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Between two mirrors : feminist performance in theory and practice

Amy Himes
San Jose State University

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**BETWEEN TWO MIRRORS:
FEMINIST PERFORMANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE**

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Theatre Arts

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by Amy Himes

August 2000

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Karl Toepfer", written over a horizontal line.

Dr. Karl Toepfer

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "David Kahn", written over a horizontal line.

Dr. David Kahn

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Victoria Byerly", written over a horizontal line.

Dr. Victoria Byerly

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Joseph J. Peret", written over a horizontal line.

ABSTRACT

BETWEEN TWO MIRRORS: FEMINIST PERFORMANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

by Amy Himes

This thesis investigates the theory and practice of feminist theatrical performance. Part One is a rhetorical and historical examination of Stanislavski's Realistic acting technique and the perceptual processes upon which it is based. Previous research suggests that the technique cannot accommodate a feminist message; however, the technique's unresolved issues of critical distance and the mind/ body split hold possibilities for alternative performance strategies. Part Two focuses on the analysis, rehearsal, and production of Karen Chronacher's play *Scavengers* as a way to apply theory to the practice of performance.

The research led to the development of two new performance techniques, dubbed *intermittent critical awareness* and *constructive body architecture*. These techniques employ fundamental strategies of improvisation to create an understanding of character that is constantly in flux, thus granting agency to the performer, implicating the spectator in the performance, and challenging perceptual expectations and abstractions which contribute to the paradigm of oppression.

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Table Of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Part One: Theoretical Reflections	
Chapter One: Epistemology, Mimesis, and the Gendered Nature of Perception.....	6
Chapter Two: The Development of Realism.....	26
Chapter Three: Feminist and Artistic Responses.....	38
Part Two: Practical Applications	
Chapter Four: <i>Scavengers</i> : A Textual Analysis.....	57
Chapter Five: Production Elements.....	79
Chapter Six: Rehearsal Ethnography.....	95
Chapter Seven: Conclusions.....	112
Bibliography and Works Cited.....	121
Appendix: Cast and Crew of <i>Scavengers</i>.....	127

List of Figures

Figure 1: Act I, Scene 8 in Performance.....	82
Figure 2: Act II, Scene 26 in Performance.....	82
Figure 3: Act I, Scene 4 in Performance.....	83
Figure 4: Act I, Scene 5 in Performance.....	83
Figure 5: Act I, Scene 3 in Performance.....	83
Figure 6: Act II, Scene 1 in Performance.....	86
Figure 7: Act II, Scene 21 in Performance.....	86
Figure 8: Screenplay 1 Storyboard (Act II, Scene 4).....	88
Figure 9: Screenplay 2 Storyboard (Act II, Scene 15).....	89
Figure 10: Screenplay 3 Storyboard (Act II, Scene 27).....	90-91
Figure 11: Act II, Scene 27 in Performance.....	91
Figure 12: Act I, Scene 1 Video Clips.....	92
Figure 13: Act I, Scene 1 in Performance.....	92
Figure 14: Video Montage (Selected Clips).....	93
Figure 15: Act II, Scene 31 Video Clip.....	94
Figure 16: Act II, Scene 31 in Performance.....	94

Introduction

The history of feminism is a long and diverse one. Of the many varieties of feminism, the one with which Americans are most familiar—liberal feminism—has its roots in the exaltation of the rational capacity. This largely political approach to feminism, which developed with the advent of the modern era, has done a great deal to improve immediate conditions for women. Liberal feminism's concentration on legislative reforms such as women's access to education, the right to vote, and a wider variety of employment opportunities has been—and continues to be—an important part of the feminist agenda.

Other varieties of feminism (such as Marxist, radical, cultural, and separatist analyses to name but a few) offer alternative ways of understanding the oppression of women. Marxism's focus on the oppressive class structures which are concurrent with capitalism; and radical, cultural, and separatist feminist contribution to an increased appreciation of that which is uniquely feminine, has strengthened the feminist front by diversifying it. At the same time, a backlash against feminism has developed, amongst not only those who stand to profit most directly from the perpetuation of patriarchal structures but also amongst women who would otherwise seem to be engaged in their own feminist battles. This backlash is perhaps motivated by a feeling that after such a long history, and so many legislative gains, that the goals of feminism have been met. However, the fact that feminists have won certain battles in the war against oppression by no means suggests that the oppression of women has ended.

Oppression is a paradigm, a way of thinking, that operates like a software program that has been running for so long that it is almost indistinguishable from the hardware of our minds. Taking cues from French theorists such as Cixous and Kristeva, postmodern feminist scholars begin to deconstruct (and thus, hopefully dismantle) the paradigm of

oppression by revealing the apparatus with which we as humans assign meaning to phenomena. This work is primarily informed by the study of epistemology, which questions what we know and how we know it. However, this tradition has (like most traditions) been defined and dominated by men; as such it is assumed that the practices of the tradition privilege men over women. Furthermore, as theories about how we know what we know become reified, modes of thinking are established that contribute to more tangible (albeit subtle) apparatus of oppression, thus perpetuating the status quo. The postmodern feminist scholar must therefore examine and reveal the ways in which these theories are constructed by society, in the hopes of uncovering alternatives.

One such reified process is that of perception—specifically visual perception. The ways in which we apprehend the outside world define the ways in which we assign meaning to it. In our highly mediated and frequently performative society, analysis of spectatorship holds important clues about the construction of power along gender lines. In the past twenty years, this scholarship has primarily been done by feminist theatre, film, and art theorists and critics. Within the framework of their media, these scholars assess the dominant styles of producing and viewing art (and thus meaning) and begin to offer resistant strategies.

This study takes as its focus the ways in which the paradigm of oppression has both contributed to and been perpetuated by dominant Western aesthetic practices, and investigates alternatives which might have meaning for feminist theory and practice. **Part One: Theoretical Reflections** will establish a vocabulary of discourse by exploring previous scholarly investigations into these topics. Chapter One is a rhetorical investigation of the contributions of epistemology, focusing on the work of Aristotle as the primary shaper of Western paradigms concerning performance and spectatorship. Special emphasis will be given to *The Poetics*, Aristotle's analysis of the nature of tragedy in dramatic texts, and an inherent theory of spectatorship will be revealed. In so doing, important implications

about imagination, desire, intentionality, and abstraction will be brought to light which suggest the gendered nature of perception.

Chapter Two reviews the development of Realism, the dominant performance style on the American stage and cinema. A historical survey of the growth and codification of this artistic movement will be undertaken, and the influences of the theories of Sigmund Freud and August Comte on the work of Konstantin Stanislavsky—to whom Realism in theatrical performance is primarily attributed—will be assessed. It will be shown that the intricate relationships between the ideologies of these three men rest on the same gendered paradigms which were postulated by Aristotle and which have now become normative.

Chapter Three examines the responses of feminist and postmodern scholars and artists to these issues. The contributions of theorists such as Judith Butler, Elin Diamond, Jill Dolan, and Laura Mulvey will be discussed, as will the resistant performance strategies of actors and playwrights such as Karen Finley, Lauren Love, Cherrie Moraga, Sandra Shotlander, and Split Britches. The alternative strategies of theorists who are not specifically feminist, such as Bertolt Brecht, Augusto Boal, and Jerzy Grotowski, will also be discussed. In addition, primary research in the form of interviews is included to reflect the practical impact of these issues in the everyday lives of three women.

Theoretical investigations into the nature of perception, the development of dominant modes of visual production, and the discourse of scholars concerned with such issues is vital to the understanding of the implications of performance theory for feminism. However, in order for the findings of such research to have an appreciable effect, theories must be made practical. It is the aim of the second part of the current investigation to do this.

Part Two: Practical Applications focuses on the text and performance of one play, Karen Chronacher's *Scavengers*, the form and content of which speaks directly to the topics dealt with in Part One. A note must be included here on the accessibility of this

script to the public. This researcher was first exposed to this script in dramaturgy class at Florida State University by Dr. Stacy Wolf, who distributed manuscript-style photocopies for classroom purposes to a small number of students and professors. Dr. Wolf was unable to provide substantial information about the author, but suggested the possibility that the author was once a student at Cornell University, because the script specifies that Jean and Jeanne are Cornell students, and that she believed that the play had been produced at the Seattle Fringe Festival.

When the decision was made by this researcher to produce the play, every effort was made to contact the playwright in order to purchase a published copy of the play, to obtain permission for performance, and to pay royalty fees. These efforts, which included contacting drama and alumni departments at Cornell University and at University of Washington, Seattle, as well as the Seattle Fringe Festival, and engaging in a nation-wide white pages and e-mail search, were unfortunately unsuccessful. The researcher would welcome any information about the playwright and/ or the production history of the play.

Such considerations might have adversely affected the decision to produce this play if the play itself was not so full of potential for communicating postmodern feminist performance theories. A self-consciously postmodern play, it addresses issues in ways that are invisible or inaccessible to modernist performance techniques. Likewise, the feminist messages inherent in the piece would be subverted by techniques like those which rest unchallenged on the patriarchal paradigm. Obviously an alternative is needed. Research suggests that the key places where the performance approach to this piece will differ from traditional methods will be in the areas of the actor's critical distance from the character/ world of the play and the mind-body split—that is, the idea that an actor must both *be* and *pretend to be*. The technique by which this will be accomplished involves an acknowledgement of the façade of performance co-existing with complete surrender to the performance, a simultaneity that is more than the binary of either/or.

Developing such a technique is at once an intellectual, an artistic, and a political endeavor. Chapter Four begins this process by engaging in a dramaturgical analysis of the text, paying special attention to the issues of identity, Self and Other, and manipulations of the gaze that are at work in the piece. These issues are discussed both in reference to the storyline of the play and in light of widely cited theoretical works.

The rehearsal process for *Scavengers* was approached as a type of laboratory/ethnography. As such, reportage of the process requires a more personal approach, because it deals not only with theory but also with the actors' and designers' personal responses, as well as my own. I did, of course, enter the process as a director with a specific vision for the piece; however, the discoveries and theories that emerged for performing the postmodern message of this piece necessarily grew not simply from my critical research but from my interaction with the actors and designers. Chapter Five describes the production choices made by the researcher/ director, including set, costumes and masks, and video elements.

Chapter Six takes the form of a rehearsal ethnography. The performance approaches of the actors and the director were recorded and evaluated on a rehearsal-to-rehearsal basis as much as possible. These notes include my own objectives for each rehearsal and the outcome of each day's work. Due to the necessities of production, some rehearsals were dedicated to non-experimental objectives such as blocking and run-throughs--the entries for these rehearsals are thus brief. However, days that are devoted to understanding the intricacies of the text and to experimental rehearsal exercises are documented in depth. I also include the voices of my actors and designers, in the form of responses to interviews, questionnaires, and rehearsal exercises.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, these notes are distilled and discussed within the context of the critical research. It is my hope that through this process I will not only develop an alternative performance technique but also an alternative way for women and men to perceive their own day-to-day performances that will facilitate the end of oppression.

Part One: Theoretical Reflections

Chapter One: Epistemology, Mimesis, and the Gendered Nature of Perception

When investigating the repercussions of Western aesthetic theories and practices, one must first examine the paradigms of perception on which they are built. The work of Aristotle has traditionally, and with good reason, been a starting place. Aristotle is regarded as one of the fathers of philosophy. His work in Greece in the fourth century B.C. on language, reasoning, the natural sciences, taxonomy, ethics, politics, and metaphysics laid the groundwork for the Western paradigm.

Specifically, Aristotle's *Poetics*, an analysis of the nature of tragedy and its constituent elements, is entrenched firmly in the Western understanding of drama. Many scholars have investigated the *Poetics* as either a descriptive or prescriptive account of the method of composing tragic poetry. Grossly neglected, however, have been the implications that the *Poetics* holds for the more performative aspects of tragedy. A short analysis of the text of the *Poetics* within the framework of other Aristotelian paradigms such as his teleological model and his theory of perception illuminates the theory of spectatorship that is inherent, if not articulated, in Aristotle's work.

The *Poetics* is arguably the most important work in the history of theatre. "The Greek civilization that was to produce the first great era of the theatre gradually took shape between the eighth and sixth centuries [B.C.]... The earliest still-extant account of how Greek drama originated [is found in] a chapter in Aristotle's *Poetics* (c. 625-585 B.C.)" (Brockett, 15,17). Carlson, in the first lines of his *Theories of the Theatre*, adds that "(t)he primacy of Aristotle's *Poetics* in theatrical theory as well as in literary theory is unchallenged. Not only is the *Poetics* the first significant work in the tradition, but its major

concepts and lines of argument have continually influenced the development of theory throughout the centuries" (15).

The first five chapters of the *Poetics* are primarily concerned with an account of imitation (*mimesis*) and its origins and applications in poetry. "Chapter VI makes the transition from poetry in general to tragedy. It consists of three major sections: (1) a definition of tragedy, (2) a derivation of six 'parts' from this definition, and (3) a discussion of the ranking of the parts. Chapters VII-XXII extend this discussion of the parts" (Golden, 112). These six constituent elements are, in order of importance, Plot, Character, Thought, Diction, Melody, and Spectacle.

Recent literary scholarship on Aristotle's *Poetics* has typically been concerned with reconciling discrepancies inherent in the text. Sheila Murnaghan, for example, finds that "the most glaring contradiction in the *Poetics*...and the greatest obstacle in the way of eliciting a coherent theory from the text is the contradiction between what is said in chapter thirteen and what is said in chapter fourteen about the best kind of tragic plot" (58). Her investigation addresses inconsistencies between what Aristotle says about the degree of knowledge that a tragic character has about the tragic act he commits. Certainly, problems like these are confusing for the modern reader interested in developing tragic drama according to Aristotle's analysis.

However, cultural historians point out that other, more fundamental problems exist: Aristotle's almost total neglect in the *Poetics* of the role of the perceptual elements in drama, including song, dance, costume, and scenery, derives from his insistent separation of dramatic text from dramatic performance and his clear preference for the former over the latter. Dramatic theory in Western thought was destined from its beginnings to concern itself almost exclusively with the dramatic text (Vince, 81).

Aristotle's biased dismissal of perceptual elements was perhaps motivated by a need to establish drama as a worthwhile enterprise in the face of detractors like Plato and threats

like the growing popularity of new theatrical genres. "During the fourth century [B.C.], writers began to turn to the lesser myths, especially those of a slightly sensational nature, and to employ forensic elements and melodramatic devices with increasing frequency" (Brockett, 37). The New Comedy that was beginning to develop during the writing of the *Poetics* differed greatly from the form and function that Aristotle prescribed. A case could be made that Aristotle purposely neglected elements such as Spectacle in a propagandistic effort to downplay their importance and prevent the new forms that depended more heavily on these elements from eclipsing the popularity of the traditional forms of tragedy.

The contradictions and omissions that scholars like Murnaghan and Vince point out force the researcher to examine the Aristotelian paradigm as a whole. "As far as the *Poetics* is concerned, scholars have become increasingly aware over the last half century of the need to relate it to Aristotle's other works instead of treating it as if it were no more than an isolated monograph...[m]any have touched upon the essential similarity between Aristotle's basic concepts and method in his *Poetics* and those in his other works, and his original readers would have been familiar with both concepts and method" (Rees, n.p.). Rees finds, as do others, that the most fundamental of these concepts is Aristotle's model of teleological change, otherwise known as the model of the four causes. In this model, which is a foundational principle of all of Aristotle's work,

the material cause is the out-of-which the thing is composed, as the statue is made of bronze...the formal cause is the what-it-is, the way the material is organized, an account of which would tell us its essence...the efficient cause, or moving cause, is the whence-the-change-begins--the advisor for the action, the father of the child, and, in general, the maker...the final cause is the for-the-sake-of-which; health, for example, is the final cause of surgery. It is the end or goal (telos) toward which the thing is working or moving (Edel, 60-61).

Rees points out that "of the four causes this final cause is of paramount importance and dominates every process...but, though they may be distinguished in reason, the causes are not always distinguishable in action, so that the final and motive causes are often confused with the formal cause" (n.p.).

Rees' investigation is well-founded, even if his conclusions sometimes miss the mark. Edel comments that "underlying the whole treatment [of *mimesis* in the *Poetics*] there is quite clearly the framework of the four causes" (Edel, 348, comment added). Aristotle, in the first lines of Chapter One, establishes his methodology by saying, "Let us follow the order of nature, beginning with the first principles" (Golden, 3, line 6-7). These "first principles" are teleological Causes. Aristotle, in Chapter Six, goes on to state that "(t)he first principle, then, and to speak figuratively, the soul of tragedy, is the Plot..." (Golden, 13, line 80-81).

Rees comments that Plot "is so described because it gives tragedy its form and meaning or, to put it in more technical terms, is its formal cause...But it is also the 'end' of tragedy, the final cause; it is the element which is the reason for the existence of all the others" (n.p.). The shifting boundaries of the teleological principles mirror the sometimes confusing boundaries of the tragic elements, which "are not parts existing separately; they are separable in thought but not in fact" (Dale, 273). Rees states that modern scholars' confusions arise from a misreading. These scholars expect the elements to fall firmly and definitely into exclusive categories; Aristotle's contemporaries (who better understood the subtleties and organic nature of the system) would have known better.

While Rees may be praised for noting this organic nature, he makes a subtle error with significant implications for theories of performance and spectatorship. His first observation--that Plot is the formal cause--is part of (to borrow a term from economics) a text-side theory, and one which Rees accurately identifies. In following Rees' line of reasoning, *mimesis*, the imitation of an action, is the final cause of the artistic act--the poet's

work in developing a tragedy. The poet himself is the efficient cause—the advisor of the action. The formal cause of the poet's work is, as Rees states, Plot—defined by Edel as "the what-it-is, the way the material is organized, an account of which would tell us its essence" (60). The remaining elements—Character, Thought, Diction, Melody, and Spectacle—become the material cause, "the out-of-which the thing is composed" (Edel, 60).

Although the premises of Rees' text-side analysis are substantiated, his spectator-side analysis is inaccurate. Rees seems to be attempting to illuminate the causes of the artistic act's final cause—tragic mimesis. However, his analysis fails because he uses the term "tragedy" too generically. Rees fails to recognize the difference between the artistic act of creation and the mimetic act of performance. He claims that the element of Plot is the goal, or final cause, of tragedy because it "is the reason for the existence of all the others" (n.p.).

But by his own argument, the elements of tragedy—like the causes themselves—are interdependent, "separable in thought but not in fact" (Dale, 273). The very organic nature to which Rees refers illuminates the weakness of his premise. Rees has made the same mistake that he accuses others of making; he has forgotten that the *Poetics* "is first and foremost a work of aesthetic theory, and interpretations that under-stress this fact inevitably lead to distortion" (Russell and Winterbottom, 85-6). In dismissing the role of spectatorship with which aesthetic theories must, by definition, deal, Rees continues to focus on the artist and obscures the true nature of the imitative, performative act of *mimesis*.

"At the beginning of Chapter IV 'pleasure' emerges as the fourth basic element of imitative art, comparable to the Aristotelian final cause" (Golden, 115). This "pleasure" is *catharsis*—a notion whose definition is as controversial as that of *mimesis*. Aristotle does not, in the *Poetics*, give a clear account of the meaning of *catharsis*. The first appearance of the term occurs in the definition of tragedy in Chapter VI, which includes the clause that

tragedy "achieves, through the representation of pitiable and fearful incidents, the catharsis of such pitiable and fearful incidents" (lines 9-11).

Aristotle's Greek is ambiguous; *catharsis* has at least three literal translations. Carlson points out that "a common interpretation of this term observes that *catharsis* is a medical term" (Carlson, 18) referring to purgation. Most traditional readings, such as those by Milton and Bernays, find that tragedy functions not to "encourage the passions but in fact rids the spectator of them" (Carlson, 18). With the advent of the neoclassical period, which favored a moral tone in tragedy, dramatists like Corneille and Racine interpreted *catharsis* slightly differently, as a moral purification as opposed to a purgation—an interpretation that is also substantiated by the original Greek word.

Hardison, however, uses Golden's analysis that by referring to Aristotle's teleological methodology, Aristotle's true meaning can be determined:

Since Aristotle's formal definition of tragedy in Chapter VI incorporates the first three basic elements [*read, causes*]...we would expect him to incorporate the fourth one also. He evidently does this in the *catharsis* clause. *Catharsis* should therefore be understood as the tragic variety of the pleasure associated with imitation in general...Just as the pleasure produced by imitation is the cause that first impelled men to produce imitative 'improvisations,' tragic pleasure is both the function of tragedy and the reason why men write, present, and witness tragedies (Golden, 115, comment added).

Carlson finds that "as concerns in modern times have shifted, for many critics, away from the moral and psychological dimensions of art, it is hardly surprising to find *catharsis* being interpreted as a purely artistic or structural term" (18). For Golden and Hardison, catharsis is neither purgation nor purification; rather, it is clarification:

Aristotle's comments in Chapters IV, VI, and IX indicate that he considered the experience of tragedy a kind of 'insight experience': (1) the experience is

pleasurable, not painful as the same events would be if experienced in 'real life'; (2) the pleasure is the kind that results from learning; (3) the learning is related to discovery of the relation between the particulars of the plot via the universals that make the particulars coherent; and (4) the term designating the tragic function is *catharsis*—something like 'clarification' (117-118).

Golden claims that this interpretation of the *catharsis* clause is useful and correct because it coincides with current aesthetic theories that attempt to define the same thing, because it fits in more neatly with the rest of Aristotle's discussion, and because it "makes the clause a reference to the *techné* [technique] of tragedy, not to the psychology of the audience" (117, comment added).

The interpretation of *catharsis* as clarification is upheld by Tassi, who draws attention to the parallel functions of tragedy and philosophy. Aristotle himself states that theatre more closely resembles philosophy than history because of the universal nature of both theatre and philosophy, as opposed to the particular nature of history. Tassi goes on to find a structural similarity between the two. "Each is an activity whose fulfillment consists in the achievement of a 'seeing' state of affairs. In the theatre we call this end-state '*catharsis*,' in traditional philosophy, 'contemplation' " (474).

