2002

Public health politics and the San Francisco plague epidemic of 1900-1904

Mark M. Skubik
San Jose State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses

---

Recommended Citation

Skubik, Mark M., "Public health politics and the San Francisco plague epidemic of 1900-1904" (2002). *Master's Theses*. 2297.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.hq5x-ph4v>
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_theses/2297

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI®

**PUBLIC HEALTH POLITICS
AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PLAGUE EPIDEMIC OF
1900-1904**

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfilment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Mark M. Skubik

May 2002

UMI Number: 1408814

**Copyright 2002 by
Skubik, Mark M.**

All rights reserved.

UMI®

UMI Microform 1408814

**Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

**ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346**

© 2002

Mark M. Skubik

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Daniel Cornford", written above a horizontal line.

Dr. Daniel Cornford

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Bruce E. Reynolds", written above a horizontal line.

Dr. Bruce E. Reynolds

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Stanley J. Underdal", written above a horizontal line.

Dr. Stanley Underdal

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "J. H. Paul", written above a horizontal line.

ABSTRACT

PUBLIC HEALTH POLITICS AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PLAGUE EPIDEMIC OF 1900-1904

by Mark M. Skubik

This thesis addresses the topic of public health politics in San Francisco, California, during the 1900 bubonic plague outbreak. It examines the history of federal and state quarantine inspection politics leading up to the political crisis which accompanied the arrival of plague in San Francisco. In addition, it explores the inherent nature of the struggle, as well as the particular personal and political interests of the parties to the conflict.

Research reveals that during an epidemic, an inherent conflict exists between business interests, wishing to suppress news of the epidemic in order to protect trade, and health officials, who require public action in order to control the disease. In addition, a conflict of long standing political interests, both in California and within the federal agency involved, aggravated the healthcare crisis, and prevented officials involved from seeking a compromise solution to a deadly public health issue.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been in the works for a long time, and without a lot of help along the way it could not have been completed. I have a great many people to thank for their support and I only have space to mention a few. First and foremost, I need to thank Professors Daniel Cornford and Bruce Reynolds of the Department of History at San Jose State University. Without their continuing support across the years I would have never finished this project. Next in line are Professors Jack Bernhardt and Stanley Underdal. Both volunteered their time and experience to this project without a second thought. In addition to the faculty at San Jose State, Guy Wilson, the History Department's administrator, was invaluable to me.

Off campus, a number of people made a difference to this project. Farthest afield, I want to thank the staff at the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, for all of their help in getting me access to their collection. In particular, I'd like to thank Laura Brown, Head of Public Services, for making the collection a joy to use. Next, I'd like to thank John Parascandola, Public Health Services Historian at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, for making himself available to me, and helping me navigate the stacks at the National Library of Medicine (NIH) in Bethesda Maryland. John not only opened doors and gave me great research tips, but he was kind enough to point me in the direction of Marjorie

Ciarlante, Public Health Records Archivist, National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD. Marjorie was able to point the way to the documentation I was looking to find. Without her guidance I might well have walked away empty-handed.

Closer to home, my thanks go out to the staff at the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, who helped me track down some fine points in California history. I give special thanks to Barbara Hoddy, formerly of the Bancroft, for introducing me to her friends at the library and making my journey pleasant. The Special Collections Room at San Francisco's main public library is the first stop for anyone researching San Francisco history. The staff at the public library holds the light to knowledge. Thank you. Along the way, I got a nudge from Gladys Hansen, curator at the San Francisco Museum, and the *grande dame* of San Francisco history. Moving down the peninsula, I made extensive use of the Lane Medical Library at Stanford University. To Chris and Heidi, a couple of first class librarians, thank you!

From all of the people and institutions listed above, I've learned much more than what appears on these pages. In some ways, what is written here is just a by-product of my educational journey. What great fun it has been! In the end, it all comes down to family--my sisters have always supported me. This research project not only brought me closer to my historical environment, but it breathed new life into the world. Along the way, I met and married Natasha Dehn, the love of my life. Natasha has been proof reader, editor, consultant and teacher. Recently, she added mother to the list, bringing Margaret Ann into the world. Life could not be better.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
Section	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
PART I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW	
2. The Emergence of the Marine Hospital Service	10
3. The Quarantine Act and Wyman's Push for Federal Control	21
4. Rosenau's Battles In San Francisco	28
5. Washington Intervenes	35
PART II. PLAGUE IN SAN FRANCISCO	
6. Kinyoun Faces the Plague Threat	46
7. Germs and Politics	54
8. The Politics of Plague	64
9. Governor Gage's Offensive	78
10. The Plague and Gage's Downfall	88
11. CONCLUSION	96
12. NOTES	102
13. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	119

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Wilfred H. Kellogg, bacteriologist for the city of San Francisco, began a political firestorm with the announcement of a confirmed case of bubonic plague in the spring of 1900.¹ The death of the Chinese laborer, found in the basement of the Globe Hotel on March 6, 1900, was the beginning of a public health and political crisis. Before the plague had passed, the city would be torn apart by political infighting, polarizing the city's newspapers, politicians, business and medical communities. The outbreak would intensify the open discrimination against the city's Chinese population, highlighting a history of stigmatism and neglect. The plague would destroy professional careers, bring state and federal quarantines against California, provoke openly hostile newspaper coverage, and ignite political battles involving everybody from the city pathologist up to and including the President of the United States.

Fearing quarantine and the blockage of trade against California, the state's business interests and politicians aggressively sought to hide the problem from the rest of the nation. The ensuing war between public health officials, fighting to protect the city from plague, and the state's businessmen and politicians, fighting to protect their economic fortunes, was a matter of national concern in 1900.

The history of public health in California is not widely studied. While the plague outbreak of 1900 has been covered in scholarly articles over the years, there are no book length studies of the first epidemic and relatively few journal articles of any value. With

few exceptions, the scholarship tends to stay close to the account of events provided by Dr. W. H. Kellogg in “Present Status of Plague with Historical Review,” published in 1920.² Kellogg was the bacteriologist for San Francisco at the time of the 1900 outbreak, and brought the first plague victim to the attention of the federal authorities. Chief among the histories which follow Kellogg’s first-hand account is Vernon B. Link’s “A History of Plague in the United States of America,” published by the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1955.³ In addition to Link’s official government history of events, early works include those of Silvio Onesti, Victor Hass, and Loren George Lipson.⁴ Expanding on these traditional works is “The Black Death in Chinatown,” by Philip Kalisch, published in 1972.⁵ By making use of material in the National Archives, Kalisch offers the most detailed account of the epidemic of the time. His study follows the basic account provided by Kellogg, and cites the additional primary sources to expand on the political nature of the medical crisis.

Following Kalisch in building on the work of Kellogg and Link, the most notable early work is “The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco, 1870-1905,” by Joan B. Trauner.⁶ In her 1978 article, Trauner briefly details the social and public health history of prejudice and abuse against the Chinese population of the city. The author focuses on the fact that the Chinese were consistently blamed as the source of the various contagious diseases afflicting San Francisco’s population. Expanding on Trauner’s early writing, Nayan Shah’s studies of San Francisco’s Chinatown and the political context of public health stand out as the most comprehensive. In both his 1995 dissertation and in his recently published book, *Contagious Divides*, Shah provides a detailed understanding

of the racial, political, and cultural dynamics at play in San Francisco, and how these factors came to affect public health policy towards the city's Chinese population.⁷ While Shah devotes a chapter in his book to the 1900 plague outbreak, his work stays focused on the Chinese community, and doesn't consider the larger political issues at play in San Francisco which the outbreak helped to expose.

Enlarging on the political and social histories cited above, Charles McClain has written an excellent study concerning the legal aspects of the discriminatory quarantines placed on Chinatown during the 1900 crisis.⁸ McClain's study describes the events and circumstances which led to successful anti-discrimination law suits against Joseph James Kinyoun, the federal health official in charge of containing the San Francisco outbreak, and the local Board of Health. In the mid 1990's two excellent synthesis works appeared which brought the history of the first plague epidemic up to date. The first is provided by Alan Mayne in his book, *The Imagined Slum*, published in 1993.⁹ Finally, Guenter Risse's, "The Politics of Fear: Bubonic Plague in San Francisco, California, 1900," was presented at an international conference on the history of medicine, held in Auckland, New Zealand, in 1994.¹⁰

Current scholarship devoted to the 1900 plague outbreak concentrates on the events following the discovery of plague in Chinatown in March of 1900. Some of the work traces the origin of the outbreak back to the summer of 1899, when the ship *Nippon Maru* arrived in San Francisco with a history of plague on board. While the *Nippon Maru* incident is often cited as the first infectious episode of the 1900 plague outbreak, the origins of the political crisis which accompanied the epidemic has been largely ignored.

This study will explore the origins and features of the political environment into which the plague arrived and ignited a medico-political crisis between California and the federal government. The fight over the outbreak of plague and how to control it was the culmination of a struggle for control that had been going on for many years. As the *San Francisco Examiner* put it in 1899,

This effort now being made in San Francisco to grab the quarantine service from the local and State authorities, and concentrate it in the Marine Hospital Service under the Secretary of the Treasury, is merely part of a scheme to do away with local quarantine regulations and local quarantine officers all over the United States and to centralize everything in the Federal control. This effort has been going on ever since the Marine Hospital Service, by hook or crook, superseded the National Board of Health.¹¹

Indeed, local quarantine inspection authority began to be challenged by the United States Marine Hospital Service (MHS) under John B. Hamilton in 1884 when the service won out over its rival, the National Board of Health, to become the nation's primary public health agency. A concentrated effort to assume federal control began in 1891 when Walter Wyman became supervising surgeon-general,¹² succeeding Hamilton. Those efforts picked up momentum after the passage of the 1893 National Quarantine Act, and intensified again with the realization that an epidemic of plague in Asia had become a pandemic by 1897, and would, sooner or later, arrive in the United States.

This thesis addresses three key issues. First and foremost, it explores the shape and consequences of the inherent conflicts of interest between public health authorities and businessmen and civic boosters. During an epidemic business interests often wish to control economic damage by suppressing news of a public health crisis within their community. At the same time, public health authorities frequently need to take very

public actions to control the outbreak. In 1900, California came very close to having the federal government enforce a complete quarantine against the state for its failure to address the issue. For his part in the cover-up, Governor Henry Tift Gage of California (1899-1903) was made to look ridiculous, and his political career was indelibly tarnished by his refusal to admit the existence of plague in San Francisco.

Second, this thesis attempts to shed some light on the historically complex power struggles which were exposed by the political crisis of 1900. While some political interests in San Francisco were antagonistic toward federal authorities, others supported the federal position. Indeed, within groups of political constituencies, opinions and positions varied across time and issues.

During the late 1890's, for example, the fight for control over local quarantine inspection was couched as a states' rights issue in defense of a few political patronage jobs. San Francisco's old Board of Health had opposed the federal takeover of the quarantine inspection service in 1897 in order to protect its quarantine inspection fees. By 1900, a newly appointed board, under a new city charter, backed the federal position on fighting the plague once it arrived in the city. In contrast, the Southern Pacific Company welcomed the federal takeover of quarantine inspection in the 1890's because it standardized their operating procedures from port to port and reduced inspection fees. Then in 1900, fearing a commercial quarantine against San Francisco if news of plague got out, the transportation giant led the fight to deny the existence of the epidemic. In both cases, the Southern Pacific, along with the rest of the business community, was

trying to protect its profits. In 1900, the governor backed California's business interests over San Francisco's Board of Health and the city's Chinese population.

Third, this paper considers the political forces within the United States MHS, which was as much guided by its own political needs as was the Southern Pacific Railroad or California's Governor Gage. Surgeon General Wyman was relentless in his drive to take control over port inspection away from local and state authorities; he appears to have been just as manipulative and single-minded in dealing with people within his own agency

Each of the three main issues revolves around money and politics. The political crisis which arrived with the plague in 1900 was not just a reaction to loss of local control over port inspection to federal officials, but was part of a much larger struggle in California over political and financial control. The outbreak brought California's political machinery into contact and conflict with the MHS, then part of the Treasury Department. California's response to the unwanted arrival of the federal agency offers a chance to look inside the state's political house. In addition, the crisis provides a glimpse of the politics at play within the MHS and the office of the surgeon general.

Indeed, the plague outbreak of 1900 provides a window onto the political landscape and characters of the time. California's political machine was a steam locomotive run by corporate interests, most notably Southern Pacific Railroad. From the governor on down to the "mushman" in the kitchen of San Francisco's receiving hospital, control of government jobs was a function of party politics and political cronyism. One of the most interesting characters in this study, and a man whose political career seems

almost entirely forgotten, is Governor Gage, a political scoundrel extraordinaire, and completely beholden to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.

In addition to acting as an agent for the railroad, Governor Gage also sought advantage for himself and his friends. The problem was that Gage was none too subtle about his choices, and early on, the public began to suspect that his campaign promises had been tossed out of the governor's mansion with the rest of the inauguration party debris. While history records that his administration was tainted by the "plague incident," which this study details, Gage was covered with so much political backwash from endless scheming that it is hard to pick out the definitive cause of his political death in the 1902 primary. That said, this study helps fill in some of the historical pages that are otherwise left blank in the political biography of Governor Gage.

In the same way California's history is opened to view, the crisis opens a window onto the internal politics of the federal public health service under Walter Wyman. Much of our ability to see into the inner workings of the MHS comes from the preserved papers of two men closely associated with the plague outbreak in San Francisco. The first is Milton Rosenau, the man chosen by Surgeon General Wyman to lead the federal takeover of San Francisco's quarantine inspection during the late 1890's. The political animosity between California and the Marine Hospital Service is a direct result of the methods that Rosenau and Wyman employed during their successful bid to wrest control away from the local political machine. Rosenau was rewarded by Wyman for his work in San Francisco by being given the directorship of the service's quickly expanding hygienic laboratory. From there, he went on to create the first school of public health in the nation at Harvard

University and to end his career at the University of North Carolina, where his papers now rest. These papers provide wonderful insight into the service's deliberate takeover of the San Francisco quarantine inspection and the political gamesmanship that Wyman and his agency engaged in order to win control away from local authorities.

Joseph J. Kinyoun, the Marine Hospital Service's quarantine officer in charge of controlling the outbreak in 1900, also left behind papers, now residing at the National Library of Medicine. Kinyoun came under intense personal attack by the California political machine for openly reporting news concerning the plague epidemic in San Francisco. For the sin of placing public health before politics, his career as a scientist in the Marine Hospital Service was destroyed. As Kellogg put it, the "campaign of vilification" against Kinyoun, "for unexampled bitterness, unfair and dishonest methods, probably never had been and never again will be equaled."¹³

In 1899, Surgeon General Wyman, who controlled every aspect of the MHS and the men under his command, removed Kinyoun from his position as the service's founder and director of its hygienic laboratory, and transferred him out to the docks of San Francisco to meet the oncoming plague. Forced to trade places with Rosneau, Kinyoun was subjected to daily attacks in the press, in the courts, and from the California Governor's office for enforcing Wyman's quarantine control over the outbreak. When it came time to cut a political deal between the MHS and the state, Kinyoun's career was sacrificed by Wyman as a political gift to Governor Gage.

