1999

The CIA : the struggle between national security and democracy

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.4uqz-evwm>
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**THE CIA: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND
DEMOCRACY**

**A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
San Jose State University**

**In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements of the Degree
Master of Arts**

**by
Daren Anderson**

December 1999

UMI Number: 1397709

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ABSTRACT

THE CIA: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY

by Daren Anderson

This thesis examines the origins of the modern Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and how it came to possess wartime powers, even in times of peace. It will further detail how the CIA came to harbor Nazi war criminals for purposes of intelligence gathering. This thesis will address the CIA's journey down the dark path of mind control and how the agency's quest for the perfect mind control agent led to its utter disregard for the rights of American citizens.

Research illustrates that Cold War threats, both real and imaginary, led the CIA into a paradoxical situation in which it was subverting the very rights, principles, and liberties that make up the way of life it was fighting to defend. The report will demonstrate that the CIA is neither wholly a rogue organization acting without meaningful oversight or accountability, nor merely the whipping boy of presidents, but it is a nebulous mixture of both. The nature of our country's top intelligence organization prevents any meaningful accountability to the American people whose way of life it ostensibly exists to protect.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to defend the national security of the United States of America the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has engaged in unconscionable violations of human rights, civil liberties, and the American way of life. It is this historian's intention to show how and why these things happened. This report will examine the origins of the modern CIA and how it came to possess wartime powers, even in times of peace. It will further detail how the CIA harbored Nazi war criminals for purposes of intelligence gathering, and even draw some poignant comparisons between the Nazis and the CIA. The report will follow the CIA's journey down the dark path of mind control and how the agency's quest for the Holy Grail of a perfect mind control agent led to its utter disregard for the rights of ordinary Americans. The report will demonstrate that the CIA is neither wholly a rogue organization acting without meaningful oversight or accountability, nor merely the whipping boy of presidents, but it is a nebulous mixture of both. Cold War threats, both real and imaginary, led the CIA into a paradoxical situation in which it was subverting the very rights, principles, and liberties that make up the way of life it was fighting to defend. The nature of our country's top intelligence organization prevents any meaningful accountability to the American people whose way of life it ostensibly exists to protect.

The United States still needs a Centralized Intelligence Agency capable of producing high-quality analysis and carrying out sensitive operations. This is a necessary function of our government. With the end of the Cold War, some have asserted that the mission of the CIA has changed. However, the basic mission of the CIA continues to be to supply information and analysis to policymakers in a timely fashion that permits informed, knowledgeable decision making, especially in the areas of foreign policy and national security. The mission has not changed; the nature of targets and threats has changed. In fact, intelligence is becoming an even more integral part of the modern battlefield. We are no longer locked in an eternal bipolar struggle. Now and in the future events will unfold quickly and unpredictably. More than ever before, the CIA's job of providing early warning of potential crises is essential. American citizens must know they can trust the CIA.

The CIA is the most controversial element of the Intelligence Community. It conjures images of secret spy networks, assassinations, political over-throws, and various other nefarious activities. The public, the press, and popular entertainment share the impression that the CIA is an organization out of control and above the law and therefore not worthy of public support. The Agency would benefit greatly from the support of American citizens. Before this society can become comfortable with operations that must be conducted in secret, the public must know the truth about the CIA's past and accountability, both inside and outside the CIA, must be restored. American citizens should know about the origins of the CIA, its connection with Nazis, and its experimentation with mind control.

The secrecy required for effective intelligence functions has perhaps been the most compelling factor in inspiring historians to write on the Central Intelligence Agency. Nearly every facet of the CIA has been examined. This brief historiography will discuss some of the most significant and seminal studies of the CIA.

A ground-breaking history of the CIA was Harry Ransom's 1959 study, *Central Intelligence and National Security*. Ransom revised and enlarged this work in 1970 and published it as *The Intelligence Establishment*. Both works focused on the CIA, but the latter included other elements of the American Intelligence community, as well as the British intelligence agencies to serve as a comparison. Ransom was a pioneer in analyzing and critiquing the problems of the CIA's use of secrecy in a democratic government. *The Intelligence Establishment* argues for tighter Congressional oversight of the CIA, and offers specific suggestions on reforming the CIA.

The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, John Ranelagh's 1986 work, is an exemplary comprehensive study. He discusses in detail the origins of the CIA and its connection with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime predecessor of the CIA. Ranelagh also covers the CIA's involvement in covert operations. However, he only briefly mentions General Reinhard Gehlen and his ties to the CIA. Ranelagh provides a cursory discussion of the CIA's mind control experiments. This scholarly contribution contains hundreds of interviews and quotes from both on-the-record and unattributed sources, as well as documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

The CIA's History Staff has assembled three volumes of Cold War Records. The third volume, *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA Under Harry Truman*, published in 1994,

contains key documents that provide an overview of the Agency's early development during the Truman Administration. In recent years the CIA has declassified many of its early records. This volume contains previously classified records that were released to individual researchers through Freedom of Information Act requests. It also contains some newly declassified records. A few of the newly declassified documents have had words or passages deleted to protect sources and methods. Some of the documents are barely legible due to faint carbon, Mimeograph, or Ditto copies of the time. These highly useful documents range from memoranda for the record summarizing senior officials' policy debates to working-level reports and communications. Many of the documents received President Truman's personal attention.

Former CIA officers wrote many important books. Thomas F. Troy's *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* is a massive study initially written to provide recruits to the CIA a noninflammatory account of the origins of the Agency. The study was written in the early 1970s but it was not available to the public until 1981. Because Troy, a CIA officer, was commissioned to write an internal history, he had access to classified documents and the cooperation of Agency officials. The CIA's security review led to the deletion of six pages from the book. This well-researched official history enhances the understanding of the origins of the CIA. Ray Cline, another former CIA officer, wrote *The CIA Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan* in 1981. Cline's work contained a wealth of information on the transformation of the OSS to the CIA. Cline provides an objective and analytical study of the Agency and the personalities who have

shaped its development. His fascinating study provides a wealth of understanding and knowledge. Victor Marchetti, a former CIA officer, and John Marks published a major expose of the CIA called *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* in 1980. The book caused a furor among CIA employees, many of whom did not realize the extent of CIA involvement in suborning foreign officials and plotting assassinations. The CIA demanded the deletion of 339 passages; a court agreed that 168 passages should be cut. Although this thesis does not use *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* as a source, it is an extremely influential work.

The Joint Hearing Before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Project MKULTRA (1977) provided an excellent source of information on the CIA's research in mind control. It contains highly informative testimony by Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner and many other influential leaders of the CIA. It also contains nearly seventy pages of original documents. These documents include memoranda between high-ranking CIA officers that discuss mind control operations such as MKULTRA. However, many have had significant passages deleted to protect sources and methods. Also on the topic of the CIA's involvement in mind control experiments is Martin A. Lee and Bruce Shlain's provocative *Acid Dreams: The CIA, LSD, and the Sixties Rebellion*. While their work occasionally loses objectivity, it is highly informative and well-documented.

General Reinhard Gehlen wrote *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen* in 1972. Gehlen's tendentious memoirs offer little of value concerning his connection to the CIA. The work suffers from a lack of detail and documentation. The

book is valuable, however, as a personal account from someone who was intimately involved in the Cold War struggle. E.H. Cookridge's 1971 study, *Gehlen: Spy of the Century*, offers far more information on Gehlen's background and his connection with the CIA. However, Cookridge's anecdotal style and his idolatry of Gehlen detract from the quality of the book. In 1990 Mary Ellen Reese published a well-written study on Gehlen entitled *General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection*. Reese incorporates many interviews with key members of the CIA team that worked with Gehlen. She skillfully describes the relationship between Gehlen and the CIA and its significance.

Chapter 2

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OSS INTO THE CIA: THE LEGACY OF COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE GEHLEN CONNECTION

It is frequently cited that former President Truman never thought that when he created the CIA it would ever be involved in peacetime covert operations. In 1964 Allen Dulles, one of the most influential Directors of Central Intelligence in CIA history, challenged Truman's remarks, saying that although Truman did not care for dirty Gestapo tactics, the CIA had certainly performed them during his presidency.¹ This chapter will chronicle the transformation of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into the Central Intelligence Agency. It also will examine how and why the peacetime Central Intelligence Agency came to possess many of the same powers as its wartime predecessor. In particular this chapter will focus on the OSS legacy of covert operations and how the CIA inherited that legacy. It will further document the CIA's close affiliation with Hitler's Chief of Eastern Intelligence, General Reinhard Gehlen.

During World War II, the United States created the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The agency wielded broad powers, including clandestine intelligence gathering and covert political warfare. William Donovan, Director of the OSS, exhorted the United

¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 178.

States to maintain the OSS or a close facsimile of it in the post-war period. The end of the war and the reminder of another secret organization that waged covert political warfare, the Nazi Gestapo, influenced President Truman to dissolve the OSS. However, as the United States gradually entered the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the necessity of a peacetime intelligence agency became apparent. To meet the need, Truman created the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946. In 1947 Congress transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The powers of the CIA increased dramatically as U.S. policymakers began to perceive an increasing threat of Soviet-Communists bent on world domination. By 1952 the CIA closely resembled the wartime OSS, having the same authority and capabilities. At the same time the War Crimes Trials were being conducted at Nuremberg, American intelligence officers were secretly interviewing high-ranking German officers to determine their potential usefulness in supplying intelligence on the Soviet Union.

Three critical events were significant influences on the Truman Administration officials who founded and built the CIA. The first was the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which demonstrated that the United States was unprepared, not for want of information, but because no apparatus existed to filter and analyze the large volume of available information in a way that could produce accurate intelligence. This infamous intelligence failure clearly demonstrated that the security of the United States would be greatly compromised until it developed a peacetime centralized intelligence agency. The second significant event was Stalin's seizure of political and military control of most of Eastern Europe in violation of his wartime understanding with the Allied Powers. The

fighting in Europe had only recently ended when American and foreign reports on Soviet activities in the occupied territories began to distress leaders in Washington, London, and other capitals. The third event concerned the sponsorship by Soviet and Chinese Communists of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. This sponsorship heightened Cold War tensions and strengthened the conviction of policy makers to buttress the CIA's power to fight communism. Pearl Harbor illustrated the need for a peacetime central intelligence service and the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union galvanized the Truman Administration to create a peacetime intelligence organization with quasi-wartime powers.

During World War II, the United States created the first American centralized intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). On June 13, 1942, a Military Order issued by President Roosevelt created the OSS and granted it broad powers that included intelligence analysis, clandestine collection, and paramilitary, psychological and political warfare.² The agency operated under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was devoted to the business of sabotage, espionage, counterespionage, and covert action, hallmarks that would be passed on to its successor, the CIA. The OSS was involved in both intelligence gathering and clandestine political warfare. To combine both of these capabilities in one agency, Donovan assigned different functions to separate branches of

² Ray S. Cline, *The CIA Under Reagan, Bush and Casey: The Evolution of the Agency from Roosevelt to Reagan* (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1981), 71.

the OSS. Three of the main branches of the OSS were Special Operations (SO), Secret Intelligence (SI), and Counterintelligence (X-2).³

The OSS was extremely successful in carrying out covert operations. The first important OSS covert operation was conducted in North Africa. Several assassinations, allegedly including that of Vichy French Admiral Darlan, were carried out by the Morale and Special Operation departments of the Psychological Warfare Division of the OSS. The success of the operation earned the burgeoning agency great respect and notoriety, especially in regards to covert action. The CIA would soon inherit the OSS's wartime experience and assassination methods.⁴ The OSS was also remarkably successful in setting up and maintaining clandestine agents in Thailand. The OSS established a solid foundation for future CIA activities in the Southeast Asia.⁵ Even early in World War II, paramilitary and political covert operations gained support of high-level figures, such as Roosevelt and Eisenhower, and began to eclipse the accomplishments of intelligence collection. The OSS emphasis on covert paramilitary operations would be one of the primary legacies passed on to the CIA. As historian John Ranelagh noted, "The benefits of covert paramilitary action in peacetime tended to be favorably regarded on the basis of a romantic recollection of these wartime experiences of the OSS."⁶ Perhaps the most

³ Ibid.

⁴ John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 88.

⁵ Ibid., 94.

⁶ Ibid., 96.

important legacy the OSS bestowed upon the CIA was that of former OSS personnel who filled the ranks of the fledgling CIA with experienced intelligence officers. Four OSS veterans, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey, went on to become Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Throughout the war, the OSS proved to be invaluable in both intelligence collection and covert operations, clearly illustrating the advantages of combining these two capabilities in one agency. In 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt requested a secret memorandum on the subject of a postwar intelligence service from General Donovan, OSS chief. Donovan exhorted President Roosevelt to create a permanent, worldwide intelligence service after the war's end. Donovan anticipated the Cold War struggle: "When our enemies are defeated the demand will be equally pressing for information that will aid us in solving the problems of peace."⁷ Donovan went on to argue that the OSS had "the trained and specialized personnel needed for the task. This talent should not be dispersed."⁸

Donovan's proposal was foiled by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, who wanted the FBI to have the exclusive right to collect and analyze intelligence on a global level. Hoover obtained a copy of Donovan's proposal for a postwar intelligence service and leaked the top-secret document to the *Chicago Tribune*. The newspaper printed a number of inflammatory stories about

⁷ Quoted in R. Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 383.

