1995

Jefferson's quest for a virtuous republic : the political economics of Indian removal

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JEFFERSON'S QUEST FOR A VIRTUOUS REPUBLIC:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History
San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by

Michael Steven Roberts

December, 1995

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard S. Cramer", written over a horizontal line.

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ABSTRACT

JEFFERSON'S QUEST FOR A VIRTUOUS REPUBLIC: THE POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF INDIAN REMOVAL

by Michael S. Roberts

This thesis demonstrates that President Jefferson's policy of Indian removal was linked to his commitment to republicanism. His policy was developed as a means to fulfill his vision of a virtuous republic of independent white farmers. Land acquisition was central to fulfillment. This study examines the successes and failures of Jefferson's objectives.

Research reveals that Jefferson received pressure from his political supporters to remove Indians to make the land available to white farmers. Furthermore, Jefferson was predisposed to a policy of Indian removal prior to his presidency. His experiences as a legislator and as an executive were preparatory to his presidential quest for a virtuous republic. As president Jefferson conducted a campaign of acquisition by "compact"--by treaty, often induced by bribery, intoxication, fear, and debt purposefully created by the government to encourage cession. Jefferson's policy of Indian removal was antecedent to Andrew Jackson's more flagrant policy.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Richard Cramer, Dr. Stanley Underdal, Dr. Billie Jensen, and Dr. John Wintterle for their guidance, editorial assistance, and encouragement. I am grateful for assistance from Dr. Lee Soltow, Department of Economics, Ohio University; William Thorndale, co-author of Map Guide to The U. S. Federal Censuses; Terry Lamb, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.; and Howard Piepenbrink, Estates and Title Research, Department of the Interior, Washington, D. C. I am indebted to the staffs of the National Archives-Pacific Sierra Region, San Bruno; the Huntington Library, San Marino; the Georgia Historical Society Library, Savannah Branch; the Georgia State Dept. of Archives and History; the Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, Public Records Division, Archival Services Branch, Frankfurt; and the Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville. Linda Woodward Geiger, C. G. R. S., Stone Mountain, Georgia, was of invaluable aid in obtaining property tax digest records.

Eric Heath, reference librarian, Cecil H. Green Library, Stanford University and Deborah LaFond, reference librarian, Doe Library, University of California, Berkeley, offered research guidance of considerable value. Hjordis Madsen, Cathy Perez, and Shirley Miguel of Interlibrary Loan Department, San Jose State University, were instrumental in acquiring needed materials expeditiously.

I am beholden to Bernard Sheehan, Ph.D. for leaving a door open.

To Robin Brooks,
Professor of History

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The character of Thomas Jefferson presents one of the most difficult studies to be met with by the historian of these times . . . More ardent in his imagination than his affections, he did not speak exactly as he felt toward either friends or enemies. As a consequence, he has left hanging over a part of his public life a vapor of duplicity, or, to say the least, of indirection, the presence of which is generally felt more than it is seen.

John Quincy and Charles Frances Adams

Life of John Adams

The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction,
is the first and only legitimate object of good government.

Thomas Jefferson

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose

This is a study of President Jefferson's policy of Indian removal and his vision of a fledgling nation rising to greatness. A substantial body of primary source evidence indicates that Jefferson's Indian policy was intimately linked to his commitment to republicanism. This ideology was the foundation for the attainment of specific objectives; Indian removal was the key to Jefferson's quest for a virtuous republic consisting of independent white farmers.

Presupposition 1: Jefferson's Indian policy was a strategy to fulfill his vision of a virtuous republic. Chapter Two is an analysis of this policy in which Indian removal was the primary element and was central to obtaining sufficient land for a growing white population. Jefferson sought to defend frontiers from foreign nations and hostile Indians under their influence. He wanted to preserve an agrarian way of life supported by manufactures; to expand trans-Atlantic trade (necessitating access to rivers and seaports); to increase the number of Republican seats in the House of Representatives; to acquire precious metal, coal, and salt deposits; and above all, to create a citizenry steeped in republican virtue--a body politic comprised of independent white male farmers exuding both private and public virtue.

Presupposition 2: Jefferson received considerable pressure from political supporters to remove Indians from their native land. Chapter Three is a case

study of this pressure by the state of Georgia, champion of states' rights and Indian removal. Georgians had an insatiable hunger for land and a desire to remove all Indians from land within their state. This chapter explores the reasons why.

Presupposition 3: Jefferson was predisposed to a policy of Indian removal prior to his presidency. He embraced republicanism throughout his public career. Chapter Four is a review of the development of Jefferson's Indian policy and his growing adherence to republicanism. Once he became president, he was prepared to "tack a Republican course" for the nation using Indian removal as the wind in the nation's sails.

Method

Chapter Two, Section 1, "Chronicle Narrative," is a review of Jefferson's Indian policy, focusing on the treaties made between the United States and the Indian nations during his administration. Letters, memoranda of instructions to subordinates, and newspaper accounts are here incorporated to delineate and to demonstrate Indian policy over a period of eight years.

In Section Two, an analysis of reasons for Jefferson's Indian policy, letters to and from political associates and friends are examined to determine a pattern of policy formulation. Documents pertaining to federal revenue-gathering efforts, reports on domestic and international trade, and reports about foreign intrigue along frontier borders and on conditions specific to unsettled areas in the western and southern regions are also reviewed.

In Section Three, an analysis of Jefferson's quest for a virtuous republic, census records, tax digests, export records, election results, federal revenue

documents, maps, and newspapers are studied. The census and tax data covered one county in each of three states most affected by Jefferson's policy and were selected on the basis of having been incorporated during Jefferson's administration. Patterns in the data validate presupposition #1.

Chapter Three is case study of Georgia's desire to acquire land and to be rid of Indians. Records affirming presupposition #2 include census counts and land tax digests, letters, political speeches, newspaper accounts, election results, and poems. Journal articles and monographs were reviewed to complement the primary source information.

In Chapter Four, an analysis of Jefferson's predisposition to a policy of Indian removal and his embrace of republicanism, letters, pamphlets, Jefferson's only published book, drafts of legislative bills, the Declaration of Independence, as well as executive and legislative reports were examined to support presupposition #3.

Literature Review

Dumas Malone's six volume biography¹ was the standard reference work on Jefferson for years, though now somewhat outdated. Malone provided a solid background for beginning a study of Jefferson; however, he offered little on Indian policy and republicanism. This study examines political aspects of Jefferson's Indian policy, which Bernard Sheehan, in his seminal work on the philanthropic efforts of Jeffersonians, Seeds of Extinction,² declined to examine.

¹Dumas Malone, Thomas Jefferson and His Times, 6 vols. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1948-81).

²Bernard W. Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973). See also Charles D. Lowery, James Barbour, A Jeffersonian Republican (University: The University of Alabama

Sheehan focused on the often-misguided efforts of Jeffersonians to acculturate Native Americans into white society. He argued that most programs went awry because those implementing them failed to understand Indian culture, a culture fragile under the weight of white European society. Sheehan failed to take into account that philanthropic programs for Indians were primarily instituted to disenfranchise them or remove them from their land. Any benefit derived from these efforts was of secondary consideration. This is also why these programs failed: they were devised to affect political objectives. To date no work explores the political rationale behind Jefferson's Indian policy or the relationship between that policy and the ideology of republicanism. Historians have alluded to Jefferson's acquisitiveness regarding Indian land but have not detailed the factors contributing to that acquisitive posture. In The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America, Drew McCoy asked: "If the necessary guarantors of the Republican vision included an interventionist foreign policy, territorial aggression, Indian removal or management, and even war, might not the means of achieving an escape from time subvert their fundamental purpose?"³ Thus, buried in the middle of a rhetorical question lies one of the few suggestions that Indian removal may have been part of an effort to achieve a republican vision of America. Joyce Appleby commented briefly that the

Press, 1984), 162: "Jefferson, who best embodied the philanthropic approach to the Indian problem, had been greatly encouraged during his presidency by what he interpreted to be a willingness on the part of the native to embrace agriculture. But the humanitarian approach was also highly paternalistic. It exacted a heavy toll from the native culture, subjecting it to stresses that tended to infantilize the Indian and to destroy the integrity of his social order. More often than not the native was left with little or nothing of his own proud culture and with the worst elements of the white culture--thievery, drunkenness, debauchery, and moral dissipation."

³Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 208.

improved terms of trade for American farm products, the expulsion of Europeans, the removal of Native Americans from the trans-Appalachian west, and the commercial tendencies of Americans made people receptive to a new conception of human nature that affirmed the reciprocal influences of freedom and prosperity.⁴

Indian removal during Jefferson's presidency has been a topic of debate for many years. Recently, a consensus has emerged acknowledging that Jefferson's policy toward Native Americans included removal. In reality, removal *was* the policy. In "The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi," Annie H. Able argued that the idea of removal first arose after the Louisiana Purchase when Jefferson sought constitutional legitimization for the purchase of foreign land in July of 1803.⁵ The president, however, had devised a scheme to force Indians to relinquish their land prior to the Louisiana Purchase, in February of that year (see Chapter Two, Section One). Chapter Two of Able's report was entitled, "Unsuccessful Attempts to Effect Removal during President Jefferson's Administrations." To the contrary, Jefferson removed Native Americans from millions of acres of their ancestral land. This was not accomplished by forced marches such as Jackson's Trail of Tears or by military conquest. Jefferson used peaceful means--it was less expensive and resulted in no bloodshed. In The Cherokee Nation of Indians, Charles Royce argued that the idea of removal did not originate with Andrew

⁴Joyce Appleby, "The 'Agrarian Myth' in the Early Republic," in Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 276.

⁵Annie H. Able, "The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi," in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1906, vol. 1, 241-59.

Jackson. "It may have originated in Jefferson's thinking; at least he appears to have been the first person in public office to suggest such a course. Jefferson's plan, however, would have been non-coercive and would have been carried out in an orderly manner over a period of years."⁶ D'Arcy McNickle believed that Jefferson did not intend forceful removal of the Indians, which he contended in They Came here First was clearly indicated by his attitude toward them and their future in the nation.⁷ In American Indians, William T. Hagan argued that despite Jefferson's "frequently proclaimed devotion to human rights," he was not color blind when the inevitable conflict between settlers and Indians arose. Hagan described Jefferson's Indian policy as "the sort of duplicity Hamilton saw in his personality."⁸ Julian Boyd, editor of The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, offered a contrary view based on a single incident. Jefferson advised Kaskaskia chief Baptiste Ducoigne to keep his people neutral in the war against the British. Boyd claimed that this address "set forth most of the sympathetic and farsighted views on the status and future of the Indian that were to be embodied in Thomas Jefferson's Indian policy as President." Boyd stated further "that Jefferson at this critical moment and in the very last hours of his governorship took the trouble to show the Kaskaskia chief every honor and to give him sound and sincere

⁶Charles Royce, The Cherokee Nation of Indians (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1975), 74.

⁷D'Arcy McNickle, They Came here First, The Epic of the American Indian (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1949), 235.

⁸William T. Hagan, American Indians (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 53-54.

advice is a measure of his feelings for the Indians as a race."⁹ In a similar view Emory Evans, in "Indian Policy Under Thomas Jefferson," argued:

Though Jefferson took advantage of the Indian's ignorance of land value and used gifts, bribes, and liquor as well as a friendly attitude to acquire large tracts of land very cheaply, acquisition of land was not an end in itself. It was only part of the ultimate goal, for by getting the Indians off their large tracts and turning them to agriculture and domestic arts, the process of civilizing them would be speeded up. Jefferson justified his methods in the light of the eventual good he hoped to do the Indian.¹⁰

Evans claimed that although Indian removal was "inaugurated" under Jefferson, it remained for Andrew Jackson to "fulfill."¹¹ He also claimed that: "With all his efforts, actual removal never took place in Jefferson's administration. . . ."¹² However, in "The Metaphysics of Empire-Building," Richard Drinnon argued that "Jefferson had initiated the Indian removal policy through his energetic efforts to 'obtain from the native proprietors the whole left bank of the Mississippi.' One major reason the lands of the aboriginal inhabitants had been so drastically reduced was Jefferson's acquisition of a hundred million acres in treaties shot through with fraud, bribery, and intimidation."¹³ In "Indian Policy in the Old Northwest," Reginald Horsman supports Hagan's contentions:

⁹Julian P. Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), vol. 6, 61-63, 63n.

¹⁰Emory G. Evans, "Indian Policy Under Thomas Jefferson," Essays in History 1 (Fall 1954): 26.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 29.

¹²*Ibid.*, 32.

¹³Richard Drinnon, "The Metaphysics of Empire-Building: American Imperialism in the Age of Jefferson and Monroe, Massachusetts Review 16 (Autumn 1975): 671.

From 1801 to 1809 President Thomas Jefferson sought the land between the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers with all the eagerness of the Confederation. With the ambivalence that is so characteristic of Jefferson, he was able to combine an apparent genuine interest in the welfare of the Indian with a voracious appetite for Indian land. In his public utterances Jefferson viewed the harsh realities of American-Indian relations through a roseate mist.¹⁴

In "American Indian Policy and the Origins of Manifest Destiny," Horsman argued that "in dealing with the Indians the United States developed a rationale of expansion which was readily adaptable to the needs of an advance over other peoples."¹⁵ "The argument that the expansion of the Americans over the Indians would be a blessing by raising them from a state of savagery to the highest level of civilization . . . persisted from the late 1780's to the late 1820's, reaching its high point in the ideas of Thomas Jefferson."¹⁶ He further argued that Jefferson saw a harmony of benefit by relegating Indians to small parcels of land: the Indians would learn to live better on less land and whites would be able to acquire the surplus land to meet their needs.¹⁷

Works on Jefferson's republicanism abound. Drew McCoy's Elusive Republic is the most complete study. McCoy argued that Jefferson's concept of a continuously expanding "empire of liberty" was a "bold intellectual stroke," because it "flew in the face of the traditional republican association of expansion and empire with luxury, corruption, and especially despotism." McCoy

¹⁴Reginald Horsman, "American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 1783-1812," William and Mary Quarterly 3d Series 18 (January 1961): 47.

¹⁵Reginald Horsman, "American Indian Policy and the Origins of Manifest Destiny," University of Birmingham Historical Journal 11 (December 1968): 129.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 134.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 135.

contended that Jefferson and most American republicans believed that expansion would preserve the republican character of America. Both the Louisiana Purchase and the Florida problem raised issues regarding United States control of rivers and ports in order to provide access to foreign markets for American farmers in the West. "The Jeffersonian vision of an expanding republican civilization," he argued, "demanded this unimpeded access to foreign markets--for economic, social, and moral reasons--and to this extent the republic was something less than the fully autonomous and self-sufficient entity the Jeffersonians usually portrayed it to be." McCoy held that the Jeffersonian Republicans' analysis of political economy for the United States adhered to Adam Smith's theory in The Wealth of Nations, particularly to the "natural" order of economic development. Smith argued that agriculture should precede commerce or manufacturing until a country's agriculture became fully developed. McCoy interpreted Jeffersonian political economy to mean that a genuinely republican political economy included neither an overextended commerce (based on the carrying trade) that was unrelated to the welfare and success of the mass of republican producers (farmers) nor a naval system that would, in defending such a commerce, threaten to embroil the United States in unnecessary, expensive, and potentially corrupting wars with the mercantilist powers of Europe.¹⁸

Garrett Ward Sheldon in The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,¹⁹ argued that Jefferson's emphasis upon economic independence and criticism of

¹⁸McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 177-78.

¹⁹Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

economic manipulation place him within the classical republican paradigm. However, his affinity for certain kinds of economic development and free market commerce belie any "nostalgic" country ideology. In essence, Sheldon contended that where Jefferson viewed economics as contributing to independent citizens and an independent nation, he approved. Where he saw economic policies detracting from an independent, self-sufficient citizenry, he opposed them. Jefferson believed that because political power followed property ownership, a virtuous republic must have an economically independent citizenry and general equality of condition in moderate wealth. Sheldon argued that Jefferson's objections to commerce were softened by the presence, in Virginia, of numerous rivers which permitted highly developed market relations without the cities, highways, and urban masses he found so objectionable as corrupting influences. Sheldon asserted that Jefferson's attitudes toward the continuation and expansion of slavery "always" remained subordinate to his ideal political philosophy of an economically independent, active citizenry preserving a virtuous republic. In the new American republic, slaves constituted the second largest property interest, surpassed only by land, and vastly outweighed manufacturing or shipping. In Jefferson's hierarchy of values, Sheldon argued, the emancipation of slaves occupied a lower position than either his personal lifestyle or the ideal republic for which he risked life and fortune. I argue that such was the case for Native Americans as well--their interests were relegated to a lowly position.

In The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View,²⁰ Richard K. Matthews contended that though Jefferson did not believe in a *natural* right to

²⁰Richard K. Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 80.

property,²¹ he did construe direct relationships between individual freedom, economic autonomy, and democratic community. Here was where the small, independent farmer entered Jefferson's vision of the good life. Matthews stated that Jefferson believed that as long as land was available, there was no economic dependency. Given the need for economic freedom as a basis for a democratic society, it was logical that Jefferson first attempt to incorporate it politically in his home state of Virginia. Jefferson's principle that the earth belonged to the living was part of that plan. In all three draft proposals for a Virginia constitution, Jefferson made provisions for each white male of age to be granted fifty acres of land. In one draft he provided that suffrage be tied to property ownership.²² To Jefferson, argued Matthews, economics and politics were *always* contingent upon each other. The relationship between economics and politics extended to a "macroscopic plane." Matthews believed that Jefferson, though with tragic results, attempted to introduce agriculture to the Indian nations in the hopes of improving their condition. Matthews stated that it was "unsurprising" that Jefferson would do so.²³ (However, the evidence presented here stresses that Jefferson's efforts to acculturate Native Americans was first and foremost intended to remove them from the land and make it available to white men who would be the independent and virtuous yeoman farmers of his envisioned republic.)

²¹Ibid., 24.

²²Ibid., 80.

²³Ibid., 46.

Joyce Appleby, in "The 'Agrarian Myth' in the Early Republic," argued that the new European demand for United States grains created an unusually favorable opportunity for small farmers to produce for the Atlantic trade world. Rather than being viewed apprehensively, this prospect undergirded Jefferson's optimism about America's future as a progressive, prosperous, democratic nation. Appleby contended that the battle between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists was not a conflict between the champions of agrarian self-sufficiency and the proponents of modern commerce, but a struggle between two different elaborations of capitalistic development. Jefferson was not a loser in a fight to retain a pastoral past, but the winner in a contest over how the government should serve its citizens in the first generation of the nation's territorial expansion. (Appleby's discussion of this expansion does not show that Native Americans were the real losers in this contest.) She argued that Jefferson's enthusiasm for agriculture has long been misinterpreted as an attachment to the past. Appleby cited European factors which encouraged American agricultural production:

Ignorant of the industrial future, Americans were nonetheless aware that their economy was being reshaped by the most important material change of the era: the rise of European population and the consequent inability of European agriculture to meet the new demand for foodstuffs. After 1755 the terms of trade between grain and all other commodities turned decisively in favor of the grains and stayed that way until the third decade of the nineteenth century. . . . The long upward climb of prices enhanced the value of those crops that ordinary farmers could easily grow. Combined with the strong markets in the West Indies for corn and meat products, the growth of European markets for American foodstuffs had the greatest impact on the ordinary farmer who pursued mixed husbandry.²⁴

²⁴Joyce Appleby, "The Agrarian Myth," 261.

Appleby asserted that rising prices for grains, more than soil exhaustion, caused the conversion from tobacco to wheat and other grain crops. Selling surplus grain and livestock offered a quick route to integration into the Atlantic trade world. Planters who switched to wheat were liberated from British merchants who controlled both the sales and purchases of tobacco planters along the eastern seaboard. Appleby argued that "By isolating in time and space the golden era of grain growing in the early national period, one can see more clearly the material base upon which Jefferson built his vision of America, a vision that was both democratic and capitalistic, agrarian and commercial."²⁵

In "A Re-examination of Jeffersonian Economics," William D. Grampp²⁶ argued that in Jefferson's thinking if men were to be directed to a path of social righteousness (as Jefferson put it: "social love"), the leading principle of economic policy became the cultivation of an economic environment that would satisfy the ends of government. Grampp asserted that Jefferson's most specific measures of domestic policy were proposed in relation to the land problem. They embraced two objectives which were derived from his political principles: 1) equality or the elimination of gross inequality, and 2) possession and freedom in the use of land.

Joseph Dorfman, in "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,"²⁷ argued that Jefferson's career was "full of shifts and contradictions. These, however, were grounded on his fundamental premise that republican government would endure only as long as opportunities were available to an

²⁵Ibid., 269.

²⁶William D. Grampp, "A Re-examination of Jeffersonian Economics," Southern Economic Journal 12 (July 1945-April 1946): 263-82.

²⁷Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson," Political Science Quarterly 55 (March 1940): 98-121.

ever-increasing population." Jefferson, asserted Dorfman, possessed a planter's logic in which wealth meant landed possessions. Specie, credit, markets, and more land were required to maintain and increase wealth. "The consequences were the expansion of empire and the correlative development of the money economy." Dorfman argued that Jefferson believed that people would remain virtuous only as long as the principal object was agriculture, and lands were available; the moderate, sure income of husbandry begot permanent improvement and orderly conduct in private and public life. Dorfman has come closest to recognizing a link between republicanism and Indian removal. He argued that Jefferson vigorously "prosecuted" a policy of providing additional lands and opportunities for the security of republican government. The Indian tribes complained that the government, instead of leaving their lands "inviolable" as had been promised, was forcing their sale.

A. Whitney Griswold argued in "The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson"²⁸ that Jefferson was not an agrarian fundamentalist; he moved with his times. Rather than developing original principles he "formulated" them. Jefferson was not an original thinker, but a representative one. His sensitive mind was a "conductor for all the intellectual currents of his age." He synthesized what he read and applied "formulated" ideas to the circumstances of his environment. Jefferson searched for that which was applicable to his set of environmental circumstances. Griswold contended that to Jefferson agriculture was not primarily a source of wealth, but of human virtues and traits most congenial to popular self-government. Jefferson believed that political

²⁸A. Whitney Griswold, "The Agrarian Democracy of Thomas Jefferson," The American Political Science Review 40 (August 1946): 657-81.

independence depended upon social equality and economic security, all best provided by a small family-sized farm. Griswold declared:

Democracy meant self-government. Who would govern himself must own his soul. To own his soul, he must own property, the means of economic security. Private property was therefore a corollary to democracy, and land that produced the means of subsistence was the typical and most valuable form of private property. Thus we find in Jefferson's construction of the property right another link between his general principles of agrarianism and democracy.²⁹

Charles A. Miller, in Jefferson and Nature: an Interpretation,³⁰ stated that Jefferson, like most thinkers of his time, did not separate economics from politics. Though he never defined the term political economy, he discussed it to a considerable extent. Jefferson would have agreed with his friend George Logan that "by *political economy* is to be understood, that natural order appointed by the Creator of the Universe, for the purpose of promoting happiness of men in united society. This science is supported by the physical order of cultivation, calculated to render the soil the most productive possible."³¹ Jefferson believed that political economy was an ordained natural order; it promoted the natural right of mankind to pursue happiness; it was best undertaken close to nature. According to Miller, the principal characteristics of Jefferson's natural political economy were freedom of occupation or trade, anti-monopoly, and no government interference in the operation of the economic order. In Jeffersonian theory the only significant economic role of the government was to keep the

²⁹Ibid., 672. As shall be seen in this study, Jefferson expected cultivators of the land to produce more than subsistence.

³⁰Charles A. Miller, Jefferson and Nature: an Interpretation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

³¹Quoted by Miller from George Logan, Letters, addressed to the yeomanry of the United States (1791), II, S.3156, in Miller, Jefferson and Nature, 199.

economy free for producers, merchants, and consumers. Jefferson thought that ideas, formulas, and the physical properties of materials were all part of nature and were, therefore, no more the legitimate subject of private property than was the sea or *unworked land*. Miller maintained that central to Jefferson's political economy was agriculture. In this field his ethical, political, and economic theories of nature were completely interwoven. Jefferson's attachment to agriculture was that both the ultimate and the greatest economic value belonged with raw nature. Agriculture was productive, manufacturing was sterile, and it was nature that made this so. Miller asserted that the problem inherent in Jefferson's political economy was that the political virtues of farming were at odds with the farmer's desire for manufactured goods and, therefore, for the benefits of commerce.

In "Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America,"³² Stanley N. Katz argued that the American revolutionaries defended property not as an end in itself but as one of the bases of republican government. Property's political value was what was most important to Jefferson. He wanted to ensure that every settler going west would be able to find and hold the land he needed, and that such land should be sold in small parcels as part of organizing the western territories on a republican basis. Katz contended that it was not property rights in the abstract, but *land* which Jefferson thought critical for the development of the nation. "Property," to Jefferson, meant "land." Katz argued that:

In the early stages of his career Jefferson was firmly wedded to the notion that land ownership and the tilling of one's own soil was not only

³²Stanley N. Katz, "Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America," The Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (October 1976): 467-88.

good economics but good politics. It was only by independent labor . . . that a man could divest himself of subordination to superiors and cultivate that inner strength upon which republicanism depended. . . . It was the virtue and judgment produced by such independent labor that rendered them capable of becoming republicans, and therefore rendered America capable of republican government.³³

Katz maintained that Jefferson well understood the symbiotic relationship between the wide accessibility of arable land, the prevention of undue aggregations of landed property, and the close relationship of government to the governed. Katz attributed the labor theory of property to Jefferson, though it has been correctly attributed by others to Locke. Katz argued that the concept of public virtue was the central point of republican political thought, which in turn relied on the assumption that people living in a republican society would exercise a highly self-conscious form of self-restraint, subordinating private interests to the good of the state. "Republicanism thus rested on public virtue, which in turn rested on private virtue, which itself rested upon the faith that individuals could bring themselves to subordinate their narrow self-interest to the interest of the community at large."³⁴ This interpretation appeared to be based largely on Gordon S. Wood's Creation of the American Republic.³⁵

McCoy, in "Jefferson and Madison on Malthus: Population Growth in Jeffersonian Political Economy,"³⁶ argued that although Jefferson praised Malthus's second edition of his Essay, one should not assume that he agreed with

³³Ibid., 473-74.

³⁴Ibid., 483.

³⁵Gordon W. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

³⁶Drew R. McCoy, "Jefferson and Madison on Malthus: Population Growth in Jeffersonian Political Economy," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 88 (July 1980): 259-76.

the main premise of Malthus's demographic analysis. Jefferson's response to the Essay appeared to have been prompted by its attack on the mercantile system and its restatement of pro-agrarian, laissez-faire doctrine. Jefferson adamantly denied that the Malthusian population theory was applicable to America due to its vast quantity of fertile, cultivatable land. He rejected the theory's claim to universality, repudiating the idea that America would experience the inevitable oscillation of population that condemned large numbers of men to a life of miserable poverty. McCoy's interpretation of Jefferson's thinking maintained that because America's food increased geometrically along with its laborers, no crisis of subsistence and no widespread poverty would appear; the Louisiana Purchase had assured that the resource of emigration was readily available. McCoy suggested that Jefferson's reading of Malthus caused him to consider related and broader questions in political economy, and this resulted in a confident reaffirmation of his long-held views for America's future. Having such a vast reservoir of rich land, it made sense to employ all of America's laborers in agriculture, which Jefferson considered to be the healthiest and most desirable of occupations. Jefferson's consideration of Malthus reconfirmed his vision of a predominantly agricultural America that would continue to export its bountiful surpluses of food abroad. Such a republic would best serve not only the interests of its own citizens by permitting them to pursue a virtuous way of life, but also the European victims of a Malthusian fate by providing them with the subsistence they desperately needed. McCoy further asserted that Jefferson's emphasis on emigration to vacant territory as a remedy for the population problem was a predictable American response to Malthus. Jeffersonians envisioned a society of industrious, enterprising, surplus-producing farmers. By maximizing their

efforts and engaging most of the increasing American population in cultivating the soil, a great demand by foreign markets for the surplus was necessary. The Jeffersonians' consistent commitment to the idea of international free trade was predicated on the need for an "open world order of bountiful markets" during the post-Revolutionary era. This was an attempt to secure the requisite demand for America's surplus produce that could offer steady employment for people on the land.

Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, in "Jefferson's Unheavenly City: An Interpretation,"³⁷ contended that although similarities did exist in the epistemological thinking of Locke and Jefferson, there were marked differences in their respective concepts of rights, property, and consent.³⁸ Jefferson's conception was broader than Locke's in his understanding that even the sovereign, be it executive or legislative, was absolutely subject to the limitations imposed by individual rights. He based his conception of rights on the evolution of legal history from Stoic Roman lawyers rather than on English common law only. Chaudhuri further asserted that Jefferson possessed a narrower conception of natural rights. Such rights under Jefferson's hierarchial approach made distinctions between *natural* and *civil* rights. Natural rights were absolute in character, whereas civil rights, also important, were secondary and not absolute.³⁹ Chaudhuri argued that Jefferson, unlike Locke, did not regard property rights as "natural." To his thinking, property as a civil right was

³⁷Joyotpaul Chaudhuri, "Jefferson's Unheavenly City: An Interpretation," in The Non-Lockean Roots of American Democratic Thought (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1977), 17-29.

³⁸Ibid., 17-18.

³⁹Ibid., 24-5.

subordinate to rights of speech and religion. Jefferson had not included property as a basic right in the Declaration of Independence. He avoided defining property in accord with Locke's labor theory of value, and made society, working through democratic legislatures rather than nature, the major source of property rights. For Locke, property was the reward of individual enterprise; for Jefferson, property was a social creation.⁴⁰ Chaudhuri contended that Jefferson's concept of express or explicit consent went well beyond Locke's. Jefferson expressed greater concern with the instruments for obtaining consent and the one-man, one-vote principle.⁴¹ Jefferson was also concerned with self-reliance, governmental responsibility for the poor and mathematical equality with regard to participation in local government. Unlike Locke, Jefferson argued for generational reexamination of the basic compact of the democratic polity. Jefferson did not depend on the body-mind ontological dualism of Locke. Rather, he depended, in part, on utilizing Epicurean consent in moral and political theory to supplement the pure force of Epictetus. Jefferson argued that the one thing that no man can do for another is to decide which proposition deserves his consent. If the living cannot make such a decision for another, Jefferson argued, it is even more inappropriate to allow the dead to do so. Chaudhuri stated that although Jefferson appealed to Lockean ideas to secure the assent of his countrymen, his practical politics often masked a "fairly original" political philosophy. Chaudhuri maintained that Jefferson's was a

⁴⁰Ibid., 26.

⁴¹Ibid., 27.

modern philosophy.⁴² Chaudhuri stands alone in his assessment of Jefferson as an original thinker; the consensus is that he was a synthesizer of thought.

In "Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought,"⁴³ Robert E. Shalhope argued that a deeper knowledge of republicanism is essential to understanding Jefferson's mind-set. The "pervasive attachment" to republicanism represented a consensus within American society because it rested on "vague" premises. In order to comprehend republicanism, Shalhope contended, one must first be familiar with the dynamics of ideology. Social-psychological determinants of ideology arise from individual or group efforts to escape strain, not to pursue interests. (Perhaps the pursuit of interests was a way to alleviate strains, particularly those of an economic nature.) Ideologies are highly selective, oversimplified symbol systems which integrate social systems.⁴⁴ Considered as symbolic action, ideological language draws its power from its capacity to articulate social realities perceived by its advocates but not yet clearly defined by the more temperate and exact language of science. Such an understanding of the structure, vitality, and special language of ideology, Shalhope argued, is essential to comprehending Jefferson's commitment to republicanism. It is also necessary, he asserted, to know how Jefferson perceived republicanism. Shalhope argued that republicanism depended upon a self-reliant citizenry. The nation's capacity to survive as a republic rested upon the extent to which its citizens retained social, economic,

⁴²Ibid., 28-9.

⁴³Robert E. Shalhope, "Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought," The Journal of Southern History 42 (November 1976): 528-56.

⁴⁴Ibid., 534. See Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in Ideology and Discontent, ed., David E. Apter (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

and political freedom of action. For Jefferson, ownership of land provided the best protection of a citizen's independence: a nation of freeholders formed the basis of republicanism. Shalhope argued that Jefferson believed his election in 1800 made America safe for republicanism. However, Shalhope did not deal with how Jefferson worked to continue that degree of safety throughout his two terms of office. He simply stated that "this same equanimity regarding his own principles and those of his party continued throughout his two terms in office and well into those of his friend and successor James Madison."⁴⁵ Shalhope contended that Jefferson attempted to remain within the realm of his pastoral southern agricultural form of republicanism while most of society gave way to an increasingly industrialized way of life.⁴⁶ Jefferson "clung" to an ideology--to a way of life with identity and meaning in a changing world--which rested on slavery. The exploitation of the black was legitimized in terms of preserving higher values--a republican society.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Ibid., 537. Clearly, as demonstrated in this study, Jefferson was constantly vigilant to maintain what had been gained. Indian removal was an integral part of a process to sustain and to expand the republic.

⁴⁶Ibid., 556. The record shows, however, that Jefferson was not tied to the past, but took active steps to ensure the republic's future: canals, acceptance and encouragement of industry, and the expansion of territory by removal of Native Americans.