It is thus evident that the final cause of tragic *mimesis* is *catharsis* defined as "the pleasure of clarification." However, Golden's statement that such an analysis is accurate because it refers to the technique of tragedy rather than the psychology of the audience seems to erase the role of the spectator in the mimetic act. When Golden outlines the four causes of poetry, he finds that the efficient cause is the "lyric-narrative, epic, [or] dramatic" with the formal cause being "actions with agents" and the material cause "language, rhythm, and harmony" (96). Spectacle is missing. It would seem, from this analysis, that *catharsis* can be achieved without a spectator, that the pleasure in question is inherent in the text and independent of any actual person that might apprehend it—except, possibly, the artist

himself. If this is the case, then the meaning of *catharsis* must be interpreted as something closer to "explanation" rather than "clarification," yet Golden has made a convincing argument for the latter.

The solution proposed here is to retain the interpretation of *catharsis* as pleasurable clarification--the final cause of *mimesis*--but to develop the designation of the essential, formal, and material causes in a way which makes room for the spectator. It must be noted that this analysis was not Aristotle's original intent in writing the *Poetics*. As outlined above, the work is prescriptive by both explanation and selection. For example, Aristotle, in the definition of tragedy, states that it is an imitation of a "noble" process, one which is "complete" and "having the proper magnitude" (Golden, 11, lines 5-6). These are clearly subjective and prescriptive terms. Further, as stated above, the exclusion of certain elements, such as Spectacle, from lengthy discussion implies a bias. However, just because Aristotle chose to present only a theory of dramatic text does not mean that he did not have a theory of dramatic performance and spectatorship. Recent scholarship has uncovered a cogent theory of Aristotelian perception that points to a resolution of the problem.

First, however, an assessment must be made of another Aristotelian notion that troubles theories of performance and spectatorship: that of the form/matter split. For Aristotle,

(t)he conceptual apparatus consists in analyzing any object or happening into the correlative aspects of its matter and its form--words used chiefly in the relative sense of materials and organization. Matter...is the material of a process or product...Aristotle insists that the matter of perceptible bodies is not separable but is always endowed with some specific qualities or properties...[however] when we say concretely that anything is ultimately made out of matter, it is a physical, specific idea of matter that is involved (Edel, 46-7).

Recall that the material cause is the "out-of-which the thing is composed...the formal cause is the what-it-is, the way material is organized, an account of which would tell us its essence" (Edel, 61). The statement that the matter of perceptible bodies is endowed with specific qualities from which it cannot be separated (read, form) recalls Rees' appeal for an organic understanding of the teleological model. Simply stated, it is impossible to conceive of matter without form and vice versa. As this is the case, it is helpful to imagine a matter-form continuum when investigating the material and formal causes of mimesis.

At this point it becomes important once again to distinguish between the current investigation and that of Aristotle, who was concerned with explicating the artistic endeavor. In Chapter VI of the *Poetics*, Aristotle notes the difference between the parallel realms of nature and art. Golden and Hardison point out that the spectator's feeling that the characters are living people who choose their own actions is an illusion. "As soon as we move from the reader's [spectator's] point of view to that of the dramatist creating the tragedy, the illusion vanishes...In nature, personality causes action and hence success or failure. *In art, action is objectified by Plot*; and Plot can thus be said to 'cause' Character and thought" (122-3, emphasis and comment added). In Aristotle's discussion, Plot is a formal cause; it is how the material of imitation is organized.

However, this discussion focuses on the reverse: the mimetic or performative act itself, in which plot becomes an actual reality. In this model, the final cause of tragic mimesis is, as explicated above, *catharsis*. What, then, is the material cause--the matter out of which it is made? If *mimesis* is interpreted as "imitative act," then the answer becomes clear: action or Plot. As Tassi states, "In the theatre what becomes visible is the human condition, the performance that produces human beings who are characters in the world of the play" (480). For all ontological purposes, these characters and their actions are real, and these actions--the Plot--are the matter from which the performance is made.

The remaining elements proceed in order along the matter-form continuum. In the eyes of the spectator, the Plot is embodied (or formalized) by Characters. These Characters are distinguished by their individual Thoughts which are communicated by their Diction--the verbal expression or formalization of Thought and the words which the spectator reads or hears. Melody, defined by Aristotle as "the greatest of the linguistic adornments," in performance becomes the form of this Diction. That is, the words may be in verse or in prose, they may have a staccato or a legato rhythm, etc. Finally, the end of the continuum is reached and there is a place for the previously neglected element of Spectacle: the organizational essence of the performative act and the formal cause.

By acknowledging the importance of spectacle in the performative act, new ground is opened to the researcher interested in theories of spectatorship. It is odd that this field has received little investigation, given the importance of sight in the Aristotelian paradigm. Modrak finds that in *De Anima*, "Aristotle compares the animal to the eye, its soul to sight, and its body to the pupil (412b18-22)" (27). Tassi also points out Aristotle's explanation of man's preference for sight over the other senses in the *Metaphysics*. Furthermore, the "pleasurable clarification" of *catharsis* requires a visual, or at least performative, act. In other words, there must be a spectator present to be affected by a spectacle in order for a *catharsis* to come about.

It has thus been established that the material and formal causes of performative *mimesis* are the six constituent elements of tragedy, inverted from Aristotle's original analysis of non-performative, textual *mimesis* and distributed across the matter-form continuum. These elements contribute to the final cause of *mimesis*: *catharsis*. It only remains to identify the efficient cause, the whence-the-change-begins. In order to do this, the nature of *mimesis*, as well as Aristotle's general theory of perception, must be re-examined.

Edel, in his exploration of Aristotle's concept of matter, finds that although matter never exists without form and to attempt to describe it separately in any particular situation is to resort to analogy e.g. "as bronze is to statue," matter nonetheless has a physical, specific nature that is referred to "when we say that anything is ultimately made out of matter" (48). According to Edel, this implies a theory of Direct Realism on Aristotle's part, one which allows Aristotle to sidestep the vagaries of Representational or Phenomenalist theories.

However, Aristotle's theory of perception is closer to a newer form of Realism—Intentional Realism. Searle's recent development of a theory of perception takes into account a "notion of intentionality that directly links the mind with the perceived object" (Pojman, *The Theory of Knowledge*, 108). As in other forms of Realism, material objects do exist and are the objects of perception. However, Searle adds that they can only be so because perceptions have an intentional content. This intentional content can be characterized as having "conditions of satisfaction which are determined by the content of the experience" (Searle, 40). An application of Intentionality to perception results in the analysis that any singular experience of visual perception always already contains the standards by which the object is to be perceived; these standards are a function of the sense data itself, with which they exist in a symmetrical and reciprocal relationship. One does not simply believe in things because one sees them—one also sees things because one believes in them.

In order to fully understand and appreciate Searle's point, one must understand his reading of the concept of direction of fit. Searle says that "Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world" (Searle, 1). In Searle's analysis—one which relies heavily on linguistics—perception is an assertive, as opposed to a directive, state. It reports about how the world is, instead of ordering an action that will affect the world. Assertive linguistic

states have world-to-word direction of fit; perception, which presupposes language, has a world-to-mind direction of fit.

Searle clarifies that although fitting is a symmetrical relationship, we may speak of direction and by way of explanation offers the following non-linguistic example. Consider a foot and a shoe; here, the shoe fits the foot and the foot fits the shoe--the fit is symmetrical. However, if someone is looking for a shoe, one takes foot size as a given and looks for shoes that fit-- this is a foot-to-shoe direction of fit. If, however, someone finds a shoe and is seeking its owner, the shoe is taken as a given and there is a shoe-to-foot direction of fit. Fit is symmetrical but it is guided by Intentionality, by conditions of satisfaction which are determined by the content of the experience.

Aristotle's analysis of the transactional schema of the *psyche* illuminates some of the finer points of Searle's argument. Edel uses the term *transactional schema* "to designate Aristotle's way of picturing how factors he has distinguished work together in the functioning of the *psyche*; that is, in the human activities of nutrition, sensation, thought, and so on" (147). Aristotle's use of the word *psyche* derives from his concept of the two types of actualities: "the first actuality is the level of organization that can issue directly in the activit[ies] that constitute being alive--the "possession of distinctive developed capacities" (Edel, 144). The second actuality is the use of these capacities.

The *psyche* is thus defined as "the first actuality of a natural body that potentially possesses life" (Edel, 144). That is, the *psyche* is the level of organization of a natural body potentially possessing life and existing in a reciprocal relationship with the activities which constitute that body's being alive. After pointing out that Aristotle's discussions were responses to the major psychological conundrums of his time that centered on the like and the unlike, Edel reports that Aristotle concluded that the *psyche* undergoes "a central process of assimilation in which the potentially like but actually unlike becomes actually like, the transformation being set off by some already existent actuality" (Edel, 148).

Tuozzo also finds that "the incidental perception of proper sensibles (e.g., that the white is sweet) involves a *phantasma* corresponding to the mental predicate; this *phantasma* itself can only be evoked because an earlier in-itself perception of the sweet produced a *phantasma*" (126). Here Tuozzo points out that Aristotle's concept of *phantasmata*, broadly defined as a sensory presentation, has a predicate structure. That is, a *phantasma* is a mental act relating together two subordinate mental acts. Modrak adds that "*phantasma* often connotes a failure of verisimilitude. The object as presented in a *phantasma* fails to correspond precisely to any object in the subject's perceptual field" (82). This failure is a function of the assimilation through which the *psyche* goes as outlined by Edel above.

This process of assimilation is echoed in Searle's account of the intentionality of perception, although under a slightly different name. According to Searle, a subject *S*'s visual perception of an object *O* is predicated by the intentionality of *S*'s perception. According to Aristotle, *S*'s *psyche* goes through a process of assimilation as a result of the visual experience that allows *S*'s perception to become actually like *O*. However, the visual experience must occur first; it is the *psyche*'s potentiality for likeness that gives rise to the intentionality of perception.

If Aristotle's account of the transactional schema can shed light on Searle's notion of Intentionality, then his account of the final teleological cause can illuminate the idea of direction of fit, which for perception is mind-to-world. "The mind goes out to the world endeavoring to gain a true presentation of the object"(Searle, 10). Notice the word "endeavoring" and the use of a prepositional phrase. Aristotle's analysis of Searle's system would be that the final cause of the object we call a perceiving mind is, as Pojman phrases it, "to gain a true presentation of an object" (*The Theory of Knowledge*, 108). This is clearly an Intentional state; thus it can be argued that while Aristotle does subscribe to a perceptual theory of Realism, it is one of Intentional, rather than purely Direct, Realism.

What, then, is the site of Intentionality in Aristotle's analysis, and what are the repercussions for theories of performance and spectatorship? Here the discussion must return to the subject of *mimesis*. Winfield finds that Aristotle distinguished himself as an aesthetic philosopher by recognizing "that imitative art can only fulfill its function if it transfigures, rather than merely mirrors, the given content of its artistry...What allows art to fulfill its edifying role is precisely this imaginative melding of the particulars of an action with what is universal and necessary" (45). Winfield's argument echoes Tassi's in drawing attention to a link between theatre and philosophy, (that "both are able to convey truth more directly than history"), but adds that theatre, "by retaining the particularity of the sensuous image, which has direct influence on emotion and desire" (45), can influence action in the spectator more directly than mere philosophical argument.

This is substantiated by Edel's finding that the concept of *mimesis* is not a narrow one. For one thing, *the poet may imitate not only things as they were or are, or things as they are said or thought to be, but even things as they ought to be...* [this is not] the refinement of imitation into the aesthetic idea of symbolism. Certainly for Aristotle *mimesis* is not freed from its physical relation to what it is representing. In many respects this is like his treatment of imagination as a movement produced by sensation actively operating. That is, imagination preserves the likeness, and in some of its functions selects or spins out but does not cut its roots or become wholly creative (Edel, 349-351, emphasis added).

This "sensation actively operating" is Aristotle's definition of imagination, or *phantasia*. "*Phantasia* is that in virtue of which we say a *phantasma* arises in us" (*De Anima* quoted by Modrak, 82). It occupies a space between sensation and thought. It is the bridge between perception and conception and between the actual and the ideal. *Phantasia*

relies on perception and without it there would be no judgment. In broad terms, it is an interpretive site.

Modrak finds that it is also a site of desire. "Aristotle clearly assigns *phantasia* a unique and important position with respect to the arousal of desire; desire is the efficient cause of voluntary animal motion, and its object is the final cause of the motion" (95). In other words, *phantasia* is the birthplace of the desire that causes an animal to move or take action. When considered in the context of Golden and Hardison's interpretation of *catharsis* as a pleasure of clarification which is the final cause or goal of spectator-side *mimesis*, Modrak's findings are quite significant.

Only one more step need be taken. The spectator must be acknowledged as an actor—simply, "one who takes action". The action is the act of looking, what Aristotle would call "sensation actively operating" and is guided by what Searle would call Intentionality. When this is brought into consideration, it is evident that the efficient cause of spectator-side *mimesis* is the *phantasia* that 1) gives rise to desire, the object of which is the final cause—*catharsis*, 2) creates and conveys the *phantasmata* of Spectacle (the formal/material causes of *mimesis* that are perceived, and 3) bridges the gap between the particulars of the performance and the universal truths inherent in it by allowing, as Tuozzo states, "our general views to be applied to particular situations" (122).

Therefore, when considering spectator-side (rather than text-side) *mimesis* or tragic imitation, the material and formal causes—which are, according to Aristotle's analysis, inseparable in fact—are a continuum of the six constituent elements. Plot or action is at the material end as the out-of-which that performance is made. Spectacle is at the formal end as the what-it-is—the way in which the material is organized—the sensual packaging of performance. *Phantasia* in the *psyche* of the spectator engaged in the act of looking is the efficient cause as the whence-the-change-begins which allows for desire, perception, and

synthesis. *Catharsis*, the pleasure of clarification, is the final cause or goal of spectator-side *mimesis* as the for-the-sake-of-which that both depends on and satisfies the efficient cause.

This analysis is much more than an exercise in understanding Aristotle's teleological model and the *Poetics*. It seems absurd to deny Aristotle a theory of spectatorship and performance in the light of all of his careful work; this study gives him one. In doing so it reveals important ideas which, even if not "true" in some "objective" sense, nonetheless can be argued to be a normative account of situations that have shaped not only the Western paradigm of theatre but also of the act of looking itself.

Cinema theorists will find a resonance between the role and function of desire in this analysis and Laura Mulvey's reading of *scopophilia* or love of looking. Lacanian analysts will note that in order to be a spectator in the above analysis, one must be in the realm of the Symbolic/Linguistic—that of grammar, sequence, self and Other. In short, the spectator must be male. Female onlookers, who dwell in the realm of the Imaginary, will be able to perceive the spectacle, but because they lack the appropriate conceptual apparatus will not be able to fully see it; that is, they will not be able to have a *catharsis*.

By assessing the active role of the always already male spectator in the Aristotelian paradigm, attention is called to the structure of performance. In this analysis, the perceptual act is an active one in which the actions of interpretation and synthesis are at work. The notions of "spectator" and "artist" are thus fused and the authority of both is challenged. Such a notion seems to trouble Aristotle's analysis of tragedy as found in the *Poetics*; if the aim of tragedy is to achieve the *catharsis* of pleasurable clarification, then it would seem that, in the minds of the Other, *phantasia* is a dangerous intermediate site which can alter the pure intent of the poet/playwright.

The analysis holds many implications for feminist theory. Liberal feminists will point to their assessment that the oppression of women is based on their supposed lack of rational capacity (or, here, conceptual capacity), while cultural feminists will point to the

ways in which woman-generated representation and spectatorship operates differently from this model. Materialist feminists will find that it offers a way to "unmask the naturalized ideology of the dominant culture most theatre and performance represents" (Dolan, *Feminist Spectator as Critic*, 17). Finally, and hopefully, feminist readers will find the analysis liberating. It is assumed by this author that women do, indeed, possess the conceptual apparatus required to perceive, comprehend, synthesize and evaluate performance. If this has historically been denied, then the denial has its basis in gynophobia and misogyny rather than in any reliable evidence. That women have been Othered, objectified, and denied access to the means of representational production is a function of history, not of nature.

The implications of this become clear when considered in the light of some of Aristotle's remarks about women. Keuls quotes the *Poetics* (15,3): "To be sure, woman has a quality and so does a slave, although it should be said that of these two the former is inferior, and the latter wholly contemptible." She goes on to ask, "Since he [Aristotle] requires of tragedies that their character be 'good,' what is the playwright going to do with women and slaves in his plots? The answer is that he should make them 'good' within the limitations of their natural inferiority" (Keuls, 322). This analysis is in keeping with Edel's reading above that the poet may imitate things not only as they are but as they should be. In short, it is not only the right but also the duty of the playwright or imitator to transform the inferior material of the lower classes into an idealized and more perfect form.

When it comes to aesthetic qualities in real life, Aristotle states that "the specific virtues of women with respect to their body are beauty and height" (*Rhetoric* in Keuls, 229) and "the chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness" (*Metaphysics* in Nead, 7). Furthermore, of the four causes, three can be aligned with the male--the final, the efficient, and the formal. Only the material cause can be aligned with the female. "The truth is, that which desires form is matter, as the female desires the male" (*Physics* in Jacobs, 79).

An equation of the female with that which is formless and inferior, and of the male with that which is formal and superior, thus emerges.

This becomes the basis of the positioning of the female as the object of transformative, imitative art and the male as the subject or artist. "If the female body is defined as lacking containment and issuing filth and pollution from its faltering outlines, then the classical forms of art perform a kind of magical regulation of the female body, containing it and momentarily repairing the orifices and tears" (Nead, 7). The female body is seen as an inferior, imperfect object. The male (and therefore superior) artist, following the dictate of Aristotle, sees it as his duty to perfect it, to make it good, through an imposition of form on the existent matter via his unique capacity for *phantasia*.

By the 1700s, the Italian masters had distinguished two types of artistry. "With its basis founded in the form-matter paradigm, the difference between perceptual (*ritrarre*) and conceptual (*imitare*) images came to be understood as a qualitative distinction between mere technical facility and technical prowess that is coupled with creative invention" (Jacobs, 79). It seemed to follow that if women are merely matter, then they lacked the soul—the formal function—necessary to make great art. Women were acknowledged to be able to create *ritrarre* but not *imitare* images; women could be artists but not great artists. Jacobs finds that this idea was so firmly entrenched that when an a great woman artist, Sofonisba Anguissola, did emerge, she was considered a *miracolo*, a word that was not thrown around lightly during the Italian Renaissance.

This distinction, and the role of gender in it, is consistent with Aristotelian and, later, Lacanian analysis. In order to be a spectator in both analyses, one must be in the realm of what Lacan terms the Symbolic/Linguistic—the realm of grammar, sequence, and—most importantly for this analysis—Self and Other. In short, the spectator must be male. Women are assigned the position of the screen or canvass, the "monolithic Other" onto which men project their artistic fantasies. Female onlookers, who dwell in the realm of the Imaginary,

will be able to perceive the spectacle, and thus create perceptual or *ritrarre* art. However, because women lack the appropriate conceptual apparatus (*phantasia* in Aristotelian terms, Language in Lacanian terms), they will not be able to fully see it; that is, they will not be able to have a *catharsis*.

This analysis places *catharsis*, the pleasure of clarification, in a position roughly equivalent to that of ejaculation. While the subtle relationships supporting this view are not the subject of this research, it is in keeping with the desire that Modrak finds is part and parcel of *phantasia*, the *scopophilia* or love of looking that Mulvey identifies, and a notion of the artist that is aligned not only with the male but also, specifically, with male sexuality.

By the nineteenth century the concept of the artist had accrued more and more exclusively male attributes. "Like Aristotle, Galen, and Vasari, Flaubert, Zola, and Van Gogh drew an analogy between artistic creativity and male sexuality" (Borel, 94). Emile Zola's novel *The Work* exemplifies this construct. In this story, a painter searches for and ultimately finds a model, who then becomes his lover. His obsession with bringing her flesh into being disrupts their relationship, as his creation of an ideal form becomes more valuable to him than the real woman before him, and she becomes jealous of the very art she inspires.

A more recent dramatic text contains many of the same themes. In Karen Cronacher's play *Scavengers*, two lovers (Jeanne, a woman, and Jean, a man) wrap themselves in layers of fantasy. Jean directs Jeanne's creation of an ideal Woman, an alter ego that she must perform for the eyes of Jean and the technology that he manipulates. As the lines between what is "real" and what is "fantasy" begin to blur, a frightening picture of jealousy, paranoia, and the disintegration of identity emerges.

This play presents many problems for the feminist actor and director. According to materialist feminist discourse, the conventional constructions of gender roles in representation place women as objects and men as subjects; the act of looking is always

already in the domain of men. Women, who are always already performers for the gaze of men, are displaced as spectators; they must either identify with men in order to look through their eyes or identify with women and not see at all. This makes any representational art form-- particularly theatre--problematic. In addition to the theoretical problems of being both spectator/ artist and spectacle/art, practical issues of how to perform as a feminist arise. As Lynda Hart states:

The constitutive dramatic aesthetic, the "mirror held up to nature," is a particularly pernicious concept for the feminist critic of the theatre, firmly entrenched as it has been by the Aristotelian directive which has had a powerful and lasting hold on the drama ... As feminist criticism has taught us, Woman and Nature have been equated in patriarchal discourses, thus women become the screen onto which men project their fantasies of women, or rather of Woman--the monolithic Other. This aesthetic of *mimesis* has maintained the hegemony of realism in the drama which effectively masks the *re-creational* power of *mimesis* (3-4).

It must be stated that the performance style of the ancient Greek stage was a far cry from the Realistic style that most contemporary audiences take for granted. Although primary evidence documenting the dramatic practices of the sixth and fifth centuries, B.C., is limited to a very few written articles and vase paintings, it is generally agreed that the focus of the ancient Greek actor's work was primarily vocal, since it was by vocal standards that performances were judged in the dramatic festivals. Movement was declamatory and exaggerated; facial expression was irrelevant because all actors wore masks (Brockett, 26). However, it will be argued that Realism on the contemporary stage developed via a set of ideological circumstances which were an outgrowth of the scientific and philosophical approaches established by Aristotle.