⁸ Ibid.

Donovan's plan to create a super-spy network. Congressional uproar, no doubt spurred by the bad press, caused the peacetime central intelligence agency proposal to be shelved.⁹

The cautious Roosevelt was optimistic about Donovan's plan, but offered no guarantees. After Roosevelt's death and the close of the war, President Truman stated in a letter to Donovan that said he would "liquidate those wartime activities of the Office of Strategic Services which will not be needed in time of peace."¹⁰ Truman feared Donovan's proposed centralized peacetime intelligence agency might one day be used to spy on Americans.¹¹

However, the reminders of Pearl Harbor and the intensifying Soviet aggressions made Truman realize that the United States could no longer deny its role as a world leader and, as such, it would require a formidable centralized intelligence agency. Even before Truman abolished the OSS, he recognized the necessity and requested proposals for the creation of an organization to collate and coordinate intelligence.¹² Upon learning of Truman's plan to disband the OSS and transfer functions to separate agencies, Donovan sent a memorandum to President Truman, on September 13, 1945, pleading that "in the

⁹ Ambrose, 162-64.

¹⁰ Truman to Donovan, 20 September 1945, United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA Cold War Records: The CIA under Harry Truman*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 15. Here on cited as *CIA Cold War Records*.

¹¹ Richard Dunlop, *Donovan: America's Master Spy* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 467-68.

¹² Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 73-76.

national interest, and in your own interest as the Chief Executive, that you will not permit this to be done.”¹³

President Truman, ignoring Donovan’s objections, issued Executive Order 9621 on September 20, 1945, titled “Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of Its Functions.”¹⁴ According to the Order, the State Department took over the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, while the War Department adopted the remnants of the OSS clandestine collection and counterintelligence branches, which it named the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). The capability that the wartime OSS had developed to perform subversive operations abroad was officially abandoned.

In December 1945 Truman deliberated proposals from both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs for a new centralized intelligence agency. Truman ultimately opted for a diluted version of the more simplistic and workable Joint Chiefs’ proposal.¹⁵ The result was the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) on January 22, 1946. Naval Reserve Rear Admiral Sidney Souers was selected to be the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). President Truman invited Souers to the White House two days after creating the CIG to award him a black cloak and dagger as symbols of his new office.¹⁶

¹³ William J. Donovan, Memorandum for the President, 13 September 1945, *CIA Cold War Records*, 3.

¹⁴ Executive Order 9621, 20 September 1945, *CIA Cold War Records*, 11.

¹⁵ Sidney W. Souers, Memorandum for Commander Clifford, 27 December 1945, *CIA Cold War Records*, 17-19.

¹⁶ Ambrose, 127.

The CIG was drastically understaffed, consisting primarily of officers borrowed from the State Department and the military services. The new agency was only a shadow of the wartime OSS. The CIG had no authorization to collect clandestine foreign information from agents in the field or to form a consensus based on information gathered from other intelligence agencies. The primary function of the agency was to coordinate the flow of intelligence to policymakers. Truman attempted to keep covert action, a prominent part of the OSS, out of this peacetime agency. In reference to the directive creating the CIG, Truman stated, "No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall be exercised under this directive."¹⁷ Compromises in the Joint Chiefs' plan to appease the State Department and the Bureau of the Budget had made the CIG an interdepartmental body that lacked its own budget and personnel.¹⁸ However, President Truman greatly appreciated the Daily Summary produced by the CIG. The Daily Summary was prepared according to Truman's own specifications, and when complete satisfied his requirements. It saved him the time of having to search through the hundreds of intelligence reports that normally flooded into the White House.¹⁹

¹⁷ Truman to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, 22 January 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 30.

¹⁸ Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1981), 346.

¹⁹ Montague, Memorandum for the Assistant Director, R & E, Conversation with Admiral Foskett regarding the CIG Daily and Weekly Summaries, 26 February 1947, *CIA Cold War Records*, 123.

Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, after five months as DCI, was replaced with U.S. Army Air Forces Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. DCI Vandenberg had an impressive military record and had the clout and ambition necessary to build the CIG into an agency that wielded great power. In just one year as Director, Vandenberg broadened the CIG's power to incorporate an independent budget and work force and won the authority to collect and analyze, as well as collate, intelligence.²⁰ In a discussion among several top intelligence officials it was agreed that "experience had showed that enabling legislation was necessary in order that the CIG could operate as an integrated organization." They also informed Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, that "experience had shown that the CIG should become an operating agency with a large staff of intelligence experts."²¹

The CIG expanded in importance as the United States attempted to contain the Soviet Union in Europe. On August 24, 1946, the CIG reported that "Soviet propaganda against the U.S. and U.K. has reached the highest pitch of violence since Stalin's February speech and follows a line which might be interpreted as preparing the Russian people for Soviet military action."²² It also stated that the Soviets viewed Anglo-American imperialistic actions, including British troop movements in Palestine and U.S. military

²⁰ National Intelligence Authority, minutes of the NIA's 4th meeting, 17 July 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 55.

²¹ George M. Elsey, Memorandum for the Record, 17 July 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 53.

²² Vandenberg, Memorandum for the President, 24 August 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 81.

operations in China, as signs “that there is no longer any hope of friendly relations between the USSR and the Western Powers.”²³ Reports of Soviet occupational forces subverting the elections mandated by wartime agreements and installing communist dominated regimes were instrumental in illustrating that a central intelligence agency during the Cold War would require many of the wartime powers that the OSS wielded.

The powers of the CIG steadily increased as the Cold War intensified. In August 1946 the CIG gained the authority to analyze intelligence on foreign atomic weapons and development. The War Department’s Strategic Services Unit (SSU), the remnants of the old OSS foreign collection and counterespionage branches, was transferred into the CIG.²⁴ The SSU was considerably larger than the CIG and had its own overseas stations, procedures, and files dating back to its wartime OSS origins. It was the SSU that retained the methods and traditions of the OSS and eventually bequeathed them to the CIA. Furthermore, Vandenberg persuaded the President to grant complete control of intelligence work in Latin America, formerly the dominion of the FBI, to the CIG.²⁵ Within the CIG a new department was created, the Office of Special Operations (OSO), which became the first civilian clandestine service in the United States. In a memoranda to the Assistant Director of the OSO Vandenberg described the mission of the Office of Special Operations as “the conduct. . . of all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States. . . . Such espionage and

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Leahy to the President, 21 August 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 79.

²⁵ Leahy to General Vandenberg, 12 August 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 77.

counterespionage may involve semi-overt and semi-covert activities for the full performance of the mission.”²⁶ The OSO was the first American peacetime agency authorized to carry out psychological warfare operations.

On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced the “Truman Doctrine,” which was instrumental in determining the eventual shape of the CIA. Historian Harry Ransom stated, “So, while Pearl Harbor may be considered the father of the CIA, the Truman Doctrine certainly was the mother; the OSS was its hero model.”²⁷ Britain had announced that it would withdraw from Greece, allowing it to fall to the Communists. Truman decided that the United States would take on the role of a world policeman to protect all people from communist insurgency. In Truman’s famous statement to Congress, he said, “The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will.” He went on to state, “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”²⁸ These words would later justify the creation of a permanent intelligence agency with the power to wage political warfare in a time of peace.

²⁶ Vandenberg, Memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations[Donald Galloway], ‘Functions of the Office of Special Operations,’ 25 October 1946, *CIA Cold War Records*, 87.

²⁷ Harry Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 83.

²⁸ Quoted in Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948* (New York: Norton, 1977), 284.

Congress transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency with the National Security Act of 1947. The Act delegated to the Agency functions relating solely to intelligence. The National Security Act of 1947 said nothing about psychological warfare, covert action, or any secret operations. However, the Act did contain an elastic, catch-all clause, which stated that the CIA had the authority to perform “such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.”²⁹ This clause would later be used to authorize covert operations. Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense under the Johnson Administration, stated in 1975 that he believed this clause authorized covert action.³⁰ The 1947 Act closely conformed to the concept of Donovan’s original 1941 charter and his November 1944 memorandum to President Roosevelt.³¹

Even from its inception, the CIA was far more than merely an intelligence agency. It should be of little surprise that the Agency usurped many powers that it was not authorized to take because it was patterned after an agency that had almost unlimited power, the wartime OSS. For all practicable purposes the United States was in a clandestine war with the USSR and because of this American policymakers clandestinely placed wartime powers into the CIA. If the United States was to compete in this new type of war and defend the world from communist tactics of coercion, subterfuge, and political infiltration, it would require an agency to carry out covert political action.

²⁹ National Security Act of 1947, 26 July 1947, *CIA Cold War Records*, 131.

³⁰ Cline, 135.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 115-16.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first Congressional approval of a peacetime intelligence agency. Congress had exercised almost no influence in the origin or development of the CIG.³² The section defining the CIA's mission and power concerning covert operations was intentionally kept vague and as brief as possible. Historian Stephen Ambrose argued that it was kept vague "because neither the Executive nor the Legislative branch of government could bring themselves to forthrightly advocate or authorize covert actions by the CIA."³³ The Act was similarly vague in defining the Director's power.³⁴ The formal transition of the CIG into the CIA took place on September 18, 1947, although it was not until 1949 that Congress passed comprehensive, enabling legislation for the Agency.³⁵

The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 exempted the CIA from all federal laws which "require the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency."³⁶ The Act also authorized appropriations for the CIA where it could transfer and receive funds from other Government agencies to perform any of its approved functions or activities. The CIA's former budget had been a special working fund collected from the Departments of State,

³² National Security Act of 1947, 26 July 1947, *CIA Cold War Records*, 131.

³³ Ambrose, 166.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 20 June 1949, *CIA Cold War Records*, 292.

War, and Navy. The CIA Act of 1949 was especially significant because it authorized the DCI to spend unvouchered funds on clandestine collection and operations.³⁷ The CIA now had access to unlimited funds without being fettered by any accounting requirements, which allowed it to secretly fund democratic organizations throughout Europe and fund its own covert operations. The Act essentially gave the CIA autonomy to wage covert Cold War with the Soviet Union.

The CIA's powers grew as the Soviet threat increased. Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe had been one of several factors that convinced American policy makers of the need of the CIG and its successor, the CIA. However, Soviet behavior in late 1947 and early 1948 became the driving force in the development of the CIA's power and responsibility.³⁸ In late 1947 there were Soviet Communist-led strikes in France and Italy, and a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. It appeared that the Soviets would not allow the Marshall Plan (a European Recovery Program called for by Secretary of State George Marshall on June 5, 1947) time to rebuild the economies of Western Europe. The only tenable solution for the Truman Administration was to contest the Soviet aggression and retaliate with its own covert political warfare.

While some policymakers had expressed concern about creating an American Gestapo, there was little discussion or concern about the nature and implications of covert action. The term, covert action, was infrequently used. Instead, components of

³⁷ Ibid., 287.

³⁸ *CIA Cold War Records*, xviii.

what would later be called covert operations were used, such as morale operations or psychological warfare.³⁹ The situation was complex because the Soviet Union, which was not officially at war with any country, was bent on politically conquering peoples and territories as completely as if by military force. The thin line distinguishing peacetime from wartime operations was further blurred by the cold war.⁴⁰

The National Security Council, which was created by the National Security Act of 1947, deliberated upon assigning the peacetime psychological warfare mission to the State Department. However, Secretary of State George Marshall believed that covert operations might compromise the integrity of his department. The CIA, which already employed a myriad of OSS veterans who were trained and experienced in covert operations, presented the ideal agency to handle the psychological warfare mission. Furthermore, the CIA had access to unvouchered funds, which meant that Congressional approval was unnecessary.⁴¹

On December 17, 1947, the National Security Council issued NSC 4-A. This directive, more than any other, put forth in explicit terms that because of the Soviet psychological warfare and propaganda, the United States needed to retaliate through covert operations. NSC 4-A stated:

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Arthur B. Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 253-63.

The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other Western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.⁴²

The directive further stipulated: "The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations."⁴³ NSC 4-A granted extraordinary powers to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The DCI was allocated responsibility for "ensuring that such psychological operations are consistent with U.S. foreign policy and overt foreign information activities. . . ."⁴⁴ This allowed the DCI to use his own discretion in selecting targets and techniques for psychological operations. Furthermore, the DCI only had to inform agencies of the U.S. Government of such operations that the DCI felt directly affected them.⁴⁵ The CIA had officially taken on the covert psychological operations mission, thus becoming an extremely powerful and dangerous weapon for American foreign policymakers to combat the Soviets.

The Office of Special Operations (OSO), which was a part of the CIA, was responsible for carrying out the covert action. DCI Rear Admiral Roscoe H.

⁴² National Security Council, NSC 4-A, 17 December 1947, *CIA Cold War Records*, 174.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Hillenkoetter, who replaced Vandenberg on May 1, 1947, was cautious, overly so in the opinion of the State Department and the military, in his use of the mandate to conduct covert action. In 1948 State Department Policy Planning Staff Chief George Kennan maintained that the United States needed the capability to carry out covert political and psychological warfare. The State Department and the military urged the creation of an independent, or at least more powerful, psychological warfare office.⁴⁶ The result was a new NSC directive that broadened the CIA's power of covert action, but removed some of its control.