⁴⁷Ibid. Though this conclusion appeared to be based on the "change" in Jefferson's tactics and thinking after the War of 1812, the years of his presidency were ignored as was the exploitation of the Native Americans during this period--to the inclusion alone of blacks in slavery. Is this because of an oversight by Shalhope and other historians or is it because Native Americans constitute a smaller, less powerful contemporary minority in this country?

CHAPTER TWO

PRESIDENT JEFFERSON'S INDIAN POLICY

Section 1: Chronological Narrative

A deluge of letters sent to Thomas Jefferson regarding Indian affairs began arriving a week before his inauguration.

On February 26, 1801, two Tennessee lawyers, representing the state of Georgia, reminded the president-elect of the dispute between the federal government and Georgia over Georgia's western land left unresolved by his predecessor.¹ The Georgia citizenry wanted title to all Indian lands within the boundaries of the state. In exchange, Georgia would relinquish claim to the western territory so that the federal government could establish several new territories which would, at a later date, attain statehood.

This letter was followed in quick succession by two more, dated March 5th and 6th respectively, addressing the desires of Georgia, Tennessee, and South Carolina to settle Indian land claims and boundaries disputes.² Two state representatives from Georgia also advised the new president of their desire for immediate resolution.³ The following week the postmaster general sent a letter

¹Joseph Anderson and William Cocke to Jefferson, February 26, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress (Microfilm, Series no. 1, reel 37).

²Joseph Anderson and William Cocke to Jefferson, March 5 and 6, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC.

³Abraham Baldwin and Benjamin Taliaferro to Jefferson, March 5, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC.

to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, advising him of the desirability of opening a road to Natchez, Tennessee:

The public is considerably interested in preserving a proper communication with that distant frontier which is exposed both to the Spaniards & Indians & is quite separated by the intervening possessions of the latter from the settled parts of the United States. The whole of the produce raised in Kentucky & Tennessee for exportation is conveyed by boats down the Mississippi and the boats with the produce are generally disposed of at New Orleans, being found very expensive & difficult to navigate them back against the rapid stream of that river. The boatmen after the sale of their boats & cargoes return by the above mentioned route to their respective homes. The badness of the road is a great discouragement to such undertakings.⁴

Jefferson responded before the year ended, having negotiated a treaty with the Chickasaw Nation on October 24th, which resulted in the blazing of the Natchez Trace. In exchange for \$700 worth of goods to the Chickasaw (in particular, the Mingo, principal men and warriors) the President was given "leave and permission" to create a wagon road through their land between the settlements of Mero District in Tennessee and those of Natchez in the Mississippi Territory.⁵

On December 17th a treaty with the Choctaw Nation permitted a wagon road through their lands commencing at the northernmost part of the settlements of the Mississippi Territory and extending to the lands of the Chickasaw. Furthermore, the Choctaws would relinquish claim to the land between the Mississippi River and the settlements of the Mississippi Territory. The chiefs and

⁴Postmaster General Joseph Habersham to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, March 12, 1801, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States, vol. 5: The Territory of Mississippi, 1798-1817, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1937), 118.

⁵"A treaty, of reciprocal advantages and mutual convenience between the United States of America and the Chickasaws," October 24, 1801, Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties: 1778-1883, (New York: Interland Publishing Inc., 1972), 55-56.

warriors of the Choctaw Nation would receive \$2,000 worth of goods and merchandise, in addition to three sets of blacksmith's tools.⁶

In a letter to Return J. Meigs, Acting Indian Agent, dated May 15, 1801, Secretary of War Dearborn instructed Meigs to continue the efforts of the previous administrations to teach Indian women and girls the crafts of spinning and weaving and men the methods and benefits of agriculture.⁷

On June 26th Jefferson received a letter signed anonymously "A Kentucky Citizen," advising the president to take action on five specific matters, including the building of permanent roads from the

Eastern States to the Western States on the Ohio river, which by establishing a more easy intercourse, will tend to cement & unite the union. Perhaps this intercourse will destroy that idea, that the Eastern & Western States have two Separate interests, and the Allegany [sic] Mountain the natural boundary, - an idea hostile to our very existence as a nation.

The writer also called for the president to extinguish the Indian claims on both sides of the Ohio River, "with all the Indian claims in Tennessee--in the Cherokee country--and twenty five miles on each side of the Illinois River from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi bank - as Lands you must purchase for settlers or loose [sic] subjects, & of two evils you are to choose the least, for while Spain continues to give lands away, you must loose [sic] at least 3000 subjects a-year, unless more lands in the United States are provided for them to settle on."

The writer argued that unless Indian claims were extinguished, the owners of patented lands would settle on them and be subjected to Indian depredations. However, if the Ohio was settled, the northern and southern tribes

⁶ "A treaty of friendship, limits and accommodation between the United States of America and the Chactaw Nation of Indians," December 17, 1801, Kappler, Indian Treaties, 56-58.

⁷Sec. of War Dearborn to Return J. Meigs, May 15, 1801. War Department, Secretary's Office, Letters Sent, Indian Affairs (M-15), Roll 1.

would be separated. New Englanders could, by way of the Great Lakes, settle the Illinois River region, thereby creating a barrier against the northern tribes. When accomplished, all the tribes between the "Lakes" and the Ohio River "would be circumscribed, as would the southern [tribes], & would sell out, & emigrate over the Mississippi, & you [Jefferson] would acquire lands for settlers to last a century."⁸

Upon receipt of this letter, Jefferson, on the same day, dashed off a quick note to Dearborn stating that among the measures that an anonymous author recommends:

there is one which as it may serve the public good, a more legitimate object appears worthy consideration at this moment while we are about to negotiate [*sic*] for roads through the Indian country. [T]he rout [*sic*] he proposes from Danville to South Westpoint & thence through the Cherokee country to Augusta, on a view of the map appears worthy important. I mark the passage in the letter . . . for your perusal, & submit to your consideration whether it be worthy & practicable to become an object of the ensuing treaty. I confess I see it in an important view, and the more so as it seems to be the desire of the three states of Georgia, Tennessee & Kentucky.⁹

Also in June, Jefferson, through Secretary of State James Madison, responded to a speech by a chief known as "the Glass":

The whites have many people & little land for them. The Indians have much land & few people. it is natural therefore that the whites should be

⁸A Kentucky Citizen to Jefferson, June 26, 1801, MSS Jefferson Collection, LC. Note: Original spelling and punctuation are maintained throughout this paper.

⁹Jefferson to Sec. of War Dearborn, June 26, 1801, MSS Jefferson Collection, LC. It is worth noting that Jefferson did not address the issue of extinguishment of Indian title to land in his note to Dearborn, but simply marked the passage alluding to the laying of roads. Jefferson often reserved to himself his views on matters in which he waited for opportunity to arise, whether by chance or deliberate effort, before discussing with or giving instructions to his subordinates. It was not that Jefferson did not give his approbation to the Kentuckian's arguments regarding settlement of the Ohio and emigration of Indians to areas west of the Mississippi—Jefferson, as discussed in Chapter Four, had long held a vision of an American empire spanning the continent—he did not see the moment as ripe for pressing the matter; Jefferson was blessed with a keen sense of timing.

willing to buy whenever the Indians can spare. but only with the good will of the Indians. [T]he lands heretofore bought have been marked off by a line. all beyond that line belongs to the Indians. whenever they chuse [sic] to sell more we shall be ready to buy; and on this subject we shall never press anything disagreeable to them . . . but Share the Indian lands between our settlements so that our people cannot visit & trade without passing thro' the Indn [sic] lands, if they cannot sell us these lands, we ask them to let us have roads along which our people may pass . . . we paying for this privelege [sic]. on this subject we are about to propose ***interests.

They ask who get the lands when the Indians sell them? They see that the states of tennessee [sic] & Kentuckey [sic] have been established on these purchases.

We rejoice to learn that they [Indians] are beginning to spin & weave clothes, to raise stock and to make bread with the plough . [T]his is a more certain subsistence [sic] than hunting and we will with pleasure send them person to instruct them in all the useful arts . . .¹⁰

It was not long, however, before the Jefferson administration began pressing for sale of Indian lands.

On December 8th Dearborn wrote to Jefferson: "The intercourse which grows out of such establishments [factories and trading houses], has a powerful tendency towards strengthening and confirming the friendship of the Indians to the people and Government of the United States, and towards detaching them more and more from the influence of neighboring Governments."¹¹ Dearborn was referring to British, French, and Spanish influence among the Indian nations on the northern, western, and southern frontiers.

On July 15th, William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory, implored the president to mark off boundaries for Indian lands quickly in order to better enforce laws against encroachment by whites.¹²

¹⁰Jefferson to the Glass, June 1801, MSS Jefferson Collection, LC. ***Illegible.

¹¹Sec. of War Dearborn to Jefferson, December 8, 1801, War Dept., Secretary's Office, Letters Sent, (M-15), Roll 1.

¹²William Henry Harrison to Jefferson, July 15, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC.

Harrison's request was fulfilled in the form of the Trade and Intercourse Act, March 30, 1802, which remained the fundamental law governing Indian affairs until 1834. Section I of the twenty-two sections of this law provided for a line between white settlements and Indian lands.

The remaining sections of the Trade and Intercourse Act pertained to violators of the law who trespassed on Indian land or committed crimes against Indians; they regulated trade with Indians, especially liquor, and made illegal the private negotiation and sale of Indian land and treaties.

Section VIII provided for the promotion of "civilization among the friendly Indian tribes," and called for furnishing them with "useful domestic animals, and implements of husbandry," with other goods or cash, and to appoint "temporary agents, . . . Provided, that the whole amount of such presents, and allowance to such agents, shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars per annum."

Section XIV provided for prosecution of Indian offenders against white persons.¹³

The Trade and Intercourse Act of March 30, 1802, overhauled the Intercourse Act of May 19, 1796, enacted during Washington's second administration. The 1796 act was subject to minor revisions in 1799, but in 1802, Jefferson pressed Congress for comprehensive regulations designed to maintain peace and establish friendship between the federal government and the Indian nations. Accomplishment of these goals would pave the way for Jefferson's fundamental Indian policy: acquisition of as much Indian land as possible, quickly, cheaply, and peaceably.

¹³The Trade and Intercourse Act of March 30, 1802, Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers, Indian Affairs, Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, From the First Session to the Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1815, vol. 7: Indian Affairs, vol. 1, 235-38.

On April 24th federal commissioners (James Madison, Albert Gallatin, and Levi Lincoln) entered into an agreement with the commissioners (James Jackson, Abraham Baldwin, and John Milledge) representing the state of Georgia to cede to the United States its western lands, and to authorize a government in the Mississippi Territory. In exchange, the United States would pay Georgia \$1,250,000 for expenses incurred by Georgia related to the western lands. Furthermore, a land office would be established for the purpose of "disposition of the vacant lands thus ceded, to which Indian title has been, or may hereafter be extinguished. . . ." The amount of land under consideration in this agreement was not to exceed five million acres. A considerable portion of the land east of the western land and within Georgia's boundaries was still claimed by Indians. Therefore, as part of the agreement, the United States:

Shall, at their own expense, extinguish for the use of Georgia, as early as the same can be peaceably obtained on reasonable terms, the Indian title to the county of Talassee, to the lands left out of the line drawn with the Creeks in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety eight, which had been previously granted by the state of Georgia, both which tracts had formerly been yielded by the Indians; and to the lands within the forks of Oconee and Oakmulgee [sic] rivers; for which several objects the President of the United States has directed that a treaty should be immediately held with the Creeks; and that the United States shall, in the same manner, also extinguish the Indian title to all the other lands within the state of Georgia.¹⁴

This treaty was negotiated on June 16th and entitled "A Treaty of Limits between the United States of America and the Creek Nation of Indians." The title was void of such terms as "friendship," "accommodation," "reciprocal

¹⁴"Articles of Agreement and Cession, Entered Into on the 24th Day of April, 1802, Between the Commissioners of The United States, and Those of Georgia," (Washington: Printed by R. C. Weightman. 1807).

advantages," or "mutual convenience" as incorporated in the titles of the two treaties made in 1801.¹⁵

On June 30th, the Jefferson administration signed a treaty with the Seneca Nation for cession of lands in the county of Ontario and the state of New York pursuant to an earlier agreement reached in 1797. The language of this treaty was rather formal in comparison to previous treaties, which probably made the treaty provisions even less comprehensible to the Senecas.¹⁶

A second treaty with the Seneca Nation signed on the same day provided for the cession of specific land within Ontario County, New York, to be quit claimed and released to three men (presumably white) in exchange for the sum of \$1,200. (These men were specifically named in the text of the treaty, though no mention was made as to who they were or why the land was granted them.)¹⁷

In a letter to Secretary Dearborn, Jefferson stated that "there is perhaps no method more irresistible of obtaining lands from them [Indians] than by letting them get in debt, which when too heavy to be paid, they are always willing to lop off by a cession of land." This was done by providing trading houses for the Indians, as specified in the Trade and Intercourse Act of March 30, 1802.

¹⁵"A Treaty of Limits between the United States of America and the Creek Nation of Indians," June 16, 1802, Kappler, 58-59.

¹⁶"This Indenture, made the thirtieth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two, between the Sachems, Chiefs, and Warriors of the Seneca nation of Indians, of the first part, and Wilhem Willink, Pieter Van Eeghen, Hendrik Vollenhoven, W. Van Staphorst, Roelof Van Staphorst, the younger, Cornelis Vollenhoven, and Hendrik Seye, all of the city of Amsterdam, and republic of Batavia, by Joseph Ellicott, esquire, their agent and attorney, of the second part," June 30, 1802, Ibid., 60-61.

¹⁷"At a treaty held under the authority of the United States, at Buffalo Creek in the county of Ontario, and state of New- York, between the Sachems, Chiefs and Warriors of the Seneca Nation of Indians, on behalf of said nation, and Oliver Phelps, Esq. of the county of Ontario, Isaac Bronson, Esq. of the city of New- York, and Horatio Jones, of the said county of Ontario, in the presence of John Tayler, Esq. Commissioner appointed by the President of the United States for holding said treaty," June 30, 1802, Ibid., 62.

Jefferson suggested that "the cheapest & most effective instrument we can use for preserving the friendship of the Indians is the establishment of trading houses among them. . . and by being so essentially useful to the Indians we should of course become objects of affection to them." The trading houses, therefore, provided two means of attaining land acquisition: 1) selling to the Indians goods that they "needed," and thus gaining their friendship, and 2) running up their debts so high that only by cession of land could they satisfy their debts.¹⁸

A treaty with the Choctaw Nation on October 17th remarked an old boundary line to include tracts of land not clearly designated in a prior treaty with the British. For consideration in the amount of one dollar, the Choctaw released to the United States, and "quit claim for ever," title to lands bordered by the Chickasawhay, Tombigby, and Mobile Rivers, and by the boundary of the United States to the south.¹⁹

In a speech (delivered by an Indian agent) to Brother Handsome Lake, of the Seneca tribe, in New York, Jefferson advised that while the United States was ready and willing to buy Indian lands, no coercion would be employed to cause

¹⁸ Jefferson to Dearborn, August 12, 1802, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. The Territorial Papers of the United States, vol. 7: The Territory of Indiana, 1800-1810, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), 67-70. Some historians have suggested that Jefferson derived this ploy from a similar and effective strategy employed by the trading company of Panton, Leslie, & Company, who engaged in transactions with whichever nation that offered the best deal. Their true allegiance, though, was to their accounts receivable ledger. Jefferson, however, is known for having used his own experiences as a basis for decision-making. Therefore, I suggest that the more likely origin for his use of the "debt" ploy is his response to queries in his Notes on the State of Virginia, in which he stated: "The advantages made by the British merchants on the tobaccos consigned to them were so enormous that they spared no means of increasing those consignments. A powerful engine for this purpose was the giving good prices and credit to the planter, till they got him more immersed in debt than he could pay without *selling his lands or slaves*." (Italics are mine for emphasis.)

¹⁹ "A provisional convention entered into and made by Brigadier General James Wilkinson, of the state of Maryland, commissioner for holding conferences with the Indians south of the Ohio River, on behalf of the United States, on the one part, and the whole Choctaw nation, by their chiefs, head men, and principal warriors, on the other part," Kappler, 63-64.

sales against the wishes of the Indians. Furthermore, purchases by individuals were disallowed by law and a federal agent had to be present in sales to a state to ensure fairness. Jefferson stressed that the lands held by Indians would remain theirs until they were disposed to sell. By running the Indians into debt, however, they naturally would become "disposed" to sell. Jefferson stated that "The right to sell is one of the rights of property. To forbid you the exercise of that right would be a wrong to your nation."²⁰

On February 16, 1803, in response to concerns expressed by General Andrew Jackson about the loyalty and efficiency of Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins, Jefferson advised that "in keeping agents among the Indians, two objects are principle [sic] in view: 1. The preservation of peace; 2. The obtaining [of] lands." Jefferson intended to attain the latter goal by convincing Indians of the benefits of agriculture, best effected on small parcels of land, thereby giving leave to sell off their "useless" and extensive forests.

Jefferson assured Jackson that Hawkins would preserve peace and encourage Indian agriculture. He acknowledged the suspicions of others (referring in particular to Georgians) who believed that Hawkins was more concerned with "the interests of the Indians than of the United States; whether he is willing they should cede lands, when they are willing to do it." Jefferson further assured Jackson that he would bring to bear upon Hawkins his (Jefferson's) views on the matter, "that he shall be placed under as strong a pressure from the executive to obtain cessions as he can fell* from any opposite quarter to obstruct. He shall be made sensible that his value will be estimated by

²⁰ Jefferson to Brother Handsome Lake, November 3, 1802, Saul K. Padover, ed., The Complete Jefferson, Containing His Major Writings, Published and Unpublished, Except His Letters (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1943), 460-61.

us in proportion to *the benefits he can obtain for us.*" Jefferson advised that obtaining lands from the Indians by all "honest and peaceable means" would result in procurement of such lands as quickly as expansion of white settlements was necessary.²¹

Secretary of War Dearborn advised General James Wilkinson to expect to be appointed as Surveyor General of the Mississippi Territory; a primary goal would be to acquire Indian land within the territory, particularly from the Choctaws and Creeks.²²

Three days later Dearborn suggested to Wilkinson that the upper Choctaw Town pay off its debt to Pantan & Leslie Co. with cessions of land, and that the General should induce the lower Choctaw Towns to part with lands between the Tombigby and the Alabama Rivers. This would lead to establishment of a white settlement. Whether this idea was the result of a directive from Jefferson or originated with Dearborn, based on his understanding of the President's policy, is not clear.²³

On February 27th, Jefferson wrote to Governor Harrison outlining his Indian policy. This letter has been discussed by numerous historians as indicative of Jefferson's darker or Machiavellian side vis-a-vis Native Americans. Other correspondence pre-dating this letter has alluded to the same policy but has not received treatment by scholars.

²¹ Jefferson to General Andrew Jackson, February 16, 1803, Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, (Washington, D. C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1907), vol. 10, 357-60 (*Italics added for emphasis*). See Jefferson to Hawkins, February 18, 1803, Bergh, Writings, vol. 10, 365. **(Obtain or acquire.)*

²² Sec. of War Dearborn to General James Wilkinson, February 18, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, vol.5, 186-88.

²³ Sec. of War Dearborn to Wilkinson, February 21, 1803, Carter, 189.

The letter was designated by Jefferson as unofficial and private; the president did not wish to express his policy publicly as it might have resulted in negative political consequences, tarnishing his "sterling" public image. He advised Harrison that the "system" was to exist in eternal tranquillity with the Indians, to gain their friendship through use of reasonable means, and to shelter them from wrongs committed by American citizens.

The president wished the Indians to go into trade debt and pay off these debts by cession of lands. He further stated that he wanted either to incorporate the Indians as citizens or remove them to west of the Mississippi River. Jefferson encouraged the cultivation of the Indians' affection, but stated firmly that, in lieu of this, actions to arouse their fear would serve as both an example to others and as a means of attaining consolidation.

Jefferson reviewed the circumstances of the various tribes in the Louisiana Territory and advised Harrison to purchase land from them at nominal expense, but leave enough Indian families to sustain themselves on small tracts of land suitable for cultivation.

Finally, Jefferson warned that the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France posed a crisis, as the Indians held favorable views toward the French and would, with French assistance, resist further cessions of land to the United States.²⁴

In a letter to Surveyor General Wilkinson, Dearborn stressed the importance of acquiring land from the Creek in the area between the Oconee and the Ocmulgee Rivers, making the latter river the boundary. He also pressed for Choctaw cession of the region between the Yazoo and Chickasaw boundaries,

²⁴ Jefferson to William Henry Harrison, February 27, 1803, Carter, ed., Territorial Papers, vol. 7, 88-92.

including a tract of desirable land between the Mississippi River and the Big Black River.

Dearborn suggested that the debts due to Panton, Leslie, & Co. might lead to a "favorable opportunity" for such cessions, if that company pressed the Choctaws for a "liberal offer of land" to satisfy the debt. Dearborn stressed, however, that if the aggregate debt was very large, the United States would consider nothing short of acquisition of land on the Mississippi. The plan was "to plant on the Miss. a [white] population equal to its own defence [*sic*]."25

In a private letter to Louisiana Territorial Governor William C. C. Claiborne, Jefferson, with reference to the imminence of war between France and England, apprised the governor on the Indian situation in the territory. Jefferson stated that it was important to press the Indians as much as they would tolerate for cession of lands on the Mississippi River, from the Yazoo upwards, so as to increase frontier security by means of settlement along the entire length of that river.

The president informed Claiborne that he had recommended Governor John Dickinson (Tennessee) purchase only what was needed for settlement, and transfer the purchase from the Choctaw to lands west of the Big Black River, rather than the fork of the Tombigby and Alabama, which they had offered to satisfy their debt to Panton & Leslie Co. Jefferson counseled further that his policy was to furnish those Indians who relocated to the west side of the Mississippi River with arms, ammunition, and other necessities. This, he believed, would encourage Indians on the east side to cross the river, eventually leading to a retreat of all.

²⁵ Dearborn to Wilkinson, April 16, 1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, vol. 5, 212-14.

Jefferson urged the establishment of a factory on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River, convenient to the Indians for trade. He also suggested a horse path from Knoxville to Natchez, which would save two hundred miles for mail delivery. This, however, would require consent of the Indians. Additionally, individual Indians should form partnerships with white men, to establish houses of entertainment and farms to support them, every nineteen miles. Jefferson believed that the Indians would soon be reconciled by the profits earned and that they would consider public use of the road desirable rather than fear encroachment upon their land. Jefferson would then encourage them to allow the horse path to be developed into a wagon road.²⁶ This is a clear example of Jefferson's manipulative tactics, to get the Indians gradually to acquiesce to his wishes. The conversion of a horse path to a wagon road would not only increase the Indians' profits, it would inundate the entire region with white settlers. Thus, relatively few Indians would prosper financially while many more would simply lose their lands and move across the Mississippi River.

On June 7th, a treaty with the Delaware, Shawanee, Potawatomi, Miami, Eel River, Weea, Kickapoo, Piankishaw, and Kaskaskia Nations remarked old British boundary lines to include a tract consisting of the post at St. Vincennes and all adjacent lands to which title had been extinguished as reserved to the United States. In exchange the United States relinquished claim to adjoining lands. A salt spring was ceded to the United States (located along the Saline Creek which falls into the Ohio River below the mouth of the Wabash). Surrounding land four miles square was part of the cession. The treaty provided

²⁶ Jefferson to William C. C. Claiborne, Governor of the Louisiana Territory, May 24, 1803, Bergh, *Writings*, vol. 10, 390-96.

for delivery of a quantity of salt not exceeding one hundred fifty bushels to the Indians annually to be divided amongst the several tribes. Additionally, three tracts of land were given to the United States by the Kickapoo, Eel River, Weea, Piankashaw, and Kaskaskia to establish houses of entertainment on the main road between Vincennes and Kaskaskias, and between Vincennes and Clarksville.²⁷

In a letter to General Horatio Gates, Jefferson expressed hope that Congress would see fit to tempt all Indians on the east side of the Mississippi to move to the west as a result of the Louisiana Purchase.²⁸

A treaty supplementing the accord of June 7th was signed on August 7th, to enable the United States to locate the four tracts of land of one mile square each for houses of entertainment to accommodate travelers situated along the two roads previously mentioned "as shall best comport with the convenience and interest of the United States. . . ."²⁹

Jefferson urged John Breckinridge of Tennessee that:

The best use we can make of the country for some time, will be to give establishments in it to the Indians on the east side of the Mississippi, in exchange for their present country [further east], and open land offices in the last, and thus make this acquisition the means of filling up the eastern side, instead of drawing off its population. When we shall be full on this

²⁷"Articles of a treaty between the United States of America, and the Delawares, Shawanoes, Putawatines, Miamies, Eel River, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias nations of Indians," June 7, 1803, Kappler, 64-66.

²⁸Jefferson to General Horatio Gates, July 11, 1803, Bergh, 402-3.

²⁹"At a council holden at Vincennes on the seventh day of August, one thousand eight hundred and three, under the direction of William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana territory, superintendent of Indian affairs, and commissioner plenipotentiary of the United States for concluding any treaty or treaties which may be found necessary with any of the Indian nations north west of the river Ohio, at which were present the chiefs and warriors of the Eel River nation," Kappler, 66.

side, we may lay off a range of States on the western bank from the head to the mouth, and so, range after range, advance compactly as we multiply.

Jefferson made it clear that he had designs on the western side of the Mississippi River, and that Indian settlements there would be only temporary. To advance "compactly" would ensure security along the frontier against both hostile Indians and British, French, and Spanish maneuvers.³⁰

An accord was reached with the Kaskaskia August 13th. The Kaskaskia ceded to the United States all lands in the Illinois country, "reserving to themselves however the tract of about three hundred and fifty acres near the town of Kaskaskia, . . . and also one other tract of twelve hundred and eighty acres within the bounds of that now ceded, which two tracts of land shall remain to them forever." The United States pledged to protect the tribe in exchange for promising not engage to make war or give "any insult or offence [sic] to any other Indian tribe or to any foreign nation, without having first obtained the approbation and consent of the United States."

Additionally, the former annuity was increased to \$1,000, and a house was to be constructed for the chief, as well as a one hundred acre field enclosed by a fence set aside for farming. The Indians would be allowed to live on and hunt on the lands ceded by this treaty.³¹

Two weeks later, Jefferson related to Secretary of State Madison his plans for the newly acquired Louisiana Territory. He discussed granting land located in Louisiana to Indians in exchange for land held by them in the east.³² By this

³⁰Jefferson to John Breckinridge, August 12, 1803, Bergh, 407-11.

³¹"A treaty between the United States of America and the Kaskaskia Tribe of Indians," August 13, 1803, Kappler, 67-68.

³²Jefferson to Secretary of State James Madison, August 25, 1803, Bergh, 412-15.

time Jefferson was confident that he could use the Louisiana Purchase to fulfill his goal of extinguishing all Indian title to land east of the Mississippi, removing those Indians who chose to remain hunters to land west of the river, and accommodating Indians willing to farm on small parcels on land in the east.

Two days later, Jefferson discussed with Attorney General Levi Lincoln a proposal to amend the Constitution with respect to Indians:

Save only that as to the portion thereof lying north of an east and west line drawn through the mouth of Arkansas river, no new State shall be established, nor any grants of land made, other than to Indians, in exchange for equivalent portions of land occupied by them, until an amendment of the Constitution shall be made for these purposes.³³

Although, as in the instance of his proposed amendment regarding the Louisiana Purchase, the amendment was not sent to Congress for ratification, Jefferson sought legitimacy, again not unlike the reasoning behind his proposed amendment for the purchase of the Louisiana territory.

The next day a treaty was signed with the Choctaw Nation to "recognise [sic] and acknowledge" the boundary which "shall separate and distinguish the land ceded to the United States, between the Tombigby, Mobile and Pascagola [sic] rivers, from that which has not been ceded by the said Choctaw nation."³⁴

That same day, Surveyor General Wilkinson reported to Dearborn that the treaty with the Choctaws had been concluded and that "If we can extend the Indian concession sufficiently, on the Tombigby & Alabama, and get possession of Mobile [River], This will become the preferable district of our whole country,

³³Jefferson to Attorney General Levi Lincoln, August 30, 1803, *Ibid.*, 415-17.

³⁴"To whom these presents shall come," August 31, 1803, Kappler, 69-70.

and must progress rapidly in Population & Wealth - I hold it to have three fold the superiority of the Banks of the Mississippi."³⁵

Writing to his friend Monsieur Du Pont De Nemours, Jefferson confided that United States policy would be to incorporate New Orleans and the surrounding country on the Gulf of Mexico into a state, and to "transplant our Indians into it, constituting them a Marechaussee* to prevent emigrants crossing the river, until we shall have filled up all the vacant country on this side."³⁶ Jefferson also stated that this arrangement would secure for half a century the mines of Mexico for both Spain and the United States.

In a speech delivered to the Choctaw Nation, Jefferson stated that the United States wished to live in peace with the Choctaw and that each would benefit. Due to a growing population, the United States desired to purchase Indian lands when the Indians were ready to sell. Jefferson raised the specter of Indian debts to merchants, suggesting that they might wish to sell land to pay off their considerable debt, as they had no other means to do so. He advised that never before had so much been paid for Indian lands; their (Choctaw) proposal for cession of land was inadequate to meet the debt and, therefore, he urged the Choctaw to include additional tracts of land on the Mississippi River. Jefferson

³⁵Wilkinson to Dearborn, August 31, 1803, Carter, 236-38. It would seem that Wilkinson was suggesting to Dearborn that it would not be necessary, in the event of a large debt due to Panton, Leslie & Co., to hold out only for cession of land along the Mississippi as payment for that debt, as he saw other lands of greater value, central to extensive settlement in the future. Though lacking access to letters which may help to establish any ulterior motive by Wilkinson, one should view suspiciously any suggestions made by him in light of his dubious record for chicanery, disloyalty, and personal ambition, especially that pertaining to his financial well-being.

³⁶Jefferson to Monsieur Du Pont Nemours, November 1, 1803, Bergh, 422-24. This raises an interesting scenario: Did Jefferson plan to fill the Treasury coffers with silver and gold from these mines, after first ensuring that individual whites would remain east of the Mississippi and north of Mexico, in order to protect the settlements of the Indians removed to the west, and keep them (whites) away from the Mexican mines? *Police force.

said that he would appoint persons qualified to determine how much land would give "a just equivalent for the sum of money you want paid."³⁷

Nearly a full year had elapsed since the last treaty had been signed. The federal government, wanting to connect settlements on the Wabash with the state of Kentucky, convinced the Delaware that the vast extent of land which they held could only retard their desire to acquire the "arts of civilized life" by giving "opportunity to their hunting parties to ramble to a great distance from their towns." Furthermore, the Delaware found that their annuity was not sufficient to supply them with goods and merchandise that they had come to find desirable, if not necessary.

The annuity was increased with the stipulation that the money be used exclusively for "the purpose of ameliorating their condition and promoting their civilization." The Delaware would retain rights to specified tracts of land, but would cede all lands between the Ohio and Wabash Rivers, the tract ceded by the treaty of Fort Wayne (June 7, 1803), and the road leading from Vincennes to the Falls of the Ohio. It was further agreed that the United States would treat with the Piankishaw for acknowledgment of title to land held by the Delaware.³⁸

³⁷Jefferson to the Choctaw Nation, December 17, 1803, Padover, 464-66.

³⁸"A treaty between the United States of America and the Delaware tribe of Indians," August 18, 1804, Kappler, 70-72. In this particular instance Jefferson and his administration displayed some awareness of the intricate relationships between Indian nations which sometimes involved their own disputes of claims to land. Not unlike the pressure built up in the Mediterranean region during the westward press for arable land, causing various Germanic tribes to be backed up against other tribes, so too had Native Americans been removed from their lands onto those of others, resulting in disputed land claims and at times warfare. Such a problem had been less prevalent prior to the westward thrust by white settlers and their government. In this instance relating to the Delawares, the federal government was acutely aware that if the Piankeshaws did not acknowledge Delaware land claims, the treaty would be considered null and void, as the United States would not be able to attain the lands desired by treating with the Delaware. The government sensitivity to this issue, therefore, had more to do with acquisition of land rather than how the two Indian nations would cope with being in closer proximity to each other. Such proximity, of course, would have affected use of hunting grounds, water and waterways, and availability of an already severely depleted source of game.

Jefferson's commissioners wasted little time seeking an accord with the Piankishaw, signing on August 27th. Rather than attempting to gain acknowledgment by the Piankishaw of the Delaware land title, the treaty simply called for the cession of lands between the Ohio and Wabash. Whether this was the intended strategy all along or that the commissioners, with or without knowledge and approbation of the president, decided to circumvent the risk of heated argument or even warfare is not known. It was apparently deemed necessary, however, to obtain acknowledgment from the Piankishaw regarding the Kaskaskia's right to sell their land. Indeed, there was little room for debate here as the land of the Piankishaw was separated from the lands of the Kaskaskia by a ridge which divided the Wabash from the Saline Creek, and one that divided the Wabash from the Au-vase and other branches of the Mississippi. Furthermore, the administration wanted to leave no doubts about claim to the salt springs by the Saline Creek. In exchange for these considerations the Piankeshaws were to receive a two hundred dollar annuity increase for ten years, in addition to seven hundred dollars worth of goods delivered at the treaty site.³⁹

In October, Jefferson was still pressuring the Choctaw to relinquish title to lands that the government wanted to offer for public sale. Dearborn instructed Indian agent Silas Dinsmoor that he should press for all the Choctaw lands between the Mississippi and the Big Black.⁴⁰ In November of 1805 a treaty was signed providing for further cessions (as discussed later in this section).