Chapter Two: The Development of Realism

The realistic techniques to which contemporary audiences are accustomed are relatively new within the larger annals of the stage. They are attributed primarily to the work of one man, Konstantin Stanislavsky, whose system was the first to emphasize internal motivation of the character. A concurrently developing theory, Sigmund Freud's method of psychoanalysis, which was the first to address the drives of the unconscious mind, bears striking resemblances to Stanislavsky's system. Many scholars have investigated the work of these men independently; however, it is important for the feminist performance theorist to address the relationship between these two theories in the light of another figure, Auguste Comte. Although Brockett vaguely asserts that the development of realism, itself a recent phenomenon, "owed much to... 'positivism,'" (417) Comte's vision of objectivity and empiricism, this triadic relationship has not been deeply investigated. A brief historical survey coupled with an investigation of the lives and works of three men, who, it will be argued, gave form to realism on the stage, will attempt to do this.

Prior to 1850, Western literature, visual art, and drama were dominated by the Romantic style. According to this school, which originated in Germany around 1800 and was imbued with the philosophy of Kant, truth and happiness cannot be found in the material world—only the spiritual realm encompasses the whole of reality that can give contribute to complete and accurate knowledge. Utopian and nationalist variations of Romanticism blossomed across Europe in a symbiotic relationship with the growth of revolutionary and reform movements of the time (such as those in France and Spain, as well as the uneasy tensions that followed Napoleon's conquests). In theatre, these ideas found form in a drama that frequently focused on elements of character such as mood and heroic strength. Plot was considered merely a device by which to expose these elements.

But as the revolutions that had swept the continent proved ineffectual (or, at times, failed outright), the idealist visions of Romanticism lost their charm. Kantian philosophy began to be replaced by the theories of August Comte, who, around 1830, had published his six-volume *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. The work began with an illustration of the three stages of human thought: "the theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract [read, the Romantic], and the scientific or positive" (Clarke, M., 20, comment added). Comte also developed a hierarchy of the sciences, and declared that the ultimate aim of science must be the betterment of human society; in doing so he coined the term "sociology".

The science of sociology termed as such is thus fairly recent; however, the scientific process upon which it is based is not. Ellwood finds that

Aristotle rather than Comte may be said to have been the first seriously to attempt a science of society. He at any rate first attempted systematically the collection and rationalization of knowledge about men in society; and he is therefore entitled as much as any one to be looked upon as the founder of sociology in the sense of general social philosophy (1).

This is not meant to detract from the importance of Comte's contributions. If nothing else, Comte gave a name to the practice and presented it in a form that was more accessible to the scholars of his time. "Comte's arguments fell on willing ears, not only among scientists and philosophers, but also among many artists, who sought to make art 'scientific' " (Brockett, 418). After a few short alternative experiments, such as France's Theatre of Common Sense, a new style developed. Realism as a codified genre emerged in France around 1860. By 1863 the major French papers had published the theoretical foundations of the new movement, and presented it as a scientific formula.

Realism was explored first by writers and visual artists. The first European and American forays into Realism on the stage were confined to playwrighting and the visual effects of verisimilitude and local color in set design. "While fidelity of spectacle had been

increasing throughout the century, realism of character and situation were slower in arriving" (Brockett, 460). Franoise Delsarte, in the spirit of the newly rational times, did develop a system of acting in an attempt to "demonstrate the laws of stage expression" (Brockett, 422). His system was a gesticular one in which specific movements of certain parts of the body indicated particular ideas or emotions; in short, it was not based on the organic, visceral experience of the character.

The Russian stage was, however, in a different position from the rest of the continent. Czar Alexander II, who ruled from 1855 to 1881, was a progressive leader who established a number of civil and educational reforms. However, after his assassination, Alexander III ruled strictly and reinstituted laws that aimed to curb the revolutionary momentum of the lower classes and restore power to the aristocracy. Amidst these tensions, the author/playwright Ivan Turgenev began his work. Although his plays were written in the mid-1800s, it was not until 1872 that his master work, *A Month in the Country*, was produced. The play "renders the daily life of a country estate faithfully, but...only as means of showing the permanent psychological changes wrought in several characters...Upon (Turgenev's) work, Chekhov was to build" (Brockett, 441).

Anton Chekhov's first play, *The Sea Gull*, was a failure when it was performed in 1896 at the Alexandrinsky Theatre in St. Petersburg "because the actors did not understand their roles and had not learned their lines" (Brockett, 478). Chekhov's plays are subtle, detailed pieces which, when glanced at casually, seem to have no transformations or purpose. However, on closer analysis, the plays are revealed to be filled with finely textured patterns in all of the elements that interweave to form a tapestry of profound meaning. After the reception of his first attempt, Chekhov despaired of playwrighting and almost gave it up.

Fortunately for Chekhov another theatre was developing and would soon be searching for new material to produce. The Moscow Art Theatre, founded in 1898 by Vladimir Nemirovich-Danchenko and Konstantin Stanislavsky, astounded audiences that

attended its first season with its production of Alexei Tolstoy's *Tsar Feodor Ivanovich*, which had a stunningly realistic set (an area in which the Russian stage had previously been lagging), ensemble acting, and a lack of any big-name stars. However, it was not until the Theatre's production of Chekhov's play that the style of each was fully realized. The union between Chekhov and the Moscow Art Theatre was a fortuitous one, since Stanislavsky had already established a style of directing that included months of study of each play.

A number of scholars have commented on the many ways in which the relationship between the director Stanislavsky and the playwright Chekhov was mutually beneficial. Further examination of this point is not integral to this discussion; suffice it to say that the intricate nature of Chekhov's characters provided a fertile ground for analysis that was probably essential to the development of what came to be known as the Stanislavsky System. In brief, the principles of the system include an insistence on complete vocal and physical training and familiarity with stage technique for the actor, a need for clear observation of reality and the capacity to apply this to building a role, the need for inner justification of the character's actions, thorough script analysis, complete concentration when onstage, and an exhortation to continue to work towards perfection.

In addition to the relationship between Chekhov's plays and Stanislavsky's work, the prevalent political forces in Russia certainly had an influence on the System. In 1917, the February and October Revolutions overthrew the power of the last Russian czar, Nicholas II. Nikolai Lenin, Socialist leader and co-supervisor (with Stalin) of the newspaper *Pravda*, was elevated to the position of Chief Commisar. Benedetti remarks that although "Stanislavski was not a political sophisticate...he believed that the revolution was in the best interests of his country and he welcomed it" (225). The October Revolution caused the temporary closure of the Theatre; it was decided that a representative from the Theatre would be sent "to the Moscow Soviet to ask how the Art Theatre could best serve the people. The answer came back: start working again as soon as possible" (226). Evidently,

the Moscow Art Theatre's experiments found favor with the developing tenets of Socialist Realism.

In 1917 another theory was reaching its zenith. In Austria, Sigmund Freud completed and published his *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*. Freud, who began his career as a neurologist, had already published three of his most influential books, including *The Interpretation of Dreams*. He had also established his private practice and "patients were beginning to come to him from far afield" (Isbister, 262). Freud's base in biology led him to investigate the structure of the human brain and, by extension, the human mind. However, while trained in neurology, he was heavily influenced by the work of Dr. Jean-Martin Charcot, whose work in psychology centered on hypnosis.

After meeting and studying with the doctor, Freud found his attentions being diverted from neurology and directed to "the new, and hitherto unexplored, field of neurosis" (Isbister, 39). Freud's work went through changes in focus as he developed his seduction theory, his model of a layered system of consciousnesses, and ultimately his tri-party of the Id, Ego, and Super-Ego. However, certain underlying assumptions persist throughout his theories, including the ideas that individuals possess a mind that is physiologically based and relatively constant in its essence, and which can be described in psychological terms. Furthermore, the mind is for the most part hidden from direct observation, acting as it does in the realms of the sub- and unconscious.

Freud's theory was also an outgrowth of the formation of the "Vienna Circle," a group of Austrian intellectuals which was founded in 1927. Among the issues discussed by the group was the newly rejuvenated "logical positivism," an updating of Comte's earlier work. Frank comments that while "it would be difficult to prove that the theories of Freud or Jung could satisfy the criteria of acceptance advanced by Logical Positivism...it is certainly a fact that the roots of psychoanalysis and of Logical Positivism grew up in one and the same soil, the intellectual and social climate of Vienna before and after the first

World War" (101-2). Frank goes on to say that psychoanalysis must be a practical theory which proves its validity in each instance through the agreement of its theoretical tenets with directly observed facts. Freud's agreement with this view is maintained by his position as not only a theorist, but also as a practitioner.

Freud's exposure to the philosophy of positivism is thus clearly identifiable. Stanislavsky's involvement with Comte's thinking is more difficult to assess, primarily because of the restrictions of the Stalinist regime. Gray states that "Russian sociology, while significant before the 1917 Revolution and into the mid-1920s, was non-existent for a quarter of a century under Stalin" (163). When Gray visited Russia after the end of the Cold War to teach a course in sociology at Novosibirsk State University, he found

a strongly expressed interest in Emile Durkheim and Auguste Comte...[Comte] indicated that a series of social life was possible and would provide the most enlightened basis for social order and progress...While Comte's advice that sociology should be scientific is generally accepted in the West, his desire for social scientists to become scientific high priests shepherding social order and human progress is not. On this score, Russian sociologists are less shy. Conditioned by broad Marxian assurances that historical forces can be objectively understood, they are far more likely to believe that scientific objectivity is not so problematic and that social knowledge is relatively useless unless it leads to social reform (168-9).

Although Marx himself "had nothing but contempt for Comte's utopian visions" (Clarke, M., 16), "a number of Comte's crucial projects have been implemented" (Clarke, M., 16) by Marx's worshippers, namely, the leaders of Socialist and Communist Russia. Clearly, Marxism and positivism can be reconciled. But how can positivism relayed through Marxism be reconciled with an artist who, while generally supportive of the cause of the working class, was, as indicated above, politically naive until he had to negotiate the censorship of Russian Socialism? To answer this, one must look for a connection between

Stanislavsky and another important--and self-professedly Marxist--theatre visionary, Bertolt Brecht.

"As far as Brecht is concerned, the pure, contemplative, knowing subject is an idealist illusion" (Giles, 93). In the late 1920s, Brecht was searching for a "matter-of-factness," the *Neue Sachlichkeit* that had first been associated with Bauhaus. His theory of the *Verfremdungseffekt*, or alienation effect, aimed at creating a critical distance that would allow his audience to observe the action objectively and form critical opinions. He felt that his actors frequently acted not badly but wrong, and that they ought to act "for an audience of the scientific age" (Willett, 26). Here "scientific" (*Wissenschaft* in German) must, as Willett points out, be interpreted as "embracing the Marxist view of history as well as the natural sciences" (29). The methodological arguments of Brecht and Comte, within the boundaries of Marx, are therefore in accordance.

Brecht is generally agreed to be directly at odds with Stanislavsky. However, Mumford revisits this, reporting that Brecht in the 1950s studied Stanislavsky for political reasons. Mumford finds that Brecht's opposition to Stanislavsky previously had dealt with "theatre practice prior to the Revolution, which gave emphasis to the very psychotechnique abhorred by Brecht" (243). However, Brecht's study of the post-Revolution period revealed "ideas that in some respects overlapped with Brecht's theatre concepts. These include ensemble work, the through-line and super-objective, and the method of physical actions...Brecht also reassessed Stanislavsky's attitude toward the actor/character split" (Mumford, 244) and found that in order to uphold the superobjective of the play, a certain critical distance must be kept by the actor. "The implication is that perhaps Stanislavskian acting demanded not only an empathetic but also a critical and objective approach" (Mumford, 244). In addition, Willett, in *Brecht on Theatre*, includes a selection entitled "Some Things That Can Be Learnt From Stanislavsky," which adds "the sense of

responsibility to society...(and) truthfulness as a duty" (Willett, 236), among other points, to the list of concordances between the two theorists.

This critical distance is an issue which is present, but not fully addressed, in Stanislavsky's system. Olf finds that

at the core of the modernist paradox lies a phenomenological pleonasm: the need to employ "the real" in order to represent "the real." If man is, as Appia called him, 'reality itself,' then how is one to go about using a living actor in the service of representing a reality as compelling as his own reality? Is it possible both to be and to pretend to be--not alternately but simultaneously?...Stanislavski dedicated himself to finding a method by which the actor might bring the most life--the greatest degree of truth--to his work. All practice was aimed at making role and self as nearly synonymous as possible. Yet Stanislavski felt that the confusion of art and life were somehow wrong, that there must always be a clear distinction between the two...(but) nowhere in his system was the actor provided with a concrete means for both being and pretending to be simultaneously (34).

The actor/character split for purposes of critical distance, then, was at least one point on which Stanislavsky and Brecht could agree. However, "the question again arises as to what extent (Brecht's) Stanislavski studies were a tactical move to avoid political and artistic pressure" and to protect his theatre "in an environment where Stanislavski, socialist realism, and the communist cause were regarded as interlinked"(Mumford, 243). But instead of weakening the bonds between the two theorists, this question strengthens them. It shows another parallel between Brecht and Stanislavsky, for Stanislavsky's ideas, at least in print, were certainly affected by his own political climate.

His first book, *My Life in Art*, "written in haste at a time when his ideas and practices were under attack in Russia," (Benedetti, x) was published in 1924, the year of Lenin's death and of Stalin's rise. Senelick continues, stating that if some of the freshness of the volume

was lost by aligning its content with the dictates of the censors, "Stanislavsky and (friend and critic Lyubov) Gurevich can hardly be blamed, for they were striving to keep the Art Theatre alive in parlous times" (60). Stanislavsky's following books were also written under threat of censorship. In 1931 the Russian Association of Proletariat Writers declared Stanislavsky's system to be "idealistic and inimicable to proletarian art" (Benedetti, 302).

The Socialist censors could also have been wary of the Stanislavsky system because, although it promoted an ensemble performance devoid of stars, was nonetheless partially essentialist and individualist, since it displays a "regard for the artist's authentic autonomy, his need to define his art by defining himself" (Worthen, 33). Furthermore, the author states, Stanislavsky not only outlines a method, but also

defines an art, an attitude, a set of values; Stanislavsky creates an ethos for the modern actor...Stanislavsky's thorough exploration of dramatic character--particularly his sense of character as acting out of the traumas of the past--has its roots in the *deterministic orientation of the naturalistic style*. But when he considers the actor's performance, Stanislavsky insists that the actor must be liberated from his stage world, free from the conventions of society and of the theatre that threaten to make his acting artificial and inauthentic (33, emphasis added).

The vision of the dramatic artist as autonomous and separate from society, searching for his or her essential identity, was certainly troubling to the Socialist regime who had previously sanctioned the theatre by telling it to start working again as soon as possible after the 1917 Revolution. Stanislavsky evidently had specific ideas not only about the technique that could best be employed in realistically portraying a character's life on stage, but also about the very way in which a dramatic artist should approach his or her life in art. One needs only to look to the title of his first book, *My Life In Art*, or to one of the final

principles of the System: "an actor must continue to perfect himself as an instrument" (Brockett, 479).

Psychoanalysis can also offer insights into what Trossman terms "the imaginative world" that Stanislavsky seemed to be trying to foster. Here, creative ability is taken to occupy a location in the subconscious realm, regardless of whether the ability is innate or learned. The creative drive, like the sexual drive, must be tamed and properly directed. "Even if we presume the presence of some constitutionally given talent, such talent must be trained and molded by experience and tradition before it can be put to use" (208). Trossman also points out that Freud applied the concept of artistic creation to the understanding of neurosis, and that this application was based on Freud's exposure to literature, including dramatic literature, as a youth. "As a boy of eight, he started to read Shakespeare. At sixteen he was versed in Goethe and recommended Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* to a correspondent" (72).

Worthen makes another point that bears further scrutiny: Stanislavsky's "sense of character as acting out of the traumas of the past" (33). This is indeed in accordance with a Freudian analysis; there have been preliminary investigations into this relationship. In the early 1960s in Los Angeles, a study group of dramatic artists and teachers gathered with Donald Freed to learn about the basic ideas of psychoanalysis and to apply their findings to their understanding of Method acting, an American version of the Stanislavsky system as developed by Lee Strasberg and The Group Theatre in the 1930s. Freed's *Freud and Stanislavsky* is primarily an account of the explorations of the Los Angeles study group. In the forward, Lawrence J. Friedman, M.D., Dean of the Los Angeles Institute for Psychoanalysis, states that Freed

demonstrates convincingly that an actor will be able to portray a character best if he understands the character's "hidden motivations" (unconscious drives), *but that the acting will be effective only if the actor can convince the audience that these hidden*

intents are just as hidden to him as they are to the character he portrays (12, emphasis in original).

Although the acting technique employed in the Los Angeles experiment was not purely Stanislavskian, there are resonances between Freudian psychoanalysis and the Method technique of preparing a role that echo within the Stanislavsky system as well. One aspect of Method acting is the technique of coming to discoveries about internal, psychological aspects of the character through physicalization—a technique that it shares, in some measure, with the Stanislavsky system. Stanislavsky insisted on physical training because of his "belief that the body in everyday life manifests what is happening inside a person" (Logie, 259).

This belief, says Logie, was a product of a contemporary philosophical attempt to "escape the old dualistic view of mind and body" (257). George Henry Lewes, a respected academic and acting theorist whose work in translation Stanislavsky is known to have used, felt that the organism should be seen as a whole. Logie finds that "while Stanislavsky was apparently seeking a monist conception of the mind-body, at other times he talks in clearly dualistic and hierarchical terms, of, for example, 'the ability to keep one's body completely at the service of one's feelings' (*Building A Character*, 105)" (257). This unresolved attempt to heal the mind-body split recalls the unresolved relationship between character and actor referred to above in Olf's discussion.

The implications of these unresolved debates, the latter a "phenomenological pleonasm" (Olf, 34), the former a psychological conundrum, hold important clues about the relationship between the theories of Comte, Stanislavsky, and Freud. Konecni asserts that the three pivotal points of psychology are the ideas of mind, body, and emotion, and that Stanislavsky's system contains elements that "inadvertently anticipated psychological and physiological findings" (106). Furthermore, states Konecni, "Stanislavsky came even

closer to the work of experimental psychology, notably his famous Russian contemporaries Pavlov and Sechenov (by whose work on the conditioned reflexes he was deeply impressed), in developing the 'method of physical actions' and 'emotional memory.' ” (106).

What, then, is the connection between Pavlov and Freud? Or, perhaps just as important to an investigation of Stanislavsky's influences, what was the relationship between the Socialist censors and Freud? “Insofar as Soviet Psychiatry takes any attitude towards psychoanalysis, one can say that it is one of hostile depreciation. Their position purports to derive from the data and work of Pavlov, yet the arguments advanced betray many elemental misconceptions...” (Kubie, 249). Benedetti also points out inconsistencies in the Soviet criticism of Stanislavsky's system as it relates to Pavlov: “If the Stanislavski system was ‘idealist’ why was Pavlov, the determined behaviorist, interested in it?” (122). It becomes clear that the system does indeed share elements with both Pavlov and Freud. Furthermore, the differences between Pavlov and Freud are not, as Kubie points out, irreconcilable. Both approached problems of behavior and psychology from a biogenetic basis; Pavlov also came to recognize the concept of conscious action in later years, and “the psychoanalytic technique of free association is actually the mirror image of the conditioned reflex” (Kubie, 250).

It becomes evident that there is indeed an illuminating, if intricate, relationship between the director and performance theorist Stanislavsky, the psychoanalyst Freud, and the scientific methodologist Comte. Briefly stated, it seems that Comte provided a methodology of objective observation for his two successors. Stanislavsky and Freud, then, worked along similar paths which intersect at important points—namely, the issues of critical distance and the mind-body split. These issues are important to the materialist feminist who engages in performance theory debates because they hold within them kernels of meaning about objectivity and subjectivity, agency of action, and the manipulation of the gaze.

Chapter Three: Feminist and Artistic Responses

The aesthetic theories and techniques of Realism surround us. Most popular film and television, the media which dominate the dramatic scene in America, employ realistic techniques that ask audience members to suspend their disbelief, to "forget" that what they are watching is a re-production of reality and not reality itself. The stage, too, is primarily realistic, although arguments can and have been made that this medium is not best suited for such a technique. Some of these arguments are aesthetically based, but these are more of a validation of realism in film (which can show, for example, a "real" sunrise instead of a "fake" one) than a condemnation of its presence on the stage.

More intriguing are the arguments of feminist performance theorists. The liberal feminist analysis has for some time critiqued the inaccurate and oppressive representations of women in art—particularly in the performing arts. The solution of liberal feminist playwrights like Wendy Wasserstein has been to create works that reflect more accurately the lives of real women; the solution of liberal feminist directors and actors has been to produce them. Rosemary Curb finds that for liberals who "(accept) the basic social structure," (100) Realism is beneficial in showing the struggle of women on the stage. However, materialist feminist Dolan finds Realism limiting and calls it "a conservative force that reproduces and reinforces dominant cultural relations" (*Feminist Spectator as Critic*, 84). She also refers to Freud, stating that his model of human consciousness is patriarchal and heterocentrist. "If realism is a mimetic site for such arrangements, theorists suggest that realism cannot accommodate feminism..." (*Presence and Desire*, 138).

Although the theories of Stanislavsky are now the most widespread, they were not the only ones of his time. A variety of realistic and non-realistic plays and theatres, such as France's Théâtre Libre, Germany's Freie Bühne, and the works of Jarry, Strindberg, and

Ibsen were experimented with in Western Europe and in Russia in the early twentieth century (Brockett, 467-504). Of most importance for this discussion is the work of Vsevolod Meyerhold. At one time a member of the Moscow Art Theatre with Stanislavsky, Meyerhold became “dissatisfied with Stanislavsky’s emphasis on psychological realism” (Carlson, 314) and left to establish his own theatre in the Ukraine. Glover finds that Meyerhold, as well as other Russian directors of non-realistic theatre, was heavily influenced by Cubism. He refers to a number of points of contact that Meyerhold could have had with the new artistic movement, including Diaghilev’s reviews of contemporary art, Russian exhibitions of Léger’s work, and the translation and publication of *Du Cubisme* in Russia (38).

