top circle. However, their knowledge of the international community was extremely limited. In July 1945, Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro asked the Soviet Union to mediate a cease-fire treaty with Great Britain and the United States without knowing that the Yalta accords had already determined the Soviet's declaration of war against Japan (Oe, 1991).

On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration was issued. On August 6 and 8, the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The atomic bombs demonstrated the superior

American power in science and technology, but the Japanese decision makers were still indecisive. On August 9, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. On August 14, the Imperial Conference finally decided on Japan's surrender (Hatano, 1988).

On August 15, NHK, Japan's national radio broadcaster, carried the voice of Emperor Hirohito announcing the end of the war. The Japanese audience for the first time listened to the voice of the human being for whom they had fought.

The Surrender Ceremony

Once Japan surrendered, the Allied Forces successfully landed in Japan. Serious Japanese resistance was expected, but the landings proceeded smoothly without resistance. On August 30, General Douglas MacArthur landed at the Atsugi airport near Tokyo. On September 2, General MacArthur and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru signed a formal surrender agreement on the U. S. Missouri anchored at Tokyo Bay. The document formally ended the war and determined the content of the post-war Allied occupation in Japan.

World War II in the Pacific came to end, and the Allied occupation in Japan started. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) was General MacArthur. The American-led General Headquarters in Tokyo launched its task of transforming the Japanese military regime into a democratic one. The Japanese media acquired a relative freedom of

speech under the U. S. occupation, but SCAP often suppressed anti-American speech, including criticisms of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which SCAP regarded as harmful to the execution of the American-led occupation policies (Matsuura, 1984). The occupation ended in 1952, but SCAP and its occupation policies had a great impact on post-war Japanese politics.

CHAPTER 5

THE PACIFIC WAR AS NEWS: A QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

This chapter examined the Pacific War as news by a qualitative content analysis. It described the media treatment of the three critical events in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* and addressed the media level of analysis.

The chapter is divided into the three parts: (1) the Manchurian Incident as news; (2) Pearl Harbor as news; and (3) the surrender ceremony as news. Each part described the media treatment of *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times* and compared the historical understanding of the event and the media treatment of the same event. These comparisons presented three major problems of propaganda: misinformation, *omnibus symbols*, and relationship with the news source.

Manchurian Incident as News: Misinformation

Treatment of Asahi Shimbun. In the morning issue on September 19, *Asahi Shimbun* first reported the Manchurian

Incident. The headline read: "Mukden Army Bombed the Manchurian Railway: Hostilities Opened between Japanese and Chinese Armies." The Mukden Army referred to the Chinese army at Mukden. A Mukden-byline telegram followed as below:

At 10:30 p. m., today, as violent Chinese troops blew up the Manchurian Railway tracks and attacked our soldiers guarding the area, our defense troops reacted against it without delay, fired cannons at the Chinese army and occupied a part of Peitaying Barracks.

Asahi Shimbun reported the incident in almost the same manner as the Kwantung Army's announcement. The original military communiqué was disseminated through the media to the Japanese audience.

The same day, *Asahi Shimbun* cast suspicion on the official announcement in an extra edition only circulated in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The article argued, "Did a group of the Kwantung Army plot the explosion?" *Asahi Shimbun* had reason to suspect it was the case because the Kwantung Army had been seen as looking for an opportunity to advance the army. The article simply reflected the suspicion pervasive among some civilian and military officials in Tokyo (Hata, 1993). However, the suspicion was soon

suppressed because *Asahi Shimbun* never brought up the suspicion in the later coverage of the incident.

The same day's evening issue covered reactions to the incident, carrying several stories on the Kwantung Army's deployments and the government's non-expansion policy. However, two continuities were observed: The *Asahi* articles pinned the blame of the explosion on the Chinese and described the Japanese civilian populations as *plain folks*. This created a black-and-white contrast of self and enemy images.

Asahi Shimbun quoted the two official statements that endorsed these views: Japanese Consul-General Hayashi of Mukden stated "the Chinese side was responsible," and Prime Minister Wakatsuki stated "the reaction of the Kwantung Army was a reasonable, justifiable self-defense." Both Consul-General Hayashi and Prime Minister Wakatsuki requested the Kwantung Army to take a non-expansion policy but contributed to the enemy image of the Chinese in the mass media.

The reaction of the United States was covered even though the space assigned was relatively small: "The Secretary of the State, Stimson, considered that the incident would not violate the Kellogg-Brian Treaty but will carefully look at the Japanese deployment in Manchuria." In an even smaller article, *Asahi Shimbun* reported the Chinese objection: The Chinese representative of the League of

Nations at Geneva announced that the incident was not caused by the Chinese (September 19, 1931).

However, it was the editorial of the same day that put the ambiguity down into a *reality* by asserting that the Chinese were responsible for the explosion. The editorial traced the series of happenings in Manchuria and this resulted in giving a *meaning* to the event. The media interpretation was that the Japanese military advance was a reasonable reaction since the explosion was obviously plotted by the Chinese army. The reality of the Manchurian Incident for the Japanese audience was already found in the editorial of September 19. Not until after the war was it modified.

Treatment of The New York Times. The early reaction of *The New York Times* reflected the American government's reluctant attitude in intervening in the Manchurian Incident. However, the newspaper, presenting both sides, soon realized the news from Tokyo and that from Shanghai and Nanking were in conflict.

Although the clear-cut answer was not available until after the war, insofar as the coverage of the Manchurian Incident, the objective reporting standards of *The New York Times* played an important role in discerning the truthfulness of the Japanese original communiqué which was intentionally planned misinformation.

On September 19, *The New York Times* carried the first report of the Manchurian Incident written by Hugh Byas, *The New York Times* correspondent in Tokyo. The headlines read: "Japanese Seize Mukden in Battle with Chinese; Rush More Troops to City; Tokyo Alleges Attack, But Chinese Say Assault was Unprovoked and Unanswered."

The news was primarily based on the Japanese military communiqué of the incident. The story read: "According to the source available, . . . three companies of Chinese troops began destroying the South Manchurian Railway lines." In Tokyo, the information was limited not only for the Japanese reporters but also for the foreign correspondents.

On September 20, however, another report of the Manchurian Incident came from Shanghai which clearly contradicted the Japanese announcement of the previous day. The news read: "An aggressive policy by Japan was responsible for the incident which, the Chinese believe, was deliberately created in order to give the Japanese an excuse for their action."

On September 21, *The New York Times* carried a Nanking-bylined report saying that the Nanking government would invoke the Kellogg Peace Pact. The spokesman for the Nanking government did not refer to the Japanese charge that the Chinese soldiers had damaged the South Manchurian railway tracks but accused the Japanese army that occupied a large

region of Manchuria of responsibility. *The New York Times* headline read: "More Fighting Expected."

On September 22, the *Times* carried an editorial on "The Manchurian Quarrel." It noted that the quarrel was not only between China and Japan but also was between two factions in Japan, referring that the factional conflicts in Japan's politics would "make the task of the Council of the League easier." In retrospect, the perspective was as overly optimistic as that of Secretary of State Henry Stimson, but at least *The New York Times* calmly observed the inside politics of Japan.

Misinformation. The problem in the media treatment of the Manchurian Incident is that the incident was first announced by the Japanese army's message, and the misinformation was eventually taken as a truth by the Japanese media and its audience. The problem stems from a very common situation in the coverage of war: The journalist is rarely present at the scene and almost all war news is filtered by military censorship.

As discussed in Chapter 1, military censorship arranges information to be advantageous for its own side. In the Manchurian Incident, from the very beginning, the propagandist took advantage of the Japanese supremacy in the information network of the Mukden area and planned to announce misinformation that would be advantageous for their

military strategy. The explosion and the statement that followed were obviously plotted as a set.

Both *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times* first reported the Japanese military communiqué. However, *The New York Times* began to investigate the truthfulness of the statement by reporting a conflicting news source from China, while *Asahi Shimbun* did not continue the investigation although it first suspected the statement.

The difference in the coverage by the two newspapers perhaps originated from three factors: the political systems, and the relationships with the news sources and relationships with the respective audience. While *The New York Times* did not suffer any pressure from the government, at least regarding the report of the Manchurian Incident, *Asahi Shimbun* was perhaps pressured by some authority. The speech environment for *Asahi Shimbun* was tightly controlled by the political system and the paper's relations with both news source and audience were close enough to affect the media content; however, the dysfunction of the Japanese elite newspaper led to the Japanese public support for the war.

The New York Times was published in a relatively free speech environment and suffered less pressure because the medium's position was relatively detached from the news

source. The combined situation allowed *The New York Times* to detect the misinformation.

Pearl Harbor as News: Omnibus Symbols

Treatment of Asahi Shimbun. Prior to Pearl Harbor, *Asahi Shimbun* had covered the U. S.-Japan negotiations in Washington. The paper, at least presenting both sides, reported what Roosevelt and Hull said to Japan and the Japanese representatives to the United States. However, *Asahi Shimbun* often charged that Roosevelt and Hull never understood Japan's position and, as a result, the American leaders were given a cold blooded and arrogant image.

On December 9, *Asahi Shimbun* reported the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The large headlines read: "The Empire of Japan Declares War Against the United States and Great Britain. War Begun in the Western Pacific." The official announcement of the Imperial Headquarters followed: "The Imperial Navy and Army Entered a State of War Against the United States and Britain in the Western Pacific." *Asahi Shimbun* used the term *war declaration*, but it addressed the Japanese people, referring to the Imperial Order.

The Imperial Order *declaring* war against the United States and Britain was placed in the center of the page one. The Imperial Order stated that all Japanese have to unite and serve the Emperor and our nation to accomplish peace and prosperity in East Asia. As Dower (1986) noted, in the

Imperial Order was the typical Japanese view of the war at the time: The war became unavoidable because of the Western-dominated world system despite all the earnest efforts that Japan had taken. In this dominant view, no self-image as an aggressor was indicated.

Several short telegrams from Washington, New York, Honolulu, and Buenos Aires carried the news of Pearl Harbor. The different bylines implied that the announcement of the Imperial Headquarters, which was frequently taken as an unreliable source by the Japanese media, was true this time. *Asahi Shimbun* confirmed the truthfulness with these many bylines, including AP and NBC.

After Pearl Harbor, the tone of the newspaper changed. Many quotations from the official communiqués started to occupy the media and a lack of journalistic expressions was observed. The editorial attempted a pro-forma persuasion of the people to unite and dedicate themselves to the nation, but it simply echoed the Imperial Order. No other rationale than the Imperial Order was presented in the editorial on why Japan went to war against the United States and Japan. This type of logic was not found in *Asahi Shimbun* during Manchurian Incident and pre-Pearl Harbor periods.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, the *Asahi* editorials had at least discussed various international situations and, by doing so, reached their conclusions; in the case of Pearl Harbor, the

newspaper did not present any arguments and just attempted to persuade the audience on the rationale that it was the Imperial Order. The Japanese Navy had argued the surprise attack was necessary, and it apparently surprised the Japanese mass communicators.