³⁹"A treaty between the United States of America, and the Piankeshaw tribe of Indians," August 27, 1804, Kappler, 72-73.

⁴⁰Dearborn to Dinsmoor, October 25, 1804, Carter, 342-44.

On October 24th a treaty with the Cherokee ceded land between the state of Georgia and an establishment known as Wafford's Settlement. The Cherokee were to receive goods valued at \$5,000 or that sum of money, at the option of the Cherokee, plus an increase of their annuity by \$1,000.⁴¹

A treaty between the United States and the Fox and Sauk tribes on November 3rd, the lengthiest treaty thus far, was to have repercussions twenty-eight years later, culminating in the Black Hawk "War." The two tribes were to be under the protection of the United States, "and of no other power whatsoever." All lands between the United States and the Fox and Sauk were ceded to the United States. This boundary included an area encompassed by the Missouri, Illinois, Gasconade, Jefferson, and Mississippi Rivers. The Indians were to receive \$2,234.50 and an annuity of goods valued at six hundred dollars for the Sauk and four hundred dollars for the Fox. The tribes were not to sell their lands to any "citizens or subjects of any other foreign power, nor to the citizens of the United States." The two tribes were assured that they could remain in peaceable possession of their remaining lands. The Sauk and Fox would be allowed to hunt on ceded lands until said lands were sold. Only traders authorized by the federal government would be allowed to reside in Indian country.

Article 9 provided that "in order to put a stop to the abuses and impositions which are practiced upon the said tribes by the private traders, the United States will at a convenient time establish a trading house or factory where the individuals of the said tribes can be supplied with goods at a more

⁴¹"Articles of a treaty between the United States of America and the Cherokee Indians," October 24, 1804, Kappler, 73-74.

reasonable rate than they have been accustomed to procure them."⁴² Here, hypocrisy reigned supreme: the Jefferson administration did not want the Indians to have liquor, which the private traders sold liberally. Yet at this and other treaty signings, the commissioners for the United States had given ample supplies of liquor to the Indians, who were usually intoxicated when agreeing to the treaties. By barring unauthorized private traders from dealing with the Indians, the Jefferson administration reaped the benefits of mounting Indian debt at the federally established trading houses: further cessions of land.

Article 10 stipulated that peace would exist amongst the Fox, Sauk, and the Great and Little Osages through the intermediary efforts of the appointed Indian commissioner, William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory. Article 11 provided that two square miles be ceded to the United States to establish a military post, either on the upper side of the Ouisconsin [sic] River or on the right bank of the Mississippi, whichever proved more convenient to the United States.

In his Fourth Annual Message, on November 8th, Jefferson urged Congress to follow a policy of "governing . . . Indians by commerce rather than by arms."⁴³

In a message to the Senate, Jefferson advised of the treaty with the Sauk and Foxes:

This cession, giving us a perfect title to such a breadth of country on the eastern side of the Mississippi, with a command of the Ouisconsin [sic]

⁴²"A treaty between the United States of America and the United tribes of the Sac and Fox Indians," November 3, 1804, Kappler, 74-77.

⁴³Fourth Annual Message, November 8, 1804, J. D. Richardson, ed., Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 53d Cong., 2d sess., 1907, House Miscellaneous Document no. 210 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 1: 357-61.

strengthens our means of retaining exclusive commerce with the Indians on the western side of the Mississippi - a right indispensable to the policy of governing those Indians by commerce rather than by arms.⁴⁴

In January 1805, the president addressed the chiefs of the Fox, Sauk, and Potawatomi Nations; his message was delivered by an agent. Jefferson stated that the establishment of factories and the exchange of furs would improve the Indians' lot and that he had "no other motive for doing it."⁴⁵ The record of Jefferson's Indian policy during his first term of office substantially contradicts this statement.

Three days after beginning his second administration, Jefferson told the chiefs of the Chickasaw, Minghey, Mataha, and Tishohotana that their people would be better off cultivating small tracts of land and engaging in spinning and weaving rather than holding on to large sections of land left unused and wasted and being dependent on a diminishing quantity of game. Selling those parcels to the United States would satisfy debts, bring in an annuity, and generally improve the quality of life for the Indians. Jefferson advised that his people were quickly multiplying; therefore, it would "suit us to buy as much land as you wish to sell, but only according to your good will."⁴⁶

The year 1805 was characterized by a major push for Indian land cessions. Eight treaties signed between July and December resulted in substantial acquisition of land for the United States.

⁴⁴Special Message to the Senate of the United States, December 31, 1804, Richardson, Messages and Papers, 363.

⁴⁵Jefferson to the chiefs of the "Fox, Sac, and Pautewatamie Nations," January 1805, Padover, The Complete Jefferson, 468-70.

⁴⁶Jefferson to the chiefs of the "Chickasaw, Minghey, Mataha, and Tishohotana," March 7, 1805, Padover, 471-72.

On July 4th a treaty with the Wyandot, Ottawa, Chipawa, Musnee, Delaware, Shawnee, and Potawatomi Nations marked a boundary line between the United States and the above-named nations. Cession of 500,000 acres was to be exchanged for friendship and protection by the United States, along with an annuity for the Wyandot, Munsee, Delaware, and those of the Shawnee and Seneca Iroquois residing with the Wyandot, held in trust for them by the Connecticut Land Company and payable annually in the sum of one hundred seventy-five dollars, plus eight hundred twenty-five dollars by the United States, thus totaling one thousand dollars per year for the cession of half a million acres.

The Ottawa and Chipawa Nations, and those of the Potawatomi nation who resided on the River Huron of Lake Erie, would receive \$4,000 in addition to an annuity of \$2,000 for six years. The Indian nations were assured that they would be free to fish and hunt within the ceded territory "so long as they demean themselves peaceably." What was not said was that they could fish and hunt until the land was sold to white settlers. Nothing in the treaty indicated that this vast amount of land would be sold to perhaps thousands of white settlers.⁴⁷

Jefferson advised Dearborn that "instead of inviting Indians to come within our limits, our object is to tempt them to evacuate them."⁴⁸ This statement, made after the Louisiana Purchase and early in his second term in office, clarified his Indian policy. Note, however, the use of the word "evacuate" rather than the embarrassing and more accurate word "remove"; "evacuate"

⁴⁷"A treaty between the United States of America, and the sachems, chiefs, and warriors of the Wyandots, Ottawa, Chipawa, Munsee and Delaware, Shawanee, and Pottawatima nations, holden at Fort Industry, on the Miami of the Lake, on the fourth day of July, Anno Domini, one thousand eight hundred and five," Kappler, 77-78.

⁴⁸Jefferson to Dearborn, July 5, 1805, MSS, Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress, Microfilm (Series no. 1, reel 47).

connotes benevolent action which in this context was certainly not the case.

"Remove" explains Jefferson's policy of displacing Native Americans in favor of his white constituency.

Nineteen days later a treaty was concluded with the Chickasaw nation. Article I began, "Whereas the Chickasaw nation of Indians have been for some time embarrassed by heavy debts due to their merchants and traders, and being destitute of funds to effect important improvements in their country, they have agreed and do hereby agree to cede to the United States, and forever quit claim to the tract of country included within the following bounds, to wit: . . ." which included land between the Ohio, Tennessee, Duck, Cumberland, and Elk Rivers. A parcel of land one mile square was reserved for Chief O'Koy (or Tishumastuble).

Twenty thousand dollars would be paid to satisfy debts due to their traders and merchants. O'Koy and George Colbert would receive \$1,000 each "for services rendered their [Chickasaw] nation. . . ." Also Chinubbe Mingo, king of the nation, would receive an annuity of one hundred dollars for the rest of his life, "granted as a testimony of his personal worth and friendly disposition." The three individual arrangements for payment constituted nothing more than sanctioned bribes. Jefferson's strategy was to get the leaders into debt and then present an "opportunity" to rid themselves of these debts, with some cash payments thrown in as added incentive, by selling their ancestral lands. All lands ceded would not be subject to settlement until three years had elapsed from the date of ratification of the treaty.⁴⁹

⁴⁹"Articles of arrangement made and concluded in the Chickasaw country, between James Robertson and Silas Dinsmoor, commissioners of the United States of the one part, and the Mingo chiefs and warriors of the Chickasaw nation of Indians on the other part," July 23, 1805, Kappler, 79-80.

A treaty was made with the Delaware, Potawatomi, Miami, Eel River, and Wea nations. The Delaware agreed to relinquish their claim to the tract of land ceded one year prior. The Miami, Eel River, and Wea agreed to cede to the United States land bounded by a line originated in the treaty of Fort Wayne from "a point opposite to the mouth of the Kentucky River, to fort Recovery, at the distance of fifty miles from its commencement on the Ohio river." The United States would pay annuities to each tribe, ranging from two hundred fifty dollars to six hundred dollars, determined by the extent of each tribe's cession and other considerations.

The Miami, Eel River, and Wea, who considered themselves as one nation, would not dispose of any of their remaining lands "which they hold in common; in order to quiet their minds on that head, the United States do hereby engage to consider them as joint owners of all the country on the Wabash and its waters, above the Vincennes tract, and which has not been ceded to the United States, by this or any former treaty. . . ." Treating with joint owners of such desirable land in the future would prove easier and less costly than negotiating separate treaties.

The Potawatomi agreed to acknowledge claims of the Delaware now ceded, in exchange for an annuity of five hundred dollars for ten years, along with an immediate sum of four thousand dollars, as "full compensation for the land now ceded."⁵⁰

On October 25th, the United States entered into a treaty with the Cherokee nation to acquire land bordered by the Duck, Hiwassa, Tennessee, and Clinch

⁵⁰"A treaty between the United States of America, and the tribes of Indians called the Delawares, Pottawatimies, Miamies, Eel River, and Weas," August 21, 1805, *Ibid.*, 80-82.

Rivers. Some islands in the Tennessee River and a small tract near the mouth of the Clinch River were reserved for the Cherokee. The Cherokee would receive immediate payment of three thousand dollars in "valuable" merchandise, and eleven thousand dollars within ninety days after the ratification (April 24, 1806) of the treaty, and an annuity of three thousand dollars. The Cherokee had the option of accepting as much as they chose of the eleven thousand dollars in the form of machines for agricultural and manufacturing purposes. Furthermore, the citizens of the United States were to have "the free and unmolested use and enjoyment" of two roads through remaining Cherokee land.⁵¹

Two days later, another treaty with the Cherokee ceded the first island in the Tennessee River, above the mouth of the Clinch River. A tract of land desired by the state of Tennessee for use of that state's assembly was also relinquished. The Cherokee also agreed to allow use of a road between Tellico and Tombigbee for purposes of delivering mail through their land, as part of a route including Creek and Choctaw lands from Knoxville to New Orleans. The Cherokee would be paid sixteen hundred dollars in money or merchandise, at their option, within ninety days after ratification of this treaty (June 10, 1806).⁵²

Jefferson encouraged the chiefs of the Creek Nation to cultivate the land, learn husbandry, and sell off at their own good will and inclination "waste and

⁵¹"Articles of a treaty agreed upon between the United States of America, by their commissioners, Return J. Meigs and Daniel Smith, appointed to hold conferences with the Cherokee Indians, for the purpose of arranging certain interesting matters with the said Cherokees, of the one part, and the undersigned chiefs and head men of the said nation, of the other part," October 25, 1805, *Ibid.*, 82-83.

⁵²"Articles of a treaty between the United States of America, by their commissioners, Return J. Meigs and Daniel Smith, who are appointed to hold conferences with the Cherokees for the purpose of arranging interesting matters with the said Indians, of the one part, and the undersigned chiefs and head men of the Cherokees, of the other part, concluded at Tellico," October 27, 1805, *Ibid.*, 84.

useless" lands. He declared that the Creeks had asked too high a price and urged a meeting of chiefs with his administration to negotiate a reasonable price. Jefferson counseled that white territory now "extended all around our Indian neighbours," and of the logical necessity of having roads crossing through Indian lands to facilitate travel from one place to another. The president encouraged the Creek to settle their people along the roads to establish stations for provisions and lodgings, which would be of mutual benefit to both Indians and whites.⁵³

On November 14th a treaty with the Creek ceded land to the United States as well as provided for the establishment of a fort and either a factory or trading house. Navigation and fishery of the Ocmulgee River, "from its junction with the Oconee to the mouth of the Ulcofauhatchee [*sic*], shall be free to the white people; provided they use no traps for taking fish; but nets and seines may be used, which shall be drawn to the eastern shore only."

It was agreed further that the United States would "forever hereafter" have a right to a horse path through the Creek country from the Ocmulgee River to the Mobile River. The Creek chiefs

will have boats kept at the several rivers for the conveyance of men and horses, and houses of entertainment established at suitable places on said path for the accommodation of travelers; and the respective ferriages and prices of entertainment for men and horses, shall be regulated by the present agent. Col. Hawkins, or by his successor in office, or *as is usual among white people*.

An annuity would be paid over a period of eight years at the rate of twelve thousand dollars per annum, in money or goods, as well as eleven

⁵³Jefferson to the chiefs of the "Creek Nation," November 2, 1805, Padover, 473-75.

thousand dollars per year for the succeeding ten years. The Creeks would be furnished with two blacksmiths and two strikers* for eight years.⁵⁴

Two days later a treaty with the Choctaw Nation resulted in cessions of more land. Article I called for cession of lands in the central region of Tennessee. Forty-eight thousand dollars was paid to discharge the debt due to their traders and merchants. An additional two thousand five hundred dollars was to make restitution to whites who had suffered property losses due to depredations committed by individual Choctaw. An annuity of three thousand dollars worth of goods would be payable. Three chiefs were to receive five hundred dollars each "in consideration of past services to their nation, and also to pay each of them an annuity of one hundred and fifty dollars during their continuance in office." To satisfy the debt, 4,142,720 fertile acres of Mississippi Valley land was ceded.⁵⁵

The final treaty of 1805 was signed on December 30th with the Piankashaw. The Piankashaw agreed to cede lands within Indiana Territory between the Wabash and the tract ceded by the Kaskaskia in 1803. Article II provided that "The United States take the Piankishaw tribe under their immediate care and patronage, and will extend to them a protection as effectual as that which is enjoyed by the Kaskaskia tribe; and the said Pianishaws [*sic*] will never commit any depredations or make war upon any other tribe *without the consent of the United States.*"

⁵⁴"A convention between the United States and the Creek nation of Indians, concluded at the City of Washington, on the fourteenth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and five," Kappler, 85-86. *Assisted blacksmiths. (Italics added for emphasis).

⁵⁵"A Treaty of Limits between the United States of America and the Chaktaw Nation of Indians," November 16, 1805, Ibid., 87-8; Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 452.

An additional annuity to that received since the Treaty of Greenville would be paid at the rate of three hundred dollars. A proviso stipulated that "the United States may, at any time they shall think proper, divide the said annuity amongst the individuals of the said tribe." This proviso probably added economic incentive for individual tribal members to "behave" themselves. Article IV provided for an additional sum of eleven hundred dollars payable immediately as compensation for lands ceded and relinquished to the United States forever. Article V gave the Piankishaw the "privelege [sic] of living and hunting upon" the lands then ceded, and "reserve to themselves the right of locating a tract of two square miles, or twelve hundred and eighty acres, the fee of which is to remain with them for ever."⁵⁶

Eight days later, January 7, 1806, the Jefferson administration concluded another treaty with the Cherokee Nation. Article I stated that the Cherokee were to cede all lands north of the Tennessee River, to a westward point at Chickasaw Island, to the Duck River on the east, and at a southern point on the Tennessee known as Muscle Shoals. Another tract, two miles in width located on the north side of the Tennessee River and extending three miles northward, was part of the cession. Furthermore, the Cherokee Nation relinquished the land known as Long Island in the Holston River. The United States agreed to pay two thousand dollars immediately, and two thousand dollars per year for four years. A separate payment would be made, of one hundred dollars per year, to the aging chief Black Fox during his life.⁵⁷

⁵⁶"A treaty between the United States of America and the Piankishaw tribe of Indians," December 30, 1805, Kappler, 89-90 (Italics added for emphasis).

⁵⁷A convention between the United States and the Cherokee nation of Indians, concluded at the city of Washington, on the seventh day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and six," Ibid., 90-91.

Jefferson addressed the chiefs of the Shawnee nation on February 19, 1807, to consider problems caused by the division of the Shawnee nation in scattered settlements. Jefferson encouraged the Shawnee to come together, "gathering them all into one place from which they may never again move" [allowing whites to move into their former settlements].⁵⁸

Jefferson, in a letter to Meriwether Lewis, governor of Louisiana Territory, expressed his regret that open warfare with the Osages had taken place. He favored supplying opposing Indian nations with provisions, including ammunition, to "take their own satisfaction for the wrongs they complain of." As for the Fox and Sauk, Jefferson hoped for peaceful settlement. He stated that "Commerce is the great engine by which we are to coerce them, and not war."⁵⁹

Rather than risking United States troops, Jefferson reasoned that it would be better to supply the Indian combatants with arms and let them settle their own scores. If sizable losses were incurred by either or both sides, the weakening of those nations, as well as the sheer distraction of fighting, would bolster the negotiating strength of the United States in the future. Though Jefferson preferred economic coercion, he did not turn his back on any other opportunistic means at his disposal.

In September of 1807, Jefferson told Secretary Dearborn that negotiations for land should cease for the time being as the Indians might feel that preliminary proceedings were meant to coerce them into ceding lands. Friendship was of paramount importance at this time rather than immediate

⁵⁸Jefferson to the chiefs of the "Shawnee Nation," February 19, 1807, Padover, 487-89.

⁵⁹Jefferson to Governor Meriwether Lewis, August 21, 1807, MSS, Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress (Microfilm, Series no. 1, reel 48).

acquisition of land. He remarked that "We had better let the purchase lie till they are in better temper."⁶⁰

Jefferson's immediate concern was good will and friendship with the Indians so that subsequent land acquisition would be easier and not appear to have been gained through coercion. Jefferson's ultimate objective never veered from the attainment of Indian lands for white settlement. Nine days later--apparently enough time had elapsed for negotiations to resume--the United States reached an accord entitled "Elucidation of a convention with the Cherokee Nation." This was an amendment to the January 6th treaty. The Cherokee Nation would cede to the United States a tract of land between the Tennessee River and the Elk River to the east to mark clearly the eastern boundary between the Cherokee and the Chickasaw and lands belonging to the United States.

The Cherokee Nation was to receive two thousand dollars "to be paid to them by their agent, at such time as the said executive shall direct." It was declared further that "the Cherokee hunters, as hath been the custom in such cases, may hunt on said ceded tract, until by the fullness of settlers it shall become improper. And it is hereby declared by the parties, that this explanation ought to be considered as a just elucidation of the cession made by the first article of said convention." This was the first time that the Jefferson administration had made clear that hunting on ceded land would be temporary.⁶¹

About ten weeks later a treaty at Detroit with the Ottawa, Chippewa, Wyandot, and Potawatomi Nations ceded land to the United States between the mouth of the Miami River and Lake Huron.

⁶⁰Jefferson to Dearborn, September 2, 1807, Bergh, Writings, vol. 11, 354-55.

⁶¹"Elucidation of a convention with the Cherokee Nation," September 11, 1807, Kappler, 91-92.

The United States agreed to pay "ten thousand dollars, in money, goods, implements of husbandry, or domestic animals," at the option of the Indian nations. Furthermore, each nation would receive from one thousand, six hundred sixty-six dollars and sixty-six cents to three thousand three hundred thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents, along with four to six mills. Additional annuities would be paid ranging from four hundred to twenty-four hundred dollars. One blacksmith would be sent to the Chippewa and one to the Ottawa for a term of ten years.

This last provision by the United States was "to manifest their liberality, and disposition to encourage the said Indians, in agriculture. . . ." Stipulation was made that "the said Indian nations shall enjoy the *privilege* of hunting and fishing on the lands ceded as aforesaid, as long as they remain the property of the United States." This meant until sold to white settlers. The last provision of the treaty, Article VII, stated that "The said nations of Indians acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United States, and no other power, and will prove by their conduct that they are worthy of *so great a blessing*."⁶²

Addressing the United States Senate Jefferson stated that:

Although it is deemed very desirable that the United States should obtain from the native proprietors the whole left bank of the Mississippi to a certain breadth, yet to obliterate from the Indian mind an impression deeply

⁶²"Articles of a treaty made at Detroit, this seventeenth day of November, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seven, by William Hull, governor of the territory of Michigan, and superintendent of Indian affairs, and sole commissioner of the United States, to conclude and sign a treaty or treaties, with the several nations of Indians, north west of the river Ohio, on the one part, and the sachems, chiefs, and warriors of the Ottoway, Chippeway, Wyandotte, and Pottawatamie nations of Indians, on the other part. To confirm and perpetuate the friendship, which happily subsists between the United States and the nations aforesaid, to manifest the sincerity of that friendship, and to settle arrangements mutually beneficial to the parties; after a full explanation and perfect understanding, the following articles are agreed to, which, when ratified by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States shall be binding on them, and the respective nations of Indians," *Ibid.*, 92-95 (Italics added for emphasis).

made in it that we are constantly forming designs on their lands I have thout [sic] it best where urged by no peculiar necessity to leave to themselves and to the pressure of their own convenience only to come forward with offers of sale to the United States.

Jefferson cited examples of Indian tribes with mounting merchant debts who, lacking money to pay off their creditors, requested that land be purchased from them to pay off these debts. However, in several instances the land offered or the amount of land subject to sale was not of sufficient value or quantity, according to the administration, which demanded more extensive and valuable tracts of land. The Indians finally acquiesced.⁶³

In February 1808, Jefferson urged the Chippewa to avoid entanglements in disputes amongst whites (referring indirectly to British and Americans). He argued that if any white man attempted to enlist their aid, it was because he was too weak to fight his own battles, that those men were the Indian's enemies, ready to "*sacrifice you to save themselves*," and that they would not be concerned about the Indians when being driven out by the strong Americans.⁶⁴

In April Jefferson encouraged the chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomie, Wyandot, and Seneca of Sandusky to cultivate the soil, learn trades, and be assured that even if a particular tract of land were so desirable to the United States that the government inquired about the Indian's desire to sell, that the Indians were under no obligation to do so, and that declining to sell would not foster ill will.

⁶³Special Message by Jefferson to the Senate of the United States, June 15, 1808, Richardson, 434-35.

⁶⁴Jefferson to Kitchao Geoboway, February 27, 1808, Padover, 490-91 (Italics added for emphasis).

Jefferson counseled the Indians about problems with the British; he urged them to stay at home and take care of their own rather than engage in conflicts between the Americans and the British. Jefferson warned that any nation taking up arms against the United States would suffer both the loss of friendship and the ability to strike again.⁶⁵

Two days later Jefferson indicated that he would extend friendly aid and services to the new prophet, Tenskwatawa, as long as he showed a friendly disposition to the United States. He stated that he would like him to encourage his people to pursue "industry and peace," and would "do what we can to render his influence as extensive as possible."⁶⁶ Jefferson was concerned about Indians joining the British in the event of another war, as had happened during the American Revolution and would occur again during the War of 1812. Jefferson knew that the British would dangle a carrot--a chance to regain their lands--to get the Indians to join them again.

In May Jefferson addressed the chiefs of the Upper Cherokee. Aware that the Cherokee might split into two nations, Jefferson encouraged those who wished to become United States citizens to become adept at "industry," cultivate the land, raise domestic animals, learn trades and crafts, and to settle on farms granted to each family. He encouraged those who wished to remain hunters to settle west of the Mississippi River. He also stated that a store would be established to provide "necessaries in exchange for their peltries, and we will still

⁶⁵Jefferson to the chiefs of the "Ottawas, Chippewas, Powtewattamies, Wyandots, and Senecas of Sandusky," April 22, 1808, *Ibid.*, 491-93. See also (in Padover) addresses to the St. Regis Indians, May 5, 1808, 495; to the "Miamis, Potawatamies, Delawares, and Chippeways," December 21, 1808, 496-97, and to Beaver, the Head Warrior of the Delawares, December 21, 1808, 502.

⁶⁶Jefferson to Colonel William A. Washington, April 24, 1808, Bergh, *Writings*, vol. 12, 37-38.

continue to be their friends there as much as here."⁶⁷ Retaining the friendship of those who removed to the west would, of course, be important as Jefferson intended to expand settlement ever westward.

In July Jefferson advised Governor Lewis of the formation of a large company, headed by John Jacob Astor. The company began with capital of three hundred thousand dollars, and expected it to rise later to one million dollars, to undertake Indian commerce. Jefferson believed that "nothing but the exclusive possession of the Indian commerce can secure us their peace."⁶⁸ Jefferson had earlier discussed the advantages of having American merchants form companies to trade with Indians. He blamed foreign traders for much of the ill will roused against Americans.⁶⁹

In August Jefferson wrote to Secretary Dearborn expressing his fears that Governor Lewis would rather go to war against the Saux and Fox than reach a peaceful settlement. Jefferson preferred to rely on Indian friendship. He believed that factories on the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers would do more good than armies (commerce instead of war). Jefferson wanted to keep the British out of commerce with the Indians. He also thought it better to have the Indians come to the trading posts rather than send goods to them, as proposed by Governor Lewis.⁷⁰

On November 10th the Jefferson administration entered into an accord with the Osage at Fort Clark, in Louisiana Territory. This was the only treaty

⁶⁷Jefferson to the chiefs of the upper Cherokees, May 4, 1808, Padover, 493-95.

⁶⁸Jefferson to Meriwether Lewis, July 17, 1808, Bergh, 100.

⁶⁹Jefferson to John Jacob Astor, April 13, 1808, Ibid., 28.

⁷⁰Jefferson to Dearborn, August 20, 1808, Ibid., 139-41.

during Jefferson's two terms in office not requiring cession of lands. It did, however, provide for the construction of a fort, supposedly to "protect them [the Osage] from the insults and injuries of other tribes of Indians, situated near the settlements of the white people. . . ." One might fairly construe that Jefferson was concerned mostly about "insults and injuries" to the white people in the settlements.

Stipulations in the treaty prevented the Osage from selling their lands either to foreign powers or to individual citizens of the United States or other inhabitants of Louisiana. The Osage were to refrain from supplying weapons to Indians not "in amity with the United States. . . ."71

Fifteen days later, at Brownstown in Michigan Territory, the United States signed a treaty with the Chippewa, Ottawa, Potawatomi, Wyandot, and Shawnee nations to correct a problem not resolved in an earlier treaty: land to build a road from the settlements in the state of Ohio to the settlements in the Michigan Territory. The land ceded was 120 feet wide from the foot of the rapids of the Miami River of Lake Erie to the western line of the Connecticut Reserve, and all the land within one mile on either side of the road. Settlements would be established along the road. A second tract of the same width was ceded for another road to run southward from the Lower Sandusky to the boundary line established by the Treaty of Greenville.⁷²

⁷¹"Articles of a treaty made and concluded at Fort Clark, on the the right bank of the Missouri, about five miles above the Fire Prairie, in the territory of Louisiana, the tenth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight, between Peter Chouteau, esquire, agent for the Osage, and specially commissioned and instructed to enter into the same by his excellency Meriwether Lewis, governor and superintendent of Indian affairs for the territory aforesaid, in behalf of the United States of America, of the one part, and the chiefs and warriors of the Great and Little Osage, for themselves and their nations respectively, on the other part," Kappler, 95-99.

⁷²"Articles of a treaty made and concluded at Brownstown, in the territory of Michigan, between William Hull, governor of said territory, superintendent of Indian affairs, and

In a letter to Governor Harrison of Indiana, Jefferson reviewed the effects of earlier treaties on land boundaries favoring the United States and the gaps in territory which might now be filled as the result of the extinction of the Pioria tribe. Jefferson stated that by being proprietors paramount of the whole country, the United States gained title. In dealing with the Kickapoo, the next neighboring tribe, Jefferson wanted a formal treaty of limits, which would include the usual gifts, or, if the Indians were so inclined, to accept cession of a part of their country in exchange for a proportioned price.⁷³

In an address to Little Turtle, Chief of the Miami, Jefferson reviewed Indian dependency on hunting game which was becoming steadily scarcer. He reminded the Miami that it is "an act of friendship to our red brethren whenever they wish to sell a portion of their lands to be ready to buy whether we wanted them or not, because the price enables them to improve the lands they retain, and turning their industry from hunting to agriculture, the same exertions will support them more plentifully."⁷⁴ Jefferson's logical argument, persuasive rhetoric, and exhortations of friendship (he cited as his only motive the welfare of the Indians) accomplished his goal of obtaining lands to satisfy the increasing needs of his white constituency. Any degree of acculturation or profit for the Indians was a mere by-product.

commissioner plenipotentiary of the United States of America, for concluding any treaty or treaties, which may be found necessary, with any of the Indian tribes, North West of the river Ohio, of the one part, and the Sachems, Chiefs, and Warriors of the Chippewa, Ottawa, Pottawatamie, Wyandot, and Shawanoese nations of Indians, of the other part," November 25, 1808, *Ibid.* 99-100.

⁷³Jefferson to Harrison, December 22, 1808, Bergh, 213-15.

⁷⁴Jefferson to Little Turtle, Chief of the Miami, 1808, Padover, 497-98.

In an address to the Delaware, Mohican, and Munrie, Jefferson made an exception to the rule, encouraging the Indians to keep their land rather than sell.⁷⁵ One may surmise that the land was of no immediate use for white settlement and commerce.

In continued contact with the now-divided Cherokee Nation, Jefferson praised those wishing to settle into agrarian lifestyles east of the Mississippi, while extending friendship to those who wished to retain the old ways by relocating on the west side of the Mississippi River. When a scouting party "shall have found a tract of country suiting the emigrants, and not claimed by other Indians, we will arrange with them and you the exchange of that for a just portion of the country they leave, and to part of which proportioned to their numbers they have a right. [*sic*] every aid towards their *removal*, and what will be necessary for them there, will then be freely administered to them, and when established in their new settlements, we shall still consider them as our children, give them the benefit of exchanging their peltries for what they want at our factories, and always hold them firmly by the hand."⁷⁶ Continuing trade with those removing to west of the Mississippi was, of course, part of the policy of Jefferson's administration to retain influence over them, prevent foreign meddling, and tprepare for future cessions of lands.

On January 18th, Jefferson encouraged the chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Shawnee and Wyandot to sell "surplus" lands and to

⁷⁵Jefferson to Captain Hendrich, the "Delawares, Mohicans, and Murries," 1808, *Ibid.*, 502-4.

⁷⁶Jefferson to the Deputies of the Cherokee of the Upper and Lower Towns, January 9, 1809, *Ibid.*, 506-7 (*Italics added for emphasis*).

cultivate the soil and engage in husbandry on lands retained, for the betterment of their people. He cited advantages of this way of living, naming the "wealthy " men of the Cherokee as examples. Jefferson stressed that no matter how much a certain parcel of land was valued by the United States, no pressure would be applied to coerce them to sell against their will.⁷⁷

In another address to the above nations thirteen days later, Jefferson advised that it would be necessary to acquire more roads through their territory as white settlements were "now extending so much in every direction, that we shall be obliged to ask for roads from our Indian brethren, that we may pass conveniently from one settlement to another, for which we will always gladly pay them the *full value*."⁷⁸

The final treaties of the Jefferson administration took place on February 28, 1809, with the Alabama and with the Wyandot six days before the end of Jefferson's presidency. The United States *leased* to the Alabama two thousand five hundred acres of land in the Territory of Orleans, west of the Mississippi River. The Wyandot were granted a reserve of two tracts, not to exceed five thousand acres in the Michigan Territory. If the land were abandoned, it would revert to the United States.⁷⁹

⁷⁷Jefferson to the "Chiefs of the Ottawas, Chippewas, Powtewatamies, Shawnese, and Wyandots," January 18, 1809, *Ibid.*, 510-12.

⁷⁸Jefferson to the "Chiefs of the Ottawas, Chippewas, Powtewatamies, Wyandots, and Shawnese," January 31, 1809, *Ibid.*, 512-14 (*Italics added for emphasis*).

⁷⁹Charles C. Royce, ed., "Indian Land Cessions in the United States," in J. W. Powell, Director, Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 1896-97, in two parts, Part 2, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), 676-77.

Section 2: Analysis of Factors

Leading to Jefferson's Indian Policy

Indian policy was central to Thomas Jefferson's presidency; without the acquisition of vast tracts of Native American lands, Jefferson's vision of a virtuous republic could not be fulfilled. Whether or to what extent he succeeded will be discussed in the third and final section of this chapter. Here, the reasons behind Jefferson's Indian policy are explored.