In Kinyoun's papers is a long private letter to Preston Bailhache, a senior MHS officer, in which he bitterly describes his situation. In the letter, Kinyoun refers to

Bailhache's earlier idea that Kinyoun should write a complete report to be used as the basis for a book on the San Francisco plague outbreak and its surrounding politics. Perhaps only partly tongue-in-cheek, Kinyoun writes "In thinking over the matter, I believe that paraphrasing of [Victor] Hugo's immortal work entitled 'Les Miserables,' would be, perhaps, the best title for the letter which you are to grace with the idea of its being a book. The legend 'Les Miserables en Quarentaine' would perhaps be a title which would not, to our minds, be misleading."¹⁴ The book, if written, was never published, and is now lost to history.

While the 1900 plague outbreak is the focal point where the lives of these men cross, it also is the vehicle from which a historical review of federal and state quarantine inspection policies can be made. In light of current events, a study of the history of disease control holds some interest and possibly some lessons as we revamp our national public health service to deal with today's public health issues.

PART I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Emergence of the Marine Hospital Service

In 1892, a cholera epidemic killed tens of thousands across Eastern Europe and Germany. Ships full of immigrants arriving at the port of New York from Hamburg had cases of cholera on board, and the city was in a panic to stop the arrival of the deadly disease. While the city was spared from a cholera epidemic through massive federal and state intervention, the confusion and infighting between the state and federal authorities very nearly let the healthcare crisis get out of hand. As a result of the 1892 cholera scare, the U. S. Congress passed the 1893 national quarantine act, which for the first time gave the Marine Hospital Service the power to intervene in local quarantine inspection and control. In order to understand events in San Francisco during the 1900 plague crisis, we need to start with an understanding of the 1893 quarantine law, its history and its politics.

Once an issue of local politics, quarantine had always been controversial. Nobody was particularly sure that local quarantines worked to keep out infection, and the methods used to enforce quarantine were often unwelcome in the extreme. As one National Board of Health (NBH) inspector said of the 1878 New Orleans epidemic, “A quarantine is their abomination,” it is “at war with every interest in New Orleans, destroying commerce, and

preventing the city from being one of the grandest on the Continent.” As to the efficacy of quarantine, it had not been of much use in New Orleans. While destroying the city’s commercial life, quarantine provided the port with little protection. As far as anyone could tell, “It keeps out ships, and merchants, and capital and dont [sic] keep out yellow fever.” According to the inspector, quarantine was generally viewed as worse than failure, because it destroyed the economy of the city without protecting it from the disease it was put in place to protect against. The inspector noted that “This view is not advocated alone by merchants and businessmen and tradespeople, but by a large number of the best medical men in New Orleans.”¹⁵

On board ship, quarantine historically meant isolation through imprisoning all aboard for up to forty days (thus the origin of the word *quarantine*) until the fire of disease to “exhausted its material,”¹⁶ with the healthy aboard left to be consumed by the epidemic. On shore, outbreaks often caused panic and wholesale abandonment of infected areas. Neighboring towns would quarantine against one another, stopping the flow of people, traffic, and commerce. During the South’s yellow fever season, typically starting in early summer and lasting until the first local frost, infected areas were further weakened by the cutoff of trade and transportation, often coming in the form of the infamous “shotgun quarantine.” While commerce would be brought to a halt, so too would the traffic bringing food into the affected local communities, so that besides facing the horror of contagious disease, quarantined communities also faced economic destruction and famine.

This destruction in trade was often as much a product of regional economic rivalry, coming in the form of “commercial” quarantines, as it was a public health response. The economic effects experienced by New Orleans were a case in point. The yellow fever quarantines had brought considerable suffering to New Orleans and the surrounding communities. As Margaret Humphreys explains the problem in *Yellow Fever and the South*, “The fever of 1878 spread so effectively because of the railroad network that enabled passengers and mosquitoes to travel quickly into the rural communities of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee, and it was the same network’s fledgling patterns of trade that were to be sorely damaged by the local inland quarantines of 1878.”¹⁷

In late fall of 1878, after frost had brought an end to the fever season, the New Orleans’ business community held a meeting to study and discuss the disastrous fever season. As one of the meeting reports said of the quarantine, “The City of New Orleans has found itself, at the close of the late epidemic, under circumstances of peculiar and unprecedented commercial embarrassment.” What the business leaders found was a “system of artificial trade lines created by the railroads which carried imports and exports of the West directly to and from the East, denying New Orleans the trade that was “naturally due exclusively to her merchants” by right of their location at the mouth of the Mississippi.¹⁸ During the recent epidemic, while New Orleans was embargoed, the interior rail lines running to the north of New Orleans remained unaffected and flourishing, and by the end of the epidemic the city’s customers had learned to acquire commodities from other sources.”¹⁹

The reports found that the interior quarantines were, by and large, economic in nature, and that rival business communities were using quarantine against New Orleans to gain a larger share of regional trade. The damage to New Orleans's economy was almost incalculable: the loss of business during the 1878 fever season was but a drop in the bucket compared to the irreparable loss in business which would come as a result of the loss of business clients and long term contracts. Once it became established that the new railroad lines could and would ship goods past New Orleans and could do so more reliably and without fear of interruption brought on by quarantine, the city's future was dimmed. Much of New Orleans' traditional business in cotton and other exports from the Mississippi River region would now be exported through interior railroad towns. As the city's business community saw it, continued interior quarantines would establish New Orleans "as a leper among cities, with which it will be forbidden to conduct the operations of trade or exchange the offices of a common humanity for a period of at least one third of each year."²⁰

The 1878 yellow fever season not only affected the New Orleans region, but also brought devastation and hardship throughout much of the South, as hundreds of local quarantines paralyzed towns large and small. In Memphis, Tennessee, a city with a population of just under 34,000, yellow fever caused 5,000 deaths. Because mild forms of yellow fever can be, and often were, mistaken for other diseases, mortality rates for the disease are hard to calculate. Estimates of mortality caused by yellow fever range from ten to sixty percent of people who contract the disease.²¹ Within this range, one can

easily imagine that half or more of Memphis was prostrate with hemorrhagic fever during the summer of 1878!

The most notable response to this devastation was a drive towards the nationalization of quarantine control. The federal government created the NBH in March of 1879. The Board was charged with coordinating the actions of the nation's state and municipal boards of health. The NBH, whose members were drawn primarily from the American Public Health Association leadership, was charged with advising local boards of health, providing some monetary support where needed, and if necessary, stepping in to take local control of quarantine functions where the NBH deemed it warranted.

The NBH's initial charter was granted by Congress for a period of four years, with the expectation of annual renewal. Unfortunately, its funding was not renewed, and it ceased activities in 1884. The failure of this pilot program for national quarantine administration was due more to state and federal politics than to lack of NBH enthusiasm. On the state level, the NBH's attempts to interfere with local quarantine politics were actively resented and rebuffed by the local and state politicians, who asserted states' rights under the Constitution. At the federal level, the NBH was in competition for money and authority with John B. Hamilton, Supervising Surgeon-General, who headed the MHS from 1879 until 1891.²²

Hamilton was appointed supervising surgeon general in April 1879, one month after the National Board of Health came into existence. As the second head of the MHS, his primary responsibility was to protect and foster the service. The 31-year-old Hamilton brought energy, wit, and charisma to his role. He quickly developed into a

skilled politician, combining bureaucratic acumen with sharp negotiating skills.

Throughout the NBH period, Hamilton was in a constant struggle with the supporters of the National Board, led by John Shaw Billings, Surgeon General of the Army. Hamilton was ultimately successful in his struggle against the NBH in 1884, defeating the funding act before Congress which would have continued the NBH's charter.²³

While the MHS emerged as the primary public health agency in the federal government, Hamilton's fight with Billings created a vocal opposition against him which would dog Hamilton throughout the rest of his career. During the remainder of the 1880's Hamilton spent a great deal of time on Capital Hill defending the MHS to Congress and protecting the service against a resurgent movement to resurrect the NBH. In 1887, to quell criticism that his agency was falling behind the times in public health science, Hamilton created the service's first laboratory to study disease. To do so, Hamilton brought into the service a young physician and Ph.D. in the new science of bacteriology, Joseph James Kinyoun.²⁴

Kinyoun, fresh from studies in Europe with the world's leading bacteriological laboratories, was a rising star within the scientific community. Under Hamilton's patronage, Kinyoun established the service's hygienic laboratory at the Staten Island Quarantine Station. The Staten Island station was then under the command of Walter Wyman, the service's senior quarantine officer. Although within Wyman's command, Kinyoun's laboratory was Hamilton's pet political project and functioned outside of Wyman's control. In retrospect, it would appear that the Wyman-Kinyoun relationship must have gotten off to a bad start from this awkward beginning. Wyman was known as

a strict disciplinarian,²⁵ and Kinyoun, in his letters, comes across as self assured and somewhat egotistical. One can easily speculate that the egos of these two men clashed from the very beginning.

Kinyoun's laboratory, built into the attic of the Staten Island Marine Hospital, established the MHS as the top health care research agency within the federal government. With Kinyoun's state-of-the-art facility available to study the new science of bacteriology, the MHS was in the forefront of the war against epidemic diseases such as diphtheria and cholera. The high profile laboratory and its young director generated much needed publicity and political credit for Hamilton and his agency. The laboratory established by Kinyoun would eventually grow to become the National Institutes of Health (NIH).

In addition to establishing the nation's first hygienic laboratory, Hamilton began the process of creating a string of national quarantine stations protecting American ports. During the 1888 yellow fever outbreak, local quarantines throughout the south brought the region's economy to a standstill. In Florida, where the fever had broken out, the state had not yet established a Board of Health, instead relying on local boards to deal with the outbreaks in piecemeal fashion. This lack of coordination within Florida was loudly criticized by her neighboring states. In Jacksonville, Florida, where the largest public health battle was fought against the disease, much of the city was evacuated under a MHS plan and placed into quarantine camps located in the surrounding countryside. While the neighboring states were able to fend off the spread of yellow fever from Florida, the general disruption caused by the epidemic was enormous. Hamilton, whose MHS was

tasked with fighting the outbreak in Florida, used the occasion to further advance federal control of quarantine functions.

Citing Florida's failed quarantine policy and the lack of regional cooperation and coordination among the surrounding states as practical examples, Hamilton pushed for the creation of federally built and controlled quarantine stations to protect the nation's ports. In August, 1888, President Grover Cleveland was faced with an economically crippling epidemic in the South and an upswell of political pressure from northern financial interests invested in the southern economy. He signed into law a construction bill that would establish federal quarantine stations to protect the nation's health and economy. The stations would ring the coastline, from Boston and Delaware Bay to Key West, then over to San Diego and San Francisco, and on up to Puget Sound. Administered by the Marine Hospital Service, the quarantine stations would be on the front lines providing defense against imported diseases.

The stations were to be built on the Holt model, developed in 1884 in Louisiana to defend New Orleans from the constant threat of yellow fever and the ensuing quarantines.²⁶ Joseph Holt's new system of "Maritime Sanitation" relied primarily on high-pressure steam to disinfect baggage and cargo. According to Holt,

The new system contemplates the detention of a ship only so many hours as may be required to cleanse her by the aid of powerful appliances, as speedily as can be effected. The time will vary from ten hours to two or three days, according to the size of the vessel, nature of the cargo, sanitary condition, and probability or not of special danger.²⁷

The goal of the new system was to eliminate as far as practicable the quarantine delays that were so devastating to commerce.

As far as Hamilton was concerned, federal responsibility for the day-to-day cost of conducting quarantine operations was actually an additional benefit of building modern quarantine stations to be run by the MHS. Locally controlled quarantines were infamous for charging fees for inspection and disinfection, whether the services were needed or not. The financial burden to shipping and the extra expense charged to passengers trapped aboard quarantined vessels was odious to all concerned (excepting, of course, those local interests collecting the fees). Hamilton argued that the new federal stations “would free the affected states from the expense of maintaining quarantine stations, and benefit commerce by removing the burdensome fees that those stations currently operating were forced to charge for their services.”²⁸

Despite concern from states’ rights advocates that the MHS would be violating their constitutional powers, the plan went forward. From the federal standpoint, the responsibility to protect interstate commerce outweighed a state’s right to police quarantine inspection. Hamilton ordered local maritime survey inspections and the selection of suitable locations for federal facilities. As far as Hamilton was concerned, the sooner the building got under way the less chance there was to reverse the policy. In the opinion of Walter Wyman, Hamilton’s chief quarantine officer, the stations, when completed, would be a *fait accompli* on the road to federal control. The presence of the stations, by definition, would establish a national quarantine service.²⁹

As head of the MHS’s quarantine inspection effort, Wyman was responsible for the creation of the new quarantine stations. For San Francisco, Wyman chose Angel Island, in the middle of the San Francisco Bay. The island was already in use as a

military transport base for operations in the Pacific. It would serve admirably as the site for a new quarantine station designed to protect the west coast. The San Francisco station was built and opened for service in spring of 1892. Wyman saw to it that the quarantine stations, upon completion, established the MHS as the supreme force in control of the nation's public health. Wyman made sure that the new stations would be in control of local quarantine inspections, and that he would be in control of the stations when they opened.

In a move which would prove key to the San Francisco conflict, Wyman was appointed as supervising surgeon-general of the MHS on June 1, 1891, when John Hamilton stepped down from the position. Hamilton appears to have decided to step down temporarily for political reasons after losing a battle to increase MHS salaries to match those of the military medical officers.³⁰ According to Bess Furman, an official historian of the Public Health Service, Hamilton supposedly cut a deal with Wyman that would allow him to reclaim the title of supervising surgeon-general. When the time came, and Hamilton returned to Washington to resume his role as head of the service, Wyman refused to recognize the agreement, having become comfortable in the position.

³¹ Hamilton stayed on with the service for several years, fighting a losing battle to regain his position. The intra-office politics between the supporters of Hamilton and those of Wyman, are, for the most part, lost to history. Clearly, however, Wyman prevailed. One action which strengthened his hand politically was the move of Kiynoun's laboratory to Washington DC. The laboratory was set up in a building across the street from the capitol

building, where Kinyoun's modern hygienic science could be put on display to Congress.

According to Furman:

Congress made constant use of the bacteriological laboratory which had been set up close by. Dr. Kinyoun was asked to report on the ventilation of the House of Representatives. He found illuminating gas in the air, due to leaky gas pipes. The carpet on the floor of the House and in the galleries, he said, had been 'saturated with tobacco expectoration' which "tends to make it odorous." He found the air "further vitiated by persons smoking." He recommended a general overhauling and electric lighting in all parts of the building to exclude gas leaks.³²

While the planning had begun under Hamilton's administration of the agency, the laboratory's move occurred during what was to be Wyman's temporary duty as surgeon general. After securing control from Hamilton, Wyman had no interest in sharing Congressional attention. Kinyoun's prestige within the MHS began to erode as Wyman moved him out of his laboratory and placed him on routine assignments away from Washington.³³

When a cholera epidemic threatened New York City in 1892, Wyman ordered Hamilton and Kinyoun to go there and manage the situation. If they succeeded in their task, Wyman would get credit for making the right decision. If they failed, their careers with the service would be over and Wyman would have rid himself of Hamilton and his protégé. In fact, Hamilton effectively stopped the onslaught of a cholera epidemic which had devastated Europe. Governor Roswell Pettibone Flower of New York (1892-1895) and the city's port authorities struggled against Hamilton over certain issues, but Hamilton won out and Wyman reaped the credit.³⁴ The fear of economic disruption that cholera could bring to the United States, which was already suffering from a business downturn, caused Congress to pass the interstate, or "National" Quarantine Act of 1893.

The Quarantine Act and Wyman's Push for Federal Control

Signed into law on February 15, 1893, the national quarantine act granted additional and extensive powers to the Marine Hospital Service to oversee, and if necessary, take over local quarantine functions. While the 1893 law left the initial responsibility for quarantine functions in the hands of local authorities, it opened the door to federal control if and when the MHS deemed it in the national interest to take over local quarantine functions.