However, the sense of surprise turned into eloquent patriotic appeals a few days later. On December 11, *Asahi Shimbun* reported the Japanese naval victory over the British ship *Prince of Wales* in a raising morale tone. The news of the succeeding Japanese naval victories had reached *Asahi Shimbun*. The situational change made the *Asahi* journalists confident to support the ruling elites of the nation. From this time on, *Asahi Shimbun* started to describe the Japanese military victories and losses in a patriotic, glorious, and eloquent tone, and literally turned into a propaganda machine.

Treatment of the New York Times. Prior to Pearl Harbor, *The New York Times* had also covered the Japanese-American negotiations. The image of Ambassador Nomura and his subordinates was not necessarily presented negatively. *The New York Times* appeared to have found some hope for avoiding the American-Japanese showdown in Nomura's earnest efforts. *The New York Times* even often described Nomura positively, although the space assigned to the Japanese-American talks was less than that in *Asahi Shimbun*.

The New York Times was occupied with war news from Europe and Asia even before Pearl Harbor. The tone was relatively calm and it observed the developments of battles and events in both theaters in a way that adhered to the standards of objective journalism.

On December 7, *The New York Times* reported President Roosevelt's direct appeal to Emperor Hirohito. Roosevelt reacted upon the reports that a large number of Japanese troops were advancing into French Indochina. *The New York Times* noted it as "a serious warlike move" but was quite optimistic that the direct appeal could successfully avoid the war, referring to the successful precedent of Roosevelt's appeal to Hirohito at the time of the Panay Incident. The large number of Japanese troops in Indochina in effect diverted American attention away from Pearl Harbor.

On December 8, *The New York Times* first reported the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The headlines read: "Japan Wars on U. S. and Britain; Makes Sudden Attack on Hawaii; Heavy Fighting at Sea Reported." A story pointed out that the military action was followed by a formal declaration of war. Another story quoted Hull denouncing a "treacherous and utterly unprovoked attack," but the general tone of the page one reports was still as calm and neutral as in the pre-Pearl Harbor period. *The New York Times* carried the entire

translation of Emperor Hirohito's proclamation of war on page two. However, the relatively positive description of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor gradually changed. In an editorial on December 8, *The New York Times* called Japan a "treacherous friend" and mentioned that the "madmen of Japan" had attacked Pearl Harbor.

On December 9, *The New York Times* carried the entire text of the president's war message to Congress and reported that Congress voted for participation in both the European and Pacific War. *The New York Times* reported with a Washington byline that the United States lost only one battleship at Pearl Harbor, but another article with a Tokyo byline reported large American losses claimed by Japan: two battleships; one mine-sweeper sunk; four capital ships; and four cruisers damaged.

After Pearl Harbor, while *Asahi Shimbun* did not report the American media treatment of the series of events of the Pacific War, *The New York Times* continued to report the Japanese media treatment of them by identifying sources.

In an editorial entitled "United We Stand" on December 9, *The New York Times* quoted President Roosevelt's address as a rationale for the war. However, the presidential address was not only the rationale as the Imperial Order was for *Asahi Shimbun* the only rationale. *The New York Times*

discussed various present situations of the time and tried to base its analysis on this as it had in peacetime.

Despite the relative objectivity, however, *The New York Times* engaged in no debates. On December 8, the day after Pearl Harbor, an editorial urged Americans to fight to protect their democracy:

The United States has been attacked. The United States is in danger. Let every patriot take his stand on the bastions of democracy. We go to battle in defense of our own land, of our present and our future, of all that we are and all that we still hope to be, of a way of life of which we have made for ourselves on free and independent soil, the only way of life which we believe to be worth living (p. 22).

The quotation above showed the continuing logic through which the American media rationalized the state's engagement in war during and after World War II. The president's speech could not be the *omnibus symbol* to persuade the audience to go to war, but the American democracy was an effective *glittering generality symbol*.

Omnibus symbols. A why-we-fight question offered the main argument in the both papers' coverage of Pearl Harbor and related editorials. There was a difference in the

rationale of each paper; however, there was a crucial similarity in the logic of justifying the state's engagement of the war. Both papers used what Lee (1952) called *omnibus symbols* to find a reason to support the state's war engagement.

Asahi Shimbun persuaded the Japanese audience on the rationale of the Imperial Order, while *The New York Times* persuaded the American audience by arguing that the United States and democracy was in danger. In the lines of reasoning, the Emperor for the Japanese and democracy for the Americans were used as *omnibus symbols* to answer the why-we-fight question.

The enemy's image also played an important role in rationalizing the state's engagement of the war. *Asahi Shimbun* reasoned that the American leaders never understood our position, while *The New York Times* reasoned that Japan attacked our nation. In view of this, a contrast image between *they* versus *we* was presented.

As an American newspaper, *The New York Times* considered the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as an unconditional basis for the American war declaration and engaged in no debate whether this condition really necessitated the American participation in World War II. *Asahi Shimbun* also presented no discussion on the state's decision. The Japanese prestige paper subserviently posted the Emperor's

message as an *omnibus symbol* and made the symbol the only rationale for the entire nation to go to war. The debate on the pros and cons of the state's engagement in war should be the first responsibility of the press. The problem is that neither media engaged in this crucial debate once the war started.

Insofar as the Manchurian Incident was concerned, the standards of objective journalism in *The New York Times* detected misinformation as the medium's position was relatively detached from the pressure of the news source. Despite the environment in which freedom of speech was nominally allowed, however, *The New York Times* did not engage in that debate regarding Pearl Harbor. The American quality paper was perhaps affected by the closer proximity to the news source: the media's relation with the government regarding Pearl Harbor was much closer than that of the Manchurian Incident. *The New York Times* had to criticize its own government if it engaged in the pros and cons of argument of the state's participation in World War II, and it perhaps endangered its relationship with news sources.

The problem of what Lang and Lang (1990) called the *negotiation*--the interactive power relationship between the actors of an event and those who report--existed regardless of the political system: It presents a serious propaganda problem in democratic societies.

Surrender Ceremony as News: Relationship with the Source

Treatment of Asahi Shimbun. On August 15, the Emperor's formal cease-fire proclamation changed the patriotic tone in *Asahi Shimbun*, and the Allied Force and General Douglas MacArthur began being positively presented in the newspaper. Although the Japanese prestige paper frequently worried about the violence that might happen between the Allied soldiers and the Japanese citizens, the coverage of General MacArthur was generally very favorable. *Asahi Shimbun* even presented MacArthur as heroic, describing his plane, garments, sunglasses, behavior, way of dealing with his staff, and personal dialogues with other American officers in detail. *Asahi Shimbun* described a series of Allied landings in a favorable sense of surprise. The *Asahi* journalists seemed to have observed the cultural differences with a sense of wonder and curiosity and to have been surprised at the wealth of the Americans and their army.

On September 3, 1945, *Asahi Shimbun* once again carried the Imperial Order at the top of page one. Although Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru had signed the formal documents of the Japanese surrender the previous day, the Foreign Minister's ratification of the international treaty, was thereby justified by reasserting the Emperor's approval.

The same day, *Asahi Shimbun* carried the statement of the prime minister. The statement reasoned that Japan had to

accept the unconditional surrender determined by the Potsdam Declaration because it was the Emperor's order. This was the same rationale on which *Asahi Shimbun* had justified the war on the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor.

However, the *Asahi* editorial on the surrender ceremony no longer discussed the unconditional Japanese surrender on the rationale of the Imperial Order. It reported a summary of the surrender documents and attempted to encourage the audience, showing the newly suggested purpose which the post-war Japanese should work for--the reconstruction of Japan.

Neither the Japanese government nor Emperor Hirohito could be the source of constraints for *Asahi Shimbun* since the Allied occupation force had taken over authority. However, the newly emerged theme for *Asahi Shimbun*, the reconstruction of Japan, accorded with the Allied postwar occupation policy in Japan.

Treatment of the New York Times. MacArthur in Japan was described as a national hero in a series of articles in *The New York Times*. Its treatment of the Allied landings in Japan, General MacArthur, and related issues were not only positive but patriotic.

On August 30, 1945, *The New York Times* was headlined: "M'Arthur [sic] in Japan; Yokosuka is Taken." It carried a picture of the first group of American soldiers in Japan

with the caption: "Our marines land on the soil of Japan." A victorious parade of American soldiers was reported. *The New York Times* quoted MacArthur's comments: "'Well, we got here, didn't we?' the general said, beaming as he recognized familiar faces among the surging crowd of officers and soldiers. . . . he said everything seemed to be 'going splendidly.'" American journalists had already arrived in Japan prior to MacArthur's arrival and had prepared for the news gathering. *The New York Times* reported the Allied Force and MacArthur in Japan on a daily basis.

Once the war ended, however, Pearl Harbor became an issue again. On the same day of MacArthur's arrival in Japan, *The New York Times* carried the Army and Navy report on Pearl Harbor concerning who was responsible for the unpreparedness. Once the prisoners of war in Japan were released, the harsh Japanese treatment of them became another issue.

On September 2, *The New York Times* reported on the treaty signed by General Douglas MacArthur and Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru. *The New York Times* reported that Shigemitsu signed the surrender articles "on behalf of the Emperor."

In an article entitled "War Comes to End," *The New York Times* eloquently wrote:

Japan surrendered formally and unconditionally to the Allies today in a twenty-minute ceremony which ended just as the sun burst through low-hanging clouds as a shining symbol to a ravaged world now done with war.

Such emotional description was not found in the Manchurian and Pearl Harbor periods. *The New York Times* articles on the Japanese surrender contained a more patriotic tone than the previous periods in part because it reflected the sense of the American relief from the war.

Relationship with the source. *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* presented the coverage of the Allied Force and General MacArthur in a very similar tone; both media positively described MacArthur as a heroic figure and presented a similar perceived reality both for the Japanese and American audience.

The convergence of the previously divided perceived reality perhaps improved the post-war American and Japanese mutual image. However, the situational change did not alter either the Japanese or American collective memories of the Pacific War. In addition to the war memories, the MacArthur's image in postwar Japan emerged as another archetypal image of Americans both for Japanese and Americans.

The convergence of the image indicated another problem: Both media were controlled by the same news source and the power relationship with the source. Insofar as the pressure from the news source exists, the media coverage is always constrained by the power relationship with the news source, and the constraint gives news some propagandistic attributes. The surrender ceremony can be understood as what Boorstin (1961) called the *pseudoevent* which was consciously aimed at being covered by the media and attempts to create a preferred image for the target audience. The target of the September 2 surrender ceremony was both American and Japanese audience.