Jefferson was obsessed with the need to protect the new republic. His goal was to create and sustain a republic based on virtues derived from principles and practices of both the classical and contemporary periods of civilization. Every threat to the new nation had to be countered. Borders had to be secured against British, French, and Spanish incursions; the national debt posed an economic threat and had to be drastically reduced, if not erased; the country needed to be populated with virtuous republican farmers; access to the seas was important for an export trade based on surplus goods grown by those farmers. Jefferson believed that a small republic (as espoused by Montesquieu) could not hope to survive both internal and external sources of strife. The best way to ensure the health and safety of the republic was to expand it and fill the "vacant" land with industrious settlers who would lead the virtuous life as perceived by Jefferson.

Jefferson believed that because political power followed property ownership, a virtuous republic must have an independent citizenry and general equality of condition in moderate wealth.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 74.

All of these considerations could be met by controlling the frontier borders, rivers and ports, and by sale of public lands acquired from Native Americans. What was gained through the "Revolution of 1800" had to be safeguarded and perpetuated to ensure the survival of the republic. Indian removal was an integral part of the process to *sustain* and to *expand* the republic. Jefferson equated expansion with sustaining and safeguarding the republic and its ideals. Thus, Jefferson's Indian policy was based on accomplishing these objectives, and any philanthropic efforts extended to Native Americans were primarily to fulfill these objectives and only secondarily to benefit the Indians. Publicly, Indian policy was portrayed as intended to improve the condition of Indians, but in reality the measures were designed to reduce their land holdings.

House of Representatives

Through the cession of Indian lands, Jefferson's intent was to create an environment conducive to maintaining a Republican majority in the House of Representatives. The sale of public lands to settlers in the new South and the ever-expanding western country resulted in a new source of representation; as most farmers were Republicans, their representatives in Congress would bolster the total number of Republican members. The new president would have an easier time getting legislation passed—legislation that would benefit southern and western states and territories, thus ensuring their allegiance to him and his policies.

In May of 1802, Jefferson said that the Republicans enjoyed about a two to one majority in the House, and in the Senate a split of eighteen to fifteen in favor

of his party. After the next election he believed that the Senate ratio would be two to one.⁸¹

Jefferson had contemplated means of attaining his republican vision well before his election as president. In 1791 and again in 1797, he anticipated that after the Census of 1790 congressional apportionment would result in "the augmentation of the numbers in the lower house, so as to get a more agricultural representation."⁸²

Addressing an assortment of problems, Jefferson urged that "all can be done peaceably, by the people confirming their choice of Representatives and Senators to persons attached to republican government and the principles of 1776, not office hunters, but farmers, whose interests are entirely agricultural. Such men are the true representatives of the great American interest, and are alone to be relied on for expressing the proper American sentiments."⁸³ Westward expansion meant that Jefferson could expect to gain greater representation for his party. This raised an onerous political issue arising out of a compromise reached during the debates over the Constitution: slavery, representation, and the "three-fifths Rule." With the abolishment of importing African slaves into the United States, the interstate slave trade became brisk and profitable. Public land acquired from the Indians was quickly bought, on cash or credit, and the new settlers brought in slaves. The three-fifths compromise gave new slave-holding states in the South and West greater representation in

⁸¹Jefferson to Joel Barlow, May 3, 1802, Bergh, Writings, vol. 10, 319.

⁸²Jefferson to George Mason, February 4, 1791, Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 19, 242.

⁸³Jefferson to Colonel Arthur Campbell, September 1, 1797, Bergh, Writings, vol. 9, 420-21.

Congress than they would have had based solely on white population figures. Slaves were enumerated as three-fifths of a person and thus added substantially to the overall population total in the South and West. When the direct tax was abolished, the slave-holding states reaped the added advantage of extra representation without a commensurate rise in taxation.

Strengthening of the Republican Party

Another way to increase Republican representation was to strengthen the party. Jefferson believed that his election would bring former Republicans, whom he called "republican-federalists," back to the welcoming embrace of the Republican Party.⁸⁴

To one of his many correspondents Jefferson wrote, "It will be a great blessing to our country if we can once more restore harmony and social love among its citizens. I confess, as to myself, it is almost the first object of my heart, and one to which I would sacrifice everything but *principle*."⁸⁵

To the General Assembly of Rhode Island, Jefferson declared that "To preserve the peace of our fellow citizens, promote their prosperity and happiness, reunite opinion, cultivate a spirit of candor, moderation, charity, and forbearance [*sic*] towards one another, are objects calling for the efforts and

⁸⁴Jefferson to John Dickinson, March 6, 1801, Bergh, vol.10, 216-18; Jefferson to James Monroe, March 7, 1801, Ibid., 218-21; Jefferson to Joel Barlow, March 14, 1801, Ibid., 222-23; Jefferson to Nathaniel Niles, March 22, 1801, Ibid., 232-33; Jefferson to General Henry Knox, March 27, 1801, Ibid., 245-48; Jefferson to Samuel Adams, March 29, 1801, Ibid., 250-51.

⁸⁵Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, March 29, 1801, Ibid., 253 (Italics added for emphasis).

sacrifices of every good man and patriot. Our religion enjoins it; our happiness demands it; and no sacrifice is requisite but of passions hostile to both."⁸⁶

To William Short, Jefferson's personal assistant, the president remarked that, "The state of political opinions continues to return steadily toward republicanism."⁸⁷

To Amos Marsh, Representative of Vermont, Jefferson said, "To observe our fellow citizens gathering daily under the banners of this faith [republicanism], devoting their powers to its establishment, and strengthening with their confidence the instruments of their selection, cannot but give new animation to the zeal of those who, steadfast in the same belief, have seen no other object worthy the labors and losses we have all encountered."⁸⁸

In a letter to John Dickinson of Tennessee he exclaimed that, "My great anxiety at present is, to avail ourselves of our ascendancy to establish good principles and good practices; to fortify republicanism behind as many barriers as possible, that the outworks may give time to rally and save the citadel, should that be again in danger [resurrection of federalism]."⁸⁹

And in his first inaugural address, the new president uttered his now famous words: "We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists."⁹⁰

⁸⁶Jefferson to the General Assembly of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, March 26, 1801, *Ibid.*, 262.

⁸⁷Jefferson to William Short, October 3, 1801, *Ibid.*, 286.

⁸⁸Jefferson to Amos Marsh, November 20, 1801, *Ibid.*, 292.

⁸⁹Jefferson to John Dickinson, December 19, 1801. *Ibid.*, 301-2.

⁹⁰First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, Richardson, 310.

Commerce

Many scholars have claimed that Jefferson clung to the past, despised commerce, and loved agriculture to the exclusion of other economic endeavors.⁹¹ Nothing could be farther from the truth. Jefferson possessed a considerable knowledge of the past; he used that knowledge to avoid the mistakes of prior generations and to replicate their successes.

Jefferson has often been cited as referring to commerce as the "handmaid of agriculture,"⁹² thus placing commerce in an unwarranted second ranking. To the General Assembly of Rhode Island Jefferson said, "I am sensible of the great interest which your State justly feels in the prosperity of commerce. It is of vital interest also to States more agricultural, whose produce without commerce, could not be exchanged. As the handmaid of agriculture therefore, commerce will be cherished by me both from principle and duty."⁹³ Jefferson spoke of commerce working in conjunction with agriculture, particularly in those states whose economies were founded primarily upon growing crops and raising livestock. Commerce was as dependent on agriculture as agriculture on commerce, and Jefferson well understood this relationship. The northern and

⁹¹See generally: Henry Adams, The Formative Years: A History of the United States During the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947); Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform from Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, 1955); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978); and Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic in Jeffersonian America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980).

⁹²First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, Richardson 311.

⁹³Jefferson to the General Assembly of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, May 26, 1801, Bergh, 262.

mid-Atlantic states engaged chiefly in commerce derived their raw materials mostly from the southern and western agrarian states. The southern states were largely dependent upon northern merchants to move their goods in the trans-Atlantic trade.

Jefferson envisioned an extended republic encompassing vast tracts of land upon which the most natural primary endeavor would be cultivation of the soil. With each new territory and each new state accepted into the Union, agriculture--for at least three decades--did overshadow commerce. Commerce *was* the "handmaid" to agriculture. The lands were first developed agriculturally; commerce then inevitably followed.

Jefferson felt the bitterness of opponents who accused him of having an aversion to commerce:

One imputation in particular has been remarked till it seems as if some at least believe it: that I am an enemy to commerce. They admit me as a friend to agriculture, and suppose me an enemy to the only means of disposing its produce. I might appeal too to evidence of my attention to the commerce and navigation of our country in different stations connected with them, but this would lead to details not to be expected.⁹⁴

Jefferson's administrative record is replete with examples of his commitment to commerce. In his First Annual Message, Jefferson referred to agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation as "the four pillars of our prosperity."⁹⁵ In his Second Inaugural Address, Jefferson wrote of the use of surplus revenues garnered by the Treasury Department:

⁹⁴Jefferson to Major William Jackson, February 18, 1801, *Ibid.*, 206. Jefferson asked Jackson to keep this letter private.

⁹⁵First Annual Message, December 8, 1801, Richardson, 318.

These contributions enable us to support the current expenses of the government, to fulfill contracts with foreign nations, *to extinguish the native right of soil within our limits, to extend those limits*, and to apply such a surplus . . . in time of peace, to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufactures, education and other great objects within each state.⁹⁶

In his Second Annual Message, Jefferson stated that "the landmarks by which we are to guide ourselves in all our proceedings . . . included the cultivation of peace and maintenance of "commerce and navigation in all their lawful enterprises; to foster our fisheries as nurseries of navigation and for the nurture of man, and protect the *manufactures adapted to our circumstances*. . . ."97

Jefferson's efforts to regain the right of deposit at New Orleans and the right of navigation on the Mississippi,⁹⁸ which resulted in the Louisiana Purchase, were due to his realization that commercial activity in the West was severely hampered by impediments to Caribbean and trans-Atlantic trade.

Jefferson also held strong opinions about commerce with Native Americans. Such commerce, he believed, aided the republic in a number of ways: 1) it was better to coerce through commerce than by force of arms; 2) commerce was designed to cultivate their affection and dependency; and 3) commerce with the Indians would help maintain friendly relationships

⁹⁶Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805, *Ibid.*, 367; see also Jefferson to Dunbar, March 3, 1803, Mrs. Dunbar Rowland (Eron Rowland), comp., Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar of Elgin, Morayshire, Scotland, and Natchez, Mississippi: Pioneer Scientist of the Southern United States (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Historical Society, 1930), 158; Jefferson to W. C. C. Claiborne, July 17, 1808, regarding construction of a canal along the Mississippi River, Bergh, Writings, vol. 12, 96-97; Jefferson to Dearborn, May 12, 1808 and July 18, 1808, *Ibid.*, 54-55 and 101; Jefferson to Messrs. Kerr, Moore and Williams, Commissioners of the Western Road, August 6, 1808, *Ibid.*, 117; and Jefferson to Sec. of the Treasury Gallatin, re: the Western Road, August 6, 1808, *Ibid.*, 118.

⁹⁷Second Annual Message, December 15, 1802, Richardson, 334 (Italics added for emphasis).

⁹⁸Third Annual Message, October 17, 1803, *Ibid.*, 346.

enabling the federal government to gain further cessions as needed, and to counter the influence of foreign governments.

Jefferson also found Indian land cessions desirable for purposes other than settlement. Commerce was high on his list of priorities when he learned of copper mines on the south side of Lake Superior, silver mines in Spanish territory west of the Mississippi and in Mexico, salt springs in Illinois Territory, lead mines in Indiana Territory, and iron ore along a part of the Natchez Trace.

That Jefferson may have favored agriculture over manufactures and commerce does not mean that he clung to the past or that he lacked a vision for the future. Jefferson engaged in manufactures and commerce: he made nails, sold his crops for trans-Atlantic export, and built dams and canals. Inventors and scientists are usually forward-looking people; Jefferson was no exception in this regard.

Secretary of State James Madison received a report from Richard Cooper, secretary to the administration's Indian commissioners, announcing the discovery of copper deposits on the south side of Lake Superior that would be invaluable to the United States. This led to the treaty with the Ottawa, et al., on November 17, 1807.⁹⁹

As to the importance of copper, Jefferson declared that "Congress are authorized to defend the nation. Ships are necessary for defence [*sic*]; copper is necessary for ships; mines necessary for copper; a company necessary to work

⁹⁹Richard Cooper to Secretary of State James Madison, May 31, 1801. Robert J. Brugger, et al., ed., *The Papers of James Madison*, Secretary of State Series, vol. 1, 4 March-31 July 1801 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986), 241.

mines; and who can doubt this reasoning who has ever played at 'This is the House that Jack built'?"¹⁰⁰

In one of his frequent reports to Jefferson while exploring the Red River and Arkansas River country, William Dunbar told the president of a silver mine described by John Sibley, a member of the expedition who had gone ahead of Dunbar's party: "the Richness of it is not well known" though the "Oar [sic] is in large quantities."¹⁰¹

In his Fourth Annual Message, Jefferson told Congress of the discovery of lead mines in Indiana Territory: "The lead mines in that district offer so rich a supply of that metal as to merit attention. The report now communicated will inform you of their state and of the necessity of immediate inquiry into their occupation and titles [Indians]."¹⁰²

The salt springs in Illinois Territory, which were primary objects of the treaty signed with the Delaware, et al., in 1803, offered not only an opportunity to obtain revenue by leasing the salt springs to a manufacturer, but had, adjacent to them, a bed of coal.¹⁰³

Jefferson responded to the commercial needs of westerners by negotiating treaties with the Chickasaws so as to blaze the Natchez Trace. Nashville's Tennessee Gazette reported in November 1801 that "we hear from the Chickasaw

¹⁰⁰Jefferson to Edward Livingston, Esq., April 30, 1800, Bergh, Writings, vol. 10, 165.

¹⁰¹John Sibley to Dunbar, April 2, 1805, Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers, 168; Dunbar's letters and journal entries were forwarded to Jefferson, as acknowledged by the latter's letter of May 25, 1805, to Dunbar; however, the letters and journal entries are not among known collections.

¹⁰²Fourth Annual Message, November 8, 1804, Richardson, 359.

¹⁰³President's Report to the Senate and the House of Representatives, January 18, 1803, *Ibid.*, 343.

Bluffs, that the Chickasaw Indians have agreed to the cutting of the road from this place to the Natchez."¹⁰⁴ Five years later Congress appropriated funds to relocate and improve the transwilderness highway. In 1806, 455 flatboats laden with goods, made the trip down the Mississippi River, and in 1808, 1,049 took that route to New Orleans.¹⁰⁵

Jefferson soon found more than ease of transportation in the Natchez Trace. In 1805 fellow planter and amateur scientist, Dr. Rush Nutt, discovered iron ore near the Natchez Trace on a ridge south of the Buffalo River in Tennessee.¹⁰⁶ After word of the discovery reached Jefferson, he urged the Congressional appropriation in 1806 to relocate and improve the Natchez Trace.

William Dunbar of Natchez, also a planter and scientist, profited by the improved road. He drew an advance on two-thirds of his cotton exports from his London merchants because of the increased speed and efficiency of getting his cotton to them..¹⁰⁷

Jefferson and a number of his Republican colleagues found substantive economic support in the writings of Adam Smith. Smith argued that wealth in America was created primarily in agriculture.¹⁰⁸ He also attested that "Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of carriage, put

¹⁰⁴Tennessee Gazette (Nashville), 18 November 1801.

¹⁰⁵Thomas D. Clark, Agrarian Kentucky (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977), 19.

¹⁰⁶Dawson A. Phelps and John T. Willett, "Iron Works on the Natchez Trace," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 12 (Mar.-Dec. 1963): 309-22.

¹⁰⁷ Dunbar to Green & Wainwright, February 25, 1806, Rowland, 328.

¹⁰⁸Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: Books 1-3, ed., Andrew Skinner (London: The Penguin Group, 1986), 516.

the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those in the neighborhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which must always be the most extensive circle of the country."¹⁰⁹ Jefferson read Smith extensively and used aspects of his writings that he found applicable to the unique circumstances of the North American continent: witness the expeditions of Lewis and Clark, and that by Colonel Freeman to the Red River country; his treaties with Native Americans for cessions of land near to or including rivers; and his pronounced desire to build canals and roads to facilitate commercial transportation.

Smith contended that, "the land constitutes by far the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of every extensive country."¹¹⁰ He also asserted that "the capital . . . that is acquired to any country by commerce and manufactures, is all a very precarious and uncertain possession till some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvements of its lands."¹¹¹

Jefferson and his fellow Republicans opposed commerce that did not contribute to the wealth and well-being of the fledgling republic; the commerce of a small elite contingent of New England merchants which contributed to their own extensive wealth but provided little benefit to the nation. This type of commerce was the carrying trade in which merchants simply shipped goods--in

¹⁰⁹Skinner, ed., Wealth of Nations, 251.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 348.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, 519.

particular, luxury items--from one port to another. They produced nothing and, when carried to excess, Republicans insisted, corrupted society.

The experiences of the tidewater planters of Virginia on the eve of the American Revolution demonstrated the corrosive qualities of the carrying trade. Jefferson was among this group who consigned their crops to London merchants in exchange for goods. Progressively, however, the planters fell into debt to the merchants, buying on credit luxuries such as china, silver, and carriages so as to lead the lives of proper English gentlemen. Some, such as Jefferson and Washington, survived; many others went bankrupt. Jefferson, Gallatin, Madison, and others in the president's cabinet and in Congress wanted to base the nation's economy on the industriousness of American people working the land, selling their produce both at home and abroad. Drew McCoy, in The Elusive Republic, says that "a truly republican political economy . . . included neither an over-extended commerce that was unrelated to the health and prosperity of the mass of republican producers nor a naval system that would, in defending such a commerce, threaten to embroil the United States in unnecessary, expensive, and potentially corrupting wars with the mercantilist powers of Europe."¹¹²

Discharge of the National Debt
and
Abolishment of other Federal Internal Taxes

Jefferson was able to abolish forms of revenue-gathering which he despised, using proceeds from sale of public lands, secured by Indian cessions. He argued that without the direct tax and duties on goods, his republican vision

¹¹²Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1980), 177-78.

of an industrious society reaping the rewards of its collective labors, would be realized.

Jefferson railed against the fear of some over the abolition of all internal taxes, contending that no harm would come from such a happy event. These taxes brought in less than one million dollars each year; with economy of government, Jefferson believed that savings of two to three times that sum could be realized. One source of revenue, the impost, garnered ten to eleven million dollars annually and was expected to double in ten years based on a compound ratio of six and two-thirds percent each year. If that money were set aside for contingencies, claimed the president, "the present amount will support the government, pay the interest of the public debt, and discharge the principal in fifteen years," and under favorable circumstances in less time. Jefferson stated that one half of the public debt was owned in the United States; this capital amounted to about thirty-seven million dollars, which could enhance agricultural production, rescue commerce from foreign factors, and build canals, bridges, or any other advantageous undertakings. If all internal taxes were abolished, three-fourths of the political offices in existence would be done away with, resulting in considerable savings to the central government, thus exacting the confidence and happiness of the people.¹¹³

In his First Inaugural Address, Jefferson declared that a "wise and frugal Government . . . shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned," an allusion to taxation.¹¹⁴

¹¹³Jefferson to Dickinson, December 19, 1801, Bergh, *Writings*, vol. 10, 302-3.

¹¹⁴First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, Richardson, 311.

In his First Annual Message, Jefferson cheerily advised that there was sufficient cause to believe that the federal government could "dispense with all the internal taxes" and that while wars or other unexpected occurrences might, from time to time arise, "sound principles will not justify our taxing the industry of our fellow citizens to accumulate treasures for wars to happen [we] know not when, and which might not perhaps happen but from the temptations offered by that treasure."¹¹⁵

As to the sale of public lands as an alternative to the burdens of internal taxes, the President said, "the success which has attended the late sales of the public lands, shows that with attention they may be an important source of receipt. Among the payments, those made in discharge of the principle and interest of the national debt, will show that the public faith has been exactly maintained."¹¹⁶

Republicanism, the Independent Farmer, and Slavery

Jefferson's vision of republicanism and a virtuous republic was predicated on the availability of land for white settlers, who, through ownership of property and cultivation of soil, would constitute a higher class of citizenry than the wretched masses of Europe or of the corrupting cities of the north and mid-Atlantic states:

Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he had made his peculiar deposit for

¹¹⁵First Annual Message, December 8, 1801, *Ibid.*, 316.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, 317.

substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age or nation has furnished an example.¹¹⁷

Charles A. Miller, in Jefferson and Nature, raised an interesting point about this oft-quoted declaration. The term "sacred fire," as used by Washington in his First Inaugural Address, referred to liberty; for Jefferson the meaning was altogether different. Miller believed Jefferson was referring to the sacred fire of ancient Rome. Miller contended that Roman culture "suffused" Jefferson's personal life, especially on his plantation at Monticello, whose architecture was adorned by depiction of Roman agriculture. The sacred fire sculptured on the dome of Monticello was modeled on a temple in Rome dedicated to Vesta, goddess of the hearth, whose priestesses vowed to keep burning forever the fire that she had brought back from Troy. "It is pagan antiquity, not physiocratic political economy, that supplies Jefferson's farmers with a household of substantial and genuine virtue," argued Miller.¹¹⁸

I do not bring up this point to become embroiled in the debate over the origins of Jefferson's republicanism or political economy, much has been written about classical versus country ideology and physiocratic or other sources of political economic theory. Miller's assertion raises another, more salient point: Roman agricultural production had to be extensive to support an ever-expanding empire. Such a labor-intensive endeavor found its source of workers in slaves. Jefferson's envisioned republic of virtuous, independent farmers was based on

¹¹⁷Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed., William Peden (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1954), 164-65.

¹¹⁸Charles A. Miller, Jefferson and Nature: An Interpretation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 209-10.

the same source of labor: slaves. With so many adult white males acquiring parcels of land with relative ease, where were they going to obtain sufficient labor to sow, tend, and harvest their crops?

Jefferson had a knack for anticipating future developments (especially if he thought he might have a hand in them). When the importation of African slaves was abolished, a drastic change took place within the institution of slavery—interregional exportation. Slavery became an industry in the United States.¹¹⁹ The last paragraph of Query XXII in Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia was both anticipatory and an unabashed acknowledgment of slavery as an integral element in the perpetuation of the republic:

The value of our lands and slaves, taken conjunctly [*sic*], doubles in about twenty years. This arises from the multiplication of our slaves, from the extension of culture, and increased demands for lands. The amount of what we may raise will of course rise in the same proportion.¹²⁰

Jefferson's farmers were not just self-sufficient; they were agrarian capitalists, selling their prolific surplus produce either directly or indirectly to foreign markets. Slavery made it feasible to cultivate these surplus crops. Slave owners sought to improve upon what they perceived as the blacks' natural propensity to reproduce rapidly by purchasing sufficient numbers of females at auctions or by written purchase orders to slave traders.¹²¹

¹¹⁹Peter Kolchin, American Slavery: 1619-1877 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 96-98, 126; Kenneth Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 237-44; Winfield H. Collins, The Domestic Slave Trade of the Southern States (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1969, reprint of the 1904 ed.), 21-67; Frederic Bancroft, Slave Trading in the Old South (Baltimore: J. H. Furst Company, 1931), 22-23; Robert William Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 43-58.

¹²⁰Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, 302.

¹²¹Dunbar to Tunno and Price, February 1, 1807, Rowland, 351-52.

As Indian lands were ceded to the United States and subsequently sold to the public, new farms dotted the landscape and the settlers' desire for slaves increased markedly. The invention of the cotton gin, the acquisition of new, fertile lands well-suited to the cultivation of cotton, and the introduction of a type of cotton that would grow well in the interior regions proliferated the domestic slave trade.

Slavery, in Jefferson's envisioned republic, meant more than the monetary benefits of commercial agrarianism. Part of the virtue of the independent farmer was not just his industriousness in cultivation of the land, but also his participation in civic functions. In order to take part in local politics and other civic duties, such as promoting education, the virtuous farmer required time to contemplate the issues, formulate opinions, and act. A farmer who spent all his waking hours in the field or constructing and repairing buildings and tools did not have time to fulfill his republican responsibilities; hence the need for slaves to allow him time for intellectual pursuits to help his community and, by extension, the national republic.

For all his rhetoric about the evils of slavery Jefferson resolutely subordinated such misgivings to the perpetuation of that which was most dear to him--the virtuous republic.

Barrier to Foreign Intrigue

One aspect of Jefferson's Indian policy was to acquire lands to buttress frontier borders and to protect waterways and ports. North American commercial competition, infringements upon perceived rights of navigation and

deposit, and competition for influence over the Indians were national concerns which Jefferson dealt with, in part, by acquisition of Indian lands.

Jefferson declaimed that the functions of the federal government included erecting barriers against foreign foes, and "to watch the borders of every State, that no external hand may intrude. . . ." ¹²² In a letter to William Dunbar, after reviewing problems regarding the right of deposit at New Orleans, Jefferson expressed concern over the potential for renewed conflicts of a similar nature. Jefferson avered that "we shall endeavor to procure the Indian right of soil, as soon as they can be prevailed on to part with it, the whole left bank of the Mississippi to a respectable breadth, and encourage a prompt settlement, and thereby plant on the Mississippi itself the means of its own defense and present as strong a frontier as that on our Eastern border." ¹²³ Again to Dunbar in 1805, Jefferson advised that due to strained relations with Spain, the United States should make every effort to attain the "friendship" of Indians who lived within the sphere of influence of Spain. ¹²⁴

Between the treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795 and Jefferson's election in 1800, the Spanish enjoyed a relatively effective barrier against American territories in Louisiana and the Floridas: the Chickasaw, Creek, and Choctaw Nations. The border nations, however, were another matter. The Cherokee, for instance, had substantial intercourse with the United States during Washington's and Adams's administrations, and continued during Jefferson's tenure. It wasn't a matter of the Cherokees not dealing with the Spanish--Panton, Leslie & Company had a

¹²²Jefferson to Amos Marsh, November 20, 1801, Bergh, 293.

¹²³Jefferson to Dunbar, March 3, 1803, Rowland, 158-59.

¹²⁴Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1803, Ibid., 174.

considerable amount of money invested in trade with them--it was, rather, that the United States government realized the advantages of trade with the Cherokees, unlike its failure to recognize the significance of such intercourse with the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws until Jefferson became president in 1801. Panton realized that he could not compete with the United States in Indian trade and, after the restraints imposed upon him by the Treaty of San Lorenzo, in which the Spanish did not support his claim for debts owed by all four Indian nations, he retired, leaving the business to his partners.¹²⁵

Foreign incursion was not limited to the lower Mississippi region or the southeast. The British were entrenched from the north downward. Louisiana Governor Wilkinson, in his report to War Secretary Dearborn, testified:

It is well known that the Indian trade, from Hudsons bay and the St Lawrence, to the remotest streams of the lakes, the Mississippi and the Missouri is nearly monopolized by British Traders, their factors Agents and Engagees, and their goods are imported and their furs [sic] exported through British Posts; the privation We Suffer from this diversion of our rightful commerce, is a trifling ill, when compared to the transcendent influence, which is thus acquired and perpetuated by a foreign power, over the aborigines within our national limits. . . .¹²⁶

Jefferson's method to resolve the problems of foreign trade and influence upon the Indians was to acquire land from the Indians to extend the boundaries of the United States and to expel the British, French, and Spanish. This enabled Jefferson to gain control over the Indians and engage them in commerce, which resulted in debts necessitating the cession of even more lands and ensuring that the Indians would not sell their lands to foreign powers. This was another

¹²⁵Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question*, 68-78.

¹²⁶Governor Wilkinson to Secretary of War, September 8, 1805, Carter, vol. 13, 198. See also Wilkinson to the Officers of the Territory, August 22, 1805, *Ibid.*, 188-89.

variation of "the House that Jack built" analogy that Jefferson had employed in his lecture on the importance of copper.

Section 3: Analysis of Jefferson's Successes and Failures in Indian Policy

The primary purpose of Jefferson's Indian policy was to acquire Indian lands in order to attain the objectives enumerated in Section 2 of this chapter.

Did Thomas Jefferson succeed in his quest for a virtuous republic? The following analysis, based on census, export, and tax records, as well as records relating to Congressional elections, newspapers, and letters attempts to answer this question.

House of Representatives

One of Jefferson's objectives was to increase the number of Republican members of the House of Representatives. The Sixth Congress, March 4, 1799, to March 3, 1801, had 106 seats divided between Federalists and Republicans 60 to 46, respectively. The Seventh Congress, March 4, 1801, to March 3, 1803, had 107 seats, one of which was vacant; 38 were Federalist and 68 were Republican. The Eighth Congress, March 4, 1803, to March 3, 1805, had 142 seats of which 39 were Federalist and 103 Republican. The Ninth Congress, March 4, 1805, to March 3, 1807, also had 142 seats composed of 28 Federalists and 144 Republicans. The

Tenth Congress, March 4, 1807, to March 3, 1809, had 142 seats consisting of 26 Federalists and 146 Republicans.¹²⁷

At first glance it would appear that Jefferson had reached his objective, concerning the House. During his first administration the Federalists were reduced to a powerless minority, and the Republicans passed legislation with little more than a whimper and a whine from the Federalists.

The Land Law of 1804 reduced the minimum parcel of public land that could be purchased from 320 to 160 acres, thereby enabling more people to purchase tracts of ceded Indian land.¹²⁸ It was also a self-serving proposition for the Republicans because more settlers moved into the western and newer southern regions of the nation where the Republicans were very strong. The increase in western and southern populations was reflected in subsequent apportionment, enabling the Republican Party to gain more seats as the total number of seats in the House increased.

While the older seaboard South gradually lost representation and power to the new South and the West, due to the influx of settlers moving into the new regions, other population changes were occurring in the north, particularly in the mid-Atlantic states, such as New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, as well as in the New England state of Massachusetts.

During Jefferson's second term the seams of cohesion in the Republican Party began to tear. Factions developed which had their own agendas, in many

¹²⁷ Kenneth C. Martis and Gregory A. Elmes, The Historical Atlas of State Power in Congress, 1790-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993), 75-80.

¹²⁸ James Muhn and Hanson R. Stuart, "Opportunity and Challenge: The Story of BLM" (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, September 1988), 6-9.

instances at odds with the president's. The states engaged in manufacturing and trade gained population due chiefly to European emigration, as well as natural reproduction of a relatively dense population. A corresponding increase in representation occurred, resulting in an increase in the number of House seats for these states. New York went from ten seats in the Sixth Congress to seventeen in the Tenth Congress. Pennsylvania increased from thirteen to eighteen seats, and New Jersey from five to six seats. Vermont doubled from two to four. In New England, Massachusetts had a gain in seats from fourteen to seventeen during this period. New Hampshire, starting with four seats, had five at the start of the Tenth Congress. These states, though benefiting from southern and western agriculture, did not share Jefferson's southern-oriented vision of a republic founded on agrarianism, with commerce as its "handmaid."

In the South, Georgia, starting with two seats during the Sixth Congress, had four in the Eighth, remaining at that number through the Tenth Congress. North Carolina increased its representation from ten to twelve, adding another after the Third Census. South Carolina gained two seats, having started with six and ending with eight. Virginia initially acquired six additional seats in the House, from sixteen to twenty-two, between the Sixth and Seventh Congresses, but added only two more seats in the Ninth, indicative of the emigration from Virginia into new lands in Georgia's interior, as well as into Tennessee, Kentucky, and the western territories.

In the West, Ohio was apportioned one representative in the Eighth Congress, while Tennessee picked up two. Kentucky began with two seats and finished with six. Pennsylvania was a good example of how emigration affected representation. Though Pennsylvania began with nine representatives and

ended with fifteen, the years in between are significant. The number of seats was as follows: thirteen at the Sixth, thirteen at the Seventh, eighteen at the Ninth, and eighteen at the Tenth Congress. The increase in the early years reflected a large gain in population, whereas the stagnation in the later years resulted from emigration from western Pennsylvania into Kentucky and Tennessee, which gained four and two seats respectively. Maryland, which started with eight representatives, gained one more. Kentucky gained not only from Pennsylvania, but from Virginia, North Carolina, and Maryland as well.¹²⁹ The losses to these states, and Virginia's stagnation, occurred during the latter part of Jefferson's second administration. Power shifted from the original thirteen states to the trans-Appalachian states. The number of Republican representatives in the House meant less than before, as cohesion in the Republican Party broke down, leaving Jefferson with a House representing diverse interests. Other regions of the country were not interested in replicating Jefferson's Virginia, his model for an idealized republic and way of life.

Strengthening the Republican Party

Most of those who had gone over to the Federalists before the election of 1800, came back as Jefferson had hoped. During his first administration Jefferson enjoyed party solidarity that escaped him during his second term. Many shared his objectives of obtaining Indian lands so that they could reap the profits of surplus farming, but not all shared his vision of a virtuous republic. Insatiable hunger for land and consumer goods prevailed over theoretical and idealized

¹²⁹Martis, The Historical Atlas, 75-80.

visions. Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia were different from Virginia. Some wealthy citizens of these states had come from the Old Dominion and replicated their lives there, but most settlers, including those from Virginia, were not wealthy aristocrats, but small farmers and artisans who sought new lives on new lands. Though Jefferson wished to cover the republican landscape with small farmers, they did not necessarily share his idea of virtue nor did they have the luxury of time to be publicly virtuous. The wealthy among them had time to participate in local politics, but the average small farmer did not. Slavery was the agent of republican virtue; most settlers were either inadequately served by it, or served not at all.