On June 18, 1948, the National Security Council issued NSC 10/2, which authorized the CIA to carry out "covert operations" rather than merely the "psychological operations" that were mandated in NSC 4-A. NSC 10/2 ended the ambiguity that had surrounded the CIA and covert operations by listing exactly what covert operations the CIA was now authorized to perform. These operations included:

propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.⁴⁷

NSC 10/2 included a section on plausible deniability for the United States

Government:

As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities . . . which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign

⁴⁶ Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency*, 263-69.

⁴⁷ National Security Council NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, *CIA Cold War Records*, 216.

states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.⁴⁸

Time and time again the policy of denying involvement in foiled covert operations has embarrassed the United States Government. It is arguable that NSC 4-A and NSC 10/2 combined intelligence gathering and covert operations in one agency and greatly empowered that agency to the point that it essentially had a license of immunity to carry out operations of dubious legality in a peacetime setting.

NSC 10/2 also created a new unit within the CIA, called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which would be responsible for covert operations. However, the CIA no longer retained complete control over covert action. In an official analysis of the implementation of NSC 10/2, it was declared that the "OPC must take its policy direction and guidance from the State Department and the National Military Establishment."⁴⁹ The OPC would also have its own director, Frank G Wisner, an OSS veteran, and would "operate independently of other components of the CIA."⁵⁰ The analysis went on to state, "Mr. Kennan. . . asserted the principle that covert operations, as an instrument of foreign policy, must function to the fullest extent possible."⁵¹ The directive further removed control from the CIA by stating that, "In time of war, or when the President directs, all

⁴⁸ Ibid., 213.

⁴⁹ Lawrence R. Houston, Memorandum for the Director, 'Responsibility and Control for OPC,' 19 October 1948, *CIA Cold War Records*, 236.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 235.

⁵¹ Ibid.

plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander.”⁵²

The CIA’s Office of Special Operations (OSO) was forced to compete with OPC, which had virtually taken over the field of covert operations. The OSO’s mission was intelligence collection, while the OPC was designated to undertake covert political intervention (covert action directed at influencing the internal affairs of foreign nations). The two offices suffered from a lack of cooperation; they proved unable to function as a team. Arguments between the well-funded OPC and the OSO at Headquarters were a frequent problem caused by competition for the services of the same agents in the field. The problems were exacerbated by the professional and even social distinctions between the officers of the two offices. The OSO officers who had worked for the OSS during the war viewed the new OPC personnel as amateurs. The well-funded OPC expanded rapidly, and the new officers often received higher wages than their veteran OSO counterparts. Each office considered the other’s work unimportant.⁵³ The competition between the two agencies led officials to push for a unification of covert actions under one office.⁵⁴

⁵² National Security Council, NSC 10/2, 18 June 1948, *CIA Cold War Record*, 215.

⁵³ *CIA Cold War Records*, xxi.

⁵⁴ Wisner, Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Observations upon the report of the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report to the National Security Council,’ 14 February 1949, *CIA Cold War Records*, 247.

The problems between the OPC and the OSO prompted the NSC to order a study of the CIA. Allen Dulles was on the panel performing the survey of the agency. Dulles and many OSS veterans followed General Donovan's belief that the nation needed a peacetime secret service that was modeled on the OSS. By late 1948, the transformation of the OSS into the CIA was complete. Dulles recognized that in addition to acquiring the powers and responsibilities wielded by the OSS in World War II, the CIA also acquired many of its problems.⁵⁵ On July 1, 1949, Dulles's efforts to resolve these problems culminated in a new National Security Council Directive, NSC 50.

NSC 50 reinstated the CIA's dominion over covert operations by uniting the OSO and the OPC. The directive stated, "The operations of the Office of Special Operations, the Office of Policy Coordination. . . should be integrated under single overall direction in an operations division, with its separate administration, within CIA."⁵⁶ The directive further increased the DCI's authority to coordinate intelligence.

The Soviet policy aimed at spreading communism throughout Asia and the growth of Soviet military power served as the impetus for significant growth in the CIA's authority to conduct covert operations. On January 22, 1949, Beijing, the capital of China, fell to the Communists. In April 1949 the CIA issued an estimate entitled "Prospects For Soviet Control of a Communist China." The report stated, "It is the intention of the Soviet Union to advance toward its goal of eventual world domination by

⁵⁵ *CIA Cold War Records*, xxii.

⁵⁶ National Security Council, NSC-50, 1 July 1949, *CIA Cold War Records*, 305.

adding to the Soviet orbit the enormous territory and population of China, and by employing China to facilitate Soviet expansion into other Far Eastern areas.”⁵⁷

Even more threatening to the security of the United States was the Soviet possession of atomic bombs in late 1949. On June 9, 1950, the CIA published a report on “The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs on the Security of the United States.” The report concluded that the Soviet capability to employ atomic weapons “has increased the military and political-subversive capabilities of the USSR and the possibility of war. Accordingly the security of the United States is in increasing jeopardy.”⁵⁸ The apocalyptic terms in which the American struggle against the Soviet Union was portrayed explain why the CIA was empowered with wartime capabilities. It was deemed necessary to halt the Soviet Communist juggernaut.

The fear of the Soviet possession of atomic weapons and the unacceptable spread of Communism in China encouraged the National Security Council to issue NSC-68 in April 1950. It shifted the United States from a primarily defensive strategy to an aggressive political offensive against the Soviets. The directive raised the stakes of the Cold War. It framed the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and its allies and promised that the United States would counter Soviet encroachments at all levels-- political, economic, and clandestine. “The Kremlin is inescapably militant,” NSC-68

⁵⁷ ORE 29-49, ‘Prospects for Soviet Control of a Communist China,’ 15 April 1949, *CIA Cold War Records*, 275.

⁵⁸ ORE 32-50, ‘The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs on the Security of the United States,’ 9 June 1950, *CIA Cold War Records*, 327.

stated. "It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its domination by the methods of the cold war."⁵⁹ The directive was responsible for massive increases in appropriations to the CIA for espionage and covert operations.

The Communist North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 exacerbated the need for the CIA to take an offensive stance against Communist insurgency. The CIA's failure to anticipate the North Korean invasion prompted the replacement of DCI Hillenkoetter. The new DCI, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, ushered in numerous reforms within the CIA. The Korean War increased the demand on the CIA to produce more intelligence and increase covert operations. Smith was influential in meeting those wartime demands. During the war, the CIA's budget and personnel increased tremendously to the point that Agency and Congressional officials were forced to search for new ways to hide additional funding to the Agency.⁶⁰

DCI Smith, who was concerned that the CIA was dedicating too much time to covert operations at the expense of intelligence analysis, requested that the NSC adjudicate the proper scope of CIA covert actions. DCI Smith felt "that operations have assumed such a very large size in comparison to our intelligence function that we have almost arrived at a stage where it is necessary to decide whether CIA will remain an

⁵⁹ Quoted in John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 164.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 135.

intelligence agency or become a 'cold war department.'"⁶¹ DCI Smith's inquiry resulted in NSC 10/5, which made the CIA's anti-Communist crusade sacrosanct. The directive stated:

The National Security Council approves in principle as a national responsibility the immediate expansion of the covert organization established in NSC 10/2, and the intensification of covert operations designed in general order of emphasis to: a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites, and Communist China. . . . b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination.⁶²

NSC 10/5 further ordered the CIA to intensify its development of underground resistance and "facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent. . . ."⁶³ The directive also reaffirmed the responsibility and authority of the DCI to determine the "desirability and feasibility" of covert operations, as well as to establish "the scope, pace, and timing of covert operations. . . ."⁶⁴

DCI Smith, under the authority of NSC 50, finally merged the OSO and the OPC on July 15, 1952. Smith justified creating a single overseas clandestine service in a memorandum to the Deputy Directors of the CIA. He stated: "The experience of the British and the OSS during the last war, as well as within CIA during the last three years, justify the conclusion that the best organizational arrangement consists of a single field

⁶¹ Office of the DCI, 'Staff Conference,' 22 October 1951, *CIA Cold War Records*, 435.

⁶² National Security Council, NSC 10/5, 23 October 1951, *CIA Cold War Records*, 437.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 438-39.

organization with a single chain of command and single set of administrative procedures. .

. .⁶⁵ Smith's changes and reforms had lasting effects for the shape of the CIA.

Another legacy the OSS passed on to the CIA was a willingness to utilize anyone, even former enemies, to defeat a current enemy. The OSS had earned the catchphrase "Oh So Socialist" for its use of excommunists, communists, Marxists, and socialists in the war against the Nazis. Donovan believed in the theory of using any means necessary to defeat the enemy. He claimed: "I'd put Stalin on the OSS payroll if I thought it would help us defeat Hitler."⁶⁶ The OSS employed members of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, which had been sponsored by the American Communist Party to fight fascism in the Spanish civil war. They proved to be extremely useful agents during World War II. Donovan said, "You have to take chances. If you're afraid of the wolves, you have to stay out of the forest."⁶⁷ The CIA not only proved it was unafraid of wolves, it also attempted to tame its own wolf in General Reinhard Gehlen. The CIA's willingness to conspire with Gehlen is an example of the lengths to which the Agency would go to combat Communism.

The threat of the Soviet Union was so profoundly felt by the Americans that they were willing to liberate and conspire with Nazis and other war criminals to thwart Soviet aggression. On May 22, 1945, Brigadier General Reinhard Gehlen, a member of the

⁶⁵ Smith to CIA Deputy Directors, 'Organization of CIA Clandestine Services,' 15 July 1952, *CIA Cold War Records*, 465.

⁶⁶ Quoted in Ranelagh, 65.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

German General Staff, Chief of the Eastern Intelligence, and authority on Soviet military capabilities, surrendered to the Americans.⁶⁸ There was a race between the Soviets, the British, and the Americans to enlist Gehlen's support. He spent over a month in interrogation trying, in vain, to explain to uniformed Army personnel his value to US intelligence. Captain John Boker, who was knowledgeable about Russian affairs and had no illusions of Soviet intentions, finally found Gehlen.⁶⁹ Boker was convinced that Gehlen was not a Nazi and that he had valuable information on the Soviets. Boker discerned a demarcation between the Nazi Party and the German Army, the *Wehrmacht*. The German Army had offered some resistance to Hitler. The majority of Americans perceived this distinction as meaningless. Shortly after Boker found him, Gehlen, several of his FHO⁷⁰ officers, and their intelligence documents on the Soviet Union were sent to Post Office Box 1142, the covert name for the Interrogation Center at Fort Hunt, Virginia. With this move responsibility and control of Gehlen transferred from the U.S. Forces to the Pentagon. Ill-equipped to evaluate Gehlen's potential, Army Intelligence (G-2)⁷¹ called on

⁶⁸ Mary Ellen Reese, *General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection* (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1990), 40.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 46.

⁷⁰ *Fremde Herre Ost*, a department of the German Armed Forces, engaged in evaluating war intelligence in the West.

⁷¹ G-2 lost control of Gehlen, but they set up a rival German Secret Service of their own. G-2 used Colonel Hermann Baun who had worked for WALLI I and had information and agents in the Soviet Union.

ex-OSS personnel with experience and knowledge on Gehlen and the FHO to aid in negotiating with Gehlen.⁷²

Once Gehlen's value to American intelligence on the Soviets became clear, he was sent to West Germany to begin his mission. His objective was to obtain as much information on the Soviets as possible. Gehlen, like Donovan and other American intelligence officers, believed the Russians' true long-standing agenda was a Communist takeover of Europe. Gehlen and a number of other Nazis that he would recruit were now working for the Americans. As one observer noted: "Stringing them up publicly in Nuremberg, while we were signing them up secretly in Frankfurt smacked and still smacks, of hypocrisy. But it was a complicated time."⁷³ In the name of national security and in the defense against totalitarianism America willingly became hypocritical.

General Gehlen had retained his wartime contacts and was able to create, with American funding, an extremely efficient intelligence agency known as the Organization. The Gehlen Organization was a political liability to the American Intelligence community. Consequently, none of the intelligence agencies wanted to sponsor it. In September 1948 the CIA and the military performed a joint study of the Organization to determine its destiny. On July 1, 1949, the CIA officially took over the Organization. Even from the beginning it was agreed that the Organization would ultimately become an arm of the West German Government. By having the CIA sponsor the Organization, it ensured

⁷² E.H Cookridge, *Gehlen: The Spy of the Century* (New York: Random House, 1971), 134.

⁷³ Quoted in Reese, 28.

American influence over Gehlen's group. This shift would not have been possible without the approval of the highest-ranking officials in the Truman Administration.⁷⁴

A quid pro quo agreement was reached where the CIA would receive a great deal of control over the Gehlen Organization in exchange for support. The CIA supplied funds and equipment, while the Organization carried out the operations. The agreement guaranteed the CIA access to all reports and evaluations. However, Gehlen refused to give the names of his agents, many of them Nazis, despite the CIA's exhortations. The CIA's anxiety over Gehlen's personnel did not stem from apprehension of Nazi involvement, but rather from a profound fear of Soviet penetration, which later proved to be a valid concern. "‘Former Nazis,’ said one member of that early CIA liaison team, ‘were the skeleton in Gehlen's closet.’"⁷⁵ The Americans adhered to the old adage that the ends justify the means, especially when the ends are thwarting the spread of communism.