CHAPTER 6

PROPAGANDISTIC ATTRIBUTES IN THE MEDIA:

A QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS

This chapter addressed the similarities and differences of propagandistic attributes between *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* in a quantitative content analysis based on five thematic categories: authoritarianism; patriotic appeal; self-image; enemy image; and morale manipulation. It also examined change over time during the following periods: Period 1, Manchurian Incident Period; Period 2, Pre-Pearl Harbor Period; Period 3, Post-Pearl Harbor Period; and Period 4, Surrender Ceremony Period. The operational definitions were provided in Chapter 3. A total of 746 stories were coded, of which *Asahi Shimbun* accounted for 455; and *The New York Times*, 291.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was rated by five-scales: high libertarian; libertarian; neither libertarian nor authoritarian; authoritarian; and high authoritarian.

However, the first two categories were discarded as high libertarian and libertarian were not observed in the sample.

Table 2 shows that, overall, *Asahi Shimbun* carried a significantly higher number of stories that were coded as authoritarian than *The New York Times*. Although the stories coded as authoritarian were most dominant in *Asahi Shimbun*, those coded as neither libertarian nor authoritarian were most dominant in *The New York Times*.

As shown in Figure 1, although no stories for *The New York Times* were coded as high authoritarian in the Manchurian Incident Period and the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period,

Table 2

Percentage of Authoritarianism Level Categories
in The New York Times and Asahi Shimbun

Authoritarianism Level	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)	Total (N=746)
Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian	52%	19%	32%
Authoritarian	43	63	55
High Authoritarian	5	18	13

$$\chi^2(2, N=746)=103.10, p<.0001$$

about 10% of the *Times* stories were rated as high authoritarian in the Post-Pearl Harbor Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period.

As shown in Figure 2, although *Asahi Shimbun* carried

Figure 1

Percentage of Authoritarianism Level Categories and Change Over Time in The New York Times

$$\chi^2(6, N=746)=58.10, p<.0001$$

Figure 2

Percentage of Authoritarianism Level Categories and
Change Over Time in Asahi Shimbun

$\chi^2(6, N=746)=97.31, p<.0001$

high authoritarian stories throughout the four periods, the percentage of the high authoritarian stories significantly increased at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period.

Table 3 shows that the overall means for authoritarianism were 3.52 for *The New York Times* and 4.00 for *Asahi Shimbun* on a scale in which neither libertarian nor authoritarian was coded as 3, authoritarian as 4, and high authoritarianism as 5. However, the authoritarianism means changed significantly in both papers according to the time periods. The authoritarianism means for the Manchurian Incident Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period indicated a significant difference between the two papers, but those for the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods were not significantly different.

Overall, as shown in Figure 3, *Asahi Shimbun* carried a higher level of authoritarianism than *The New York Times*, but the increases and decreases showed a similar pattern. In both papers, the level of authoritarianism was relatively low at the Manchurian Incident Period, but it gradually increased in the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period and peaked in the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. It decreased slightly in the Surrender Ceremony Period.

For the most part, the difference in authoritarianism between *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* held for page

Table 3

Authoritarianism Means and Change Over Time

	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun	<i>p</i>
	(<i>n</i> =291)	(<i>n</i> =455)	
All Periods	3.52	4.00	<.001
Period 1	(<i>n</i> =57)	(<i>n</i> =104)	
Manchurian Incident	3.11	3.76	<.001
Period 2	(<i>n</i> =78)	(<i>n</i> =105)	
Pre-Pearl Harbor	3.46	3.84	n.s.
Period 3	(<i>n</i> =77)	(<i>n</i> =116)	
Post-Pearl Harbor	3.83	4.45	n.s.
Period 4	(<i>n</i> =79)	(<i>n</i> =130)	
Surrender Ceremony	3.58	3.91	<.01
<i>F</i>	<.0001	<.0001	
<i>F</i> -Value	20.61	37.55	

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian as 4, and High Authoritarian as 5.

Figure 3

Authoritarianism Means and Change Over Time
in The New York Times and Asahi Shimbun

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian as 4, and High Authoritarian as 5.

one stories but not for editorials. This overall result should be noted with caution as this tendency changed according to the time periods; however, the authoritarianism means of all page one stories indicated a significant difference between *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* at $p<.001$, while the means for all editorials showed a similar authoritarianism level between the two papers.

This tendency was evident particularly in the Manchurian Incident Period: The authoritarianism means for *Asahi* page one stories were significantly higher than the *Times* page one stories ($p<.001$), while the authoritarianism means for the editorials were not significantly different. The significant difference of the authoritarian means for page one stories indicated that the objective journalism standards of *The New York Times* could have worked as a safeguard against high authoritarianism. The result of the qualitative content analysis in Chapter 5 indicated that the presence of objectivity was a major difference between the page one stories of the two newspapers: It especially functioned well in the Manchurian Incident Period.

The U. S.-related news in *Asahi Shimbun* and Japan-related news in *The New York Times* carried a significantly higher level of authoritarianism than the other war news including that related to Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, and other nations. The mean for Japan-related news in *The*

New York Times was 3.67, which was significantly higher than 3.37, the mean for other war news. The means for *Asahi Shimbun* showed a similar tendency: U. S.-related news in *Asahi Shimbun* carried a higher authoritarianism mean than other war news including the news on China, Germany, Italy, Russia, Britain, and other nations.

However, these results should be considered with caution as the sample for this study was purposively selected with the focus of three critical events of Japanese-American relations. Therefore, the result cannot be generalized as a tendency for coverage of the Japanese-American relations to be more authoritarian; rather, what the result implies is that authoritarianism is event-driven. The sample items for this study included the news from the Atlantic theater of World War II, but the sample periods did not cover major events in the Atlantic. The higher authoritarianism in the U. S.-related news in *Asahi Shimbun* and Japan-related news in *The New York Times* can be understood as the short-term effect of the critical events in the Pacific such as the Manchurian Incident and Pearl Harbor.

Table 4 compares the percentage of the propaganda technique, *testimonial and transfer*, in the total sample of *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. The technique was observed in 18% of the total *Asahi* samples: It was significantly higher than the 9% observed in *The New York*

Table 4

Percentage of Stories in Which Testimonial and Transfer Were
Used and Not Used

Testimonial and Transfer	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)	Total (N=746)
Used	9%	18%	14%
Not Used	91	82	86

$$\chi^2(1, N=746)=12.35, p<.001$$

Table 5

Authoritarianism Means by Testimonial and Transfer Usage

Testimonial and Transfer	Levels of Authoritarianism		
	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)	Total (N=746)
Used	4.20	4.46	4.40
Not Used	3.46	3.90	3.71
p*	<.001	<.05	n.s.

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian as 4, and High Authoritarian as 5.

*p-value was calculated by t-test.

Times.

As shown in Table 5, the usage of *testimonial* and *transfer* showed a positive relationship with authoritarianism. The authoritarianism of the subgroup in which *testimonial* and *transfer* were used was significantly higher than the subgroup in which it was not used. The authoritarianism between the former and latter subgroups indicated a significant difference at $p < .001$ for *The New York Times*, and $p < .05$ for *Asahi Shimbun*.

Patriotic Appeal

Patriotic Appeals were observed in 81% of the total sample of *Asahi Shimbun* and 64% of *The New York Times*: It was significantly different between the two media at $p < .0001$.

Figure 4 illustrates the percentage of stories in which patriotic appeals were observed and its change over time periods. The number of stories containing patriotic appeals increased in the Post-Pearl Harbor Period in both media, up to 97% for *Asahi Shimbun* and 84% for *The New York Times*. The increases and decreases in patriotic appeal showed a curve that was shaped very similar to the authoritarianism curve, which peaked at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period (see also Figure 3).

Editorials carried a significantly higher number of patriotic appeals than page one news ($p < .05$). Domestic news

Figure 4

Percentage of Stories in Which Patriotic Appeals Were Observed

$\chi^2(3, n=291)=27.94, p<.0001$ for The New York Times.
 $\chi^2(3, n=455)=25.47, p<.0001$ for Asahi Shimbun.

carried a significantly higher rate of patriotic appeals than international news ($p < .01$). U. S.-Japan related news in both papers carried a similar number of patriotic appeals, as compared with other war-related news.

Table 6 describes the type of patriotic appeals used by *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. The majority of the stories in both papers reflected patriotic appeals by description, but *Asahi Shimbun* appealed to morality at a significantly higher rate than *The New York Times*.

The patriotic appeal type for each paper changed significantly according to the time periods. As shown in Figure 5, although no stories for *The New York Times* used

Table 6

Percentage of Patriotic Appeal Types Used
in The New York Times and Asahi Shimbun

Patriotic Appeal Type	New York Times ($n=185$)	Asahi Shimbun ($n=368$)	Total ($n=553$)
By Description	80%	68%	72%
By Necessity	16	16	16
By Morality	4	16	12

$$\chi^2(2, n=553)=18.34, p<.001$$

the patriotic appeal by morality in the Manchurian Incident Period and Surrender Ceremony Period, they did appear in the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods. Figure 6 illustrates that *Asahi Shimbun* engaged in patriotic appeals by morality at a significantly higher rate in the Post-Pearl

Figure 5

Percentages for Three Types of Patriotic Appeals
in The New York Times

$$\chi^2(6, n=185)=20.64, p<.01$$

Harbor Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period.

Table 7 shows a relationship between the types of patriotic appeal and the level of authoritarianism: The appeal by morality carried the highest level of

Figure 6

Percentages for Three Types of Patriotic Appeals
in Asahi Shimbun

$$\chi^2(6, n=368)=46.09, p<.0001$$

authoritarianism, the appeal by necessity a moderate level, and the appeal by description the lowest level of authoritarianism. The appeal by morality subgroup in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* contained a similar high level of authoritarianism.

The appeals by necessity and morality were more frequently observed in editorials than on page one. Domestic news contained more appeals by necessity and morality than

Table 7

Types of Patriotic Appeal by Authoritarianism

Types of Patriotic Appeal	Levels of Authoritarianism		p
	New York Times (n=185)	Asahi Shimbun (n=368)	
By Description	3.68	4.04	<.001
By Necessity	3.90	4.11	<.05
By Morality	4.57	4.75	n.s.
F	<.001	<.0001	
F-Value	9.95	65.63	

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian was 4, and High Authoritarian was 5.

international news.

Table 8 shows that both *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* similarly used the propaganda technique, *bandwagon*. In both *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*, the *bandwagon* technique was used with the appeal by necessity and morality at a significantly higher rate than the appeal by description. In both papers, the *bandwagon* technique was used more frequently in editorials than on page one.