Republicanism, the Independent Farmer, and Slavery

Most farmers settling in the new South or in the West had either a few slaves or none at all. Those who had a few worked alongside their slaves in the fields. A scant few of the wealthy had fifty or more slaves, and these men, like Jefferson, had time to contemplate political and social issues and be active participants in local, state, and national affairs. While their small farmer counterparts worked long hours, the great planters, with overseers to manage the day-to-day operations of their plantations, had time to sip brandy and discuss politics and agriculture. Even planters who kept close watch on their overseers had sufficient time to engage in civic virtue. For most small farmers civic virtue was beyond their reach. Working hard to acquire desirable consumer goods proved to be a more attainable objective. This desire differed from Jefferson's concept of a small, independent, industrious, and virtuous farmer who would

sell his surplus product to European markets so that he might obtain goods and merchandise of a "necessary" nature from European manufacturers, that he could not manufacture himself.

Baldwin County, Georgia, provides an example of the typical distribution of slaves during Jefferson's presidency. Baldwin, a predominantly cotton-growing county, was established between the second and third censuses and located on fertile lands ceded by the Indians. A representative sampling of 263 taxpayers from the tax digest of 1810 provides some insight into the circumstances of the majority of farmers. The average number of acres per landholder was 205.7. The average number of slaves per owner was 3.67. The taxpayer owning the most slaves attached to property in Baldwin County had 23 slaves on but 202.5 acres. Slave-owning farmers would have used only as many slaves as necessary to tend their crops, renting out the rest to other farmers, especially at harvest time. The taxpayer with the most land in Baldwin County had 3 slaves and owned 2,430 acres (much of it probably pine forest land). Of the 263 taxpayers in the sample, 105 did not own slaves. These people owned from 20 to 587.5 acres each. The greatest number of these taxpayers (40) owned parcels averaging 202.5 acres.

Breaking down Baldwin County into its seven militia districts establishes a clear picture of the distribution of slaves.

Table 1.—Baldwin County Distribution of Slaves

District	Taxpayers	Slaves	Average No. of Slaves
Howard	37	124	3.5 on 295.1 acres
Jarrat	10	62	6.2 on 176.65 acres
Watson	49	177	3.61 on 186.47 acres
Lander	43	367	8.53 on 394.1 acres
Hill	37	129	3.5 on 192.6 acres

Cox	33	58	1.76 on 183.75 acres
Brown	29	126	4.34 on 209.1 acres
Gum	25	82	3.3 on 210.16 acres

Source: Baldwin County, Georgia Tax Digest, 1810.

Georgia State Dept. of Archives and History.

Microfilm GDAH 187/27: 184-27.

Clearly, Captains Jarrat's and Lander's Districts significantly raised the average number of slaves per taxpayer. Captains Howard's, Watson's, Hill's, and Gum's Districts were more representative of the county as a whole, while Cox's was low and Brown's a little above the average.

Figure 1 depicts the distribution of slave ownership in Baldwin County.

Figure 1

Baldwin County Slave Ownership

Source: Baldwin County, Georgia Tax Digest, 1810.

Georgia State Dept. of Archives and History.

Microfilm GDAH 187/27: 184-27.

The Census of 1800 indicates that in Georgia there were 59,699 slaves. The Third Census (1810) recorded 105,218, an increase of 45,519 or 56.7%. The new counties in Georgia established between these two censuses accounted for 18,457 slaves, 17.5% of the total in the state or 40.5% of the total increase during the decade.

Tennessee and Kentucky also experienced substantial increases in slave population in their new counties established on ceded Indian lands. In 1800 Tennesseans owned 13,584 slaves. As of 1810 the slave population was 44,535, an increase of 30,951 or 69.5%. The slave population in the seventeen new counties established during this period amounted to 10,671 or 23.9% of the state total. This accounted for 34.5% of the total increase in slaves throughout Tennessee.

In 1800 the slave population of Kentucky was 40,343. By 1810 this figure was 80,561, a rise of 40,218 or 99.7%. The new county of Wayne and the expanded counties of Knox and Pulaski added 12,943 slaves to the state total or 16% of Kentucky's slave population. This represented 32.2% of the increase in slaves in the state.

In Wayne County, according to the tax records for 1810, eighty out of four hundred twenty-two rural landowners owned slaves. Twenty-nine owned one slave each, fifteen had two, five possessed three each and one slave holder had eighteen slaves. 18.96% of rural landowners held slaves, while 81.04% had none. Of the eighty who owned slaves, 36.25% had one each.¹³⁰

¹³⁰Wayne County, 1810, County Clerk Tax Assessment Books, Roll No. 008269.

Figures 2 further illustrates the paradox between Jefferson's vision of a virtuous republic sustained by slavery, and the reality of the extent of slavery in newly settled regions.

Source: Wayne County, 1810, Clerk
Tax Assessment Books
Microfilm Roll No. 008269

Eighty-one percent of landowners in Wayne County owned no slaves. Of the remaining nineteen percent with slaves, less than three percent owned seven or more slaves.

Figure 3, based on a differentiation enumerated in the tax records between the total number of slaves and those above the age of sixteen years, indicates the pattern of slave distribution in the newly settled regions formerly held by Native Americans.

Figure 3
Wayne County, Slaves Above 16

Source: Wayne County, 1810, County Clerk
Tax Assessment Books
Microfilm Roll No. 008269

Slaveholders owning slaves over the age of sixteen were subject to a poll tax. But the age differentiation recorded in the tax digests extended beyond tax liabilities; a slave over the age of sixteen, if not elderly or infirmed, was likely to be more robust and capable of arduous labor than a child. While children often worked in cotton fields, they usually did not have the capacity to work with tobacco, to fell trees or to engage in other more strenuous forms of labor. Thus, most slaveholders did not have sufficient labor to conform to Jefferson's envisioned republic of independent and virtuous farmers.

Acreage in Stewart County, Tennessee, ranged from 10 to 1,005 acres per parcel. Land was divided into three categories: first, second, and third rate. First rate land was suitable for high yielding crops, whereas second rate land combined arable soil and timber. Third rate land was typically rocky and full of scrub brush; the top soil was thin and not particularly fecund. Few landowners had first rate land. The only slave holder with prime agricultural land had ten slaves, though but three were above sixteen years of age. The parcel consisted of four hundred acres. Slaves were attached to forty-three parcels with a second rating. Thirty-three parcels on which slaves were held were rated third. Some slaveholders had additional parcels of land rated either second or third; these did not have slaves attached to them, though owners may have had their slaves clear trees and brush on these sites from time to time. A clear majority of the landowners without slaves had parcels rated third. Three hundred thirty-four parcels, in which no slaves were attached to the land, were rated third, while one hundred thirteen were rated second. Four owners who owned no slaves had one parcel each rated first. These parcels ranged in size from fifty-six to one hundred eighty-two acres of arable land.

Few farmers in Stewart County had the right combination of high quality soil and sufficient numbers of slaves to thrive in Jefferson's visionary republic.

Stewart County in 1808 was divided into five militia companies, along with landowners not attached to a captain. The tax returns for this last group were filed with either the county clerk or with the sheriff.¹³¹

Two hundred thirty-nine rural landowners were recorded in 1808. Of these, one hundred seventy-eight (74.5%) owned no slaves, while sixty-one (25.5%) did own slaves. The number of slaves attached to rural parcels was one hundred fifty-nine. Figure 4 indicates the distribution of slave ownership.

Figure 4

Stewart County Slave Ownership

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Book, vol. 2, Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

¹³¹Records of Stewart County Tax Book, vol. 2, Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

Of the sixty-one landowners holding slaves, the average number of slaves was 2.6. A review of the militia companies and the "Returns of the Clerk and Sheriff" provides a more precise pattern of slave distribution in Stewart County. Tables for the militia companies are in the Appendix. According to the "Returns of the Clerk & Sheriff," George Cathey, Sr. owned sixty acres and possessed two slaves. Thomas French owned four slaves on his 320-acre spread. William Peacock had 100 acres along Blue Creek. He owned five slaves. By Richland Creek lived Thomas Black with his two slaves on a 100 acre parcel. Moses Larissa had 253 acres along Shelby Creek, with one slave. H. Hambleton owned 150 acres and one slave, as did Thomas Hambleton. Josiah Hambleton also owned 150 acres, but had no slaves. He may have borrowed his relatives' slaves at critical times such as during the harvest season. If his crops matured before or after his relatives', he might have been fortunate to use their slaves. If the crops were ready to harvest at the same time, Josiah's relatives would have been hard pressed to release their slaves to Josiah.

It is not too difficult to use one's "historical imagination" to see that most settlers did not have the wherewithal to conform to Jefferson's vision of virtuous and independent farmers in an idealized republican nation. Furthermore, many women owned and cultivated land, yet they were excluded from the higher echelon of Jefferson's envisioned republic: they did not have the right to vote, a right which the president opposed. In Jefferson's republic women would be subservient to white male landholders.

In neither Baldwin County, Georgia; Wayne County, Kentucky; nor Stewart County, Tennessee, were there any of the great slaveholding landowners of Jefferson's beloved Virginia. This is true of all the counties established on

previously ceded Indian lands settled during Jefferson's administrations. The great plantation masters of the South and West lived in the older established counties of Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and most of these planters had migrated from the Old Dominion.

In the Mississippi Territory the 1800 slave population was 3,489.¹³² In 1810 this number rose to 17,088, an increase of 13,599 or 20.4%. The new counties of Wayne, Washington, Baldwin, Amite, and the enlarged county of Franklin added 4,036 slaves to the state total or 23.6%. These counties accounted for 29.6% of the rise in the number of slaves in the territory.¹³³ The Indiana Territory slave population rose from 135 to 237 between 1800 and 1810; an increase of 43%. In Illinois Territory 168 slaves were brought in by 1810.¹³⁴

Jefferson's policies spread slavery throughout the southern and western states and territories. Because of the three-fifths rule, Republican representation in the House increased. Although slavery spread, it did not afford most settlers the opportunity to exercise republicanism's public virtue, as most farmers had few if any slaves.

It should be noted, too, that not all slaves were engaged in agricultural or domestic work. Take for example the iron industry in Tennessee, where slaves were used at such iron works as the Bourbon Iron Works Company of which

¹³²"Return of the Whole Number of Persons within the Several Districts of the United States, according to 'An act providing for the second Census or Enumeration of the Inhabitants of the United States.' Passed February the twenty eighth, one thousand eight hundred." Printed by Order of the House of Representatives (Washington: Duane Printers).

¹³³"Aggregate amount of each description of Persons within the United States of America, and the Territories thereof, agreeably to actual enumeration made according to law, in the year 1810."

¹³⁴Second and Third Censuses of the United States. Though not statistically large numbers, they indicate that where Indian lands were ceded, the introduction or increase of slavery followed.

John Breckinridge, a Jeffersonian Republican and friend and supporter of the president, was a major shareholding partner. Breckinridge was one of the largest slave owners in Tennessee; he also owned more than 20,000 acres.¹³⁵

Commerce

The Republicans deemed exportation of surplus crops and raw materials to foreign markets as a major factor in the economic viability of the new nation. Jefferson pressed for Indian cessions in order to acquire land suitable for commercial cultivation. Jefferson perceived the masses of European workers as laboring in factories; he saw an opportunity to make farmers out of Americans, an occupation which he viewed as the ideal form of Republican virtue. By exporting great quantities of produce and raw materials to Europe, Jefferson intended to keep the majority of Americans out of factories. Better to let the wretched masses in Europe make and export to America goods and merchandise desired by the industrious farmer.

For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1800, the value of exports to foreign markets was \$70,971,780.¹³⁶ In the year ending September 30, 1801, the value was \$93,020,513.¹³⁷ The following year exports dropped back to

¹³⁵Lowell Harrison, John Breckinridge, Jeffersonian Republican (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 184.

¹³⁶Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, From the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1815, vol. 14: Commerce and Navigation, vol. 1, 453.

¹³⁷*Ibid.*, 489.

\$71,957,144,¹³⁸ due to the closing of the deposit at New Orleans. In 1803 the export value plummeted to \$55,800,033¹³⁹, but in 1804 rebounded to \$77,699,074.¹⁴⁰ In 1805 the value of foreign exports shot up to \$95,566,021.¹⁴¹ At the close of fiscal year 1806, the export value was \$101,536,963,¹⁴² skyrocketing to \$108,343,150 in 1807.¹⁴³ This was the zenith of export value during Jefferson's two administrations. With the implementation of the Embargo Act, the value of foreign exports spiraled downward in 1808 to \$22,430,960.¹⁴⁴ For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1809, less than seven months after Jefferson left office, the value of exports climbed to \$52,203,233,¹⁴⁵ still less than half of the best year, 1806-1807.

An examination of the export records on a state-by-state basis provides some illuminating findings. Prior to the fiscal year ending September 30, 1803, no differentiation was made between a state's domestic and foreign exports--only a total value of all exports was recorded. From 1803 on, however, the records were more exact, and the more specific cataloging of exports offers greater insight into the economy of the nation, and thus the significance of the acquisition of Indian lands.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, 507.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 543.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 591.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*, 671.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 696.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, 721.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 738.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 815.

One other deficiency in the export records of note is that not all states were accounted for in each year recorded. Tennessee, for example, appears only in the records for 1801. Kentucky export values are listed for 1802. Ironically, these states' exports were critical to the economic well-being of the new republic; therefore, the lack of data is unfortunate. Apparently, the data for Tennessee and Kentucky were incorporated into the information for the Territory of Orleans; however, no differentiation was made as to what came down the Mississippi River to New Orleans from Tennessee and Kentucky and what originated in the Territory of Orleans.

Of the states enumerated between 1803 and 1809, patterns emerge regarding exportation of produce, goods, merchandise, and raw materials.

The most striking revelation is that in the states in which Indian lands were ceded and new counties developed between the second and third censuses (1800 -1810) the majority of exports were domestic. Most of the domestic exports went to northern and mid-Atlantic states such as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland.

Much of what was sent to other states was raw material which was then either converted into durable goods and exported to foreign markets or exported in raw form for manufacture abroad (see tables in Appendix).

From Tennessee came pig iron. Ceded Indian land which became Dickinson County in 1803 produced 450 tons of iron valued at \$68,500. White County exported 100 tons valued at \$28,000. White and Warren Counties together shipped 50,600 pounds of copperas (ferrous sulfate) valued at \$56,600, as well as 129,695 pounds of salt peter valued at \$16,212. From Warren came 10,000 pounds of red ochre. Gun powder mills in Tennessee did brisk business;

production value amounted to \$48,612. Of that amount \$16,346 came from counties established from Indian lands ceded between 1800 and 1810. The amount produced by these counties was valued at 33.6% of the total for Tennessee. These counties also produced distilled liquors, tanned leather, and cotton and woolen cloth.¹⁴⁶

Much of the iron from Tennessee went to Pennsylvania to be made into nails. Pennsylvania produced \$760,862 worth of nails. New Jersey manufactured 1,235 tons of iron bar valued at \$139,835. New York manufactured 2,292,960 pounds of nails worth \$275,155.20.¹⁴⁷

In Kentucky, Wayne County produced 194,654 yards of blended cloth valued at \$89,261, as well as 2,000 pounds of gun powder, 19,813 pounds of maple sugar, and 51,785 pounds of salt peter valued at \$8,630. Knox and Pulaski Counties expanded as the result of Indian land cessions during Jefferson's presidency. Both produced maple sugar, salt peter, hemp, liquor, cloth, hides, gun powder, and salt. How much came from the newly expanded parts of these counties is unknown based on available data.¹⁴⁸

Ohio produced 1,093,031 yards of flaxen cloth worth \$425,149, as well as 93,074 yards of woolen cloth amounting to \$112,485. Other blended cloth totaled 701,156 yards valued at \$418,244.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶A Series of Tables of the Several Branches of American Manufactures, exhibiting them by every County of the Union, so far as they are returned in the reports of the Marshals, and of the Secretaries of the Territories and their respective assistants, in the Autumn of the Year 1810: Together with Returns of certain doubtful Goods, Productions of the Soil and agricultural Stock, so far as they have been received. (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Treasury, 1810), 140-43.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 50-51; 40-41; 35.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 121-29.

¹⁴⁹A Series of Tables of the Several Branches of American Manufactuers [sic], exhibiting them by States, Territories and Districts, so far as they are returned in the reports of the Marshals, and of the Secretaries of the Territories and their respective assistants, in the Autumn of the Year 1810:

The Territory of Orleans exported 14,010,000 bricks assessed at \$126,090. Thirty-four mills sawed 6,790,000 feet of lumber worth \$339,500. Ninety sugar planters shipped 9,671 hogsheads of sugar going for \$712,372.77.¹⁵⁰

Cotton reigned supreme in Georgia where thirty-seven of thirty-eight counties in Georgia grew cotton. Of these ten were new counties established from public land sales subsequent to Indian cessions between 1800 and 1810. These counties produced 1,218,961 yards of cotton goods. The total for Georgia was 3,688,534. The ten new counties accounted for approximately one-third of all cotton produced in the state. The value of all cotton in Georgia came to \$1,797,264.50. For the ten new counties the total was \$584,477, roughly one third of the total value of cotton in the state.¹⁵¹ Six of the new counties produced 104,262 yards of blended cloth. The total for the state's 23 counties was 471,065. The six new counties produced 22% of the cloth in Georgia. The value of the cloth for the state came to \$325,623.25, of which \$82,867 or 25% came from the six new counties.¹⁵²

In the ten new counties the number of spinning wheels accounted for 26.5% of these implements throughout the state. 23.8% of the looms in Georgia

Together with similar Returns of certain doubtful goods, productions of the soil and agricultural stock, as far as they have been received. (Washington, D. C.: Department of the Treasury, 1810), 2-3.

¹⁵⁰American Manufacturers, 157.

¹⁵¹Ibid., 148. I have not included Wayne county with the new counties' figures as part of Wayne was expanded into Indian land during this time. I do not have a reliable means of determining which part of Wayne expanded into ceded lands or how much cotton was produced in the expanded area or the monetary value of the cotton grown there. (The figures for Wayne were 8,425 yards at \$4,212.50; not enough to affect the percentages enumerated above.)

¹⁵²Ibid., 149. In Camden County, which like Wayne had expanded into ceded Indian land, lumber was a major product. As in the case of Wayne County, it is difficult to determine which part of Camden was new, and how much of its products came from the recently acquired Indian land. 1,252,000 feet of lumber was valued to be worth \$25,040.

were used in the new counties. Distilled liquor and hides accounted for a relatively small percentage of the output for the state.

The number of spinning wheels and looms in Georgia, 20,058 and 13,290, respectively,¹⁵³ indicates two things: 1) cotton became the major crop when interior lands, once held by Indians, became available for commercial cultivation; 2) Jefferson's goal of creating domestic manufactures to work in conjunction with agriculture had been realized. One must take into consideration, however, that the above figures are from the American Manufacturers' tables of 1810; therefore, the domestic consequences of the Embargo Act must be taken into account. It is likely, though, that most of these implements would have been in use, despite the Embargo, since cotton was such a prolific crop (see tables in Appendix).

Jefferson acquired silver, copper, iron, lead mines, salt springs and coal beds through Indian land cessions. Copper, in particular, was prized for its versatility in making rivets for ship-building, culinary utensils, and minted coins (half-cents and cents). The latter also proved to be profitable.

Table 7.--Copper Coins Minted

Year	Amount of Copper Coins Minted	Profit (not recorded after 1805)
1801	\$13,628.37	
1802	\$34,422.83	\$5,644.32
1803	\$25,203.03	\$5,095.48
1804	\$12,844.94	\$2,597.52
1805	\$13,483.48	\$2,187.68
1806	\$5,260	
1807	\$9,652.21	
1808	\$13,090.00	

Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Finance, Vol. 2, 634.

¹⁵³Ibid., 150.

Copper from the Lake Superior region was exported to Massachusetts for manufacturing. Copper, along with brass, amounted to 45,135 pounds of goods valued at \$29,964. Pennsylvania, too, manufactured copper, as well as brass and tin items. One hundred nine manufactories produced \$361,650 worth of goods.¹⁵⁴

Silver ore production boosted the mintage of silver coins from 58,343 pieces in 1802 to 255,787 in 1803, worth \$87,118. In 1804 the amount of coins made dropped to 191,092, yet the value was higher at \$100,345.50 (due possibly to a temporary shortage of silver). In 1805 mint production rose again to 469,496 coins valued at \$149,067.50 (apparently silver had become quite plentiful, thus lowering the value). The surge in silver production corresponded with the acquisition of silver mines gained by treaty. In 1806, 1,045,700 coins worth \$471,319 were minted, in 1807, 1,437,219 coins worth \$597,448.75, 1,368,600 silver coins in 1808 valued at \$684,300, and in 1809, 1,450,250 coins worth \$707,376.¹⁵⁵

Jefferson succeeded in creating an agrarian republic, supported by domestic manufactures, that lasted until the "age of Jackson." The acquisition of Indian lands resulted in thousands of new farms throughout the nation. Exports, both domestic and foreign, flourished throughout most of Jefferson's tenure.

Jefferson wanted his farmers to be independent. This simply did not prove to be the case. The farmer may have been industrious, but was dependent upon conditions not within his control. The agrarian-based economy of Jefferson's republic was founded on the ability to get surplus produce and goods to foreign

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁵⁵*ASP*, vol. 10: *Finance*, vol.2, 21, 76, 119, 166, 225, 264, 317.

markets. If conditions, political or otherwise, changed in foreign countries, access to these markets could be curbed or eliminated. European wars, climate, and economic factors placed the American farmer at the mercy of international flux. As Jefferson's Embargo proved, United States policy could have a deleterious effect on agriculture. Historian Joyce Appleby argued that high yields abroad, rather than the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, repressed demand for American agricultural products.¹⁵⁶ I agree that conditions in Europe suppressed the demand for American produce, but would not the end of a continental war have enabled European farmers to produce greater yields?

Appleby noted that although high food prices increased the range of the market, soil and climate more rigidly delimited the domain of agriculture. In New England the thin soils and rocky terrain also kept farmers from competing effectively with the fertile farmlands of the South and West. I contend that soil and climate varied in the south and were factors that affected the kinds of crops that could be grown. This created a strong desire for fertile lands and more favorable climates further inland in the possession of Native Americans.¹⁵⁷

Jefferson did gain access to foreign markets, largely by resolving the problems associated with the right of deposit at New Orleans and by establishing free navigation on the Mississippi River. This gave farmers from Ohio, Tennessee, Kentucky, and the Indiana and Illinois Territories, an outlet to the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The Louisiana Purchase doubled the size

¹⁵⁶Joyce Appleby, 'The 'Agrarian Myth' in the Early Republic,' in Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 263.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 267.

of the nation and ensured unfettered transfer of goods from the interior of the country to the sea.

Reduction of the National Debt and Abolishment of Federal Internal Taxes

One of Jefferson's main objectives was to reduce the national debt and make the onerous direct tax, as well as other federal internal taxes, unnecessary. He did this largely by selling public lands obtained from the Indians.

Table 8.--Revenue Derived from the Sale of Public Lands

Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30th	Number of Acres Sold	Revenue Received for Acreage sold
1801	243,000	\$326,052.08
1802	200,000*	\$398,162.28
1803	314,253.41	\$633,563.83
1804	619,266.13	\$1,235,953.22
1805	473,211.63	\$1,001,358.02
1806	359,011.79	\$738,273.29
1807	195,579.21	\$433,444.54
1808	143,409.24	\$355,783.04
1809	158,843.57	\$344,256.16
Total	2,706,573.7	\$5,466,846.16

*Less because of "situation of the Western country."

Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Finance, Vol. 2, 634.

Before abolishing most internal taxes, Jefferson derived revenue from liquor, as well as from refined sugar. Sugar from southern and western states was exported to Massachusetts (422,000 pounds valued at \$82,400), New York (2,474,742 pounds totaling \$420,706.14), Pennsylvania (3,364,590 pounds valued

at \$605,618), and Maryland (755,879 pounds amounting to \$150,000). Duties on refined sugar totaled \$78,687.14 in 1801.¹⁵⁸

Revenue from stills and liquor for the year ending December 31, 1801 totaled \$257,070.03.¹⁵⁹

The national debt was reduced from \$83,38,050.80 in 1801 to \$57,023,192.09 in 1809.¹⁶⁰

* * *

Jefferson substantially reduced the national debt by acquiring and selling millions of acres of Native American land. As thousands of farms were created throughout the new South and the West, surplus products increased dramatically, thereby enhancing both domestic and foreign exportation of goods and produce. The farmers provided a network of frontier defense, while land cessions along exterior borders reduced the sphere of influence of the British, Spanish, and French over the Indians. The administration acquired natural resources such as copper, salt, coal, gold, silver, and iron. Land cessions resulted in access and control of rivers, enabling farmers to ship their goods and produce to sea ports. Canals were built to create a network of waterways between inland rivers. Overland routes became accessible for transporting mail, people, and goods. Commerce flourished. The increase in population in the new South and the West led to a collateral increase in Republican representation in Congress.

¹⁵⁸ASP, vol. 10: Finance, vol. 2, 14.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 14.

¹⁶⁰Ibid., 425.

Jefferson failed, however, to create a virtuous republic based on a society comprised of independent yeoman farmers. He bolstered the trans-Atlantic trade, but this made the farmer's success dependent on a fluctuating foreign demand for goods, produce, and raw materials. Jefferson attained his pre-presidential goal of spreading slavery throughout the newer regions of the nation with the intent of diffusing the slave population to the point in which the institution eventually would cease to exist. This goal was diametrically opposed to his presidential ambition of making the nation's farmers virtuous republicans. Though slavery spread into ceded lands, it was--during Jefferson's presidency--sufficiently diffused so that most farmers in the new South and the West had no slaves, and those who did, didn't have enough to afford them time to become involved in civic matters. They were not consumed with a passion for virtuous participation in government and society but for the acquisition of material wealth and comfort. Jefferson's Indian policy did not lead to a virtuous republic but to a phase of economic development that was antecedent to the Industrial Revolution. Jefferson created an agrarian capitalism supported by manufactures.

CHAPTER THREE

GEORGIA: A CASE STUDY FOR INDIAN REMOVAL

When Thomas Jefferson ascended to the presidency March 4, 1801, he brought with him a wagon-load of intellectual baggage. Amongst the numerous articles was his philanthropic quest to acculturate the Indians with white society. Intending to follow the precedents set by George Washington, Jefferson soon found himself under considerable pressure to let his "enlightened" philanthropic efforts take a backseat to political expediency in his approach to Indian-white relations.

No state government and no populace within a state brought greater pressure to bear upon the new president than the state and people of Georgia. Georgia pursued its views on Indian affairs more vigorously than any other state, and not only championed its cause for itself and for several neighboring states, but also had the greatest impact, over the longest time, concerning treatment of the Indians. Up through Andrew Jackson's administrations, Georgians sought to remove Indians beyond their state's boundaries. Furthermore, Georgians voted three times to elect Jefferson president (1796, 1800, and 1804) and continued to vote for his disciples through the election of 1824.

The first part of this chapter, therefore, is a review of the intellectual views of Georgians, focusing on the ideological issues espoused so adamantly by governors, legislators, and private citizens.

The second part of this chapter is an analysis of these intellectual factors, examining how they compare to the documented realities of the times.

States' rights (or sovereignty of the state) was central to the pursuit of land cession and outright Indian removal in Georgia. Demanded vehemently by public and private citizens alike, "states' rights" was the rallying cry evoked whenever the federal government seemed an obstacle to the achievement of their individual and collective desires.

From the inception of the Continental Congress through the administration of John Adams, Georgians felt that the federal government had trampled upon their state's sovereignty. Treaties with ambiguous clauses seemed to create alliances between Indians and the United States against Georgia. Congress passed acts that, regardless of clauses addressing the solemn sovereignty of the state of Georgia, impinged upon the jurisdiction of the state.

With the election of Jefferson to the presidency, Georgians believed that no longer would their grievances fall upon deaf Federalist ears. Jefferson, renowned as a champion of states' rights and as an opponent of a strong central government, would respect their state's sovereignty and offer relief from their endured hardships.

As soon became apparent, however, the governing officials of Georgia decided not to leave things to chance. A week before Jefferson assumed his duties as president--while Adams was still residing in the White House--two lawyers, Joseph Anderson and William Cocke, representing the state government of Georgia sent Jefferson a letter. After offering profuse apologies for any impropriety for having written to him prior to his inauguration, the lawyers asked the new president to do what that Federalist

Adams "hath never yet, thought proper to take any Step to Carry the law into operation," to get the Cherokee to cede land to Georgia.¹

In another, perhaps more telling letter sent to Jefferson the day after his inauguration, Anderson and Cocke raised the issue of "exclusive Jurisdiction and right of Domain to all the lands which lay within their Chartered limits" and stated further that "this Soveriegnty [*sic*] enabled the States [referring to all states of the Union] to parcel out their land in Such manner as their Legislatures thereof might from time to time deem." In a postscript the lawyers advised Jefferson that South Carolina and Tennessee shared

¹J. Anderson and W. Cocke to Jefferson, February 26, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress (Microfilm, Series no. 1, reel 37). Joseph Anderson was born in Pennsylvania in 1757, and studied law. During the Revolutionary War he was appointed an ensign in New Jersey at the age of nineteen and rose to the rank of captain, serving in the Iroquois expedition. After serving at Valley Forge and Yorktown, he retired from military service at the conclusion of the war as a major. He practiced law in Delaware. President Washington appointed Anderson as judge of the territory south of the Ohio River. He assisted in drafting the Tennessee constitution. Anderson was appointed United States Senator and later elected, serving on two occasions as president *pro tempore*. He was the first comptroller of the United States Treasury. Anderson championed the western cause of the right of deposit at the mouth of the Mississippi River.

William Cocke was born in Virginia around 1740 and practiced law. He explored eastern Tennessee and western Kentucky with Daniel Boone. Cocke was an Indian fighter, serving as a colonel of the Virginia militia, and served in the Virginia House of Burgesses. Cocke moved to Tennessee and became a member of the Tennessee state constitutional convention. He was appointed as a brigadier-general of the state militia. Cocke fought with General Jackson in the War of 1812, redeeming himself for an earlier incident of Indian and Tory fighting in which he was court-martialed for cowardice during the American Revolution. Cocke served in the legislatures of Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Mississippi, as well as a member of the House of Delegates for the short-lived Transylvania colony in Kentucky. He was founder of the University of Tennessee. He became a judge of the First Circuit. In 1814 President Madison appointed Cocke agent for the Chickasaw Nation. He failed to gain their confidence and was soon replaced. He moved to Mississippi and was elected to the state legislature.

A lack of documentation, resulting from General Sherman's fiery march through Georgia during the Civil War, leaves no trace as to who enlisted the aide of Anderson and Cocke to write to Jefferson. In all likelihood, however, Governor John Milledge requested their assistance. Milledge's surviving correspondence with Jefferson is mostly of a personal nature as they were friends, and of a scientific theme as they were both active in natural history and agricultural experimentation. Milledge probably sought Anderson and Cocke as they had a high level of prestige throughout much of the nation and were staunch Republicans. Furthermore, both men had been engaged in crushing victories over hostile Indians during the American Revolution, which was something that would have impressed Jefferson, as he held bitter resentment toward those Indians and appreciated a "thorough drubbing" of them, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Georgia's interest in prompt extinguishment of Indian claims to "wilderness" lands, implying that Georgia had built a consensus of neighboring states in pursuance of lands perceived to be theirs by sovereign right.²

Yet another letter to the new president was written March 5th by two Georgian senators, Abraham Baldwin and Benjamin Taliaferro. They too, complained of steadfast inaction on the part of Jefferson's immediate predecessor. Adams had received a report from a congressional committee favorable to a new treaty with the Creek Indians to regain Tallassee County, which had been ceded to the Creek by a treaty signed in 1790, and to obtain the fork of the Ocmulgee River. The senators stated it was no longer a viable hunting ground for the Creek as game had been severely depleted years ago, but would bring much gratification to the frontier people, long disappointed by the apparent lack of concern by Adams for their frustrated efforts to obtain the highly desirable interior lands.

Baldwin and Taliaferro complained that despite several requests to the president to take action, nothing had been done to rectify the grievances of the frontier people of Georgia. Furthermore, the senators stated that:

We have been deeply sensible of the disrespect to the Legislature of our State on a subject vastly interesting to its citizens, which we should not have expected would have been shown to the common application of an individual. . . . [W]e have observed with regret that there has been from the first a studied system of evasion on this subject.³

The governor of Georgia, while Jefferson was vice-president under Adams, was James Jackson, an ardent follower of the new president. He

²J. Anderson and W. Cocke to Jefferson, March 5, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC (reel 37).