The influences of Cubism on Meyerhold’s work were primarily apparent in scenic and costume elements which reproduced the Cubist style. In addition to these stylistic choices, the effect of simultaneity was introduced. In Cubist visual art, this term denotes the presence of two points of view, such as the frontal and the profile, at the same time. In Meyerhold’s theatre, this translated to the effect of transmutable meaning. “It was possible for a stage prop or set piece to have one or more possible sets of meanings or perspectives within the production; a single object could simultaneously present two or more independent perspectives or references” (Glover, 48).

The actor in Meyerhold’s Cubist theatre played caricatures rather than characters. Performers

functioned as a go-between for the production aesthetics and the play. [...] Actors were given gimmicks which were intended to strengthen the caricature-like quality of their performances. An actor, in one moment, would be playing the character’s emotions or sentiments with sincerity; a second later, he would quickly drop out of character or assume a new attitude. [...] The quick change from one attitude to another and the many absurd antics were not written into Sukhovo-Kobylin’s script;

rather, they were gimmicks Meyerhold devised to put a distance between the actors and their characters, to exaggerate the thematic core of the script, and to demonstrate the fictitious reality of the performance (Glover, 59).

Meyerhold's method of distancing the actors from their characters suggests another method that developed in the early part of the twentieth century. Bertolt Brecht's epic theatre differs from realistic or dramatic theatre in that it rebuked the idea of the suspension of disbelief, forcing the spectator to face the issues in the play before him. This intellectual, rather than emotional, response was intended to incite the spectator to take action to make positive changes in society. To this end, Brecht employed the *Verfremdungseffekt*, or distancing effect. It is important to remember that Brecht did not invent this idea or practice. Rather, he appropriated and re-named a technique that had been used for many hundreds of years in China. Brecht's *Alienation Effects in Chinese Acting* (Willet, 91) was written after a period of exile in Russia where he saw Mei Lan-Fang's company. In the essay, Brecht briefly touches on some of these techniques, including use of symbols and mime, as well as the non-existence of the fourth wall.

The technique of Brechtian acting is one of Gestus. The action is self-consciously presentational, rather than unconsciously representational, and the actor can (because there is no fourth wall) address the audience directly. Brecht's *A Short Description of a New Techniques of Acting which Produces an Alienation Effect* is included in Willet's collection and relates that a sense of simultaneity is also at play:

Whatever he [the actor] doesn't do must be contained and conserved in what he does. In this way every sentence and every gesture signifies a decision; the character remains under observation and is tested. The technical term for this procedure is "fixing the 'not...but' " (137).

Feminist responses to Brechtian theory are varied. Diamond points out that “Brecht exhibits a typical Marxian blindness toward gender relations...he created conventionally gendered plays and too many saintly mothers...”(83). Diamond also refers to Heiner Müller’s critique that Brecht’s epic theatre is a “fable” and a “closed form” which the audience consumes as a “package, a commodity” (84). However, Diamond looks beyond these objections to the heart of Brecht’s theory, the *Gestus*, locating it as the “explosive (and elusive) synthesis of alienation, historicization, and the ‘not, but’ ”(89) and finds that

Because the *Gestus* is effected by a historical actor/ subject, what the spectator sees is not a mere miming of social relationship, but a *reading* of it, an interpretation by a historical subject who supplements (rather than disappears into) the production of meaning. [This] splits the gaze of the spectator, who, as a reader of a complex sign system, cannot consume or reduce the object of her vision to a monolithic projection of the self. In fact, *Gestus* undermines the stability of the spectatorial “self,” for in the act of looking the spectator engages with her own temporality. She, too, becomes historicized.[...] This feminist rereading of *Gestus* makes room, at least theoretically, for the female spectator. Because the semiosis of *Gestus* involves the gendered bodies of spectator, actor/subject, and character, all working together but *never harmoniously*, there can be no fetishization and no end to signification (90).

Latin American theorist and director Augusto Boal also both agrees and disagrees with Brecht. In *Theatre of the Oppressed*, Boal dismisses the Aristotelian model of tragedy as inappropriate during revolution because, during a time of change, there exists no dominant social ethos (belief system) against which the protagonist can be seen in relief. The acting techniques at work here are also very physical, wherein an actor assumes the “mask” of a character with the entire body, moving physicalization into the realm of caricature. Boal also sides with Brecht against Hegel, agreeing that dramatic action is

created by circumstance rather than a character's free spirit; however, he finds the concept of the epic theatre too mystic, too abstract for the audiences of Latin America whom he hopes to motivate, and instead develops an "earthly perspective clearly localized in time and space" (166). The synthesis of his musings and experiments is the "Joker" technique, one which places great emphasis on interpretation and thus implies the presence of a postmodern condition.

The primary epistemological battle in the postmodern era is one not of conflicting beliefs but of beliefs about beliefs, pitting objectivists against subjectivists. Postmodern theory sides with subjectivity; a postmodern application of Boal finds that the subjective reality of the ruling class becomes a de facto objective reality for the oppressed. Boal resists perpetuating this dynamic by using the technique of multi-casting, which avoids the unaddressed subjective interpretation of individual actors and leads instead to a collective interpretation. This could be seen as an attempt to get closer to objective Truth (more interpreters, acting as filters of meaning, discover a common ground of the essential) but is probably more concerned with presenting a particular, locally held subjective belief system and naming it as such—as is evidenced by performance text such as "We, all together, are going to tell a story, what we all think about the subject" (170)—in order to give the audience the agency to disagree. The structure of the performance also contributes to a localized perspective. The dedication relates the performance to a real-life occurrence and the explanation sets the performance within the context of a fiction (the theatre)—a simple deconstructionist tactic.

In addition to these conventions, Boal presents two very different characters: the Protagonist and the Joker. The Protagonist does not exist outside of the world of the play, he is "real," and since he knows only his own socially constructed reality, he appears to the audience to be obviously subjective, perhaps even to a fault. The main dramaturgical purpose of this character is to create a level of empathy—which Boal found missing from

Brecht--that will drive home the audience's intellectual response. In contrast to the Protagonist is the Joker, who functions as a *raisonneur*. The Joker is godlike, speaking with the voice of the author and thus existing outside of the world of the play as its creator. He can alter spacetime and frequently halts the action to reveal the motivations of the other characters. Removed from the social constructions of this world, he can see its reality objectively. However, since he is introduced along with the rest of the actors during the "explanation," as well as being multi-cast, the Joker-actor is revealed to be human--as susceptible to social constructions as any other performer.

The danger of presuming a socially constructed reality to be an absolute is a common thread throughout postmodern feminist theory. These theorists find gender to be a constructed, rather than essential, facet of human existence. As such it is malleable; however, the ways in which gender brings itself into being are complex and depend on a process of reification that recalls Searle's theory of intentional perception, in which one sees something because one believes in it. Butler refers to Searle's precursive theory, that of " 'speech acts,' those verbal assurances and promises which seem not only to refer to a speaking relationship, but to constitute a moral bond between speakers..." (270) by way of introducing the concept of reification and the importance of phenomenology to feminist gender studies:

Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts which are internally discontinuous, then the *appearance of substance* is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief. [...] Clearly, it is necessary to reread the texts of western philosophy from the various points of view that have been excluded, not only to reveal the particular perspective and sets of interests informing those ostensibly transparent descriptions of the real, but to offer alternative descriptions and prescriptions...[m]y only concern is that sexual

difference not become a reification which unwittingly preserves a binary restriction on gender identity and an implicitly heterosexual framework for the description of gender, gender identity, and sexuality (281).

The experimental feminist performance group Split Britches, consisting of Peggy Shaw, Lois Weaver, and Deborah Margolin, strives to foreground the constructedness of gender and sexuality by means of both the content and the structure of their performances. The group's premiere piece, *Split Britches*, tells the story of "women too old, too poor, too dumb, too lesbian, or too insistent on controlling their own lives to be visible" (Patraka, 217). The performance itself hinges on the shifting locales of identity in a way that subverts the concept of a binary system.

Within a simultaneous space [the actors/characters] freeze in the family narrative/ slide, speak out at us from their frozen positions, then perform outside the frame as it dissolves...This oscillation between the various constructions of their reality does not, then lead to two simultaneous static spaces. It isn't as if there's a fixed place of female culture that they and we can inhabit as an alternative to patriarchy, the place that fixes us in these representations. Instead, Split Britches shows us the instability and fragility of their space (in living, in representation) in a movement that underscores the difficult process of oscillating in and out of gender ideology and so is part of the subversiveness of the work, part of its importance (220).

The concept of a fixed and essential subject, bounded by binary definitions, may be found to be commensurate with linear thought. Linear thought "proceeds from a set of fixed opinions or assumptions, and reaches conclusions based strictly on these base assumptions...Most of the paradigms of this world, including the ones upon which business, religion, and government are based, proceed from this limited sphere of information processing" (Soulier, screen 1). It has already been established that philosophy finds a model for understanding this mode of thought; neuroscience does, too:

The basal ganglia selects the high level plan/prediction that satisfies/will satisfy some behavioral goal, and imposes this decision on the (frontal) cortex. The decision is broadcast to lower levels through cortico-cortical feedback connections as a prediction/sensory state. This top down feedback determines to a high degree the activity of higher level cortex, and also the activity of lower levels to a lesser degree. You literally see and think what you expect to happen, rather than what actually happens, unless reality strongly disagrees with your prediction (you are distracted) (Bush, screen 1).

It would seem that the most restrictive and literally prejudiced mode of thinking is also the one that is biologically the easiest. To engage in other modes of thinking, one must integrate more external and abstract awareness. Soulier finds that one must employ subconscious memory for associative thought, pure deduction for lateral thought, and poly-perspective conceptualization for spherical thought. He adds that, “spherical thinking can only be approximated while in a relaxed or meditative state of mind” (screen 5).

It is possible that the spectator of a theatrical event could be in this state of mind. If so, then the work of Split Britches to create an “oscillation between the various constructions of their reality” (Patraka, 220) could engage this kind of holistic thinking. Pure Brechtian performance, with its focus on the “not, but” and the entreaty for an audience in an active, rather than passive or meditative, state of mind, would seem to belong at best to the realm of lateral thinking, and at worst to the level of linear thinking.

Split Britches creates a reality that “strongly disagrees with [the spectator’s] prediction” (Bush, screen 1) not only via structure but also content. “In one powerful scene, Della/ Shaw defiantly peels off pieces of clothing that embody layers of protection against the oppression and rejection directed at her because of her lesbianism” (Patraka, 218). The metaphor of stripping and the actuality of the nude body in performance is a very

potent one that performace artist Karen Finley has used to shock the spectator into distraction. In *Constant State of Desire*,

Finley stands beside a table and takes her clothes off. She has just finished one of her trance momologues, dropping it as she now drops her dress. In distinction to the monolog she begins to speak nonchalantly and extemporaneously...On the table beside which she undresses [are] Easter eggs, Easter paraphernalia... After she strips down to a pair of distinctly unremarkable high-waist white underpants, Finley turns her concentration to the jumble of stuff on the table...[She uses a] “I’m on stage but it’s no big deal” kind of voice. Indeed, Finley’s punctuations of her trance chants with these unrehearsed asides function as Brechtian interruptions: as she told C. Carr for the *Village Voice*, “I want the audience to see what I’m going through. I want to demystify this process you go through when you’re trying to expose yourself. Also it can’t be packaged and polished.” (Carr 1993:127) [Finley smashes the eggs and other items together, smearing them on her body] She looks like a birthday present, or a boa-ed starlet gone amuck. A dreamgirl in nightmare. In a flash she is fevered again (Schneider, 101-102).

Schneider finds that Finley’s use of explicit language, and moreover, of her own body, suggests the “impact of social symbolics, social hieroglyphics on literal bodies” (102). Toepfer categorizes Finley’s work as “obscene nudity” (as opposed to other types such as mythic, ritual, or model nudity). Obscene nudity “produces an extremely violent clash between the body and speech of the performer. The nude performer presents her body as a lurid object of desire, but her incredibly filthy language roots the desire to see her and her own desire to be seen deeply in contradictory moods of disgust, degradation, defilement, and desecration...Desire becomes a form of excretion” (86).

Dolan asserts that Finley, who has experience as a conventional stripper, “refuses to give male spectators their money’s worth”(Feminist Spectator As Critic, 67) by offering

herself not as an object to be consumed but as an object already consumed. “She forces men to be passive in the face of her rage, and she desecrates herself as the object of their desire,” leaving no room for consuming gaze of the male spectator. “Finley perverts the stripper’s position, but remains defined by its traditional history. Because she is mired in the corporeality of her own flesh as it has been abused in the system of representation, she never takes flight into sexual and gender fantasies of liberation”(*Feminist Spectator as Critic*, 67).

The power (or lack thereof) of depictions of the nude female body, and of violence against women, to affect positive change for women is hotly contested. Some media critics contend that while researchers are unable to prove a causal relationship between the depiction and the actuality of violence against women, “widespread fictional presentation of male violence toward women does legitimate it” (French, 10). However, Wolf points out that French assumes a passive spectator who identifies with the male perpetrator. Wolf agrees that while the tendency of the mainstream media constructs a spectacle-spectator relationship along these lines, critics such as French focus on content, rather than form, and in so doing neglect the possibilities that “images of violence could make a progressive rather than regressive critique” (17). Wolf investigates the plays of Maria Irene Fornes, arguing that

in *Fefu and Her Friends* and *The Conduct of Life*, Fornes’ formal devices (including the delineation of active and shifting spectatorial positions, the foregrounding of theatrical apparatuses, and the excessive, non-realistic imagery) allow spectators to perceive the manner in which acts of violence position each character as perpetrator or victim, as empowered or disempowered, and to see how each character’s relationship to violence signifies her or his power in terms of gender...Her plays do not reproduce the deluge of violence images of mainstream

culture but, rather, re-present violence in order to point to its gendered construction (19).

However, the problems implicit in placing the female body within the scope of representation persist, even within the scope of texts with feminist content and form. As Love states, "as a feminist actor, my performance experiences in conventional theatre grow increasingly frustrating, because *my corporeal presence within its representational frames demands my complicity with an ideology I seek to resist*" (275, emphasis added).

For both Dolan and Love, simply creating "true-to-life" women characters is not a sufficient challenge to the patriarchy. It is not just the representation but also--and more importantly--the act of representing that must be altered. In *Resisting the "Organic": A Feminist Actor's Approach*, Love explores techniques that challenge implicitly sexist theatre practices. Through her use of resistant subtext and camp, Love establishes performative reflexivity in an effort to give her character--and the women in the audience--access to the gaze.

In a production of Oscar Wilde's *The Importance of Being Earnest*, Love played Gwendolyn, a character that most productions read as dizzy and empty-headed. "When I was asked to play Gwendolyn Fairfax I tried to imagine a performance that would not compromise my political or artistic integrity" (280). Love found that by exploring and playing subtext that was in tension with a traditional reading of the play, she could resist the subservient positions in which she was frequently placed by the director. Love refers to a moment in which she, as Gwendolyn, is placed downstage with John upstage looking at her. She is clearly the object of his gaze; however, Love nonetheless claims agency for Gwendolyn by voicing her resistant subtext. Gwendolyn is revealed as an independent woman with strong sexual drives--a far cry from a mere object.

Love's reading of Gwendolyn was perhaps closer to Wilde's intent than more traditional readings. "In order to mock the oppressive mores of his time, Wilde constructed a parody, and parody demands a flamboyant acting style that need not be rooted in psychological paradigms" (280). Love, as well as many other feminist performance theorists like Jill Dolan and Sue-Ellen Case, finds that camp is a highly workable feminist performance strategy. Camp is self-parodying and self-referential. It calls attention to itself and thus to the performative act. As such it is a way of framing the performance as performance, not reality—it does not ask for the suspension of disbelief. "...I exaggerated my facial expressions and vocal and gestural inflections...I commented on the circumstances and showed the audience the character's reactions" (Love, 286).

In conventional, patriarchal spectatorship, the spectator's (read, Man's) demand for spectacle leads to the creation of the performer (read, Woman). The relationship is unbalanced; without the spectator, there would be no performance and thus no performer. The performer needs the spectator for definition and existence. According to materialist feminist discourse, the conventional constructions of gender roles in representation place women as objects and men as subjects; the act of looking is always already in the domain of men. Women, who are always already performers for the gaze of men, are displaced as spectators; they must either identify with men in order to look through their eyes or identify with women and not see at all. This makes any representational art form, particularly theatre, problematic. Love's answer is, as Dolan suggests, "to disrupt the narrative of gender ideology" (*Feminist Spectator as Critic*, 10).

Love's performance is an attempt to establish a balanced and symbiotic relationship between performer and spectator—a performative reflexivity. Not only does the performer rely on the spectator as outlined above, but the spectator—especially when she is a woman—also depends on the performer. Love's use of resistant subtext and camp allowed her to represent Gwendolyn in a way that "magnified and revealed as artifice" (282) the character's

gender. Revealing this artifice is a way of speaking directly to women spectators, who will read that the woman character is performed by herself as well as by the actor who plays her. By employing such techniques, the woman performer holds a mirror to the woman spectator—showing her not as a character type or an object to be consumed by men, but as a performative creature—in order for the woman spectator to be able to see the performance through her own eyes instead of those of a man.

The findings of materialist feminists, derived from analyses of Aristotle and Stanislavski and filtered through Lacan, are not simply theoretical exercises—they are deconstructions of the paradoxical situation that exists for many women in real life. In order to assess the ways in which individual women move within the paradigms of perception that have been established by the patriarchy, I interviewed three women. One, Kimi, is an experienced, working stage actor who also paints. Another, Shu, is a student of visual art who also has some experience with performance. The third, Weslie, works outside the artistic profession. I interviewed these women in their homes, asking questions about their artistic and professional lives, alliances with feminism, education and media exposure, and beginnings.

What I found was that all had a sense of the need for women to perform in order to exist. Each articulated and applied this sense in different ways. For Weslie, this performative aspect results primarily as sexual commodification:

Q: How are women portrayed in the media? Answer that however you want.

W: I think that women are portrayed a lot as sex (pause) I don't know about as sex objects but like (pause) that that's one of their main appealing points is that they can be sexy and (pause)

Q: How does that make you feel?

W: (Pause) It makes me feel (pause) um it makes me feel like men are probably the ones that are casting it and it makes me feel like (pause) well that's also another thing about TV in general is that it's so visual and everything has to be so appealing and that's besides the news and even the news is skewed um I just don't think that's what life's about.

Q: You said specifically visual. Talk about that some more.

W: Well, (pause) I know that I saw something on TV about--and I think it might have been 90210 or maybe it was about a soap opera--where some of the characters the female characters had wanted to wear less makeup and look more natural and the producers said no absolutely not that doesn't make it, you know, like it's gonna ruin the TV show if you guys don't look doll-ish and that was irritating to me because I don't think it's true for me. I'd like to be given the chance to see whether it is true for me or not.

Q: Why do you think the producers think they need to look dollish?

W: Because I think TV is so visual and I think people are attracted to (pause) pretty, appealing... you know like people want to be people on TV and that's--you can't be someone on TV cause its TV and it's all made up you know literally the people are made up and it's not what they look like in their real life...(Brandon)

Weslie voices the practical, everyday aspect of two important points discussed above in critical theory. Although Weslie has no professional or educational experience with the media, she has enough media savvy to know that television shows are cast and developed by producers who, by and large, are men. When Weslie states that she would "like to be given the chance to see whether it is true for me or not," she refers to the difficulty of accessing one's own gaze as a female.

Also interesting is the fact that, despite her media savvy, Weslie refers to actors as "characters." When she discusses the "female characters [on a show who] had wanted to wear less makeup and look more natural and the producer said no," Weslie equates the

actors who portray the "dollish" characters with the characters themselves. While this might have been a slip of the tongue, it is a significant one that illustrates process of reification that is one of the subtlest strengths of the mass media. Weslie has some sense of this process, as well as the frustration for real women of being expected to embody all the charms of the fantastical Mythic Woman, when she states that "...people want to be people on TV and that's--you can't be someone on TV cause it's TV and it's all made up..."

Weslie begins to articulate this process but does not locate herself specifically in relation to it. Kimi, however, who is a working actor, does. Kimi expresses an extreme frustration with her work in theatre because of the lack of agency that the actor has:

Q: How do you deal with plays or performances that you don't believe in or agree with?

K: Um, you know I don't know if I've learned how to deal with it yet I mean this is definitely a new experience and I'm telling you I'm frustrated I'm very frustrated as a performer I want to uh I want to focus on things that I can really give fully with and totally believe in and I think that's my next step after this play is done that I'm in I'm gonna work on towards investigating what plays in particular I really want to be involved with.

Q: How much of that feeling of not liking what the writer is saying has to do with gender, or does it have to do with gender?

K: Yes, at times it does. I'm typically cast as a young ingenue airhead and I am tired [...] and I guess just growing older, I mean I just don't want to play that role again and now I know it's gonna be a struggle and a fight for me to um to prove that I can play, or that I have a major desire to play something like a Chekhov you know, a Nina, Nina is a role that I would just, that's one of the goal roles for me um she's young, she's an ingenue but there's a lot of emotional levels going on with her and very rich you know um I'd like to step over on that side. I'm ready for it, I'm willing to work for it. (Kovac)

What Kimi describes here is a fact of life for all actors, male or female—typecasting. A producer or director will usually cast an actor whose real life experience speaks to the experience of the character, especially in Realism which requires the actor to make an emotional connection in order to become the character. In addition, actors are usually cast who somehow look the part—in theoretical terms, the actor's own physiognomy carries codes which are assessed by the producer/director to communicate certain meanings to the audience. Analysis of how these physiognomic codes are constructed is not the work of this research; however, acknowledgment that these codes are constructed and manipulated is.

The frustration that Kimi feels as a performer has to do with the act of looking, with her placement on stage as an object that is seen by the male gaze and which works to communicate a message that is sometimes at odds with her own beliefs. Kimi's experience as an actor, like that of most Western actors, is primarily in Realism. That Kimi feels a lack of agency has partly to do with the structure of show business (in which actors are cast to play roles) and partly to do with the nature of Realistic, representational performance itself, which seeks to hide its constructedness and render the fantasy, the (female) object of the (male) scopophilic drive, into "reality."