Table 9 shows that the *bandwagon* technique was significantly related to a higher level of authoritarianism: It implies a positive relationship between use of the *bandwagon* technique and authoritarianism.

Table 8

Percentage of Stories in Which Bandwagon Was Used and Not Used

Bandwagon	New York Times (n=184)	Asahi Shimbun (n=368)	Total (n=552)
Used	17%	20%	19%
Not Used	83	80	81

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian was 4, and High Authoritarian was 5.

$\chi^2(1, n=552)=0.72, n.s.$

Figure 7 illustrates that the use of the *bandwagon* technique changed over time. It increased the most from the Manchurian Incident Period to the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period in *The New York Times* and the most from the Post-Pearl Harbor Period to the Surrender Ceremony Period in *Asahi Shimbun*. The *bandwagon* curve differed from the authoritarianism and patriotic curves (see also Figure 3 and 4): The *bandwagon* technique was used in both wartime and peacetime.

Table 9

Bandwagon Usage by Authoritarianism

Bandwagon	Levels of Authoritarianism		
	New York Times (<i>n</i> =184)	Asahi Shimbun (<i>n</i> =368)	Total (<i>n</i> =552)
Used	3.94	4.35	4.23
Not Used	3.71	4.12	3.98
<i>p</i>	<.05	<.001	<.001
<i>F</i>	5.04	19.16	13.09

Note. Neither Libertarian nor Authoritarian was coded as 3, Authoritarian was 4, and High Authoritarian was 5.

Figure 7

Percentage of Bandwagon Usage and Change Over Time

Table 10

Percentage of Positive and Neutral Self-Image Presentation

	New York Times (n=269)	Asahi Shimbun (n=437)	Total (n=706)
Positive	50%	63%	58%
Neutral	50	37	42

$$\chi^2(1, n=706)=10.70, p<.01$$

Self-Image

Self-image was presented in 92% of the total sample of *Asahi Shimbun* and 96% of *The New York Times*: The difference was significant at $p < .05$. Figure 8 illustrates the percentage of self-image presented in stories and change over the time periods. The self-image presentation increased most at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period in both papers, and the increase and decrease of the self-image presentation showed a curve that was shaped similar to the authoritarianism and patriotic appeal curves (see Figure 3 and 4).

Table 10 shows that self-images were presented either as positive or neutral in both papers. Although only one *Asahi* story was coded as negative, the case was recoded as a missing observation because the number was too small. *Asahi Shimbun* presented self-image more positively than neutrally, while *The New York Times* presented half of it as positive and another half as neutral.

Table 11 shows that the self-image means change over time periods: The average mean for all the periods was 1.50 for *The New York Times* and 1.38 for *Asahi Shimbun*. During the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods, *Asahi Shimbun* presented a positive self-image at a significantly higher rate than did *The New York Times*. However, the self-image means for the two papers were similar in the Manchurian Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period.

Figure 8

Percentage of Stories in Which Self-Image Was Presented and
Change Over Time

$\chi^2(3, n=291)=20.77, p<.001$ for The New York Times.

$\chi^2(3, n=455)=20.94, p<.001$ for Asahi Shimbun.

Table 11

Self-Image Means and Change Over Time

	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun	<i>p</i>
	(<i>n</i> =269)	(<i>n</i> =437)	
All Periods	1.50	1.38	<.001
Period 1	(<i>n</i> =45)	(<i>n</i> =95)	
Manchurian Incident	1.64	1.41	n.s.
Period 2	(<i>n</i> =72)	(<i>n</i> =96)	
Pre-Pearl Harbor	1.61	1.48	<.05
Period 3	(<i>n</i> =76)	(<i>n</i> =116)	
Post-Pearl Harbor	1.32	1.12	<.001
Period 4	(<i>n</i> =76)	(<i>n</i> =130)	
Surrender Ceremony	1.49	1.50	n.s.
<i>F</i>	<.001	<.0001	
<i>F</i> -Value	6.21	16.52	

Note. Positive was coded as 1, and Neutral as 2.

Domestic news presented a higher self-image in both papers than international news: The difference was significant at $p < .001$ for *The New York Times* and $p < .01$ for *Asahi Shimbun*. However, the self-image means were not significantly different between the domestic and international news in either paper. Editorials described the self-images more positively than page one stories: The difference was significant in both papers at $p < .001$.

Self-image was positively presented in the subgroups in which propagandistic attributes such as *testimonial* and *transfer*, patriotic appeals, and the *bandwagon* technique were observed. There were significant differences between the propagandistic attributes of positive groups and negative groups at $p < .001$. This shows a positive relationship between these propagandistic attributes and the positive self-image presentation.

Table 12 shows the type of positive self-image descriptions used by each newspaper. More than half of the positive images for each media were presented by self-effort descriptions. *The New York Times* used the propaganda techniques of *plain folks* and *glittering generalities* at a significantly higher rate than *Asahi Shimbun*. *Asahi Shimbun* tended to present a positive self-image on the rationale of good leaders or cultural supremacy that, the Japanese

believed, was inherent in the traditional Japanese Imperial system.

The *plain folks* support type was the least authoritarianism in both papers, 3.62 for *The New York Times* and 3.95 for *Asahi Shimbun*. *Glittering generalities* and God/cultural supremacy types tended to carry the highest level of authoritarianism: 4.87 for *Asahi Shimbun* was the highest (God/cultural supremacy type) and 4.35 for *The New York Times* was the highest (*glittering generalities* type). The differences of the authoritarianism means between

Table 12

Percentage of Self-Image Types in Positive Image Presentation

Self-Image Type	New York Times (n=134)	Asahi Shimbun (n=275)	Total (n=409)
Self-Effort	49%	57%	54%
Plain Folks Support	16	7	10
With Int'l Allies	11	10	10
Good Leaders	5	11	9
Glittering Generalities	13	5	7
God/Supremacy	7	11	10

$$\chi^2(5, n=409)=21.93, p<.001$$

the *plain folks* type and *glittering generalities* or god/cultural supremacy type were both significant at $p < .001$.

Figure 9 shows the percentage of the *plain folks* usage in self-image presentation and change over time. *The New York Times* used the technique at a significantly higher level than *Asahi Shimbun*. The *plain folks* usage in *Asahi Shimbun* did not change significantly throughout the periods. The result implies that the *plain folks* was used both in wartime and peacetime, particularly by *The New York Times*.

Figure 9

Percentage of Plain Folks Usage in Self-Image Presentation and Change Over Time

Figure 10 shows that *glittering generalities* for *The New York Times* most increased in the Surrender Ceremony Period. *Glittering generalities* tended to have a higher authoritarianism than other self-image types: A relatively high level of authoritarianism was observed in *The New York Times* during this period.

Figure 11 shows that *Asahi Shimbun* presented the positive self-image on the rationale of good leaders at a significantly higher rate during the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period. *Asahi Shimbun* favorably described the Japanese political leaders in the Japanese-American negotiations and presented a positive self-image based on the good leadership.

However, Figure 12 shows that *Asahi Shimbun* started to

Figure 10

Percentage of Glittering Generalities Usage in Self-Image Presentation

present the rationale of cultural supremacy after Pearl Harbor: The media's justification of the state's policy shifted from the concrete political level to an abstract level involving collective cultural identity. The ethnocentrism based on historical heritage was emphasized along with the Emperor as an *omnibus symbol*. The good leaders and cultural supremacy types can be interpreted as a continuity because of the dominant authoritarianism of *Asahi Shimbun*.

Figure 11

Percentage of Good Leaders Type in Self-Image Presentation and Change Over Time

Figure 12

Percentage of God/Cultural Supremacy Type in Self-ImagePresentation

Table 13

Percentage of Stories in Which Value-Laden Words Were Used

Value-Laden Words	New York Times (n=127)	Asahi Shimbun (n=274)	Total (n=401)
Happiness, Peace	6%	10%	9%
Liberty, Freedom, Democracy	12	1	4
No Such Words	82	89	87

$$\chi^2(2, n=401)=23.97, p<.0001$$

Prior to Pearl Harbor, *The New York Times* tended to stress cultural supremacy based on a relatively abstract sense of ethnocentrism or national identity of *being Americans*. However, it started to stress more conceptual *glittering generalities* such as democracy after Pearl Harbor. However, these two types of self-image can be understood as a continuity based on the traditional values anchored in the American society.

Table 13 shows that *The New York Times* used value-laden words such as happiness, peace, liberty, freedom, and democracy in the self-image presentation more frequently than *Asahi Shimbun*. Of these words, *The New York Times* most preferred the term democracy, and *Asahi Shimbun* peace. Gans (1979) suggested that American news contains bias such as ethnocentrism and altruistic democracy, and the results of this study support his findings.

Enemy Image

Enemy image was presented in 67% of the total sample of *The New York Times* and 77% of *Asahi Shimbun*: The latter was significantly higher than the former at $p < .01$.

Figure 13 illustrates the percentage of the enemy image presentation in the total sample and its change over time. Only 25% of the *Times* stories presented an enemy image in the Manchurian Incident Period, but the rate

Figure 13

Percentage of Stories in Which Enemy Image Was Presented and
Change Over Time

$\chi^2(3, n=291)=70.59, p<.0001$ for The New York Times.

$\chi^2(3, n=455)=36.45, p<.0001$ for Asahi Shimbun.

dramatically increased to 92% at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period, with *Asahi Shimbun* showing a similar high percentage of 91%.

The increase and decrease in the enemy image showed an almost similar shaped curve to that of authoritarianism and patriotic appeal. However, the exception for *Asahi Shimbun* was the Manchurian Period. Many negative images of the Chinese were presented in *Asahi Shimbun* at the period immediately after the Manchurian Incident: The event-driven element increased the rate of enemy image presentation.

Table 14 shows that the enemy image was mostly presented as neutral or negative in both media. However, overall, *The New York Times* tended to describe the enemy more negatively

Table 14

Percentage of Positive, Neutral, and Negative Descriptions
in the Enemy Image Presentation

	New York Times (n=194)	Asahi Shimbun (n=348)	Total (n=542)
Positive	1%	8%	5%
Neutral	57	62	61
Negative	42	30	34

$$\chi^2(2, n=542)=18.76, p<.0001$$

than *Asahi Shimbun*. Eight percent of *Asahi Shimbun* stories positively described the enemy and showed an ambivalent feeling against the enemy: Most of the positive enemy images appeared during the Surrender Ceremony Period as *Asahi Shimbun* favorably described Douglas MacArthur and his staff.

Table 15 describes the significant change in the enemy image means between the media and time periods. In the Manchurian Incident Period, *Asahi Shimbun* described the enemy image more negatively than *The New York Times*: The majority of the negative images were those of the Chinese. In the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period, *The New York Times* described the enemy image more negatively than *Asahi Shimbun*. However, no significant difference was found between the average means for all the periods.