Rather than imposing direct and immediate control, the 1893 law gave the MHS oversight responsibility for local quarantine operations conducted by the local authorities.

The MHS would:

Examine the quarantine regulations of all State and municipal boards of health, and shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, co-operate with and aid State and municipal boards of health in the execution and enforcement of the rules and regulations of such boards and in the execution and enforcement of the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury to prevent the introduction of contagious or infectious diseases . . . and at ports and places within the United States as have no quarantine regulations under State or municipal authority, where such regulations are, in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, necessary to prevent the introduction of contagious or infectious diseases.³⁵

At such ports where local laws were deemed insufficient to prevent the introduction of disease, "The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . make such additional rules and regulations as are necessary," to be

Enforced by the sanitary authorities of the States or municipalities, where the State or municipal health authorities will undertake to execute and enforce them; but if the State or municipal authorities shall fail or refuse to enforce said rules or

regulations the President shall execute and enforce the same and adopt such measures as in his judgment shall be necessary.³⁶

In other words, the MHS would henceforth oversee all state and municipal quarantine functions. Where deficiencies in quarantine operations were due to lack of local laws concerning such, the MHS would provide such laws. Where deficiencies in operations were seen to be caused by lack of ability or will on the part of local authorities, then the federal officials would, under the authority of the president, take physical control of the quarantine operations by placing MHS personnel on quarantine duties. The law gave local authorities the rights and responsibilities to maintain adequate local quarantine operations, but if the state or local health authorities failed to do so, the federal authorities would step in and take control.

In framing the new law, Surgeon General Wyman had apparently learned a lesson from his predecessors on avoiding direct collisions with state's rights issues when it came to quarantine politics. Perhaps he had heeded the warning and taken advice from a letter he received in October of 1892 from Jerome Cochran of the Alabama Board of Health. Cochran wrote to Wyman suggesting that the MHS should avoid the direct takeover and management of local quarantine functions, which he felt would generate too much opposition from local and state politicians. Cochran wrote that any "attempt to legislate the local quarantine authorities out of existence will fail." Instead, Cochran suggested that Wyman allow the shift towards a national quarantine service to take its course. Why not, asked Cochran, "allow the evolution that is now going to continue? There is no

doubt as to the ultimate outcome.”³⁷ As an article in *Harper's Weekly*, dated August 26, 1893 put it:

Under this law it is not contemplated that the local authorities, when efficient and thorough in their work, shall be either superseded or interfered with. It is made the duty of the Supervising Surgeon-General of the United States Marine Hospital Service to see that the local authorities are efficient and zealous, and to take charge of the work or supplement it in cases where he deems such course as necessary.³⁸

Despite of the wording of the law and the positive spin expressed in *Harper's*, many local quarantine officials discerned a slow creep towards national control of their local prerogatives. In August of 1897 the Conference of State Boards of Health met in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss the problem. In a paper delivered to the conference, Richard M. Swearingen, health officer for the State of Texas, argued that the nationalization of quarantine functions was unconstitutional. He said that the 1893 law, then in effect, ought to be repealed or, failing that, amended to reduce the power of the Marine Hospital Service and, very specifically, that of Surgeon-General Wyman.

Interpreting the law differently than *Harper's Magazine*, Swearingen proclaimed that:

When this remarkable enactment is stripped of its technical verbiage, in plain English it means that sovereign States can not be entrusted with the police regulations necessary to protect the public health, and that the Federal Government, with vastly superior knowledge, must stretch forth its mighty arms in our defense.

In this law there is no provision made for testing the merits of any controversy that might arise between State and Federal authority, nor of deciding questions of competency of any officer, nor for court-martial in case of charges of incompetence or neglect of duty...no tribunal before which shall be determined the grave question of setting aside the laws of the State. It depends solely upon the opinion of the chief, and his opinion, upon the report of some inspector of the Marine Hospital Service, to the effect that the State rules are not satisfactory.

What a parody on constitutional government! When one man [Wyman], without even in the form of trial, can set aside the laws of a State, it is a despotism, subversive of every principle of freedom, and unworthy of the American people.³⁹

Swearingen was agitated over a fight between Texas and the MHS concerning the Sabine Pass quarantine station guarding the entrance to Port Arthur, Texas. The Texas authorities had been forced to back down in a clash with the MHS, and were smarting from the humiliation. In concluding his remarks to the conference, Swearingen warned that to give way to the MHS on quarantine issues would lead to the destruction of states' rights under the Constitution:

We are confronted by a growing power that threatens to monopolize all sanitary matters and control all systems of public health. The evolution of the Marine Hospital Service within a few years from a charitable institution, caring only for sick sailors, into a vast machine of power, is one of the marvels of the century; and unless a halt is called, it foreshadows, at no distant date, the doom of all State and municipal quarantines.⁴⁰

In this, Swearingen seemed to be in ironic agreement with Cochran regarding the ultimate outcome of the 1893 act.

Surgeon-General Wyman cast the issue somewhat differently than Swearingen.

Addressing the conference, Wyman pointed out that under previous law,

Quarantine was permitted to be exercised by the states as a police function, and even in the present law, which gives national supremacy, it is provided that assistance shall be given to the states or municipalities by the federal authorities, the supremacy of the latter being asserted only when the state or local authorities fail or refuse to enforce the uniform national regulations.⁴¹

Nonetheless, Wyman emphasized the flaws in independent, local quarantine administration, which was often poorly equipped to deal with the physical functions of

quarantine. He noted that local quarantines were as likely to serve competitive commercial interests as they were to be applied to disease prevention:

As a result of the old system, prior to 1893, each State had its own quarantine requirements. Different cities in the same States had different requirements. One city, in order to divert trade from its neighboring rival, would be less exacting than the latter in inspection and treatment of infected vessels. Some cities found quarantine to be a means of considerable revenue, laying heavy charges for unnecessary inspection and perfunctory disinfection of vessels. The position of Quarantine Officer became extremely lucrative, and one of the principle offices to be used as a reward for political service, and a source from which could be derived contributions for partisan purposes. No wonder, then, that this system was faulty, a burden upon commerce, and did not protect.⁴²

Wyman went on to assert that under the United States Constitution, the federal government had the right and responsibility to regulate and protect interstate commerce. Since haphazard local quarantine regulations and enforcement disrupted such commerce, Congress had acted in 1893 to create unified national quarantine regulations. While reiterating that the national regulations were only minimum requirements, and that the states, under the new law, were free to “add to them,” Wyman suggested that:

A strong sentiment for exclusive national control is developing, even in States, which have been heretofore most thoroughly identified with the States’ rights doctrine, and also in the interior States, whose borders may not touch the sea, but may be reached by infection brought across it.⁴³

Wyman applied the 1893 Quarantine Act to challenge local authorities from New York to Florida, Key West to Galveston. In June of 1897, while writing to Milton Rosenau to discuss the battle over the San Francisco Quarantine station, Wyman described his strategy in Mississippi:

I suppose you have heard about the controversy with the Miss. State Bd. of H. concerning the Ship Island Quarantine. Two members of the State board dropped in with a view of having the order of the Sec'y [Secretary of the Treasury] to the Coll'r [Collector] of Customs changed so that he would accept the pratique of the State quarantine authorities, but they got a very direct, straight from the shoulder blow from the Sec'y & must have gone away discouraged. They threatened to treat our quar. statⁿ [quarantine station] at Ship Island as an infected location, & in fact did quarantine against it., & threatened our supply boat from Biloxi. The Sec'y simply ordered a rev. cutter there to act as our supply boat if necessary, but they weakened, & we are having no trouble at present.

The present policy seems to be to go on our way ignoring local quarantines when they interfere with us & letting them do all the kicking and making appeals to the law. I give you this as a pointer.⁴⁴

In a personal letter to Rosenau dated a few months later, Wyman reiterated this "policy:"

Just now we are in a contest with Texas...A dangerous state of affairs exists at Sabine Pass, where a town was built right around the quarantine station for the purpose of using the ballast of discharged vessels for raising the grade. Ballast was being discharged from infected ports. We have given Magruder a boat and a yellow flag and a United States ensign, and instructed him to board at the head of the jetties, near the mouth of the Pass, and to send vessels from infected ports to Ship Island. The Collector of Customs has been instructed not to admit vessels to entry at Sabine Pass Without Magruder's certificate. The State contemplates removing its quarantine station, but is very dilatory about it, and we have taken this action.

Rosenau was in the middle of a battle for control over the port of San Francisco with the local authorities. Wyman's confidence is impressive. "Do not let the bickerings of the local authorities worry you," he wrote,

They were to be expected. The law, I am sure, is on our side, and I believe that if the matter ever goes to the courts it will be bad for the State quarantines. Even if a court should decide against us there could be an appeal, and even if the highest courts should decide adversely it would show Congress the necessity of sweeping action, and would ultimately work to our advantage. I thoroughly appreciate the good work you are doing.⁴⁵

When Wyman wrote to Rosenau in 1897, he had been in control of the Marine Hospital Service for six years. The national quarantine act of 1893 had allowed Wyman to strengthen the service's hand well beyond anything Hamilton ever controlled. As previously noted, this legislation act transferred quarantine and inspections powers from the states into the hands of Wyman's MHS. The legislation strengthened Wyman's control in indirect ways as well: it permanently disbanded the National Board of Health, the MHS's primary rival within the federal government. This left the MHS and Wyman in command of the nation's public health bureaucracy. Free from the need to compete for political attention, Wyman was able to take full advantage of the powers granted to the MHS under the new regulations.

By the time the new law was passed, the service had built nine federal quarantine stations and had moved effectively to take control of local quarantine inspection whenever and wherever Wyman saw an opportunity for the MHS to step in. During the yellow fever outbreak of 1897, the battle between the states and the MHS was renewed with vigor. The weakness of the various state's quarantine administrations; their lack of coordination; and local political bickering, corruption, and profiteering all provided the opportunity Wyman had been seeking. The situation was on the mind of A. N. Bell, editor of *The Sanitarian*, when he commented on the war of words between Swearingen, Health Officer for the State of Texas, and Supervising Surgeon-General Wyman:

Legislation has been all sufficient for the occasion, but the fault is and has been the lack of organized effort by those who are entrusted with their execution, severally and jointly. Not one of our State Boards of Health is lacking in law—indeed, for the most part, the laws makes it the duty of the State Boards of Health to organize and supervise the local boards of health, and empowers them to

enforce preventive measures. But these boards have been so constantly jealous of their exclusive rights and privileges that any effort to exercise the national health laws, under the direction of the Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service, without express invitation is more vigorously fought than any disease against which they should jointly contend...On the subject of quarantine there appears to be no unity of either sentiment or effort, except it be in opposition to any interference by the Marine Hospital Service, lest as if the duties of that service were not, or could not be made helpful in the one primary object—the protection of the public health. The members—*all of them*—not merely the executive officers of the State Boards are supposed to possess that knowledge, and to *organize it*.⁴⁶

In 1897, as the pandemic of bubonic plague was working its way around the globe from Asia towards the Americas and San Francisco, the MHS was already fighting local quarantine battles in a political war to control the nation's public health bureaucracy. Although the struggle to control San Francisco's quarantine administration had begun when the Angel Island Quarantine Station opened for business in the spring of 1892, it was only after the beginning of the plague pandemic, and the realization that the disease would make it to San Francisco, that Wyman's attention focused on Angel Island.

Rosenau's Battles In San Francisco

Surgeon General Wyman's first concern was to take control of San Francisco's quarantine inspection from the local authorities. In 1896, when it became obvious from foreign reports that the Asian plague epidemic had become a world-wide pandemic, Wyman placed a trusted MHS officer and friend, Milton Rosenau, in position at San Francisco to ready the port for what appeared to be the inevitable importation of bubonic plague. Wyman must have foreseen that San Francisco held the key to preventing the

pandemic from spreading to the United States and that the port simply had to come under control of the MHS.

Rosenau was chosen for the San Francisco post in 1896 in part because he was already in the city. He had been placed on temporary duty in San Francisco in September of 1895 in response to reports of cholera on board the steamer *Belgic* in route to San Francisco from Asia.⁴⁷ During the 1892 cholera epidemic, he had been placed in Antwerp to inspect ships leaving for America. He was well trained in cholera inspection and detection procedures.⁴⁸ In November 1895, Wyman ordered Rosenau to stay on in order to scientifically analyze the city's water supply at the request of Mayor Adolph Sutro.

Still, Rosenau's stay on the west coast was supposed to be a brief one: Rosenau had been working with Kinyoun in the Washington laboratory, and had every reason to expect to return once Sutro's water study was completed.⁴⁹ Wyman had even written to Rosenau in December of 1895 to deny his request to have his personal effects transferred out to San Francisco on the grounds that he wouldn't be there long enough to need them. As Wyman put it, "you are informed that it is the intention of the Bureau to order you to return to your station on completion of your examination of San Francisco water. Therefore, under the circumstances, it is presumed that you will not wish the above effects sent to San Francisco."⁵⁰

Wyman's plans were about to change, however. With the reports of plague coming out of Asia, Wyman decided that he needed to take control of the local quarantine administration in San Francisco, and that it was better to do so with a trusted officer in

place. In March 1896, Rosenau was detailed to Angel Island as quarantine officer in charge of the facility.⁵¹

Upon assuming control of the station, Rosenau began the process of transferring control away from the local quarantine officials. One of his first orders of business was to let the San Francisco Board of Health, in possession of his recently completed water study, know that he was in town and available. The letter read in part:

Dear Sirs: I am in receipt of a telegram from the Surgeon-General directing me to disinfect the baggage of all Chinese immigrants landing in San Francisco, and I respectfully request the cooperation of your board to aid me to carry out this timely precaution...I have also the honor to invite the attention of your board to the fact that I am prepared to make bacteriological diagnosis of suspected cases of plague, cholera, or diphtheria that may come into your quarantine, and desire to place my services and my laboratory at your disposal.⁵²

Many members of San Francisco's Board of Health were happy to have federal help.

After all, California's legislature had passed a joint resolution in 1895 "to urge upon the Secretary of the Treasury that the Department assume entire control of the Maritime Quarantine Service at the port of San Francisco."⁵³ The timing of Rosenau's assignment could not have been better, since the first reports of plague on board trans-Pacific steamers began circulate in April 1896.

The first San Francisco newspaper reports claimed that a Chinese passenger on board the *S. S. Gaelic*, running between San Francisco and Hong Kong, died of plague at the port of Yokohama, where his body was removed. The article assured its readers that "no pains will be spared by the Board of Health to see that all danger of contagion is eradicated from the Gaelic before her mails, cargo and passengers are allowed to land in this City."⁵⁴ Wyman, according to the report, had already telegraphed Rosenau and told

him to inform the city Board of Health that the ship was on its way to San Francisco from Honolulu. The quarantine station at Angel Island was on high alert. So was the San Francisco Board of Health, which ordered its local quarantine officer, Dr. W. P. Chalmers, to be on the lookout for the *Gaelic*, which was due to arrive on April 18.

Two days after San Francisco began receiving news of plague aboard the *Gaelic*, the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that the Asian press was suppressing the news of disease. Under the headline “Plagues Raging in the Orient,” the *Chronicle* reported “Only the most meager reports relative to the cholera and smallpox plagues known to be raging in various parts of China and Japan are contained in the papers brought by the steamer *Rio*, which arrived yesterday, owing to the strict press censorship being exercised.”⁵⁵ Fear of quarantine was causing predictable results in the port cities along the *Gaelic*’s route, cities whose trade was likely to be adversely affected. In Asia, as in the United States, local business interests often exerted pressure to hide news of disease outbreaks in order to protect trade and market share.

