1996

A pluralistic model of the property goodness

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.bxd9-dqru>
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A PLURALISTIC MODEL OF THE
PROPERTY GOODNESS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Philosophy
San José State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Gerald Albert Haug, Sr.

December 1996

UMI Number: 1382577

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ABSTRACT

A PLURALISTIC MODEL OF THE PROPERTY GOODNESS

by Gerald Albert Haug, Sr.

This thesis argues against G.E. Moore's characterizations of the property goodness in his Principia Ethica and argues for a pluralistic understanding of goodness. Moore's claims that the property goodness is simple, indefinable, and non-natural are attacked in this thesis. Also Moore's notions of rational ends and "The Naturalistic Fallacy" are critically examined and argued against. According to this thesis, Moore attributed simplicity and non-naturalness to the property goodness because he wished to preserve goodness as a single property. It is also argued that the underlying motives for holding a singular goodness were related to Platonic metaphysical doctrines held by Moore, which lead to a number of inconsistencies.

This thesis offers W.D. Ross' characterization of goodness, presented in his The Right and the Good, as an alternative to Moore's model. It is argued that Ross' model is preferable to Moore's because the inconsistencies that occur in Moore's model are absent in Ross' model.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the members on my thesis committee for their guidance and help. Specifically, my thanks go to Andy Ward for the many suggestions, comments and hours he gave me as I wrote my thesis. Also, my thanks and gratitude go to Sterling Harwood and Bill Shaw for their valuable input. Finally, I wish to thank my typist, Kasey Nugent, for her tireless efforts in typing and re-typing the numerous drafts and alterations that were necessary to produce this thesis.

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Introduction

In this thesis I will ask whether there is more than one meaning to the term "good." The primary objective of this thesis will be to argue that goodness is not a unitary concept, but is pluralistic in meaning and application. In arguing this, I will critically examine the various characteristics of goodness that G. E. Moore discussed in his Principia Ethica. Also, I will attempt to show that the arguments Moore used to assert that an error exists in moral thought - an error he called the "naturalistic fallacy" - are unsound arguments.¹ Thus, I will defend ethical naturalism against Moore's attack.

This thesis has four chapters. The first chapter will examine each of the several characteristics that Moore attributed to the concept of goodness. Specifically, Moore claimed that goodness is either a property of other objects or of other properties, while also claiming that it is distinct from that of which it is predicated. Moore also claimed that the property goodness, is simple, that it is non-natural, and that all things having the property goodness predicated of them are always good. I will argue that these claims are problematic, and probably false,

for various reasons. The simplicity of goodness, for instance, seems inconsistent with the notion of goodness in the superlative, (i.e., good, better, best), for reasons that will be discussed in the section on simplicity. Likewise, I will examine Moore's other claims about the character of goodness in separate sections of the first chapter of this thesis.

The second chapter contains an analysis of Moore's notion of goodness as a "rational end." I argue that Moore's claim that choosing intrinsic goods as ends are what make them rational ends² actually amounts to a false conclusion derived from a valid, but unsound, argument. This argument can be extracted from the discussion of rational ends in his Principia Ethica. An outline of the argument's premises and conclusion, as well as its structure, is provided to bring to light the implicit as well as explicit assumptions that Moore used to develop his notion of rational ends. In the balance of this chapter I criticize the argument's premises, give examples to support the claim that he in fact held these premises, and examine the problem associated with a premise I call the "Socratic Doctrine" - a doctrine which claims that if people know what is good, they will do what is right.

Chapter three begins with a summary of all Moore's characteristics of goodness and how they are used to develop his notion of the naturalistic fallacy. In the section of this chapter called "The Evaluative and the Prescriptive

are Compared" I will more closely examine the ramifications of the Socratic Doctrine, while in the last section of the chapter I will discuss how Moore used the concept of the naturalistic fallacy to support his claims that goodness is both objective and singular.

The final chapter of this thesis begins with a discussion that supports a pluralistic model of goodness. I will use comments from W.D. Ross' The Right and the Good and will contrast them with Moore's claim that goodness is singular. Additionally, I will argue that the several meanings of goodness are mind-dependent³ and that Moore's claim that goodness is objective is false. Finally, I will argue that Moore's insistence that goodness is always a property of an end is inconsistent with his claim of the non-naturalness of goodness. If goodness is actually a natural property, Moore's grounds for holding that goodness is singular no longer exist.

CHAPTER I

A Definition of Some Key Terms

The first order of business, then, will be to examine each of the several characteristics that Moore attributes to goodness, followed by an analysis of the naturalistic fallacy.

Before starting, I will define some key terms. When something is said to be "intrinsically valuable" or "intrinsically good," what is meant is that it has value in and of itself. Moore says this of intrinsic value when stating: "Their difference [the difference between instrumental and intrinsic goodness] has, indeed, received expression in ordinary language by the contrast between the terms 'good as means' and 'good in itself,' 'value as a means' and 'intrinsic value.'"⁴ An example of intrinsic value is that if it is thought that telling the truth has value independent of its consequences, it is considered intrinsically valuable. Related to intrinsic value is the notion of something being an "end." An end is something that is sought for itself. In contrast to a thing having intrinsic value, something has "instrumental value" when its value is due to causing, or leading to, some further thing that is valuable. Related to

instrumental value is the notion of something being a "means" rather than an end. A means is some act or object which leads to something beyond itself.⁵ Finally, it is notable that "goodness" and "value" will be used interchangeably in this thesis, and that an attempt to define them will begin with the negative process of determining what they are not.⁶

G.E. Moore stated in his book Principia Ethica that goodness is indefinable because it is a simple property.⁷ Now according to Moore, one way of providing a definition consists of breaking down complex objects into their simple parts, and this cannot be done in the case of any simple property.

Definitions of the kind that I was asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you can no longer define those terms.⁸

This type of definition, then, is what Moore had in mind when claiming that goodness is indefinable.

Moore also claimed that goodness is non-natural, meaning that it does not exist in time.⁹ Moore used the non-naturalness of goodness to support an important thesis in his book. This thesis is that most moralists commit what he called the "naturalistic fallacy," because they

mistakenly identify good or value with one or more of the natural objects in our universe.¹⁰ Moore claimed that this is wrong because goodness is non-natural.

In addition to characterizing goodness as simple and non-natural, Moore also claimed that it is a property, that it is universal (in the sense that objects that are intrinsically good will always be so), and that it is the sole, rational aim of humans. This thesis will begin, then, by discussing each of these qualities which Moore attributed to goodness.

An Explanation of Moore's Concept of Goodness as a Property

In this first section, I will not argue against Moore's concept of goodness as a property, since the ramifications of his characterization of goodness as a property appear in detail later in this chapter. I will reserve a discussion of exactly what kind of property Moore claimed goodness to be for the following three sections. Here I will attempt only to explain what Moore meant by referring to goodness as a property. Moore made a distinction between the property of goodness and a good. A good he claimed was an object that has the property of goodness. For instance, at the beginning of the Principia, Moore stated:

To readers who are familiar with philosophic terminology,

I can express their importance [Moore is referring here to the importance of his answers to the question - What is good?] by saying that they amount to this: That propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic; and that plainly is no trivial matter. And the same thing may be expressed more popularly, by saying that, if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom that 'Pleasure is the only good' or that 'The good is the desired' on the pretense that this is the very meaning of the word.¹¹

An example, given by Moore to illustrate the distinction between the property goodness and its object, is the consciousness of a beautiful object.¹² The essential components that make up the consciousness of a beautiful object are human consciousness and an object of beauty. Moore pointed out that neither of these elements has any value separately, yet when conjoined they consist of a whole that has great value. Yet Moore was quick to point out that the properties that are essential to the make-up of an object such as this are distinct from the value (the property of goodness) that results from their conjunction.¹³

The fact that propositions about a good are all synthetic, or that goodness is always a property, does not limit goodness to being a property of acts or objects. Goodness may also be a property of other properties. Moore stated:

Now it may be that this something will have other adjectives, besides 'good', that will apply to it. It may be full of pleasure, for example; it may be intelligent; and if these two objectives are really part of its definition, then it will certainly be true, that pleasure and intelligence are good.¹⁴

In other words, the properties pleasure and intelligence, which are properties of an object, may themselves have the property of goodness.¹⁵ Now in the cases where properties are properties of properties there exists the potential confusion about which property plays the part of the determinate property, and which is the determinable property (i.e., the property which plays a passive role). For instance, in the case of a steel ingot heated at one thousand degrees and weighing 2000 lbs, it would be wrong to say that the ingot's temperature was heavy, or that the bar's weight was hot. But in the sentences quoted, Moore referred to the adjective "good" applying to the complete or whole substantive (Moore uses "substantive" as we now use the word "subject") - "it must be the whole of that to which the adjective will apply" - and he refers to other adjectives which apply to the substantive as "really part of its definition."¹⁶ Moore, then, seemed to be saying that goodness will be a property of pleasure and intelligence when they are defining properties of a whole. (Moore did not claim that this is the only way in which goodness can be a property of pleasure and intelligence.) While properties such as pleasure and intelligence may be defining properties of a whole, Moore claimed that goodness is not a defining property of a whole.¹⁷ Thus, it would seem that goodness would be a determinate property in the sense that pleasure or intelligence would have the property of goodness. But

goodness, not being a defining part of the whole, would not be a determinable property. In the above case, then, pleasure and intelligence may be good, but it does not follow that goodness is pleasant and intelligent.

In addition to Moore's claim that goodness is a property distinct from all other properties, he also claimed that it is a simple property. Moore's concept of simple properties, however, is not always consistent, and this may well weaken his argument "that all propositions about the good are synthetic."¹⁸

Moore's Concepts of Simple Goods and Properties are Inconsistent with Each Other

In this section I will argue that Moore's claim that certain properties, like pleasure and intelligence, are both simple and instances of "the good" involves an inconsistency.

Moore carefully explained what he meant by calling something simple. "I say that it is not composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it."¹⁹ That is, a simple object or property is not an entity that is made of a conglomerate of other objects or properties. Rather, it is simple and consists of nothing but itself. Moore maintained that goodness is simple in this way. He also maintained that

other properties are simple. Pleasure, in fact, is one of those properties that Moore mentioned when referring to simple properties.

Yet in so far as it is pleasure we have, whether there be more or less of it, and whether it be one kind or another, what we have is one definite thing, absolutely indefinable, some one thing that is the same in all the various degrees and in all the various kinds of it that there may be ... We can, I say, describe its relations to other things, but define it we cannot.²⁰

Now if we recall why Moore maintained that properties are indefinable, it is plain that pleasure is indefinable for the same reason that goodness is - it is simple. Moore claimed that pleasure has no other property or any additional component of any kind from which it is composed. Like goodness, it consists of itself only and is simple and indefinable.²¹

After explaining at length what he meant by simplicity, Moore went on to explain that goodness is a simple property, while "the good" is an object that has the property of goodness. In Moore's words:

I suppose it may be granted that 'good' is an adjective. Well 'the good', 'that which is good', must therefore be the substantive to which the adjective 'good' will apply, and the adjective must always apply to it. But if it is that to which the adjective will apply, it must be something different from that adjective itself.²²

Since this is the case, it would seem that while goodness may well be a simple property, a good must be complex,

for a good consists of at least two components - the substantive and the property of goodness. Furthermore, in asserting that "the adjective must always truly apply to it," Moore characterized a good as an object which in all cases has the property of goodness.

Let us treat what has been said above as a list of premises, then, and state them as follows:

- 1) goodness is simple
- 2) other properties, such as pleasure, are simple
- 3) a good consists of a subject and goodness, and is complex
- 4) a good is a subject which has the property of goodness at all times

From these premises it follows that pleasure is either complex or is not an instance of good, for if pleasure is indefinable, as Moore claimed, it must be a simple property. But if pleasure is an instance of good, it must always have the property of goodness. Now we could object that what we are referring to is the conjunction of two simple properties, goodness and pleasure, which, while forming a compound, nevertheless maintain their simplicity as distinct elements. But the notion of a compound formed by the conjunction of goodness and any other property runs counter to Moore's concept of a simple property. A good, according to Moore, is a whole formed by parts other than the property goodness.²³

In other words, Moore characterized the formation of

a good as a conjunction of two or more elements, not necessarily good by themselves, which as a compound has the property of goodness. The good, a compound having the property of goodness, is the outcome or result of the conjunction of the elements. It is not the conjunction of goodness with any other element, such as pleasure. Thus, a problem in the form of a contradiction occurs when asserting that pleasure itself is a good. For pleasure, while being characterized as simple, is also said to be a good, thus having the property of goodness, and so being complex. Therefore, Moore's claim that pleasure is both a good and is simple would seem to be false and generally casts doubt on the notion of goods being simple.

Now Moore was quite intent on disproving that pleasure is the sole good. This, he claimed, was an instance of the "naturalistic fallacy," which I will discuss later.²⁴ But he did not intend to argue against pleasure being one of a number of goods. As mentioned above, though, in each case where a good, such as pleasure, is alleged to be simple, the problem arises as to how it can also have the property of goodness.