There was a general tendency for *Asahi Shimbun* to describe the enemy as a friend more frequently than *The New York Times*. Thirty-three percent of the total sample of *Asahi Shimbun* described the enemy as a friend, while only 10% of *The New York Times* stories regarded the enemy as a friend: The difference was significant at $p < .0001$.

Figure 14 shows that 87% of the enemy image presentations for *Asahi Shimbun* in the Surrender Ceremony Period regarded the enemy as a friend, perhaps because the United States, the former enemy of Japan, led the postwar

Table 15

Enemy Image Means and Change Over Time

	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun	<i>p</i>
	(<i>n</i> =194)	(<i>n</i> =348)	
All Periods	2.42	2.22	n.s.
Period 1	(<i>n</i> =14)	(<i>n</i> =86)	
Manchurian Incident	2.07	2.30	<.001
Period 2	(<i>n</i> =50)	(<i>n</i> =80)	
Pre-Pearl Harbor	2.46	2.35	<.05
Period 3	(<i>n</i> =71)	(<i>n</i> =105)	
Post-Pearl Harbor	2.62	2.33	n.s.
Period 4	(<i>n</i> =59)	(<i>n</i> =77)	
Surrender Ceremony	2.22	1.84	n.s.
<i>F</i>	<.0001	<.0001	
<i>F</i> -Value	10.45	16.27	

Note. Positive was coded as 1, Neutral as 2, Negative as 3.

Figure 14

Percentage of Enemy-as-a-Friend Image Presentation and
Change Over Time

$\chi^2(3, n=193)=19.42, p<.001$ for The New York Times.

$\chi^2(3, n=348)=149.52, p<.0001$ for Asahi Shimbun.

occupation. In contrast, only 22% of enemy image presentations in *The New York Times* regarded the enemy as a friend.

However, the enemy-as-a-friend image in *Asahi Shimbun* cannot be interpreted literally--that the media regarded the former enemy as a friend. As discussed in Chapter 5, the information in Japan during the Surrender Ceremony Period was about to be controlled by the public relations programs of the American occupation force. Given this situation, the enemy-as-a-friend image in *Asahi Shimbun* is rather understood as a manifestation and continuation of the same authoritarianism of the newspaper as that of wartime.

Table 16 describes the type of negative enemy image descriptions. The similarity between the two papers was that

Table 16

Percentage of Enemy Type in Enemy Image Presentation

Enemy Image Type	New York Times (n=79)	Asahi Shimbun (n=106)	Total (n=185)
Not Understanding Us	4%	19%	12%
Damage Plain Folks	65	69	67
Bad Ideal & Nature	32	12	21

$$\chi^2(2, n=185)=16.67, p<.001$$

both the negative enemy image was described as those damaging *plain folks* in almost two-thirds of the total sample. The difference was that *The New York Times* described the enemy as having an inherently bad ideal or nature more frequently than *Asahi Shimbun*.

Figure 15 describes the percentage of the *plain folks* type in the negative enemy image presentation and its change

Figure 15

Percentage of Damaging Plain Folks Type in Enemy Image Presentation and Change Over Time

over time. It dramatically decreased at the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods and showed a reversed shape to such curves as of authoritarianism, patriotic appeal, and self-image that increased most at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. The *plain folks* in self-image showed a similar curve to the *plain folks* in enemy image: This implies that the *plain folks* was used both in wartime and peacetime as well as the *bandwagon* technique.

Figure 16 illustrates the percentage of the bad ideal and nature type in the enemy image presentation and its change over time. This enemy image type dramatically

Figure 16

Percentage of Bad Ideal & Nature Type in Enemy Image Presentation

increased in *The New York Times* during the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods.

Table 17 contrasts the self-image means difference in the story in which the enemy image was described as the *plain folks* or bad ideal/nature types. In both papers, the self-image tended to be described more positively when the article described the enemy as inherently having bad ideals or nature.

Table 18 shows that *The New York Times* (15%) was more likely to describe the enemy in such terms as barbarians, madmen, brutal humans, or animals than *Asahi Shimbun* (5%). Although Dower (1986) regarded the Japanese-American war as a race war in which racial and cultural differences between the two states escalated the brutality, these subhuman figures in the two papers in part supported the racial prejudicial element of the war.

Dower also pointed out the Japanese racial prejudice against Americans appearing in some Japanese magazines. However, insofar as the *Asahi Shimbun* sample for this study was concerned, most of the subhuman images were not American images but Chinese images. Most of the subhuman figures in *The New York Times* were images of the Japanese, but overall explicit name calling symbols such as Japs or Monkeys as appeared in World War II combat films (Basinger, 1986) were not found in this American elite newspaper.

Table 17

Types of Enemy Image by Self-Image Means

Enemy Image Type	Self-Image Means	
	New York Times (n=79)	Asahi Shimbun (n=106)
Damaging Plain Folks	1.35	1.14
Bad Nature & Ideal	1.21	1.31
<i>T</i>	<.001	<.001
<i>T</i> -Value	7.71	6.48

Note. Positive self-image was coded as 1, and neutral as 2.

Table 18

Percentage of Stories in Which Enemy Image Was Described as Subhuman Figures

	New York Times (n=82)	Asahi Shimbun (n=105)	Total (n=187)
Subhuman Figures	15%	5%	9%
No Such Figures	85	95	91

$\chi^2(2, n=187)=7.48, p<.05$

Morale Manipulation

Morale manipulation was observed in 82% of the total sample of *The New York Times* and 94% of that of *Asahi Shimbun*: The difference was significant at $p < .0001$. Figure 17 illustrates the change of morale manipulations over the time periods. The increase and decrease of the morale manipulations for *The New York Times* showed a similar curve to the authoritarianism, patriotic appeal, self-image with the peak at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. However, the curve for *Asahi Shimbun* was relatively flat.

The morale manipulation was observed similarly in page one stories and editorials, domestic, and international news, and the U. S.-Japan related news and non-Japanese American related news.

No significant relationship between morale manipulation and authoritarianism was observed. However, as shown in Tables 19 and 20, the result showed a relationship between morale manipulation and self and enemy images. The self-image was presented more positively and the enemy image was presented more negatively in the subgroups in which morale manipulation was observed. The result implied that morale manipulation and the self and enemy image presentation combined to form a subtler type of propaganda, which is not necessarily related to the level of authoritarianism.

Figure 17

Percentage of Stories in Which Morale Manipulation Was Observed

$\chi^2(3, n=291)=54.35, p<.0001$ for The New York Times.
 $\chi^2(3, n=455)=11.82, p<.01$ for Asahi Shimbun.

Table 19

Morale Manipulation by Self-Image

Morale Manipulation	Self-Image Means	
	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)
Observed	1.45	1.35
Not Observed	1.79	1.84
p*	<.001	<.001

Note. Positive self-image was coded as 1, and neutral as 2.

*p-value was calculated by t-test.

Table 20

Morale Manipulation by Enemy Image

Morale Manipulation	Enemy Image Means	
	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)
Observed	2.45	2.23
Not Observed	2.06	2.00
p*	<.001	<.001

Note. Positive was coded as 1, neutral as 2, negative as 3.

*p-value was calculated by t-test.

The tone of warning similarly appeared in the self and enemy images, but the tone of encouragement tended to appear more with the self-image than with the enemy image.

Figure 18 shows that the tone of encouragement in *Asahi Shimbun* significantly increased at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period and the Surrender Ceremony Period. The tone of

Figure 18

Percentage of Stories in Which Encouragement Was Observed

$\chi^2(3, n=238)=21.92, p<.0001$ for The New York Times.

$\chi^2(3, n=427)=93.10, p<.0001$ for Asahi Shimbun.

encouragement for *The New York Times* remained at nearly a third of the sample in the Pre-Pearl and the Post-Pearl Harbor Periods but increased up to 64% in the Surrender Ceremony Period. The curve showed a left-down to right-up line, similar to the *glittering generalities* and *bandwagon* curves (see Figure 7 and 10).

Although the tone of encouragement was operationally defined as a surface manifestation of what George (1959) called anticipatory and preparatory propaganda, the result implies a positive relationship between the anticipatory or preparatory propaganda and such propaganda techniques as *glittering generalities* and the *bandwagon* technique.

Morale manipulation against the enemy was recorded in a

Table 21

Percentage of Stories in Which Warning of Propaganda Was Observed

Warning of Propaganda	New York Times (n=291)	Asahi Shimbun (n=455)	Total (N=746)
Observed	3%	4%	3%
Not Observed	97	96	97

$$\chi^2(1, N=746)=1.33, \text{ n.s.}$$

few cases, perhaps because it was difficult to discern. However, this difficulty indicates that the propaganda against the enemy would be also barely attributable even in daily life either for the allied or opponent's audience.

Table 21 shows that the warning of propaganda appeared in only from 3-4% of the total sample in both newspapers. The number increased slightly at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period in both papers, but there was not a significant difference between the two papers. The warning was only observed against enemy propaganda in the two papers. The warning against the nation in which the newspaper was published was not observed in either media. As Fortner (1993) argued, providing such a perception to the domestic audience was an important purpose of propaganda.

Overview of Findings

The results show that the five thematic categories were closely intertwined with each other and can be seen as dimensions of the propaganda phenomenon. The thematic categories were constructed on the basis of propaganda theories that do not directly deal with the media content; however, the results indicate that the attributes of propaganda are found by examining the media content. The findings of the quantitative content analysis of this study were as follows:

- (1) The outbreak and expansion of the war increased the number of propagandistic attributes in the newspapers, but such attributes as *bandwagon* and *plain folks* were not affected by the war factor and were observed both in wartime and peacetime.
- (2) The patriotic appeal factor, closely intertwined with the authoritarianism and self-image factors, combined to form a type of propaganda, while the enemy image factor formed another type of propaganda.
- (3) Propaganda mobilized different *omnibus symbols* according to cultural factors but used the same logic despite cultural differences.

Wartime vs. peacetime. Some propagandistic attributes increased with the outbreak or expansion of war, but some attributes were not affected by the war factor.

The increase and decrease of authoritarianism, patriotic appeal, self-image, enemy image, and morale manipulation propaganda showed a similar pattern in both media: These propagandistic attributes significantly increased in Period 3, the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. The Post-Pearl Harbor Period offered a wartime sample both for *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*: The outbreak and expansion of war clearly increased the amount of propaganda.

The increase of the propagandistic attributes in wartime indicated a close relationship between war and propaganda

that has been long suggested in past research. Although few studies have quantitatively analyzed it, this study empirically confirmed the relationship.