Ray Cline, a former member of both the OSS and the CIA, offers an interesting perspective and justification for America's use of people like Gehlen. "This post-facto business of criticizing government because it employs people whose characters are not admirable is sheer hypocrisy," says Cline, former Deputy Director of Plans at CIA. Cline goes on to argue:

You don't seek these people out, you seek out avenues to vital pieces of data, and in many cases, whether you're dealing with the Mafia, the drug trade, or Soviet intentions you are going to find your best access to what you need to know among

⁷⁴ Ibid., 104.

⁷⁵ Quoted in Ibid., 111.

the crooked, the cranks, the disaffected, the criminals. You can't allow yourself to say "I won't get a piece of information vital to the country because I don't like the guy." American Intelligence has no predilection for people like this, but it does have a vital interest in the national security.⁷⁶

Another former Intelligence officer, who chose to remain anonymous, agrees that enemies of your enemies should be utilized even if it requires giving them immunity, except when it comes to Nazis. He argues:

But a Nazi war criminal is a different story, unless he's informing on other Nazi war criminals or has some specific highly valuable information only he and no one else can provide. Then all right, you use him just for that. But you don't just put him on the payroll and hope he'll turn out to be useful. There's a line you have to draw.⁷⁷

There was no such line drawn by the United States Government when it authorized the CIA to support and utilize the Gehlen Organization, which was rife with former Nazis.

Some in the CIA did not support the use of Gehlen's Organization. They were critical of the unprofessional behavior they believed was prevalent in Gehlen's group. The voices of dissent tended to come from former OSS members who viewed themselves as true professionals.⁷⁸ The CIA's connection to the Organization provided the Americans with access and a modicum of control over Germany's future intelligence community.

The Gehlen Organization was involved in the previously mentioned rivalry between the OPC and the OSO. The OPC wanted to control and exploit the Organization, which by 1948 had extended throughout Europe. However, it was the other

⁷⁶ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 117.

⁷⁷ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 117-18.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 118.

branch of the CIA's Clandestine Service, the OSO, which possessed control and responsibility over Gehlen's group.⁷⁹ Historian Mary Reese noted:

For years it has been asserted that the OPC took over the Organization and used elements of it in its covert operations; that Gehlen's agents were part of OPC's "private army." So prevalent has this notion become that some veterans of the CIA's liaison operations with the German government. . . believe it was deliberately planted by the Soviets to discredit Gehlen and the CIA.⁸⁰

Reese went on to argue that there is nothing but circumstantial evidence that the Organization ever officially became an affiliate of the OPC and its operations. However, some members of the Organization most likely free-lanced for the OPC. A number of recently released Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) reports document that some agents of Gehlen's Organization, including some of high rank, sold their services to American Intelligence agencies.⁸¹ The OSO, under Richard Helms (who later became Director of Central Intelligence), not the OPC, controlled Gehlen's Organization. The OSO, over which the CIA shared control with the Pentagon and the State Department, utilized the Organization solely for intelligence collection and not for covert political intervention. However, DCI Walter Bedell Smith merged the OPC and the OSO placing exclusive control of Gehlen with the CIA. As tensions with the Soviets mounted, the Americans, desperate for intelligence on the Soviet Union, never considered halting the

⁷⁹ Ibid., 122.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 123.

CIA support of Gehlen, despite the ethical questions and concerns about using the Organization.⁸²

Allen Dulles, DCI from 1953 to 1961, developed a special relationship with Gehlen. In 1952 Dulles, then head of the CIA's Plans and Operations Division, devised a plan with Gehlen for an immediate intensification of espionage against the Soviets. Dulles, desperate for vital intelligence on the Soviets, urged Gehlen to place agents deep within the Soviet Union. As Gehlen's and Dulles's relationship progressed, it became more of a partnership than a sponsorship, and often times Gehlen served as the senior partner.⁸³

The Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), led by Thomas Wesley Dale and his team known as the Experts, conducted a covert and unsanctioned operation called CAMPUS. Dale and the CIC, who believed that the most egregious error the U.S. intelligence community ever made was taking on Gehlen, created the operation because they feared the CIA had no real control over Gehlen. This ultra-secret operation discovered that the Gehlen Organization was harboring former hard-core Nazi war criminals and that these Nazis were forming into a group within the Organization.⁸⁴

Gehlen did not want Nazis in the Organization because it only hampered his goal of gaining respect for his Organization and its becoming a part of the new German government. However, he had to attain results, which often times meant using former

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid., 240.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 135.

SS⁸⁵ or SD⁸⁶ members. Today former CIA officers distance the CIA from Gehlen's Nazi Problem.⁸⁷ They argue that the Agency only provided financial support and that it was purely a German concern and responsibility.

The hard-core Nazis employed by Gehlen's Organization were exposed in the CAMPUS documents. One example of the unsavory characters employed by Gehlen and supported by the CIA was Friedrich Heinrich Busch. He had been a member of the Nazi Party and the Gestapo. He was arrested and released by the CIC after the war on three separate occasions. He was wanted for the murder and torture of an American and of several French citizens and the pursuit and torture of Jews. Busch disappeared and no charges were brought against him. In March 1954 he reappeared, already a member of the Gehlen Organization and the inner-circle of Nazis within it.⁸⁸ The circle of Nazis in the Organization continued to expand, because the Nazis recruited new members from the ranks of former SS and SD colleagues.⁸⁹

The CAMPUS files also show that the existence of Nazis was not the only problem in the Organization. There was evidence of Soviet penetration. Gehlen's Nazis, to the

⁸⁵ *Schutzstaffel*. Formed in 1929 as Hitler's bodyguard. It became the most powerful organization of the Nazi Party. It became a state within a state with its own SS army.

⁸⁶ *Sicherheitsdienst*. The intelligence service of the SS and Nazi Party.

⁸⁷ Reese, 136.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 138.

surprise of some CIA officials, could not even be trusted to fight the communists.⁹⁰

Perhaps even more shocking than the Nazi and Communist officers in the Gehlen Organization was the terrible fact that the CIC intentionally avoided alerting the CIA, or any other authority, to the legitimate threat of Soviet penetration in the Organization. Because the Gehlen Organization was a subsidiary of United States Intelligence, the CIC had in effect committed treason. To maintain the secrecy of the CAMPUS Operation, the CIC remained silent, allowing the Communist agents to continue their spying.⁹¹

In 1953 Gehlen instigated his own secret investigation of the Organization to locate the leaks that were supplying the Soviets with classified information. His investigation concluded that the entire group of Nazis in the Organization was also working for the Communists. The CIC, mired in an abyss of treason, had full knowledge of the results of Gehlen's investigation and again opted to maintain its secrecy and keep the CIA unaware of the Soviet penetration.⁹² The magnitude of this betrayal of U.S. National Security was intensified in May 1955, when Germany regained its sovereignty. The first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Konrad Adenauer, established the Gehlen Organization, severed from its overt connection with the CIA, as an official arm of the government on April 1, 1956. The Organization became the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND), the Federal Intelligence Agency for West Germany, and Gehlen became its chief. The new West Germany would become a member of NATO,

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid., 139.

and consequently its intelligence agency, inundated with Nazis spying for the Soviets, had access to the intelligence secrets of all the Western allies, including the United States.⁹³

When World War II ended, combating the spread of communism became America's new crusade, and to fulfill it the CIA struck a deal with Gehlen. Despite the secrecy, working with Gehlen was a political risk, but the CIA reaped benefits by gaining access to reliable military operational intelligence on the Soviets when there were few other sources. As the Operation CAMPUS reports illustrate, the CIA, understaffed and inexperienced, failed to control the Organization. Early on, the CIA had access to identity files and there was no excuse for hiring Nazis, whose backgrounds were easily checked.⁹⁴ Despite convincing evidence that the Organization harbored numerous former Nazis, Gehlen argued in his memoirs that the Nazi element was negligible. Gehlen wrote:

During the postwar period we had of course recruited nobody who had not passed the proper denazification procedures. We had sent certain former members of the SS on special missions overseas, insofar as they had clean political records; this was done with the full approval of the American authorities. For example we found the Arab countries particularly willing to embrace Germans with an ostensibly "Nazi" past. There were not many of them in our organization.⁹⁵

The CIA was not only utilizing former Nazis for intelligence, it was also using the war criminals as instructors of espionage. Gehlen created a highly efficient and effective system for recruiting and training agents, from which the CIA would eventually benefit. The recruited agents were sent to espionage training schools. The first such school was

⁹³ Ibid., 140-41.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 175.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 203.

established at the castle of Countess Totenbach at Weidekamp. The CIC and the CIA were involved with a number of other schools that rapidly developed. The CIA, using a general syllabus of training devised by Gehlen, developed its own spy schools in West Berlin at Buckeburg, Karlspatz, and various other areas in Germany. Eventually, there were some sixty schools, in cooperation with the CIA, that were producing agents for the Organization.⁹⁶ Radio Free Europe, an American effort to counter the effects of Soviet propaganda in West Germany, was another area in which Gehlen and several of his Nazi radio experts assisted. The CIA continued to rely on Gehlen even after the Organization had been officially transferred to the German government in July 1956.⁹⁷

General Gehlen worked exclusively for the CIA for nearly ten years before his Organization was transferred into the BND. During those ten years, the CIA supplied him with nearly 200,000,000 dollars for his Organization. NSC 10/2, which provided the CIA with unvouchered funds, provided large sums of money for Gehlen, allowing him to conduct several operations for which he had hitherto had insufficient funds. In addition to its own funds, the CIA persuaded many American businesses to contribute substantial funding to Gehlen's Organization.⁹⁸

Gehlen and CIA officials had diametrically opposed opinions on their relationship. General Gehlen wrote: "My admiration for the individuals on the early CIA liaison staff is boundless: they recognized that their own parent organization was considerably younger

⁹⁶ Ibid., 165.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 204.

⁹⁸ Cookridge, 158.

than ours, and clearly regarded their job as being to learn as much from us as they could.”⁹⁹ He went on to state that every member of the CIA liaison team that worked with him went on to attain high positions within the Agency.¹⁰⁰ One member of the CIA staff that had worked with Gehlen observed: “It would have been more accurate to say we clearly regarded our job as being to learn as much about them as we could.”¹⁰¹

Contrary to Gehlen’s assertion, “I resisted all American pressure to undertake sabotage operations behind the Iron Curtain, and I refused to invite their sabotage agents to carry out spotting missions on our behalf,”¹⁰² evidence illustrates that he assisted Dulles and Wisner in creating a private army for the CIA. In 1951 Gehlen, Dulles, and Wisner schemed to recruit men from Eastern European nations for secret armed units to assist insurgents inside communist countries.¹⁰³ This plan to establish a private mercenary force in Germany was put into effect in 1952. Gehlen, his former FHO assistants, and the SS officers provided all the experience that the Americans required. There were ample recruits available to join this new Special Force from the hundreds of thousands of displaced people trapped after the war in refugee camps.¹⁰⁴ Ukrainians, Belorussians,

⁹⁹ Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen*, trans. David Irving (New York: World Publishing, 1972), 143.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Quoted in Reese, 111.

¹⁰² Gehlen, 178.

¹⁰³ Cookridge, 240.

¹⁰⁴ These displaced people were remnants of the seven and a half million people who had been brought from dozens of countries for slave labor in Germany.

Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians and others from the refugee camps helped make up the five thousand enlisted. They were trained by American officers and former German *Wehrmacht* and *Waffen SS*¹⁰⁵ officers in camps at Bad Wiessee, at Kaufbeuren in Bavaria and at the U.S. Army Hammand Barracks near Mannheim.¹⁰⁶ These private mercenary forces became the core of the CIA's private army, which was later known as the Green Berets in Vietnam.¹⁰⁷ Clearly Gehlen was involved in far more than just intelligence gathering for the United States.

The CIA, by 1952, had taken on the powers of the OSS, which had hitherto been reserved strictly for wartime situations. It is clear that the CIA was not an overnight incarnation of the OSS. The transformation of the OSS to the CIA was a gradual process, which took several years of intensifying Cold War trauma to convince Congress and the President that the CIA required many of the same powers as the wartime OSS. Francis Miller, an OSS veteran, wrote that, "The CIA inherited from Donovan his lopsided and mischievous preoccupation with action and the Bay of Pigs was one of the results of that legacy."¹⁰⁸ Another OSS veteran, Edmond Taylor, wrote that the OSS established "a precedent, or a pattern, for United States intervention in the revolutionary struggles of the

¹⁰⁵ *Wehrmacht* were German Armed Forces under the Hitler regime. *Waffen SS* were fully militarized combat units of the SS.

¹⁰⁶ Cookridge, 241.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Francis P. Miller, *Man from the Valley* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 362.

postwar age.”¹⁰⁹ The CIA, had in fact, inherited both ideology and personnel from its wartime predecessor, the OSS.