Another problem with the simplicity of goodness is that some objects are better than others. One way that Moore characterized the comparison of goods is in the superlative; i.e., "the degree of value which they have," and "the different degrees in which things themselves possess this property."²⁵ From "different degrees of value," which

Moore claimed things to possess, it seems correct to say that Moore meant that the property goodness is instantiated in varying magnitudes in different objects. Thus, those objects which possess the greater magnitudes of goodness are better than those having lesser magnitudes. Yet, it is strange to think of a simple element existing in unequal amounts. This is because simple elements do not have parts and are thus not divisible into separate magnitudes or amounts.

Also, in considering the problem concerning magnitudes of goodness it may be asked what exactly is involved in determining a magnitude. Primarily, to determine a magnitude requires measurement. But any time we measure the magnitude of a property, we are comparing some magnitude of a property to another magnitude of the same property. In other words, the determination of the magnitude of a property involves a comparison. The comparative magnitudes of a property, indicates a relation between differing magnitudes or measurements of the same property. Now, if the property goodness stands in a comparative relationship to itself, it is a relational, and therefore a complex, property. C.H. Langford in his "Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy" has pointed out how an instance of a simple term relating to itself may occur.

Thus we might write Sa, b_2 to say that a sees b, Sa_2b , to say that b sees a, and Sa, a_2 to say that a sees himself ... For it happens not only that one and the same term may play more than one role in a relational

complex, but also that one and the same role may be played by more than one term.²⁶

Besides Langford's notation revealing how a single term relates to itself, I wish to emphasize the part of the second sentence in this quote which says "one and the same term may play more than one role in a relational complex." For the same term goodness plays more than one role when lesser magnitudes are compared to greater magnitudes, thus forming the relational property of goodness. Regarding the complexity of relational properties, C.D. Broad remarked as follows:

The next topic which would have to be discussed in any full treatment of the theory [Broad is referring to Moore's ethical theories in general] would be Moore's contention that the characteristic of which "good" is a name is simple and unanalysable. This, of course implies that it is a pure quality and not a relational property.²⁷

Here the distinction is made between a "pure quality," by which I assume Broad meant a simple property, and a relational property. The reason that pure qualities and relational properties were held distinct by Broad would seemingly be because pure qualities are simple and relational properties are complex.

Goodness as a Non-Natural Property Creates Conceptual Problems

In this section I will argue that Moore's characterization of goodness as a non-natural property conflicts with the ideas of superlatives and goodness attaching to natural properties.

Moore claimed that goodness is a non-natural property. By non-natural he meant that it does not exist by itself in time.²⁸ He also meant that goodness is non-natural in the sense that it is not an essential component of natural objects. Contrasting the property goodness with natural properties, Moore stated that:

They [natural properties] are, in fact, rather parts of which the object is made up than mere predicates which attach to it. If they were all taken away, no object would be left, not even a bare substance: for they are in themselves substantial and give the object all the substance that it has. But this is not so with good.²⁹

But if goodness does not exist in time and is not a part of natural objects, then it is also immaterial.³⁰ And if goodness is immaterial, then it is hard to explain how goodness can be subject to a change in degree. This difficulty is explainable by considering Aristotle's comments on the conditions necessary for a change of any kind.

Aristotle asserted that the source of differentiation

in all things is in their matter and not in their form. Using the example of the difference of Callius and Socrates, Aristotle stated, "and when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callius or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but the same in form; for their form is indivisible."³¹ Fredrick Sontag characterized Aristotle's understanding of a form as "unchanging in itself ... the source of intelligibility in terms of which individual sense-objects are to be understood."³² The form of a substance,³³ then, is the universal element of the substance giving it its commonality with other objects of a like species. Therefore, a change in magnitude in a substance does not imply that the change is in the form of a substance, but in its matter.

There is another potential problem involved with the non-naturalness of goodness. This involves Moore's assertion that goodness, while non-natural, cannot be identified with the super-sensible, and yet is a property that is predicated of natural objects. By "super-sensible" Moore meant any object of thought that does not exist in nature. In other words, it does not exist in time as an object of perception.³⁴ He contrasted that which is "eternally real" (does not exist in time) with that which does exist in time, i.e., the natural. Thus, it is the non-naturalness of the super-sensible that precludes its having anything to do with objects that exist in time.

As Moore put it, "it is plain that what exists eternally cannot be affected by our actions..."³⁵ But Moore claimed that goodness is a non-natural property predicated from natural objects. What seems missing is an explanation of exactly how non-natural properties are instantiated in natural objects.

Now an answer may be that there are clear examples of non-natural properties attached to natural objects. Moore gave the example of numbers. "It is quite clear that two natural objects may exist: but it is equally certain that two itself does not exist and never can."³⁶ Moore claims that numbers are not natural properties, but neither do they exist in a super-sensible realm. "Two and two are four. But that does not mean that either two or four exists. Yet it certainly means something. Two is somehow, although it does not exist."³⁷ It seems reasonable to say that two objects, when grouped together, have the property of two-ness, but it is less clear how two-ness belongs to a strange class of properties that are, but do not exist.³⁸

Furthermore, in whatever way we are to understand this class of properties that are but do not exist, Moore claimed that goodness is also a property that does not exist (in either space and in time or in some super-sensible realm), yet is. To say that a property does not exist yet is, seems contradictory. Russell was perhaps somewhat clearer in stating what seems to amount to the same thing. "We

may say, in a certain sense, that the symbol 'two' means nothing, for when it occurs in a true statement, there is no corresponding constituent in the meaning of the statement."³⁹ Similarly, goodness, being non-natural, when occurring in a true statement has "no corresponding constituent in the meaning of the statement."⁴⁰ Yet when asserting that the joining of a subject to the predicate "two" results in a true statement, we must in some sense be referring to a constituent in the statement. Surely "two" and "good" must have some kind of meaning as properties, since obviously we can assign a truth value to statements such as, "There are two cars," or "Her voice is good."

Thus, let us concede for now that goodness and two-ness are co-elements of this class of properties, and that a class of two natural objects do have the non-natural property of two-ness. There is another characteristic of two-ness, however, which reveals that two-ness and goodness also belong to very different classes of properties. Namely, when a class of objects is said to consist of two objects, or that the class has the property of two-ness, a non-evaluative property is being attributed to natural objects. When, however, Moore included goodness in the class of properties which do not exist, yet are, he failed to qualify goodness as a property that is also quite different from its co-elements of this set. Goodness is obviously an evaluative property, and when it is applied,

in Moore's words, "as an adjective to a substantive," it is not simply assigning a factual property to a substantive. A distinction exists, after all, between evaluation and description. Anthony Flew said that the evaluative "tends to concern or suggest rules or standards, as opposed to purely descriptive [matters]."⁴¹ Thus, goodness is used to assign a value to the substantive. Now the initial question was how a non-natural property like goodness is instantiated in natural objects. But Moore, by using "two" as an example, merely shifted the question to how an evaluative property such as goodness can be attached to factual elements of the universe.

Universally Good Objects Are Not Always the Aims of People

In developing his discussion of intrinsically good objects, Moore seemed content with the commonly understood meaning of an intrinsic good, namely, that an object that is intrinsically good is an object which is good in itself.⁴² It does not derive its value by its instrumentality in bringing about a further good. It is valuable in its own right. Moore's claim that intrinsically good objects are composites of two or more objects or properties is also clear. He called them "organic wholes" consisting of elements which may or may not be good in themselves.⁴³ Moore, however, also claimed that an

intrinsically good object always has the property of goodness and is always intrinsically good. He stated that, "On the other hand there are judgments which state that certain kinds of things are themselves good; and these differ from the last in that, if true at all, they are all of them universally true."⁴⁴ Examples of Moore's insistence of the universality of intrinsic goodness include the following. "We are not then justified in asserting that one and the same thing is under some circumstances intrinsically good, and under others not so."⁴⁵ "The good, that which is good, must therefore be the substantive to which the adjective 'good' will apply... and the adjective must always truly apply to it."⁴⁶ It is this claim of the universality of goodness as a property of certain objects that forces certain conclusions that are hard to accept.

The problem of maintaining that intrinsically good objects are always intrinsically good is that these are the same objects that Moore identified as ends. It seems straightforward to consider intrinsic goods as ends, since other goods such as instrumentally good objects are good only by virtue of their being a means to an intrinsic good. However, Moore not only maintained that all intrinsic goods are ends, he also maintained that ends are all intrinsically good. Moore asked, "And if it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it? How can it be a rational end for him?"⁴⁷ Thus, Moore claimed that intrinsic

goods are always good, and that they alone are the objects that it is rational to have as ends.

The Aims and Rational Ends of People are Different

In the following section of this thesis I will discuss the rationality of having intrinsic goods as ends, and at that time I will argue that the assumption which motivated Moore's claim that only intrinsic goods are rational ends is that all human desires are good-dependent. That is, it is rational to desire goods because the goodness of a thing itself explains why the thing is desired. What is of immediate concern, however, is that Moore must have considered the actual aims of people to be different from their rational ends. There is, after all, much in human experience to refute the claim that what individuals aim for at any given time and place has remained the same throughout history. Let us consider two examples.

If an act of benevolence, for instance, is done for no other reason than that it has intrinsic value, then the person performing this act is doing it for its own sake, and the act of benevolence is what Moore would call a rational end. It is not hard for at least some people living today to understand this act as an intrinsically valuable act. But it is also possible to imagine, as did Hobbes, that humans living in a "state of nature," before

the rule of a sovereign, were egoistic. In such a state humans "are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man."⁴⁸ It is conceivable, then, that in such circumstances people would initiate the rudiments of cooperation, not only in terms of collectively relinquishing their freedom to a sovereign, but also in the more general sense of the deferral of egoistic impulses for the sake of living in a safe and peaceful community. Cooperation, civility and even benevolence, therefore, would be understood on such an account as means to the end of survival in the above circumstances.

Another example of a means becoming an end is the transformation of money from having only instrumental value into an end in itself. Marx gave an interesting account of this. He stated:

With the earliest development of the circulation of commodities, there is also developed the necessity, and the passionate desire, to hold fast the product of the first metamorphosis. This product is the transformed shape of the commodity, or its gold chrysalis. Commodities are thus sold not for the purpose of buying others, but in order to replace their money form. From being the mere means of effecting the circulation of commodities, this change of form becomes end and aim.⁴⁹

Now these examples may appear to refer more to the psychology of people whose final aims are changing than to examples of changes in the values of objects that are aimed at. But one of the primary arguments of this thesis

is that those things that people seek for their own sakes are their rational ends. That is, it is the person's choosing of an object for its own sake which gives the object the status of being an intrinsic good, and not a mind-independent property called goodness which attaches to the object.⁵⁰

The discrepancy of the supposed permanence of ends and their impermanence, which I suggest in the above examples, is therefore reflected in two different definitions of an end. While Moore associated an end with what is good in itself, I am arguing that an end can also be simply that which is sought for itself. And it is in this second sense of an end being a thing that is sought for itself that the permanence of ends becomes questionable. In a person's life the status of a given object may well change from a means to that of an end, as Marx demonstrated by his comments on money.

Moore, by identifying a rational end with an intrinsically good object, was identifying that which is good in itself with that which it is rational for one to aim at or seek. But defining an end as that which is intrinsically good contains the assumption that an object's goodness is the reason it is sought. This assumption, while serving as an important premise in Moore's arguments, seemed to have Moore's uncritical acceptance. The following is an example of how Moore used this assumption.

The egoists' happiness must either be good in itself, and so a part of Universal Good, or else it cannot be good in itself at all: there is no escaping this dilemma. And if it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it? How can it be a rational aim for him?⁵¹

Here then, it is clear that Moore thought that an object's being good is the sole reason "for aiming at it." Indeed, it could not, according to Moore, be a rational end unless it (the object) is good.