If only the wartime sample of the Post-Pearl Harbor Period is examined, as Table 22 shows, propagandistic attributes in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* are similar in all the thematic categories except patriotic appeal. *Asahi Shimbun* carried a significantly higher number of patriotic appeals than *The New York Times* in the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. Although the reason that increased the patriotic appeal in

Table 22

Similarities and Differences in Five Thematic Categories
Between The New York Times and Asahi Shimbun During the
Post-Pearl Harbor Period

Thematic Categories	<i>p</i>
Authoritarianism	n.s.
Patriotic Appeal	<.01
Self-Image	n.s.
Enemy Image	n.s.
Morale Manipulation	n.s.

Note. T-test was used for authoritarianism.
Chi-square was used for other thematic categories.

Asahi Shimbun was not certain, it can be a long-term effect of war.

For *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan was at war in three out of the four sample periods: the Manchurian Incident Period; the Pre-Pearl Harbor Period; and the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. For *The New York Times*, the United States was at war only in one sample period, the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. For both papers, the nations were at the end of war in the Surrender Ceremony Period. The significantly higher rate of patriotic appeals in *Asahi Shimbun* may have reflected a long-term effect of war.

Despite the similarities in the wartime sample of the Post-Pearl Harbor Period, if the sample is compared throughout the four periods, the propagandistic attributes were more frequently found in *Asahi Shimbun* than in *The New York Times*: *Asahi Shimbun* was more authoritarian than *The New York Times*, contained more patriotic appeals and morale manipulation, and described the self as more positive and the enemy as more negative.

The increase and decrease of these propagandistic attributes showed the similar curves with the peaks at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period. However, some propagandistic attributes such as *plain folks* and *bandwagon* showed different patterns. The *plain folks* and *bandwagon* were not

affected by the war factor: These attributes were used in the newspapers regardless of the nations' war engagement.

For example, the frequencies of the *plain folks* both in self and enemy image for *The New York Times* dramatically decreased in the Post-Pearl Harbor Period when other propagandistic attributes increased: It indicates that the *plain folks* was a peacetime persuasion logic for *The New York Times*.

The frequencies of the *plain folks* in enemy image for *Asahi Shimbun* similarly decreased at the Post-Pearl Harbor Period, but the *plain folks* in self-image did not change significantly throughout the time periods: *Asahi Shimbun* used the *plain folks* technique in both wartime and peacetime.

The *bandwagon* technique, similarly used in both *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times*, also showed a different pattern. This indicated that the *bandwagon* can be used in both wartime and peacetime.

The result empirically confirmed that war increased a variety of propagandistic attributes in the newspapers; however, the fact that some propaganda attributes were not affected by the war factor indicates that propaganda is pervasive not only in wartime but also in peacetime.

Patriotic appeal type vs. enemy image type. As shown in Table 23, factor analysis indicated that two factors are

dominant in the five thematic categories of this study. Authoritarianism, patriotic appeal, and self-image were closely intertwined with one another and combined to form Factor 1. The enemy image categories emerged as Factor 2. Morale manipulation loaded on both Factor 1 and Factor 2. Figure 19 illustrates the relationship between the two factors in the five thematic categories.

These two factors can be also understood as types of propaganda. This study called Factor 1 *patriotic appeal type* since the key factor was patriotic appeal, and Factor 2 *enemy image type*. The propagandistic attributes in the patriotic appeal and self-image categories indicated positive relationship with authoritarianism. However, no significant relationship was found between authoritarianism

Table 23

Factor Loadings on Five Thematic Categories for Total Sample

Thematic Categories	Factor 1	Factor 2
Authoritarianism	-.74010	-.22815
Patriotic Appeal	.82480	-.14223
Self-Image	.70399	-.20896
Enemy Image	-.07819	.89843
Morale Manipulation	.48225	.56228

Figure 19

Two Factors in Five Thematic Categories

■ Factor 1 □ Factor 2

and enemy image. This indicates that *enemy image type* can appear regardless of the authoritarianism level.

Patriotic appeal type is a direct type of propaganda in which the propagandist persuades the audience in an orthodox fashion. This model frequently has a positive relationship with authoritarianism and self-image presentation and directly appeals to the audience's morality anchoring in the society, using such logical devices as *testimonial* and *transfer* and *bandwagon*.

Enemy image type is an indirect type of propaganda in which the propagandist first mobilizes hatred against the enemy and, by doing so, attempts to mobilize a large number of people, using what Ellul (1965) called the *enemy-victim-scapegoat cycle*. This model appeals to the audience by consciously revealing a black-and-white picture of the self and enemy, using *glittering generalities* symbols for the self and *name calling* symbols for the enemy.

However, the final goal of the *enemy image type* is the same as that of the *patriotic appeal type*, the mobilization of a large number of people. Both types similarly appear in the media and similarly work for the interests of the ruling elites just as the dynamics of propaganda always functions. However, *enemy image type* is a subtler and more sophisticated type of propaganda than *patriotic appeal type*.

Asahi Shimbun used *patriotic appeal type* more than *The New York Times*, and *The New York Times* used *enemy image type* more than *Asahi Shimbun*. However, this can be noted only as a relative tendency. In the Manchurian Incident Period, *Asahi Shimbun* tended to use *enemy image type*, and *The New York Times* tended to use *patriotic appeal type* in the Surrender Ceremony Period. The two types of propaganda are usually mixed in the same media.

Same logic, different symbols. The manipulation of *omnibus symbols* was observed both in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. What Lee (1952) called the logical devices of propaganda, such as *bandwagon*, *testimonial* and *transfer*, and *plain folks*, were all used in both papers. However, the Japanese and American newspapers reacted in a different fashion.

Asahi Shimbun quoted the Imperial Order and justified the war by regarding the Imperial authority as an *omnibus symbol*. The *testimonial* and *transfer* was the most frequently used logical device. *The New York Times* justified the war with such *glittering generalities* as democracy or the American Way of Life by regarding these concepts as *omnibus symbols*.

The effective *omnibus symbols* were different according to cultural dispositions; however, the similarity was that each media mobilized what Lasswell (1927) called the

traditional prejudices of the society: The media used the seemingly safest traditional values anchoring the society for the justification of war.

The result suggests that propaganda mobilizes different *omnibus symbols* according to the societal biases anchored in the culture but uses the same logical devices despite cultural differences.

Suggestions for Future Analysis

Based on the findings, the following theoretical hypotheses were developed:

- (1) Logical devices of propaganda such as *plain folks*, *bandwagon*, and *testimonial and transfer* are not affected by the war factor.
- (2) The frequencies of an *omnibus symbol* examined in content analysis of the media are positively related to the frequencies of the symbol examined by survey research of the audience.
- (3) A democratic society uses the *enemy image type* of propaganda more than a totalitarian society.
- (4) A totalitarian society uses the *patriotic appeal type* of propaganda more than a democratic society.

The results indicated that what Lee (1952) called the logical devices of propaganda may not be affected by the war

factor. In this study, such devices as *bandwagon* and *plain folks* were not affected by the outbreak and expansion of the war. Although the amount of *testimonial and transfer* propaganda increased with the war factor, this may have occurred because this study operationally narrowed down the original definition to be more attributable.

This study only attributed the logic of *testimonial and transfer* that occurred within an article but could not attribute that which would have occurred over a series of articles or debates. The logic of the *testimonial and transfer* may occur not only within an article, but also across a series of articles. The problem of coding was how the *testimonial and transfer* can be attributable across a series of articles. However, if once attributable, the logical device of *testimonial and transfer* may not be also affected by the war factor as well as other logical devices such as *bandwagon* and *plain folks*.

The results also indicated that propaganda utilizes different *omnibus symbols* according to cultural dispositions. However, as Lee (1952) suggested, further survey research should be used to examine how the audience perceives those symbols and how the media usage of the symbols and the audience's perceptions are related. Researchers should also examine how the audience's response

is different according to culture. Further research on propaganda in different nations and cultures is also needed.

The results of this study indicated that *enemy image* type of propaganda is more sophisticated than the orthodox *patriotic appeal* type of propaganda and appears despite the level of the authoritarianism. This suggests that democratic societies tend to use the *enemy image* type more than the *patriotic appeal* type. However, further comparative research on other media systems is needed to determine if the findings of this study are applicable in other contexts.

Propaganda and Content Analysis Method

The results of this study also indicated that further revisions of coding categories will be needed. Although the overall intercoder reliability of this study was .80, the morale manipulation category was problematic.

As shown in Table 24, the morale manipulation factor indicated a divergence between *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. The morale manipulation factor in *The New York Times* was more frequently observed with the *patriotic appeal* type. The morale manipulation factor may have been more attributable to the *enemy image* type in *Asahi Shimbun*. The divergence implies a weakness of this thematic category.

The intercoder reliability for the morale manipulation, .69, was the lowest of the five thematic categories. This suggests that the morale manipulation element may not be

suitable for the content analysis method. Although some morale manipulations were clearly attributable, some were difficult to discern because the coding of what George (1959) called the *logic of situational change* requires some historical knowledge about a series of events of the time, and the difference in the understanding of the *situational change* affects the coding decisions. This also implies that the effectiveness of morale manipulation propaganda will differ among the individuals even in real life.

George argued that the examination of *anticipatory and preparatory propaganda* does not suit the quantitative approach; therefore, this study attempted to measure it by simplifying George's original definitions. However, the attempt to measure the surface manifestation of the *anticipatory and preparatory propaganda* still presented a similar methodological problem. This study suggests that survey research should be combined to measure the morale manipulation factor: how the audience understands the situational change or *meaning* of an event.

However, the intercoder reliability for the enemy image category, .85, was the highest of the five thematic categories. This indicated that the enemy image factor was the most appropriate for the content analysis method. The factor analysis also indicated that enemy image was the strongest factor of the five thematic categories. The self-

image factor had an alpha of .80 in the reliability test, which also indicated its suitability for the content analysis method.

This suggests that content analysis can be a useful method to measure more detailed content of self and enemy image factors in mass media. Although this study could not specify what types of subhuman enemy image are presented in the sample papers, for example, future researchers could examine this question. These subhuman figures can be found more often in newspaper features, or magazines than in page one stories in elite newspapers.

Table 24

Factor Loadings on Five Thematic Categories
for The New York Times and Asahi Shimbun

Thematic Categories	Patriotic Appeal Type (Factor 1)		Enemy Image Type (Factor 2)	
	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun	New York Times	Asahi Shimbun
Authoritarianism	-.72473	-.78417	-.18449	-.12800
Patriotic Appeal	.79132	.85588	-.00363	.09814
Self-Image	.60964	.68400	-.58275	-.15405
Enemy Image	.33797	-.20149	.82178	.77730
Morale Manipulation	.73948	.26291	.16890	.71588

CHAPTER 7

MEANING-BUILDING FUNCTION OF PROPAGANDA:

CONCLUSION

This study addressed the problems of propaganda that created mutually divergent perceived realities of World War II in Japan and the United States. It examined the coverage of *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* in a content analysis of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the surrender ceremony in 1945, and compared the coverage with current historical knowledge of these events. The results indicated some critical differences between the Pacific War as an event and the same war as news.