In 1896, with the *Gaelic* steaming towards San Francisco, all of the issues which had come to light in earlier disease control campaigns would come into play again in California. The first battles would be over jurisdictional control: both the MHS and the city’s local quarantine officer were on the lookout for the *Gaelic*, and it was soon to become a bone of contention as to who was in control of the port’s quarantine functions.

When The *Gaelic* arrived in port on April 18, it was quarantined at Angel Island for disinfection. Chalmers, on the tugboat *Governor Perkins*, escorted the ship to the quarantine station after meeting the vessel upon her entry through the Golden Gate.

there was no plague or smallpox among the passengers inspected, the process highlighted a deficiency in the MHS operations: it had not been able to provide Dr. Rosenau with a boat or crew with which to meet the arriving vessels requiring inspection. This left the local quarantine officer, Dr. Chalmers, free to perform the incoming inspections and charge the local inspection fees on which his income depended, while Rosenau could only watch from Angel Island.⁵⁶

In mid June, Wyman sent a hand written letter to Rosenau, marked “confidential,” in which he laid out the service’s plans to Rosenau. Wyman told Rosenau that he had requested an increase in the agency’s budget to cover the cost of acquiring a boat, to be commissioned as the *Sternberg*, and that he hoped that the pier and wharf on Angel Island could be repaired using funds “out of the repairs and preservation appropriation for the next fiscal year.” Further, he said, “You will be given a boarding official” and be expected to board ships coming in from foreign ports. “I trust you will get the disinfecting apparatus on the Omaha in good working order” he wrote. The service had acquired a hulk from the Navy and converted its coal boilers into steam generators to be used for high- pressure steam disinfection. On the subject of the local quarantine officer, Wyman told Rosenau, “My plan is to ignore the officer. He can now proceed with the boarding if he wants to, but he must not interfere.”⁵⁷

Help arrived when Wyman sent another service officer, Rupert Blue, to assist Rosenau with the inspection duties. Their transportation problem was solved with the purchase of an old launch, christened as the *Sternberg*. Per Wyman’s instructions, by mid July, 1896, the MHS was ready to take over quarantine functions at San Francisco.

Surgeon General Wyman sent a letter to the San Francisco Board of Health informing it of the service's intention: "Congress made appropriations sufficient to enable the service to perform the entire quarantine function at the port of San Francisco," and therefore, "with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury," Rosenau had been directed, "on July 1st, or as soon thereafter as practicable, to begin the boarding and inspection of all Vessels requiring inspection." ⁵⁸

The Board had initially welcomed Rosenau's presence, happy to have the MHS disinfection and laboratory facilities at Angel Island available to support its operations. Yet had no interest in turning over local quarantine control to the MHS. No doubt the prospective loss of revenue figured largely in their concerns: the fees collected by Dr. Chalmers supported the budget of the board. The board wrote back to say that Wyman's plans would not float:

In reply thereto, we call your attention to the plain language of the Laws of the State of California, under which this Board was appointed to carry out, through its Quarantine Officer, the functions of boarding and inspecting Vessels [sic] requiring inspection... We are unable to find any warrant in any provision of U.S. Statutes... [for] the statement in your letter, that this inspection by the Local Quarantine Officer 'has been permitted to be continued,' or that Congress appropriated moneys, 'to perform the entire quarantine function' at the Port of San Francisco.

On the contrary, the U.S. Statute of April 29, 1878, provides especially 'that there shall be no interference in any manner with any quarantine Laws or Regulations, as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under State Laws.'

We both believe and hope that our respective duties may be carried out without friction, and possibly to greater efficiency of the quarantine service, until the exclusive and tremendous responsibility of safeguarding the Nations [sic] health from infectious diseases shall have been fully fixed and determined... You state that you are acting under the instructions of the Honorable Secretary or the U. S. Treasury; were acting under the commanding laws of a Sovereign State, and, as

her Officers sworn to maintain those Laws, we shall attempt to enforce them so long as we are in charge of that duty.⁵⁹

Clearly, the city Board of Health had seen through Wyman's bluff and called him on it. It's response to Wyman had matched his officiousness, and showed that it intended Dr. Chalmers to continue to act in his official capacity. As far as the board was concerned, the MHS should stay on its island and out of San Francisco's business. The press got hold of the story, and ran with it. "Defies the Federal Government," read one headline, and "The Board of Health Defiant" declared another.⁶⁰ The federal tax collector at the port was ordered by the Treasury Department to accept certificates of inspection from both the MHS and the local quarantine officer until things got straightened out.⁶¹

The Treasury Department was acting, in part, to put an end to an inspection war that had started between Chalmers and Blue. The two services had begun a fight over who could get to the incoming vessels first in order to perform the quarantine inspection. As one of the local papers had the story:

When this order was received a curious war was in progress on the water front. The steamship Mariposa from Australia was sighted at an early hour and the national and local quarantine officers set out to board her. Dr. Chalmers, the local quarantine officer, slipped out from his berth along the sea wall in the tug Governor Perkins as was away on his mission before the Federal officer, Dr. Rosenau, was apprized [sic] of the fact that a vessel had been sighted.

When the Governor Perkins was off Angel Island Dr. Blue, assistant Federal officer, put off in the launch Sternberg and headed for the incoming steamer. It might have been a pretty race if the Sternberg was anything like as fast a boat as the Perkins, but she is not, and the Federal doctor was left far behind. Dr. Chalmers boarded the Mariposa... and quickly completed his inspection and filled out the necessary certificate. He had concluded and was climbing down over the rail when the Sternberg steamed up in a big flurry.

Dr. Blue saluted the State officer and presented himself and his credentials to the wondering captain of the big ocean liner. he was accorded the same privileges and courtesies as Dr. Chalmers, and made a formal inspection of the vessel. When he demanded the ship's bill of health, however, he found that Chalmers had taken all of the papers. He immediately informed the captain that he would not enter the ship unless the proper documents were presented to him, and the captain told Chalmers to give them up.

Chalmers refused, and then there was a scene. The captain again demanded that Chalmers give up possession of the papers, saying that he did not care to run counter to Federal authority in any way. Chalmers flatly declined to heed the request, and then the captain in language enlivened by picturesque sea phrases told Chalmers that if he did not obey him instantly he would take the papers by force and throw him overboard. Chalmers weakened. Dr. Blue promptly issued a certificate on Federal authority, and the big steamship docked without delay. At the Custom-house both the Federal and State certificates were presented and duly entered by the entry clerk. All parties concerned enjoyed a general smile over the incident.⁶²

While the humor of the situation was not lost on the press, it is hard to imagine that Dr. Chalmers smiled on his way back to the office. Wyman was facing a growing political problem over the MHS actions in San Francisco, and Rosenau was becoming a target. Not long after the the confrontations between Chalmers and Rosenau began to generate continuing press coverage, Wyman sought to remove Rosenau from harm's way by replacing him with his ex-boss and active critic, John Hamilton, but Hamilton chose to resign from the service rather than take the unpleasant assignment.⁶³ Rosenau would have to stay put for a while longer.

Washington Intervenes

In October of 1896, Acting Secretary of the Treasury W. E. Curtis, reversed himself and issued orders stating that only federal inspection certificates would be honored

honored at the San Francisco customs-house. Then as now, customs inspection was a singularly crucial step on gaining entry to the port. Without it, all other steps were superfluous unless one intended to enter the port illegally. While Dr. Chalmers of the San Francisco Board of Health was free to issue inspection certificates, the customs-house would now only accept certificates from Rosenau or Blue.⁶⁴ To ensure that Blue could actually make good on the service's intention, and beat Chalmers in the race out to the incoming ships, the service purchased a new steam launch, the *Bacillus*, to outrun the *Perkins*.⁶⁵

The San Francisco authorities were not prepared to give up the fight, however. On January 20, 1897, Chalmers wrote to J. G. Carlisle, Secretary of the Treasury under President Grover Cleveland, to complain that the Marine Hospital Service personnel at Angel Island were overstepping their legal authority. Chalmers charged that Rosenau and Blue were interfering with his ability to do his job as local quarantine officer. Furthermore, said Chalmers, the MHS appeared to be trying to take over his job:

For some reason which I do not understand an effort seems to have been made to take the whole matter of quarantine of the port of San Francisco out of my jurisdiction, and place it in the hands of the United States authorities, where I respectfully suggest it does not belong under the laws as they exist. In many instances the United States quarantine officer has taken from incoming vessels there bills of health (hereafter mentioned) so that when said vessels are boarded by myself there were no data upon which I could base any opinion as to the condition of the vessel or the port of departure. This, of course, has very seriously hampered my duty. This is a very serious grievance as you can well understand, when I state that the original bill of health is required at the Custom House, and the duties of my office require me to file the duplicate with the Board of Health of the City and County of San Francisco.

The United States Quarantine officer, upon a number of occasions, has given authority to the captains of vessels from foreign ports to go ashore before the

quarantine officer of this port has inspected the vessel The United States Quarantine Officer has made it a daily practice to board a vessel and make inspection prior to the arrival, if possible, of the local quarantine officer, grant free pratique and depart. This course absolutely nullifying the intent of the law with reference to quarantine...This action has occasioned a great deal of annoyance to the shipping people and passengers of this port.⁶⁶

Indeed, the tug of war between the two had become a nuisance to all concerned, and had to be ended. Wyman received a copy of Chalmers' letter of complaint from his boss, Secretary Carlisle, and had to explain what he, Rosenau, and Blue were up to. The seven page letter of complaint, also signed by San Francisco Mayor James Phelan, and members of San Francisco's Board of Health, required a response. Fortunately, the city Board of Health had literally telegraphed its intentions, wiring a summary of the complaint to the Treasury Department before the full text of the letter had arrived by mail to the Secretary's office. Anticipating the need to mount a defense, Wyman and Rosenau discussed the situation via telegram. On January 22, Rosenau suggested that

The President be requested to assume control of the quarantine at this port, in accordance with Section 3 of the act of 1893. Refer to correspondence concerning the misconduct of quarantine affairs here, and the apparent inability of the local board of health to control matters satisfactorily, and their refusal to answer specific charges. The Chamber of Commerce has passed strong resolutions favoring Federal Control, and all the shipping interests desire the same. Urge prompt action.⁶⁷

Wyman then telegraphed Rosenau, asking him to "Wire briefly substance chamber commerce resolutions and any additional neglect local officer for presentation to the president." It is clear that Wyman expected to be called into a meeting with President Cleveland over the issue and he wanted to be prepared.⁶⁸

The showdown in Washington came at a critical moment. At the beginning of January, Wyman has issued orders to all MHS staff to increase efforts directed at stopping bubonic plague from reaching the U.S. "In view of the prevalence of the bubonic plague in India and China," Wyman said, increased attention was to be given to quarantine inspections as stipulated under the 1893 law. This meant that the Service's quarantine inspectors based at foreign ports were to be on heightened alert for signs of plague in their daily inspection routines.⁶⁹

On January 21, 1897, it was announced that Dr. Waldemar Mordecai Haffkine of the Pasteur Institute, while working in a Calcutta laboratory, had produced a vaccine that prevented bubonic plague. The vaccine used dead plague bacteria, and although patients usually reacted strongly to the vaccine itself as the immune system created the appropriate antibodies, it seemed to provide a real level of protection against contracting the disease.

⁷⁰ While this news was heartening, it did not stop the MHS from following Wyman's orders for increased vigilance. In addition, vaccine or not, San Francisco's quarantine situation still needed to be straightened out.

Wyman's defense of the Marine Hospital Service's actions in San Francisco rested on the impending threat that bubonic plague posed to the nation, and on San Francisco's questionable ability to handle the job of quarantine inspection. Specifically, Wyman intended to prove that Chalmers was incompetent and neglectful, and that under the rules of the 1893 quarantine law, the MHS had the right and responsibility to step in and take over the local quarantine inspection. The meeting with the President must have gone well, because on January 26, 1897, Cleveland announced that he was "placing all

quarantine matters at the port of San Francisco under the charge of the National Government.” As the *Chronicle* reported, “This is a direct result of the conflict which raged between the State and national authorities, and is the outcome of Dr. Chalmer’s [sic] exercise of authority as to State control of the quarantine service.”⁷¹

Given the tradition of states’ rights, however, the efficacy of President Cleveland’s proclamation in resolving the matter remained in doubt. Shortly after the president’s order, Wyman wrote a private letter to Rosenau asking for detailed proof against Chalmers and the “inefficiency of his service.” The letter went on to say that Rosenau needed to be careful not to push the locals too far, since “I am informed on the highest authority that even after you are detailed by the President...The effect of the Presidential detail will be partly moral, and will give only additional force to your position,” and not absolute authority. “I let you know this personally rather than officially so that if any strong impression is made on Chalmers by the President’s action, it may hold good,” he wrote.⁷² In other words, if Chalmers wanted to read more authority into the president’s action than it actually carried, Rosenau would be well advised not to let the cat out of the bag.

Predictably, the authorities in San Francisco were unhappy with the results of their letter of protest. Up until January 1897 the struggle for control of San Francisco’s quarantine functions had been a matter of limited concern, with a certain element of humor and good-natured competition. Cleveland’s response to the city’s letter of protest was a direct slap in the face to San Francisco authority, and the stinging rebuke was not to be forgotten. In some ways, the hardening of political positions, and indeed, personal

animosity, exercised in San Francisco towards the MHS grew out of the January exchange of political fire. Political egos were wounded in the exchange, and San Francisco authorities would not forget the insult.

During the spring of 1897, both sides in the conflict tested their strength against one another. On the one hand, the MHS moved forward, building a case against Chalmers and the city Board of Health that would allow it to take formal control. At the same time, the city continued to contest its right, under state law, to carry out quarantine inspection. The waterfront became the stage on which several bitter disputes were played out between the two services.⁷³

In early May, Rosenau submitted his formal indictment of Chalmers and the city Board of Health's quarantine inspection. Wyman attached a cover letter to Rosenau's documentation and delivered it to his new boss, Lyman Gage, Treasury Secretary under the new administration of President William McKinley. In the letter, Wyman produced affidavits proving that Chalmers had, among other things, failed to provide for proper inspection and disinfection of arriving passengers, baggage and cargo.⁷⁴ On several occasions, he interfered with Rosenau's attempts to disinfect baggage. As the local quarantine officer, he failed to meet incoming vessels in a timely manner, preferring to sleep through their arrival and then perform inspections at his convenience. Chalmers issued permits without performing the required inspections, having the permits delivered by the pilot on board his launch *Perkins*. Furthermore, he pre-endorsed blank permits to be issued in his absence by his clerk, in the office, where the captains of incoming vessels were expected to pick them up. Finally, Wyman attached copies of previous requests

made by both California and San Francisco authorities that the Marine Hospital Service take over full control of the port's quarantine inspection.