³Abraham Baldwin and Benjamin Taliaferro to Jefferson, March 5, 1801, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC (reel 37).

made clear his views on states' rights in a message to the state legislature. Jackson stated flatly that an act of Congress to create a government in the Mississippi Territory (western part of Georgia) was a violation of the rights of Georgia, as well as a constitutional infringement, because the act established a government within the bounds of Georgia, independent of its jurisdiction, and without its consent. Citing specific sections in both the federal and Georgia constitutions, Jackson declared that the United States Congress had created the new government within the state limits of Georgia under "imperious circumstances" and that the act was "reprehensible." Jackson warned the legislators that "governments and constitutional rights are never overthrown, or attempted to be overthrown at once; like the gradual mouldering [sic] of a wall, [the] whole foundation has been once injured, so a constitutional right falls unobserved to-day and another to-morrow, until the whole fabric gives way and tyranny rises on its ruins." Jackson argued that the act was a blow "which appears like an entering wedge to undermine your state title to all her Western Territory."⁴

David Meriwether, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the state of Georgia, argued before the legislature, December 4, 1800, essentially along the same premise as Jackson:

If on this ground of limits, the Legislature of Georgia be (and they are of opinion that they are) correct, the point of unconstitutionality of the Acts establishing a government in the Mississippi territory without the consent of Georgia, as well as their being in violation of her rights, must be conceded. For is it not erecting a government on territory the property of Georgia without her consent? Opposed to the 2d section of the 9th Article of the Confederation before cited, "Provided also, that no state shall be deprived of territory, for the benefit of the United States," as well as an infringement of the 2nd Article thereof, "each state retains its

⁴The Augusta Chronicle and Gazette of the State, 22 November 1800.

sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled," most fully by the several aforementioned sections and articles of the Constitution of the United States.⁵

After Jefferson had been in office nearly one year, but prior to the cession of western lands to the United States, the Georgia legislature reminded the president of their concerns regarding state sovereignty. After expressing confidence in the chief executive, the Georgia representatives stated:

We have equal confidence in the Legislature of the Union--State-rights, state sovereignty, as recognised [sic] by the constitution; when respected by the General Government, will form the ligament binding each political fraction to the aggregate, by the indissoluble ties of reciprocal interest: then Georgia receiving justice for the past; and wishing no security for the future, will harmonize with the Legislature of the Union and throw her feeble weight into the Federal scale.⁶

Seeking to assure the Georgia legislators, Jefferson maintained that:

State-rights and state sovereignty as recognised [sic] by the constitution, are an integral and essential part of our great political fabric. They are bound up by a common ligament with those of the national government, and form with it one system, of which the constitution is the law and the life. A sacred respect to that instrument therefore becomes the first interest and duty of all.⁷

⁵Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Georgia for the Year 1800 [Microform] (Louisville [GA]: Printed by Ambrose Day and James Hely, printers to the state, 1801), MPRINT 3, no. 565.

⁶The Louisville Gazette and Republican Trumpet, (Louisville, Georgia), 24 February 1802 .

⁷*Ibid.*, 7 July 1802 .

On the 24th of April, 1802, agreement was reached between the commissioners representing the United States and the state of Georgia. In essence, the Western Territory was ceded to the United States in exchange for one million two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; critical to Georgia's decision to compromise was a promise by the federal government to extinguish all remaining Indian claims to land within the bounds of Georgia "as early as the same can be peaceably obtained on reasonable terms."⁸

With the treaty signed and soon ratified, the battle cry of states' rights began to wane--at least for the time being. Georgia now had a considerable sum of money to meet some of its most pressing needs. Georgia had been ravaged by war during the fight for independence and the citizens felt crushed under the burden of high taxes. It wasn't long, however, before Georgians became impatient for the federal government to extinguish the remaining Indian land title.

In a long and rambling letter to the President, Georgia Senator Jackson pressed Jefferson on the interdependent issues of removing Indians from within the bounds of Georgia and of extending the current boundary between Georgia and United States territory farther west. Nearly a year had elapsed since the signing of the Articles of Agreement and Cession, and even the most ardent Republican supporters of the president were losing their patience. Jackson had hoped to deliver personally to Jefferson a few letters "from men who were true Republicans"; however, as opportunity had not arisen, he wished to share their views with him.

⁸"Articles of Agreement and Cession, Entered Into on the (24th Day of April, 1802, Between the Commissioners of The United States, and Those of Georgia," Washington: Printed by R. C. Weightman. 1807); The Augusta Chronicle and Gazette of the State, 15 May 1802; Grace M. Schwartzman and Susan K. Barnard, "A Trail of Broken Promises: Georgians and Muscogee/Creek Treaties, 1796-1826," Georgia Historical Quarterly 75 (Winter 1991): 700.

These men had expected to obtain "the whole of the Ocmulgee fork [sic]" after the agreement had been ratified, and asserted that the failure to do so was the fault of Indian agent Benjamin Hawkins. These Georgians believed that Hawkins had held private talks with the Indians and seemed "more connected with them than with the White people," and appeared to be acting more in the interests of the Indians than "of the United States, the State of Georgia or her Citizens." Jackson said that these Georgians, as well as others, had, for the short term, "given up all hopes of procuring an extension [sic] of boundary to the Ocmulgee [sic] as well as the lands left out of the line of 1790 which Mr. Hawkins officiously ran with the Creeks who had no claim to them. . . ." The Georgians informed Jackson that the Federalists had persuaded many people, in Georgia and in other states, that the Republican administration had no intention of obtaining a further extension to the Ocmulgee River or for other lands which Georgians desired. The Federalists, they said, claimed that Georgia would have had a better chance under Adams's administration had he succeeded in attaining a second term, and that Jackson and other Republicans had "duped them by teaching them to believe that the effect of a change of the administration would be the obtaining of the Ocmulgee [sic] fork & Talassee County [sic] immediately for them. . . ."

Jackson advised Jefferson that he intervened when many Republican legislators prepared a remonstrance regarding the administration's failure to act swiftly in this matter. Jackson expressed his "dread" over the "consequences" which might result if the Georgia legislature became angry, and "the people will follow. . . ." Jackson expressed dismay that the Secretary of War seemed to favor Hawkins and his subordinate agents "against the

poor Georgians who seem always to be placed by the War department as respects Indians in the background."

Senator Jackson concluded his letter on another matter of concern to him: the situation of imminent French possession of Louisiana. Jackson considered the French dangerous *provacateurs* with respect to the Indians. He was fearful that the French might "reach" the Creek soon, and also might persuade the Chickasaw and Choctaw to hold onto their lands. Word would then get to the Creek and Cherokee and "the Federalists will triumph at a failure - it strikes me Sir that the present is the moment to secure what lands and roads can be obtained from all those Tribes. . . .[It] is a great measure in my humble opinion not only Republican principles is that greater united with a love of the present administration but a lasting and never to be eradicated affection for the general Government. . . ."⁹

Between May and November of 1803, Governor Milledge, President Jefferson, and Secretary of War Dearborn exchanged at least six letters relating to circumstances regarding Georgians and Indians.¹⁰

On May 19th Milledge requested that the President appoint new federal commissioners to demand the Creek to return all prisoners, slaves, and other property taken from Georgians.¹¹

In reply, Dearborn stated that the President thought it improper at such a late date to take action. Dearborn inquired why Georgia had allowed so

⁹Senator James Jackson to Jefferson, February 14th, 1803, MSS, Jefferson Collection, LC, (reel 45).

¹⁰These represent the surviving letters contained in the collections of the Georgia Historical Society. It may be that other letters, filling the gaps between the dates enumerated, exist in other archival facilities.

¹¹Governor John Milledge to President Jefferson (received by Secretary of War Dearborn and forwarded to the President) May 19, 1803. This letter is not in the collections of the Georgia Historical Society, but referred to in Dearborn's letter of July 13, 1803.

much time to elapse after the alleged offense before requesting federal assistance. The Secretary had assumed that the objective had either been abandoned or an alternative resolution found.¹²

In a response directed to the President, Milledge stated emphatically that the state legislature had not acted sooner because it felt that--with regard to Indian matters--the federal government had not accorded Georgia the respect due a member of the Union and, therefore, had delayed acting until overwhelmed by mounting complaints from the Georgia citizenry as well as those of South Carolina, which left the state legislature and the executive no choice. Milledge referred to Article Seven of the Treaty of Colraine (1796) which stated that "the Governor of Georgia may enforce this provision to repair to the said nation in order to claim and receive such prisoners, negroes and property, under the direction of the President of the United States," and that no time limit had been set for the right to exercise the provision of this article. The Governor expressed special concern over the loss of slaves to the Indians. Milledge hoped that Jefferson saw the "justice and propriety" of the state of Georgia on behalf of "her unfortunate Citizens. . . ."¹³

A week later Secretary Dearborn informed Governor Milledge that the President had authorized a surveyor to map the current boundary lines of Georgia with the intent of obtaining further cessions from the Creek. Colonel Hawkins was instructed to supervise the surveying "scrupulously" and with exactitude. Dearborn acknowledged the prior failure of the federal

¹²Dearborn to Milledge, July 13, 1803. Georgia Historical Society Manuscript Collection (hereinafter referred to as GHS MC), John Milledge Papers, Collection No. 560, Folder No. 6.

¹³Milledge to Jefferson, August 5, 1803. GHS MC John Milledge Papers, Collection No. 560, Folder No. 6.

commissioners to obtain the desired cessions was due to the "unaccountable conduct of the Lower Creek."¹⁴

In late November Dearborn wrote to Milledge, enclosing an extract of an agreement with the Cherokee to open a road from Tennessee to Georgia. Dearborn cautioned that federal funds were not available for the building of the road; therefore, the legislatures of the states which would benefit the most would have to take measures to raise the necessary funds.¹⁵

The next day, Jefferson sent word to Milledge that he had instructed Dearborn "to take the proper measures for effecting the object of your letter of Aug. 5." He informed Milledge that the Cherokee had ceded land "from Knoxville to the Savanna [sic]." Furthermore, he intended to "press on the Creek." With regard to the Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson said that he hoped to convince all the Indians east of the Mississippi River to move to the west side "before many years get about."¹⁶

Most Georgians were not satisfied with Jefferson's efforts to accommodate; they viewed these efforts as too little and too late. A growing population and a desire for the rich valley lands of the interior led Georgians to express their displeasure with the federal government. Georgians pursued a different line of argument this time, contending that the Indians were too slow to acculturate into white society, that they were not the "noble savages" perceived by Jefferson and his fellow philanthropists; they were uncivilized beasts who refused to give up their ancient ways of living--hunting and

¹⁴Dearborn to Milledge, October 6, 1803. GHS MC, John Milledge Papers, Collection No. 560, Folder No. 6.

¹⁵Dearborn to Milledge, November 21, 1803. GHS MC, John Milledge Papers, Collection No. 560, Folder No. 6.

¹⁶Jefferson to Milledge, November 22, 1803. GHS MC, John Milledge Papers, Collection No. 560, Folder No. 6.

gathering--and this mode of life was unsatisfactory as game had become drastically depleted over the years. The Indians, claimed Georgians, wasted precious lands, while roaming over vast tracts of country searching for game. White people, Georgians argued, would make better use of such land by cultivating crops. Georgians wanted the Indians removed, and the sooner the better.

Analysis

In the aftermath of the American Revolution, Georgia's only unscathed or, for that matter, remaining form of wealth was its land. Eager to protect its lands, Georgia expressed willingness to become part of a centralized union of states.¹⁷

Frequently Georgians asked for assistance when the Creek Indians had their fill of trespass by encroaching whites and raided on white settlements; the ineffectual Confederation Congress offered little help. This situation arose from insistence by the more heavily populated, wealthier New England states, that Congress address itself to their needs rather than expend money and manpower on a distant frontier state beset with great financial woes and a drain on resources of the fledgling government. Whatever the reasons, Georgia had come to support a unified government largely because of pragmatic need, such as protection from Indians and from British and Spanish machinations on its Florida border, rather than from an overwhelming desire to submit to either a strong or weak central government.¹⁸

¹⁷ E. Merton Coulter, A Short History of Georgia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1933), 178.

¹⁸ Kenneth Coleman, ed., A History of Georgia (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1941), 93.

Left to its own devices, Georgia relied upon decimated resources to cope with internal and external woes. After eight years of this, Georgia renewed interest in a central government when a convention was called to write a new constitution.

Though Georgia favored an effective federal government, it vigorously maintained the right to a separate existence as a state within the new union. Self-reliance during eight years under a loose confederation resulted in an unwillingness to give up cherished autonomy and sovereignty. It was not long, however, before Georgians felt the power of the new government to such a degree that they voiced collective indignation, becoming increasingly defiant of central authority and protective of their state's sovereignty.¹⁹

Following the ratification of the Constitution on July 26, 1788, the new federal government urged the states to define their western boundaries. The unoccupied land was to be established as new territories. Georgia, the last state to comply, offered a compromise: it would relinquish a portion of its land along the southern boundaries of present-day Alabama and Mississippi to Congress if it could retain the remainder. This offer was rejected. The United States claimed the vast western territories of Georgia as part of the legitimate spoils of the Revolution, won not by Georgia, but by the combined efforts of all the states. Therefore, the federal government argued, it belonged not to one state but to the common country. Georgia, relying on its colonial boundaries, refused to give in.

¹⁹Ulrich B. Phillips, Georgia and State Rights: A Study of the Political History of Georgia from the Revolution to the Civil War, with Particular Regard to Federal Relations (Yellow Springs: The Antioch Press, 1968, reprint of the 1902 edition), 90; Coulter, A Short History of Georgia, 156-57.

The Georgia legislature, looking to the sale of western lands to retire the state's Revolutionary War debt and to set up a buffer against Spanish intrusions, passed the Yazoo Act on January 7, 1795. This act enabled four companies of land speculators to purchase over thirty-five million acres of Indian land stretching from the Alabama and Coosa Rivers to the Mississippi for one and one-half cents per acre. This became known as the Yazoo Land Fraud. Many Georgians protested, arguing that they had been denied the opportunity to purchase land when there was no necessity to sacrifice such a huge parcel of territory to outside investors. This discontent became a primary motivating force for the pursuit of Indian removal from Georgia.²⁰

The federal government, angered by Georgia's fiasco, developed an alternative method to legally obtain land retained by the Indians: the imposition of white civilization upon the Indians. If the Indians learned husbandry, farmed on small plots of land, and gave up hunting as a way of life, they would require less land, which would then become available to the federal government for the purpose of establishing new states.

This scheme did not please white Georgians. Following the Articles of Agreement of 1802, the federal government found itself playing both sides of the fence and satisfying no one. The attempt to "civilize" the Indians meant that extinguishment of Indian title to desired lands would be hindered as the Indians would remain on numerous, though small tracts of land. This

²⁰For an in depth study of the Yazoo controversy see C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New Republic: The Case of Fletcher v. Peck, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1967). However, see Clyde R. Ferguson, "Confrontation at Coleraine: Creeks, Georgians, and Federalist Indian Policy," South Atlantic Quarterly 78 (Spring 1979): 224-43, for an opposing interpretation of James Jackson's role in the revocation of the Yazoo Acts, his character, and his political ambitions.

practice flew in the face of the promise by the United States to use every reasonable means to remove the Indians from Georgia.²¹

The letters exchanged between Jefferson and Dearborn with Governor Milledge and Senator Jackson during 1803 displayed a level of tension barely submerged beneath their characteristically gentlemanly discourse.

The Georgians made clear their frustration and impatience with the federal government's perceived lack of concern. Since the signing of the Articles of Agreement in April 1802 little had been done to fulfill the promise by the national government to extinguish the remaining claims of the Indians in Georgia and make their land available to Georgians.

The President expressed concern that the time was not yet right to press the Creek and Cherokee for further cessions of land as they had balked during recent negotiations. To push them would only cause further delay in obtaining what the Georgians desired. Jefferson knew that he had a way to solve the dilemma--the Louisiana Purchase--which would take longer to implement than the Georgians would like but would lead to resolution in a peaceful and satisfactory manner. For the Georgians it was simply a matter of removing the Indians from the state. For the President it was a more complex matter in which he had to take into account the interests of the nation as a whole.

Nonetheless, Jefferson felt the pressure from his Republican supporters in Georgia; he made a series of small inroads, pressing gingerly for what he could acquire from the Creek and Cherokee without causing them to resist further negotiations for greater cessions.

²¹Coulter, 178-9; Carl J. Vipperman, "'Forcibly if We Must' The Georgia Case for Cherokee Removal, 1802-1832," The Journal of Cherokee Studies 11 (Spring 1978): 103-4; Grace M. Schwartzman and Susan K. Barnard, "A Trail of Broken Promise: Georgians and Muscogee/Creek Treaties, 1796-1826," Georgia Historical Quarterly 75 (Winter 1991): 698.

Although the Georgia legislature had voted unanimously to ratify the new constitution, this did not mean that Georgians favored the Hamiltonian system that many equated with the Federalist Party by the end of Washington's presidency. The land policy of the Federalist period, in which Hamilton's favoritism for business prevailed, set a high price on western-domain lands to purchasers, in order to prevent the labor force from departing the industrial areas and to bring purchase money into the national coffers. Hamilton's policy was diametrically opposed to Jefferson's philosophy regarding the distribution of land. Jefferson believed that the small yeoman farmer was the best type of citizen for the new republic. As a man of property he was responsible; as a cultivator of the soil he was disciplined by his commitment to follow closely the cycle of nature; and as a rural resident he was removed from the distractions and demagogery of cities. Most Georgians in 1800 were aligned with the more democratic orientation of Jefferson, in particular his call for an agrarian republic comprised of small, independent yeoman farmers. They also found solace in Jefferson's record on states' rights.²²

It was, however, the notion of an agrarian republic that most Georgians found appealing. Such a system meant that the Indians within the bounds of Georgia would need to be removed in order to make room for an increasing number of white settlers, eager to help Jefferson fulfill his vision. Rapid immigration into Georgia by Virginians and South Carolinians after the war created immense pressure for fertile land to become quickly available.

Prior to the Revolution, a handful of hardy Virginian and Carolinian pioneers emigrated to the northern regions of Georgia, intent on growing

²²Coleman, A History of Georgia, 101.

tobacco in the fertile virgin soil. Tobacco had been grown in Georgia for local consumption since the early years of settlement, but did not evolve into a staple for export until 1769. In that year Georgia exported 3,050 pounds of tobacco, and in 1772, the Virginian and Carolinian growers increased the export poundage to 176,732. By 1792 Georgians were exporting nearly five million two hundred thousand pounds of tobacco.²³

During the Revolution, settlement in Georgia ceased and population declined as the British moved in, taking control over the northern part of the state. After the war, a new wave of migration into Georgia began. Primarily small planters from Virginia and some from the Carolinas, these immigrants sought fresh land for growing the crop they knew so well. The Virginia soil had suffered erosion, depleted of nutrients necessary to grow tobacco profitably. Many growers found the transition to wheat farming unpalatable, having been raised and indoctrinated in a tobacco culture. Wheat had become more profitable, as it could be grown in poor soil, and enjoyed an increase in demand as a staple during the Revolutionary War.

The fertile Broad River region of upper Georgia most closely resembled the tobacco-growing lands of Virginia. This area known politically as Wilkes County accounted for 31,500 of the 82,548 people residing in Georgia according to the 1790 census.

Immediately following the war, Virginians from Albermarle, Amherst, Augusta, Bedford, Chesterfield, Halifax, Hanover, Lundenburg, Mecklenberg,

²³G. Melvin Herndon, "Samuel Butler of Virginia Goes to Georgia, 1784," Georgia Historical Quarterly, 52 (Spring 1968): 117. Herndon stated that the amount of exported tobacco was over 6,000,000; however, the data indicates otherwise: 5,471 hogsheads at 950 lbs. each equals 5,197,450 lbs.; Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., American State Papers, Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, From the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive: Commencing March 3, 1815, (Washington, D. C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832), vol. 14: Commerce and Navigation, vol. 1, 161.

Prince Edward, and Westmoreland Counties petitioned the Georgia legislature for land upon which to settle and grow tobacco. The legislature, realizing the potential for an expanding tax base, established a liberal land policy as well as inspection stations similar to those in Virginia in order to insure a quality export product. In 1785 the Georgia legislators agreed that "the cultivation of tobacco is very considerable and if properly attended will become a most valuable article of exportation for the State."²⁴

The effect of Virginia migration upon Georgia may be measured in several ways: the economics of commerce, population density, land distribution and use, cultural diversity, and political influences.

Virginia settlers established tobacco as a major export crop for Georgia. This gave rise to a new way of doing business. The barter of tobacco became one of the main features of the economy of upper Georgia. State law specified that all tobacco must be packed in hogsheads or casks weighing at least 950 pounds. Large purchases of merchandise by planters were paid for in hogsheads of tobacco, known commonly as "crop tobacco" or "tobacco note." Planters were also allowed to barter with local merchants using small amounts of tobacco (i.e., 150 lbs.) for items such as hand tools. These smaller units of tobacco were referred to as "transfer tobacco." In addition to "tobacco" or "transfer" notes, Virginia currency was prevalent in the region.²⁵

The gentry amongst the Virginia immigrants did not settle on the frontier of Georgia to be frontier people, but to acquire good land to raise their beloved "tobo."; the frontier was where such land was readily available. The gentry were intent upon establishing a "civilized" way of life, replete with all

²⁴Herndon, "Samuel Butler," *GHQ* (Spring 1968): 116-17.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 126-27.

the essential components. Education for their children was of primary concern; therefore, schools would have to be built. Social gatherings were part of the Virginian's lifestyle, hence a fine home, spacious enough to accommodate numerous guests, was a necessity. The establishment of towns for commercial transactions and political activities was important to Virginians.²⁶

The Indians were an obstacle to the attainment of goals sought by the Virginia settlers. Those tribes that sided with the British during the Revolutionary War had not endeared themselves to Virginians. One migrating member of the Virginia gentry stated succinctly in a poem the sentiments of most Virginians new to Georgia:

New Georgia is a pleasant place
If we could but Enjoye it
Indians & Rogues they are so great
They allmost have destroyed it.

Could but the Indians be subdued
And Rogues could have their portion
There could not be a better place
A this side of the ocean.²⁷

Most Virginia immigrants were not of the same socio-economic class as the gentry. They were either marginally well off, downright poor or somewhere in between. Micajah McGehee, a Scotsman from Virginia, was somewhere in between and perhaps typical of Virginian immigrants. McGehee was not a learned man and did not own books, except possibly a Bible; he was a tobacco planter, and growing the "tobo." was what he knew

²⁶See generally: Reba Strickland Biehle, "Edward Oxford Pioneer Farmer of Middle Georgia," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 52 (Spring 1968): 187-98.

²⁷Herndon, "Butler," *GHQ* (Spring 1968): 124-25.

best. He was given some land by his new father-in-law upon arrival in Georgia, and using his skills as a grower of tobacco was soon able to purchase his own large tract of land well suited to cultivation of the tobacco plant. McGehee's wealth increased markedly as the result of the labor of his black slaves, his twelve children, and his own penchant for thrift and economy. He built a large frame-house by the Broad River, inviting neighbors to dance as they had back home in Virginia.²⁸

The Scotch-Irish, and in particular the Scottish Highlanders, who moved southward from Virginia into the frontiers of Georgia, had no love for the Indians either. They viewed the Indians as scurrilous savages presenting impediments to their desires for large tracts of land. They perceived the Indians as a menace to be dealt with forthwith. These transplanted Virginians were also, in large part, ardent supporters of Jefferson.

In agricultural Georgia, land was essential to advancement. While a house indicated social status, land meant income derived from the sale of crops and livestock. Georgians around the turn of the century were especially mobile, moving on an average of three times within their lifespans. This was particularly true of pioneers in frontier areas who, after staking a claim on

²⁸George R. Gilmer, Sketches of Some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia (Americus, 1926, reprint of 1855 ed., New York: Appleton), 127-28. Gilmer reported that "Soon after he became his own man, he was employed by Mr. Scott, a wealthy gentleman, of the family to which Gen. Winfield Scott belongs, to do some plantation business for him." The reference to McGehee becoming his "own man" may infer that he had been an indentured servant (though not directly from Scotland as Gilmer also described him as a native of Virginia and descended from a Scottish family). It is not unlikely that many Virginians having served their time or purchased their release from indentured servitude found the Georgia frontiers an alluring opportunity to make good on their new found freedom, albeit ironically, in many instances, at the expense of enslaved blacks.

land, would, following one or more years of making improvements, sell at a profit and move on, usually upward.²⁹

In Wilkes County, which accounted for more than one third of Georgia's population as of the Census of 1790, 2,563 homes were valued in 1798 at \$100 - \$500, while twenty-eight were assessed at \$500 - \$1,000, and sixteen appraised at \$1,001 - \$3, 000 in value; the number of houses of at least \$100 in value being three hundred seven. The Census of 1800 indicated that in Wilkes County there were 1,274 white males aged twenty-six or older and the percentage of these men with houses valued at one hundred dollars and up was twenty-four and one-tenth percent. These houses varied from rustic log cabins to stately mansions. The majority of residents comprising the other seventy-five and nine-tenths percent either lived in homes under one hundred dollars in value or rented their shelter. Most of the owned houses were in the fifty dollar range, and quite a number in the twenty dollar range. The latter were typically nothing more than hovels, a temporary respite from the elements until better quarters could be obtained.³⁰

Politically, Wilkes County was an anomaly; the Federalists had a slight majority amongst the voters in 1796 and in 1800, while most of Georgia was Jeffersonian Republican.

Political and economic sectionalism in Georgia resulted primarily from geographical, topographical, and geological characteristics of the land: tidewater (sea island and coast), pine barren (middle), and piedmont (upper).

²⁹Lee Soltow and Aubrey C. Land, "Housing and Social Standing in Georgia, 1798," Georgia Historical Quarterly 64 (Winter 1980): 454-45. See also, generally, Lee Soltow, Distribution of Wealth and Income in the United States in 1798 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989).

³⁰Soltow, "Housing," 452-56.

The piedmont region was prime land, bearing hickory and oak; it had the right conditions for high yields of tobacco, corn, fruits, and cotton.³¹

Impressed with the capacity of the land, one Virginian, General George Mathews, obtained land grants for an entire settlement consisting of his Virginia friends. Rapid settlement of Wilkes County ensued, and was accelerated further by the passage of the Legislative Act of 1780 which made easier the procurement of land by application. The shift of population into the upper regions of the state had political, economic, and social consequences.³²

Political sectionalism was increased by legislation in 1798 that provided for additional representation of whites by incorporating slave populations into the district totals using the three-fifths ratio.³³ The tidewater planters had the advantage here; they owned more slaves, and therefore, could increase their political representation. In Wilkes County, landowners who owned slaves had, on the average, far fewer than their low country counterparts. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the up-country men to hold on to the slaves they had, not losing any to Indians, and if feasible, increase their slave population to gain greater political representation, while also increasing their productivity and profits.

³¹Lucien E. Roberts, "Sectional Problems in Georgia during the Formative Period, 1776-1798," Georgia Historical Quarterly 18 (September 1934): 207-8.

³²*Ibid.*, 209.

³³Fletcher M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1930), 135.

Most of the coastal land had been grabbed during the confiscations of Tory properties, these having been granted or sold cheaply to veterans of the war, or given as gifts to men such as Anthony Wayne and James Jackson.³⁴

Jackson, perhaps the most vitriolic of Georgia's states' rightists, used that issue to protect his substantial landed interests as well as those of numerous gentry peers. That Congress wanted to wrest away the westernmost lands of Georgia, to establish new states, meant interference with Georgian plans to seize immense tracts of Indian lands. Jackson, besides his belligerent cry for protection of states' rights, also railed against the corruption that prevailed during the period of the Yazoo land frauds. Jackson, John Milledge, George Troup, and others warned of land speculation that favored a relatively few rich men who amassed fabulous wealth by monopolizing ownership of property. Better to sell lands cheaply as they became available (by extinguishment of Indian title) to individual settlers, whose love of the soil would ensure stability and would help the state prosper by way of an increased tax base necessary to develop the infrastructure of the state.³⁵

As the utility of the issue of states' rights as a means for acquiring the remaining Indian lands diminished--temporarily--Georgians increasingly expressed their disdain for the "barbaric" red man.

It is noteworthy at this juncture to recall that such "devaluation" of Indians in Georgia was a phenomenon of fairly recent origin. No less a

³⁴See R. J. Taylor, Jr. Foundation, An Index to Georgia Colonial Conveyances and Confiscated Lands Records, 1750-1804 (Atlanta: R. J. Taylor, Jr. Foundation [1981]; Coulter, 150-51; Coleman, 105; James C. Bonner, A History of Georgia Agriculture, 1732-1860 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1964), 32.

³⁵Columbian Museum & Savannah Advertiser, 6 May 1803; Georgia Republican & State Intelligencer, (Savannah) 30 May 1803.

personage than James Edward Oglethorpe, founder of Georgia, perceived considerable value in the Creek and Cherokee Indians, sufficient to win their friendship and enlist their services against the Spanish and French during the 1730s and 1740s.³⁶

The claim that the Indians wasted vast acres of land by their mode of living was empty rhetoric. If anything it projected the inefficiency of white Georgians as cultivators, rather than speaking accurately of the Indians. The Indians owned the most fertile land which was located in the valleys between the Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers, especially in the northern and western areas. These lands were of clay and lime composition, thus accounting for the extraordinary fertility of the soil. Along the banks of these rivers, Indians planted corn, a primary staple for Indian and white man alike, at times on as much as ten thousand acres of land.³⁷

White farmers on the other hand, particularly tobacco planters, brought from Europe archaic methods of agriculture, often based on superstition. Such practices resulted in the destruction of topsoil and in increasingly poor yields. Thus, white planters in Georgia found it necessary to move on to new fertile tracts of land, repeating the process until land along the eastern seaboard had been depleted of its vital nutrients. The coastal swamp regions were useful for rice cultivation only. Inland country was needed for tobacco and cotton, the latter soon becoming the predominant cash

³⁶E. Merton Coulter, Wormsloe: Two Centuries of a Georgia Family (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1955), 54; 56-57.

³⁷George White, Statistics of the State of Georgia: Including an Account of its Natural, Civil, and Ecclesiastical History, together with a particular Description of each County, Notices of the Manners and Customs of its Aboriginal Tribes, and a Correct Map of the State (Savannah: W. Thorne Williams, 1849), 37-38.

crop, especially after the invention of the cotton gin by Eli Whitney in Savannah.³⁸

It is ironic that white Georgians would accuse Indians of wasting valued lands by the methods of sustenance. The Highland Scots, who settled in the Georgia Lowlands not only cleared land for planting, but also required great stretches of land for cattle grazing. Native wiregrass grew in abundance, providing limitless pasturage for the Scots' black cattle. The Highlanders readily adapted to the manner of raising and marketing livestock generally practiced on the Georgia frontier. The cattlemen branded their young animals with distinctive brands and then turned the cattle loose to range freely over vast tracts of country. Once each year the cattle were rounded up, claimed by their respective owners, and then driven to market. Such use of a large number of acres by a relatively few men led to destruction of topsoil and wreaked havoc with the natural ecological balance of the land. Hungry for more land, they gained more through a series of successive land cessions wrought from the Indians.

The Scotch-Irish were predominant among the frontiersmen on the most western fringes of Georgia territory. They were ardent supporters of Jefferson and favored his agrarian vision. They were a hardy lot, accustomed to the harshness of frontier life. When expedient, they either traded with the Indians, or fought them tenaciously. The Scotch-Irish learned quickly the Indian methods of fighting and became adept at warring with them on their own terms. This attribute led the more cultivated seaboard Georgians to press the Scotch-Irish into service against the Indians to protect the gentry's interests, which included a desire for accumulation of inland acreage. As the

³⁸Coulter, *A Short History of Georgia*, 257; Phillips, *Georgia and States Rights*, 136; Coleman, 111; Bonner, *A History of Georgia Agriculture*, 52-53.

Scotch-Irish frontiersmen shared the same desire, they did not hesitate to engage in raiding parties on Indian villages or, by deliberate encroachment, induce the Indians to fight ³⁹

Climate, too, played a role in the desire for Indian lands. Untimely strong, frost-laden winds, in more than one year during March and April, destroyed whole crops of cotton in the lower country and sea islands. A second planting would prove a meager harvest due to the lateness of the season. Experiments by Governor Milledge, however, provided ample support for the cultivation of black seed cotton in the rich upland regions between the Oconee and Ocmulgee rivers rather than the more vulnerable, though popular green seed cotton. In these more protected areas, the cold and frost came on more gradually so that the pods of the black seed plants would open fully, allowing easier and more abundant gathering of the cotton.

Milledge recognized the economic significance of planting the black seed (or sea island) cotton in the back country. This cotton was selling for fifty-two cents per bushel whereas green seed cotton did not exceed fifteen cents per bushel. Newspaper editorials encouraged the acquisition of these lands and the switch to the more profitable type of cotton. As the Tax Act of 1802 called for millage rates, taxes collected on sale of the hardier and prolific black seed cotton would fill the state treasury. Furthermore, political bickering amongst Brazilian growers of the same cotton caused their prices to soar, thus creating a lucrative market for Georgian planters who could sell to European importers at more reasonable, yet still profitable rates.⁴⁰

³⁹James G. Leyburn, The Scotch-Irish, a Social History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1962), 254-66; Fussell M. Chalker, "Highland Scots in the Georgia Lowlands," Georgia Historical Quarterly 53 (Spring 1969): 35-36.

⁴⁰Georgia Republican & State Intelligencer, (Savannah) 30 May 1802; Augusta Herald, 10 August 1803. An extract of a letter from a merchantile house in Liverpool dated April 14, 1799, to a gentleman in Charleston, South Carolina, printed in the Louisville Gazette, (Louisville,

The depletion of game available to the Indians was a result not of their wastefulness but of the wholesale slaughter of game by white frontiersmen and the deforestation of thousands of acres of land for row crops, cattle grazing, and the timber industry.