The gap between the event and new was created by propaganda communication processes on both sides. A variety of propagandistic attributes in mass media gradually generated the *meaning* of the events at a societal level as the media provided the critical link between the leaders and

people. The meaning-building function of propaganda provided a slanted logic that made sense of the situational change of these events and finally created two divergent realities of the same war.

A group of propagandists, who were not attributable even among the political decision makers, purposively created the perceived realities but, at the same time, the decision makers conducted the war according to the media-generated reality. Propaganda in the media helped create a mediated reality that were shared by the people and their leaders.

Propagandistic Control

The first research question of this study was what propagandistic framework of information control each nation used. Propagandistic frameworks were observed both in Japan and the United States, but the two states engaged in propaganda with different frameworks under different socio-political situations.

Japan mobilized a state-led, total information control system. The Peace Preservation Law, originally codified as a speech control act against Communism, was gradually expanded to allow government authorities to control almost all the anti-establishment factors. The *thought police*, called *Tokko*, was a formidable weapon for information control.

Schools and educators were also controlled through municipal agencies as the end unit of the central

government. Students were encouraged to respect the Emperor as a divine being. The Imperial Military Reserve Association, a national web of veterans' organizations, developed patriotic campaigns to establish the status of the Japanese militarists at the grassroots level.

Media censorship in Japan was only part of the state's total information control system. Once the Cabinet Information Committee was established in 1936, the agency centralized all the in-coming and out-going information. The Japanese media took the initiative in amplifying the state's policy and appealed to the public's patriotism.

In the United States, none of the government's propaganda agencies had the absolute power of totalitarian regimes because an antagonism against propaganda already existed in the American society. However, journalists, along with poets and writers, were brought into the propaganda program of the Office of War Information and created a new form of American propaganda, using facts as news but arranging it to be effective for propaganda purposes. Two major themes emerged from the OWI campaigns: democracy and the American way of life.

The American mass communicators did not like being overtly controlled, but once information was arranged in the way they liked it--such as in press release and public relations materials--they willingly propagated the nation's

war policy. Hollywood combat films vividly described the enemy image and mobilized hatred against it.

In the United States and Japan, the power vector in what Lang and Lang (1990) called *negotiations* between the government, media, and audience, worked in a different fashion. However, in each nation, the interactive communication processes between the leaders, media, and audience, gradually generated propaganda, as the interactive power relationships in these process of communication between the three actors constrained the nature of news.

Problems of Propaganda

The second research question was how the critical events of the Pacific War were reported and what similarities and differences existed between *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times*. The analysis of these events respectively presented the problems of propaganda.

The analysis of the Manchurian Incident presented the problem of misinformation. The Japanese military communiqué, despite its being misinformation, was disseminated without change in *Asahi Shimbun* and remained as the *reality* for the Japanese audience throughout the war. *The New York Times* first reported the incident based on the same Japanese communiqué, but objective reporting standards led to successful investigation of the misinformation.

The difference in the media performance derived from three factors: the political environment of the media; the relationship to the news source; and the prospective reaction of the audience. The speech environment for *Asahi Shimbun* was strictly controlled by the political system, and the pressure from the news source and the audience was strong. However, the dysfunction of this Japanese elite newspaper led the Japanese people to support the war.

The analysis of Pearl Harbor presented the problem in the manipulation of what Lee (1952) called *omnibus symbols*. After Pearl Harbor, manipulation of *omnibus symbols* justified the nation's engagement in the war in both *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. *The New York Times* used such *glittering generalities* as democracy or the American way of life, while *Asahi Shimbun* used the Emperor as an *omnibus symbol*.

The manipulation of these symbols was an effective application of what Lasswell (1927) called the *traditional prejudices*, or what Ellul (1965) called the *pre-propagandistic values* anchoring in the societies. Despite the cultural differences, Lee's (1952) logical devices of propaganda such as *plain folks*, *bandwagon*, and *testimonial and transfer* were all used in both newspapers, but different *omnibus symbols* were mobilized according to cultural dispositions. As a result, after Pearl Harbor, debates were

suppressed in both nations. The self-image presentation of both media became more positive. The enemy image was presented more negatively than ever.

The analysis of the surrender ceremony presented the problem of the power relationship with the news source. The coverage of MacArthur and his staff in Japan was affected by the American public relations programs that attempted to generate the positive image of the Allied occupation forces in both the United States and Japan. The convergence did not necessarily indicate that the American image in Japan dramatically improved because the U. S. occupation force had emerged as another authoritarian pressure for *Asahi Shimbun*.

What Lang and Lang (1990) called the mutually interactive relationship between the actor of the event and those who report it, once again, created the problem. The surrender ceremony can be understood as what Boorstin (1961) called the *pseudoevent* that was consciously performed for media coverage and its potential effect. The targets were both Japanese and American audiences across the Pacific Ocean. MacArthur and his staff in Japan emerged as another archetypal image for both postwar American and Japanese audiences.

During the period of the surrender ceremony that formally ended World War II in the Pacific, the number of propagandistic attributes decreased at least down to the

pre-Pearl Harbor level but not to the level of the Manchurian Incident period. The levels of authoritarianism and patriotic appeal even remained high in both media. The American image in *Asahi Shimbun* significantly improved during this period, but the Japanese image in *The New York Times* did not return to the pre-Pearl Harbor level.

Dimensions of Propaganda

The third research question was what propagandistic attributes were observed in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. The newspapers contained propagandistic attributes such as authoritarianism, patriotic appeal, self-image, enemy image, and morale manipulation. They also used Lee's (1952) symbol manipulation techniques such as *glittering generalities* and *name calling* and logical devices such as *plain folks*, *bandwagon*, and *testimonial and transfer*.

The major findings in the content analysis of these propagandistic attributes were:

- (1) The outbreak and expansion of war increases propagandistic attributes, although some logical devices of propaganda are not affected by the war factor.
- (2) Propaganda mobilizes different omnibus symbols according to cultural dispositions but uses the same logical devices.
- (3) Two undercurrents of propaganda exist in the media: the *patriotic appeal type* and the *enemy image type*.

The *patriotic appeal type* tends to carry a higher level of authoritarianism and appeals to the audience's patriotism by morality, using such propaganda techniques as *testimonial and transfer* and *bandwagon*. The *enemy image type* appears regardless of the authoritarianism level and appeals to the audience by revealing a black-and-white picture of the self and enemy, using *glittering generalities* symbols for the self-image and *name calling* symbols for the enemy image.

The goal of both *patriotic appeal type* and *enemy image type* propaganda is the mobilization of the nation, but the *enemy image type* first mobilizes hatred against the enemy and then attempts to mobilize the nation via this hatred, while the *patriotic appeal type* directly appeals to the audience's patriotism and morality in an orthodox fashion.

These two models of propaganda appeared in both *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun*. However, there was a relative tendency for *Asahi Shimbun* to use the *patriotic appeal type* more than *The New York Times*, and *The New York Times* to use the *enemy image type* more than *Asahi Shimbun*.

These types of propaganda were also closely intertwined with the socio-political system of each nation. Japan's inherently authoritarian information control system allowed the increase of orthodox *patriotic appeal type* of propaganda in *Asahi Shimbun*. In the United States, however, there had been warnings about the manipulation of propaganda prior to

the American participation in World War II. This condition combined to encourage an American rejection of the orthodox *patriotic appeal type* of propaganda and led to an increase of a subtler *enemy image type* of propaganda. The result of this study supports Winkler's (1978) argument that American propaganda became more sophisticated through the experience of World War II.

However, this result cannot be interpreted as general differences between *Asahi Shimbun* and *The New York Times* as the amount of each propagandistic attribute changed significantly according to the time periods. Further research on these propaganda attributes at different time periods will make some generalization possible.

Although logical device such as *plain folks* and *bandwagon* were not affected by war, the number of most propagandistic attributes increased with the outbreak and expansion of war. The result of this study empirically confirmed the long-discussed relationship between war and propaganda.

Meaning-Building Function

The last research question of this study was why the gap occurred between the event and the same event as reported news. This can be explained by presuming the meaning-building function of propaganda. The result of this study suggests that once the number of propaganda attributes

surpass a certain threshold, the gap between the event and the news will be created.

In *Asahi Shimbun*, the meaning of the Manchurian Incident was first determined in the editorial on the next day of the event. The dominant enemy image of the Chinese determined the meaning of the event and assigned the Manchurian Incident a propagandistic value for the Japanese public.

The New York Times during the Manchurian Incident period, carrying the least number of propagandistic attributes, successfully detected the misinformation of the Japanese communiqué. However, the propagandistic attributes in *The New York Times* gradually increased before Pearl Harbor as war news from Europe and Asia poured into the United States. The meaning-building process of propaganda finally brought a dysfunction of the standards of objective journalism in *The New York Times* that had worked efficiently during the Manchurian Incident. Pearl Harbor was unconditionally regarded as the cause of the war, and debates were suppressed.

The dysfunction of the standards of objective journalism occurred somewhere between the Manchurian Incident and Pearl Harbor. This study could not pinpoint the exact time of the threshold, but it probably could be determined by further analysis of critical events between the Manchurian Incident and Pearl Harbor, such as: the Shanghai Incident, the Rape

of Nanking, the Panay Incident, the ratification of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, or the Japanese invasion of French Indochina and the American oil embargo that followed.

In addition, the increased amount of propaganda in *The New York Times* and *Asahi Shimbun* after the outbreak and expansion of war implies that further enforcement of the meaning was necessary for national mobilization in both the United States and Japan.

The propagandistic attributes in the media gradually but steadily created the meaning of the critical events, and the media-perceived realities were directly intertwined with the development of World War II.

Thomson (1977) defined propaganda as the repetition of words that gradually form a certain socially shared, symbolic meaning. The results of this study supports his theory. Doob (1935) wrote in one of the early propaganda studies: "Not only are newspapers reflections of social milieu, but at the same time they also try to change that milieu" (p. 334). The propagandist actively tries to change that milieu. The mass communicators also play an active role in the meaning-building process.

Propagandistic frameworks of information control were observed not only in totalitarian societies but also in democratic societies. They created the gap between the event and that event as news through the meaning-building function

of propaganda. In essence, however, the nature of propaganda is totalitarian. It is a form of information control aimed at the mobilization of a large number of people in ways advantageous to the ruling elites.