A series of National Security Council Directives: NSC 4-A, NSC 10/2, NSC 10/5, NSC 50, and NSC 68, combined with the National Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, gave the CIA authority to wage covert political warfare. The prevalent anti-communism of the Cold War era necessitated empowering a peacetime intelligence agency, the CIA, with wartime powers, including covert operations. The Central Intelligence Agency was ultimately imbued with the power to carry out covert operations to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constituted a threat to world peace and the security of the United States. In order to maintain national security the CIA has been authorized to avoid informing and even actively to deceive the American people and all but a few of their elected officials. This issue complicates the already dubious morality of the CIA's conducting covert operations during times of peace. The OSS use of covert operations had stood on a moral high-ground because it was waging all out war against fascism. The CIA has not received the same mantle of morality because its war against Communism was clandestine. To understand why the wartime methods of the OSS were transferred to peacetime, it must be realized that the war never ended in the eyes of U.S. policymakers. Stalin simply replaced Hitler as the mortal enemy of democracy and the United States. Consequently, the CIA replaced the OSS as a dominant and influential arm of the nation's defense. As historian John Ranelagh notes: “The most notorious CIA fomented coups in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East were,

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Ambrose, 166.

technically speaking, only extensions of Donovan's mandate for political warfare. The secret service remained the same, only the world had changed."¹¹⁰ Halting the spread of Soviet Communism was deemed such an important priority that, in addition to granting wartime powers to the peacetime agency, the U.S. was willing to liberate, support, and learn from Nazi war criminals. During World War II, the OSS had, on occasion, employed Communists to help fight the Nazis; the CIA, during the Cold War, utilized Nazis to combat the Communists. The CIA inherited from the OSS a belief in an old Hebrew proverb that stated: the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

The CIA also inherited from the OSS a willingness to experiment with mind controlling drugs. While the OSS had just barely scratched the surface with mind control experimentation, the CIA eagerly embarked on a twenty-three-year quest to develop effective mind controlling substances. The omnipresent threat of the Communists was a driving force in the Agency's argument for substances that would aid in behavior control. The CIA went too far in this quest when it began making enemies of some of its own citizens, as shall be discussed in the following chapter.

¹¹⁰ Ranelagh, 88.

Chapter 3

THE CIA AND MIND CONTROL

For centuries human beings have employed various forms of persuasion and torture to manipulate and control people's behavior. All approaches have limitations that have made the search for more effective and efficient mind control substances and techniques an unending quest. In the early twentieth century the burgeoning psychology field began researching new ways of controlling minds. These new techniques utilized scientific technology and newly developed pharmaceuticals to compel individuals to behave in a certain manner. Clandestine intelligence agencies recognized the tremendous potential of these new techniques for controlling minds and quickly incorporated them into their operations. The CIA took up the search for mind controlling substances and techniques with alarming alacrity. The science of mind manipulation has been growing exponentially since its inception and has become increasingly sophisticated. Mind control is a serious threat to democracy and freedom. This section of the paper will chronicle the development of the CIA's mind control programs and identify the reasons why the programs were initiated and maintained. This section will also examine the conditions within the CIA that allowed such unscrupulous activities. Along with the preceding evidence of the CIA's early misdeeds, this evidence will demonstrate conclusively that the

CIA was willing to do anything, including violating the laws of the United States and the rights of American citizens, to ensure national security.

The Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the other Communist bloc countries presented a serious concern for the United States in the area of mind control during the 1940s and early 1950s. There was an overwhelming fear that these countries had developed chemical and biological substances and used them in interrogations, in brainwashing, and to harass, disable and even kill their enemies. The United States responded to this threat with a defensive program to understand the mind control techniques and substances and how to counter them. However, the defensive pretense was soon dropped, and chemical and biological substances were studied to aid interrogation and behavior control of individuals willing or not. The CIA began developing, testing, and stockpiling substances that would be useful for interrogation, behavior control, harassment, disablement, and killing enemies of the state.

The United States intelligence agencies were convinced that the Soviets had mastered some new form of brainwashing and mind control when they made Hungary's Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, an outspoken anti-Communist, confess to espionage. The traditional forms of mind control, such as physical torture, produce recalcitrant and temporary results or confessions, and usually leave their mark on the victim. However, the notorious Moscow Show Trials of 1936-38¹¹¹ and the confession of Cardinal

¹¹¹ During the late 1930s Joseph Stalin was determined to expunge his enemies from the Communist Party. He killed several million people, and his rampage culminated in a series of spectacular public trials known as the Moscow Show Trials. A great number of top-level Bolshevik leaders were manipulated into confessing to a ridiculously large number of fictitious crimes and conspiracies.

Mindszenty in 1949 illustrated a new level of mind control. It was the style, context, and manner of delivery of the confessions that pointed to a reorganization of the minds of the confessors. A 1950 CIA memorandum entitled, "An Analysis of Confessions in Russian Trials," stated that the defendants in the trials "exhibited anomalous and incomprehensible behavior and confessions" and that the deliveries of the confessions were "so similar in a large number of cases as to suggest factitious origin."¹¹² The CIA responded with programs designed to understand the methods and substances that the Soviets had used. Not long after these programs were initiated, the defensive orientation was dropped in favor of a more offensive stance.

The justification for the transformation from a defensive strategy to offensive mind control programs lay in the perceived threat to national security from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. Adding to that threat were the confessions of American prisoners of war during the Korean War. American prisoners were made to confess, falsely, that they had taken part in germ warfare operations.¹¹³ The CIA was convinced that these countries had researched and developed mind controlling substances and that in order to compete the United States must also gain dominion over the mind. In 1952 the CIA's Chief Medical Staff stated:

There is ample evidence in the reports of innumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. With such evidence it is difficult not to keep from

¹¹² Quoted in John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 203.

¹¹³ Alan W. Schefflin and Edward M. Opton, Jr., *The Mind Manipulators* (New York: Paddington Press, 1978), 15.

becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. We are forced by this mounting evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the development of these techniques, but must be cautious to maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands.¹¹⁴

To combat this Communist threat the CIA instigated a number of mind control programs, which began in 1950 and continued until 1973. These programs tested potential biological and chemical weapons on human subjects. Some of the tests involved administering dangerous drugs to unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. The CIA's grandiose mind control experiments resulted in extreme violations of the rights of American citizens. A letter to the Deputy Director of the CIA concerning the unwitting testing from Richard Helms, the CIA Deputy Director of Plans, explains that while the CIA did not wish to infringe on the rights of Americans, it was necessary in order to win the Cold War. Helms stated:

While I share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private and legal prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the Agency maintain a central role in this activity, keep current on enemy capabilities for the manipulation of human behavior, and maintain an offensive capability.¹¹⁵

The CIA had information that the Soviet Union was extremely interested in LSD. The CIA learned that at one point the Soviets attempted to purchase the world's supply of LSD from Sandoz Laboratories, which at that time was the only manufacturer of the substance. One former CIA officer explained why LSD received so much attention: "We

¹¹⁴ Quoted in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Human Resources: *Project MKULTRA, the CIA's Program of Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research*, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 3 August 1977, 73. Here on cited as U.S. Congress

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

were literally terrified, because this was the one material that we had ever been able to locate that really had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly.”¹¹⁶ John Gittinger, a CIA psychologist, disclosed in an interview in 1994 part of the reason the CIA was so fearful of the Soviets: “One of the problems we had all the way along was the ingrained belief on the part of [CIA] agents that the Soviets were 10 feet tall, that there were huge programs going on in the Soviet Union to influence behavior.”¹¹⁷ His statement adds credibility to the CIA’s perception of a serious threat from the Soviets.

However, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the Moscow Show Trials and the confession of Cardinal Mindszenty were used to justify the CIA’s own mind control research. A CIA memorandum dated February 1953 discussing Communist techniques for interrogation stated: “We have no indications that they know any methods not known in this country for determining the truthfulness of information obtained from prisoners.”¹¹⁸ Is it possible that the CIA used the threat of Soviet brainwashing as propaganda to justify its own desire to control minds? It is more likely that the CIA at times actually perceived a threat from the Communists and that at other times that threat was exaggerated to justify their own research. Concerning the fear that the Soviets had developed some esoteric mind control drug, Senator Walter Huddleston inquired, during the 1977 Select Hearing on CIA mind control programs, about the CIA’s response to that

¹¹⁶ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 72.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Stephen Budiansky, Erica E. Goode, and Ted Gest, “The Cold War Experiments,” *U.S. News and World Report*, 24 January 1994, 36.

¹¹⁸ Quoted in Schefflin and Opton, 225.

perceived Soviet threat. The Senator asked: "The project continued for some time after it was learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was first feared, didn't it?"¹¹⁹ Admiral Stansfield Turner, the Director of the CIA responded: "That is my understanding. Yes, sir."¹²⁰

Another factor that influenced the CIA's involvement in research and development of mind controlling techniques and drugs was the legacy from its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As previously noted, President Truman disbanded the OSS at the close of World War II and replaced it with the CIA in 1947. Nearly a third of the CIA employees had worked for the OSS and almost all the CIA leadership positions were filled with OSS veterans. The urgent need for a truth serum to aid in intelligence interrogations was so acute that the OSS created a research committee consisting of some of the most eminent American psychiatrists and chemical scholars, such as the President of American Psychiatric Association, Dr. Edward Strecker. This OSS committee examined a myriad of drugs, including peyote, alcohol, barbiturates, and caffeine. These drugs, it was hoped, would also be useful in screening OSS officers to locate double agents. Ultimately, marijuana proved to be the most promising of the drugs. OSS scientists, searching for a speech-inducing agent, developed a highly potent extract of cannabis, which they code-named TD (Truth Drug). They created a colorless, odorless, tasteless drug that could easily and surreptitiously be administered. After extensive testing of the TD on

¹¹⁹ U.S. Congress, 43.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

themselves, their associates, and U.S. military personnel, OSS agents used the drug operationally in World War II.¹²¹ At times the drug proved effective; however, the lack of consistency was a serious problem. Often subjects under the influence of TD would be overcome with paranoia and become recalcitrant and reluctant to speak at all.¹²²

The OSS first used the truth drug operationally on August Del Gracio, a member of the Lucky Luciano organized crime family. The OSS hoped to use Luciano to obtain help from the Mafia in preparing for the invasion of Sicily and for the protection of New York docks and shipyards from enemy sabotage. Del Gracio was unwittingly given cigarettes laced with marijuana and then questioned. After the interrogation it was determined that the truth drug functioned well as a speech-inducing agent.¹²³

The CIA and the Navy took over the quest for a truth serum after the OSS was disbanded at the close of the war. Both the CIA and the Navy took an interest in mescaline, an extract of peyote which produces hallucinations, after learning of mind control experiments performed by Nazi scientists at the Dachau concentration camp. The Nazis had concluded that no matter how much mescaline had been given it was impossible to impose one's will on another person.¹²⁴ Yet, the experiments did illustrate that the

¹²¹ Martin A. Lee and Bruce Shlain, *Acid Dreams: The CIA, LSD, and the Sixties Rebellion* (New York: Grove Press, 1985), 4.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²³ Ranelagh, 203-4.

¹²⁴ Lee and Shlain, 95.

drug benefited interrogations. Interrogators were consistently able to extract classified information from subjects under the drug's influence.

The U.S. Naval Technical Mission was created to locate and collect scientific experimental information from the defeated German nation. The CIA quickly became involved in the mission and supervised Project Paperclip, a related program. Project Paperclip imported more than six hundred top Nazi scientists to the United States. Many of these Nazi scientists, such as Dr. Hubertus Strughold, Dr. Sigmund Ruff, and Dr. Sigmund Rascher, were involved in the mind control experiments at Dachau. Despite their war crimes, many of these doctors held prominent careers in America. While working in Dachau Dr. Strughold committed heinous crimes, such as injecting inmates with gasoline, crushing them to death in high-pressure chambers, shooting them to test potential blood coagulants on their wounds, and placing them naked in sub-freezing conditions to see how long it would take for them to die. Despite these crimes against humanity, Dr. Strughold was employed by the American Government and became extremely successful while working for NASA.¹²⁵

As early as November 1951 the CIA was convinced that the use of drugs in interrogations was highly useful and that enough experimentation had been performed to justify using them in operations. The CIA did not have a clear plan for disposing of subjects of interrogation once they were finished with them. One solution suggested in a CIA document was to make the person incoherent through psychological and

¹²⁵ Ibid., 96.

pharmacological attack and have that person kept in a mental institution. The CIA had a number of mentally sound people involuntarily placed in mental institutions.

Another CIA document suggested lobotomy and related operations for disposal of subjects of special interrogation. A CIA memo dated February 7, 1952, explains “that on numerous occasions after using electroshock to produce anesthesia, an unidentified surgeon in the Washington, DC, area performed an operation that involved destroying brain tissue by piercing the skull just above the eye with a fine surgical ice pick.”¹²⁶ This surgery had the advantage of producing amnesia without the obvious scar of traditional lobotomy. Some CIA officials opposed this kind of disposal technique because it violated the “American way of life and [thus] it could never be *officially* [emphasis added] sanctioned or supported.”¹²⁷ On March 3, 1952, a CIA document stated that while

the USSR and its satellites are capable of any conceivable atrocity against human beings to attain what they think are their ends, we should not, with our high regard for human life, use these techniques unless by using them we save the lives of our own people and the situation is highly critical to the nation’s safety.¹²⁸

This document clearly illustrates the vilification of the Soviet Union and the convenient excuse that the threat of the Soviets offered for the United States. The frightening paradox and terrible irony presented in this document is that the perception of a Soviet threat to the American way of life justified the CIA’s violating the American way of life. The CIA felt vindicated and, in fact, duty bound to engage in anything that would give the

¹²⁶ Ibid., 9.