CHAPTER II

Goodness as a Rational End

So far the expression "rational end" has been used without an explicit definition. Let us suppose that a rational end is one that a person is being rational in seeking as an end. Furthermore, let us suppose that a person, when rationally seeking an object as an end, is first of all forming a conclusion that is consistent with some set of premises that person holds. This is not to say that it is common for a person to conclude consciously, or explicitly, that it is rational to choose a specific object as an end by considering whether such a choice is consistent with a set of premises. However, it seems that when a person reflects on whether it is rational to choose an object for its own sake, that this person at least implicitly considers whether that choice is consistent with his or her existing beliefs.⁵² Secondly, this writer would like to use the terms "rational" and "reasonable" as synonyms in the following way: when referring to a person making a rational choice, it would be equivalent in meaning to this person being reasonable in making a certain choice. Someone, if they were rational in concluding that a certain object was an end, could be said to be reasonable in coming

to such a conclusion. The reason for proposing this equivalence involves Moore's use of the identification of the reasonableness of a proposition with its compliance to the law of non-contradiction. In his essay "The Refutation of Idealism," Moore made his case for the objectivity of reality by asserting that to say that the world consisted solely of our perceptions is contradictory.⁵³ Moore argued that a person's sensations of blue and green are both alike and different. They are alike because they both involve a person being conscious of a color. They are different because the consciousness of green differs from the consciousness of blue. Thus Moore claimed that the difference in the consciousness of blue and green lies in the difference between blue and green. From this source of differentiation, Moore inferred the existence of blue and green as distinct from the consciousness of blue and green. Moore stated this as follows:

We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness, and another which I call the object of consciousness. This must be so if the sensation of blue and green, though different in one respect, are alike in another: blue is one object of sensation and green is another, and consciousness, which both sensations have in common, is different from either.⁵⁴

Thus, claimed Moore, it is a contradiction to say that the sensation of an object (say blue or green) is identical to the object itself. Moore concluded his essay by saying,

"The only reasonable alternative to the admission that matter exists as well as spirit, is absolute scepticism - that, as likely as not, nothing exists at all."⁵⁵ Moore granted the reasonableness of this alternative due to its compliance with the law of non-contradiction. Moore can be seen here, then, relating the idea of reasonableness to the condition of being non-contradictory.

Likewise, Moore's case for rational ends is similar to his argument for the reasonableness of a dualistic (material-spiritual) world. As will be shown in this section, Moore held several premises that relate goodness to human ends, and my argument will be that Moore considered ends rational that are intrinsically good because only these ends are consistent with his premises. Furthermore, I will argue that Moore's discussion of rational ends really amounts to the conclusion that only intrinsic goods can be rational ends and that this is derived by a deductive argument. I will, therefore, be arguing that Moore's real criterion for the rationality of an end is its being the product of a valid argument.⁵⁶ In other words, a person rationally concludes that a certain object is an end when deductively deriving a conclusion from a set of premises. Thus, I am proposing the notion of deductive validity as a working criterion to examine Moore's notion of a rational end. Along these lines Moore remarked:

The evidence of a proposition to us is only a reason for our holding it to be true: whereas a logical reason,

or reason in the sense in which self-evident propositions have no reason, is a reason why the proposition itself must be true, not why we hold it so to be.⁵⁷

Now the "logical reason" that necessitates the truth of a proposition is the soundness of an argument having that proposition as its conclusion. And since validity is a necessary condition of soundness, it seems that validity is at least part of Moore's criterion of rationality.

In claiming that deductive validity is a criterion of rationality, two points should be mentioned. First, it is admittedly wrong to consider deductive validity as the sole criterion of rationality. Certainly we must consider soundness as the highest criterion of rationality, since we may construct deductively valid arguments with false premises and false conclusions. However, our first consideration of criteria will concentrate on validity, since Moore's assertion that only intrinsic goods are rational ends is, I will argue, a conclusion derived from a certain set of premises to be listed below. After Moore's argument for rational ends is examined, we will be in a better position to examine the truth of his premises.

Secondly, and more generally, the reason that rationality is associated in the above way with deductive validity is because of the manner in which Moore arrived at the concept of an end being rational. That is, he argued that given that rational people choose only goodness for its own sake, and that only intrinsic goods have the property

of goodness attached to them, it follows that rational people choose only intrinsic goods for their own sake. This is why they are rational ends. Thus, rationality and deductive validity are linked because Moore has made the rationality of a person's choosing intrinsic goods the conclusion of a valid argument.⁵⁸

Regarding deductive validity, Susan Haack remarked, "What is going on, though, when one judges an informal argument to be valid? One is claiming, I take it, that its conclusion follows from its premises, that its premises couldn't be true and its conclusion false."⁵⁹ A person would not be arguing rationally, then, if a conclusion was derived that was not logically consistent with the argument's premises. An example of someone violating the above criterion might go as follows:

Premise 1: All right acts result in good.

Premise 2: Some of my acts are right.

Conclusion: None of my acts results in good.

Here the argument is invalid because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. And it is not rational to affirm the conclusion when applying our criterion of rationality.

Now while the use of deductive validity is inadequate as the sole criterion of rationality (for reasons mentioned above), it is also overly rigorous. To consider a person

to be irrational whenever he or she makes a statement that is not derivable from a given set of premises is unreasonably strict. What if, for instance, the set of premises under consideration were the entire inventory of a person's beliefs? It seems unreasonably strict to insist that no statements made by a rational person can contradict any of that person's beliefs. Christopher Cherniak discussed the excessive rigor of such a demand in his Minimal Rationality. He called this overly rigorous demand for consistency the "ideal rationality model." "The philosophical accounts employ, usually tacitly, an ideal general rationality condition, which can be formulated roughly as: If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake all and only actions that are apparently appropriate."⁶⁰ In contrast to this ideal model, Cherniak proposed a more realistic model, which he calls the "minimal rationality theory."

All of the other minimal rational conditions below can be derived from a minimal general rationality condition: If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake some, but not necessarily all, of those actions that are apparently appropriate.⁶¹

Cherniak's minimal model is balanced then between his claim that:

(1) no creature in the finitary predicament can satisfy the ideal rationality condition. And (2) if the agent were not required to be at least more likely to undertake some of the apparently appropriate actions, then a belief-desire set attribution could never yield any behavior predictions ...⁶²

In what is more pertinent to the notion of a linkage between intrinsic goods and rational ends, Cherniak compared the conditions of "minimal inference" and "ideal inference" as they respectively relate to minimal and ideal rationality, respectively. Regarding the minimal inference condition, he stated:

The minimal inference condition on deductive validity is: If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would make some, but not necessarily all, of the sound inferences from the belief set that are apparently appropriate.⁶³

And regarding the ideal inference condition, he stated:

The logical ability needed for a creature to satisfy the ideal general rationality condition is described by an ideal inference condition: If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would make all and only sound inferences from the belief set that are apparently appropriate.⁶⁴

These inference conditions characterized by Cherniak have been mentioned to clarify the position that Moore takes regarding rationality. When Moore claimed that intrinsic goods are the rational ends of humans, he meant that rational humans only have ends that are intrinsic goods.⁶⁵ Thus, Moore adopted the ideal inference condition; for if he held the minimal inference condition, his linkage between human rationality and goods as ends would be somewhat relaxed. That is, he would have claimed that

rational humans at least sometimes have ends that are intrinsic goods.

With all due consideration to the limitations of deductive validity as a standard of rationality, then, I am using such a standard here because Moore used it in this way. In particular, Moore's use of validity in regards to rationality may be understood along the strict lines of Cherniak's ideal inference condition. My intent is to show that Moore's argument for rational ends is unwarranted even when this standard of rationality is used.

Moore's thought on the centrality of validity as a criterion for rationality, while not explicitly stated in his Principia, is nevertheless clear by instances of his argumentation. For instance in chapter IV of the Principia, "Metaphysical Ethics," Moore claimed that metaphysical ethics:

do not recognize that the question 'What is good?' is a different one from the question 'What is willed in a certain way?' Thus we find Green explicitly stating that 'the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire.'... And this can only be the case, if being good is identical with satisfying desire: if 'good' is merely another name for 'desire-satisfying.'... An unhappy alternative is before us. Such reasoning would give valid reasons for his conclusions, if and only if, being good and being desired in a particular way were identical: and in this case, as we have seen in chapter I, his conclusions would not be ethical. On the other hand, if the two are not identical, his conclusions may be ethical and may be right, but he has not given us a single reason for believing them.⁶⁶

It seems here that Moore characterized the justification of a belief as its being the conclusion of "valid reasons."

If one's conclusions are not derived by "valid reasons" (I assume here that Moore meant valid arguments), then there is "not given us a single reason for believing them." At this point one could ask why Moore's criticism of another philosopher's argument as being invalid, or of failing to provide valid reasons for believing something, commits Moore to validity as a criterion for rationality.

In the remainder of this section I will argue that one can distill Moore's discussion of rational ends into an argument whose premises necessitate the conclusions that anything sought as an end is intrinsically good, and that the validity of this argument is the basis for claiming that ends that are intrinsic goods are rational ends.

In chapter V of the Principia - "Ethics in Relation to Conduct" - Moore made the distinction between why we might hold that a proposition is true and why a proposition must be true.

Again, that a proposition is evident to us may not only be the reason why we do think or affirm it, it may even be a reason why we ought to think it or affirm it. But a reason, in this sense too, is not a logical reason for the truth of the proposition, though it is a logical reason for the rightness of holding the position.⁶⁷

Moore's comment here differentiates between why we may hold and even ought to hold, that a proposition is true and what makes a proposition itself true. As to the former, Moore identifies intuition as a sufficient reason for holding that a proposition is true in the absence of a

logical reason. Moore's own example of a belief that is justified in this way in his denial of hedonism. Moore stated:

When, therefore, I talk of intuitionistic Hedonism, I must not be understood to imply that my denial that 'Pleasure is the only good' is only based on my intuition of its falsehood. My intuition of its falsehood is indeed my reason for holding and declaring it untrue; it is indeed the only valid reason for so doing. But that is just because there is no logical reason for it; because there is no proper evidence or reason of its falsehood except itself alone.⁶⁸

It is the lack of a "logical reason," which this writer takes to mean a valid argument, that justifies a belief via intuition. At this level of justification, the level of intuition, Moore claimed that "we ought to think it or affirm it" ["it" refers to a proposition that we ought to think or affirm] on the strength of intuition. And if we ought to believe a proposition true, might it be unreasonable or irrational to disbelieve it? But here we are jumping ahead by identifying warranted beliefs with rationality. Let us look, then, at Moore's second level of justification.

Moore claimed: "Nothing whatsoever can take the place of reasons for the truth of any propositions: intuition can only furnish a reason for holding any proposition to be true."⁶⁹ Here, then, Moore identified "reasons" (i.e. logical reasons) as the proper criterion of truth for a proposition. If we can arrive at a proposition by more than bare intuition - that is, if we have at hand "logical

reasons" that infer the validity of a proposition - we are in a position to hold a belief about a proposition's truth which must be true.

Now, Moore claimed that an end is rational when it is an intrinsic good.⁷⁰ Moore has said that there are really two levels of justification for believing that a proposition is true; those cases when we intuit a proposition to be true, and those cases when propositions are conclusions of valid arguments.⁷¹ I will show now that Moore attributed the predicate "rational" to an end that is intrinsically good because the proposition expressing that an end is intrinsically good is the conclusion of a valid argument.

Validity is a useful criterion for rationality in the case of Moore's concept of a rational end. It can by itself explain why Moore maintained that it is rational for a person to have an end which is intrinsically good, and not rational for a person to have an end which is not intrinsically good. I will now show a valid argument for an end being intrinsically good.

In claiming that one is rational in having an end only when it is intrinsically good, Moore presumably meant to imply that having such an end would be logically consistent⁷² with a set of premises. A set of premises that would necessitate the conclusion that a person is rationally choosing his or her ends only when these ends are intrinsically good might well consist of the following:

- (1) An end is that which is sought for its own sake.⁷³
- (2) Humans seek only goodness for its own sake.
- (3) Goodness is only attached to intrinsically good objects.⁷⁴

It will be shown that these premises are justifiably attributed to Moore after discussing how they logically imply Moore's notion of rational ends.

From the above premises it may be inferred that rational ends consist solely of intrinsic goods. This inference can be demonstrated by a proof. Let the following elements of the premises be symbolically expressed as follows:

P: end

Q: sought for its own sake

G: goodness

I: an intrinsic good

Thus premise one, "an end is that which is sought for its own sake," may be expressed as $(x)(Px \rightarrow Qx)$. Premise two, "humans seek only goodness for its own sake," may be expressed as $(x)(Qx \rightarrow Gx)$. And premise three, "goodness is only attached to (predicated of) intrinsically good objects," may be expressed as $(x)(Gx \rightarrow Ix)$. With these premises symbolically expressed, a proof may be constructed. The proof goes as follows:

(1) $(x)(Px \rightarrow Qx)$	Premise 1
(2) $(x)(Qx \rightarrow Gx)$	Premise 2
(3) $(x)(Px \rightarrow Gx)$	Hypothetical Syl.- 1,2
(4) $(x)(Gx \rightarrow Ix)$	Premise 3
(5) $(x)(Px \rightarrow Ix)$	Hypothetical Syl.- 3,4
(6) $\neg(Ex) - (Px \rightarrow Ix)$	Quantifier Exchange - 5

As is shown in the proof, line five can be inferred from the preceeding premises. That is, it follows from premises one and two that all ends are objects with goodness attached to them. Premise three states that all objects having the property goodness attached are intrinsic goods. Thus, since in line three all objects which are ends have the property of goodness, and in line four all objects which have the property of goodness are intrinsic goods, it follows in line five that all ends are intrinsic goods. The contrary here is an instance where an object's being an end is not derivable from the previous lines of the proof and directly contradicts line six. It is therefore demonstrable from the above set of premises, and from the proposed criterion of rationality as deductive validity that the only ends that are rational for a person to have are intrinsic goods. The question, then, is whether Moore held these premises in his Principia.