Notably, Kimi's frustration is with performance and not with visual art, a form which places her in the position of spectator/artist rather than spectacle/artist:

Q: What's your artistic process? Do you go into the work with a message in mind?

K: With theatre it's very different [than] with art. With art I definitely have, I can see it I can see what I want and yeah it is um usually has to do with freedom, um, breaking out with my images with art um and I see it and it I can see the picture [...] definitely with art a message. It's independent, you know, it's more introspective, you can do that. With theatre it's more

of a collaboration and you're working with somebody else's world, the playwright's world, and um it's like accepting that world that you're in and living to the fullest of it and there are parts that I have found that I can really speak--it's so close, it's so easy to be in that role because I really feel it you know, and there are others like fuckin' A, (laughs) you know, I just want to argue with the playwright you know and um so it's more of a surrender, trying to be open minded. (Kovac)

The frustrations that Kimi expressed do not carry into her work as a visual artist. This position was shared by Shu, whose experience is primarily with visual art but who has some background in the performing arts.

Q: Are there any differences between your work as a visual artist and your work as a performer that have anything to do with gender?

S: I think so, yeah, actually I do. For the visual art it's easy to see myself as a non-gender. I don't have to do anything, I mean I don't have to put any effort [into] showing that there's a difference between men and women, but then for the performing art, I think I have to struggle, even like playing music, if you have a guitar and you have to wear some kind of clothes you just cannot wear some men's clothes, I mean you could but just in order to get attention from the audience you have to look like bimbo look, I guess.

Q: How have you reacted to that in your acting work in class or has that been a level that you had to deal with?

S: Yeah sure, (pause) I mean the character has to be female right, so, and I think that sometimes maybe I might feel bad and I don't want to play that role because it's just your typical female, but then I have no control over [it]. (Katahira)

That it is easy for Shu to see herself as non-gendered when it comes to visual art exemplifies another important aspect of the critical theory. The spectator is, in Lacanian terms, the Self which sees the Other. This Self has the gender of no-gender; it is only the Other which, due to lack, has the gender--female. Just as it is easy for "white" people to perceive themselves free of race or color (as opposed to "black" people who have race and are Colored), it is easy for men to perceive themselves free of gender. Art forms which structurally are the domain of men (such as the spectator/artist form of visual art) thus appear non-gendered, since they occupy the position of Self. It is only when the artist is asked to occupy the paradoxical position of Other that gender becomes apparent.

Interestingly, Shu was the only woman I interviewed who identifies herself as a feminist--in her words, "a woman who anchors other women to get equal rights." However, although she considers herself both a feminist and an artist, she does not consider herself a feminist artist. This seems primarily to do with subject matter; she states "I want to do some work, feminist art, but I haven't come up with anything yet."

Weslie identifies a feminist as "a person that stands up for women's rights." She is reticent about calling herself a feminist because "in a general sense I'm not fighting for women's rights." At the same time she feels that in specific, personal situations she would "stand up" for herself or another woman--"I just don't put too many labels on myself."

Kimi's reaction to the word "feminist" ("I hate it") has less to do with labels than it does with her "bad images of feminists" and her perception that "it's a separation of man and woman, of people coming together." Kimi says, "I want to consider myself as a human being before I consider myself as a female." This position makes sense considering her struggle to find roles that are fully human and not fabrications or fantasies based on difference.

These interviews show that the findings of critical feminist epistemology and performance theory do play out in the everyday lives of women; however, these analyses are

by and large unarticulated by these women. The highest level of frustration with the situation of being Othered was found in the woman whose day-to-day work has the most to do with direct performance (as an actor) for the male gaze. This woman, and another, felt most empowered when placed in the position of spectator/artist, the Self.

I believe that one of my missions as a feminist theorist, artist and activist is to help people learn to articulate these situations. As Anderson states,

If and when more women see that their daily effort to be somebody is both driven by social constructions of reality and limited by them, and act on that perception, the postmodern era will reach not only every culture, but every household (144).

The strategy for me involves theatre: developing an acting technique that not only allows the (female) actor to retain subjectivity, but also communicates this subjectivity and all the layers of its construction to the audience. The findings of this study can inform the development of this technique; however, to be fully ascertained, an additional interview sequence should be conducted with three men of similar backgrounds. With this information, steps can be taken to challenge the hegemony of Realism and offer alternative modes of perception and thus social construction.

Part Two: Practical Applications

Chapter Four

Scavengers: A Textual Analysis

Karen Chronacher's play *Scavengers* exemplifies many of the issues of performance and spectatorship which feminist theory investigates. In this play, a pair of lovers named Jeanne (a woman) and Jean (a man) act out their fantasies for themselves, each other, and their tape recorder. As the play progresses their performances become more technologized and complex--and their identities become decentralized. The couple's interactions are punctuated by the presence of The Friends, one woman and two men, who are continuously "dressed alike and smiling" and who appear at comically (and frighteningly) inopportune moments.

Because this is an unpublished play this chapter will relate the storyline in detail and engage in an in-depth dramaturgical analysis of the text. The structure of this two-act play is very episodic: Act I contains thirteen scenes within the course of twenty-one pages, and Act II contains thirty-one scenes within the course of nineteen pages. The play does not have a "plot" in the traditional sense. Neither is the play particularly character-driven, since (as will be illustrated later) the characters have no inner life. There are, of course, important moments and turning points in the play.

The first words of the play introduce Jeanne to the audience in an unequivocally performative way. Jeanne is discovered in spotlight "before the proscenium or in a clear area of the stage."

Jeanne: I live my life like I'm a movie star, everyone's eyes on me, me, me, cameras rolling, motors whirring, shutters clicking: at every moment, visions of me being formed. (*She sits up, strikes a pose.*) I sense

the camera trailing me like a hound, I feel the hunger of the camera's eye as it devours me.

Jeanne continues with a long, bizarre monologue in which she recounts her high school escapades of torturing lunch ladies, being drunk in A.P. English, impaling the Homecoming Queen's toenail with her pointy high-heeled shoes, and being interviewed by the school psychiatrist. This first scene is followed by another monologue (less than one-third as long) in which Jean is introduced via his remembrance of the first time he saw Jeanne.

Jean: Everything about her was slightly off, I mean you just knew that above the hemline of her dress her stockings were torn, that she wore too much heavy perfume all the time because she hadn't washed in days.

Jeanne is described by both as a larger-than-life Dionysian character who sharply contrasts Jean's circumspect Apollonian qualities. It is important to note that she is *described* as such; the audience has no first-hand knowledge of this until Scene 3 (page 2), a scene with no dialogue in which the audience sees Jeanne sitting in a library, making a spectacle of herself by kissing books instead of reading them. Scene 4 (page 2) of Act I is the first scene that contains any dialogue, and it shows the game that the couple plays from the first moment. The scene takes place in the dining room. "Jeanne and Jean sit at each end of table. A partially carved roast beef on center of the table. Jeanne struggles with piece of meat on her plate as Jean watches with mild disgust." The conversation begins casually enough and refers to the previous scene.

Jean: Did you have a good read?

Jeanne: It was very good.

Jean: Oh? What did you read?

Jeanne: Books.
Jean: What books?
Jeanne: I don't know, I don't remember.
Jean: You don't remember?
Jeanne: Jean, I'm tired.

Jean continues a subtle interrogation and tells Jeanne that he, too went to the library to find out about the "scandal" which had taken place there. He tells Jeanne about a sensual, dramatic character who shaves her legs and clips her toenails in public, a woman who is "tottering on the brink"

Jeanne: Tottering on the brink? Oh I don't think she's tottering on the brink.
Jean: She's crying out for help. Today she stripped naked.
Jeanne: She did?
Jean: Oh yes. Did she ever. Right in the stacks.
Jeanne: You saw her?
Jean: *(After a long pause)* No. That's what I hear.

The discussion becomes more heated and Jean, in a fit of frustration, runs over to Jeanne's plate and slices the meat, with which she has been struggling, into tiny slivers.

Jean: Eat your meat.
Jeanne: I can't eat this. It's all chopped up. It's baby food.
Jean: What's that supposed to mean? You're always bringing up babies! We're not having any babies, understand? Where do you get these ideas, is that his idea? We're too young, we're in college, for Christ's sake! My mother would kill me, she'd have a fit, every time I speak to her she thinks you're pregnant, it's her greatest fear. She doesn't want me to get trapped, you know--

Jeanne: Your mother died last year.

(Jean pulls out the tape recorder which has been hidden behind the beef and angrily switches it off, then switches it back on and speaks into it.)

Jean: No, Jeanne, it was your mother who died last year.

Jeanne: All right, I'm sorry. I just hate that shit about me wanting a baby.

Jean: So you kill off my mother because you don't want babies?

Jeanne: Will you turn that tape off already?

It becomes apparent that the actions that these characters describe, like those of George and Martha in *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?*, are not necessarily tied to what the audience might refer to as "reality." Furthermore, the presence of the tape recorder provides an important indicator as to the status of this performance game: when it is on, so are Jeanne and Jean—at least in the beginning of the play.

Scene 5 (page 7) shows that Jean and Jeanne disagree not only about the content of the game, but also when they should play it. Here, Jeanne sits on the edge of their bed, complaining almost obsessively about the dirtiness of the house. When Jean sees Jeanne in this excited state, he recognizes another moment of "high art" and runs to get his tape recorder:

Jean: Let's have that again, Jeanne. What's bothering you?

Jeanne: No, no, turn it off, stop it! I'm serious about the dust, Jean, cut it out. I WANT THIS PLACE CLEAN NOW!

As Jeanne continues her tirade, Jean becomes more involved in his tape recorder than with her:

Jean: Jeanne. When two people love each other as much as we do--

Jeanne: What?

Jean: *(He switches off tape)* Ssssh...I'm speaking to *her*. *(He switches on tape)*. When two people love each other as much as we do, the normal order of things collapses, life falls into a state of disarray....

Jean proceeds with a short monologue, completely inappropos of the situation, in which he describes Jeanne as a "creature of the woods" to whom the rules of decent behavior do not apply. When Jeanne looks at him quizzically, he turns off the tape recorder, says "Stop looking at me like that. Can't you see I'm thinking?" then turns the recorder back on and proceeds. As he finishes, Jeanne begins to laugh hysterically. Jean ineffectually orders her to stop, then puts her on the bed and leaves.

The first indication that something is awry in this world occurs in Scene 6 (page 11) of Act I. The Friends have just arrived for the first time in the play and Jeanne and Jean's argument is thrown into relief by the "violent pounding" of The Friends at the door:

Jean: Persistent little buggers, aren't they?

Jeanne: Maybe we should let them in, Jean. You're always talking about how alienated you feel, so maybe--

Jean: Me? Alienated? Wait a minute. I'm not the one running around defiling myself in the library.

Jeanne: You're slipping, Jean! I knew this would happen, I knew you wouldn't be able to keep it straight in your head. You're talking about her, Jean, not me, her!

The Friends: Jean! Jeanne! We know you're in there! Don't be strangers!

Jean: Why shouldn't I be talking about her? She's the one who interests me. She's the one I can't stop thinking about. You, my darling, are a bad Xerox.

Throughout Act I, the couple negotiates the terms of their fantasies. Two Jeanes begin to emerge: the "Real Jeanne" who has a body, who is speaking in the lines in Scene

6 cited above, and the “Fantasy Jeanne” to whom Jean refers, the one who takes her clothes off in the library, pulls the tails off of squirrels, and intrigues Jean. Although from time to time both Jeanne and Jean participate fully and enthusiastically in the fantasy game (as in Scene 10), the two usually have differing opinions about when and what they should be playing. When these differences arise, Jean typically recedes into his own fantasies and ignores the “Real Jeanne,” who then retaliates by introducing a wild card into the game that Jean does not approve of (for example, making love with a chair or “killing off” Jean’s mother).

The convention of “Real Jeanne” vs. “Fantasy Jeanne,” as well as that of performing for the eyes and ears of The Other (the tape recorder, The Friends, each other) is barely established as a reference point when it is dissolved. In Scene 13 (page 20), the final scene of Act I, Jean is discovered “angrily switching off the tape.” He confronts Jeanne, accusing her of recording strange messages. When she denies this, he plays the tape for her. Jeanne’s voice is heard, complaining about the messiness of the house and berating Jean for his slovenly appearance. Jean switches off the tape:

Jean: Well?

Jeanne: She doesn’t sound too happy, does she?

Jean: That is not Jeanne of the woods, that is not the Jeanne ripping off squirrel tails, that is not the Jeanne who defies all conventions, all attempts to define and limit her being--

Jeanne: Jean, you’re all mixed up again. That’s me you’re talking about. I’m the one who goes to the library, remember? She’s too inhibited for all that.

Jean: What are you talking about? She’s unbridled!

Jeanne: No, Jean. The other day she said to me, you know, I’ve been thinking about this sex thing. About how now, suddenly it’s become

a good thing to do [... But] don't you just feel like a dog when you're doing it, she asked me, what about human dignity, after all?

Jean: I'm leaving you, Jeanne.

The differentiating lines between "Real Jeanne" and "Fantasy Jeanne" have begun to blur--in fact, they have reversed. Whether this has to do with manipulation or schizophrenia is irrelevant--Jean's position as the director of the fantasy has been usurped. Jean goes to the closet to get his coat and finds the chair with which Jeanne has been "cheating" on him. While Jean exclaims furiously, Jeanne secretly turns on the tape recorder, and his language becomes elevated--more performed.

Jean: OH TREACHERY! OH YOU BASE DECEIVER! OH YOU EVIL
TEMPTRESS! YOU VILE EVE! YOU VISCIOUS
DESDEMONA!

At this point, The Friends reappear. As always, they are freakishly cheery as they greet the couple. Their greetings turn more menacing as they ask Jean and Jeanne,

The Friends: Hey, is something wrong? What's the matter, you guys look a little pale, a little washed up, a little frayed around the edges, a little green around the gills, a little confused, lost, weary, out of shape, out of breath, out of control. You look vapid, vacant, bleary-eyed, sickly, jaundiced, ghastly, gangrenous, wasted, spent and destroyed. You can't stand up straight. (*Jean and Jeanne fall down*) That's right, get some rest. Hey do you want to talk about it? Don't you want to emote? Share your feeeeeeeelings with us? You trust us, right? You trust your friends? (*Blackout*)

The Friends are thus established as an audience that does more than just watch Jean and Jeanne. With the power of their gaze upon Jean and Jeanne, they also have the power to direct the couple's performance, or, more specifically, the level of the couple's

performativity. It is of note that while The Friends annoy both Jean and Jeanne, it is Jean (who is more accustomed to being the Gazer than the Gazed-Upon) who is the more disturbed by their presence.

As Act II (page 22) begins, the audience sees Jean underneath the dining room table, listening and talking to his tape recorder which is playing a French Language Instruction tape. As the woman's voice on the tape speaks basic conversational sentences in French, Jean repeats them. Jeanne enters:

Jeanne: What's going on in here?

Jean: I told you it's all over between us, Jeanne. I tried, God knows I've tried. And somewhere in my heart there will always be a place for you. But don't you see, Jeanne, what we had was all a dream. I've taken my love, and all the chairs, and fled to Paris.

(Jeanne turns on tape)

French Language Tape: Nous sommes a' Paris.

Jeanne: Merde.

When The Friends appear in this scene, their first few lines are also in French ("Vous etes a' Paris aussi? C'est Super! Fantastique! Comment allez vous?") which Jean does not understand. A comical "Who's on first?" type of scene follows in which Jeanne tries to tell Jean what The Friends are saying ("Qu'est-ce-que savait dire, you idiot: what does that mean".) Finally, Jeanne takes the now recording tape player from Jean, tells him that she is in Paris to inform him of his mother's funeral, and follows with this passage:

Jeanne: (...) You shouldn't have come to Paris, Jean. You're lost here. You're out of your league. You don't even know how to speak the language. You wouldn't know where to begin.

The Friends: Jean! Jeanne! It's your honeymoon? A honeymoon in Paris? It's so romantic! Congratulations! Till Death do you part!

Jean: Listen to me, Jeanne, you're in my way. I'm on my honeymoon, comprenez vous? So me and Jacqueline--

Jeanne: (*Rushes to turn off tape*) THAT'S NOT HER NAME! YOU CAN'T DO THAT, JEAN--

Jean: Sure I can. Jeanne, I'd like you to meet my wife, Jacqueline Berlitz. (*He turns on tape.*)

French Language Tape: Bon. Repetez: "Voulez vous couchez avec moi:"
I am a tourist.

In this scene, Jean has established that his Fantasy Jeanne is inadequate--she allows herself to be taken over by Real Jeanne far too often. He has thus found a new fantasy partner: Jacqueline Berlitz, who speaks to him in the language of love, has no body, and whom he can manipulate and control completely. Jeanne's distress is caused by the fact that she is not being included in this new game. The anchor of her identity--the eyes of the Other for whom she performs--has been taken away, and she is adrift.

The scenes following this (relatively) long dialogue scene are very short. In Scene Two (page 25), Jeanne enters with her chair. After placing a beret on it, she sees the tape player and turns it on. After listening to the tape tell her how to say "The French women are the most beautiful women in the world," she angrily rips the tape to shreds, stomps on it, and exits with her chair.

Scene Three (page 25) begins as Jeanne enters, whistling jauntily. He sees the mangled tape and forces it into the tape player. When he presses play, "a horrific, slightly French sound is heard." Jean wraps himself in the long strands of tape and calls out to Jeanne, who responds by hurling "chair after chair--as many as possible--onstage".

From Scene Four (page 25) on, a shift in the power structure begins to occur. Jeanne is seen dictating into the tape recorder alone on stage. Her words are those of a filmmaker. She describes, in screenplay language, the scene that she sees in her mind:

Jeanne: Exterior. Along the banks of the Seine, night. Willow trees dip branches into the Seine. Jeanne and Jean are kissing passionately. Close up of Jean's face. He opens eyes while kissing and looks up. His point of view, a man stands above them on top of bank (...)
Jean's point of view, man looks at Jeanne's breasts. Cut.
(*Blackout*)

This scene is important for a number of reasons. In terms of the storyline, it is the first time in the script that Jeanne records anything on the tape without Jean. That she does so within the context of Hollywood script-speak reflects her media savvy. Further, the repeated use of terms like "close up" and "point of view," and the action of Jean and the man looking at Jeanne, reinforces the theme of the gaze and one's relationship to it. Finally, and most importantly, it begins to place Jeanne in the position of both the Gazer and the Gazed-Upon simultaneously.

As the second act progresses, the awkwardness of Jeanne's tenuous position unfolds--and Jeanne is, to some extent, able to articulate it. Scene Five (page 26) is a three line scene in which Jeanne tells Jean "Something happened to me in Paris." Scene Six (page 26) shows Jean sinking deeper into his own fantasy realm as Jeanne does the same. Jean talks on a toy phone (specified by the script) to a fantasy operator, trying to get in touch with his mother. As Jeanne crosses into and out of the space, Jean asks her where she is going:

Jeanne: (*As she leaves*) To the library.

Jean: Oh shit-- (*into phone*) No, I'm not talking to you, operator, hang on a minute--JEANNE! COME BACK HERE, JEANNE! Damn! Hello, Mom? Operator! What? Yeah, I'll wait. (*Blackout*)

Why is Jean so distressed that Jeanne is going to the library? Because Real Jeanne is fusing with Fantasy Jeanne--and this is occurring independantly of Jean's direction. But did the audience not observe Jeanne at the library dramatically kissing books in the third scene of the play? It is a stronger choice to decide that Act I, Scene Three occurs only within Jean and Jeanne's collective fantasy--it is an illustration of the game that they play at the table in Act I, Scene Four. But here, in the second act, Jeanne is actually going (or at least, she says she is going) and she is taking her body with her. Meanwhile, Jean stays at home, "holding" on a toy phone for a non-existent mother.

Scenes Seven and Eight in Act Two revert to a monologue form that is, in tempo, reminiscent of the beginning of the play. Jeanne's lines, spoken into the tape player as she strokes her chair, are particularly/ remarkably revealing and articulate:

Jeanne: It's just so fucked up. I mean, I go around with all this male sexuality in my head. Every time I go to a movie, or watch TV, or look at a billboard, I'm forced to see everything from a man's point of view. I become a man. I look at other women as if I were a man. And then I can't see them, and I have to wake up, fight it, try *to see what I see*. But I can't anymore. I know what it's like to lust like a man. I look at my own breasts as if I were a man. I get turned on looking at my own breasts. It's not right. My head's being fucked with. I'll never know my own desire, mon chere. (Emphasis added)

Jeanne's attempt to see as a woman is a practical example of the theoretical model set forth by Laura Mulvey. Mulvey states:

The scopophilic instinct (pleasure in looking at another person as an erotic object) and in contradistinction, ego libido (forming identification processes) act as formations, mechanisms, which mould the cinema's formal attributes. The actual image of woman as (passive) raw material for the (active) gaze of man takes the argument a step further into the content and structure of representation, adding a further layer of ideological significance demanded by the patriarchal order in its favourite cinematic form--illusionistic narrative film [...] the place of the look defines cinema, the possibility of varying it and exposing it. This is what makes cinema quite different in its voyeuristic potential from, say, striptease, theatre, shows and so on. Going far beyond highlighting a woman's to-be-looked-at-ness, cinema builds the way she is to be looked at into the spectacle itself...cinematic codes create a gaze, a world and an object thereby producing an illusion cut to the measure of desire (25).

Jeanne's monologue is important for a number of reasons. First, it straightforwardly introduces the difficulties inherent with placing women in the representational frame, and it does so in a way that is conversational and accessible rather than pedantic. Secondly, it establishes Jeanne as a woman for whom these difficulties exist in a substantive, rather than simply theoretical, way. Thirdly, that Jeanne acknowledges and is able to articulate her displacement from her Self signals a level of consciousness about representation, Self and Other which seems to be accessible primarily to the Other--an oddly liberating situation. Finally, that Jeanne speaks this monologue into a tape recorder (as specified in the script) shows that she has actually found a way to be both Self (the owner of the gaze and the operator of the mode of representational production) and Other (the gazed-upon and the product of representation) at the same time.