The letter was all Wyman had hoped for and more. In bureaucratic detail, it laid out the history of the present conflict, point by point. Not only did it show evidence that the local quarantine officer was failing to perform quarantine inspection, but also that he was refusing the service's help. It clearly showed that ship owners and operators had a particular preference for a single local inspection regime, and their preference was for the federal policy of offering free pratique in place of the local quarantine inspection fees charged by the State. As icing on the cake, Wyman could prove to the President that California had, on several occasions, invited the MHS to take over. He made it appear as if the only opponent to the service's plan to take over quarantine inspection at San Francisco was the local quarantine officer, "prompted chiefly, it is believed, by pecuniary motives." Wyman added that Chalmers "has proved himself wholly incompetent to perform the duties imposed by the local laws, and has frequently ignored the quarantine laws and regulations of the United States."⁷⁵

Wyman had only one request to make: "In these circumstances the detail of Passed Assistant Surgeon Rosenau as quarantine officer for the port of San Francisco, by the President, appears to be an absolute necessity in order to protect the country from the introduction of foreign pestilence."⁷⁶ President McKinley signed his approval to the request on May 17, 1897. Rosenau, with the full authority of the new President behind him, would have to stay in San Francisco for a little while longer.

The first reaction of the San Francisco authorities was one of defiance. When the federal takeover was announced, Edmond Godchaux, secretary of San Francisco's Board of Health, announced that the board would continue to inspect incoming vessels, and that while it might not have the authority to stop ships from entering the port, "it does claim the power and the duty under the law of inspecting all persons and freight attempted to be landed . . . as well as the right to charge fees for the services."⁷⁷ Godchaux pointed out that "The same question has arisen at other seaports, in New York and New Orleans, and neither State nor city has consented to surrender its right to inspection in the interests of public health," or in the collection of fees.

It wasn't long before the tests began. Claiming sole authority over the quarantine inspection for San Francisco, Chalmers ordered the MHS to disinfect all incoming mail. The Service balked and Chalmers took his complaint to the Post Office. In addition, Chalmers began to order arrest warrants made out against any captain who refused to pay his fees. Before long, Rosenau was having to answer subpoenas to appear as a material witness and Wyman was having to answer inquiries coming out of the Post Office about the Service's refusal to disinfect mail. As Wyman noted, "it is not unlikely that the demand for the disinfection of mails by the local authorities when the national authority determine that it was unnecessary, was made more as an attempt at legal obstruction than for public safety."⁷⁸

By August, Wyman was writing to Rosenau thanking him for news clippings about all of the cases Chalmers was taking to court. "I wish to keep track of these cases," he wrote, "And intend to consult the Attorney-General to see that the Government's

interests are looked after as far as may be possible. I have little fear as to the result.”⁷⁹ In the same private letter to Rosenau in which Wyman told of the troubles the Service was experiencing with the Texas authorities over Sabine Pass, he spoke his mind concerning the mail: “I will say, right now, however, that the U.S. is on top! . . . It is absurd to think of placing ourselves under the orders of Chalmers with regard to these matters.”⁸⁰

The bureaucratic war that would later erupt in San Francisco between the MHS and California political forces can be easily traced back to Rosenau’s assumption of quarantine responsibilities in the spring and summer of 1897. Wyman’s leadership alienated local politicians in every state in which the MHS had business. In San Francisco, Wyman used the tactics he developed in New York, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas to take control of local quarantine inspection, circumventing local quarantine authority by first duplicating functions, and then, using the law he tailored, placing his federal officers in control of local quarantine duties. As the *San Francisco Examiner* explained, “This same controversy is an old one,” but it also noted that:

The Federal Service in the past has made vigorous efforts to obtain control of quarantine at the ports of New York and New Orleans, but people in those States, having more pride in their State institutions than the people of California, were successful in resisting the encroachments of the service . . . San Francisco being the next port in importance, the attempt is now being made to wrest it from the State authorities, and our people, less progressive than those of New York and Louisiana, are sufficiently apathetic to allow the capture to be made without any resistance.⁸¹

Indeed, even as the political forces behind the city Board of Health were trying to fend off the Marine Hospital Service, other political interests in San Francisco were siding with

the federal authorities. The Chamber of Commerce was quite open about its dislike for the local inspection fees, and the press picked up the story:

The Chamber of Commerce at its annual meeting in January adopted resolutions declaring the State service worthless and a burden to commerce, urged the National Government to take entire charge of quarantine and advised shipowners and officers to refuse to pay the State fees, offering to join in the expense of the litigation which might possibly ensue.⁸²

The shipping interests in San Francisco were behind the federal takeover because it would standardize the quarantine inspection regulations at their United States ports of call, streamline the inspection procedures, and eliminate the burden of local inspection fees charged to the shippers. In San Francisco, one of the largest shipping concerns was the “O. & O.,” or Occidental and Oriental, owned by the Southern Pacific Railroad. The owners of the O. & O. were in favor of the increased profits promised by a federal takeover, and decided to back the federal position. O. & O. captains were under orders to obey only federal inspection offices and management agreed to fund the court cases being brought against its ships.⁸³

Similarly, where the *Examiner* backed the city Board of Health in a call to arms, the *San Francisco Call* referred to the city’s quarantine inspection as a sinecure and an incubus, saying “There is no need in this city of a State quarantine office nor a State quarantine officer. There are many uses to which the money of the taxpayers can be better applied than at maintaining a futile pretense at doing something which the National Government is already doing to the satisfaction of the public.”⁸⁴ The city’s business elite were prepared to back the federal government when they saw it in their best interests to do so, while the local politicians were fighting to maintain the local spoils system.

Between the two competing interests, Wyman found a home for his service in San Francisco.

Wyman followed the plan he had developed and placed Rosenau in charge of San Francisco's quarantine inspection. In other ports where Wyman tried to enforce MHS supremacy over quarantine matters, the Service had encountered strong local opposition. San Francisco was no different in this respect from any of the other ports in which the Service had taken control of quarantine inspection. Where California would differ from the other states would be in the scale of the war it was prepared to fight against federal control. As a consequence, ensuing political battles in San Francisco over quarantine issues would be long and bitter.

PART II. PLAGUE IN SAN FRANCISCO

Kinyoun Faces the Plague Threat

The fight for control over San Francisco's quarantine inspection program had been won by Rosenau and Wyman, but the political cost was high. Rosenau was very unpopular in San Francisco: the welcome he had received by the city Board of Health in 1896 had long since worn thin. His working relationships with his San Francisco colleagues were uncertain at best, and in the case of the board, openly hostile. At the same time, news that plague was spreading around the globe was finding its way to Wyman's desk via the MHS officers he had posted overseas. San Francisco was a problem. It was an obvious target for the spreading plague pandemic and had become hostile territory. If plague made its way to the port, there was no way Rosenau would ever get the cooperation he needed from the local authorities in order to fight an outbreak. Wyman needed to pull Rosenau out, but finding a man to take over in such difficult conditions would be a problem. Wyman would have to plan his next move.

As soldiers in arms against a common enemy, Wyman and Rosenau had developed an enduring friendship. The strength of the bond between them was highlighted in the summer of 1897, while Rosenau was fighting Wyman's war in San

Francisco. Wyman relied on him as a friend to perform a very personal favor and service [in addition to his official duties]. In July, Wyman wrote to say:

It is rarely that I have a personal matter to speak of or request to make, but just at present I am solicitous regarding a nephew who shipped as passenger on the Ship A. G. Ropes at New York some weeks ago and is expected to arrive at San Francisco early in August.

He has finished his junior year at Harvard College and was urged by his physician to take the roundtrip on a sailing vessel for his health. His trouble was caused by application to his studies and unappeased animal appetite and I have no doubt the long sea voyage will effect a speedy cure.

He returns on this same vessel and my care concerning him relates to the period while waiting for the A. G. Ropes to take her departure from San Francisco for New York. I expected to have given him a letter to you but the vessel sailed earlier than was announced and I missed the opportunity. He is a young man who has always been highly considered by his associates and stood well in his class at college . . . I would be grateful if you would take some little interest in him and make him feel there is some one friendly on hand, for he is missing acquaintances in San Francisco.⁸⁵

Wyman's nephew, it seems, needed a good long drying out. Rosenau, friend and physician, came up with a perfect plan: when Frank Wyman arrived in San Francisco, Rosenau offered him the use of guest rooms on Angel Island during his stay in San Francisco. Young Frank would be out in the middle of the San Francisco Bay, far from the temptations of the city's Barbary Coast, and under the watchful eyes of his uncle's friend.⁸⁶ Walter Wyman was grateful for his nephew's protection, and would find a way to repay Rosenau for his friendship.

Wyman's relationship with Rosenau seems to be an aberration. History records Wyman as a martinet and what we would call today a workaholic. He never married and he died in office after twenty years as the surgeon general. Certainly, his relationships

with his other officers all seem to have remained quite formal in nature. In the cases of Kinyoun and Hamilton, his relations were cool if not directly adversarial. Whatever the reason, Rosenau appears to have had a remarkably close relationship with the Surgeon General. The fact that Wyman would trust his very personal business to Rosenau shows the degree of faith the Surgeon General had in Rosenau.

In June of 1898, the Treasury Department's Collector's office filed a complaint with Wyman over Rosenau's relations with the San Francisco port collector. Rosenau, it seems, had interfered with the customs inspection process while pursuing his quarantine inspection duties. Wyman knew the Secretary of the Treasury was likely to side with the Collector's office over any disagreement with the MHS, since collections were the primary mission of the Treasury Department. If Rosenau's activities were conflicting with the San Francisco Collector's office, his friend needed to be moved out of harm's way.⁸⁷

In the autumn of 1898, at the end of the Spanish-American War, Wyman temporarily transferred Rosenau to Cuba in order to set up a quarantine inspection, leaving the San Francisco station under the interim command of a junior MHS officer, Dr. Brooks.. In the official history of the Public Health Service, Furman says that Wyman had decided to give Rosenau the position of Hygienic Lab director, and to send Joseph Kinyoun, the laboratory's sitting director, out to replace Rosenau in San Francisco. As Furman has it,

He would not court criticism by making the exchange too obvious. First, he sent Rosenau, in the autumn of 1898, to Cuba to organize post war public health protection. He sent Dr. Kinyoun to San Francisco in the spring of 1899, making

Dr. E. K. Sprague Acting Director of the Hygienic Laboratory until October 25, 1899, when Dr. Rosenau could take charge. Sending Dr. Kinyoun was not well received by the medical men of Washington, D. C.⁸⁸

Between Rosenau's departure and Kinyoun's arrival, in San Francisco, Dr.

Brooks' role was to stay out of trouble and act as a place-holder until he was relieved.

Dr. Joseph J. Kinyoun was transferred suddenly, in late spring of 1899, after news of a plague ship bound for San Francisco was telegraphed to Wyman. News that a plague ship was headed for San Francisco provided a convenient pretext for announcing Kinyoun's transfer to San Francisco. Evidently, the move came as a surprise to Kinyoun, who had expected to continue as the director of the hygienic laboratory in Washington. In a letter to family, Kinyoun wrote:

I did not intend to go to San Francisco. In fact, it was the farthest from my intentions and expectations. I was led to believe by Dr. Wyman in the latter part of 1899 that when I was assigned to duty in Washington that my assignment meant exactly what it said. I therefore expected to continue my work in the laboratory, and had my arrangements made accordingly. Instead of this, and without a moments warning, my work was suddenly brought to a standstill; work which I had devoted the best years of my life, and through which I had been able, as well as instrumental in obtaining for the Marine Hospital Service a recognition in the Scientific world. Moreover, it was through my efforts that the hygienic laboratory was established.⁸⁹

Kinyoun's laboratory had come to be known and respected as the leading hygienic research laboratory in the United States. Torn from his laboratory and his life's work as a bacteriologist, Kinyoun, with his young family in tow, was shipped to San Francisco to intercept bubonic plague. As Kinyoun put it, "Immediately on assuming charge of the quarantine, I became by inheritance the heir to a bitter fight that had been waged against the national quarantine by the state and city authorities."⁹⁰

The fight that had become too dangerous for Rosenau had been handed over to Kinyoun. By whim of Surgeon General Wyman, the career paths of the two men were reversed. Kinyoun would now face the combined forces of the California political machine, run by the Southern Pacific Railroad, and an incoming epidemic of plague, with all the unpleasantness associated with its suppression. Meanwhile, Rosenau would be free to remodel the director's office back at the hygienic laboratory in Washington. While Rosenau settled in to his new role, Kinyoun was left sitting on the dock of the bay, watching for plague ships. One in particular, the *Nippon Maru*, was due into port soon after Kinyoun arrived in San Francisco.

The first suspected plague deaths in San Francisco are associated with the arrival of this ship, the jewel of the Toyo Kisen Kaisha's pacific merchant fleet.⁹¹ The *Nippon Maru* steamed through the Golden Gate at dawn on June 27, 1899 flying a yellow quarantine flag atop its mast.⁹² All along its voyage from Hong Kong to San Francisco, via Nagasaki and Honolulu, the ship carried the dreaded bubonic plague. On its way to Nagasaki, one of the steerage passengers died of symptoms resembling the plague. Suspecting the worst, the ship's surgeon, Dr. Deas, kept the body on board for examination once the Japanese port was reached.⁹³

Japanese health officials determined the cause of death to be plague and ordered the body cremated and the ship into quarantine for seven days, believed at the time to be the extreme limit of the plague's gestation period. During the *Nippon Maru*'s stay in Nagasaki, news of the plague was forwarded, via trans-pacific telegraph cable, to the quarantine authorities at ports in the ship's path. By the time the ship was released to

travel on to Honolulu, news that a plague ship was moving into US held territory and on towards the mainland had made its way to Washington D. C. and onto the desk of Surgeon General Wyman.

By the time the *Nippon Maru* sailed for San Francisco in 1899, Wyman had spent the better part of the decade developing a system to fight and defeat epidemics. The MHS had matured into a well trained corps of motivated, professional health care officials organized on a military model. Their purpose was to fight wars against invading disease. Their mission was to win those wars. By the time the news about the *Nippon Maru* reached Wyman towards the end of April 1899, the Surgeon General had already had a great deal of practice fighting epidemics.

The Spanish American War sent U. S. troops into Cuba and the Philippines. In Cuba soldiers met more and deadlier resistance from the local mosquito population than from the Spanish colonial forces.⁹⁴ The troops were under constant threat from yellow fever. In the Philippines American soldiers were fighting a guerrilla war against an ill equipped but motivated local population suffering from endemic smallpox. The troops arriving in California from the Philippines brought with them the occasional case of smallpox, and this alone was enough to keep the quarantine inspection controversy alive in the San Francisco press. Fear of a smallpox outbreak in San Francisco caused by returning troops was very real, and the city Board of Health had to rely unwillingly on Rosenau and the MHS for quarantine inspection. Off the Florida coast, U.S. soldiers in Cuba were dying from yellow fever. Fear was spreading that the troops would soon bring yellow fever home from the conflict.⁹⁵ In addition, the MHS had dispatched officers to

monitor a serious yellow fever outbreak in Mexico that was causing a great deal of concern to the Texas authorities.⁹⁶ Perhaps worst of all, Wyman had begun tracking an outbreak of bubonic plague in the port of Oporto, Portugal. The plague had made it across the vastness of the oceans and gained a foothold in Europe. The pandemic that started in Asia in 1894 was reaching out towards the shores of America.⁹⁷ The MHS was fighting public health battles on almost every front.