Moore maintained the first premise in his Principia,⁷⁵ and it is simply the generally recognized meaning of an end. While it is true that an object may be an end and

also a means to a still further end, it will be assumed for simplicity's sake that an end refers to that which is sought for itself, and not as a means to something else.

The third premise was also held by Moore. It is clear from Moore's discussion of a good that he meant by goods those objects which have the property of goodness.⁷⁶ Furthermore, Moore characterized what are called instrumentally good objects as a "cause or necessary condition for the existence of other things to which this unique property does attach."⁷⁷ In other words, the property goodness is attached (Moore used the term "attached" only in reference to intrinsically good objects and contrasts them to other good objects which are merely the means to intrinsically good objects)⁷⁸ only to those objects that are intrinsically good, while objects that are instrumentally good are causes of the good, and do not themselves have the property of goodness attached.⁷⁹

It may be objected that an object can have the property goodness attached to it and not be intrinsically good, as in the case of a mixed good. One might think of a mixed good as an object having both the property of good and the property of evil.⁸⁰ Thus an object would have goodness attached to it and yet not be intrinsically good.

The answer to such an objection lies in Moore's notion of "organic wholes."⁸¹ Moore held that:

what has intrinsic value is the existence of the whole...
The part of a valuable whole retains exactly the same

value when it is, as when it is not, a part of the whole. If it had value under other circumstances, its value is not any greater, when it is part of a far more valuable whole, and if it had no value by itself, it has none still, however great be that of the whole of which it now forms a part.⁸²

Related to the concept of wholes, Moore claimed that the addition of a bad thing to a good whole may increase the positive value of the whole. He also claimed that the addition of a bad thing to a bad whole may produce a whole having a positive value, though this seemed more doubtful. It is at least possible, though, and one must take this possibility into account in our ethical investigations. However we may decide particular questions, the principle is clear. We should not assume that the value of a whole is the same as the sum of the values of its parts. Near the end of the Principia, Moore added that "I cannot avoid thinking that there are wholes, containing something positively evil and ugly,⁸³ which are, nevertheless, great positive goods on the whole."⁸⁴ Therefore, in consideration of the object thus formed, the whole, it is correct in Moore's scheme to think of goodness predicated of intrinsic goods and to be otherwise absent.

I have saved the second premise for last because it not only is a key premise in upholding Moore's concept of rational ends, but also because it brings up Moore's assumption, the Socratic Doctrine, that we will examine below. We already saw that the premise that humans seek only the good for its own sake causes inconsistency in

concluding that something other than an intrinsic good can be an end. Moreover, Moore has been quoted earlier as asking whether "if it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it?"⁸⁵ So now it is possible to look at this premise not only as Moore's assumption, but as an accepted belief long before the Principia. As we will see shortly, it appears in several of Plato's dialogues.

Earlier, I referred to Moore's intuitive justification of holding a proposition true. Moore apparently had in mind those propositions which were irreducible as conclusions of valid arguments. Our knowledge of these kinds of propositions, claimed Moore, were immediate and intuitive.⁸⁶ In the following discussion I will argue that Moore held the second premise, humans seek only goodness for its own sake, and that he held it to be intuitively justified.

The notion that what is good is what is aimed at is at least as old as Socrates. In Plato's Protagoras Socrates stated that "Nobody willingly goes to face evil or what he thinks is bad, nor is it in human nature, apparently, for a man to seek what he thinks is bad in preference to the good."⁸⁷ Similarly, Bertrand Russell referred to "the Socratic doctrine that no man sins wittingly, from which it follows that whoever knows what is good does what is right."⁸⁸ Moore, then, by denying that anything other than an object's goodness would rationally motivate a person

to aim at it,⁸⁹ apparently had the Socratic doctrine in mind. Since the Socratic doctrine amounts to line three of the above proof, in $(x)(Px \rightarrow Gx)$, it is clear that the doctrine plays a crucial role in the above characterization of Moore's argument for rational ends.

For a further inquiry into Moore's assumption of the Socratic doctrine, let us again examine Moore's question - "And if it [i.e., a human's end] is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it? how can it be a rational end for him?"⁹⁰ Suppose in examining this question, that we substitute the word "explanation" for the word "reason." Then Moore's question would read "And if it is not good at all, what explanation can he have for aiming at it?"

Now an explanation is related to the concept of rationality in Terence Irwin's discussion of the Socratic claim that "knowledge is sufficient for virtue."⁹¹ Irwin characterized the Socratic relationship of the explanatory to rationality in the following statement:

Socrates rejects incontinent [the incontinent chooses evil rather than good] actions because they must be explained by incontinent, non-rational desires, and a non-rational desire fails his conditions for being explanatory. If I say A chews light bulbs because he wants to chew them, and can say nothing more about why he wants to, I am none the wiser; I will doubt whether his action is explicable by his reasons at all.⁹²

Here a desire is rational because it is explainable, and Socrates held that the sole explanation for a human's

desiring something is that thing's being good.⁹³ What I wish to contend is that Moore also held that a thing's goodness explained its desirability. For Moore's question of what reason a person would have for aiming at something that was not good is equivalent to stating: if a thing is not good, a human will not aim at it. This has the form of " $\neg p \rightarrow \neg q$." From this conditional we can derive " $q \rightarrow p$," which says that if a human aims at something, the thing is good. Now one way that Socrates accounted for the many instances of people choosing what is not good was by claiming that they were ignorant of what is good.⁹⁴ Similarly, Moore, while primarily addressing fellow philosophers, nevertheless made the claim that "it is extremely unlikely that the most general ethical judgments will be equally valid, in the absence of a true answer to this question (i.e., What is good?)"⁹⁵

In what way, then, does Moore's meaning of "reason" differ from Irwin's meaning of "explanation" in the above quotation? The answer is that there is no discernable difference. Since Moore not only asked "if it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it?," but also "how can it be a rational end for him?," it is pertinent to ask in what way Moore's explanation of human desires differs from the explanation given by Socrates. Again, the answer is that there is no difference.

Notably, within the structure of the existing arguments the equivalence of ends and intrinsic goods is unwarranted.

That is, in the above proof, line five, " $(x)(Px \rightarrow Ix)$," was deduced from the premises. But the reverse implication, " $(x)(Ix \rightarrow Px)$," is not warranted by the premises. In fact, such a conclusion would be an instance of the fallacy of affirming the consequent. In other words, if by accepting premises one through three we are obliged to concede that all human ends are intrinsic goods, we are not similarly obliged to accept that all intrinsic goods are human ends. So, at the very least, the possibility exists that there are intrinsic goods that are not human ends, and this possibility exists without challenging the veracity of the above premises.

The fact that intrinsic goods might exist that are not human ends, however, presents no argument against Moore's position on goodness, goods, or rational ends. Rather, it would seem to reinforce his argument for the non-naturalness of goodness. Since intrinsic goods exist, it follows that choosing an object for its own sake does not create an intrinsic good. Rather, intrinsic goods exist independently of human wants or desires, implying the mind-independence of intrinsic goods asserted by Moore. Therefore, this argument containing the three above mentioned premises cannot be used to overturn Moore's notion of a sole rational end. To do so requires a refutation of one or more of the premises.

Regarding the refutation of the argument's premises, I mentioned earlier that we would examine the truth of

the premises after examining the structure of Moore's argument for rational ends. So now it may be that a case can be made for ends that are not good by broadening the criterion for rationality. Thus, we will add the truth of the premises as a condition for rationally arriving at conclusions. Moore's own comments would seem to warrant such an addition. Moore claimed that there are certain fundamental, irreducible premises of ethics that are self-evidently true. Moore states:

In fact it follows from the meaning of good and bad, that such propositions are all of them, in Kant's phrase, 'synthetic': they all must rest in the end upon some proposition which must be simply accepted or rejected, which cannot be logically deduced from any other set of propositions. This result, which follows from our first investigation, may otherwise be expressed by saying that the fundamental principles of Ethics must be self-evident.⁹⁶

But Moore affirmed that since there are no arguments from which such fundamental propositions may be deduced, we are left with intuition as a justification for holding that these propositions are true.⁹⁷

Moore seemed to be treating the second premise of the above argument as though it were self-evident. In asserting that humans seek only goodness for its own sake, Moore asked whether "if it is not good at all, what reasons can he have for aiming at it?"⁹⁸ However, Moore made no attempt to answer the question because the answer seems self-evident to him; i.e. there is no reason for a person to seek a thing that is not good. This is again plain, as Moore

stated:

Let us admit then, to think a thing good and to will it are the same thing in this sense, that, wherever the latter occurs, the former also occurs as a part of it; and even that they are generally the same thing in the converse sense, that when the former occurs it is generally a part of the latter.⁹⁹

But what if Moore was wrong about the second premise, and it is false? As noted earlier, an argument is valid when it is impossible for all the premises to be true and the conclusion false. But the conclusion of a valid argument can be false when one or more of the premises are false. Therefore, the conclusion of the above argument that all human ends are intrinsic goods could be false if, for instance, premise two of the argument were false.

Now there are examples of Moore attempting to persuade the reader that particular admittedly unprovable propositions were nevertheless true. In refuting the hedonistic principle that pleasure is goodness, Moore said:

I claimed that the untruth of this proposition was self-evident. I could do nothing to prove that it was untrue; I could only point out as clearly as possible what it means, and how it contradicts other propositions which appear to be equally true. My only object in all this was, necessarily, to convince.¹⁰⁰

In other words, Moore clearly saw the necessity of defending the truth of the premises in his arguments, as well as the validity of the arguments themselves. Thus, it would seem in line with Moore's thinking that the criteria for

a rational proposition would include both that it be the result of a deductive argument and that the premises of the argument be true.

Finally, I will examine and criticize premise two for two reasons. First, the antecedent of premise two is the middle term of the syllogism formed by proof lines 1-3. Premise two, then, is very important for the argument, since line three, " $(x)(Px \rightarrow GX)$," is possible only due to premise two and thus is necessary for the syllogism formed by lines three, four, and five. Secondly, I have chosen to criticize this premise because there are plausible arguments and examples opposed to this premise. One such argument is offered by Bernard Williams. Williams wrote:

For many kinds of things, you can distinguish between thinking that a given item is good of its kind and liking, wanting or choosing that item; moreover, your ability to make the distinction shows that you understand that the merits of the thing in question may go beyond your own interest or powers of response.¹⁰¹

By way of an example that illustrates the distinction between the consciousness and choosing of goodness, Williams referred to R.M. Hare's account of the merits of a hotel:

but once you have put in the merits of a hotel (or whatever type of thing it may be), the logical link with the preference seems misguided ... I can distinguish between the merits of a hotel and what I, for perfectly good reasons, happen to prefer. 'I simply do not like staying at good hotels' is an intelligible thing to say.¹⁰²

William's example strikes at the heart of premise two,

and thus the Socratic Doctrine, by asserting that a distinction exists "between thinking that a given item is good ... and choosing that item." Indeed, the distinction of cognizing good and choosing it is apparently as old as the Socratic Doctrine. Much religious activity, for instance, revolves around atonement for sin, for relief of guilt, etc. In these cases people were quite clear about which objects were good and which were not, and they knowingly sought and preferred objects which were not good. "Thou lovest evil more than good," claimed David of his enemy, Doeg, in the Psalms.¹⁰³ Any notion of people erring due to ignorance is put to rest by the following scriptural text:

And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.¹⁰⁴

The above remarks by Williams, as well as the Biblical quote, have been used to argue against the premise that humans seek only goodness for its own sake and to argue in favor of the idea that people do at times choose objects for their own sake which either are less good than other available objects or are altogether devoid of goodness.

Finally, in arguing against premise two, it is notable that the Socratic Doctrine is quite similar, if not identical, to what is known as "internalism." David O.

Brink defined internalism as follows:

Broadly speaking, internalism is the view that there is an internal or conceptual connection between moral considerations and action or the sources of action ... Sometimes internalism has been formulated as a thesis about the connection between morality and motivation. As Richard Price puts it, 'When we are conscious that an action is fit to be done, or that it ought to be done, it is not conceivable that we can remain uninfluenced or won't [lack] a motive to action.'¹⁰⁵

Brink also made a distinction between "weak internalism" and "strong internalism." He claimed:

Weak internalism about motives claims it is a conceptual truth that moral considerations provide some motivation, while strong internalism about motives claims it is a conceptual truth that moral considerations provide sufficient motive for action.¹⁰⁶

Now it would seem that Moore, who I have claimed held the Socratic Doctrine, could be considered an internalist. Also, Moore seems to have been a strong internalist, since he identified thinking a thing good with willing that thing.