Scene Eight consists of a monologue that Jean delivers partially in darkness. As the lights come up on him, alone on stage, he calls out for Jeanne. When there is no response, he rationalizes her absence with the idea that she is in the shower:

Jean: ...that's where she is. I'm sure of it. **HAVING A GOOD SHOWER JEANNE?** She can't hear me, you know. She's in the shower. She's a clean Jeanne. She's in there, sliding the soap over her naked body, rubbing herself with the washcloth, the steam flushing her skin pink. She dropped the soap. Now she's bending way over-- (*Blackout. Jean continues to speak in darkness*) to get the soap. Oh, she got it--nope it slipped out again. **HEY, JEANNE! IT'S OVER THAT WAY, BEHIND YOU!** She can't hear me, she's in the shower.

Jean's monologue in performance results in the creation of what Critical Art Ensemble cites Antonin Artaud as calling "the body without organs," or BWO. "The electronic body is the body without organs. It already dominates performance and has recentered the theatre around empty identity and empty desire. The body without organs is the perfect body--forever reproducible....[This BWO is] free of flesh, free of the economy of desire" (screen 4).

In response what Jean perceives as the inadequacy of "Real" Jeanne, Jeanne-with-organs, Jean has created Fantasy Jeanne, a (pro-)filmic event that plays in the theatre of his mind. He is the only entity with access to this spectacle and is uneasy when Other Selves--The Friends--appear and threaten his monopoly over the mode of visual (albeit internal) production. Jeanne's BWO is at once more intriguing and more controllable--more perfect. Jeanne is reduced to being debris--the biological receptacle/ progenator of his inspiration--and is ultimately discarded as such. Jean has fallen in love with a BWO who is shared for the first time with audience in Scene Eight.

Not only does this scene convey one of Jean's explicit fantasies of the Mythic Jeanne, it also (presumably for most of the audience) creates an image of Jeanne in the minds of the persons who are listening to his description of this fantasy. When the lights go out, the biological spectacle of the actor's body on stage is removed and the spectator's gaze moves to virtual spectacle of Jeanne's BWO as Jean is describing her. In other words, the mind's eye opens as the actual eye closes.

After a brief scene of role-reversal in which Jeanne questions Jean about if he has "been fucking with this tape" because "there's some weird shit on this tape," (the exact same five-line exchange as Act I Scene 6 with the roles reversed), Scene 10 presents another extended monologue. Here Jeanne, while recording with the tape recorder, relates an adventure in the city wherein she goes to a store, notices the security system's surveillance equipment, finds the experience excitingly erotic, and steals what Jean later describes as a "device used for sexual titillation." She then visits the Met and, while going through security, the device falls out of her bag "like a great black spider on the white marble floor and there's dead silence in the lobby of the Met as everyone turns away from the pictures to look at my thing spread out on the floor" (Act II, Scene 10).

Again, Jeanne embraces both sides of the equation simultaneously. As the owner of what is presumably a dildo, vibrator or other phallic stand-in, and as the director of the scene in her mind's eye, she is the Self which has no lack. At the same time, she is the object of the gaze both in her mind's eye and within the context of the fantasy itself, thereby personifying the female Other who implies lack. Jeanne's BWO is present here, too, although not quite as visually as in Scene 9. The electronic nature of her BWO is beginning to grow--she is present not only on audio tape via the recording she is making, but also via the specter of her video image.

When, in scene 11, Jean and Jeanne perform a dialogue for the tape recorder, Jean questions Jeanne about her adventure. It becomes apparent that the adventure was a virtual one, not a “real” one:

Jean: Well, it all started when some girl dropped some “device used for sexual titilation”--that’s what the Times called it, it’s still unclear exactly what it was--

Jeanne: What do you think it was?

Jean: How should I know? What was it?

Jeanne: Well I wouldn’t know!

Jean: No, you weren’t there.

Jeanne: Neither were you.

Jean continues to relate the story to Jeanne much as Jeanne did to the tape recorder, but soon begins adding his own twists to the tale. He tells of a mob scene that turns violent, appropriating Jeanne’s BWO and the situation it inhabits. Jeanne quickly turns off the tape recorder and accuses Jean of ruining what was formerly a beautiful picture, to which Jean replies, “Jeanne, Jeanne, I had nothing to do with it, I wasn’t there.”

The fantasies that these two people have created are starting to live a life beyond their control. The primacy and growing authenticity of Jean and especially Jeanne’s BsWO continue to be evidenced in Scenes 12 and 13, in which there are no biological bodies, only BsWO. Scene 12 consists of a telephone ring, Jeanne’s outgoing message on the answering machine, and The Friends ever-cheery message entreating Jean and Jeanne to “keep the lines of communication open.” Scene 13 consists of a melodramatic tape-recorded dialogue between the couple. The stage directions specify “debonair” voices that are “very hushed and soft as the actresses on Dallas speak.” Jeanne has a secret which she is afraid to reveal to Jean, one that “will forever change the way you see the world.” She is just about to tell him when the tape runs out.

In contrast, Scene 14 is a very short scene in which Jean and Jeanne are both physically present and fairly calm:

Lights up on JEAN and JEANNE reading post-structuralist theory.

Jean: Jeanne, have I ever told you all about my childhood?

Jeanne: Yes. *Blackout.*

For those in the know, the scene is primarily a comic punctuation. However, it also reminds the spectator of Jean and Jeanne's physical bodies and their postmodern condition, while returning a more "human" face to the drama. This is continued in Scene 15, in which Jeanne dictates another screenplay, like the one in Scene 4. (More specific implications of the screenplay scenes in performance will be discussed in a subsequent section.)

The next scene is another one in which the stage space belongs exclusively to the BWO. Again the phone rings and the answering machine picks up. This time, Jeanne's outgoing message has a frightened tone, as she asks the caller to "help me...Jean's been acting really weird lately--please help me...call the police." This is followed by an incoming message, Jean's "thinly disguised" voice, saying, "I've been watching you, Jeanne....I'm coming to get you, Jeanne."

Scene 17 follows up on this as Jeanne tells Jean that she is "feeling unsafe" and asks him to install a heavy-duty security and surveillance system. The authenticity of this request is called into question when the text specifies that Jeanne "turns off the tape recorder":

Jeanne: Will you listen to that. She's got ya now Jean. She's started up with that feminine wiles stuff.

Jean: Keep pit of this, will you, this is between her and me! Just let me handle this! (*he turns on tape*) Baby, when I hold you in my arms, you know you're safe with me.

A brief argument ensues between the two over control of the tape recorder and the choice of words in describing the situation, but finally Jean agrees to install the system. This is the process of virtual life passing into everyday life. Ultimately it does not matter if it is initially Jeanne or Jean who wants the surveillance system installed; the end result is the same. The BWO is bringing itself into being.

By the next scene, the system is installed. *"Lights up on JEAN talking into the newly installed intercom on wall of dining room. The video camera pans. He occasionally regards it suspiciously."* Scenes 18, 19, and 20 show Jean's discomfort in an environment in which he is the gazed-upon, while Jeanne seems to be flourishing. At the end of Scene 18, Jean tells her that she's getting fat. When she reminds him that "the camera adds ten pounds," he retorts that it's she who has gained weight; certainly she has much more mass than the electronic BWO which Jean can now gaze freely upon at anytime. Scene 21 opens with Jeanne doing leglifts to an exercise tape. A woman's voice (another BWO) is heard counting off lifts ("And one and two and three and four," ad nauseum) as Jeanne tries to keep up. The BWO is shaping the biological body that initially gave it form. "Since spectacle is a dry surface image the body must reflect that image. The body becomes it's mirror or perhaps more accurately its xerox" (Critical Art Ensemble, screen 4).

The following two scenes build on this idea of the "real" and "authentic" body clashing with the virtual body--and the virtual body emerging triumphant. Scene 22 is another telephone/ answering machine scene in which the data carried by the BWO clashes with the data carried by a body with organs--namely, Jean's mother-- to a comic effect. Scene 23 again shows the recombinant nature of the BWO as Jean and Jeanne's physical bodies on stage mouth words that they have previously recorded with the tape recorder. Again, the BWO shapes the biological body. In Scene 24, a very short two-line scene, the effects of the blurring begin to trouble Jean:

Jean: *(Talking into tape recorder)* Jeanne do you believe in the existence of an ideal world, another reality, paralleling our own, a world which is seldom, if ever, perceptible to us?

Jeanne: Are you talking to her or me?

Is Jean speaking as the “real Jean,” the body with organs who initially created the fantasy? Or is he speaking as the BWO? Furthermore, to whom is he speaking--the “real Jeanne” or Jeanne’s BWO--and to whom does Jeanne refer when she asks “her or me”? The multiple constructions of reality are apparent to both Jean and Jeanne, although they have no way now of controlling their navigations between them. The BWO exists when it wants to, and its recombinant nature allows it to reproduce as if caught between two mirrors.

The effects this awareness has on the biological Jean and Jeanne are immense. Critical Art Ensemble cites Baudrillard as stating, “In spite of himself the schizophrenic is open to everything and lives in the most extreme confusion. The schizophrenic is not, as generally claimed, characterized by his loss of touch with reality, but by the absolute proximity to it and total instantaneousness with things, this overexposure to the transparency of the world”(screen 4).

In Scene 25 the reification of the simulacra is complete. The Jeanne’s BWO (in the form of her tape-recorded voice and her voice through the security system intercom) speaks to the biological Jeanne, who do not seem to recall creating the text. This is the unauthorized presence of the Self’s BWO, which reduces to the unauthorized presence of the Self. This paradoxical and alarming situation is illuminated by Barthes’ analysis of the central features of photography, one of which is the model’s action of posing:

In front of the lens, I am at the same time: the one I think I am, the one I want others to think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art. In other words, a strange action: I do not stop imitating myself, and because of this, each time I am (or let myself be) photographed, I invariably suffer

from a sensation of inauthenticity, sometimes of imposture...the Photograph represents the very subtle moment when, to tell the truth, I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming an object: I then experience a micro-version of death...I am truly becoming a specter (11-14).

When, in Scene 26, Jean (biologically alone in the room) is spoken to by Jeanne's BWO (her tape recorded voice), this construct progresses. However, Jean has by this time grown accustomed to this presence. The unauthorized presence of the Other's BWO is less alarming than the unauthorized presence of the Self's BWO. It is interesting thematically that the play relates the escape—or, perhaps, the liberation— of Jeanne's BWO as well as her reactions her awareness of this situation, but it does not show Jean's awareness of his own. Again, as in Jeanne's Scene 7 monologue in which she is able to articulate her displacement from her Self, the Other/ object has a level of consciousness that is not as readily accessible to the Self/ subject.

Scene 25 ends with Jeanne's terrified scream. She has been exposed to Baudrillard's "transparency of the world," and the impossibility of an authentic self. Just as Cratylus found that it is impossible to cross the same river once (Honderich, 170), the Self's "subjectivity is linked to a notion of authenticity, yet any image of that self is a sign of its objectification, and hence, its inauthenticity." (Barthes quoted by Critical Art ensemble, screen 2). The delineations of identity and reality have, for Jeanne, been dissolved.

From this point through the end of the play, Jeanne is a fractured psyche. She is not, however, crippled. Scene 27 contains another screenplay monologue (the treatment of which will be examined in depth subsequently) which has everything to do with the acts of gazing and being gazed upon and the interaction of the body with these looks. Not only is Jeanne able to define her situation, but she is also able to synthesize it artistically and in so doing direct the gaze.

Jeanne is also able to freely and spontaneously move between the realities of each of her Image/ Selves (Self no longer being of consequence), but she does so to the hazard of her physical body. Scene 28 finds Jean puzzling over the tape in the recorder when Jeanne enters, her wrists bloody:

Jeanne: Jean, is it true what they say about squirrels carrying rabies? (*Jean looks up. Child's voice:*) The squirrel got me. (*Normal voice*) Is the tape on? (*Blackout*)

Jeanne's physical body seems to be of little importance--what is important is the creation of the spectacle which progenates the BWO. In Scene 29, the couple returns from the hospital. Jeanne's arms are bandaged; she runs to turn the recorder on but is unable to because of the bandages. Jean does it for her. She asks if they have a gun. They will need one, she says, because of the squirrels, and then implies that she has been infected:

Jeanne: Are you with me?

Jean: (*resigned*) I'm with you, Jeanne.

Jeanne: First, I start asking for water. I'm going to start asking for water but no matter how much I beg for it, you can't come near me, OK? You've got to save yourself, Jean, I'm telling you this while I'm still lucid, I'm going to beg you to come near me, but you can't, because it's contagious, just keep reminding yourself of that. Because I'll be foaming at the mouth and I'll try to bite you and the only thing you can do at that point is shoot me. (*Blackout*)

This is the last time in the written text of the play that the physical bodies of Jeanne and Jean appear onstage. In Scene 30, the phone rings. There is no answer, and no answering machine picks up. In Scene 31, the lights come up on the tape player:

Jeanne's Voice on Tape: I love you, Jean.

Jean's Voice on Tape: I love you too Jeanne.

(This is played over and over again, at different speeds, so that finally we no longer hear words but pained roars.)

Scavengers is a unique play that presents many challenges to both the actor and the director. In this world, identity is a fluid and malleable thing; there is a heightened sense that these characters--especially Jeanne--truly exist in time. In the final moment of the play, in which the audience is left with the spectacle of Jean and Jeanne's BsWO mimicking and reproducing themselves, there is also a sense that the concept of identity as a function of corporeality has been relinquished. While the ending, with its feeling that all points of reference have evaporated or been demolished, is understandably disturbing, it is also somewhat liberating.

Jeanne has for so long been the object of the gaze that she has collected certain tools of perception and understanding which are, by and large, inaccessible to Jean. Jeanne takes a journey into oppression and then out the other side. She is at some points caught between two mirrors; at first she articulates that she sees only as a man, that she is unable to see what she sees (Act II, Scene 7), but later she sees not only what she sees but also herself in the act of seeing. The infinity of images and identities that are produced when two mirrors face one another is a powerful metaphor not only for the play (particularly the final scene) but also for the peculiarly liberating position in which many women find themselves. In a society in which the identity of women has traditionally been constructed, defined, and perpetuated by the patriarchy, these messages hold powerful implications for feminism.

These messages are also at odds with the technique of Realistic Acting. As outlined above by such scholars as Dolan and Love, Realism seems to be unable to fully accommodate feminism. Furthermore, the fluidity of identity that these characters experience cannot be communicated by a technique which takes as one of its primary tenants the objective observation of a character with a fixed set of traits and motivations,

which insofar as it changes at all, changes linearly. The changes that occur in the characters in *Scavengers*, particularly in Jeanne, occur laterally and spherically.

In order for the message of this play to be fully communicated, techniques must be developed that can accommodate a multitude of co-existing identities. Actors approaching Jeanne and Jean must do so in ways that allow and encourage them to think of identity as fluid. To place emphasis, as Realism does, on the character's deterministic Self and his subconscious motivations, is to reinforce linear pathways of intention which rest on a binary system of Self and Other that both perpetuates patriarchy and, in our postmodern condition, is an insufficient structure for understanding character. The points at which Stanislavski himself was indeterminate about his System—namely, the issues of critical distance and the mind-body split—offer the best starting places for developing alternatives.

Chapter Five:

Production Elements

In a reality that is so much about looking, the identity of Jeanne and Jean follows the vectors of the gaze—vectors which travel and reflect as if caught in a carnival funhouse. The performance approach for this piece must therefore derive from what is seen (particularly when it is the Other), what is desired to be seen, and what it means to be seen. Such a literally spectacular approach is integrally linked with scenic, costume and multimedia production elements.

The Set

The script of *Scavengers* indicates that

The stage is divided into three areas: the college library, suggested by a few currels or desks; the bedroom and dining room of an old Victorian mansion in Ithaca, New York. Dining room and bedroom are entirely covered in dust. In the dining room, a long table with two chairs. Books everywhere, amidst junk collected at antique shops. The bedroom is a mess; the double bed is unmade, dirty clothes are strewn on the floor, dying plants, more books, dirty ashtrays filled with cigarette butts.

The realistic approach to the set design was not the approach taken in this production. As the set designer, John Harrison York, states:

Of the play's many themes, the one that figures most prominently in the design is the question of one's identity, particularly the female identity, and how it is perceived by oneself and others; and how that identity is distorted and twisted and

fucked with until it fractures. The characters in the play are fracturing their identities as they try on and discard role after role in search of love and self-love. They publicly scavenge for who they are in front of [each other], their friends, the tape recorder, the surveillance cameras, the audience, and ultimately in front of themselves as they try to put the pieces of their increasingly lost identity back into some coherent whole. The three distorted mirrored panels that twist around a central axis are intended to literally be reflective of that search. The panels are also used much like a scrim to reveal the increasingly annoying presence and pressure from their friends in the outside world. The movable frames that spin around the platforms downstage change the audience perspective of the characters as they themselves re-frame who they are and what they mean to each other. [...] The multi-layered mirrored panels framed in sensual, feminine lines are meant to emphasize the seductive nature of the images that appear within them and to blur the lines between fantasy and reality (York).

When I first approached John with the play, I made it clear that I did not want a fully realistic set as indicated by the stage directions. We spoke about the themes of the play, and I showed him a reprint of a painting by Pablo Picasso that holds a lot of meaning for my reading of the play (*Girl Before a Mirror*, 1932). I clarified that we would need the three playing areas indicated (the bedroom, the dining room, and the library) in some sense, and that there was also a need for a clear area that would convey the same idea as the apron downstage of a proscenium arch. The Stage, where the play was performed, is a thrust space and as such has no apron.

The solution was the creation of two platforms, one downstage right and one downstage left, which were the domain of Jean and Jeanne, respectively. Anchored through each of these platforms to the deck was a vertical pipe that was secured at the top to the grid. Rotating around these pipes were two sets of frames. The first, larger frame was empty—a

simple rectangular shape (the angles of which were slightly out of whack) made of welded pipe. The second, smaller frame could pass through the larger frame in its own rotation. A clear, thin sheet of plastic was stretched taut across this frame. The downstage left inside frame also had a pull-down blind attachment that added a layer of the reflective plastic used in the upstage panels.

Three panels were positioned upstage. These panels rotated around a central axis and were made up of a set of frames across which a thin layer of reflective plastic was stretched. Because of the properties of this plastic, these upstage panels were translucent when viewed with a light source upstage of them, but highly reflective when hit with a downstage light source (Figures 1 and 2).

The upstage right and upstage left panels were used primarily as entrances and exits into the downstage playing space, and at one point to indicate the video monitors in Act II. The upstage center panel served a number of scenic purposes. Both sides of the central pipe of this panel were fitted with a low arm like a bicycle carrier to which the bed and the dining room table (both in castors) could be attached. When the bed was in the downstage position, the table would be upstage, and could be removed or added as necessary and vice versa (Figures 3 and 4). Thus, the two primary elements of Jean and Jeanne's home could come on and off stage simply by rotating the center panel around its axis.

The center panel was also used as a screening area for the video clips. For all except the final image, a large framed projection screen (also on castors) was wheeled on and positioned just upstage of the panel in order to provide a clear image. However, the lines of the three intersecting frames that comprised the panel served to fragment the image and foreground its constructedness.

Finally, all three upstage panels acted as a scrim that, when lit from upstage, evoked a no-man's land sense of space. This was the domain of *The Friends* and the location of the library which Jeanne "visits" in Act I--an occurrence which this production read as a

Figure 1

1a

“...this violent ugly thing in you, this, this manliness, has completely consumed you and I can’t keep it at bay any longer” (Jeanne, Act I, Scene 8). In Figure 1a, Jeanne’s reflection is superimposed onto Jean’s body with the use of the downstage right frames and the pull-down insert of reflective plastic. In Figure 1b, the actors have moved around the pipe clockwise and Jean’s reflection is superimposed onto Jeanne’s body.

1b

Figure 2

Act II, Scene 26. Jean dances with himself and his fantasy of Jeanne. The darkened stage and single shaft of isolated downlight allows the plastic in this scene to be very highly reflective.

Figure 3

Act I, Scene 4.

In the dining room; the table is in the downstage position. The painting on the floor is an adapted detail from Pablo Picasso's *Girl Before a Mirror* (1932).

Figure 4

Act I, Scene 5

In the bedroom; the bed is in the downstage position. The downstage panels work as framing elements in this scene and others.

Figure 5

Act I, Scene 3

In the library. In this "fantasy" scene, the action takes place upstage of the panels and is lit from behind, so as to render the plastic transparent.

fantasy (Figure 5). The line of the upstage panels was the same as the plaster line of the theatre, so the majority of the action was pushed downstage in order to capitalize on the unique multi-perspective possibilities of the space.

Props were limited to that which was necessary for the business of the script. A prop roast beef (with an area for hiding the tape recorder) along with some plates and cutlery was present on the table in Act I, Scene 4, and was replaced by a toy telephone, a real telephone, and an answering machine in Act II. The bed was a jumble of mis-matched sheets, pillows, and blankets. Two dilapidated chairs were brought on and offstage by the actors, along with other small hand props as necessary. The surveillance system intercom was placed on the downstage right pipe by Dan immediately before the scene in which it first appears (Act II, Scene 18); dummy surveillance cameras were in place on top of the downstage pipes throughout the show and were revealed by lights.

The Costumes and Masks

The costumes for Jeanne and Jean were ordinary street clothes pulled from Jennifer and Dan's own closets. I considered dressing them in black and adding small accessories, but I ultimately rejected this idea for three reasons. First of all, I wanted to create a sense that Jeanne and Jean were suspended in time and space. Using non-realistic costumes would have led the visual aspect of the characters on stage to blend in with the non-realistic set and thus a sense of unity rather than disjointure. Secondly, the characters (especially Jeanne) are highly performative and self-conscious. Thus, I felt that that costume changes would be a part of this performance and an indication for the audience of which level of performativity the characters were engaged. Finally, the use of Jennifer and Dan's own clothes helped to establish a sense for the actors that *they personally were on stage*.

The masks for The Friends were designed and built by Rob Hamilton. The design concept was inspired by Cubism. My initial concept was to design a smiley-face mask with a three-dimensional topology. When the mask was viewed from straight ahead, the face would appear to be smiling. When viewed from a different angle it would appear to have a different expression (such as a frown or a look of surprise). This concept was discussed briefly with Rob and immediately discarded as too difficult, time consuming, and expensive.