¹²⁷ Quoted in Ibid.

¹²⁸ Quoted in Ibid.

United States an advantage over its enemies. The CIA has made patently obvious, by conducting nearly twenty-five years of experiments costing millions of dollars, and violating the laws of its own nation and the rights of its citizens, that the control of minds was so crucial that it justified any means.

Following the example of its OSS predecessor, the CIA reached out to scholars and people of science for assistance in its search for control over minds. Medical practitioners, professional hypnotists, psychiatrists, and magicians were brought on as paid consultants. Lines of communication were established with research sections of the military. The CIA's interest in mind control led to the BLUEBIRD project.

Project BLUEBIRD, which began in 1950, was the first major mind control program carried out by the CIA. Even from the beginning, the CIA's experiments incorporated the domestic sphere. A CIA memo dated July 13, 1951, described BLUEBIRD as "broad and comprehensive, involving both domestic and overseas activities, and taking into consideration the programs and objectives of other departments, principally the military services."¹²⁹ The project also involved a continuation of the OSS's search for the illusive reliable speech-inducing drug.¹³⁰

An examination of how this project was authorized explains how the CIA eventually could test dangerous mind altering drugs on unwitting American citizens. Instead of clearing the proposed project through the Projects Review Committee, the normal channel of authorization, BLUEBIRD was submitted only to the Director of

¹²⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 10.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

Central Intelligence, Roscoe Hillenkoetter. He authorized the project and used unvouchered funds to keep the operation secret.¹³¹ This lack of supervision by any elected, and hence accountable officials, and the carefully maintained veil of absolute secrecy, which was entirely legal, are a part of the problem. A section on accountability, towards the end of the paper, will attempt to illustrate the larger problem.

BLUEBIRD operated from early 1950 until August 20, 1951, when it officially became project ARTICHOKE. The objectives of the project, outlined in a CIA memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in 1975, were:

(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information from them by known means, (b) investigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrogation techniques, (c) memory enhancement, and (d) establishing defensive means for preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.¹³²

An additional objective of evaluating the offensive uses of unconventional interrogation techniques, such as drugs and hypnosis, was added to the project once interrogations were conducted abroad.¹³³ Initially BLUEBIRD appeared to be aimed at explaining and developing the Soviet successes in interrogation and indoctrination. In August 1951 the project was renamed ARTICHOKE.

Project ARTICHOKE continued the search for the truth drug. The project sent CIA officials all over the world in search of rare herbs and botanicals.¹³⁴ Another aspect

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Quoted in U.S. Congress, 67.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Lee and Shlain, 11.

of ARTICHOKE was the use of heroin as a mind control drug. CIA scientists discovered that heroin and other habit-forming drugs were extremely effective when used in reverse. The process of giving the subject an addiction to the drug and then withdrawing the drug was a powerful interrogation tool.¹³⁵ Project ARTICHOKE also involved in-house experiments on interrogation techniques. These experiments, unlike future CIA experiments, were conducted with medical and security controls to ensure the safety of individuals that volunteered for the experiments. The techniques learned from these experiments were utilized in overseas interrogations that used a combination of hypnosis and sodium pentothal. However, the subjects were given physical and psychiatric examinations before the interrogation.¹³⁶ These precautions were markedly absent from future CIA mind control experiments. With each successive mind control program the CIA became less concerned with the subjects of experiments.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) was initially responsible for both BLUEBIRD and ARTICHOKE because it studied scientific advances in hostile nations. This was in keeping with the original objectives of the projects. However, as the objectives changed, control of ARTICHOKE was transferred from the OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), which was an operating unit. This change in control from intelligence unit to operating unit is indicative of the transformation of BLUEBIRD, which involved the study of actions of hostile nations, to ARTICHOKE, which involved the use of interrogation techniques, both offensively and defensively. The

¹³⁵ Ibid., 12.

¹³⁶ U.S. Congress, 68.

CIA claims that the project ended in 1956, however there is no evidence to substantiate this assertion.¹³⁷

MKNAOMI was another major CIA mind control project. The MKNAOMI program, which began in 1952, was designed to develop, test, and maintain biological agents and delivery systems. The Special Operations Division of the United States Army assisted the CIA in this project. The Army lent its knowledge, skill, and facilities to further the development of biological weapons for the CIA.¹³⁸ A CIA memorandum dated 1967 summarizes the objectives of MKNAOMI:

- (a) To provide for a covert support base to meet clandestine operational requirements.
- (b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal materials for the specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].
- (c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique items for the dissemination of biological and chemical materials.
- (d) To provide for the required surveillance, testing, upgrading, and evaluation of materials and items in order to assure absence of defects and complete predictability of results to be expected under operational conditions.¹³⁹

Examples of the results of MKNAOMI were the development of special darts coated with biological agents and a gun capable of shooting the darts. The Army not only aided the CIA in its search for biological weapons against humans, it also helped study biological weapons against crops and animals. According to a CIA memorandum, "Three methods

¹³⁷ Ibid., 68.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 69.

¹³⁹ Quoted in Ibid., 68.

and systems for carrying out a covert attack against crops and causing severe crop loss have been developed and evaluated under field conditions.”¹⁴⁰

On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon banned the use of any form of biological weapons and ordered that existing stocks of bacteriological weapons be destroyed. On February 14, 1970, President Nixon expanded his order and directed that toxins, chemicals that are not living organisms but are created by living organisms, were to be considered biological weapons and should be destroyed. The CIA terminated MKNAOMI in 1970. However, despite the Presidential order the CIA maintained possession of eleven grams of highly potent shellfish toxin for five more years.¹⁴¹

The relationship between the CIA and the military intelligence agencies varied greatly over time, ranging from complete cooperation to extreme and wasteful competition. The early years of mind control were marked by cooperation; however, gradually the military’s effort to share information waned. The CIA refused to coordinate efforts with the Army Special Forces and this caused duplication of effort. The CIA, in an effort to maintain secrecy, also provided misleading information concerning the operational requirements to the Secretary of Defense (SOD), which limited the SOD’s ability to assist the CIA.¹⁴² Another example of the competition between agencies was an incident in which a military officer mentioned to a CIA employee in

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 69.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 100.

confidence about an Army field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD CHANCE. The CIA quickly began spying on the Army program.¹⁴³

Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), gave a speech at the National Alumni conference at Princeton University April 10, 1953, on the evils that were connected with the Soviet mind manipulation techniques. He described their methods as “so subtle and abhorrent to our way of life that we have recoiled from facing up to them.”¹⁴⁴ Ironically, three days after his diatribe on the heinous activities of the Soviets, Dulles approved Operation MKULTRA, the most extensive drug and mind control program ever embarked upon by the United States.

MKULTRA involved researching and developing mind controlling chemical, biological, and radiological materials to be utilized in covert operations.¹⁴⁵ The program gradually included additional mind control techniques, including radiation, electroshock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials.¹⁴⁶ The project began as a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to DCI Allan Dulles that suggested a special funding mechanism for extremely sensitive CIA research and development projects that

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Quoted in Lee and Shlain, 27.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in U.S. Congress, 69.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 70.

studied the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior.¹⁴⁷ A CIA memorandum stated that MKULTRA involved:

Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are.¹⁴⁸

DCI Allan Dulles approved the proposal on April 23, 1953. The rationale for the special funding of the program was the highly sensitive nature of the operation. In 1963 during a routine survey by the CIA Inspector General, a member of the Inspector General's staff, John Vance, learned about MKULTRA and its experiments with surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. The report following this discovery of MKULTRA by the Inspector General explains why the project was extremely sensitive. The Inspector General stated:

- a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputation of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.
- b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.
- c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.
- d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Quoted in Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Quoted in Ibid.

Understandably, soon after this report MKULTRA's experiments on unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects were canceled, and tighter controls were placed on the program.¹⁵⁰ What is difficult to understand is how this program was allowed to flourish for ten years. The Inspector General succinctly stated all the reasons why the operation never should have been suggested, let alone authorized. In January 1973 CIA Director Richard Helms forever complicated the matter when he directed Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief of TSD, to have the MKULTRA records destroyed.¹⁵¹ This opened a Pandora's Box of speculation concerning the full extent of the program.

MKULTRA's research and development of substances to be used for controlling human behavior consisted of three stages: first, the search for substances with potential for mind control experimentation; second, laboratory testing on voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the application of MKULTRA substances in realistic situations. The search for substances was carried out through arrangements with universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, federal and state institutions, and private research institutions. The CIA concealed the funding, and its interest, for these organizations by making the annual grants under the auspices of research foundations.¹⁵² The next stage of the MKULTRA project was to utilize the substances in extensive testing

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 72.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 69.

¹⁵² Ibid., 70.

on humans. Arrangements were made with physicians, toxicologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, scholars, and specialists in prisons, hospitals, and mental institutions.¹⁵³

One of the first MKULTRA studies was conducted by the National Institute of Mental Health. Researchers there studied the effects of various drugs on the inmates at the Rehabilitation Center in Lexington, Kentucky, which was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug violations. The subjects of the experiments were volunteer inmates who were given brief physical examinations before testing. In return for signing up for the experiment, the prisoners were given the drug of their addiction.¹⁵⁴ The CIA would send Dr. Harris Isbell, who headed research at Lexington Center, the new drugs that required testing. Over eight hundred different drugs were tested on the patients under Isbell's care. In one experiment, patients, nearly all African American, were given LSD for more than seventy-five consecutive days. The doses had to be quadrupled in order to overcome tolerance.¹⁵⁵ Apparently, rehabilitation was a misnomer.

The final phase of MKULTRA, testing mind control substances in realistic settings, was performed by officers of the Bureau of Narcotics acting for the CIA. They tested LSD, and other drugs, on unwitting, non-volunteer human subjects. These unwitting American citizens were not given physical or mental examination as to determine if they could handle the experiment. The CIA's argument for the testing was

¹⁵³ Ibid., 71.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Lee and Shlain, 25.

that the experiments under accepted scientific procedures failed to produce the full range of reactions that would occur in operational settings.¹⁵⁶

The CIA chose the Bureau of Narcotics to conduct testing because it could obtain and develop test subjects within the setting of narcotics control.¹⁵⁷ The Bureau was also chosen because it made it difficult to trace Agency participation.¹⁵⁸ A number of the subjects were informers or suspected criminal elements from whom the Bureau of Narcotics obtained valuable operational results. However, the CIA felt it was necessary to experiment on a wide range of personality types. A CIA report on MKULTRA stated that “the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories.”¹⁵⁹ Due to the destruction of the CIA mind control records, it is impossible to examine the operational use of MKULTRA substances abroad. However, it has been documented that MKULTRA substances were employed operationally overseas, beginning by at least 1953.¹⁶⁰

The CIA had researched and studied LSD previously, but under MKULTRA it became a focal point. While Project ARTICHOKE used LSD solely as an interrogation aid, MKULTRA’s vision of LSD was far broader and was used in a wide array of covert

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, 79.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 71.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 100.

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in Ibid., 71.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

operations. One CIA document describes the potential use of LSD to be secretly administered to foreign officials before they made public speeches, or held important meetings, thus causing them to appear foolish and discrediting themselves. Third World leaders were often targets for the CIA's mind altering weapons.¹⁶¹ The Inspector General's Survey of the Technical Services Division in 1957 found that through MKULTRA the CIA had developed six drugs for operational use and that the drugs were used on six separate operations on thirty-three subjects.¹⁶² The number of operations and subjects had increased dramatically by 1963.¹⁶³

The Technical Services Division (TSD) of the CIA, which was headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, was responsible for MKULTRA. Dr. Gottlieb later explained the reason for the CIA's self-experimentation with LSD: "There was an extensive amount of self-experimentation for the reason that we felt that a first hand knowledge of the subjective effects of these drugs [was] important to those of us who were involved in the program."¹⁶⁴ Part of the MKULTRA program involved CIA officials sneaking LSD into fellow officials' drinks. These surprise acid tests were considered useful experiments because they provided examples of how subjects reacted to LSD when they were unaware of having been drugged. One TSD member recalled about the surprise tests that, "We

¹⁶¹ Lee and Shlain, 35.

¹⁶² U.S. Congress, 71-72.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 72.

¹⁶⁴ Quoted in Lee and Shlain, 29.

didn't know much. We were playing around in ignorance. . . ."¹⁶⁵ This is another example of the unscientific techniques often employed by the CIA.