Moore's internalism, however, also seemed to include a confusion between the reason for aiming at something and the motivation for aiming at it. This type of confusion was elucidated by Brink as follows:

In part because internalists have not always distinguished clearly between having a motive or desire to do something and having a reason to do that same thing, they have not always distinguished their thesis about the connection between morality and motivation from what seems, upon reflection, to be a different, if related, thesis about the connection between morality and reasons for action.¹⁰⁷

An example of Moore's connection between morality and reasons for action or aiming at a thing is his question: "And if it is not good at all, what reason can he have for aiming at it?"¹⁰⁸ While an example of his connection between morality and motivation for acting or aiming at a thing is his claim: "That to think a thing good and to will it are the same thing."¹⁰⁹ Nowhere in Moore's Principia Ethica, though, did he indicate that there is a distinction between these two connections.

Moore, then, would seem to be a strong internalist, who apparently considered the reasons and the motivation for aiming at a thing to be identical. But it seems plausible to view the relationship between reasons and motivation as one of implication. That is, it seems that a motive would always imply a reason for aiming at something. But the reverse implication, that a reason implies a motivation, does not seem to hold. Indeed, both Hare's hotel example and the biblical passages referred to above are illustrations of a reason (something being good) not implying a motivation. Therefore, it is wrong to hold premise two.

CHAPTER III

A Brief Summary of Goodness and an Analysis of the Naturalistic Fallacy

Before continuing, let me briefly summarize the ideas in Moore's Principia that I have discussed so far. We have examined three key characteristics of goodness that Moore held, namely: that goodness is a property, that it is simple, and that it is non-natural. Moore used each of these characteristics of goodness to prevent the conflation of goodness with any other property. If goodness is a property in the sense meant by Moore then it is distinct from the objects in which it is substantiated. Similarly, if goodness is simple rather than complex, it is irreducible to a composite of elements and is therefore indefinable. If goodness is not definable, then one cannot equate it with any other object or property. Finally, Moore's assertion that goodness is non-natural was again intended to prevent the identification of goodness with any natural object, and ultimately with any other object whatsoever except itself.

When Moore asserted these characteristics of goodness he was able to develop a notion of how goodness was related to other objects and properties - in particular, goodness

as a simple, non-natural property of each of these substantives. Moore was also prepared to state an important thesis used throughout his Principia which has been associated with his name ever since. This is the thesis which he called the "Naturalistic Fallacy."

In explaining what this fallacy was, he stated the following:

It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other', but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy' and of it I shall now endeavor to dispose.¹¹⁰

Moore's use of the term "fallacy" in characterizing his version of the naturalistic fallacy can itself be a cause for confusion. As Bernard Williams claimed, "it is hard to think of any other widely used phrase in the history of philosophy that is such a spectacular misnomer. In the first place, it is not clear why those criticized were committing a fallacy (which is a mistake in inference)¹¹¹ as opposed to making what in Moore's view was an error, or else simply redefining a word."¹¹² By using the term "fallacy" it seems clear that Moore did not mean that the naturalistic fallacy was a fallacy in the formal sense - that is, a logical fallacy. Rather, he meant that the naturalistic fallacy was an error in

the sense of a category mistake. The naturalistic fallacy is the error of supposing that the property goodness belongs in one category or class (natural properties), while it really belonged to another class (non-natural properties). The fact that Moore made a further distinction between goodness and most non-natural properties will be discussed shortly. But for now what is noteworthy is that Moore meant by the naturalistic fallacy that assignment of goodness to the wrong class of properties.

Another version of the naturalistic fallacy is attributed to David Hume, although he never used the expression "naturalistic fallacy" in his writings.¹¹³ Hume stated:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning ... When of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, tis' necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at that same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.¹¹⁴

In the above quotes both Moore and Hume pointed out how moralists conflate two different sets of properties, but the two sets that each refer to are different.

Moore seemed at first to be making a distinction between all that is natural and the non-natural property of goodness.¹¹⁵ But he continued by claiming that goodness

should also not be conflated with most non-natural properties.¹¹⁶ He claimed that nothing other than the property goodness itself, is indefinable with goodness.¹¹⁷ Moore's exclusion of all properties, both natural and non-natural, that are indefinable as goodness, prompted the following comment by Bernard Williams: "There is not simply a ban on defining good in naturalistic terms (in the broad and useful sense); as we have just seen, it also bans definitions that are non-naturalistic. So perhaps it just bans a definition of good in terms of anything? This was Moore's own position."¹¹⁸ According to Williams, what Moore actually had in mind was "setting up two classes of expressions."¹¹⁹ One of them contained "good" and "right," among others, and Williams labeled them "evaluative" expressions. The other, non-evaluative class contained a wide variety of expressions such as statements of fact and mathematical truths. "The naturalistic fallacy then comes out as the attempt to define any term that belongs to the first class entirely in terms that belong to second."¹²⁰

Moore's fundamental distinction of the evaluative and the non-evaluative is comparable to the two classes of expressions which Hume wished to keep separate. Hume intended in the above quote from his Treatise to prohibit the conflation of the descriptive with the prescriptive - i.e. a mixing up of the "is" with the "ought." So the comparison of class distinctions amounts to a comparison

of the evaluative-nonevaluative and descriptive-prescriptive dichotomies.

Now in comparing the second terms of these dichotomies, there seems to be little difference in their meaning. The non-evaluative and descriptive would both seem to include such items as "statements of facts, mathematical truths," etc., which Williams listed as non-evaluative expressions. The act of simply describing an act or object is generally understood not to entail the act of evaluating that act or object. Rather, it would seem that a description is a non-evaluative expression. Thus, it would appear that the comparison of the second terms of the dichotomies of Moore and Hume is not problematic. This leaves a comparison of the first terms - namely, a comparison of the evaluative and the prescriptive.

The Evaluative and the Prescriptive are Compared

Now the first thing that occurs to this writer when comparing evaluative and prescriptive expressions is that Moore's class of evaluative expressions must include the class of prescriptive expressions as a subset if Moore's moral system is to work. This is because claiming that an object's goodness is the reason why it is an end amounts to prescribing good objects as ends. If all the possible ends are laid out before us, and we are clear that these

amount to nothing other than entities having the property of goodness, then it is clear that we are to aim at nothing other than goods. Goods and only goods are what are prescribed as our ends. But what would make Moore assume that we are rational only when goods are our ends? That is, what would motivate his asking, "If it is not good at all ... how can it be a rational end for him?" Reference has already been made to the "Socratic doctrine ... that whoever knows what is good does what is right."¹²¹ And it seems clear that Moore, at least implicitly, adhered to this doctrine. But then why would anyone accept such a doctrine? Is it being assumed that people always do what is right when they know what is good because they are innately upright? More specifically, when one assumes this Socratic doctrine, which I have argued that Moore does assume, one seems to imply a built-in or "hard-wired" tendency for humans always to be attracted to what is good. Such a tendency, though, is at odds with Williams' remark that "you can distinguish between thinking that a given item is good ... and choosing that item."¹²² Also, the tendency of human attraction to what is good is the reverse of the view that temptation leads to evil, and that social sanctions are necessary to promise good behavior.

Now, Williams' remarks, as well as the view that temptation leads to evil, are in contrast to Socrates' claim that people fail to do what is good because they are ignorant of what is good.¹²³ In contrast to both,

however, is the seemingly more plausible account given by Aristotle on why people fail to do or choose what is good. While Aristotle did not deny that it was rational for people to have ends that were good, he did hold a somewhat modified account of the relationship of goodness and ends. That is, unlike Socrates, he gave an accounting of people who knew what was good, yet did not choose the good. Among the moral types of people listed in chapter seven of his Nicomachean Ethics we find the bad person (Kakos), the self-indulgent person (Akolastos), and the incontinent, or weakwilled, person (Akrates).¹²⁴ These three types of people have the common characteristic of not doing what is good. While the bad person and the self-indulgent person choose to do what is not good because of not knowing what is good, the incontinent person does know what is good and nevertheless does what is wrong. The incontinent, then, would seem to be the type of person that would suggest the presence of an inconsistency in Socrates' alleged relationship of knowledge of the good and right action. Aristotle's account of the incontinent, however, was not a blanket refutation of the Socratic doctrine. Amelie O. Rorty summed up Aristotle's characterization of the incontinent with these comments:

The Akrates has the general knowledge which Kakos lacks. His failure is a function of some other form of ignorance or irrationality. Yet the Akrates is not necessarily stupid; indeed, like the vicious person, he can be quite clever. But a clever person can be quite irrational. Sometimes the Akrates acts impulsively: he can fail to think about whether the situation before him falls

under his general principles about what is good. Or if he does think about what he is doing, he does not see the particular case properly: he misperceives or misdescribes what is before him. Or even if he gets it right, he can fail to connect it with his general principles, fail to see the importance of his knowledge. He then fails to draw the right conclusion about what to do, either making the wrong decision or failing to act from the decision implicit in his beliefs. These are varieties of failure of mind, whose origins lie in the sorts of failures of character for which a person can be responsible. They are failures that are compatible with a person's having the right general principles, having them to a relatively high degree of actualization.¹²⁵

Two points concerning Aristotle's account of the incontinent are notable. First, Aristotle had not abandoned the notion that a rational person is one who aims at the good. In the case of the incontinent person, Aristotle attempted to explain why such a person would act in an irrational way. In this respect Aristotle was in agreement with Socrates and Moore. All three held that only goods can be rational ends.¹²⁶ Secondly, Aristotle obviously did not agree with Socrates that a knowledge of the good would always lead one to a right act. His account of the incontinent is a clear instance of the contrary. What Aristotle pointed out is that within the human intellect, there are a number of pitfalls - impulsiveness, misperception, misdescriptions, etc. - that can cause a person who knows the good to do what is wrong.

In light of the above, a primary difference between Socrates and Aristotle concerns their account of why people fail to choose what is good. Socrates claimed that people failed to choose the good due to a failure to know.

Aristotle claimed that this failure was due to a failure of character. Aristotle, while maintaining the rationality of choosing what is good, nevertheless separated the mere knowing of what is good from choosing it. He claimed:

It is impossible for the same person to be at the same time prudent and incontinent; for we have proved that a prudent man is at the same time morally good. Besides merely knowing what is right does not make a person prudent; he must be disposed to do it too: and the incontinent man is not so disposed.¹²⁷

Now Moore claimed that "there seems no doubt that on the whole he [Aristotle] regards the exercise of the practical virtues as a good of the same kind (i.e., having intrinsic value)."¹²⁸ Virtues, claimed Moore, are instances of a disposition to perform actions which are right.¹²⁹ Thus, in keeping with Moore's characterization of the Aristotelian notions of virtue, rightness and good, it seems justified to apply Aristotle's above-quoted comment not only to what is right, but to what is good. With the substitution of "good" for "right" Aristotle's statement would read: "Besides, merely knowing what is good does not make a person prudent; he must be disposed to do it too."¹³⁰

Keeping in mind Aristotle's separation of knowledge of good from choosing good, we may then ask in what sense he meant that people were rational in choosing good, and irrational in not choosing good. Aristotle's answer consisted in dividing the soul into a rational and irrational part. Concerning the rational part, Aristotle

said: "It [the rational part] urges them [both the continent and incontinent] in the right direction and encourages them to take the best course."¹³¹ Regarding the irrational part, he stated that "The soul too contains an irrational element which opposes and runs counter to reason."¹³² Thus, Aristotle characterized the irrational actions of people - that is, actions which were choices of bad rather than good - as instances where the irrational part of the soul has stronger impulses than the rational part. As Aristotle put it:

It is possible for each of these parts to have its impulses thwarted to some extent by the other.¹³³

Now, while Socrates characterized the soul as consisting of rational and irrational parts,¹³⁴ he did not, like Aristotle, allow for instances of incontinence. Terence Irwin explains Socrates' denial of incontinence as follows:

He [Socrates] rejects Meno's suggestion that A might know that x is evil and still choose x; no one, Socrates replies, wants to be unhappy, and so no one wants what will make him unhappy. The reply is invalid: A may not want x because it makes him unhappy, but he may still want x although it makes him unhappy. To rule this out, Socrates must assume, as he assumes in the Gorgias and Lysis, that incontinent action is excluded because the strongest desire is always focused on the final good.¹³⁵

Thus, according to Socrates, when a moral agent has knowledge of what is good, he or she will more strongly desire what is good than what is not good, and will choose

what is good.