When the news came that the *Nippon Maru* was sailing towards Hawaii and on to the West Coast, Wyman began to deploy his forces. Prior to its annexation, Wyman had stationed an officer in Hawaii under the terms of the 1893 Quarantine Act. Under Section 2 the law states that:

Any vessel at any foreign port clearing for any port of place in the United States shall be required to obtain from the consul, vice-consul, or other consular official of the United States at the port of departure, or from the medical officer, where such an officer has been detailed by the President for that purpose, a bill of health . . . The President, in his discretion, is authorized to detail any medical officer of the Government to serve in the office of consul at any foreign port for the purpose of furnishing information and making the inspection and giving the bills of health hereinbefore mentioned.⁹⁸

With the President's authority, Wyman had made sure that his quarantine officer, Dr. Carmichael, was in contact with the local Hawaiian health authorities and under orders to offer any and all assistance that might be requested by the local quarantine officers. When The *Nippon Maru* arrived in Honolulu on June 17 carrying the body of another possible plague victim, the ship, its passengers, and its cargo were immediately quarantined and an examination of the victim was performed. The cause of death was determined to be plague, and the ship's passengers, after weeks at sea, were stuck in the harbor.⁹⁹

The news of the arrival of a plague ship was picked up by the Associated Press, which interviewed Surgeon General Wyman concerning the matter. While the *Nippon Maru*'s passengers were in Hawaiian quarantine, Wyman assured the A. P. that the plague would not gain a foothold in Hawaii or in San Francisco. Wyman pointed out to the press that all of the necessary precautions would be taken to prevent plague from reaching the island's shore.¹⁰⁰ As it turned out, the Honolulu quarantine station was rat infested and determined to be too vulnerable to infection from plague to be used.¹⁰¹ After two days of negotiation, the ship's local agent, H. Hackfeld & Co. arranged to use another ship, the *City of Columbia*, as a temporary quarantine vessel for the *Nippon Maru*'s Honolulu bound passengers. Cargo for the port would have to stay on board the *Nippon Maru* and be delivered after an additional quarantine period, when it was thought safe to do so.

The *Nippon Maru* was cleared to depart for San Francisco on June 20 with the idea that it would self-quarantine at sea. Left on board the *Nippon Maru* were its San Francisco bound passengers and one Honolulu passenger, a young Japanese woman suspected to be dying of plague. Apparently traveling alone, the dying passenger, age nineteen, was very likely a "picture bride" sailing to Hawaii to meet her prospective husband in Honolulu. Refused landing, and sailing away from her destination, the passage to San Francisco proved to be too long for the woman. She was buried at sea on June 25, 1899, two days out from the Golden Gate. The remaining passengers were told that she had died of "apoplexy."¹⁰² Plague seemed to be on its way to San Francisco, but the authorities were trying to keep a lid on the news. Between Wyman's calming assurances to the Associated Press, and the cover story told to the *Nippon Maru*'s

California bound passengers, official denials concerning plague had begun. So too, the public relations battle over the disease's existence in San Francisco had begun nine months before the first case of plague would be diagnosed in San Francisco.

Suspected plague in Hawaii was one thing; a plague ship steaming for San Francisco was a different matter altogether. Not only was San Francisco the destination port of the *Nippon Maru* on the American continent, it was the largest city on the Pacific coast, and a transportation hub to the rest of the continent. Wyman knew that if plague was on board the *Nippon Maru*, the first battle against this most deadly disease would be fought in the port of San Francisco under Kinyoun's leadership.

Germes and Politics

The arrival of the plague ship *Nippon Maru* in San Francisco is fairly well documented. The fact that two bodies were recovered from the bay wearing life preservers from the ship, and that examination of the bodies showed the existence of plague-like bacteria, is widely accepted. Whether or not the bodies contained plague bacteria is a matter of dispute.¹⁰³ The dispute over the bodies marks the beginning of the war between Kinyoun and California's political machine. The incident was the focus of a jurisdictional fight between the local and federal health authorities, one complicated by internal politics on both sides of the struggle.

Between the summer of 1897 and the spring of 1900, the actors in the "politico-medical" crisis of the 1900 plague outbreak emerged. In San Francisco local political conditions evolved as the city adopted a new civic charter in order to clean up local

government. While the new charter raised the hopes of “good government” reformers, referred to sometimes with a mixture of humor and contempt as “goo-goos,” old-style politicians continued to run the political machinery with old-style politics, breathing as much greed, graft, and chicanery into San Francisco’s political life as ever before. With the state’s largest population base, San Francisco’s politicians controlled the state government and the state’s politics. The net result was the continuation of the political status quo with a few name changes along the way and nothing to protect the innocent.

San Francisco’s Board of Health stood at the center of local complications. The board was a political holdover from the previous administration. While the new mayor James Phelan had been voted in on a “good government” ticket, the “goo-goos” did not control the city’s political machinery: the Southern Pacific Railroad did. The “Espee’s” interests in the board lay in the fact that it controlled the bureaucratic life of the San Francisco’s medical community. In order to contain incidents which could otherwise lead to numerous lawsuits lodged against the railroad by passengers injured in various railroad accidents, the Espee found it convenient to control San Francisco’s receiving hospital where accident victims were taken for examination.¹⁰⁴ The board controlled the hospital and the “political doctors” associated with the process. The Espee’s chosen means of political control was patronage, and the city’s Board of Health provided many with a means of livelihood. In the spring of 1899, while the *Nippon Maru* was making its way across the Pacific on its infamous journey, the Board of Health’s spoils politics were being aired out in the pages of the San Francisco press.¹⁰⁵

The fight over who would control the patronage jobs associated with the city's Board of Health had developed into a rivalry between the managers of competing medical schools: Cooper Medical College (surviving as Stanford University's School of Medicine), the University of California's School of Medicine (UCSF), and San Francisco's College of Physicians and Surgeons (P & S). That competition was renewed in April of 1899 during the annual convention of California's State Medical Society. Having failed again to secure a position of control and influence during the election of society officers, Winslow Anderson, owner and president of the P & S, stalked out of the annual meeting. Protesting the election, he threatened to establish a new medical society to be run on "a better and more advanced" foundation.¹⁰⁶ Shortly thereafter, Anderson created the San Francisco Clinical Society.¹⁰⁷

When the railroad combination in San Francisco wanted to fill seats on the city Board of Health in the summer of 1899, it found willing physician candidates under the control of Dr. Anderson, who wanted access to the city's receiving hospital. Not only had he and his colleagues at the College of Physicians and Surgeons been denied leadership roles within the state's medical society, they had also been excluded from San Francisco's Board of Health. The practical result of this exclusion was that doctors affiliated with the P & S were denied admitting privileges at the city's receiving hospital and students were denied residency. Without admitting privileges, the P & S lacked a teaching hospital. Without patients or residency privileges, competing with the Cooper and UCSF medical schools was a losing battle. Dr. Anderson was determined to change the status quo and make some extra money as well by allying himself with the railroad interests.

Anderson turned to one of his patients and political friends, Daniel Burns. Under W. F. Herrin, senior attorney for the Southern Pacific, Republican Party politics in San Francisco were managed in part by Burns, whose exploits were a frequent subject of political cartoons appearing in the San Francisco press. Topped by a sombrero, “Mexican Dan” appeared in the middle of things political with regularity.¹⁰⁸ In the previous year of 1888, he had the job of “delivering” San Francisco for the Espee’s Republican candidate for governor, Henry T. Gage. Gage’s political base was in southern California, but to win the state, the Espee’s candidate needed to win San Francisco, which had by far the largest voting population. Dan Burns, himself an outsider to San Francisco, was responsible for making it happen.

Governor Gage and the Espee showed their appreciation by promising Burns the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by Stephen M. White, a Democrat, whose term had expired. In 1899, California’s federal senators were chosen by the state assembly. Gage’s victory had placed the state in Republican hands, and Gage, controlled by the Espee, wanted Burns for U.S. Senator.¹⁰⁹ Burns had the governor’s ear and his favor, and Anderson wanted in on the action, so he made a deal.

Promising cooperation with Burns, who arranged the appointments, Anderson succeeded in placing three P & S doctors on the four-member Board of Health, winning a major victory against his rivals and putting the body into the hands of the railroads. Control over the Board of Health by Burns and Anderson, however, would be short lived. Political rivalry and the city’s new reform charter would thwart Burns’ use of the board to channel patronage jobs.

The positions everyone was so eager to control were themselves a point of contention. San Francisco had a new mayor, James Phelan, who was voted in on a reformist ticket. The Phelan Administration wanted to clean up the management of the city Board of Health. Under Burns, the Board had created quite a number of sinecure jobs, and Burns wanted to keep them. Local party bosses, double-crossed by Burns over patronage jobs with the city Board of Health, wanted to take them away. The local bosses arranged for the city's auditor to deny salary warrants for the unauthorized positions, and the press had a field day over the issue.¹¹⁰

Under the headline "A Small Army of Tax Eaters," the *San Francisco Chronicle* reported the Board had 221 employees in patronage positions, ranging from health examiners to bakers to gardeners and everything in between, including an "assistant mushman."¹¹¹ Ridiculing the patronage positions, the *Chronicle* followed a few of the employees around and reported that:

The garbage inspectors do not arise as early as the bakery man. On June 28th W. Grigg reached the office at 9 A.M. where he remained until 10. He then went out and inspected some scavenge carts until noon, when he promptly ate his luncheon, devoting an hour to the midday repast. He then worked until 3 P.M. Possibly Grigg quit early because he became exhausted by the 'extra or special service' he performed and which consisted of inspecting a manure pile on Market Street . . . The main occupation of the Boards of Health has been the creation of jobs for the "push." So ingenious have they been at this line that now there are a mushman and an assistant mushman in the County Hospital. The part politics plays in this department is shown in the fact that the assistant mushman is paid \$18 a month, while his chief receives but \$15. The second mush stirrer has a bigger pull than the other fellow. Hence the heavier draw-down.¹¹²

Under the new city charter, the mushman was eliminated from the budget, as was his overpaid assistant. In retaliation, the Board of Health closed all of the city's receiving

hospitals, arguing that there was no money in their budget to run the facilities. The fight between the Board of Health, run by Burns and his political doctor, Anderson, and the city's reform administration, under Mayor Phelan and the local politicians, dumbfounded observers. By August, the fight had become a topic of national attention. In an editorial, the American Medical Association described the battle:

The conflict between the Board of Health and the Supervisors, backed by the Auditor, has assumed a phase that promises much harm to the city of San Francisco...The root of the whole trouble lies in the fact that in the fall there will be held an election under the new charter, and the political bosses are all striving to secure as much patronage as they can in order to influence things at the election. If they can appoint a hundred or two of their political friends to jobs in the Board of Health office, then this hundred or two can do a good deal of electioneering, and help on the party through which they secured their appointments. The truth of the whole matter is fully understood by every one, yet the maneuvering for political advantage goes on all the time. Under the new charter these city offices will be appointed by the mayor, who will control almost all the patronage, and consequently the strife is a particularly bitter one.¹¹³

The battle over control of the Board of Health and the receiving hospitals tilted back and forth into the fall election season. In September, Burns and Anderson were able to take control of the city and county hospital. By forcing out its superintendent, Anderson was able to place D. A. Hodgehead, a P&S physician and Anderson's close friend, into the vacant position. Anderson was now in a position to control the hospital, its clinical services, and admitting privileges. At the same time, the Board voted to condemn the hospital as unfit for habitation, and planned the creation of a new facility.¹¹⁴ With these two acts, Anderson was in a position to hand the P. & S. a brand new teaching hospital paid for by the city.

By October, the Board of Health had won a local court ruling allowing it to hire as many employees as it saw fit, prompting Mayor Phelan to say “there is evidently a conspiracy among the committees of the board to make economy odious.”¹¹⁵ The Board of Health wasted no time making its political appointments. Dan Burns was once again in a position to control the board’s funds.

The tone of the battle changed on October 23, when the State Supreme Court ruled San Francisco’s new charter constitutional. The good government movement in California had finally won a most important victory. To Mayor Phelan, it meant that he now had the power to select and remove board members and city supervisors. To the city Board of Health and the supervisors controlled by the Burns faction, it meant that the game was up: the board members would be replaced in January 1900 under the new city charter. Burns and Anderson, minions of the Southern Pacific machine, were turned out. Further, in the fall 1899 election, the city voted to keep its mayor, build a new hospital, erect new schools, and improve its sewage system. In January 1900, the city Board of Health was replaced by a new board of the mayor’s choosing, and the city and county hospital again had a new superintendent. The Espee was not used to losing political battles and it prepared to fight its way back, but it would have to wait for new elections before it could try to retake the town.

The Southern Pacific was a formidable foe: its transportation monopoly in California had lead to a near monopoly of the state’s politics as well. Almost all business in the state had direct or indirect ties to the Espee’s transportation system. With its ability to affect shipping costs, the Espee controlled the profitability of much of the state’s

business community. Many industry leaders allied themselves politically with the Southern Pacific, hoping to win favor with the transportation giant and maintain a stable and profitable business environment for themselves. With a firm hold on the California legislature and the state's governor's office, the Espee was usually well protected.

Any force or event that might challenge the Espee and its profits in California was therefore an enemy to be destroyed. The plague ship sailing toward California's Golden Gate in the spring of 1900 would pose a new challenge to the interests of the Espee and the Californian business community as a whole. The Southern Pacific's political machinery was about to come up against the deadly disease, and in so doing, collide with the Marine Hospital Service, which had both public health and internal political interests to protect.

The medico-political crisis that would erupt in California over the discovery of plague in San Francisco had much in common with previous quarantine struggles, but it had its particular characteristics. First, the political machinery in California was in many ways monolithic, with an ability to marshal a vast array of forces in defense of its position. What was good for the Southern Pacific was good for California, and many of California's business interests were prepared to follow the Espee's lead. In addition to controlling the business community, the Espee controlled the governor's office and many in state and local government, thus exercising enormous power within California.

Next, the power of the Marine Hospital Service had been steadily increasing since the 1893 national quarantine act was passed. Wyman had practiced his political will and honed his skills in taking over local quarantine inspection and control. While the situation

in San Francisco had provided for a lively controversy between the local authorities and Wyman's agency for several years, the MHS believed that it had the upper hand.

Also, the science of bacteriology, while still relatively new, had advanced significantly by 1900. It must be noted, however, that the epidemiology of plague was still poorly understood, and the controversy over the characteristics of the disease and how the plague moved through a human population was lively. With competing economic and political interests at stake, controversy was inevitable.

Finally, the personalities at play over the controversy displayed particular ego and arrogance. In California, the politicians and business men backed by the Southern Pacific were a colorful mix, from political scoundrels such as Dan Burns, to lawyers like the brilliant William F. Herrin, and his tarnished minion, Governor Gage. Add to the mix political doctors, and newspapermen like Mike De Young and Fremont Older from a thriving and lively press, Chinese racketeers, and a local court system sympathetic to local political concerns. On the federal side of the controversy, Supervising Surgeon-General Wyman was "meticulous and a martinet,"¹¹⁶ a political bureaucrat seeking to expand his power and influence, while justifying his actions on the grounds of improving in the nation's public health. Acting for Wyman and the MHS was Dr. Kinyoun, the service's best bacteriologist, and no doubt an arrogant man in his own right.

In the spring of 1900, the stage was set for a battle royal between a multitude of competing interests when bubonic plague appeared San Francisco. The federal government, represented by Kinyoun, was waiting to intercept the oncoming pandemic in hopes of stopping it at the continent's doorstep. San Francisco's business interests,

hopes of stopping it at the continent's doorstep. San Francisco's business interests, reacting to the news of a dreaded contagious disease in their midst and the threat of a quarantine against the city, responded the same way that business interests had often responded in similar situations: they tried to bury the news and protect their trading concerns. San Francisco's business and political elite turned to their governor, a man who they had placed in office, for help. Governor Gage, the Southern Pacific, and the rest of San Francisco's business community chose to deny the existence of plague in hope that it would go away.