Figure 6

Act II, Scene 1 in performance. A Friend upstage rotates his mask from the sideways position (1a) to the upside-down position (1b).

Figure 7

Act II, Scene 21 in performance.

Rob's alternative was a flat, square smiley-face-yellow mask mounted on a large lazy-Susan bearing that would allow the mask to rotate 360 degrees in both directions. The element of cubism was retained in the drawing of the face itself, which appears to be in both full-front and profile positions at the same time. The shape of the mouth and eyes is such that it, when turned upside-down or on its side, creates the impression of a different feeling or mood (Figures 6a and 6b). The masks were attached to a harness and held in place by black construction hats and straps. The actors wore this assembly over black nylon hoods with eye and mouth cutouts. The actors were costumed in black long-sleeved shirts, black pants, black shoes, and yellow flannel gloves (Figure 7).

The Video Elements

The video projections in this production of *Scavengers* were a directorial choice and are not indicated in Karen Chronacher's script. The video can be classified into two groups: the video "screenplays" based on Jeanne's monologue in Act II, Scenes 4, 15, and 27, and the "live videos" that were included in at the top of Act I, Scene 1, between Act II, Scenes 28 and 29, and at the end of Act II, Scene 31 (the final scene of the play). For me, the use of video images was essential to the meaning of the play. Again, my initial concept for the use of video was very different from its final form. I originally envisioned a live video feed which would begin with the installation of the security system. Two or three video cameras would be mounted in a fixed position so that when the actors stood in specific areas on stage, their image would be picked up and displayed on monitors hung from the grid and placed on stage as a part of the set. After a discussion with Stas Ushomirsky, the video designer, it was decided that this was too costly and time-consuming, and that the ultimate effect—that of the seduction of the camera and the preference for the image of the body rather than the body itself—could be rendered just as effectively by designing and taping sequences prior to the show and projecting them onto a screen.

The screenplays (Figures 8, 9, and 10) were shot first on location, prior to the first full rehearsal. I decided that instead of shooting images exactly as Jeanne describes in the text, we would shoot the "reality" from Jeanne's point of view upon which she based the fantasy in her mind's eye. As in Jeanne's "dancing at the Met" monologue in Act II, Scene 10, the differences between the "real" and the "imagined" are primarily differences of degree. In performance, the monologues were spoken live up to a point, after which the monologue was taken over by a voice-over recording of Jennifer's voice. This was designed to suggest the gradual transfer of identity from Jeanne's biological body to Jeanne's BWO. In performance, Jeanne delivered these monologues on her downstage left platform, costumed in the same clothes in which she appeared in the video (Figure 11).

Figure 8: Screenplay 1 Storyboard Clips (Act II, Scene 4)

8a

J: Exterior. Along the banks of the Seine.

8e

J: His point of view, a man stands above them on top of bank. His dark figure is silhouetted against the sky, he towers over them.

8b

J: Willow trees dip branches into the Seine.

8f

J: Man's point of view, Jean's eyes.

8c

J: Jeanne and Jean are kissing passionately.

8g

J: Man's point of view, Jean gazes at man as he rips open Jeanne's blouse, frees her breasts, lifts them high.

8d

J: Close up of Jean's face. He opens eyes while kissing and looks up.

8h

J V/O: Cut.

Figure 9: Screenplay 2 Storyboard Clips (Act II, Scene 15)

9a

J: Exterior. Along the banks of the Seine. Jean is leading Jeanne by the hand. They wade into the river and climb onto a small wooden float tied to a mooring. Jean begins to kiss Jeanne.

9d

J V/O: *Jeanne reaches into water, grasps for earring which eludes her.*

9b

J: Close up of Jeanne's face. Her large, dangling silver earring glitters, then falls off. Shot of earring falling through crack in float.

9e

J V/O: *Shot of Jeanne's muddied arm emerging from water. Close up of the palm of Jeanne's hand. The silt runs through her fingers. Cut.*

9c

J: Jeanne interrupts lovemaking, exclaims. Shot of earring slowly sinking in murky water.

9f

Figure 10: Screenplay 3 Storyboard Clips (Act II, Scene 27)

10a

*J: Exterior. Poissy, a small village outside Paris.
J V/O: Summer afternoon. A small house with a
rose garden. The garden gate is open. A man
appears walking down the narrow street.*

10d

J V/O: Her point of view, man is entranced.

10b

*J V/O: From high, see him approach. His steps
are sharp on the pavement.*

10e

*J V/O: His point of view, he glimpses
Jeanne, naked, pressing her entire body
against the window pane.*

10c

*J V/O: His point of view, he glimpses Jeanne,
naked, pressing her entire body against the
window pane.*

10f

J V/O: Man backs away, still entranced.

Figure 10 (cont.)

J V/O: Jeanne traces the jagged edge of the broken pane with her finger.

J V/O: Holds up bloodied finger, begins to masturbate with bloodied finger.

J V/O: Cut.

Figure 11

Act II, Scene 27 in performance. The actress onstage holds the tape recorder.

Figure 12

12a

12b

"Cameras rolling, motors whirring, shutters clicking, at every moment, visions of me being formed" (Jeanne, Act 1, Scene 1). Clips from the first "live" video.

Figure 13

Act I, Scene 1 in performance.

**Figure 14: Video Montage
(Selected Clips)**

The “live videos” were shot during the rehearsal period once the actors and the set were available and final choices about design had been made. The first “live video” is the first image seen by the audience. Jeanne’s monologue in Act I, Scene 1 (pp 59-60) begins in darkness, with the actor on the downstage left platform. On each word of “me, me, me,” one of The Friends (unseen in darkness) takes a flash picture of Jeanne. The video begins to roll (Figures 12 and 13); for the rest of the segment the live monologue and the video image of Jeanne coincide in a way that foreshadows the screenplays to come in Act II. After “devours me,” the video cuts out; the audience is left only with the live body on stage.

The second “live video” was dubbed the “video montage.” This played between Scenes 28 and 29 in Act II (after Jeanne comes in with bloody wrists and before she and Jean return from the hospital) and was a quick-time projection of memorable scenes from the show up to that point, accompanied by instrumental music (Figure 14).

Figure 15
Video Clip from the final “live video.”

Figure 16
Act II, Scene 31 in performance. The actor playing Jeanne onstage touches the panel onto which her image is projected. The Friends are positioned downstage of her.

The final “live video” played during the last scene of the play. Up to this point, all of the videos were rear- projected onto a screen which was rolled on when necessary and positioned just upstage of the center upstage panel, in order to produce a clearer image. For the final video, this screen was not used. The image was projected directly onto the center upstage panel, which was then rotated (first by a Friend and then by Jeanne) to produce a more ethereal and decentered effect. The content of the video was a series of shots of Jeanne and Jean looking at each other through the reflective panels. It ended with a shot of Jeanne, alone, looking at her reflection and then touching the panel—thereby distorting the image. In performance, Jeanne approached the panel and touched it during this portion of the video (Figures 15 and 16). then made her final exit.

Chapter Six:

Rehearsal Ethnography

Sunday, August 8, 1999

Video shoot on location. We met at 9:00 am at The Stage. We started taping around 10:00. Had a somewhat difficult time communicating exactly what I wanted to Jeri and Michael, but I think that it'll work out in the editing suite. The work with Jen was much easier. I had gotten the storyboards to her a few days prior, and we stuck to them almost exactly to the letter in the second two screenplays. The last one was particularly exciting. We used Claire (who along with James) was helping with sound and light as a hand stand-in in the image-touching sequence. Stas had good insights and suggestions and made what I was going for possible. Jen remarked later that she was impressed by how organized it was and didn't quite believe that I had never directed a shoot before.

Wednesday, August 11, 1999

Voice-over recording session. Got everything except the voice of Jean's mother done. I found this to be a lot of fun. First of all, I got to record some (the French language tape and the exercise tape); secondly, Jen and Dan were able to play big, overblown fantasy characters, and actors always like that. We found a lot of humor in the text that we had not fully realized before; I think this gave both (especially Dan) a sense of relief, that this was not going to be a stodgy intellectual thing.

Thursday, August 12, 1999

Download of digital video into Media 100 Suite. I chose the takes I wanted from each scene, cutting the raw video down immensely, and explained the storyboards to Andrew

who is doing the editing. Seeing these images is inspiring—the seduction of the visual is so smooth and easy. I will get the screenplays to Jen as soon as possible so she can work her timing and also, I hope, be inspired.

Saturday August 14, 1999

First rehearsal with full cast and stage manager. At Marley's house. We first read through the play. Jen and Dan were by this time very familiar with it. Claire, Andrew, and Jon had already gotten an idea of the cadence of The Friends' speeches from the voice-over session on Wednesday. The general consensus seems to be that it is a very weird play--there is some nervous laughter, but not too much. They seem ready to trust me.

After the read-thru, we took a short break while Marley and I set up the garage to mock the stage space as closely as possible. Strings on the floor, representing the two sets of downstage frames, could be moved radially to give a sense of the movement of the frames, although they were closer together than they will be in the actual space. Was very happy to have John's model of the set, as well as an extra piece of the plastic material, to use to explain the set to the cast.

We went straight through the play and blocked all of the major traffic patterns in Act I and most of them in Act II. In the second act we had to skip around a bit because of the number of scenes that either have no bodies on stage or are so closely linked to the set and or/ technology that it would be futile to try to do them in a mocked-up situation. Very little business was blocked, but a stand-in for the tape recorder was used. I will need to get them the actual prop immediately, since much of their understanding of what's going on (especially for Dan) is hinged on whether the tape is recording or not.

The rehearsal was very productive. Even though we began a little late (a few people got caught in traffic), we ended on time with the main focus of my rehearsal goals met.

Monday, August 16, 1999

Today Jen and I met to discuss the issues at work in the play. I found that although she knew the tenants of Realistic Acting, she had not had much education as to the development of those techniques and where they stand within societal paradigms. I gave her a little history lesson and we spent some time talking about the actor/ character split more specifically. We also talked about bell hooks' model of the margin and center of society and the idea that as focus is directed inward, the margin has a kind of understanding that the center doesn't. Other things: changing how people perceive, relinquishing the need for the anchor of identity/ a reference point. The idea that we are drifting, and that this is not a bad thing. The feeling of hope that I want at the end of the play. I asked Jennifer what she felt her relationship with the audience has been like in other performances, and she said that sometimes she has felt a kind of resentment toward the audience, because "I'd rather watch." She says that she finds the concept of playing herself on stage kind of frightening, that it entails an exposure of her "vulnerability," and that she was drawn to theatre in order to avoid this, that she "got on stage to get away from being me."

The discussion was very enlightening for me, and I believe for her, too. Although she may not be able to articulate the theory as well as I can, I feel that Jen has an understanding of the paradoxes that I am trying to bring to light and is willing to tackle the issue of doing so. I gave her, as homework, the job of beginning to differentiate the differences between the bodies and voices of Jen and Jeanne.

Tuesday, August 17, 1999

Run Thru and blocking adjustment. University Theatre. We were very lucky today to have working mock-ups of the DL and DR frames. In addition, the size of the stage space allowed for a true-to-size taping of the floor. We ran through all of Act I and the first

half of Act II before we ran out of time. The majority of this rehearsal was devoted to clarifying the multitude of Jean and Jeanne's entrances and exits, and working the scenes in which The Friends appear. We worked all of The Friends' entrances and exits, and their positions on stage up of the upstage panels. In particular, the Act II Scene 1 French business was ironed out; we set the choreography as well as the mask turning. We established traffic patterns for the other scenes in which they are featured and will work the specific choreography on Sunday. It was valuable to have the actors forced to walk and talk at the same time, and to start to develop the rhythm of the piece, much of which is hinged upon The Friends.

Wednesday, August 18, 1999

Scenework with Jean and Jeanne, University Stage. Had the downstage frames again tonight, so we were able to set some blocking that was impossible on 8/14, like Act II, Scene 11 (Jean: Did you go to the Met?). The scene begins with both figures at the table. As Jean relates the fantasy, teasing her with the tape recorder, they move first to the DR platform (which has been established as Jean's space), through center very close to each other and to the closest they ever get to a kiss. At this point (Jean: ...until it got ugly) Jean moves away to the DL platform, invading Jeanne's space as he appropriates the fantasy. Jean uses the interior panel as a shield to prevent Jeanne from entering her platform space until after his last line (I just follow everything through to its logical outcome), when he leaves the space, crossing up to the table again. As Jeanne bursts through into the space, the despair in her lines makes the space seem very hollow and empty, even though her body is in it.

We were also able to clarify some work in Act II, Scene 17 (Jeanne: I'm feeling unsafe, Jean) in which Jean and Jeanne play tug-of-war with the tape recorder, turning it on and off as they argue about the way their "scene" is being presented. I placed them on the

DR platform with the large frame over the platform so that they could step through it. Each time there is a shift in performativity, the actor's body changes position, stepping into and out of the frame. Ultimately, though, the frame is large enough so that, from the audience's point of view, the figures are always framed—regardless of what side of it they are on.

I realize that the actors have a lot of very specific blocking to learn, a lot of which is similar to other blocking in the show, as well as a lot of lines. I hope they can do it.

Thursday, August 19, 1999

Today I met with Dan. This meeting was important, even if (as I believe) Dan did not seem to leave with as deep an understanding of my goals as Jen did at the end of my meeting with her. A large portion of the time was given to the definition of vocabulary. Dan is a highly intellectual person who (with me, at least) loves to argue semantics. He also has some very different ideas about the nature of gender relations than I do. It was for these reasons—in addition to his talent on stage—that I wanted him as Jean. I knew that he would help keep me honest, theoretically speaking. Still, it's frustrating sometimes to deal with him. He seems to be very reticent about the idea of releasing his grip on the point of reference; his arguments are very linear (and very substantiated) and it is difficult to get him to integrate the idea of a lateral perception. I can use these words and he understands the theory of what I am saying, and can articulate his response but he is having trouble internalizing it in a way that will allow for performance. He is, appropriately, very concerned with understanding at which points he is Jean and at which points he is Fantasy Jean, but as for the idea that he will at times be performing himself, I am almost afraid to bring it up because his views on when this should be are so different than mine. Isn't this the point, though? To allow him, the performer, the freedom to make these kind of choices? I am having a hard time resolving this issue.

However, Dan's ability to debate the theory is very helpful to me. We talked at length about the technical definition of "abstraction." I find that the *Oxford Companion to Philosophy* defines it as "a putative psychological process for the acquisition of a concept x either by attending to the features common to all and only x s" (3). Locke endorsed the idea of abstraction, assigning it as a part of rational capacity which distinguishes humans from animals, but phenomenologist Berkeley rejects it as incoherent since it entails both the inclusion and the exclusion of the properties of x . Dan said of he (Jean) and Jeanne, "we are abstractions of/ for each other." There's a "thus" on both sides of the coin there.

Sunday, August 22, 1999

Scenework with The Friends. University Theatre. It was refreshing to have a rehearsal in which it was not necessary to swim in deep theory. This rehearsal was very physical and very vocal. Because two of the actors (Andrew and Claire) have not had much experience with performance, the rehearsal began with a lesson in breath control and a warm up of the vocal range. We worked to establish specific cadences, pronunciations, and melodies within The Friends' shared text, and worked volume and resonance in preparation for the masks, which will make projection more difficult. We also established and rehearsed the choreography for The Friends' movement in Act II, Scenes 1 and 20 (the French scene and the exercise tape scene). We will have the masks a week from today.

Monday, August 23, 1999

Met again with Jen. It's nice to meet in the University Theatre. It would be better at the Stage, but it still imparts that feeling of, well, being on stage. We talked about the Act II, Scene 10 monologue about going to the Met. I asked Jen which lines or words are things that she, Jen, might say or has said. In other words, lines that she can speak as Jen. Two of the lines that Jen chose:

“There’s no sense buying a thing like that, you know, it’s none of the saleslady’s business anyway”

and

“dead silence in the lobby of the Met as everyone turns away from the pictures to look at my thing spread out on the floor.”

She says that she chooses these because she, Jen, is more “self-conscious” than Jeanne in a way that manifests itself in shyness, and she can identify with these unwelcome moments of being the center of attention. As to the amount of fantasy versus the amount of reality in the tale, she decides that Jeanne did, in fact, go to the city, and did go to a sex shop. While she was there, she was aware (to some degree) of the surveillance and followed the cameras movement for one pan across the store—but not for as long as Jeanne specifies in the monologue. She perhaps looks at, but does not steal a sex toy. It is possible that she buys it. She does go to the Met, and she does drop something, but it is not the sex toy but something more mundane, a wallet or perhaps the wrapped package containing the toy. People do look, but not to the extent that Jeanne relates, and there is no laughing, singing, or dancing in the fountain.

These are not the choices that I would have made, but I’m comfortable with them since they acheive the same end. I made it clear that Jen is not only allowed but encouraged to change her mind about any of these choices, especially in the moment of performance.

Of Jeanne, Jen says “she is turned on by the camera because she creates and performs a character who would be.”

Jen’s homework: to discover a master gesture for Jen, Jeanne, and Fantasy Jeanne, and to find the interior rhythm of each.

Tuesday, August 24, 1999

Stagger-through, University Theatre. Primarily tried to get through it all without stopping. Managed to run it twice. Rehearsal all about blocking notes, entrances and exits. Also chose wardrobe for Jeanne and Jean with Jen and Dan's help (and clothes).

Wednesday, August 25, 1999

Video montage and me-me-me shoot, University Theatre. We worked until past 1:00 a.m. I was not as prepared for this shoot as I was for the other one, but since it's a video tape of "the play so far" I guess I couldn't have been. Very tiring but I think that ultimately we got some very nice images, and I think that the experience of being video taped and seeing their images played back so quickly was helpful to all of us, it deepens things somehow.

Friday, August 27

Met with Andrew, discussed the raw footage from the shoot and looked at the screenplay scenes that he's edited. They look very good, they will soon be in a form that I can give to Jen. The montage shoot will be easier to edit, because it was film in slow-time, which means that he won't have to suture it quite so tightly.

Sunday, August 29

Run-through, University Theatre. Devoted to all the little details of blocking. The cast was off-book for the first time, which of course caused all kinds of problems. Also finding that the costume changes really slow it down. Will be under some pressure, I think, to cut them, but I don't think I will—I think they're necessary and I don't see a viable way

around them without falling into stylization—I want the look of these two people as realistic as possible in the face of all the uncertainty around them.

Also got the masks today. They look great but they are far too heavy. Rob will replace the large lazy-Susan bearings with smaller ones, and we will have the re-worked masks by Wednesday.

Tuesday, August 31

Had an exercise-based rehearsal and discussion with Dan and Jen that was very successful as far as putting the theory into practice. We rehearsed at the Stage. Prior to the rehearsal I had scripted a visualization exercise which I led them through. This part of the rehearsal lasted about forty minutes. The space was black and the building was empty except for us. After sweeping up the floor a bit (it was still very dusty) I led them through the following imagery exercise. This exercise began with a brief physical warmup that involved stretching and alignment. Part of the warmup was led by me, and time was given for the actors to continue with a personal warm up. The actors were then asked to lie down on their backs on the stage floor and concentrate on their breath.

Notes on shorthand and terminology:

“J” indicates the word that sounds like “Jean” and like “Jeanne.” This name was pronounced in this exercise, but the syntax was arranged so as not to specify gender. In this way I could speak directly to both individual actors. “J” is designated as the non-gendered name of these characters.

“TOO” indicates The Other One. For Jean, The Other One is Jeanne. For Jeanne, The Other One is Jean. In addition, for Dan, The Other One is Jennifer and for Jennifer The Other One is Dan. “TOO” can be either the “real,” physical person, or the Fantasy person--the BWO.

“Feel the breath entering and leaving this body. See J from a distance. See that body walking. Watch J walk to a bench and sit down and wait. Watch J wait. Close up on J’s face. Watch J look around. Pull away into a long shot. It’s chilly. Watch J react to the weather. No one is showing up. Watch J go home. It’s warm at home. J will take off some clothes now that it’s warmer, just a sweater or a jacket. J will like the feeling of taking off that piece of clothing. Close up— see J’s eyes as this feeling arrives and departs. See it from closer now. See it from J’s point of view. J is imagining what it looked like when that sweater was coming off. J is reacting to that image emotionally—feel it from far away, like a hand or a foot that has gone to sleep, but still feel it. There is some desire there, of one type or another, to a lesser or a greater degree. J has begun to think about TOO. J has begun to imagine that the room has dissolved and the streets are all around. J is walking. TOO is following, looking at J. See the sidewalk through the eyes of J’s imagination. The fantasy J keeps walking, followed by TOO. J watches the fantasy J walk into a small theatre, in through the black and white lobby, past the pictures of other people, and into a darkened stage space. The fantasy J will lie down on the stage, while J sits at home in the warmth in shirtsleeves, imagining it all. As the fantasy J’s eyes open, so will yours.

Sit up slowly and look around the theatre. See the empty chairs, see me. It is all both fantasy and reality. Feel the breath entering and leaving this body. It’s like seeing through two sets of lenses at once.

Stand up. You are sharing a body with Fantasy J. Develop a source of identification with the space. What here is known to the actor but not known to J? Go to something which the Fantasy J is intrigued by. Actor, find something there about which you feel differently than

J does. Use this as a way to rein yourself in and return now and then to a sense of your actor's self.

Start to take notice of each other as both the actor and as J. Look at TOO. Start to make eye contact. Make note of your reactions to this.

By group consent come face-to-face and see each other as Dan and Jennifer. By group consent you will move away. *(This was done a total of three times)*

Begin walking again. Take stock of the physical differences between the actor's body and the body of Fantasy J. Pick one of these differences and exaggerate it. Continue moving in the space, moving back and forth between these two bodies. Let Fantasy J's body take over and continue moving until you once again come face to face with TOO. You are two fantasies looking at each other in the mind's eye of J, who is sitting at home, watching all of it. It's all both fantasy and reality.

Move away from TOO, find a seat and sit. Close your eyes. J, warm at home, replay the movie of this fantasy, and as the movie plays, know that the actor is still present here in the space."