Aristotle's account of the incontinent person is consistent with Moore's claim that a rational end must be good. But if this is true of rational ends, the ends that would be rational for an incontinent are different from his or her actual aims. That is, sometimes the incontinent "gets it right" and manages to conform his or her aim to what he or she knows is good (the rational end). And there are other times when the incontinent does not aim at a good. At these times it is hard to imagine saying that what a person decides to do and in fact does was not that person's end. The above-mentioned example of people aiming at acquiring money is such a case. As Marx observed, over time people aim at acquiring money not as a means, but for its own sake. Yet few people today make the claim that the acquisition of money is intrinsically good. When a person acts on a desire, it seems right to say that this desire and act is his or her aim. But what does it mean, then, when it is said that one's aim is not a rational end? It must mean, on the one hand, that a person's aims are ends, but that they are not rational ends. On the other hand, it also would seem to mean that rational ends can be different than a person's own aims and ends. Therefore, the tendency implied in the Socratic doctrine, that all humans are always attracted to what is good, does not hold up. Rather, Aristotle's explanation, that the incontinent has impulses

that are greater than this person's conviction to do what is right, seems more in line with observable human behavior. As Aristotle put it:

There is a type of man who is impelled by his feelings to deviate from the right principle, but who, although mastered by his feelings to the extent of not acting in accordance with the right principle, is not so completely mastered to be capable of the conviction that he should pursue such pleasures unrestrainedly. This is the incontinent man.¹³⁶

The Naturalistic Fallacy and Its Role in Moore's Moral Theory

If Moore's notions of rational ends are to hold together, the property of goodness must exist independently of what a person desires. For if what a person aims at is what that person desires, and is not a rational end because it is not good, a person can only make his or her ends rational by having them conform to what is good. But what makes an object good is not the desire a person has for it, since a person can desire something that is not good, and thus have an irrational end. Thus, the goodness which makes an object good, according to Moore, is not subjective - that is, it is not a function of whether it is desirable.

Now all the aspects of Moore's characterization of goodness - its being a property, its simplicity, its non-naturalness, its universality as a property, and its

being the sole rational end of humans - have been used by Moore in characterizing his version of the naturalistic fallacy. Moore in turn used the naturalistic fallacy to establish the objective existence of goodness - i.e., that the existence of goodness is not identical to a state of mind. Finally, if Moore's argument for the independent existence of goodness is effective, then there are intrinsic goods that exist independently of whether humans desire them or aim at them. Moreover, Moore would have us conform our aims and actions to the attainment of these goods because it is only when we aim at intrinsic goods that we are choosing rational ends. Perhaps at this point it would be helpful to give some additional explanation to the three points just mentioned regarding Moore's characterization of goodness.

First, regarding the characteristics that Moore attributed to goodness, it is clear that Moore used them to support his thesis of the naturalistic fallacy. For instance, Moore, in using the linguistic relationship of an adjective to a substantive to demonstrate the relationship of a property to an object, claimed that "goodness" is the adjective that applies to the substantive. But since "goodness" is never itself the substantive, goodness is prohibited from being defined as an object. It is always a property attached to objects in virtue of which they are good objects. If true, this claim alone would seem to strengthen Moore's thesis that goodness cannot

be a natural or non-natural object. This is because goodness, being always a property which applies to a substantive, but never a defining part of the substantive,¹³⁷ is distinct from the objects to which it is attached.

Simplicity, meanwhile, restricts goodness to being only a single property. Because it cannot be analyzed further, Moore claimed that goodness is indefinable. But indefinability had a dual meaning for Moore. He meant by it that an element is simple and is not analyzable. But he also meant by indefinability that goodness is not identifiable as any other property - it is only identifiable as goodness.¹³⁸ Here too, then, Moore built his case for the naturalistic fallacy, for the fallacy consists of identifying goodness with something other than itself.

Regarding Moore's use of the concept of the naturalistic fallacy, it does not seem quite right to say that Moore exposed the fallacy to establish the objective existence of goodness.¹³⁹ Moore's remarks quoted earlier - that goodness, like numbers, is in a class of properties that really does not exist, yet somehow is - indicate that he intended to analyze a notion of goodness that is independent of all properties, in the sense that it is not identical to any property other than goodness. But it also seems that Moore did not intend to assert the objectivity of goodness in the sense usually attributed to objects - i.e., either in the natural or super-sensible realm. For the sense in which it is usually understood that something

objectively exists, whether in the natural or super-sensible realm, is as a mind-independent existence. That is, it exists regardless of whether or not it is the object of the understanding. But Moore likened goodness to the number two in that neither are natural properties, and Moore's attitude towards goodness existing in a super-sensible realm is evident in the following quote:

I define 'metaphysical', therefore, by a reference to supersensible reality; although I think that the only non-natural objects, about which it [metaphysics] has succeeded in obtaining truth, are objects which do not exist at all.¹⁴⁰

However, Moore apparently wished that we accept that goodness just somehow is. And if goodness is, and is not identifiable as any other natural or super-sensible property, goodness takes on the role and function of an objective property.

The way in which Moore characterized the objectivity of a natural property is by conceptually isolating the elements of a sensation. In The Refutation of Idealism he stated:

We have then in every sensation two distinct terms, (1)'consciousness', in respect of which all sensations are alike; and (2) something else, in respect of which one sensation differs from another. It will be convenient if I may be allowed to call this second term the 'object' of a sensation.¹⁴¹

Moore went on to say that:

Accordingly, to identify either 'blue' or any other of what I have called 'objects' of sensation, with the corresponding sensation is in every case, a self-contradictory error. It is to identify a part either with the whole of which it is a part or else with the other part of the same whole.¹⁴²

As to exactly what Moore meant by a sensation, he stated the following:

Many philosophers have called these things which I call sense data, sensations. They would say, for instance, that that particular patch of colour was a sensation. But it seems to me that this term 'sensation' is liable to be misleading. We should certainly say that I had a sensation, when I saw that colour. But when we say that I had a sensation, what we mean is, I think, that I had the experience which consisted in my seeing the colour. That is to say, what we mean by a sensation in the phrase, is my seeing of the colour, not the colour which I saw.¹⁴³

Objective properties in the case of objects of sensation, then, are the differentia of sensual experience, while sensation itself is the common element of each object of sensation. Objects of sensation, though, are natural objects and properties, while goodness, according to Moore, is non-natural. So it seems that Moore refused to locate a realm in which goodness is a part - i.e., the natural and non-natural realms. Yet it would seem consistent with his characterization of properties that all properties are objective because they are not identical to the wholes of which they are properties, or of other distinct properties of that whole. In the case of natural properties, Moore isolated the object of a sensation from

the sensation of an object by identifying a sensation as an experience and an object as that which is experienced. In the case of goodness, he isolated goodness from good objects characterizing a good object as "the substantive" to which "the adjective 'good' will apply."¹⁴⁴ In other words, Moore treated goodness as though its existence is as objective as Moore's objects of sensation.

Finally, if goodness is, and it is independently of all other elements (it consists of nothing but itself), then Moore could claim that there are goods, and they have the property of goodness independent of human desire. What I mean by saying in the previous sentence that Moore could claim that there are goods involves the specific meaning Moore intended for a good - that is, an object with the property goodness attached to it. For if goodness is and it is independently of all other elements, then there are goods in Moore's sense - objects having the property of goodness - rather than goodness itself identified as a good object. What is meant in the same sentence, that Moore could claim that goods have the property of goodness independent of human desire, is that goodness consists of nothing but itself; and when it is said that goodness attaches to an object, this is not the same as saying that an object is desirable.

The following remarks reveal that Moore considered rational ends to be independent of human desire.

Is there any sense in which a thing can be an ultimate

rational end for one person and not for another? By 'ultimate' must be meant at least that the end is good-in-itself - good in our indefinable sense; and by 'rational', at least, that it is truly good. That a thing should be an ultimate rational end means, then, that it is truly good in itself; and that it is truly good in itself means that it is part of a Universal Good.¹⁴⁵

Thus, Moore seemed to be describing rational ends as objects that have the property of goodness¹⁴⁶ independently of any property attributed to an object by the human mind. And this mind-independence, which Moore ascribed to goodness,¹⁴⁷ is related to the objectivity which Moore attributed to goodness. That is, a property which is attributable to an object by the human mind is a subjective property,¹⁴⁸ while a property that attaches to an object independently of a mind is non-subjective, and thus objective.

In addition to Moore's characterization of goodness to support his rejection of goodness as a natural property, and his use of this rejection to argue for the independent status of goodness, there remains the question of why Moore went to such pains in elaborating the objectivity of goodness. The answer would seem to be that he wished to preserve the idea that goodness is a singular, unified property. Now before pointing out Moore's clear intent to characterize goodness as a single property, it may be asked why he wished to do so. The answer seems related to the fact that Moore adopted a Platonic view of goodness throughout the Principia.

As far as Moore's being a Platonist, he stated in his

autobiography that he and his contemporaries - Bertrand Russell and John McTaggart - were admirers of F.H. Bradley. Regarding Bradley, Moore said: "I remember McTaggart once saying of an occasion when he met Bradley at Oxford that, when Bradley came in, he felt 'as if a Platonic Idea had walked into the room.'"149 And in explaining his eventual breakaway from Bradley, Moore stated the following:

In thinking about the truth, I was led to take as my text a passage from the beginning of Bradley's Logic, in which after saying that 'Truth and falsehood depend on the relation of our ideas to reality', he goes on to say that the 'meaning' of an idea consists in a part of its 'cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence' of the idea in question. It seemed to me, if I remember right, that the meaning of an idea was not anything 'cut off' from it, but something wholly independent of mind. I tried to argue for this position, and this was the beginning, I think, of certain tendencies in me which have led some people to call me a 'Realist', and was also the beginning of a breakaway from a belief in Bradley's philosophy ...150

Here Moore claimed that he broke away from Bradley - a philosopher described as a "Platonic idea" - because of Bradley's claim that the meaning of an idea is separate from its existence. Moore argued that ideas were "wholly independent of mind." Thus Moore, not satisfied with a theory of ideas postulated by Bradley, the "Platonic Idea," argued for an ontology of ideas that is, if anything, more Platonic than Bradley's theory.

Moore held other metaphysical notions that were also Platonic in nature. Regarding his characterization of goodness as non-natural and simple, it seems very much

in keeping with Plato's assertion that the particulars that exist in time (natural objects) are complex and changeable. In Plato's Phaedo Socrates asked, "And isn't it most probable that the incomposite things are those that are always constant and unchanging, while the composite are those that are different at different times and never constant?"¹⁵¹ And in a similar Platonic vein, those things which are incomposite and unchanging are the objects of true knowledge, while the objects of mere opinion are changeable and composite.¹⁵²

Now if, as Plato argued, only the simple can be objects of knowledge, it is demonstrable that only what is singular can be an object of knowledge. For the singularity of goodness, discussed previously, was assured by its being for Moore, a non-natural property, and thus immaterial. And as mentioned, the source of individuation, and thus the possibility of plurality, is found in the matter of a substance, while its form is unchanging. Thus considering the property of goodness, its non-naturalness precludes its plurality. It seems possible then, that Moore's arguing for the simplicity and non-naturalness of goodness supports the claim of goodness being a singular property. As a Platonist, Moore would want goodness to be singular so that it would qualify as knowable.

Moore spells out his intent to characterize goodness as a singular property at the beginning of the Principia:

Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; but, being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, unless it is prepared to tell us what good is as well as what is conduct. For 'good conduct' is a complex notion: all conduct is not good; for some is certainly bad and some may be indifferent. And on the other hand, other things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then, 'good' denotes some property that is common to them and conduct...¹⁵³

In this quote Moore began his investigation of goodness as a property "that is common" to all goods. Thus, it seems that because there is a single word "good," Moore thought there was a corresponding property which is the same in each object that is called a good.

CHAPTER IV

A Pluralistic Model of Goodness

In this final chapter I will develop a pluralistic model of goodness. In contrast to Moore's concept of singular goodness, there are moral pluralists such as W.D. Ross who postulate that "good" has more than one meaning. Ross argued for the intrinsic goodness of pleasure, virtue, justice and knowledge. He claimed: "Four things, then, seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and in a less degree right opinion)."¹⁵⁴ I will argue that Ross did not consider intrinsic goods to have a singular property goodness, which is the selfsame property of each good. Nor did he concur with Moore that goodness is a property that is independent of all other elements contained in a whole. To those who are of Moore's persuasion, he commented as follows:

It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in the suggestion I can find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself.¹⁵⁵

Now at first glance it may seem that Moore himself held a position not far from that just quoted by Ross. Moore's initial position in his Principia Ethica is significantly altered in his Ethics. In the Principia he stated:

If in any imaginable case you do admit that the existence of a more beautiful thing is better in itself than that of one more ugly, quite apart from its effects on any human feeling, then Professor Sidwick's principle has been broken down. Then we shall have to include in our ultimate end something beyond the limits of human experience.¹⁵⁶

In contrast, in his Ethics Moore stated that "It does seem as nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it contains both some feeling and also some other form of consciousness."¹⁵⁷ But Moore's analysis of an intrinsic good is significantly different from Ross' analysis. Ross viewed Moore's analysis as follows:

Consciousness, by which I think Professor Moore means apprehension, is a state of mind, and does not include its object (say, a body) as a part of itself. The only whole which could be said to include consciousness plus its object is the whole (if it can be called a whole) consisting of the object plus the consciousness of it. The true analysis of the consciousness of a beautiful object, it would seem, is not into consciousness plus the beautiful object, but into (a) its being an instance of consciousness in general, and (b) its being an instance of consciousness of something beautiful.¹⁵⁸

Thomas Leddy in his essay "Moore and Shusterman on Organic Wholes" also noted Moore's insistence on separating consciousness and its object. He wrote that "Moore requires strict separation between consciousness and the object

of consciousness. Thus, for Moore, consciousness is externally related to the object of consciousness."¹⁵⁹

The main point here, then, is that even in Moore's later thoughts in his Ethics, where he conceded that consciousness is a required component of intrinsic goods, he viewed consciousness and its objects as distinct elements. Ross, though, claimed that the consciousness of an object cannot be further broken down to consciousness and object. In contrast, Moore abstracted the object from consciousness and asserted the independent existence of the object. Now Moore's separation of consciousness from its object appeared in the form of consciousness separate from goodness. I will discuss this next as I examine the difference between Moore's and Ross' view of the relationship of goodness to good wholes.