Gage, inaugurated in 1899, was owned and operated by the Southern Pacific Railroad. Like a string of men before him, Gage was a polite bit of political fiction. Ever since the railroad had linked California's commercial interests to the rest of the continent, and from the time Leland Stanford sat in the governor's chair in 1860's, the interests of the railroads and the politics of California were wedded together with money and blood. By the time Gage took office in January of 1899, the "Espee" had expanded its control across all aspects of California's politics, controlling both the Republican and Democratic "machines." When Gage arrived in Sacramento to guide the wheel of state, he was driving a political locomotive built by the "octopus" of Frank Norris's famous novel.¹¹⁷ Little did he know that his political train would be wrecked by a rat, a flea, and a recently discovered bacteria.

The Politics of Plague

On March 6, 1900, the fears of the Marine Hospital Service came true: the bubonic plague pandemic found its way to the port of San Francisco, and a man lay dead in Chinatown. This brought to a head the long-standing tension between federal authorities on the one hand and state and local officials on the other. It also brought the schisms within the local medical community into bold relief.

Kinyoun's quarantine station at Angel Island was the only laboratory in the San Francisco area that had the resources for bacteriological testing. Dr. W. H. Kellogg, bacteriologist for the Board of Health in the city of San Francisco, had lost his budget to yet another local political battle, and was forced to bring his samples to Kinyoun.. All of the tests proved positive. Kinyoun contacted the local health authorities and sent a telegram to Wyman in Washington D C letting him know that he had positively identified the plague in San Francisco.

In 1900, the common belief in California and elsewhere was that plague was an "Asiatic disease." As Joan Trauner points out, anti-Asian discrimination in California extended into the realm of Public Health.¹¹⁸ Many health officials blamed the Chinese and their enforced sub-standard living conditions within the Chinese ghettos as the source of epidemic disease.¹¹⁹ Theories of germ transmission by way of dirty clothes and "foul and disgusting vapors" were only just being replaced by bacteriological science at the beginning of the twentieth century. Malaria, smallpox, and leprosy had all been blamed on San Francisco's Chinatown.¹²⁰ Now, with the discovery of a bubonic plague case in

the basement of the infamous Globe Hotel, it too would be added to the sins of the Chinese population.¹²¹

Within days of the discovery, the San Francisco newspapers were shouting in headlines that the discovery of plague was a hoax. "Nothing But A Suspicion," and "Plague Fake Exploded" declared the *San Francisco Chronicle*.¹²² A quarantine which was quickly put in place around Chinatown by the San Francisco Board of Health was just as quickly removed when white San Franciscans realized that the quarantine separated them from their Chinese domestic servants. The Board of Health was attacked by the press for its "criminal idiocy," and demands were made to Mayor Phelan for the board's removal.¹²³

The only paper in the city to support the mayor and the Board of Health was the *San Francisco Examiner*, owned and edited by William Randolph Hearst. Hearst apparently thought that there was more to gain for his newspaper in playing up the sensationalism of a plague outbreak and going to battle against rival papers. To that end, Hearst put his powers of yellow journalism into high gear, both at the *Examiner* and across the nation, at the *New York Journal*, where publication of sensational plague stories made the San Francisco outbreak into a national and international story.¹²⁴ Furious that the *Examiner* and its New York affiliate, the *Journal*, would publicize the outbreak to the world, the *San Francisco Bulletin* reacted by writing that "What is needed in this community is the inoculation of the *Examiner* with the germs of bubonic plague."¹²⁵ *The Occidental Medical Times* responded by saying, "Let this inoculation extend to the owners, editors and managers of our dailies and we would suggest that,

when subjects are needed for further experimentation, they be recruited from the ranks of sensational journalists."¹²⁶

Within a few weeks, however, San Francisco's business interests would change tactics from noisy denial to suppression of the facts. Reaction across the country to the early news of plague had led to fears of reduced tourism and trade in California. The sensational denials out of the San Francisco press turned into sensational rumors around the nation. The business interests decided that "no news was good news" and enforced a plague news blackout on the San Francisco dailies. Most of the city's newspapers voluntarily censored themselves, the *San Francisco Examiner* being the outspoken exception. But from April 1, when economic pressure also forced the *Examiner's* silence, through the remainder of 1900, the San Francisco newspapers maintained a news blackout against the plague in the streets.¹²⁷

No plague news out of San Francisco did not mean no news at all, however. The *Sacramento Bee* had picked up the story from the beginning. Charles Kenny ("C. K.") McClatchy was competing with the San Francisco newspapers, and unlike Hearst's gagged *Examiner*, the *Bee* was supported by Sacramento advertising dollars, and would get the news out to its eager readers. Accordingly, into the summer and fall, the *Bee* led off with headlines like: "The Bubonic Plague And No Mistake," "Chinatown Must Be Cleaned Up," and "Two More Cases Of The Plague."¹²⁸ Along with the *Bee*, the *Los Angeles Times* kept up a steady pace of plague news to inform California and the world. In addition, the *Occidental Medical Times*, the largest of the West Coast medical journals, opposed the campaign of denial being waged by San Francisco's business community. It

proved itself to be particularly unrelenting in the fight to get the truth out. Its April 1900 issue commented on the news blackout which the S. F. papers were perpetrating:

It is a common and certainly justifiable opinion that the press, especially in the dailies of our city, are notoriously sensational and unreliable, except when they are well paid to tell the truth, or when they wish to gain a point on a rival. This feature has been made extremely prominent since the discovery of a case of the plague. Such an amount of untruth, of political vituperation and of slander has rarely graced their pages. It seems that either from habit or inability to differentiate between true and false, their columns are ever teeming with rank sensation or pure falsehood.

It is generally assumed that newspapers are edited and conducted by intelligent men. The most prominent characteristic of education and intelligence is to be just and make at least some effort to learn the truth in all things . . . Bitter and scandalous have been the charges, and bitter and scandalous is the fight, *because the political program, arising out of the last election* was not carried out according to the demands of each; and the affair has resolved itself into a piece of base political debauchery, upon which we would hesitate to comment, if the reputation of the medical profession, its integrity and honor were not pitted against ignorance and untruth by unscrupulous, disreputable newspapers and thoughtless citizens.

Amidst the mass of rot and falsehood have been printed interviews of a most disgraceful nature with lawyers, laymen, ministers, doctors and politicians, condemning the Board of Health . . . These interviews have been granted by men of prominence and of the highest standing; and it is not only absurd, but unpardonable that they would proclaim that there was no plague, before it was possible to affirm or deny the assertion.

If no plague existed, are not the methods pursued by the press, their unfairness and injustice in condemning the actions of those who disagree with them, and their scandalous and abusive language used against the Board of Health and its assistants most conclusive evidence? ¹²⁹

By June, Dr. Kengla, editor of the journal, had reached a certain level of exasperation in his defense of the truth when he ended an editorial by saying

So much falsehood has been published, teeming with maliciousness and open charges of dishonesty, that if the honor of the profession were not at stake we

would urge that all the barriers be removed and the disease be allowed full sway in order that the people might reap that reward they well deserve.¹³⁰

Throughout the summer, the private and public debate was in full swing while the plague gained momentum. A case here and a case there was hardly enough to notice at first. The very slowness of the epidemic's advance was a point over which the debate raged. To those who were on the side of denial, the limited number of initial cases was the cornerstone on which their argument stood. Folklore and folk logic said that the plague would descend upon their town in a rush of death. Sensational press stories had heightened the city's expectations. The *Examiner's* reliance on Daniel Defoe's *Journal of the Plague Year*, with all of its gruesome detail of end-stage pneumonic plague scenes had done much to set the terms on which the plague was expected to operate.¹³¹

Additionally, the recent epidemics of yellow fever which had devastated the American South had provided many with memories of sudden, horrific deaths from an equally mysterious disease. Many in San Francisco had come to expect the plague to kill in a manner befitting its reputation. That it was not killing *en masse* was casting hopeful doubt among many people eager to believe that the Black Death was not stalking the streets of San Francisco. And yet the plague was following its true epidemiological course, taking a few human victims while spreading throughout the city's rodent population, building towards a critical mass.

The bubonic form of plague is transmitted by the rat flea. Only a small percentage of rats and their fleas may be infected even when plague exists. With their long association with plague, rats and other rodent carriers of the plague bacilli, *Y. pestis*,

generally host the disease in a dormant form. Occasionally the disease will become active and the rodent population affected will suffer an epizootic outbreak, called a “die-off.” During a die-off, plague kills many of the host rodents and then recedes back again into a dormant form within the surviving host population. In the early stages of a human epidemic, only a relatively few encounters will occur between humans and infected rat fleas. Historically, epidemics have been associated with periods when the rats in a mixed human and rodent population experience an epizootic outbreak. Under these conditions, fleas carrying the plague bacteria migrate from the infected rat population into the human population and find new hosts. A flea which feeds on an infected host soon has its digestive track blocked by a coagulant mixture of bacteria and blood.¹³² With its proboscis and fore-stomach blocked, the now starving flea will seek out any host in an attempt to feed. The flea may bite its host multiple times in a desperate drive to feed. With each attempt, the flea regurgitates some of infectious mixture blocking its gut. Tens of thousands of virulent plague bacilli can be transferred with each flea-bite.¹³³ In this manner, plague moves from rat to man. Once bitten, the human host will develop the bubonic form of plague.

As the plague attacks its human host, the victim’s lungs may become infected. In its pneumonic form, the disease attacks the lungs in a highly contagious form and is easily transmitted from person to person via coughing. The sputum expelled through coughing contains a very high percentage of plague bacilli.¹³⁴ Inhaled directly, the ensuing plague pneumonia, if left untreated, is almost always lethal, with death occurring within 24 to 72 hours.¹³⁵ Most plague deaths historically associated with the disease were caused by the

pneumonic form. In the early stages of a plague epidemic, the disease spreads through the rodent population with only occasional encounters with the human population. Plague may be resident in a rat population for months or years before a die-off triggers an explosive transmission of infection into the human population. In 1900, San Francisco was in the early stages of an epidemic.

Meanwhile, despite the denials, many in the business community knew enough to be concerned that Kinyoun's reports might soon provoke a quarantine against California. Chinatown's reputation as a source of disease and prevailing notions of the plague offered an obvious target. On May 16, the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe railroad companies met with the state Board of Health and demanded that Chinatown be quarantined, arguing that a quarantine of the district would forestall a general quarantine of the State.¹³⁶

The railroads, backed by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and the Merchant's Association, held all the cards. The state board, unable to resist, consented to the railroads' request and passed orders on to the San Francisco City Board of Health to act. According to Kinyoun:

In fact, the Southern Pacific and Santa Few [sic] railroad, at a public meeting of the State Board of Health on May 16, demanded that the City Board place a cordon of the strictest character immediately around Chinatown, because if it was not done, other States would, in order to protect themselves, enforce a rigid interstate quarantine, which would practically tie up every railroad leading out of California . . . It might be said that the quarantine was enforced at the dictation of the railroad interests, so practically the commercial quarantine and not the measure which the City Board of Health recommended, nor desired to enforce, nor any of those who, having the best interests of the health of the country at heart, would have consented to, yet the City Board of Health was compelled . . . to accept the dictation of the railroads, and enforce the quarantine.¹³⁷

On May 15, the San Francisco Board of Health declared that plague existed in the city and that "all necessary steps already taken for the prevention of its spread be continued, together with such additional measures as may be required."¹³⁸ The Chinatown district was placed under "the strictest" quarantine conditions, and the city Board of Health, along with the MHS, attempted to inoculate the Chinese community with an experimental plague vaccine. The effort failed because word had gotten around that the vaccine, known as the Haffkine prophylactic, was poisonous, and Chinatown was on the verge of a riot against the program. The Chinese, through their consul general, wrote to the Chinese Ambassador in Washington DC, protesting the treatment of Chinese nationals in San Francisco:

Authorities insist inoculation, even by force, all Chinese object, would rather go back to China than subject. They say there is no plague at all. Please use your influence at once to have authorities have officers her to facilitate matters as they intend to commence at once. If they inoculate by force there might be trouble and bloodshed and may lead to serious complications.¹³⁹

Secretary of State John Hay was asked by the Chinese Ambassador to investigate. The Secretary forwarded a request for information to Governor Gage's office, and Gage got on a train for San Francisco to begin an investigation.¹⁴⁰

Pending the completion of the investigation and under orders from Governor Gage, the California State Board of Health refuted the findings of San Francisco's board and issued its counter opinion, sending telegrams to state boards of health across the nation on May 21, reading: "Reports outside of this State of the existence of bubonic plague here [San Francisco] have been grossly exaggerated . . . At this time there are no

known cases of bubonic plague in California."¹⁴¹ On the same day, acting on reports received by Dr. Kinyoun, and after asking and receiving approval of President McKinley, Surgeon General Wyman declared that the 1890 federal quarantine law was in effect.

Wyman telegraphed orders to Kinyoun:

During the existence of plague at any point in the United States, the Surgeon General, Marine Hospital Service, is authorized to forbid the sale or donation of transportation by common carriers to Asiatics or other races liable to the disease . . . Nor shall common carriers accept for transportation any class of persons who may be designated by the Surgeon General of the Marine Hospital Service, as being likely to convey the risk of plague contagion to other communities, and said common carriers shall be subject to inspection.¹⁴²

With this telegram in hand, Kinyoun placed quarantine officers around San Francisco and at transportation points on California's borders. The attempt by the railroads to restrict the quarantine to Chinatown had failed, yet anti-Asian prejudice provided the perfect pretext for exactly the larger action they had hoped to avoid.

The situation called for immediate action, and once again, the railroads used the Chinese. They arranged through the Governor's office for the "Six Companies" to file suit in federal circuit court to end the quarantine, citing racial discrimination.¹⁴³ In private correspondence to Dr. Preston Bailhache, a senior officer with the MHS, Kinyoun described the situation as a "prearranged affair," saying that the suit

Originated in Sacramento, and passed through the hands of the District Attorney, then the [Chinese] Consul, and hence to the Minister, in order that the Governor might have an opportunity to institute an investigation . . . [it was clear] from information furnished to me by some people intimately associated with the Chinese, that the suit of injunction brought against me and the Board of Health had its origin in the same manner.^{144, 145}

Judge W. W. Morrow, U. S. Circuit Court, found in favor of the Chinese community on May 25, and ordered the quarantine lifted by Kinyoun.¹⁴⁶ Kinyoun understood this decision to represent a personal victory on the part of the governor against himself: “the Governor is reported on good authority to have said that he ‘had effectively broken my back so that I would give no more further trouble’.”¹⁴⁷ Kinyoun did as ordered, and lifted the federal quarantine.