One result of these asinine experiments was the death of Dr. Frank Olson, an Army scientist who worked in biological weapons research. Olson, who had never taken LSD before, was unknowingly slipped seventy micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau during a CIA experiment headed by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb. He fell into a deep depression after the horrible experience and committed suicide on September 27, 1953.¹⁶⁶ A CIA cover-up hid the truth of the incident for twenty years. The only ramification from the man's death was an innocuous personnel letter sent from DCI Allen Dulles that stated the researchers exercised "poor judgment"¹⁶⁷ in experimenting in an unwitting basis and without medical safeguards. Dulles informed the researcher that the letters were not reprimands and that no mention of the incident would be left on their personnel files.¹⁶⁸ On the same day they received the personnel letter from Dulles, Gottlieb and other CIA researchers proposed Subproject Number 3 of MKULTRA, which continued surreptitiously administering LSD, but with less concern for the subjects' safety than before. Despite the death of Olson and the clear example of the dangers that surreptitious testing of LSD presented, the CIA continued to administer LSD to unwitting,

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ U.S. Congress, 74.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 78.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 79.

nonvolunteer human subjects.¹⁶⁹ Compounding the problem was the fact that there were no medical precautions taken, and no follow-up to determine the long-term effects.¹⁷⁰

Gottlieb learned from old OSS files that, in the search for a truth serum, marijuana had been tested on unwitting subjects. He also learned that George Hunter White had supervised those OSS experiments. Gottlieb recruited White, who was working for the Bureau of Narcotics, to aid the CIA in drug experiments on unwitting American citizens. White was responsible for testing the effects of clandestinely administered LSD, as well as various other drugs, on a broad spectrum of social classes.¹⁷¹

White set up CIA safe-houses in apartments in New York and San Francisco. The safe-houses were equipped with surveillance equipment for secretly studying the effects of the drugs. At first White would lure people back to his apartment himself. However, by 1955 White invented a new method for enticing people back to his apartment. In this new method, named Operation Midnight Climax, White hired drug-addicted prostitutes to lure men from bars to the safe-house, where they were slipped LSD and studied by White, who was hiding behind a two-way mirror. CIA showed no concern for the safety of the subjects. There was no consent, no medical prescreening, no follow-up study, and none of the tests were conducted by qualified scientific observers.¹⁷² The Inspector General noted in 1963 that the effectiveness of the testing was significantly limited because the subjects

¹⁶⁹ Lee and Shlain, 31.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. Congress, 79.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 58.

¹⁷² Ibid., 80.

were only accessible for the first hours of the test. He also stated that the subjects often became ill to the point of requiring hospitalization, and that sickness and economic loss were inherent in this type of experiments.¹⁷³ Due to the lack of professionalism in the research, there were questions concerning the validity of White's conclusions. The CIA, paradoxically, invested far greater effort in ensuring the safety of foreign nationals when they used LSD abroad. They followed a far more scientific approach providing medical examinations before drugging the subjects, constant observation, and local physicians on call during the LSD interrogation.¹⁷⁴

White tested drugs on unwitting citizens for nearly ten years, until 1963 when CIA Inspector General John Earman came across some top-secret information on the tests performed in MKULTRA. Earman chastised Richard Helms, who was the Deputy Director of Covert Operations and the originator of the concept of MKULTRA, for not informing the new Director of CIA, John McCone, about MKULTRA. Earman felt that the safe-house experiments placed "the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy."¹⁷⁵

Despite Earman's recommendation that unwitting testing be stopped, Helms argued that it was necessary to have realistic testing. Helms argued that because operational targets would certainly be unwitting, it was necessary to have test subjects also unwitting.¹⁷⁶ More importantly, Helms pointed out that unwitting testing was

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 81.

¹⁷⁵ Quoted in Lee and Shlain, 34.

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, 81.

essential in order to compete with the Soviets in the field of mind control.¹⁷⁷ Despite Helms's objections, the surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting U.S. citizens was canceled in 1963. Even after it was banned, Helms continued to advocate the use of surreptitious testing on unwitting subjects. He repeatedly turned to the Soviets as an excuse to reestablish the suspended testing. He stated in 1964 that the U.S. would soon be incapable of staying up with Soviet advances due to "Soviet aggressiveness in the field of covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing."¹⁷⁸

Due to conflicting accounts, it is difficult to ascertain whether the CIA actually perceived a threat from the Soviets in this area, or used the supposed threat as an excuse to conduct its own research. Helms stated in 1964 that the Soviets had consistently lagged five years behind the United States in mind control technology. If this were accurate, then it would seem that the threat of Soviet mind control was merely an excuse to conduct research of dubious morality. While the evidence is inconclusive, it appears most likely that the U.S. had at times genuinely perceived threats from the Soviets and that the CIA enhanced those threats to justify mind control research.

The CIA continued to research mind control substances after MKULTRA was canceled. MKSEARCH was the cryptonym given to the continuation of MKULTRA program in 1966. The program no longer involved surreptitious administration of LSD. MKSEARCH was designed to develop and research the capabilities of biological,

¹⁷⁷ Lee and Shlain, 34.

¹⁷⁸ Quoted in U.S. Congress, 81.

chemical, and radioactive materials to used for controlling human behavior.¹⁷⁹ The program continued until 1972.

The CIA's last mind control program was OFTEN/CHICKWIT, which began in 1967 and involved identifying and classifying drugs with potential for controlling human behavior. The program was divided into two parts. OFTEN consisted of acquiring the mind control drugs and testing them through laboratory procedures on animals and then on humans. CHICKWIT dealt with acquiring information on drug research and development in Europe and the Orient, and acquiring samples. A CIA memorandum dated March 8, 1971, indicated that under the OFTEN/CHICKWIT Program a backlog of more than twenty-six thousand drugs had been acquired for future screening. These programs continued until 1973.¹⁸⁰

LSD intrigued the CIA like no other drug. Early studies appeared highly promising. One study described an officer who was ordered not to reveal an important military secret. However, under the influence of LSD he gave all the details of the secret and after the drug had worn off, he had completely forgotten that he revealed any information. There were many other reports detailing the success of LSD used in interrogations.¹⁸¹ One CIA officer described the situation: "We had thought at first that this was the secret that was going to unlock the universe."¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 169.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Lee and Shlain, 14.

¹⁸² Quoted in Ibid.

Gradually experiments revealed that LSD did not always produce the desired response. Often, intense anxiety and confusion made it impossible to extract information, and interrogations were complicated by the hallucinations caused by the drug. Another common complication was that subjects were likely to have experiences of omnipotence and other delusions of grandeur that would make them less susceptible to interrogation. There were also problems concerning the memory loss that the CIA officials had hoped would accompany the other effects of the drug. LSD often causes difficulty in remembering, but it does not guarantee complete amnesia.

Although LSD proved not to be as reliable as the Agency had initially hoped, the CIA refused to forsake the miracle drug. One reason lies in the unique qualities of the drug. Massive effects could be elicited from minuscule amounts of the drug. A few micrograms of the powerful, odorless, colorless, tasteless, drug could easily be surreptitiously administered and have a profound effect. Evidence of the unpredictability of LSD is illustrated by the CIA's suggestion that the drug displayed potential as an anti-interrogation substance. They believed that the psychotic states that the drug often elicited could protect an agent from revealing anything during an investigation.¹⁸³ The fact that the CIA suggested the drug as both a truth serum and a lie serum indicates the confusion of the CIA researchers and their sophomoric scientific procedures.

The CIA officials were deeply worried that their operatives could have LSD used against them by hostile foreign powers. There is evidence that the CIA administered LSD

¹⁸³ Ibid., 16.

to its own agents so that they would be accustomed to the drug and be able to handle the situation. Members of the CIA Medical Office believed that all members of the Agency should experience LSD. According to a CIA document on November 19, 1953, the Project Committee “verbally concurred in this recommendation.”¹⁸⁴ Consequently, many CIA agents experimented with LSD, and many did so on multiple occasions.

Because many CIA officials experimented with LSD, an important question is raised concerning what effects their use of this powerful mind altering, and perhaps expanding, drug had on the activities of the Agency. Interestingly, by 1952, after the CIA was significantly involved with LSD, the CIA began researching and experimenting with extra sensory perception (ESP). The CIA created an extensive program in 1952 that was concerned with searching for and developing people capable of perfect accuracy in ESP.¹⁸⁵ Another ARTICHOKE project had agents follow any information on individuals with reported clairvoyant abilities and submit these individuals to scientific tests to verify their powers. The CIA hoped that groups of people with ESP could provide information when no other option existed.¹⁸⁶ Even recently, former CIA agents have revealed information on current ESP research and operations, although the CIA denies these allegations.

The majority of the other drugs the CIA tested had primarily been designed as speech-inducing agents. LSD transcended this limited focus and opened up a wide range of offensive possibilities. Drugs were created that caused heart attacks or cancer and left

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 18

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

no sign as to the source of the ailment. Some made a drunken man sober and a sober man drunk. However, the CIA did not abandon LSD. It was their most powerful drug for creating mental confusion. According to CIA documents, LSD was used, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, as an aid to interrogations in Agency operations.¹⁸⁷

Researchers on CIA stipends, provided through MKULTRA funds, published unclassified versions of their work in prestigious scientific periodicals. However, these published versions left out the secret information reserved for the CIA concerning such things as eliciting information, increasing suggestibility, or generating emotional dependence. The CIA went to great lengths to ensure that it was aware of all new research being performed on LSD, including studies it did not fund. A CIA document states that on May 26, 1954, the CIA ordered all domestic field offices to monitor scientists doing LSD research.¹⁸⁸

Sandoz Laboratories, the Swiss firm that manufactured LSD, had initially provided LSD free of charge to all researchers so long as they exchanged their research information. By 1953 Sandoz was giving the drug in the United States only to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which would supervise American researchers using the drug. The FDA had an agreement with the CIA and supplied whatever it needed. The President of Sandoz Laboratories, Arthur Stoll, eventually cooperated directly with the CIA, keeping

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 19.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 26.

the Agency aware of Soviet LSD research.¹⁸⁹ In 1954 the CIA convinced the Eli Lilly Company to crack the secret formula to LSD, which secured the Agency's supply of LSD.¹⁹⁰

The CIA was particularly interested in psychiatric reports detailing the fantastic potential which LSD offered in breaking down familiar behavior patterns. This raised the possibility of using LSD for reprogramming or brainwashing.¹⁹¹ Dr. Ewan Cameron, who had served as the president of the Canadian, the American, and World Psychiatric Associations, was one of the many illustrious members of the medical community to do mind control research for the CIA. Dr. Cameron attracted the attention of the CIA officials in charge of MKULTRA in 1956 when he developed a new technique for controlling behavior. The new technique, psychic driving, forced patients to listen to recorded messages of emotionally laden material for excessive amounts of time. A wide array of drugs, including LSD, PCP, amphetamines, sodium amytal, barbiturates, and other techniques, such as electric convulsive therapy, prolonged sleep, and prolonged sensory deprivation were combined with psychic driving to reduce patients to a state of neurological and psychological infancy so that they could be imbued with new patterns of behavior.¹⁹² Dr. Harvey Weinstein, whose father was a victim who suffered life long

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 27.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 23.

¹⁹² Harvey M. Weinstein, *Psychiatry and the CIA: Victims of Mind Control* (Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1990), 110.

repercussions from Dr. Cameron's care, stated that he had never found any other center in the world where psychic driving and sensory isolation were used to treat patients. Dangerous drugs were commonly used to cure the mentally ill, but never with the ferocity that Dr. Cameron employed.¹⁹³

Ironically, Dr. Cameron was a member of the Nuremberg tribunal that heard the case against Nazi war criminals who committed atrocities during World War II. A number of Nazi doctors were put to death for their role in medical atrocities at Dachau and other concentration camps. Out of the judgment of the Nuremberg tribunal emerged, in 1948, a set of ten principles that became known as the Nuremberg Code. It defined a code of ethics for scientific research, which stipulated that full voluntary consent must be obtained from all research subjects and experiments should yield positive results for the benefit of society that could not be obtained in any other way.¹⁹⁴ The CIA violated the Nuremberg Code for medical ethics by conducting experiments on unwitting subjects. According to the Hippocratic Oath, doctors promise to aid the sick according to the best of their ability, and never poison or harm people. The CIA was able to convince numerous professionals in the medical community, who had sworn to uphold this oath, to violate it. Perhaps CIA officials should be forced to swear to an oath upon entrance to their profession, promising to use their skills and power to help protect the security of the United States and its citizens, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing.

¹⁹³ Ibid., 195.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 220.

Frightening parallels between the CIA and the Nazi physicians/war criminals can be drawn. Neither viewed the patients of their experiments as humans in pain, but rather as laboratory animals to be exploited for research purposes. The ultimate goal of their research was to attain greater control over their enemies at any cost, and in the process dehumanize their human subjects. Both had their research not only sanctioned but actively promoted by the state. Another similarity is that they both selected groups of defenseless people. The obvious victims of both groups were prisoners, mental patients, foreigners, the terminally ill, sexual deviants, and ethnic minorities.