Moore and Ross Have Different Meanings for Goodness

The basic difference between what Moore and Ross meant by goodness is perhaps best seen in their respective analyses of wholes. Moore's thoughts on organic wholes have already been discussed. Ross, in one sense, seemed to characterize good wholes in a manner quite similar to that of Moore. Ross claimed that good wholes have "ultimate valuation,"¹⁶⁰ by which he meant the property goodness applied to the whole. But Ross made a distinction between

"ultimate valuation" and "departmental values." Unlike ultimate valuation, departmental values are the irreducible components of value - i.e., virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. It is these departmental values that are the components of the ultimate valuation. As Ross stated, "Of the three elements virtue, knowledge, and pleasure are compounded all the complex states of mind that we think good in themselves."¹⁶¹ Thus, when Ross referred to the goodness of a whole, what he seemed to mean is that goodness as an ultimate valuation is itself a kind of whole and is a composite of the elements virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. Ross distinguished states of mind that were good on the whole from those merely possessing one or two of the departmental values. Ross said, "I would distinguish as Professor Urban does between the possession of moral goodness or of intellectual goodness or of feeling-goodness by a thing (i.e. by a state of mind) and its possession of goodness on the whole."¹⁶² It would follow from this that the departmental values, being different from the "goodness on the whole," and which are compounded to form all "the complex states of mind that we think good in themselves," are the components of the ultimate valuations, or goodness as wholes. And this is quite different from Moore's notion that goodness is distinct from the whole.

Several things are notable regarding the notion of goodness held by Ross. First, if the departmental values are the "constitutive qualities"¹⁶³ of ultimate valuation,

then this ultimate valuation, or goodness, which applies to the whole cannot be simple. Rather, the ultimate valuation is a complex property that is the result of the departmental values.

Secondly, if the property goodness is indeed a composite of the departmental values, then it cannot be a non-natural property. The constitutive qualities of goodness are themselves natural. They are, claimed Ross, states of mind, and being such would mean that at least the constitutive qualities of goodness are natural.¹⁶⁴ However, the fact that a whole consists of natural parts does not commit the whole itself to being natural. This is because inferring the naturalness of the whole from the naturalness of each of its parts is a commission of the fallacy of composition.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the complexity of goodness would rule out its non-naturalness, because, as mentioned earlier, those things which are complex must have parts. But the individuation necessary for having parts involves an object's having existence in space and/or time. But if an object exists in space or time it is natural. Goodness, therefore, if it is complex, is natural.

Finally, the ultimate valuation (goodness) does not appear to be just one quality or property. When Ross referred to "complex states of mind that we think good in themselves,"¹⁶⁶ it may seem that he was referring to organic wholes each having the singular property of goodness. But if this is the case, what seems involved

are simple, departmental values that form complex ultimate valuations. These in turn have in each case a simple and always identical property called goodness. In other words, if both Moore's model of a single property goodness and Ross' model of departmental and ultimate values hold, then each complex state of mind (ultimate valuation) formed by simple states of mind (departmental values) must be the same complex state of mind in every case. This would have to hold if we agree with Moore that there is a single property, goodness. But we would also agree with Ross that goodness consists of complex states of mind, and that not all of these states of mind are identical. Then these complex states themselves must be considered wholes, each of which has some further, identical property called goodness. But to call different states of mind goodness, which are formed by simple parts, but in each case have a further, identical property also called goodness, seems to be an unnecessary multiplication of entities.

It would seem, then, that affirming Ross' model of a plural meaning of "goodness" requires only that we argue correctly in favor of the first point mentioned above - i.e., that goodness, or ultimate valuation, is a composite of departmental values. If I can affirm this first point, then the second point, that goodness is natural, can be derived. If I can establish that goodness is complex and natural, then the third point, that goodness is more than one property, seems more plausible than claiming that it

is only one property. As stated in the introduction, the plurality of goodness is the primary point that I argue for in this thesis. I will therefore state my reasons for why I think that the plurality of goodness is most plausible, after I argue in favor of the complexity of goodness.

The Argument in Favor of a Pluralistic Goodness

Let us first look at the property goodness as Moore understood it. Moore claimed that "propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic."¹⁶⁷ Propositions that are analytic involve predicates contained within the subject. An example would be, "A bachelor is unmarried." But "The weather is good" is not an example of an analytic proposition, because the predicate "goodness" is not contained in the subject "weather." Rather, goodness is an accidental predicate of weather, because badness is often a predicate of weather. Now Moore has referred to propositions about the good because it relates to what he is saying about good objects and the property goodness. Regarding the connection between the subjects and predicates of propositions and objects and their properties, Howard Pospesil claimed the following:

Many English sentences can be viewed as consisting of two facts: an expression which is used to refer to an

individual, and an expression which is used to ascribe some property to the individual. Let's call expressions of the former sort singular terms and expressions of the latter kind predicate.¹⁶⁸

It seems that Pospesel's claim that propositions refer to objects (individuals) and properties, is in keeping with the realism of Moore, which I have referred to earlier. This connection between predicates and their referrants, properties, would seem to be a connection held by Moore. And it seems that Moore referred to propositions about the good as synthetic because he wished to emphasize that good objects are composed of defining properties that do not include the property goodness. Moore did not wish to identify goodness as a constitutive (i.e., definitive) property of the whole. Yet, neither did he wish to admit that goodness is a contingent property of intrinsically good wholes. Moore claimed that goodness is a property of intrinsic goods in all instances.¹⁶⁹ Moore obviously did not hold this claim on empirical grounds, since he rightly concurred with Kant that "experience cannot teach us that a thing could not be otherwise."¹⁷⁰ Rather, in maintaining that goodness is a property of intrinsically good wholes at all times, Moore could only base such a claim on the necessity of the attachment of goodness to certain wholes. But in characterizing goodness as a necessary property of an intrinsically good whole, it would seem to follow that goodness is a defining element, or constitutive property of intrinsically good wholes. If

goodness was an accidental property of an intrinsically good object, then it would follow that goodness was neither a definitive property of the whole nor a property that always attached to the whole. Moore's claim that goodness always attaches to intrinsic goods, unlike the claim that it sometimes attaches, means that goodness is a necessary property. But a necessary property of a whole is a defining property of the whole, since wholes cannot exist without their necessary properties.

Moore's several claims regarding goodness, then, seem inconsistent. Moore's insistence on the non-naturalness of goodness does not permit him to consider goodness a constitutive property of natural objects, since he identified natural properties as those which constitute natural objects. But Moore also claimed that goodness is always a property of intrinsically good wholes. As I just pointed out, though, this would indicate that goodness is a constitutive property of natural objects, and thus a natural property. Furthermore, if goodness is a constitutive property of a whole, how can it be considered a resultant property which applies to the whole? It cannot be both because a constitutive property is a defining, necessary building block of a whole, while a resultant property is one that exists as a result of the formation of a whole by constitutive properties. It seems that goodness can either be a part of the whole, or a property that results from the conjunction of the parts

of the whole. But in Moore's notion of organic wholes, it cannot be both.

Conversely, the notions of departmental values and ultimate values, proposed by Ross, allow goodness in one sense to be a part of a whole. This is in the sense of departmental values being components of the ultimate valuation. While in another sense, the sense of ultimate valuation, goodness is also a property that applies to the whole. Thus, the goodness that always applies to intrinsically good wholes does so by being the complex product of departmental values which are defining elements of the whole.

The recognition by Ross that goodness at the level of departmental values is natural is consistent with goodness being a constitutive property of a whole. Yet goodness can be a constitutive property of a whole, while on the level of ultimate valuation still apply as a property to the whole. Thus, Ross' version of goodness seems clearly preferable to Moore's. However, in choosing Ross' version, we also are conceding to the complexity of goodness, for goodness as it applies to the whole is a composite of simple states of mind.

If I am correct in arguing that goodness applied to the whole is complex, then it is not difficult to argue that goodness as ultimate valuation is not the same property, or does not have the same meaning, in all cases. If a specific instance of ultimate valuation is a composite

of virtue and knowledge, and another instance is a composite of pleasure and knowledge, then there seem to be no grounds for claiming that these two instances are the identical property. They may be classified as two properties belonging to a set which we call the set of goodnesses, much as we may classify water and carbon dioxide as two compounds belonging to the set of chemical compounds. But the fact that water and carbon dioxide both are formed by the conjunction of chemical elements does not warrant the claim that an additional property, say, "chemicalhood," exists independently of all chemical compounds. Likewise, a property called goodness which exists in addition to each ultimate valuation, and gives a unified meaning to each instance of ultimate valuation, would seem necessary only if the unity of the meaning of goodness is presupposed. It is this presupposition that underlies Moore's notion of goodness. His assertion that goodness is simple rules out all but one meaning for goodness. But as I argued earlier, the claim that goodness is simple causes problems of consistency with Moore's other claims.

Conclusion - Ross' Characterization of Goodness is
Preferable to Moore's

I think that Ross' characterization of goodness is preferable to Moore's for several reasons. Before comparing their positions, though, I will give a brief summary of how each of these philosophers characterized goodness.

Moore claimed that the property goodness is simple and non-natural. Moore also held that only intrinsic goods are rational ends for people, and I have argued that Moore was an internalist (i.e., to know the good is to will or desire the good) and presupposed the Socratic Doctrine. Finally, by insisting that goodness is simple, Moore wished to preserve the notion that goodness is a single property.

In contrast with Moore, Ross claimed that goodness, as an ultimate valuation, is complex. He claimed that it is composed of three states of mind - virtue, knowledge and pleasure. By identifying goodness as states of mind, Ross was in fact pointing out the naturalness of goodness. For, as Moore claimed, the thoughts and feelings that we have (i.e., our states of mind) exist in time and thus are natural.¹⁷¹

Regarding the internalism I have attributed to Moore, I could find no trace of it in Ross' The Right and the Good. Ross claimed "to judge of a state of mind that it is on the whole virtuous, or intelligent, or pleasant,

is not necessarily to judge that it is good on the whole."¹⁷² But nowhere did he claim that a state of mind that is not good on the whole is not rational to desire as an end.

Finally, Ross identified goodness as made up of three properties at the departmental level, and as being identifiable as an indeterminate number of complex mental states as an ultimate valuation.

In comparing these characterizations of goodness held by Moore and Ross, it seems that Moore's positions are problematic, while Ross' are not. For instance, Moore's claim that goodness is simple is consistent with the notion that some things are better than others. As I pointed out, when goodness is thought of in greater and lesser degrees it becomes a relational property, which is complex rather than simple. Ross, however, characterized goodness as a complex property consisting of the three above mentioned states of mind. Thus, when goodness in Ross' sense is thought of as being relational, its complexity as a relational property is not inconsistent with his overall characterization of goodness, the ultimate valuation, being a complex property.

Moore's claim that goodness is a non-natural property also creates problems. Moore meant by non-natural not only that goodness is not a natural property, but also that it is not a super-sensible property. Moore likened goodness to the number two. Neither goodness nor two, claimed Moore, exist in the natural or super-sensible realm.

They don't really exist anywhere, yet they just are, claimed Moore. But claiming that something does not exist and simply is, at the very least leaves the distinction between "exist" and "is" unexplained. Moreover, it seems plainly contradictory for Moore to say that something is and does not exist.

By comparison, Ross' characterization of goodness as a state of mind, and thus a natural property, does not involve incomprehensible ontological categories. Ross gives us a clear location of goodness in the natural realm.

Finally, and most pertinent to this thesis, there is Moore's intent to characterize goodness as a single property. Since Moore maintained that goodness is a simple property, it follows that it is also a single property. As mentioned in this thesis, if a property is simple it cannot have parts. Furthermore, I pointed out that Moore held a Platonic view of goodness. Plato's observation in his Phaedo that the objects of true knowledge are incomposite, and thus constant and unchanging, is very similar to Moore's position on the simplicity of goodness. But, as mentioned, both the non-naturalness and the simplicity of goodness caused conceptual problems for Moore.

These problems do not exist in Ross' ethical model. Since he attributes neither simplicity nor non-naturalness to the property goodness, Ross is consistent when characterizing goodness as a number of properties. When referring to the basic components (departmental values)

of ultimate valuations, he identifies three states of mind, each of which he identifies as goodness. When referring to ultimate valuations, the property goodness which applies to wholes, he refers to the numerous, complex states of mind, each of which is goodness acting as an evaluative property of the whole.