Furthermore, Cherokee and Creek, under the tutelage of men such as Benjamin Hawkins (United States Agent for Indian Affairs South of the Ohio River), learned to cultivate most crops grown by whites, including tobacco, grapes, melons, strawberries, beans and peaches. In addition to horses, they raised large herds of cattle, and kept hogs and poultry. Use of agricultural implements as well as use of looms and the spinning wheel became common. Some tribal leaders, such as John Ross and John Watts, were of mixed blood and owned plantations and large numbers of black slaves.⁴¹

Slave ownership, however, had not been limited to such men amongst the Indians. A review of the origins of black slave ownership by Creek Indians, in particular, sheds light on some of the reasons why white settlers in Georgia were so fierce in their efforts to have all Indians removed from the state.

Before the American Revolution, the Creek Indians owned few, if any, black slaves. After the war, the Creek, due in large part to the efforts of the British, became an acquisitive society owning many slaves. Georgia was one of three states (along with Florida and South Carolina) that was a constant source of slave labor. For centuries the Creek had been self-sustaining agriculturalists, until exposed to European trading. Until this time they had

Georgia) 23 July 1799 read: "Our market for best Georgia cotton, is higher than ever we remember it; we recommend your shipping here, in preference to selling at home; our last sales have exceeded 4s."

⁴¹R. Halliburton, Jr., Red over Black: Black Slavery among the Cherokee Indians (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 20; Bonner, 40.

no need for slave labor for either agriculture or hunting. Trade with Europeans caused a shift to commercial hunting and that became the dominant aspect of Creek economy.⁴²

During the late colonial years, the British instituted a policy of paying Indians to return runaway slaves. The British colonies adjacent to Creek settlements were chiefly staple-producing agricultural economies based on slave labor. Loss of property (including slaves) and declines in labor-oriented production were of paramount concern to the British. Furthermore, the British feared the possibility that the Indians would incite the slaves to revolt and join the Indians, thus creating a formidable adversary. This was another motivating factor in encouraging the Indians to return slaves in exchange for deerskins or money ranging from two to five pounds sterling per slave.⁴³

On October 20, 1774, Georgians and the Creek signed a treaty providing for a reward in the amount of fifty pounds of leather or the equivalent in other goods for the return of each black slave from Indian country. If the Indians brought the slaves to Savannah, they could expect an extra ten pounds for their efforts. In Savannah the slaves could be resold for a handsome profit.⁴⁴

During the Revolutionary War, some Creek fought with the Americans while others aligned with the British. Those aiding the Americans were encouraged to develop ill-will toward blacks in the hopes of dashing any potential alliance between Indians and blacks. Indians were sent on missions to locate and bring back escaped black slaves captured and held by

⁴²Martha Condray Searcy, "The Introduction of African Slavery into the Creek Indian Nation," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 66 (Spring 1982): 21.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 23.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 24.

Tory sympathizers. If capture was not possible, the Indians were to shoot the slaves rather than allow the British to sell them at a profit. Such action served a two-fold purpose: to deter other slaves from escaping and to increase the mutual aversion of Indians and blacks.⁴⁵

In the Spring of 1779, Creek fighting alongside the British in Georgia raided the coastal plantations. Upon returning to their inland territory, they took with them spoils of war--black slaves. From this point on, Creek Indians continued to amass black slave labor. While on forays with the British, Creek from distant parts of their nation visited and exchanged perspectives including that of the prosperity of white agricultural society based on a system of black slave labor. Colonel Hawkins noted that when Creek had black slaves, "there is more industry and better farms."⁴⁶

Although the white population of Georgia was diverse in national origin and religious affiliation, it may be argued that a collective mentality existed, based on the economic and cultural consciousness of the settlers. White males aged twenty-six and over were the primary land owners; they

⁴⁵Ibid., 26-27; Colonel Stephen Bull to Colonel Henry Laurens, President of the Council of Safety in Charles Town [sic], March 14, 1776: "The matter is this it is far better for the Public and the owners of the deserted Negroes on Tybee Isand who are on Tybee Island to be shot if they cannot be taken, if the Public is obliged to pay for them; for if they are carried away, and converted into money, which is the Sinews of War, it will only enable our Enemy to fight us with our own money or property. Therefore all who cannot be taken, had better be shot by the Creek Indians, as it perhaps may deter other Negroes from deserting, and will establish a hatred or Aversion between the Indians and Negroes." In response, March 16, 1776, Laurens stated, "... it is an awful business notwithstanding it has the sanction of Law to put even fugitive & Rebellious Slaves to death, the prospect is horrible. . . . we think the Council of Safety in Georgia ought to give that encouragement which is necessary to induce proper Persons to seize & if nothing else will do to destroy all those Rebellious Negroes upon Tybee Island or wherever they may be found. If Indians are the most proper hands let them be employed on this service but we would advise that some discreet white Men were incorporated with or joined to leave them the loss which may result to proprietors ought to & must be borne by the Public it ought not to be the loss of Georgia alone. . . ." David R. Chestnutt, et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Laurens, vol. 11: Jan. 5, 1776-Nov. 1, 1777 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 163 ; 172.

⁴⁶Searcy, "The Introduction of African Slavery," GHQ 66 (Spring 1982): 27-28; 30.

raised crops or livestock. These men shared a spirited antipathy toward Indians. They yearned for more land in order to improve their socio-economic status, using black slaves to enhance their productivity and profits. They felt a keen sense of competition with Indians for those very slaves, and of course for that cherished commodity above all others--land.

Because the Indians in Georgia were proving capable of acculturation into white society, Georgians vehemently opposed the federal policy started during Washington's administration and accelerated by Jefferson's; they realized the implications of the final distribution of the most valued lands in the northern and western regions of the state. Relying first on the hallowed arguments of states' rights and sovereignty and then upon the hollow contentions of racial superiority, Georgians struggled relentlessly to achieve complete dominion over wilderness lands for their exclusive benefit.

CHAPTER FOUR

A PREDISPOSITION TO INDIAN REMOVAL

Thomas Jefferson's involvement with Indians, prior to his presidency, began during his youth and continued through his tenure as vice president under John Adams.

Jefferson's father, Peter, took his son to Indian council meetings where he listened and watched with rapt attention as tribal leaders spoke. The young Jefferson understood little of what was said, but he was inspired by the eloquence and apparent conviction of the speakers. His father also invited chiefs to his cabin at Shadwell for dinner, thus offering his son further exposure to Indians and their culture. Peter Jefferson killed more than a few Indians; whether he invited them to his home or killed them was a decision based primarily on expediency, a quality which the future president inherited and utilized throughout his public career. Because his father died when Jefferson was but fourteen years of age, what his father did and how he decided what to do probably took on greater significance to him than if his father had lived on into the years of his manhood.

During his years of public service Jefferson maintained a deep belief in republican principles of government and society. As a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, the Continental Congress, the Virginia House of Delegates, as Virginia's War Governor, as Secretary of State, and as Vice President, Jefferson gave thoughtful consideration to these principles when dealing with Indian

affairs. His inclination to act expeditiously and his commitment to republicanism were evident in such matters. Jefferson developed a substantial portion of his version of republicanism during the 1780s and 1790s. During these years he drafted bills, wrote reports, and made decisions which affected Indians and Indian/white relations. The development of his republican ideology and his dealings with Indians ran a parallel course, although they became intertwined as he dealt with Indians in a way that promoted the furtherance of his goals for the nation based on republican principles. This chapter explores Jefferson's ideological commitment and his predisposition for Indian removal as a means to an end: to sustain and perpetuate the new nation according to his vision.

Historians have credited William C. C. Claiborne, William Henry Harrison, and Henry Dearborn as the primary influences on President Jefferson's Indian policy. But he entered office with prior experience and opinions as how to deal with Indians. Jefferson was influenced early on by such men as John Jay and, perhaps surprisingly, Alexander Hamilton.¹

Jefferson became a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1769; he did not serve on committees relating to Indian affairs, but was exposed to discussion and debate, and he voted on bills addressing Indian matters.

In 1775, Jefferson was elected to the Continental Congress where initially he served on a committee to consider the safety and security of North Carolina,

¹See Jay's letter to Jefferson dated December 14, 1786, below. Speaking of the Indians, Hamilton said, "Their friendship alone can keep our frontiers in peace. It is essential to the development of our fur-trade, - an object of immense importance. The attempt at the expulsion of so desultory a people is as chimerical as it would be pernicious. War with them is as expensive as it is destructive. It has not a single object, for the acquisition of their lands is not to be wished till those now vacant are filled; and the surest as well as the most just and humane way of removing them is by extending our settlements to their neighborhood. Indeed, it is not impossible that they may be already willing to exchange their former possessions for more remote ones." Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904), vol. 1, 408.

which would have included safety from hostile Indians, and to report the findings to Congress.²

The new delegate from Virginia, in July 1776, was elected as one of three members to the committee on Indian Affairs.³

Upon returning to Virginia as a member of the House of Delegates in the latter part of 1776, Jefferson gained further experience in Indian policy. In his drafts of the Virginia Constitution of 1776, Jefferson attempted to include specific provisions relating to purchasing land from Indians. In his third draft he prescribed that "no land shall be appropriated until purchased of the Indian native proprietors, nor shall any purchases be made of them but on behalf of the public, by authority of acts of the General assembly to be passed for every purchase specially." Jefferson wanted to make sure that lands were not seized, but purchased for future public sale which would bring in revenue. Furthermore, such purchases could not be made by individuals, but by the state of Virginia as committed by acts of the legislature for each purchase.⁴ This concept of sole governmental authority for acquiring land from the Indians was antecedent to his later policy of the federal government's pre-emptive right to acquire Indian land and legitimization by an act of the legislature. Jefferson's provisions were not included in the final text of the Virginia Constitution . It

²Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), vol. 3: September 21-December 30, 1775, 368.

³Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906), vol. 5: June 5-October 8, 1776, 524.

⁴Boyd, Papers, vol. 1, 359-65.

read: "And no purchases of Land shall be made of the Indian Natives but on behalf of the Publick [sic], by authority of the General Assembly."⁵

In 1779 he was chosen governor of Virginia, but served little more than one year. During this time Jefferson took executive action in matters relating to Indians, ranging from attempts to "civilize" and "christianize" them, to conducting military expeditions against hostile tribes.⁶

As Virginia's War Governor, Jefferson gave instructions to George Rogers Clark:

The defences [sic] at Detroit seem too great for small arms alone. And if that nest was destroyed the English still have a tolerable channel of communication with the Northern Indians by going from Montreal up the Utawas river [sic]. On the other hand, the Shawanese [sic], Mingoos, Munsies [sic], and the nearer Wiandots [sic] are troublesome thorns in our sides. However we must leave it to yourself to decide on the object of the campaign. If against these Indians the end proposed should be their *extermination*, or their *removal* beyond the lakes of Illinois river. The same world will scarcely do for them and us.⁷

⁵Ibid., 365n.

⁶Wilmer L. Hall, ed., Journal of the Council of the State of Virginia, (Richmond: The Virginia State Library, Division of Purchase and Printing, 1931), vol. 3, 416. "The Governor having laid before the board the plan of the Countess of Huntingdon for civilizing & christianizing the Indians, together with some observations of Sr. James Jay on the subject - It is advised that his Excellency [Governor Jefferson] write to Congress & enclose the said papers to them for their consideration, & request the result of their deliberations thereon, in order that the same may be laid, together with the papers from the Countess & Sr. James Jay, before the Legislature at their next meeting."

⁷Jefferson to Clark, January 1, 1780, Boyd, Papers, vol. 3, 258-59, italics added for emphasis. In a draft of this letter, Jefferson seemed preoccupied with extermination of the Indians. He wrote and lined out "extermination" three times placing the word at the top, middle, and lower parts of the draft before settling on a fourth and final location. Jefferson deleted the following from the draft: "I think the most important object which can be proposed with such a force is the extermination of those hostile tribes of Indians who live between the Ohio and Illinois who have harrassed us with eternal hostilities, and whom experience has shewn [sic] to be incapable of reconciliation. The Shawanese [sic], Mingos, Munsies [sic] and Wiandots [sic] can never be relied on as friends, and therefore the object of the war should be their total extinction, or their removal beyond the lakes or the Illinois river [sic] and peace."

Jefferson issued a proclamation ordering American settlers to vacate lands in which they had not been given or assigned rights of pre-emption along Virginia's western frontiers. This was done in an effort to avert war with Indians still hostile to the United States.⁸

The Governor wrote to Clark again a few weeks later in which he maintained that peace should be a primary object between tribes friendly to the Americans, and that they should be encouraged to fight against the Shawnee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw on behalf of the Americans.⁹

In a pair of letters to Clark, Jefferson stated first that "I wish it were possible to engage the Piankishaws in war against the British Indians." In his second letter he congratulated Clark for his victory over the Shawnee, adding that he regretted that a lack of provisions for Clark's troops prevented Clark from doing further damage to the Shawnee. He declared, "I hope those Savages will be taught to fear, since they cannot be taught to keep faith."¹⁰

Jefferson was elected to the Confederation Congress in 1783, and received appointments to several committees, on three of which his work would further development of positions which would be incorporated in his presidential policies. He was appointed to the Committee on Indian Affairs,¹¹ to a committee

⁸January 24, 1780, Proclamation Requiring Settlers Northwest of the Ohio to Vacate, Ibid. 266-67.

⁹Jefferson to Clark, Jan. 29, 1780, Ibid., 273-77.

¹⁰Jefferson to Clark, September 8 and 29, 1780, respectively. H. R. McLwaine, ed., Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1926), 455 and 483, respectively.

¹¹Gailard Hunt, 2d ed., Journals of the Continental Congress, vol. 25: September 1-December 1, 1783, 693n.

to plan for a temporary government of the western territory,¹² and to a third committee dealing with the state of Indian affairs in the southern region of the nation.¹³

As one of three members of the committee regarding the western territory, Jefferson contributed to a report which, in part, stipulated that territory ceded by states to the nation, having been purchased from the Indians by the United States and offered for sale, shall be formed into new states.¹⁴

He was assigned to a committee to revise an article of the Report on Indian Affairs previously submitted by another committee. He was to consider and report what further arrangements were necessary to carry into effect a proposed Indian treaty.¹⁵ Jefferson prepared a report for Congress recommending changes to two articles of instructions to be given to commissioners elected to negotiate with the Six Nations.¹⁶

A committee report on the status of Indian affairs in the southern department (region), to which Jefferson contributed, expressed the view, "that even if the Indians could be totally expelled, the policy of reducing them to such an extremity is deemed questionable; for in case of any future rupture with Great Britain they would thereby become an useful ally to that Power and a formidable Enemy to the United States." The committee recommended further that Congress should not act beyond "the essential interest of their constituents; and

¹²Ibid., 693n.

¹³Ibid., 692n

¹⁴March 1, 1784, Hunt, Journals, vol. 26: January 1-May 10, 1784, 118-20.

¹⁵Ibid., 124-25.

¹⁶Ibid., 134-35.

furthermore generosity becomes bankrupt and frustrates its own designs by prodigal bounty." Considering states in the South which had Indians inhabiting land within their borders, the committee recommended that these states, desiring to "provide speedily for the settlement of their respective territories," should prevail upon the Indians to confer with the United States to establish property lines between them and the United States, and to cede "uncultivated land to the States they inhabit respectively as may be convenient to those nations and commensurate to the present and approaching needs of those States." The committee suggested that these Indians be reminded of their alliances with the British during the American Revolution and should not expect more than "a reasonable compensation" for their land. The committee concluded that such a negotiating stance would aid financially strapped states in the South which would contribute to the funding of the federal purchase of the ceded lands. The commissioners were to be instructed to "use their own discretion" when establishing the "most advantageous boundary lines to which they can be induced to accede. . . ." Additionally, the commissioners should be instructed to encourage the Indian tribes to treat with the United States independently so as to avoid "united councils or powerful combinations among the Indians," which might result in "mischiefs" unfavorable to the interests of the United States. The committee also recommended Congress pass laws to prevent "persons not authorised [sic] by Congress from trading with the Indians. . . ." ¹⁷

Jefferson informed Representative William Carmichael that Congress had purchased Indian title to about fifty million acres between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, and anticipated another purchase of an equal quantity. Congress

¹⁷May 28, 1784, Hunt, Journals, vol. 27: May 11-December 24, 1784, 453-65.

passed an ordinance to dispose of the land by auction. The land was to be sold at no less than one dollar per acre, payable with certificates of debt. Jefferson concluded that all of the certificates for domestic debt would quickly be exchanged for land. "Our foreign debt, in that case, will soon be discharged," he reasoned.¹⁸

Jefferson wrote to his friend De'meunier that "it may be taken for a certainty that not a foot of land will ever be taken from the Indians without their own consent. The sacredness of their right [to the land] is felt by all thinking persons in America as much as in Europe."¹⁹

To Benjamin Hawkins, Jefferson counseled:

The attention which you pay to their rights [Indians] also does you great honor, as the want of that is a principal source of dishonour [sic] to the American character.

The two principles on which our conduct toward the Indians should be founded are justice and fear. After injuries we have done them, they cannot love us, which leaves us no alternative but that of fear to keep them from attacking us. But justice is what we should never lose sight of, and in time it may recover their esteem.²⁰

Jefferson lamented over the unexpected delay in completing some treaties with Indians for extensive cessions of land. However, he believed that once a survey of the land was completed, sale of the land would begin, and that "I have a firm faith that they will in short time absorb the whole of the certificates of the domestic debt."²¹

¹⁸Jefferson to William Carmichael, August 18, 1785, Boyd, Papers, vol. 8, 401-2.

¹⁹Jefferson's Observations on De meunier's Manuscript, June 1786, Boyd, Papers, vol. 10, 44.

²⁰Jefferson to Hawkins, August 13, 1786, *Ibid.*, 240.

²¹Jefferson to G. K. von Hogendorp, August 25, 1786, *Ibid.*, 298-99.

John Jay, the Confederation's Foreign Minister, wrote to Jefferson about his concerns regarding purchases of land from the Indians:

... nor are they pleased with the avidity with which we seek to acquire their Lands. Would it not be wiser gradually to extend our Settlements, as want of Room should make it necessary, than to pitch our Tents through the Wilderness in a great Variety of Places, far distant from each other, and from those Advantages of Education, Civilization, Law, and Government which compact Settlements and Neighbourhood afford? Shall we not fill the Wilderness with white Savages, and will they not become more formidable to us than the tawny ones who now inhabit it?²²

Jefferson adopted this reasoning throughout most of his public service years, even during his presidency. He typically pressed for cession when he believed the time was right, and backed off when he felt that further pressure would create insurmountable resentment among the Indian nations.

In May of 1790, Secretary of State Jefferson presented a "Report on Certain Georgia Land Grants" in which he advised that certain companies in Georgia had been granted land by that state though the Indians still possessed title to the land. Furthermore, Georgia did not have the right to acquire land from the Indians, as that transaction was exclusively the province of the federal government under the right of pre-emption. As war and treaties were the two legitimate means of acquiring land, and as only the federal government--as enumerated in the United States Constitution--had the power to declare war and to make treaties, neither the state of Georgia nor any other "particular" government had the power to acquire Indian land title.²³

The right of pre-emption by the central government was a concept that Jefferson stressed vigorously. He realized that such a right gave the federal

²²Jay to Jefferson, December 14, 1786, *Ibid.*, 596-99.

²³"Report on Certain Georgia Land Grants," May 3, 1790, Ford, *Works*, vol. 6, 55-57.

government exclusive power to deal with the Indians in accordance with its objectives: peaceful Indian/white relations, the desire for land, protection of frontier settlements, reducing risk of foreign incursions and meddling with the Indians, and reduction of the national debt. Jefferson continued to stress the federal government's right of pre-emption throughout his public life.

Jefferson wrote to Secretary of War Henry Knox arguing that in North Carolina the Cherokee "were entitled to the sole occupation of the lands within the limits guaranteed to them. The state of N. Carolina, according to the *jus gentium* established for America by universal usage, had only a right of preemption of these lands against all other nations. It could convey them to its citizens only this right of preemptions [*sic*], and the right of occupation could not be united to it till obtained by the U. S. from the Cherokees."²⁴

Writing to President Washington about Indian depredations in the West, Jefferson stated:

As to myself, I hope we shall give the Indians a thorough drubbing this summer, and I should think it better afterwards to take up the plan of liberal & repeated presents to them. This would be much the cheapest in the end, & would save all the blood which is now spilt: in time too it would produce a spirit of peace & friendship between us. The expense of a single expedition would last very long for presents.²⁵

Writing in a similar vein on the same day to James Monroe, Jefferson dropped his guarded tone and careful choice of words and expressed his views without reserve, "I hope we shall drub the Indians well this summer & then change our plan from war to Bribery." He suggested that it would be wise to replicate the strategy of the English and Spanish of influencing the Indians by

²⁴Jefferson to Knox, August 26, 1790, Boyd, *Papers*, vol. 17, 430-31.

²⁵Jefferson to Washington, April 17, 1791, Ford, *Works*, vol. 6, 245.

frequent and generous presents. "The expence [sic] of the summers [sic] expedition would have served for presents for half a century." He contended that such a strategy might suspend hostilities for years, thus making possible "a real affection" to "succeed on our frontiers to that hatred now existing there." Jefferson reasoned that other benefits could be derived from this plan of action:

Another powerful motive is that in this way we may leave no pretext for raising or continuing an army. Every rag of an Indian depredation will otherwise serve as a ground to raise troops with those who think a standing army and a public debt necessary for the happiness of the U. S. and we shall never be permitted to get rid of either.²⁶

Jefferson again wrote to Knox stating that the federal government must maintain sovereignty over treaty making with the Indians. Furthermore, he argued that the Indians had a right to occupy their lands independent of the states within which they were situated, and that no act of a state could give a right to lands not ceded to the United States by treaty or other transaction. Jefferson maintained that "neither under the present Constitution nor the antient [sic] Confederation, had any State or person a right to Treat with the Indians, without the consent of the General Government; that that consent has never been given to any Treaty for the cession of the Land in question." He further stated that the federal government would protect the Indians' right to their lands and would remove persons settling on their lands without the prior consent of the federal government.²⁷

In his notes about conversations with British diplomat George Hammond, Jefferson responded to Hammond's inquiry regarding American right to Indian

²⁶Jefferson to Monroe, April 17, 1791, *Ibid.*, 242-43.

²⁷Jefferson to Knox, August 10, 1791, *Ibid.*, 301-02. This letter was accompanied by a petition received by Knox and forwarded to Jefferson for his review, by William Moultrie on behalf of the South Carolina Yazoo Company. Mr. Moultrie was, at this time, governor of South Carolina.

soil. He stated that the United States government had a right of pre-emption of their lands--an exclusive right to purchase their lands--whenever they might be willing to sell, and a right to regulate commerce between them and United States citizens. Furthermore, the right of pre-emption prohibited individuals of other nations from purchasing Indian land. He stated that the purpose of pre-emption, in part, was to prevent British traders from coming into Indian territory.

Jefferson viewed the friendlier Indians as frontier border patrols, "a Marechausee, or police, for scouring the woods on our borders, and preventing their being a cover for rovers and robbers."²⁸

Writing once more on this topic to Washington, Jefferson stated:

I consider our right of pre-emption of the Indian lands not as amounting to any dominion, or juristiction, or paramountship* whatever, but merely in the nature of a reminder after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and that this might be forever.²⁹

Jefferson's suggestion of the potentially indefinite nature of Indian sovereignty was ingenuous and probably for Washington's benefit; the Secretary of State had usually counseled others that such sovereignty would last until the Indians elected to sell or otherwise cede their lands, an election typically through encouragement from government sources.

As Secretary of State, Jefferson submitted an amendment to a bill regulating trade with the Indians passed in 1790 and due to expire. Jefferson's

²⁸Notes of a Conversation with George Hammond, June 3, 1792, prepared June 4, 1792, John Catanzariti, 3d ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), vol. 24: 1 June to 31 December 1792, 26-31.

²⁹Jefferson to Washington, 1793, Boyd, Papers, vol. 17, 328-29. *This attitude changed during his presidency. Jefferson invoked paramountship to extinguish title to lands possessed by a tribe nearly extinct, and bordered by lands under title of the United States.

version provided for criminal penalties for anyone acquiring Indian land illegally. The original law invalidated such purchases but was not a sufficient deterrent to illicit transactions. One provision of the draft, which survived modification by James Madison in the House, and retained its objective, stated that "where any such Indians shall of their own accord desire to sell any part of their lands, and it shall be deemed the interest of the the U. S. that a purchase shall be made, the same shall be done by treaty or convention. . . ." ³⁰ On one hand the Indians retained their right to keep or sell their land as they desired, and on the other hand Jefferson and his colleagues of like mind ensured that the federal government had sole right of pre-emption. Jefferson and his fellow Republicans had every intent to encourage the Indians to exercise their right to sell, which the federal government, in turn, had an exclusive right to purchase.

During a cabinet meeting on June 1, 1793, Washington asked his department heads for their opinions about the Indians in the southern region. Jefferson proposed:

That an agent be sent to the Choctaw nation, to endeavour secretly to engage them to support the Chickasaws in their present war with the Creeks, giving them for that purpose arms and ammunition sufficient; and that it be kept in view, that, if we settle our differences amicably with the Creeks, we at the same time mediate effectually the peace of the Chickasaws and Choctaws, so as to rescue the former from the difficulties in which they are engaged, and the latter from those into which we may have been instrumental in engaging them. ³¹

³⁰Jefferson to Washington, with enclosure (Clause for Bill Regulating Trade with the Indians), January 13, 1793, Catanzariti, *Papers*, vol. 25, 47-48.

³¹Cabinet meeting held June 1, 1793, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *Washington's Writings* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931), vol. 10, 348-49n. Henry Knox agreed with Jefferson. U. S. Attorney General Edmund Randolph stated that "Although I approve of the general policy of employing Indians against Indians, yet I doubt greatly whether it ought to be exercised under the particular existing circumstances with Spain, who may hold herself bound to take the part of the Creeks, and criminate the United States for some degree of insincerity." Hamilton argued that "My judgment balanced a considerable time on the proposed measure; but

While learning about Indian affairs and gaining first-hand legislative and executive experience in matters relating to Indians, Jefferson developed his principles of republicanism, principles which formed his vision of America.

Jefferson read the works of ancient and contemporary philosophers before and during his years of public service: Aristotle, Socrates, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, Locke, among others. Having entered into political life in 1769 as a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses, the lawyer-turned-legislator was exposed to political problems that would consume his attention the rest of his life. His reading, previously dominated by the study of law, changed to politics and government, particularly works written by Locke and Montesquieu.³² In one of his many notebooks in which he wrote abstracts of his readings, Jefferson discussed Montesquieu's arguments on political virtue and forms of government:

He [Montesquieu] considers political virtue or the Amor Patriae, as the energetic principle of a democratic republic; moderation, that of an aristocratic republic; honor, that of a limited monarchy; and fear, that of a despotism; and shews [sic] that every government should provide that it's [sic] energetic principle be the object of the education of it's [sic] youth.

That it's [sic] laws also should be relative to the same principle. In a democracy, equality and frugality should be promoted by the laws, as they nurse the amor patriae. . . .³³

at length decided against it, and very materially on this ground, that I do not think the United States can honorably, or morally, or with good policy, embark the Choctaws in the war, without a determination to extricate them from the consequences, even by force. Accordingly it is proposed, that, in settling our difficulties with the Creeks, '*we mediate effectually* the peace of the Chickasaws and Choctaws;' which I understand to mean, that we are to insist with the Creeks on such terms of peace for them, as shall appear to us equitable, and, if refused, will exert ourselves *to procure them by arms*. I am unwilling, all circumstances foreign and domestic considered, to embarrass the government with such an obligation." (Italicized words are Hamilton's.)

³²Bill dated September 19, 1769, cited in Marie Kimball, Jefferson: The Road to Glory, 1743-1776 (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1943), 227.

³³Gilbert Chinard, ed., The Commonplace Book of Thomas Jefferson. A Repertory of His Ideas on Government (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1926) 31-38.

Between 1774 and 1776, Jefferson reviewed the various forms of European government which might be useful as models for an American nation. In the summer of 1774, Jefferson took his first major step toward espousing a republican ideology, this in the form of "A Summary View of the Rights of British America." It was a twenty-three page pamphlet dashed off as an indignant response to the Coercive Acts passed by the British Parliament, a body which he contended had no authority over the colonies. Explaining the plight of residents of Virginia's distant western territory, he asked King George III, "does his majesty seriously wish, and publish to the world, that his subjects should give up the glorious right of representation, with all the benefits derived from that, and submit themselves the absolute slaves of his sovereign will?"³⁴ Throughout "Summary View," Jefferson espoused the republican principles of individual rights and local self-government.

While a member of the Committee of Correspondence in 1775, Jefferson expressed his concern for the unity of the colonies, arguing that preservation of the Union was of paramount importance.³⁵

In June of 1776 he drafted the Declaration of Independence and prepared a draft of a constitution for Virginia. Among the numerous declarations in the first document, Jefferson stated, "that all men are created equal, that they are

³⁴"A Summary View of the Rights of British America," in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., Thomas Jefferson: Writings: Autobiography, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, Notes on the State of Virginia, Public Papers, Addresses, Messages, and Replies, Miscellany Letters (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1984), 103-22.

³⁵Ford, Writings, vol. 1, 451-52. Edmund Randolph, reflecting on Jefferson's attendance at the second Virginia Convention in Richmond in 1775 said, "Jefferson was not silent. He argued closely, profoundly and warmly on the same side. The post in the Revolutionary debate belonging to him, was that at which the theories of republicanism were deposited." Edmund Randolph, "Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia," Virginia Magazine, vol. 43 [year not cited], 223, as cited and quoted in Kimball, Jefferson: The Road to Glory, 258.

endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"36 In his draft for the Virginia Constitution, he provided that "All male persons of full age and sane mind having a freehold estate in [one fourth of an acre] of land in any town, or in [25] acres of land in the country, . . . shall have right to give their vote in the election of their respective representatives."37 This provision, in various forms throughout his public career, was a basic premise of Jefferson's vision for a republic of independent and virtuous white male land owners.

As part of a general revision of Virginia laws, in 1778, Jefferson submitted to the House of Delegates Bill number 79, "A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge." Its purpose was to create a system of public education for all children residing in Virginia irrespective of their parents' financial status. Jefferson believed that it was critical to have an educated populace to avert the threat of tyranny and to ensure a wise and forthright government. He wanted to emphasize knowledge of history so that citizens would recognize minacious political ambition.³⁸

³⁶Thomas Jefferson, et al., "The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America" (July 4, 1776).

³⁷Third Draft of the Virginia Constitution by Jefferson, June 1776, Boyd, Papers, vol. 1, 356-64.

³⁸"A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," Boyd, Papers, vol. 2, 526-35. The bill was reviewed, revised, but never passed during a period of eight years due primarily to the expense of its provisions, 535n. To Washington he said, "It is an axiom in my mind that our liberty can never be safe but in the hands of the people themselves, and that too of the people with a certain degree of instruction. This is the business of the state to effect, and on a general plan." Boyd, Papers, vol. 9, 150-52.

During his service in the Confederation Congress, Jefferson submitted a "Report on Government for Western Territory" in which he resolved that the "respective governments [of each new state] shall be in republican forms," and that "free males of full age [were] to meet together for the purpose of establishing a temporary government." New states would be formed from the western territory and admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with the said original States. . . ."³⁹

As minister to France beginning in the summer of 1784, Jefferson made critical observations on the forms of government, characteristics of society, and means of economic advancement of European nations. He found solace in the distinctly republican form of government of the fledgling United States:

The happiness of governments like ours, wherein the people are truly the mainspring, is that they are never to be despaired of. When an evil becomes so glaring as to strike them generally, they arrouse [*sic*] themselves, and it is redressed.⁴⁰

In a well-known letter to Madison, Jefferson told of an encounter with an elderly poor woman to whom he gave some money after she acted as a guide and informed him of the condition of the working poor in Fontainebleau, a village of about 5,000 inhabitants. Reflecting on his conversation with her he made observations about the inequal distribution of property and wealth, and taxation in European nations:

Whenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labour [*sic*] and live on. If, for the encouragement of industry we allow it to

³⁹"Report on Government for Western Territory", May 28, 1784, Ford, *Journals*, vol. 27, 722; 438bn.

⁴⁰Jefferson to Richard Price, February 1, 1785, Boyd, *Papers*, vol. 7, 630-31.

be appropriated, we must take care that other employment be furnished to those excluded from the appropriation. If we do not the fundamental right to labour [sic] the earth returns to the unemployed. It is too soon yet in our country to say that every man who cannot find employment but who can find uncultivated land, shall be at liberty to cultivate it, paying a moderate rent. But it is not too soon to provide by every possible means that as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land. The small landholders are the most precious part of a state.⁴¹

To Benjamin Hawkins he stated that for all problems associated with a republican form of government, it was by far better than what existed in Europe. In a letter to David Ramsay, Jefferson said: "I am sensible that there are defects in our federal government: yet they are so much lighter than those of monarchies that I view them with much indulgence. I rely too on the good sense of the people for remedy."⁴²

While in France, many of Jefferson's colleagues and family members kept him apprised of conditions in the United States. Madison, Monroe, Jay, and others relayed information to him about Indian affairs, politics and policies regarding commerce with other nations, and the debate on the creation of a national constitution. Jefferson wrote to Madison of "preserving inviolate the fundamental principle that the people are not to be taxed but by representatives chosen immediately by themselves." He expressed his deep concern about the lack of a bill of rights as part of the Constitution. He said that "a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference." He

⁴¹Jefferson to Madison, October 28, 1785, James Morton Smith, ed., The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-1826 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), vol. 1, 389-91.