The CIA has ignored the thousands of victims that served as human guinea pigs for its mind control experiments. The vast majority of victims are unaware that they were manipulated and experimented on, and the few victims that do know have almost all had their requests for compensation denied. The CIA has continually declined to accept responsibility for pain and suffering resulting from its experiments. The Clinton Administration shows no sign of altering this course. Legal experts assert that, “Continued secrecy and legal roadblocks erected by the government have made it virtually impossible for victims of these cold war human experiments to sue the government successfully.”¹⁹⁵

Some victims look to Congress for hope; however, they hear little more than the same empty rhetoric that Senators and concerned officials have put forth since the secret tests were discovered. Democratic Senator John Glenn of Ohio stated, in 1994, that “any

¹⁹⁵ Budiansky, Godde, and Gest, “The Cold War Experiments,” 33.

place government experimenting caused a problem we should make every effort to notify the people and follow up. We ought to set up some sort of review and compensation for people who were really hurt.”¹⁹⁶ Similar suggestions and promises were made in 1977 during the Senate Select Committee’s hearings on the CIA’s mind control programs. During that investigation, DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner promised the Select Committee that he would locate and inform the people subjected to the experiments.¹⁹⁷ In 1994, Turner argued that the Agency had located everyone it could find. Of the thousands that were experimented on, only fourteen people were notified and only ten people were compensated. Furthermore, the CIA has made no effort to examine university records or conduct personal interviews to locate other victims.¹⁹⁸ Turner argued that declassifying the names of the research centers and universities that participated in the experiments would be detrimental to the reputation of those institutions.¹⁹⁹ The release of that information would greatly increase the chances of locating additional victims. It is clear that locating and compensating victims is not the goal of the CIA. The Supreme Court upheld the CIA’s right to block the release of the names of researchers and universities involved.²⁰⁰ The majority of the victims of the CIA’s experiments have never been notified of the nature of the experiments, or even that they were subjects in experiments. In addition to

¹⁹⁶ Quoted in Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ U.S. Congress, 36.

¹⁹⁸ Budiansky, Goode, and Gest, “The Cold War Experiments,” 34.

¹⁹⁹ U.S. Congress, 36.

²⁰⁰ Budiansky, Goode, and Gest, “The Cold War Experiments,” 34.

the recalcitrance of the CIA and Congress to make reparations, the destruction of the records and the death of key witnesses have made legal redress all but impossible for victims.

Adding to the problem is the fact that important parts of the history of the CIA's research into mind control have not yet been ascertained. Concerning MKULTRA and the full extent of the operation, Senator Edward Kennedy stated, "one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure, because his name appears on just about every one of these documents. . . ." ²⁰¹ Dr. Gottlieb, who headed the MKULTRA program, admitted after the 1977 Senate investigation that "the bottom line on this whole business had not yet been written." ²⁰² Dr. Gottlieb maintained his reluctance, in a 1994 interview, to disclose any information concerning the CIA's mind control programs. He argued that the CIA had only encouraged basic work in behavioral science. However, Gottlieb offered some insight to the nature of the CIA when he stated that since he left the Agency, he has been "trying to get on the side of the angels instead of the devils." ²⁰³

From the beginning of the CIA's experiments in mind control in 1950 to the end in 1973, the CIA's leadership has failed to provide adequate supervision over its employees and projects. "'We do not target American citizens,' former CIA director Richard Helms told the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1971. 'The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we who lead the CIA are honorable men, devoted to the nation's

²⁰¹ U.S. Congress, 48.

²⁰² Lee and Shlain, xix.

²⁰³ Quoted in Budiansky, Goode, and Gest, "The Cold War Experiments," 38.

service.”²⁰⁴ The leaders of the CIA’s mind control programs were men without honor who have done the United States and its citizens a great disservice. Despite the unequivocal dangers, blatant violation of the rights of citizens as well as the laws of the United States, the CIA conducted mind control experiments that included surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvolunteer citizens. Even when the secret testing was halted in 1963, none of the CIA officials involved were punished.²⁰⁵

The Senate Select Committee in 1977 found numerous faults in monitoring and control. It pointed out that the CIA ignored standard regulations and lines of authority. An example of this waiving of internal CIA regulations was the destruction of the MKULTRA and other mind control documents, which made it impossible to reconstruct the full range and extent of the most extensive of the CIA’s programs for researching and testing biological and chemical substances. Normal auditing procedures were also waived throughout most of these programs.²⁰⁶

The Committee further found that the controversial projects, which deserved the most careful scrutiny, received inadequate internal review. For example, the Inspector General’s 1957 report does not mention the surreptitious use of LSD because the survey team was never informed of the existence of that aspect of the program. The inspector

²⁰⁴ Quoted in Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets* (New York: Knopf, 1988), 350.

²⁰⁵ U.S. Congress, 170.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 84-85.

that discovered it in 1963 did so inadvertently.²⁰⁷ Both the Inspector General and the General Counsel, the two primary internal mechanisms for controlling improper activities, were deliberately bypassed in an effort to continue programs that were clearly illegal. When Admiral Turner was asked, in 1977, what reassurances he had that CIA mind control experiments would not occur again, he replied that the CIA now had the Intelligence Oversight Board and a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations.²⁰⁸ This response seemed to appease the Senate Select Committee, but it does not guarantee that the CIA will not act in any way it feels is necessary to protect the security of the United States, including violating the laws of the United States and the rights of its citizens.

The Senate Select Committee found that the destruction of the documents made it impossible to ascertain at what level specific projects had been authorized. However, this was a problem even before the destruction of the records because the CIA made a practice of maintaining as few records as possible of the planning and approval of test programs. The Committee also found situations where written orders did not prevent unauthorized actions.²⁰⁹

The Committee identified a problem with compartmentation and jurisdictional conflicts within the CIA. The effort to maintain strict secrecy of the highly sensitive material resulted in each office isolating itself from other offices in the Agency. The

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 88.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 23.

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 86-87.

jurisdictional conflicts arose between the Technical Services Division, the Office of Medical Services, and the Office of Security. Each of these offices had interests in mind control for the CIA, yet they did not share information, and often harbored ill feelings toward one another. QKHILLTOP was a group responsible for coordinating the mind control research; however, the group met only twice a year and almost no specific information was exchanged.²¹⁰ Compartmentation and internal conflicts led to duplication of effort and deprived Agency policy-makers of pertinent data.²¹¹

The lack of consequences for breaking rules and violating procedures was another serious problem. The only evidence of discipline at all was the weak and essentially meaningless personnel letters sent from DCI Dulles to the researchers that contributed to the death of Frank Olson. There clearly were few effective deterrents to keep CIA officials from breaking laws. There has been a more significant failure on the part of those responsible for supervising the CIA as a whole. The Select Committee mentioned only in passing reluctance by the executive branch and Congress to seek detailed information from the CIA, and the CIA's reluctance to offer detailed information.²¹²

The 1977 Senate Select Committee's investigation into the CIA's mind control programs revealed an interesting discussion about the President's role in the illegal activities. Senator Malcolm Wallop posed the question: if information on mind control programs appeared in the Inspector General's report, "is there any reason to suppose that

²¹⁰ Ibid., 90.

²¹¹ Ibid., 89.

²¹² Ibid., 88.

the President did not know of this project? You said there was no reason to suppose that he did, but let me reverse that. Is there any reason to suppose that they did not?"²¹³ DCI Turner replied, "No."²¹⁴ Senator Wallop went on to state indignantly:

Well, you know, I just cannot imagine you or literally anybody undertaking projects of the magnitude of dollars here and just not knowing about it, not informing your superior that these were going on, especially when certain items of it appear in the Inspector General's report on budget matters.²¹⁵

Admiral Turner responded, "Well, I find it difficult when it is that far back to hypothesize what the procedures that the Director was using in terms of informing his superiors were. It is quite a different climate from today. . . ."²¹⁶ Senator Wallop concluded, "I think it is naive for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those times."²¹⁷ Clearly Congress had serious questions concerning what the President knew of the programs, yet nothing was done.

Jerome Zeifman, a former General Counsel to the House of Judiciary Committee, argued that Congress intentionally avoided going after the President in order to protect "the Lie." "The Lie" is the idea that the President and the American Government would not stoop to dirty tricks, such as assassination plots or mind control experiments on

²¹³ Ibid., 24-25.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 25.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

unwitting citizens. "The Lie" protects our sacred image of the American way of life and the innocence of our President. Illegal activities can be safely blamed on out-of-control institutions, such as the CIA. Presidents use "the Lie" to remain pure while the CIA performs illegal activities that they tacitly order; consequently, these orders are deniable. Zeifman pointed out several times when the House Judiciary Committee backed away from direct inquiry into the President's knowledge of illegal activities.²¹⁸ Even when following direct presidential orders, "the Lie" protects the President by placing the blame on the CIA. Zeifman stated, "The Lie is the means by which the CIA gets the goods on the president. When the president first learns about CIA illegal operations, or first orders that they be done, he has become a co-conspirator and is equally culpable in their misdeeds."²¹⁹ The CIA then has the president in a compromised position because it can disclose his complicity. The CIA would have the president of the United States at its mercy.

The lack of accountability of the CIA to Congress is another reason why the CIA was able to create and expand its mind control programs. In 1956 Senator Leverett Saltonstall succinctly stated the problem of Congressional complicity toward the CIA:

It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of American citizens.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Schefflin and Opton, 239.

²¹⁹ Quoted in Ibid., 241.

²²⁰ Quoted in Ibid., 238.

The hesitancy on the part of Congress to use its powers to oversee the CIA encourages Presidents to use the CIA to carry out activities unsuitable for public policies.

The CIA never attempted to gain authorization or approval of its mind control programs from Congress or the President. Even the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, was not notified of the full extent of the mind control experiments. The CIA intended, and believed it absolutely necessary, to conceal knowledge of the programs not only from hostile foreign powers, but also from the Congress and the executive branch, as well as the American people. The CIA's Inspector General stated in 1957 that "precautions must be taken not only to protect operations from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general."²²¹ The Inspector General went on to explain that the malevolent nature of the work demanded repression of the truth: "The knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its mission."²²² For the CIA the success of the mission takes precedence over all else, and the ends- justify- the- means argument is once again employed. However, the argument is hopelessly flawed because the ends, the protection of the American way of life, cannot justify means that include the denigration of the most sacred principles of that way of life.

²²¹ U.S. Congress, 74.

²²² Quoted in Ibid.

Chapter 4

CONCLUSION

The Cold War fear that hostile Communist countries would use chemical and biological drugs against Americans or American allies led the United States to develop defensive mind control programs to counteract chemical and biological substances. As these substances began to show potential for gaining information and control over enemy agents, the defensive orientation of the programs transformed to an offensive orientation. While the threat of the Soviets in the mind control arena may have played a large role in the CIA's development of mind control programs, it was not the only factor. The OSS, which had enormous influence in shaping the CIA, showed great interest in chemical and biological agents that would aid in interrogations long before the Cold War. The OSS passed on its legacy of searching for substances that would prove useful in eliciting truth during interrogations to the CIA. Furthermore, once it was determined that the Soviets had not mastered some unknown brainwashing substance, the CIA continued the search for its own mind controlling needs.

The CIA mind control programs began in 1950 with testing on volunteer human subjects. However, by 1953 the programs began testing on unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. Despite unequivocal knowledge of the dangers of the testing and the clear violation of the rights of American citizens, the CIA continued for over a decade,

often in an unscientific and unsophisticated manner. The CIA has been extremely reluctant to notify and compensate the thousands of victims who suffered as a result of the experiments. Because the CIA was aware that some of its programs were highly illegal, normal procedures and controls were waived. Authorization, funding, internal review committees were all circumvented to ensure the success of the mission.

Compartmentation and jurisdictional conflicts caused additional problems, such as unnecessary duplication of potentially lethal experiments. Even more distressing than the CIA's internal problems is the executive and congressional complicity concerning the CIA's illegal activities. The CIA's mind control programs resulted in massive violations of the rights of American citizens and left many victims still suffering from the residual effects. The unscientific nature of the experiments, the enormous scope and duration of the programs and the fact that they continued long after the dangers of surreptitious administration of the drugs was demonstrated illustrate a profound disregard for the sanctity and value of human life.

One can find sanction for covert actions and employing unconscionable characters, such as Gehlen and his Nazi cohorts, in wartime. Traditionally, nations declared war upon one another as a signal of their intent to kill the other's military forces and destroy their war-making ability. Under sanction of war, men are justified in killing one another. This was the ultimate sanction, and it rested on the proposition that the nation's security was in danger. From it stemmed subsidiary sanctions, justification for covert action, sabotage, malicious propaganda, and assassination, all in the name of defeating the enemy. In the gray area of international struggle short of declared war, these sanctions are not clearly

defined. The American leadership and its instrumental agent, the CIA, have had to make ad hoc decisions as to which of these exertions of power are permissible and which are not. Frequently these decisions, influenced by the legacy inherited from the OSS, have led to disastrous mistakes. The CIA's involvement with Gehlen and the abortions of justice that accompanied the mind control experiments are two examples of mistakes so egregious that they placed American democracy in jeopardy. It is imperative for us to clearly define the ideas and motives which drove these defenders of national security to violate fundamental human rights. The perverse thoughts and misguided concepts of what is necessary to protect a way of life are not dead. They cannot be destroyed by force. They must be exposed. The offenses illustrated in this thesis have been so dishonorable and so detrimental that democracy cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated.

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