Ross' model, then, is preferable to Moore's because it eliminates the problems of inconsistency and contradiction inherent in Moore's claims of non-naturalness and simplicity concerning goodness. Also, by identifying states of mind as goodness, Ross did not have to postulate an additional property goodness which applies to states of mind. Thus, there are good reasons for accepting Ross' account of goodness in favor of Moore's account.

Notes

1. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970) p.10.
2. Ibid., p.100.
3. By "mind-dependent" I mean that goodness is a state of mind and not a property existing independently of minds.
4. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.21.
5. Both acts and objects are mentioned here because both are often considered means to an end.
6. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.17.
7. Ibid., p.6.
8. Ibid., p.7.
9. Ibid., p.41.
10. Ibid., p.10.
11. Ibid., pp.6-7.
12. Ibid., p.28.
13. Ibid., p.41.
14. Ibid., p.9.
15. A counter example to goodness applying to wholes formed by goods such as pleasure and intelligence is a whole formed by two bad things, such as pain and vice. In this case at least some people think a good whole (just punishment) is formed, even though neither part of the whole is good in itself.
16. G.E Moore, Principia Ethica, p.9.
17. Ibid., p.7.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p.8.
20. Ibid., pp.12-13.

21. It already would seem questionable whether pleasure and intelligence could be considered simple and also have the property of goodness. On pages 10 and 11 it will be argued that they cannot be both.
22. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.9.
23. Ibid., p.41.
24. Ibid., p.18.
25. Ibid., p.36.
26. C.H. Langford, "Notion of Analysis in Moore's Philosophy" in Paul A. Shlipp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1968) p.339.
27. C.D Broad, "Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines" in Paul A Schlipp, ed. The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1968) p.58.
28. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.40-41.
29. Ibid., p.41.
30. Anthony Flew asks the following in his Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: St. Martin's Press) p.222: "Is matter to be regarded simply as that which is extended in both space and time?" I am presupposing existence in time and space as necessary conditions of materiality, while conceding that they may not be sufficient conditions of materiality.
31. Aristotle, "Metaphysics" Book VII, A New Aristotle Reader, J.L. Ackrill, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987) p.296.
32. Fredrick Sontag, Problems of Metaphysics (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler Publ. Co., 1970) p.46.
33. Here "substance" is meant as a compound of matter and form as characterized by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, Book VII.
34. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.111-112.
35. Ibid., p.117.
36. Ibid., p.111.
37. Ibid.

38. It seems nonsensical to say that a property does not exist, yet is. But as David O. Brink pointed out, in addition to the natural and supernatural classes of properties, there is also the non-natural class of properties. Brink states in Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p.22:

Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral facts and properties just are natural facts and properties, whereas ethical supernaturalism claims that moral facts and properties just are supernatural facts and properties (e.g., facts about and properties of the will of a divine being). Non-naturalists such as Moore, however, claim that moral facts and properties are neither natural nor supernatural facts and properties: they are sui generis.

To claim that moral properties are sui generis (i.e., in a distinct class of their own), however, leaves open the question of how a property does not exist (i.e., is not a member of either natural or supernatural classes of properties) yet is. To understand the ontological status of the property goodness, then, it may be helpful to consider Alexius Meinong's classification of objects that do not exist. According to Meinong, there are possible objects, impossible objects, and incomplete objects. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol. 5 (New York: Mac Millan Publishing Co., 1967) p.261, the following explanations are given for Meinong's objects that do not exist:

Of possible objects - not having a contradictory Sosein [character] - some exist and others (for example, golden mountains) do not exist.

And further on the same page:

An impossible object, as indicated above, is an object having a Sosein that violates the law of condition. An incomplete object, analogously, is one having a Sosein that violates that law of the excluded middle.

Now if the word "property" is substituted for the word "object" in Meinong's classes of non-existent objects, it is clear that a non-natural property a la Moore should be classed as an incomplete property. That is, if goodness exists neither as a natural property nor as a supernatural property, it cannot be considered a possible property in

Meinong's sense. But its preclusion as a possible property is not due to its Sosein violating the law of contradiction. For if Sosein were in violation of the law of contradiction, goodness would be a property belonging to both the natural and supernatural classes of properties. Goodness according to Moore, however, belongs to neither class, making it a property with a Sosein that violates the law of the excluded middle.

39. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945) pp.156-157.
40. Ibid.
41. Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, Revised Second Edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) p.115.
42. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.21.
43. Ibid., p.36.
44. Ibid., p.23.
45. Ibid., p.30.
46. Ibid., p.9.
47. Ibid., p.100.
48. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Collier Books, 1962) p.100.
49. Karl Marx, Capital Vol.I, translated by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: The Modern Library, 1906) p.146.
50. The term "mind-independent property" is used here in the sense of a property existing objectively, or independently of any human cognizance. Thus if the property of goodness was mind-independent, it would be possible for objects to be intrinsically good whose existence were unknown by minds.
51. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.100.
52. By an implicit consideration of consistency with one's beliefs, I mean that choosing an object as an end could be reflected upon and found rational in the logical sense proposed by Moore.
53. G.E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in Thomas Baldwin, ed. G.E. Moore: Selected Writings (New York:

Routledge, 1993) p.36.

54. Ibid., p.35.

55. Ibid., p.44.

56. Although I am attributing to Moore deductive validity as the criterion of rationality, I am not suggesting that other criteria, such as a strong inductive argument, would not be equally feasible.

57. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.143.

58. Ibid., p.100.

59. Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978) p.14.

60. Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1986) p.7.

61. Ibid., p.9.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p.10.

64. Ibid., p.13.

65. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.100.

66. Ibid., pp.138-139.

67. Ibid., pp.143-144.

68. Ibid., p.144.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p.100.

71. Ibid., p.144.

72. Ibid., p.100.

73. It is noteworthy that the distinction Moore makes between what is sought for its own sake (an end) and what is sought as a means to something else, is not a distinction accepted by all philosophers. John Dewey, for instance, in his "Theory of Valuation" in Paul Taylor, ed., The Moral Judgment, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963) p.180.

Every condition that has to be brought into

existence in order to serve as a means is, in that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a test of valuations previously made.

Dewey, then, was a philosopher that denied any clear distinction between ends and means.

74. Moore makes a distinction between instrumental goods (means) and objects having goodness "attached" to them in Principia Ethica, p.21.
75. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.24, 100, 216-217.
76. Ibid., p.9.
77. Ibid., p.21.
78. Ibid.
79. Moore's reference to instrumental goods as "causes" of intrinsic goods is best explained in Moore's remarks in his Principia Ethica, p.22:

Whenever we judge that a thing is 'good as a mean,' we are making a judgment with regard to its caused relations: we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that that effect will be good in itself.

80. Moore's thoughts on the status of evil as a property are evident in his discussion of wholes having values that are in some cases good and in other cases evil. Just as goodness is a property that applies to a whole, so evil too is a property that applies to a whole. The following comment in his Principia Ethica, p.208 demonstrates that this was his position:

With regard, then, to great positive evils, I think that it is evident that, if we take all due precautions to discover precisely what those things are, of which, if they existed by themselves, we should judge the existence to be a great evil, we shall find most of them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those which are the greatest positive goods.

Furthermore, it is evident that the view that evil amounts to an absence of the instantiation of goodness is not Moore's view. This absence-of-good, known as the "privative theory" of evil was held by Augustine. In his City of God (Garden City, New

York: Doubleday and Co., 1958) p.217, Augustine states: "For evil has no positive nature; what we call evil is merely the lack of something that is good." Moore, though, held that there were objects that were devoid of the property goodness, and yet were not bad. In his Principia Ethica, p.27 he claimed:

There is, as will presently be maintained, a vast number of different things, each of which has intrinsic value; there are also very many which are positively bad; and there is a still larger class of things, which appear to be indifferent.

Thus, it is difficult to imagine Moore holding the privative theory, since such a view would not seem to allow for a class of objects which are morally indifferent.

81. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.35-36.
82. Ibid., p.30.
83. Moore's intended meaning for the terms "positively evil" and "positive evils" seems ambiguous. In Principia Ethica, p.216 Moore seemed to indicate that positive evils are parts of wholes. He claimed, "What we have now to consider are cases of wholes, in which one or more parts have a great negative value - are great positive evils." In Principia Ethica, p.208 Moore seemed to be defining positive evils as wholes or organic unities. He said, "With regard, then, to great positive evils,... we shall find most of them to be organic unities of exactly the same nature as those which are the greatest positive goods."
84. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.216.
85. Ibid., p.100.
86. Ibid., p.144.
87. Plato, "Protagoras" in Erich Segal, ed., The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Bantam, 1986) p.187.
88. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, p.107.
89. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.100.
90. Ibid.
91. Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) p.90.

92. Ibid., p.79.
93. Ibid., p.78.
94. Ibid., pp.82-83.
95. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.5.
96. Ibid., p.143.
97. Ibid., p.144.
98. Ibid., p.100.
99. Ibid., p.131.
100. Ibid., pp.144-145.
101. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) p.125.
102. Ibid.
103. Bible, Psalms 52:3.
104. Ibid., John 3: 19-20.
105. David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundation of Ethics (Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1989) p.38.
106. Ibid., p.41.
107. Ibid., p.39.
108. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.100.
109. Ibid., p.131.
110. Ibid., p.10.
111. Contrary to Williams, there are fallacies which do not involve inferences, but involve inductive generalizations such as hasty generalizations.
112. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p.121.
113. The term "naturalistic fallacy" while coined by Moore, is closely associated with Hume. Anthony Flew in his A Dictionary of Philosophy, Rev. 2nd Ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press) p.241, states the following:

This [naturalistic fallacy] was first labelled by G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica (1903). But everyone now refers, as Moore did not, to a much better and characteristically ironic statement in Hume's Treatise: "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for sometime in the ordinary way of reasoning... when of a sudden I am surpris'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it." (III(i)1).

114. David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978) p.469.
115. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.41.
116. Ibid., p.39.
117. Ibid., p.6.
118. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p.122.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Bernard Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p.107.
122. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p.125.
123. Plato, "Protagoras" in Erich Segal, ed., The Dialogues of Plato, p.187.
124. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J.A.K. Thompson (New York: Penguin Books, 1955) pp.226-227.
125. Amelie O. Rorty, "Akrasia and Pleasure" in Amelie O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) pp.272-273.

126. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p.248.
127. Ibid.
128. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.176.
129. Ibid.
130. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, p.248.
131. Ibid., p.89.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., p.202.
134. Plato, The Republic, translated by B. Jowett (New York: Vintage Books) p.157.
135. Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, p.79.
136. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, pp.245-246.
137. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.9.
138. Ibid., p.6.
139. Ibid., p.112.
140. Ibid.
141. G.E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism" in Thomas Baldwin, ed., G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, p.35.
142. Ibid., pp.35-36.
143. G.E. Moore, "Sense Data," in Thomas Baldwin, ed., G.E. Moore: Selected Writings, p.48.
144. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.9.
145. Ibid., p.100.
146. Ibid.
147. G.E. Moore, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" in Philosophical Studies (Patterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1959) pp.272-273.
148. Ibid., p.254.
149. G.E. Moore, "An Autobiography" in Paul A. Schlipp, ed., The Philosophy of G.E. Moore (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1968) p.22.

150. Ibid.
151. Plato, "Phaedo" in Walter Kaufmann, ed., Philosophic Classics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968) p.118.
152. Ibid.
153. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.2.
154. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Co., 1930) p.140.
155. Ibid.
156. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.84.
157. G.E. Moore, Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) p.107.
158. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p.71.
159. Thomas Leddy, "Moore and Shusterman on Organic Wholes," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (49:1 Winter, 1991) p.64.
160. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p.107.
161. Ibid., p.141.
162. Ibid., p.107.
163. Ibid., p.104.
164. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp.40-41.
165. To infer the naturalness of a whole from the naturalness of each of its parts is a commission of the fallacy of composition. This is identical in form to Sterling Harwood's criticism of this fallacy in "The Is/Ought Gap" in Christopher B. Gray, ed., The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, forthcoming).
166. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p.141.
167. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.7.
168. Howard Pospesil, Predicate Logic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976) p.5.
169. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p.9.

170. G.E. Moore, "The Nature of Judgment" in Thomas Baldwin, ed., G.E. Moore: Selected Writings (London: Routledge, 1933) p.11.

171. Ross apparently held a similar view of things that exist in time. He stated in Plato's Theory of Ideas:

Now the nature of the Ideas for him [Plato] was (and rightly so) such that they cannot suffer change, and accordingly, while he describes time as having been brought into being by Demiourgos only simultaneously with the ordered sensible world, the Ideas, like the Demiourgos, are eternal. W.D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951) p.232.

What Ross refers to as the sensible world, then, is analogous to Moore's reference to the natural realm.

172. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p.107.

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