⁴² Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins and to David Ramsay, August 4, 1787, Boyd, Papers, vol. 11, 683-84 and 686-87, respectively.

was concerned as well that the office of president might be filled by an individual for life, thus creating, in essence, a monarchy. Jefferson said that since he believed in the will of the majority, he would "concur in it chearfully [sic]." He concluded his letter with remarks reflecting his republican views:

I think our governments will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as there shall be vacant lands in any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. Above all things I hope the education of the common people will be attended to; convinced that on their good sense we may rely with the most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.⁴³

Jefferson asked Madison to keep him informed as to progress in drafting a declaration of rights to complete the Constitution. He also requested information regarding "the impression made on the sum of our domestic debt by the sale of lands."⁴⁴ The land for sale had been ceded by Indian nations.

He argued that the powers of the executive were not his primary concern, but that of the "tyranny of the legislatures." He acknowledged that some people wanted a monarchy, yet they were few and did not have the character to see their convictions through to fruition. "The rising race," he said, "are all republicans. We were educated in royalism: no wonder if some of us retain that idolatry still. Our young people are educated in republicanism. An apostacy from that to royalism is unprecedented and impossible."⁴⁵

Soon after his return to the United States from France in the fall of 1789, Jefferson received an invitation from President Washington to become Secretary

⁴³Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, Smith, Republic of Letters, vol. 1, 510-15.

⁴⁴Jefferson to Madison, February 6, 1788, *Ibid.*, 529-30.

⁴⁵Jefferson to Madison, March 15, 1789, *Ibid.*, 586-89

of State.⁴⁶ Within a year he became embroiled in ideological warfare with Vice President Adams and, in particular, with Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton. By the spring of 1791 Jefferson and Madison moved to the forefront in defense of republicanism and as stalwart opponents of the so-called Hamiltonian system. The two Virginians had been devising a republican system of government based not on Hamilton's isolationist theory and use of credit, but on a premise of international trade as beneficial to both the United States and Europe and as a way to retire the national debt rather than increase it. Hamilton wanted the war debt of the northern states to be shared by all in the Union; the southern states rejected this plan as they had already paid their debt by sale of lands formerly held by Indians.⁴⁷

In March of 1791, President Washington assigned to Jefferson the task of preparing a report on public lands. The Secretary of State seized the opportunity to avert a war with Spain over western and southwestern lands and doing it in favor of the United States by allowing a westward flow of easterners to migrate to the expansive western and southwestern regions. Jefferson believed that westward expansion would assure domination of an agrarian society—a requisite for republicanism. Jefferson wrote to Washington that Spanish Governor Quesada's invitation to foreigners to settle in Florida would result in thousands of Americans migrating:

⁴⁶Boyd, *Papers*, vol. 16, 178-79. Jefferson, in a speech to his fellow Albemarle residents, said that, "It rests now with ourselves alone to enjoy in peace and concord the blessings of self-government so long denied to mankind, to show by example the sufficiency of human reason for the care of human affairs. . . . The will of the majority, the natural law of every society, is the only sure guardian of the rights of man. Perhaps even this may sometimes err. But its errors are honest, solitary and short-lived. Let us then, my dear friends, forever bow down to the general reason of the society. We are safe with that, even in its deviations."

⁴⁷Jefferson to William Short, April 6, 1790, *Ibid.*, 316.

This is meant for our people. Debtors take advantage of it and go off with their property. Our citizens have a right to go where they please. It is the business of the states to take measures to stop them till their debts are paid. This done, I wish a hundred thousand inhabitants would accept the invitation. It will be the means of delivering to us peaceably, what might otherwise cost us a war. In the mean time we may complain of this seduction of our inhabitants just enough to make them believe we think it very wise policy for them, and confirm it. This is my idea of it.⁴⁸

Jefferson apparently was confident that if Americans settled in Spanish Florida, they would remain true to the United States and would not live up to some of the prerequisites of the Spanish invitation: adopting Catholicism and taking up arms against Spanish enemies, including the United States. Glutting Florida with American citizens would eventually result in the territory becoming a part of the United States without the expense of war.

At Washington's behest Jefferson prepared a draft of a message to Congress regarding defense of the western territories. In this draft the Secretary of State indicated that efforts to effect peace with the Indians in the northwestern region had failed; though initial military expeditions had been successful, of late failure had occurred (in reference to General St. Clair's resounding defeat).

⁴⁸Jefferson to Washington, April 2, 1791, Boyd, *Papers*, vol. 20, 95-98. Jefferson received a letter from John Eltwein November 19, 1791 regarding a section of the "Report on Public Lands" referring to extinguishment of claims by Christian Indians. Eltwein was a well known Indian missionary and bishop of the Moravian Church of North America, who had headed the revival of the Society of the United Brethren for Propagating the Gospel among the Heathen in 1787. Eltwein had sought to obtain restitution from the federal government for losses suffered by the Christian Indians in March 1782 by American militiamen who had massacred many of them. His efforts bore fruition in 1798. Eltwein wrote to Jefferson to clarify a matter in which the Secretary of State had stated in his report that the Indians had emigrated freely and of their own choosing. Eltwein stated that in fact the Indians left because of the murders committed by militiamen and that they could not hope for protection from the western government. Eltwein said, "This simple Narrative of the Circumstances of these Christian Indians, which is strictly true, will, I am sensible convince Your Honor, that it was not Choice, which made this Congregation forsake their Settlement and the Improvements, which had cost them so much Labour [sic], and of which they had but begun to enjoy the Fruits, to emigrate beyond the Limits of the Unit. States, but that it was the most urgent Necessity and the Conviction that in their Situation they could not be protected." Charles T. Cullen, 2d ed., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), vol. 22: 6 August 1791 to 31 December 1791, 306-10. No known record exists of a reply to this letter by Jefferson.

Therefore, it was necessary to continue military operations against the hostile Indians to protect citizens in the West. Jefferson expressed concern privately that St. Clair's defeat might result in an enlargement of the regular army.⁴⁹ He hoped that Washington would rely more on militiamen who were highly skilled Indian fighters, than on regular troops who were inadequate in Indian warfare. More was at stake, however, as Jefferson feared that an increase in the size of the regular army would balloon the national debt and would perpetuate Hamilton's fiscal policies which Jefferson viewed as being detrimental to a nation steeped in republicanism.⁵⁰

Jefferson warned Washington about people in the executive and legislative ranks who wanted to replace the nation's republican form of government with an English-styled monarchical system. Jefferson warned of paper money advocates determined to place the nation in such debt as to relinquish most of the country's supply of coins to European creditors. Jefferson argued that "all the capital employed in paper speculation is barren and useless, producing, like that on a gaming table, no accession to itself, and is withdrawn from commerce and agriculture, where it would have produced addition to the common mass: That it nourishes in our citizens habits of vice and idleness, instead of industry and morality. . . ." Jefferson also expressed concern that if ongoing negotiations with the English and Spanish were not concluded prior to Washington's retirement, that the English, in particular, would double their effort in "fomenting the Indian War."⁵¹ He hoped for these reasons that Washington

⁴⁹Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr., December 11, 1791, Cullen, Papers, vol. 22, 389-90.

⁵⁰See letters above from Jefferson to Charles Carroll and James Monroe.

⁵¹Jefferson to Washington, May 23, 1792, Cullen, Papers, vol. 23, 535-40.

would assent to a second term of office. Jefferson also believed that if the nation was to continue in a republican vein, agriculture would have to continue as the main economic force, and to do so would require cessions of Indian land. Further Indian hostilities encouraged by the English and Spanish would undermine land acquisitions and raise the possibility of higher taxes to pay the inflated national debt caused by an increase in the size of the regular army.

Writing to Thomas Paine, Jefferson assured the author of "The Rights of Man" that republicanism was not about to swoon under an attack from monarchists:

Would you believe it possible that in this country there should be high and important characters who need your lessons in republicanism, and who do not heed them? It is but too true that we have a sect preaching up and panting after an English constitution of king, lords, and commons, and whose heads are itching for crowns, coronets, and mitres. But our people, my good friend, are firm and unanimous in their principles of republicanism, and there is no better proof of it than that they love what you write and read it with delight.⁵²

Jefferson resigned as Secretary of State on December 21, 1793, returning to his cherished private life at Monticello until 1796. When Washington made clear his intent to retire, Madison and others thrust Jefferson back into the realm of politics and government as the Republican presidential candidate to oppose John Adams. Falling three votes short of victory in the electoral college, he agreed to serve as vice president, saying that the "second office is honorable and easy. The first is but splendid misery. If Mr. Adams can be induced to administer the government in its true principles and relinquish his bias to the English

⁵²Jefferson to Paine, June 19, 1792, Boyd, Papers, vol. 20, 312.

constitution," he could work with Adams, adding that "he is perhaps the only sure barrier against Hamilton's getting in."⁵³

In 1797, following a series of devious incidents widening a breach between Adams and Jefferson he confided to a colleague that "the great body of our native citizens are unquestionably of the republican sentiment," as opposed to the monarchical leanings of Adams and his Federalist camp.⁵⁴ With Adams's blessings Congress passed a pair of measures known as Alien Acts in the summer of 1798. Congress then passed a Sedition Act to be implemented in either peace or war and against both foreigners and American citizens, including government officials who opposed government measures or published "any false, scandalous and malicious writing" against the president, Congress or the government in general. Jefferson declared that these acts were an attempt to prevent Republicans and their newspapers from expressing their views and were flagrantly unconstitutional.⁵⁵ In a letter to Madison while the sedition bill was pending, Jefferson confided that the bill would suppress the Whig presses. Jefferson named Bache's and Cary's newspapers as two that should be procured, "for if these papers fall, republicanism will be entirely brow beaten."⁵⁶ By the fall of 1798 Jefferson had drafted the Kentucky Resolutions attacking the constitutionality of the acts. The gist of the resolutions was that the states did not submit to the central government without limitations; that under the

⁵³Jefferson to Madison, Gailard Hunt, ed., Writings of James Madison, Comprising his Public Papers and his Private Correspondence, Including Numerous Letters and Documents now for the First Time Printed (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), vol. 6, 296-302.

⁵⁴Jefferson to James Sullivan, February 9, 1797, Bergh, Writings, vol. 9, 376-79.

⁵⁵Jefferson to Madison, May 3, 1798, Smith, Republic, vol. 2, 1004.

⁵⁶Jefferson to Madison, April 26, 1798, *Ibid.*, 1041-43.

Constitution the states constituted a general government, with most powers and rights reserved to the states for their own self-government. The resolutions further declared that whenever the general government exceeds its authority by assuming undelegated powers, its acts are void and of no force. The resolutions denounced the Alien and Sedition Acts as "contrary to the constitution."⁵⁷

By early 1799, Jefferson was not the reluctant candidate of 1796; he prepared his party for what he would later call "the revolution of 1800."⁵⁸ He wrote to Elbridge Gerry stating, "The unquestionable republicanism of the American mind will break through the mist under which it has been clouded, and will oblige its agents to reform the principles and practice of their administrations."⁵⁹

Jefferson declared that:

The spirit of 1776 is not dead. It has only been slumbering. The body of the American people is substantially republican. But their virtuous feelings have been played on by some fact with more fiction; they have been the dupes of artful manoeuvres [*sic*], and made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging chains for themselves. But time and truth have dissipated the delusion, and open their eyes.⁶⁰

Writing to Edward Livingston, Jefferson maintained that republican strength was clearly evident.⁶¹

Jefferson's growing commitment to republicanism ran concurrent to his development of an Indian policy—one that would be central to his presidential

⁵⁷Jefferson to Madison, with enclosure, November 17, 1798, *Ibid.*, 1079-84.

⁵⁸Jefferson, Bergh, *Writings*, vol. 12, 136

⁵⁹Jefferson to Gerry, January 26, 1799, Bergh, *Writings*, vol. 10, 74-86.

⁶⁰Jefferson to Thomas Lomax, March 12, 1799, *Ibid.*, 123-25.

⁶¹Jefferson to Edward Livingston, April 30, 1800, *Ibid.*, 163-65.

objectives. By the time he resigned as Secretary of State, his participation in Indian policy was tightly interwoven with republican ideology.

CHAPTER FIVE

EPILOGUE

The legacy of Jefferson's Indian policy and Jeffersonian republicanism flourished until the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828. The link between ideology and policy remained strong, particularly during the presidencies of Madison and Monroe. Though Jefferson slipped quietly away to Monticello to resume his lifestyle as a country gentleman, he continued to be influential in policy matters.

Though Jefferson announced his intention not to interfere with President Madison in making policy or in appointments for office, he apparently found reason to break his oath on more than one occasion.¹ Jefferson left a memorandum for Madison on March 4th--Jefferson's last day in office and Madison's first--regarding Indian policy. The retired president informed his successor of matters relating to the Cherokee and Chickasaw. Jefferson stated that orders were still pending to force settlers from lands reserved to these nations and that they should be carried out soon. He counseled that Wafford's Settlement on Cherokee land should be left undisturbed, as he anticipated that the Indians would exchange it for other land west of the Mississippi River. Jefferson further stated that:

From the lands of the Chickasaws all should be removed except those who settled on [Chief] Doublehead's reserve under titles from him; and they should be notified that those lands having been claimed by the Chickasaws

¹Jefferson's Circular Letter about His Relations with President Madison, March 1809, Smith, The Republic of Letters, vol., 1574

as well as the Cherokees, we purchased the Cherokee right with the exception of Doublehead's reserve, which we did not guarantee to him, but left it as it stood under the claims of both nations; that consequently they are not under our protection. That whenever we purchase the Chickasaw right, all their titles under Doublehead will become void; as our laws do not permit individuals to purchase lands from the Indians: that they should therefore look out for themselves in time.²

Jefferson also informed Madison of land purchased for the War Department to establish a school for Indian children. In December, 1809, Jefferson again addressed the issue of the Indian school, located near Detroit, stating the benefits he believed the Indians would gain from learning "useful arts" and a knowledge of farming and husbandry. More to the point, he wanted Madison to understand benefits to the United States:

It was thought more important to extend the civilised [*sic*] arts, and to introduce a separation of property among the Indians of the country around Detroit than elsewhere, because learning to set a high value on their property and losing by degrees all other dependance [*sic*] for subsistence, they would deprecate war with us as bringing certain destruction on their property, and would become a barrier for that distant and insulated post against the Indians beyond them. There are, beyond them, some strong tribes, as the Sacs, Foxes, etc. with whom we have as yet had little connection, and slender opportunities of extending to them our benefits and influence. They are therefore ready instruments to be brought into operation on us by a powerful neighbor which still cultivates it's [*sic*] influence over them by nourishing the savage habits, which waste them, rather than by encouraging the civilized arts which would soften, conciliate and preserve them.³

In his First Inaugural Address Madison declared that the government should:

carry on the benevolent plans which have been so meritoriously applied to the conversion of our aboriginal neighbors from the degradation and

²Jefferson to Madison, March 4, 1809, *Ibid.*, 1574-75.

³Jefferson to Madison, December 7, 1809, *Ibid.*, 1611-13.

wretchedness of savage life to a participation of the improvements of which the human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state. . . .⁴

Near the end of the year Madison stated that "With our Indian neighbors, the just and benevolent system continued toward them has also preserved peace, and is more and more advancing habits favorable to their civilization and happiness."⁵

Madison would no longer refer to the Indians as neighbors. He began to distance the government from the Indians :

With the Indian tribes also the peace and friendship of the United States are found to be so eligible that the general disposition to preserve both continues to gain strength. I feel particular satisfaction in remarking that an interior view of our country presents us with grateful proofs of its substantial and increasing prosperity. To a thriving agriculture and the improvements related to it is added a highly interesting extension of useful manufactures, the combined product of professional occupations and of household industry.⁶

Madison informed Congress that a force of regulars and militia had gathered in Indiana Territory due to depredations committed by Indians, and expressed concern about fanaticism within the Shawnee Nation. He stated that other tribes had remained peaceful and continued to pursue acculturation with white society.⁷

President Madison protested against British use of Indians during the War of 1812. He charged that the Indians were "savages" and that they were "ruthless" and "merciless." Madison was particularly dismayed by the

⁴First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809, Richardson, Messges and Papers, vol. 1, 468.

⁵First Annual Message, November 29, 1809., Ibid., 475.

⁶Second Annual Message, December 5, 1810, Ibid., 484.

⁷Third Annual Message, November 5, 1811, Ibid., 493.

"seduction" of the Creek Indians who "yielding to our perserving endeavors, were gradually acquiring more civilized habits" but had taken the British side. It had become necessary to prevent the Creek Nation from spreading its "bloody fanaticism" to other tribes. This was done by forming a force of regulars and militia from Georgia, Tennessee, and Mississippi Territory not only to "chastise the savages into present peace but make a lasting impression on their fears." The militia from Georgia and Tennessee were more than anxious to purge the Indians whether or not they were hostile.⁸

In his final annual address Madison discussed Indian policy at length:

The Indian tribes within our limits appear . . . disposed to remain at peace. From several of them purchases of land have been made particularly favorable to the wishes and security of our frontier settlements, as well as the general interest of the nation. In some instances the title, though not supported by due proof, and clashing with the claims of another, have been extinguished by double purchases, the benevolent policy of the United States preferring the augmented expense to the hazard of doing injustice or to the enforcement of justice against a feeble and untutored people by means involving or threatening an effusion of blood. I am happy to add that the tranquility which has been restored among the tribes themselves, as well as between them and our own population, will favor the resumption of the work of civilization which had made an encouraging progress among some tribes, and that the facility is increasing for extending that divided and individual ownership, which exists now in movable property only, to the soil itself, and of thus establishing in the culture and improvement of it the true foundation for a transit from the habits of the savage to the arts and comforts of social life.⁹

Madison's successor James Monroe claimed that the territory of the United States had been enlarged by "fair and honorable" treaty. As to the Indians he said that "it is our duty to cultivate friendly relations and to act with kindness and

⁸Fourth Annual Message, November 4, 1812, *Ibid.*, 515 and 518; Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1813, *Ibid.*, 525; Fifth Annual Message, December 7, 1813, *Ibid.*, 535-36.

⁹Eighth Annual Message, December 3, 1816, *Ibid.*, 575-76.

liberality in all our transactions. Equally proper is it to perservere in our efforts to extend to them the advantages of civilization." Monroe also declared that, "the vast amount of vacant lands, the value of which daily augments, forms an additional resource of great extent and duration. These resources, beside accomplishing every other necessary purpose, put it completely in the power of the United States to discharge the national debt at an early period."¹⁰

Monroe reported that numerous purchases of Indian land had resulted in the extinguishment of Indian title to land in Ohio, Michigan Territory, Indiana, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and soon in Alabama Territory. He expected further cessions to extend settlement from parts of Ohio along Lake Erie into Michigan Territory, and to "connect our settlements by degrees" through Indiana and Illinois Territory to Missouri Territory. Additional lands would be ceded between the Mississippi and Mobile Rivers.

In view of these acquisitions, Monroe declared that:

In this progress, which the rights of nature demand and nothing can prevent, marking a growth rapid and gigantic, it is our duty to make new effort for the preservation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants. The hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert. It yields to the more dense and compact form and greater force of civilized population; and of right it ought to yield, for the earth was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for their own support and comfort.

Monroe noted that the United States reaped significant advantages from the ceded lands, including security of inland frontiers, increased value of lands adjacent to new acquisitions, and new roads and canals.¹¹

¹⁰First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1817., Richardson, vol. 2, 9.

¹¹First Annual Message, December 2, 1817, Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. 2, 16-18.

Monroe took stock of the plight of Native Americans, displaying an arrogant form of humanitarianism typical of his time:

Experience has clearly demonstrated that independent savage communities can not exist within the limits of a civilized population. The progress of the latter has almost invariably terminated in the extinction of the former. . . .To civilize them, and even to prevent their extinction, it seems to be indispensable that their independence as communities should cease, and that the control of the United States over them should be complete and undisputed. The Hunter state will then be more easily abandoned, and recourse will be had to the acquisition and culture of land and to other pursuits tending to dissolve the ties which connect them together as a savage community and to give a new character to every individual.¹²

Monroe believed that peace with the Indians could best be maintained and progress in their "civilization" made through trade. He argued that if unable to find employment from "civilizing powers," they were apt to destroy one another. "Left to themselves," he said, "their extirpation is inevitable." Monroe suggested that judicious regulation of trade and civil administration over them would enable the government to protect white settlements from their "savage incursions" and accomplish "the great purpose of their civilization."¹³

Beginning his second term of office President Monroe reviewed past efforts to deal with Native Americans and proposed action to mitigate their dire situation, and to derive benefit to the United States through the process of acculturation:

The care of the Indian tribes within our limits long has been an essential part of our system, but, unfortunately, it has not been executed in a manner to accomplish all the objects intended by it. We have treated them as independent nations, without their having any substantial pretensions to that rank. The distinction has flattered their pride, retarded their

¹²Second Annual Message, November 16, 1818, Ibid., 46.

¹³Fourth Annual Message, November 14, 1820, Ibid., 79-80.

improvement, and in many instances paved the way to their destruction. The progress of our settlements westward, supported as they are by a dense population, has constantly driven them back, with almost the total sacrifice of the lands which they have been compelled to abandon. They have claims on the magnanimity and, I may add, on the justice of this nation which we must all feel. We should become their real benefactors; we should perform the office of their Great Father, the endearing title which they emphatically give to the Chief Magistrate of our Union. Their sovereignty over vast territories should cease, in lieu of which the right of soil should be secured to each individual and his posterity in competent portions; and for the territory thus ceded by each tribe some reasonable equivalent should be granted, to be vested in permanent funds for the support of civil government over them and for the education of their children, for their instruction in the arts of husbandry, and to provide sustenance for them until they could provide it for themselves. My earnest hope is that Congress will digest some plan, founded on these principles, with such improvements as their wisdom may suggest, and carry it into effect as soon as it may be practicable.¹⁴

Monroe reported problems with tribes residing in Florida Territory, between St. Augustine and Pensacola, who had "extensive claims but undefined boundaries." Although they were peaceful, their claims tended to interfere with intercourse between the eastern and western parts of the region, where most settlers were situated. Monroe stated that it was "essential to the growth and prosperity of the Territory, as well as to the interests of the Union, that these Indians should be removed, by special compact with them, to some other position or concentrated within narrower limits where they are."¹⁵

Monroe declared that steady progress was being made in advancing civilization to the Indians and that this was due to the "humane and perserving" policy of the federal government.¹⁶

¹⁴Second Inaugural Address, March 5, 1821, Ibid., 92.

¹⁵Sixth Annual Message, December 3, 1822, Ibid., 190.

¹⁶Eighth Annual Message, December 7, 1824, Ibid., 256.

John Quincy Adams did not mention Indians by name in his first address to the nation. Instead he referred to them indirectly: "The people of other nations, inhabitants of regions acquired not by conquest, but by compact, have been united with us in the participation of our rights and duties, of our burdens and blessings. The forest has fallen by the ax of our woodsman; the soil has been made to teem by the tillage of our farmers; our commerce has whitened every ocean."¹⁷

Adams stated that relations with Indian tribes which were strewn over the vast extent of the country were "highly interesting." He said that they were "dependent even for their existence upon our power." Adams reported on acts of Congress relating to treaties and expenses incurred to acquire land from Missouri to New Mexico and to establish boundaries and maintain peace with several tribes.¹⁸

Nearing the end of his presidency Adams discussed the relationship between Native Americans and the United States government and what he believed to be the duty of the government toward them:

At the establishment of the Federal Government under the present Constitution of the United States the principle was adopted of considering them as foreign and independent powers and also as proprietors of lands. They were, moreover, considered as savages, whom it was our policy and our duty to use our influence in converting to Christianity and in bringing within the pale of civilization.

As independent powers, we negotiated with them by treaties; as proprietors, we purchased of them all the lands which we could prevail upon them to sell; as brethren of the human race, rude and ignorant, we endeavored to bring them to the knowledge of religion and of letters. The ultimate design was to incorporate in our own institutions that portion of

¹⁷Inaugural Address, March 4, 1825, *Ibid.*, 295.

¹⁸First Annual Message, December 16, 1825, *Ibid.*, 306.

them which could be converted to the state of civilization. In the practice of European States, before our Revolution, they had been considered as *children* to be governed; as tenants at discretion, to be dispossessed as occasion might require; as hunters to be indemnified by trifling concessions for removal from the grounds from which their game was extirpated. In changing the system it would seem as if a full contemplation of the consequences of the change had not been taken. We have been far more successful in the acquisition of their lands than in imparting to them the principles or inspiring them with the spirit of civilization. But in appropriating to ourselves their hunting grounds we have brought upon ourselves the obligation of providing them with subsistence; and when we have had the rare good fortune of teaching them the arts of civilization and the doctrines of Christianity we have unexpectedly found them forming in the midst of ourselves communities claiming to be independent of ours and rivals of sovereignty within the territories of the members of our Union. This state of things requires that a remedy should be provided--a remedy which, while it shall do justice to those unfortunate children of nature, may secure to the members of our confederation their rights of sovereignty and of soil.¹⁹

Madison continued federal Indian policy along the same lines as Jefferson. Monroe accelerated the process of Indian removal, while Adams, preoccupied as his father had been with foreign affairs, generally maintained the policy set forth by his predecessors. Eighty-five treaties during the administrations of Jefferson's disciples, forty-two during the Monroe administration, caused the removal of Native Americans from many millions of acres of land.²⁰

Each president addressed the need for humanitarianism toward Native Americans; each president acknowledged Indian loss of land due to white society's appetite for acquisition; each president called Native Americans "savages," especially when at war with them; each president reported "bloodthirsty" atrocities committed by Indians, yet never acknowledged depredations against Indians; each president declared an obligation to "civilize"

¹⁹Fourth Annual Message, December 2, 1828, *Ibid.*, 415-16.

²⁰See Royce and Kappler regarding treaties.

and care for the poor "wretched children of nature," though none blamed their policy for Indian dependency; each president called for the acculturation of Native Americans, yet not one acknowledged that these people's cultures had been destroyed by the political economics of the United States; each president rationalized government acquisition of Indian land by claiming the "natural right" of the United States to dispossess Native Americans of their land; each president maintained that land acquisition had been accomplished not by conquest but by compact; and each president rejoiced in the benefits to the United States derived from removing Native Americans from their land.

By placating the southern states by acquiescing to their demands for Indian removal, Jefferson furthered his goals of westward expansion and a political economy based on an agrarian way of life. By seizing every opportunity to remove Indians from their land, Jefferson made available millions of acres of cheap cultivatable lands. The settlement of the South and the West tipped the balance of powerful interests from the industrialized North of the Federalists to the agricultural South of the Republicans. More land meant a greater need for more slaves; more slaves resulted in boundless harvests, larger profits, and increased political and economic power rivalling that of the northern, and in particular, the New England states. The creation of an imbalance in political economy, of the South over the North, was pleasing to Jefferson as he regarded with suspicion, credit, paper money and generally anything associated with the Hamiltonian doctrine.

In his quest for an idealized republican society, Jefferson strove to remove Native Americans from their ancestral lands. To be truly republican necessitated conditions favorable to both public and private virtue. He based private virtue

on self-sufficiency, independence and freedom to be industrious, enterprising, and morally sound. Jefferson believed that these characteristics were most likely to be found in people working the land, "eating the bread made with the sweat of one's brow." Public virtue entailed a commitment to one's community and involvement in politics and society. This required ownership of land. Jefferson was determined to make land available to as many adult white males as possible, hence his policy of Indian removal. This policy destroyed their cultures and forced them into a state of dependency and misery from which later generations have yet to recover. Jefferson set the stage for more flagrant forms of removal during Andrew Jackson's administration.

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APPENDIX ONE

TABLES

Chapter Two, Section 3: Stewart County, Tennessee Distribution of Slaves:

Table 2.--Captain Outlaw's Company

Landowners	Acreage	Slaves
George Boyd	284	1
John Brown	640 / 640	0 / 1
Thomas Clinton	20	5
Robert Cooper	3	2
Jas. Gatlin	448	1
William Haynes	314	1
W. Haggard	690	3
William Outlaw	800 / 272 / 25	0 / 0 / 4

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Box Vol. 2,
Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-
3-115), June 13, 1938.

Table 3.--Captain Warden's Company

Landowners	Acreage	Slaves
Wyat Arnold	100	1
Simon Bethea	100	2
Lewis Brock	300	4
Henry Edwards	700	2
Robert Ellison	1,329	8
Elizah Curtis	125	1
Beth Massey	510	4
Sarah Smith	200	0

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Book Vol. 2,
Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

Table 4.--Captain Allen's Company

Landowners	Acreage	Slaves
Issac Brunson	1,000	7
Joseph Gray	2,960	3
Joseph Gray, Jr.	500	2
John Jones	5,292	3

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Book Vol. 2, Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

Table 5.--Captain Elliot's Company

Landowners	Acreage	Slaves
John Atkins	100	8
Caleb Williams	1,708	0

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Book Vol. 2, Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

Table 6.--Captain Graham's Company

Landowner	Acreage	Slaves
Jas. Milam	1,000	2
Hendley Stone	1,030	1

Source: Records of Stewart County Tax Book Vol. 2, Historical Records Project (Official Project No. 165-44-3-115), June 13, 1938.

Chapter Two, Section 3: Domestic and Foreign Exports:

Table 9.--Massachusetts: Domestic and Foreign Exports

<u>Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30th</u>	<u>Domestic Exports</u>	<u>Foreign Exports</u>
1803	5,399,020	3,369,546
1804	6,303,122	10,591,256
1805	5,697,051	13,738,606
1806	6,621,696	14,577,547
1807	6,185,748	13,926,377
1808	1,508,632 *	3,619,690 *
1809	6,022,729	6,119,564

*During Embargo.

Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Commerce & Navigation, Vol. 2.

Table 10.--New York: Domestic and Foreign Exports

<u>Fiscal YearEnding Sept. 30th</u>	<u>Domestic Exports</u>	<u>Foreign Exports</u>
1803	7,626,831	3,191,556
1804	7,501,096	8,580,185
1805	8,098,060	15,384,883
1806	8,053,076	13,709,769
1807	9,957,416	16,400,547
1808	2,362,438 *	3,243,620 *
1809	8,348,764 **	4,232,798

*During Embargo. ** New York's economic recovery from the Embargo was clearly based on domestic manufactures. Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Commerce & Navigation, Vol. 2.

Table 11.--Pennsylvania: Domestic and Foreign Exports

<u>Fiscal Year</u> <u>Ending Sept.</u> <u>30th</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Exports</u>	<u>Foreign Exports</u>
1803	4,021,214	3,504,496
1804	4,178,713	6,851,444
1805	4,365,240	9,397,012
1806	3,765,313	13,809,389
1807	4,809,616	12,055,128
1808	1,066,527 *	2,946,803 *
1809	4,238,358	4,810,883

*During Embargo.

Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Commerce & Navigation, Vol. 2.

Table 12.--Georgia: Domestic and Foreign Exports

<u>Fiscal Year</u> <u>Ending</u> <u>Sept. 30th</u>	<u>Domestic</u> <u>Exports</u>	<u>Foreign Exports</u>
1803	1,310,832	32,476
1804	1,729,184	230,239
1805	2,351,706	1,033,062
1806	62,318	*
1807	3,710,776	34,069
1808	24,626	*
1809	1,082,108	*

*No returns received from the District of Savannah.

Source: American States Papers, Volume 10: Commerce & Navigation, Vol. 2.

Table 13.--Territories of the United States*: Domestic and Foreign Exports

<u>Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30th</u>	<u>Domestic Exports</u>	<u>Foreign Exports</u>
1803	1,310,832	32,476
1804	1,729,184	230,239
1805	2,651,706	1,033,062
1806	2,578,401	1,530,182
1807	3,474,029	1,159,174
1808	601,674	723,390
1809	480,724	197,621

*1803: Detroit, Michilimackinac, Massac, Fort Adams.

1804: Detroit, Michilimackinac, Massac, Fort Adams,
New Orleans.

1805: Detroit, Michilimackinac, New Orleans.

1806: Michigan, New Orleans.

1807: Michigan, New Orleans, Mississippi (Mobile).

1808: Ohio State, Michigan Territory, Orleans Territory.

1809: Michigan, New Orleans, Mississippi (Mobile).

Source: American State Papers, Volume 10: Commerce & Navigation, Vol. 2.

APPENDIX TWO
MAPS

Tennessee, 1800

Native American land

Land in possession of the United States

Tennessee, 1810

- Native American land
- Land in possession of the United States

Kentucky, 1800

Native American land

Land in possession of the United States

Kentucky, 1810

Native American land

Land in possession of the United States

Georgia, 1800

Native American land

Land in possession of the United States

Georgia, 1810

Native American land

Land in possession of the United States