According to Lang and Lang (1990), the media-generated realities turn into the collective memories of the nation as repeated by mass media. The media revive the American memory of Pearl Harbor on December 7 every year. The Japanese memory of the war is revived every year when the media cover, as a series of events in early August, the anniversaries of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and War Memorial Day.

This study did not address the domain of the collective memory, but further research on how the Japanese and Americans remember the war might explore a related question: how the war memories affect the current Japanese American relations. As a media effect, the collective memory impacts not only Japanese American relations but also every facet of domestic and international relations. Propagandistic frameworks of information control often create a variety of crises as it generates enmity between different nations, races, cultures, and religions. It is hoped that this study might lessen that enmity through an understanding of how those frameworks function.

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APPENDIX

Coding directions:

- (1) For multiple-choice questions, choose the number of the most appropriate answer.
- (2) For questions asking if the tone is positive, neutral, or negative: if 50% or more are positive, choose (1) Positive; if 50% or more are negative, choose (3) Negative; otherwise, choose (2) Neutral.
- (3) For yes-no questions: if the attributes stated in the question are observed in the article at least once, choose (1) YES; if the attributes are not observed at all, or if the attributes cannot be evaluated by the article at all, choose (2) NO.

Basic Data (Q1-11)

Q1. Newspaper

1. *The New York Times* (NYT)
2. *Asahi Shimbun* (ASA)

Q2. Time Periods

1. Manchurian Incident Period
(NYT: September 16-22, 1931)
(ASA: September 17-23, 1931)
2. Pre-Pearl Harbor Period
(NYT: December 1-7, 1941)
(ASA: December 2-8, 1941)
3. Post-Pearl Harbor Period
(NYT: December 8-14, 1941)
(ASA: December 9-15, 1941)
4. Surrender Ceremony Period
(NYT: August 30-September 5, 1945)
(ASA: August 31-September 6, 1945)

Q3-5. Item Number (000-999)

Q6-7. Date (1-31)

Q8. Time of the Issue

1. Morning Edition	2. Evening Edition

Q9. Type of the item:

1. Page one story	2. Editorial

Q10. The article is:

1. Domestic News
2. International News

Q11. The article refers to the United States (for only ASA) or Japan (for only NYT) at least once.

1. YES
2. No

Measures of Authoritarianism (Q12-13)

Authoritarianism is defined as the article's posture vis-à-vis the government and is determined by the position on an authoritarian versus libertarian scale.

Q12. Is the tone of the article libertarian or authoritarian?

1. High libertarianism.

The article is highly supportive of the right of the individual and/or minority, although the libertarian position often conflicts with the government's interests. The article would be high libertarian if it supported the civil rights of labor strikers, anti-war activists, women, racial minorities even though it would be in conflict with the interests of national defense.

2. Libertarianism.

The article is critical to the government's policy, with arguments and/or counter offers. The article would be libertarian if it does not forget to take a posture as expressed in the term *watchdog*. The article would be libertarian if it criticized the governmental control over wartime industry or censorship and pointed to the problems that may happen because of the control.

3. Neither libertarianism nor authoritarianism.

This category includes such articles as: one unable to be evaluated or one simply announcing the government's policy, with no comment or analysis. In the latter case, the article's posture is unknown; however, the tone implies media's self-regulation to avert a forthcoming suppression or sanction as often found under martial law or speech control.

4. Authoritarianism.

The article is supportive of the government's policy, with no criticism or questioning of policy. If the article is war news and the tone is supportive of the government's engagement in war, it would be authoritarian.

5. High authoritarianism.

Not only strongly supportive of the government's policy, the article attempts to propagate it. The media is playing an important role of propaganda machines.

Q13. *Testimonial and transfer* is a propaganda technique using an authoritarian bias in which what someone respected or in authority says is right. Using *testimonial and transfer*, the article quotes someone respected or in authority and attempts to persuade many in the direction what the respected person said.

If the article quoted the emperor's message or presidential order with no discussion, regarding it as automatically right, it would be a *testimonial and transfer*.

1. YES

2. No

Measures of Patriotic Appeal (Q14-16)

Patriotic appeal is aimed at the individual's identity and attempts to make him/her serve the nation voluntarily. By approach, patriotic appeal is subcategorized to Appeal by Description; Appeal by Necessity, and Appeal to Morale.

Q14. The article is appealing to the audience's patriotism.

1. YES

(→answer Q15-16.)

2. NO

(→skip Q15-16 and go to Q17.)

Q15. Which types of patriotic appeal is observed in the article?

1. Appeal by Positive Description.

The article favorably describes patriotic individuals, citizens and soldiers, dedicated to the nation.

2. Appeal by Negative Description.

The article unfavorably describes individuals, citizens and soldiers, who are not dedicated to the nation (such as draft evaders, labor strikers of defense industry, protesters against concentration camps, or others).

3. Appeal by Both 1 and 2 Descriptions.

The article favorably describes the patriotic and unfavorably describes the unpatriotic.

4. Appeal by Necessity.

The article stresses the necessity of mobilization and that some controls over industry have a priority in the time of national emergency.

5. Appeal to Morality.

The article appeals to the audience's member's morality and calls for the dedication to the nation with few descriptions of the situations or little analysis of the necessity, and

the tone of the article is emotional rather than objective.
The appeal is to do the right or moral thing.

Q16. *Bandwagon* is a propaganda technique that uses mob psychology and group pressure to mobilize the audience. By suggesting that "everyone is doing a certain thing," the article attempts to persuade that, *you*, each member of the audience, should do the same thing, riding on the *bandwagon*.

If the article referred to a campaign such as war bond gatherings by a women's organization and explicitly or implicitly called for participation in it, the persuasion technique would be defined as *bandwagon*.

1. YES
2. NO

Measures of Self-Image (Q17-20)

The establishment of self-image is an important aim of propaganda and, by doing so, the propagandist attempts to preserve the cooperation of the domestic and allied audiences. Self-image is often expressed by such terms as *we* and includes that of allied nations.

Q17. Is self-image presented in the article?

1. YES (→answer Q18-20.)
2. NO (→skip Q18-20 and go to Q21.)

Q18. Self-image described in the article is:

1. Positive (→answer Q19-20.)
2. Neutral (→skip Q19-20 and go to Q21.)
3. Negative (→skip Q19-20 and go to Q21.)

Q19. Which positive self-image is presented?

1. Self-image with the efforts of soldiers and citizens.
Including descriptions of fighting and patriotic activities at the home front.
2. Self-image supported by plain folks, domestically and/or abroad.
Plain folks is a propaganda technique using an underlying bias of the audience that populations, women and children in particular, are inherently innocent and good beings. The article describes the hardship and/or dedication of domestic or allied *plain folks*. The ASA article presents the image of Filipinos waving Japanese flags (or American flags in NYT).

3. Self-image with international allied nations.

The article focuses on the national level allies instead of the *plain folks'* level. The NYT article describes Britain, Russia, or China as a friend (or Germany, some Asian nations for ASA).

4. Self-image having good leaders.

5. Self-image with glittering generalities (e.g. glittering ideal or purpose).

The article refers to such national ideals as world peace (or expansion of democracy for NYT and liberation of Asia for ASA).

6. Self-image supported by God or a nation's sense of having cultural superiority.

The ASA article stresses that Japanese were the selected. The NYT article stresses on Americans have a manifest destiny.

7. Other self-image. Explain_____

Q20. In presenting self-image, does the article use such value-laden words as freedom, liberty, equality, peace, or happiness.

0. No such word is used
1. Happiness
2. Peace
3. Equality
4. Liberty
5. Freedom
6. Democracy
7. More than one of the above are used.
8. No such word is used

Measures of Enemy Image (Q21-25)

The propagandist attempts to mobilize hatred against enemy by establishing a negative image. The idea of enemy is often represented in such terms as *they*. Enemy is operationally defined as Japan and its allies for NYT and the United States and its allies for ASA.

Q21. Is an enemy image presented in the article?

1. YES (→answer Q22-26.)
2. NO (→skip Q22-26 and go to Q27.)

Q22. Does the article imply that enemy can be a friend of *ours* in some situations?

1. YES
2. NO

Q23. Does the article present the enemy as one who is allied with another enemy.

1. YES
2. NO

Q24. Enemy image described in the article is:

1. Positive (→skip Q25-26, and go to Q27.)
2. Neutral (→skip Q25-26, and go to Q27.)
3. Negative (→answer Q25-26.)

Q25. Which of the following negative enemy image is presented?

1. Enemy criticizing *us* or not understanding *us*.

2. Enemy damaging *plain folks* (domestically and abroad).

The article describes *plain folks* attacked by enemy. The NYT article presents the image of Filipinos suffering from Japanese occupation. The ASA article presents the image of Asians suffering from European colonialism.

3. Enemy with a bad ideal or purpose--description of the enemy's policy.

The ASA article says American aim is to become a dictator in the Pacific. The NYT article says Japanese aim is to become a dictator in the Pacific.

4. Enemy as being immoral, crazed, or detrimental-- description of the enemy's nature.

The ASA article describes Americans as the spiritually corrupted. The NYT article describes Japanese as fanatics.

5. Enemy as subhuman--dehumanizing the enemy.

The NYT article describes Japanese as something close to apes. The ASA article describes Americans as devils and demons.

6. Other enemy image. Explain_____

Q26. Enemy is expressed in such inhuman, animal, or mythical figures.

1. Barbarian, rapists, and other brutal humans.
2. Animals.
3. Devil, demon, monster, and other mythical figures.
4. No such description is observed.

Measures of Morale Manipulation (Q27-32)

Propaganda is not only image description but also contains a strategic purpose to manipulate morale of the audience. The article would contain a tone of warning if deprivational effect is anticipated from a forthcoming action. The article would contain a tone of encouragement if the propagandist attempts to strengthen the public's confidence and will. Is the tone of such preparatory propaganda observed?

Q27. Does the article attempt to manipulate morale?

1. YES (→answer Q28-32.)
2. NO (→skip Q28-31 and go to Q32.)

Q28. Against the domestic and/or allied audience, is a tone of warning and/or encouragement observed?

1. A tone of warning (→answer Q29, skip Q30, and go to Q31)
2. A tone of encouragement (→skip Q29, answer Q30, and go to Q31)
3. Both tones of warning and encouragement. (→ answer Q29 and 30)
4. Neither tone of warning or encouragement

Q29. Which type of warning is observed?

1. Warning by presenting a self-image.
2. Warning by presenting an enemy image.
3. Both 1 and 2.

Q30. Which type of encouragement is observed?

1. Encouragement by presenting a self-image.
2. Encouragement by presenting an enemy image
3. Bcth 1 and 2.

Q31. Against the enemy's camp, is a tone of warning or discouragement observed?

1. YES
2. NO

Q32. Does the story warn readers of propaganda efforts or techniques of the enemy?

1. YES
2. NO