Immediately after the exercise, I gave the actors paper and pens and had them write what came to their minds about the exercise. Following is a transcription of those writings:

JENNIFER:

I found going into the sound booth very enlightening—I saw it as Jen, the actor as a workspace, almost a negative place because whenever I did do sound or lights I hated it because I wanted to be on stage. Seeing it through Jeanne, I saw it as a novelty, as a place I would like to be during a show. My mood changed, my posture went from my usual slight slump to an arched “eager” position.

Having a fairly colorful fantasy life myself I latched on to being Jeanne sitting at home, taking off her sweater, enjoying it and at the same moment, pretending as if someone were watching—adding the third element of myself is proving to be a little difficult, mainly because I like to escape myself in certain aspects. Maybe it took me awhile to mentally settle in, but I really felt my physicalizations for Jen, Jeanne, and F. Jeanne actually came from a true place—even though my postures and moves were basically ones I has written down after our meeting—the first posture of Jen (leading with the head, small unobtrusive steps) onto my Mae West strut for F. Jeanne felt honest. I seem to have a hard time maintaining Jen when I’m really aware of Dan. This could be for a lot of reasons 1) I’m shy around men 2) I really don’t know Dan that well, and he does intimidate me 3) He’s dating Stacy whom I know. I’m sure there are others as well.

But I have a hard time holding on to me after a while as I’m looking at him—holding onto Jeanne and F. Jeanne is no problem. I wonder if my reaction to Dan will be similar to my reaction to the audience. I could spend more time on seeing myself as Jeanne having a fantasy—this switching lenses thing can easily get muddled when it’s in my head and I’m not sure how much I can depend on physicalization each time. This is also a little spooky for me (sorry if this is a little all over the place) to really ask myself how I feel about the stage, the chairs, the audience. These are things I don’t often deal with in an open manner—certainly not during a performance.

Sometimes, when I'm writing or re-reading the play I feel closer to fantasy Jeanne than I do to Jeanne. I noticed all but one time I initiated the eye-to-eye contact—never as me and Dan—but as F. Jeanne I felt I could approach fear[?] and really look. How interesting that I give the most “restricted” character the most “nerve.”

I think I'll definitely add these imaging techniques when I'm warming up—it'll help me keep perspective on the 3 characters.

DAN:

I Dan am much more comfortable with Jen than Jean is comfortable with Jeanne.

Jean loves Jeanne

Jean prefers his own reality to shared realities

Jean is afraid of being seen

Jean is more energetic than Dan.

Dan is more relaxed than Jean

Jean is observant, sentimental, naive, headstrong, romantic.

Dan has a runny nose.

Looking at Jen is more respectful than looking at Jeanne. I'm more aware of her energy as Jennifer. I think and feel her focus, perhaps her awareness of me. Jeanne's attention is not on me, it is about me. I don't know if these are actor/character issues or not.

It's a pretty nice old dusty house. It's warm inside. The feeling of taking off a coat and sweater to let the warmth into my skin was very vivid. Perhaps the runny nose helped with that memory.

This is some George and Martha fantasy, played on more levels.

[Illegible, maybe...] Have you noticed the change in personalities? From being very specific and presented to more lucid

Wednesday, September 1, 1999

Work with Jen. Worked with the idea of multiple lenses. Used the Act II Scene 7 monologue (Try to see what I see). Worked to assess who (Jen, Jeanne or Fantasy Jeanne) said each line. Used two costume pieces as rehearsal tools-- a pair of glasses and a scarf. When Jen was speaking, she wore neither. When Jeanne was speaking, she wore the glasses, a pair with very thick black frames. When Fantasy Jeanne was speaking, she wore both the glasses and a brightly-colored scarf. The actor started wearing neither; she added and removed the pieces as follows:

It's just so fucked up. I mean, I'm walking around with all this male sexuality in my head. (*Added glasses*) Every time I go to a movie, or watch TV, or look at a billboard, I'm forced to see everything from a man's point of view. (*Added scarf*) I become a man. I look at other women as if I were a man. (*Removed both*) And then I can't see them, and I have to wake up, fight it, try to see what I see. But I can't anymore. (*Added glasses*) I know what it is to lust like a man. I look at my own breasts as if I were a man. (*Added scarf*) I get turned on my looking at my own breasts. (*Removed both*) It's not right. (*Added glasses*) My head's being fucked with. (*Added scarf*) I'll never know my own desire, mon chere.

I noticed that as the actor went through the exercise, subtle changes in her body placement were taking place. When Jen spoke as herself, her hands were folded, resting primly on her lap. When she spoke as Jeanne, her hands were crossed on top of each other,

holding onto the back of the chair (she was sitting in it sideways). When she spoke as Fantasy Jeanne, her back arched and her body shifted downstage so that her hands and forearms dangled off the back of the chair. Also, the action of adding the scarf was accompanied by a vocal change. When I mentioned these changes to Jen after the exercise was over, she was not fully aware that she had done them—at least, she had not planned them.

Thursday, September 2, 1999

Work with Jen and Dan, Todd Theatre. Created an exercise that gave Jen and Dan a literal sense of “levels of character.” The risers in the theatre were wide enough for us to be able to arrange chairs next to the steps in the middle of the riser like this:

4th level—Fantasy Jean/ Fantasy Jeanne’s memories and fantasies

3rd level—Fantasy Jean and Fantasy Jeanne

2nd level—Jean and Jeanne

1st level (Floor)—Dan and Jennifer

A chair was set on either side of the steps on all four levels. As the point of view changed, so did the actor’s position. In other words, the more heightened characters resided on a more heightened position on the riser. We did Act I Scene 4 (Did you have a good read?) and Act I Scene 10 (I found another one today). I would have like to do Act II Scene 11, too, but we ran out of time. I think the exercise was very useful, especially to Dan who seems to need a firmer reference point as to what is reality and what is fantasy. It was very interesting to watch the choices they made. Dan did a lot more jumping around than Jen; that is, Jen would usually progress from one level to a higher one in steps, while Dan would skip levels and did so with more frequency—although Jen would usually match his tempo.

In the discussion that followed this exercise, the idea emerged that Jean creates the reality of his thoughts by performing them. This may seem simplistic, but it means that those fantasies, which don't really have any basis in physical reality, are rendered into physical reality by the simple fact that they rise to the surface and are performed by the physical body. We also discussed the idea that these characters have no inner life because nothing is held back—it's always performed.

Friday, September 3, 1999

Run through, University Theatre. We are at the point now that I have to step back and stop throwing new stuff at them. Today we ran the show twice, with full costume and set changes. Lots of line problems. Dan and Jen are trying hard, but the more subtle work starts to fall away.

Sunday, September 5, 1999

Run and line-through, Todd Theatre. Started a run-through but there are so many line problems that we stopped and I had them do a walking line-through from the top of the show to the end, with only a short break at the end of Act I. Frustrated.

Monday, September 6, 1999

Load-in. First run in the space at The Stage at 7 pm. Lines are better, the notes tonight primarily about subtle blocking, business, and timing.

Tuesday, September 7, 1999

Q2Q and Tech

Wednesday, September 8, 1999

Dress Rehearsal

Thursday, September 9, 1999

Performance

Friday, September 10, 1999

Performance

Saturday, September 11, 1999

Performance and Strike

Chapter Seven: Conclusions

The process of rehearsing and producing *Scavengers* was an enlightening and frustrating one. Budget and other resource restrictions required the researcher to wear not only the hat of director, but also the hats of producer, production manager, and publicist, to name a few. Additionally, the requirements of the piece itself, and of the technology that was added to it, sometimes created a sense of “just make sure the actors know their lines and the set doesn’t fall apart,” leading some of the more subtle discoveries made by the actors in rehearsal to be overshadowed by the specter of *The Performance*. Nonetheless, some very interesting and important conclusions can be drawn from the actors’ work in rehearsal and their reactions to the knowledge that they would at one point perform in front of an audience.

Research undertaken in Part One suggests that perception, and thus spectatorship, had an intentional and gendered content that arises from a complex web of physiology and psychology that includes desire, imagination, abstraction, and the concept of Self and Other. Feminist analysis finds that within this structure of spectatorship the female Other is displaced. The dominant mode of theatrical performance, Realism as first developed by Stanislavski, serves to reify and perpetuate these structures by resting on many of the same philosophical and aesthetic tenets. Interestingly, the points at which mainstream historians and critics raise questions about Stanislavski’s System—that of critical distance and the mind/ body split—are also the points at which the feminist theorist can find clues as to the building of resistant strategies.

A number of feminist and non-feminist theorists and artists have offered alternatives to Realism, but a schism exists between the two. The theorists have been able to deconstruct and identify points in the System with which they take issue, and clearly articulate their

positions, but usually do not offer practical ways of implementing their findings. The artists have been able to create striking and liberating new plays, performance art and production aesthetics, but tend to be unable or unwilling to articulate the reasons why or how what they are doing works.

The current investigation has attempted to bring theory and practice together in a way that allows each to inform the other. It was by no means an easy task; the project met with resistance from both sides. Those on the academic side of the equation frequently had misgivings about the ways in which theory could arise from performance, and those on the performance side of the equation sometimes were distrustful of the ways in which their performance would be affected by these excursions into theory. In the end, however, the researcher was able to cultivate and identify two practical applications of theory that allow for resistant performance strategies. These techniques have been designated by the researcher as *intermittent critical awareness* and *constructive body architecture*. Both of these techniques employ fundamental strategies of improvisation to create an understanding of character that is constantly in flux, thereby altering the courses of perceptual intentionality which have, after many countless runs through the personal and collective subconscious, created deep canyons of expectation and abstraction which contribute to the paradigm of oppression.

In the first stages of rehearsal, the actor creates a critical distance from the character which allows her to see the character as fully as possible. The character's background, likes and dislikes, needs and desires, etcetera, become apparent to the actor who will be re-creating/ re-producing the character on stage. As rehearsal continues, the actor is allowed to "get into the role" in the same ways in which this would be done using Realistic techniques. That is, the traits of the character are appropriated by the actor and a sense of closeness or sameness begins to develop. However, the ways in which the actor is different

from the character are by no means discarded but in fact consciously used during performance.

Through analysis of the text, the actor and the director identify “awareness points”- points at which a shift in the actor’s degree of critical distance occurs. The points will, by and large, cluster around moments in the script in which the character herself changes levels of performativity. It is at these points in rehearsal and in performance that the actor is granted access to the gaze; she is allowed to see the character, to see herself playing the character, and to see the elements of production and performance such as the audience.

This technique is Brechtian in that it encourages the actor to maintain a critical distance, but it differs from true Brechtian technique in several important ways. First of all, the technique is primarily for the benefit of the performer rather than the audience. The actor does not, as in Brecht, maintain a critical distance for the purpose of passing this distance on to the audience who will then presumably be able to form an intellectual response to the performance. Rather, the actor maintains a critical distance for the purpose of retaining her own agency on stage. Furthermore, the actor is not asked to completely separate herself from the character—moments of closeness and sameness, of what Brecht might disdain as feeling instead of reason, are in fact present in the performance as well.

Additionally, the goal of the technique in performance differs; while Brecht sought to “turn the spectator into an observer, but arouse his capacity for action [by] forc[ing] him to take decisions” about the content of the piece (Willett, 37), this technique seeks to offer not the content but the form of the performance as a point of discourse. Finally, Brecht aims to abolish the sense that “the spectator is in the thick of it, shares the experience” as Realism would have it, creating instead a theatre in which “the spectator stands outside [and] studies” the performance (Willett, 37). It is acknowledged here that there would be no performance without the presence of some spectator; for this reason the pure Realistic approach seems self-prohibiting. However, it is also acknowledged that Brecht’s entreaty

for a scientific observer who stands outside the performance in order to study it is equally impossible because of the reflexivity of the relationship between the spectator and the performance. In short, there is simply no “outside” in which to stand.

The mode of performance outlined here seeks to decentralize meaning by limiting as much as possible the number of steadfast points of reference, both for the audience and for the actors. This was a very difficult process for the two actors in *Scavengers* who dealt most closely with it. There is a strong human need to seek a reference point, to identify and define ourselves in reference to a constant Other. But this Other may well be a fiction—at the very least it is changing in time with the rest of the world. This binary structure of meaning-making is comforting but limiting, and the conclusions which modern society has drawn from it are at best suspect and at worst oppressive.

The actor’s negotiation of awareness points is achieved by physical as well as intellectual means. The actor and director identify not only points at which the character undergoes a shift in performativity (e.g., becomes more self-consciously “dramatic”), but also points at which the character’s actions or words could be the actions or words of the actor. For example, in the Act II, Scene 10 monologue about going to the Metropolitan Museum of Art (referred to here on pages 70-71 and 100-101), Jeanne recounts a story which is, at least to some degree, a fantasy. As she relates the more fantastic portions, her level of performativity increases. She becomes another character— Fantasy Jeanne. The points at which the level of Jeanne’s performativity increase are awareness points for the actor. Additionally, there are lines in the monologue identified by the actor as lines that the character of the actor (Jennifer) says. When the line “there’s no sense buying a thing like that, you know, it’s none of the saleslady’s business anyway” is spoken, it is Jennifer who speaks the line, not Jeanne or Fantasy Jeanne.

The actor delineates these characters by constructing body architectures and master gestures for each. In the Act II, Scene 7 monologue (referred to here on pages 71-73 and

106-107), Jennifer, Jeanne, and Fantasy Jeanne are all present at points. The actor keyed into the different characters physically. One body architecture or posture was evident when Jennifer was speaking. When the actor passed through an awareness point and into another character (e.g., Jeanne), a physical movement occurred that constructed a different body architecture relevant to the new character. Master gestures (e.g., a habit of scratching a wrist, pushing hair out of one's eyes, rubbing a chin, etc.) could also be used for this same purpose, and would be more feasible in moments in which an awareness point occurs during a cross or other locomotive movement across the stage.

In the early parts of rehearsal, the actor will make decisions about when to construct certain body architectures (the state of the actor's mind influences the state of the actor's body). As the actor becomes more familiar with the role and the chosen body architectures, the body architectures will emerge at shifts in the character's level of performativity and the observant actor will find her/himself at an awareness point (the state of the actor's body influences the state of the actor's mind). This technique begins to address the questions surrounding the mind/body split.

In order to make the fullest use of the techniques of intermittent critical awareness and constructive body architecture, another important approach must be employed: improvisation. Discoveries about awareness points are, of course, made and discussed in rehearsal between the actor and the director. However, the times in which they are implemented in performance are necessarily dictated by the actor alone—the actor may choose to add or delete awareness points in the moment of performance. This improvisational aspect can be both liberating and unsettling for actor and spectator alike.

The majority of the exercises engaged in during the rehearsal process for *Scavengers* were structured improvisational games and/or journeys. The August 31st rehearsal (pages 101-106), in which the actors were led first through a physical warmup, then through a fantasy in which they imagined their characters (Jeanne and Jean) sitting at

home imagining themselves doing something else (walking outside and going to a place which turned out to be the rehearsal space), and then into an exploration of the space itself and of the physical presence of the other actor/character, was a very interesting one. The actors had to make choices in the moment such as where and when to move in the space and at what points to make or break eye contact. The actors participated in these exercises in self-awareness and agency enthusiastically during rehearsal, but shied away from them in performance. The following excerpt from a survey given to both actors after the production run was over is evidence of this:

Q12: Was your process of preparing for *Scavengers* different from your work in other productions? If so, how?

Dan: Yes. Deprivation. We were instructed to not use character development tools and to not focus on the story. I think that this denial resulted in tentative choices. This coupled with the large number of scenes was unnerving.

Q13: What, for you, were the most liberating or enjoyable aspects of your work on *Scavengers*?

Dan: Structured improvisation as a rehearsal tool.

Q14: What, for you, were the most confining, uncomfortable, or unenjoyable aspects of your work on *Scavengers*?

Dan: Structured improvisation as a performance. Not knowing where we were.

Again, the human need for a steadfast reference point is a strong one. Dan articulates that he (as, indeed most people) has trouble telling where he is without the reference of where he is not—be it the script, the audience, or the absolute character opposite whom he is playing. But it is this very need which must be troubled if the apparatus of performance and spectatorship are to be acknowledged as a construct rather than

a given. The techniques outlined here were difficult but feasible; although both actors were wary of and uncomfortable with the use of improvisation in the performance, they were able to employ it in ways that have considerable implications for feminism.

Theoretical investigation (Modrak, Searle in Chapter One), has found that the spectator's desire to see, and to see a particular *phantasm*, contributes to the intentionality of the spectator's perception and the reification of the desired spectacle. *Scavengers* provides a practical example of this construct in a way that falls along gender lines. In this play, Jean desires a Mythic Woman; his desire creates a pathway of intentionality that filters his perception so that he sees what he wants to see. This intentionality has a recombinant effect (Barthes, Critical Art Ensemble in Chapter Four) in which the Mythic Woman becomes "real" and the "real" woman mutates so as to accommodate her. These relationships occur not only in the play between these two characters, but also in the theatre (between actor and character and between audience and performance) as well as in everyday life (between subject and object).

Feminist analysis additionally finds that perception is not only intentional, it is also gendered (Mulvey, Dolan, Butler in Chapter Three). If the subject/ Self is always already masculine, and the object/ Other (as identified by lack) is always already feminine, then the process by which the subject perceives the object must also belong to the domain of the masculine. This process is an intentional one driven by desire which is capable not only of applying observed particulars to the spectator's understanding of universals or ideals, but is also capable of rendering these ideals into the form of an observed particular actuality. *Phantasia*, the perceptual bridge between universal ideal and the particular actuality, is a two-way street. This latter process of reification places the feminine as its object. The practical effects of this include the creation and continuance of stereotyped images of women (or any Othered group) and the host of mental, emotional, physical, and economic hardships that can result from these images.

The current investigation interprets the intentional pathways that lead to the reification of desired ideals as a sort of perceptual script. As in any script, a set of circumstances (here, desires) applied to a particular situation (the perceptual/ performative event) leads to a new set of circumstances (the application and reification of the ideal). Although the concluding step is reflexive, the process is still linear and as such can not describe the fullness of what it attempts to perceive. This perceptual construct endures primarily because it is unacknowledged. Conventional realistic performance practices, as well as most alternative practices, reinforce the construct by ignoring it.

In the theatrical performance mode discussed here, as in the performance mode of everyday life, identity is not fixed but is constantly shifting and mutating. Other performance modes attempt to fix the identities of the characters (who dwell in the realm of the feminine) in one locale, thus perpetuating the perceptual processes outlined above which themselves perpetuate the fictions of the deterministic Self and the Ideal Other. In contrast, the techniques of intermittent critical awareness, constructive body architecture and improvisation aim to unveil the apparatus of performance and spectatorship by creating a tension between what "is" and what is desired to be which decenters the identity of the spectator. By acknowledging the perceptual construct as a construct, the spectator is implicated in the performance and the performer is granted some agency. These techniques can thus accommodate feminism.

Additional research into the use of these techniques would be useful to feminist performance theorists and artists. Investigating and developing ways in which the techniques can be taught to actors within the context of a rehearsal process, and to students within a classroom setting, would be very important and could continue to reveal aspects of the perceptual and meaning-making process. Experimentation with the use of these techniques in other postmodern plays, as well as in classical and conventional modern

pieces, would also be revealing. Exit surveys and/ or interviews of audience members who have seen productions which employ these techniques might also be useful.

Even more exciting is the realm of cyberperformance. Internet chat rooms, e-mail, multi-user domains, CD-ROM adventures and super high-tech video games all give people access to ways of consciously shifting their identity and of creating multiple identities. What kinds of perceptual modes exist in cyberspace? Does the concept of Self and Other remain intact in a realm in which Self *is*, to a greater or lesser extent, Other? What implications might these questions have for live-body performance? It is possible that the techniques of intermittent critical awareness and constructive body architecture could greatly inform and be informed by investigations into electronic media.

The development and exponential propagation of mass media has brought human consciousness to a new threshold of understanding. Just as industry ushered in a modern era, communication has ushered in the postmodern era. Whether the postmodern era will perpetuate the shortfalls of its predecessor is still in question; what seems clear is that within the very structures of the paradigms that have guided civilization are tools for creating new structures, new paradigms which perhaps will be more peaceful and less oppressive than the old ones. A new concept of identity is emerging, one that is not so bound in the binary of Self and Other, one that can shift and transform and has the potential for great beauty.

This paradigmatic change—a non-linear, non-deterministic sense of identity born of mass media—has the unusual trait of having existed first in the collective consciousness rather than the individual consciousness. Bringing an articulation of this new paradigm to the individual must be the work of theorists and artists whose goal is ending oppression. Theatre offers a minimally mediated opportunity for doing so. The techniques of intermittent critical awareness and constructive body architecture as outlined here gives the actor and the audience practice in stepping away from the mooring of the deterministic Self. It is a daunting step to take, but it is one which leads to a multitude of possibilities.

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Appendix:
Cast and Crew of
Scavengers
by Karen Chronacher

Directed by
 Amy Himes

Set and Lighting Designed by
 John Harrison York

Masks Designed by
 Rob Hamilton

Sound Designed by
 Andrew Hohenner

Video Consultant/ Cameraman
 Stas Ushomirsky

Video Editor
 Andrew Kirby

The Cast

Jeanne
 Jean
 The Friends

Jennifer Fagundes
 Dan Scott
 Claire Joynt
 Andrew Kirby
 Jonathon Rabette
 Jeri Tubbs
 Michael Cellura
 Mary Smith

Video Fantasy Woman
 Video Fantasy Man
 Voice of the Mother

The Crew

Stage Manager
 Video Operator
 Light Board Operator
 Sound Board Operator
 Master Electrician
 Video Editing Assistant
 Video Location Assistants
 Properties Assistant
 Technical Director
 Stagehand
 Build Crew

Marley Morris
 James Gutierrez
 Matt Olsem
 Andrew Hohenner
 Anne Quirion
 Sharon Jennings
 James Gutierrez, Claire Joynt
 Sarah Joynt
 John Harrison York
 Michelle Morris
 Nick Amin, Mark D'Ascenzo
 David Guzzeta, Jonathan Williams

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 San Jose State University Department of Theatre Arts
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