On May 29, the city’s Board of Health, backed by the Board of Supervisors, elected to place a quarantine on Chinatown in order to forestall a threat from the state Board of Health to quarantine the entire city if something wasn’t done. Under pressure from the state, city authorities considered mass removal of the Chinese to Mission Rock and Angel Island. Additionally, a plan was floated to burn down Chinatown in order to clean the area.¹⁴⁸ The Chinese community took the matter to court seeking relief. For his role in the affair, Kinyoun found himself in Judge Morrow’s court once again, this time facing contempt of court charges. Things were clearly getting out of control.¹⁴⁹

Governor Gage’s official response to the Chinese consul’s complaints, released on June 13, continued the attack on Kinyoun. Gage denied an outbreak of the plague in Chinatown and blamed any mistreatment of the local Chinese population on federal health officials outside of his control.¹⁵⁰ On June 15, Judge Morrow found in favor of the Chinese citing Fourteenth Amendment equal protection laws as well as diversity of citizenship.¹⁵¹ A few days later, Gage wrote to President McKinley and directly blamed the entire plague epidemic on Kinyoun, accusing him of acting in contempt of court and

in a fashion bringing great harm to the state by way of quarantine and other actions. The governor ended his letter to McKinley by demanding that Kinyoun drop the quarantine.¹⁵²

On June 18, the California delegation to the National Republican Convention, meeting in Philadelphia, visited the president in Washington. They denied the existence of plague and demanded the removal of Kinyoun. Facing reelection and a threat from California's delegates, the President ordered Wyman to end federal quarantine activities and he immediately complied.¹⁵³ In a private letter, Kinyoun explained the incident:

The efforts of the combined political interests of California were successful. On the afternoon of the same day, upon which the delegates reached Washington, a telegram was sent to me by the Surgeon General, to cease all inspection until further orders. This was accordingly done, and the quarantine procedures and measures instituted in California by Dr. Wyman came to a sudden end.¹⁵⁴

While Wyman refused to pull Kinyoun out of San Francisco, the change in orders caused Wyman to reconsider the situation. Feeling the rebuke from the president, and in a mood to shift blame for the quarantine away from himself, Wyman began to separate himself politically from Kinyoun. As events continued to unfold in California, Wyman's support for Kinyoun, already tenuous, weakened.

During the fall of 1900, the San Francisco newspapers continued their attack against reports of the plague and vilified Dr. Kinyoun for continuing publicly to fight the disease. Under headlines reading "Has Kinyoun Gone Mad?" and "Indecencies Of Kinyoun," the *San Francisco Chronicle* charged Kinyoun with gross abuse of passengers aboard the O. & O.'s steamship *Coptic*:

For some time past passengers on incoming steamers have accused the quarantine authorities of needless brutality and outrageous indelicacy in the performance of their duties, and it has been openly charges my many that Kinyoun's methods

were having the effect, designedly or unintentionally as the case may be, of driving business away from the port of San Francisco . . . While the details of the revolting methods employed by Kinyoun cannot be printed, they are such as to make it plain why many transpacific passengers are loud in denouncing Kinyoun as a brutal ruffian.¹⁵⁵

The reports went on to say that Kinyoun and his officers were requiring mass public strip inspections of cabin passengers, even after ships had submitted clean bills of health. In a coded telegram to Wyman, sent October 12, Kinyoun tersely explained the situation to the Supervising Surgeon-General:

Have received request committee Chamber Commerce to present myself explaining actions regarding treatment cabin passengers coptic in quarantine September 30 was at Port Townsend, September 30 knew nothing of circumstances until my returning October 4. Lumsden report charges without foundation attitude few cabin passengers probably due to ignorant of vessels possible infection plague; sensational articles in San Francisco press effort to effect transfer because my reports to bureau regarding plague and actuated by Governor and Southern Pacific; whole matter political attack; general population kept in ignorance of facts; my letter forwarded committee bureau explains; have informed committee matter must be referred to bureau with request for instructions Kinyoun. (Not signed)¹⁵⁶

In a follow-up letter, Kinyoun reported that “I have made a careful inquiry concerning the alleged treatment, and find that the abuses referred to existed only in the minds of the versatile reportorial staff of the local press.” Kinyoun went on to say that “this attack was premeditated and deliberate . . . Rumors have reached me that political influence has been used on several occasions in the past to secure my removal from this station.”¹⁵⁷ Privately, Kinyoun told his family that “the Chamber of Commerce, and allied mercantile bodies got together, and I was informed of their intent and purpose by some of the reportorial staff of San Francisco papers to the effect that a general onslaught

was going to be made on me just as soon as an opportunity offered, and that I must be on my guard.”¹⁵⁸

The media attack was premeditated and designed to damage Kinyoun’s reputation and drive him from his post. That Kinyoun was not in San Francisco at the time of the alleged incident was of no matter. According to Kinyoun, referring to his conversations with members of the San Francisco press, “Some of them told me that it was known in the editorial rooms of all the newspapers that I was away from San Francisco during the alleged occurrence, but notwithstanding the fact that they were informed, that it made no difference whatever. It was an opportunity which they could use to the best advantage in obtaining the removal of Dr. Kinyoun.”¹⁵⁹

In the wake of the *Coptic* incident, the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution denying the existence of plague in the city, denouncing the treatment of transpacific passengers by Kinyoun, and declaring him *persona non grata*.¹⁶⁰ The resolution went on to ask for the state representatives in Washington to demand Kinyoun’s removal. Kinyoun dug in his heels. When asked by the San Francisco press if he would resign his post, he was resolute in refusal, saying “so far as I was officially concerned, I could stay here until Hades froze over, and so far, there had been only a slight frost.”¹⁶¹

Kinyoun’s reputation continued to suffer, however. In December Wyman chose to stop publishing his reports in the weekly *Public Health Reports*, even as he continued to publish the reports made by other officers in the field. The California press attributed the lack of reporting as proof that no plague existed, and to Kinyoun having been

discredited in the eyes of the Supervising Surgeon-General.¹⁶² Kinyoun appears to have drawn similar conclusions: in early January, he wrote to Wyman questioning the failure to report the increasing numbers of cases, and asking for permission to defend himself:

By reason of infamous statements and libelous charges made by Governor California in message, I most respectfully request publication in full my letter December 6 inadvertently dated November 6. Every statement made therein true and fully justified. Governor has by implication charged me being accessory to inoculating dead bodies with imported plague germs in order to foist upon community plague scare. This reflects on service as well as Kinyoun. Great stress now being laid press dispatch from Washington stating that Surgeon General no longer any confidence in reports sent by Kinyoun regarding the plague here as no further mention is made in public health reports. Kinyoun being disgraced and discredited. Situation demands action be taken by Surgeon General or allow me to defend myself. Rumors of Congressional investigation which I hope are true.¹⁶³

Indeed, Wyman appears to have been separating himself and the MHS from the political controversy surrounding the epidemic, leaving one of his officers out in the cold. From Kinyoun's perspective, it must have appeared that Hell *was* going to freeze over after all.

As Kinyoun had reported, the death toll rose throughout the fall of 1900. The city's Board of Health continued to report that there was plague loose in the street, but the state Board of Health was under tremendous pressure from the governor's office to deny that the plague existed. Gage forced the resignation of several of the state board's officers and replaced them with men who passed the governor's anti-plague political tests. Chief among these was Dr. Anderson, president of the San Francisco College of Physicians and Surgeons and editor in chief of the *Pacific Medical Journal*. Anderson was in debt to the Burns Republican machine for his position in the San Francisco

medical community. Kinyoun described Anderson as “a man of no professional standing, a most noted quack, a most consummate scoundrel and villain.”¹⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, Anderson’s journal had early taken up the flag of denial and championed the anti-plague cause.¹⁶⁵ Anderson’s position and his journal lent an air of academic respectability to the cause of denial which the governor was happy to purchase.¹⁶⁶ The governor placed Anderson at the head of his hand-picked board, naming him as the Surgeon-General of the California State Militia.¹⁶⁷ “Thus reformed,” wrote the *Bee*, “the state Board of Health passed out of existence as a source of information relative to the existence of plague.”¹⁶⁸

Governor Gage’s Offensive

At the beginning of January 1901, the plague had claimed twenty-two human victims and spread itself throughout San Francisco’s rat population; the city’s Board of Health was under siege; the federal quarantine officer was under personal attack, with the San Francisco press clamoring for his removal; the state Board of Health had been dismantled and replaced by a rubber stamp committee; the San Francisco newspapers and city’s business community were complaining about lost business and tourist dollars, while the eastern press was reporting sensational rumors, unable to get reliable information from California’s officials.

The *Sacramento Bee* covered the plague story as well as it could, stinging both Governor Gage and the San Francisco dailies for their inept and foolish handling of a simmering medical crisis affecting the state. On January 7, 1901, the 34th session of the

California and Assembly began with the *Bee* announcing “a Dull Session in Prospect.”¹⁶⁹ That was before the governor had his biennial address read to the joint Legislature the evening of January 8, and declared an open war of denial on the existence of the plague in California.

In many ways, Gage’s first biennial address was a remarkable event. In a speech of roughly 20,000 words, the governor spent approximately one quarter of his time declaring that there was no plague in California. Gage opened the topic by saying “At this most favorable juncture for our people, a fearful shadow was cast upon our State, through the recklessness of certain city officials of San Francisco, assisted by a Federal officer, one Doctor Kinyoun.”¹⁷⁰ In the address, Gage went on to present his version of the plague story. Not only was there no possibility that plague could be in San Francisco, but *if* the plague bacteria was found, it *must* have been planted by someone wishing to harm California. During his address, Gage would ask “Could it have been possible that some dead body of a Chinaman had innocently or otherwise received a post-mortem inoculation in a lymphatic region by someone possessing the imported plague bacilli, and that honest people were thereby deluded?”¹⁷¹ Gage’s comments amounted to a direct accusation aimed at Kinyoun. The rest of the presentation that night was equally charged and inflammatory, filled with accusations, denials, and innuendo:

Notwithstanding some official and private reports to the contrary, I am still convinced that up to this time no case of bubonic plague has existed in this State; and with ordinary vigilance of the Federal Quarantine Officers to prevent its importation from foreign countries, none will exist in the State, unless through the criminal negligence or connivance of those who might possess genuine imported bacilli, and who would be interested in planting the dreaded disease in our midst.

The false reports of the existence of the plague and the unjust quarantine of the state irreparably injured many of our business interests and numerous industries of the State. Travel was stopped in California, and visiting tourists made haste to leave our State. The prices of California fruits and cereals shrunk, and in the markets of other states, this placard was observable: 'No California Fruits for Sale.' Our commodities were for sale at a discount in foreign markets, and the reputation of this State as a Mecca for health seekers has been blackened for years to come...It is unnecessary to go further into details of our injuries as a people, in view of our widely-known bitter experience.¹⁷²

With that, the governor then called for several pieces of legislation to address the plague scare in California. Boiled down, the governor wanted four things. First, he wanted to make it illegal to possess plague bacteria samples, even for laboratory testing, without his express approval. Second, he intended to make the state Board of Health the only legal outlet of information concerning the plague within the state of California. Third, Gage planned to make it illegal for newspapers to report plague news. This item was aimed most directly at the *Bee*, and the owner, McClatchy, knew it. Gage had made a similar attempt in 1899 to silence the press by passing the "anti-cartoon bill" making it illegal for newspapers to ridicule the new governor's relationship to the railroads. Finally, Gage suggested that the state set up its own quarantine office to take over the job from the federal officials.¹⁷³

The editorial response from the *Bee* was swift and pointed, giving the Governor a lashing of the type our current news industry is incapable of delivering:

From the beginning to the end of the long dissertation in Governor Gage's message relative to bubonic plague, there is not a single important statement that is true and the entire matter is full of baseless and absurd innuendoes that hold the author up to the contempt and pity of every honest scientist and of every man acquainted with the facts who reads them. Coming from the Chief Executive of the State and intended for circulation abroad they involve the State's honor and

should provoke the righteous indignation of every honest-minded citizen at the debauchery of the highest office . . . Even Governor Gage, in spite of his audacity and supreme faith in himself, would not have dared to take his present course had he not had the backing of the San Francisco press. Governed by a narrow view of commercial interests at stake and unable to see beyond the carloads of California produce then on the track ready to be sent to Eastern markets, and urged by the merchants themselves, the San Francisco dailies refused to print anything that could be construed into an admission that plague exists in the city.

The danger to commercial interests is not that the truth shall be reported and proper precautions taken, but that the idea shall prevail that truth is being suppressed for the sake of present sales and that Californians are willing to jeopardize the health of the Nation in the interest of commercialism . . . Attempts to suppress the truth result only in rumor that is far worse than the facts warrant, and the sooner this principle is recognized, the better it will be for the future of the State, commercially and otherwise.¹⁷⁴

The *Bee* published a point by point rebuttal to the charges made by the Governor in his address.¹⁷⁵ From that moment on, there was open warfare between the McClatchy newspaper and the Governor. By responding to the plague in the fashion chosen for him by the state's business interests, i.e., active denial and offensive legislative proposals flying in the face of the established medical facts, Gage had set the stage for a newspaper campaign that would ruin his credibility and open the door for other, sharper attacks on his dishonesty and debauchery in office.

Gage's tirade did not go unnoticed in Washington. Surgeon General Wyman was put on notice that his office and the authority of the MHS was being challenged by the State of California. Wyman, a politician by nature, had headed the MHS for enough years that the service had become an extension of himself. He took challenge to the service was taken personally.

By January 12 more cases of plague were reported. On the suggestion of William Henry Welch of Johns Hopkins University, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman Gage (no relation to the governor) appointed an investigative commission to put an end to the politicized speculation on the existence of bubonic plague in California. Appointed on January 19, the secretary commissioned professors Lewellys Barker of the University of Chicago, Simon Flexner, University of Pennsylvania, and Frederick Novy of the University of Michigan. The “Commission for the Investigation of the Existence or Non-Existence of Plague in San Francisco” arrived in San Francisco in late January and set up shop at the University of California in Berkeley to begin their work.¹⁷⁶

Immediately upon learning that the commission was in San Francisco, Governor Gage fired off a telegram to President McKinley protesting the uninvited commission and demanding that he have oversight in regards to its investigation. Secretary Gage, responding on behalf of the president, politely refused the governor’s demands, explaining that the commission was there in order to determine the facts, inasmuch as the governor had let it be known that he did not trust the federal quarantine officer assigned to San Francisco. The secretary told the governor that the commission would be completely independent of Dr. Kinyoun, the San Francisco Board of Health, the state Board of Health, and the governor’s office. In a rage, the governor contacted the university president and threatened to remove the University of California at Berkeley from the state budget unless the university evicted the commission from the campus where they had been allowed professorial courtesy to set up their laboratory.¹⁷⁷ Evicted, the commission found other accommodations within San Francisco and went to work.

Despite certain inconveniences, including being followed by detectives employed by the governor, the commission members continued their investigation.¹⁷⁸ One of the advantages the federal commission held was access to the Chinese community. On the advice of their legal counsel, the Chinese Six Companies agreed to cooperate with the commission's investigation. Every courtesy was extended to Commissioner Barker, and orders went out that all cases of illness and death within the Chinese community were to be reported directly to the Six Companies to aid in the investigation. In addition, the secretary of the Six Companies, Wong Chin, acted as a guide, liaison, and interpreter. In part as a result of the Chinese community's cooperation, the commission's work was able to positively identify six cases of plague during their two-week investigation.¹⁷⁹ The federal commission met with Governor Gage on February 16 and discussed their findings. As the *Bee* would report, "Gage In The Dumps Over That 'Conference.'" ¹⁸⁰

Gage's response to the rebuff was to attack the federal government in a speech to the Assembly, and invoke states' rights in defending California. "The meanest criminal," said Gage,

Cannot be denied the right of being confronted by his accusers...and it shall be contended that the great State of California shall be unjustly denied a similar privilege in the opportunity of facing those who, impugning the public health, as the result of a secret, one-sided examination, might choose to cast an irremovable blemish upon the State's sanitary condition.

That being said, Gage demanded that immediate action be taken by the legislature to enact the plague bills "by which our State may assume that general and unrestrained control over the subject of the public health within its borders which so vitally concerns her, and which is her inalienable right by virtue of her sovereignty."¹⁸¹ The governor

introduced three major anti-plague bills via the Speaker of the Assembly, C. W.

Pendleton of Los Angeles.¹⁸²

Gage's bills were far-reaching and controversial, if not scandalous in their own right. A.

B. 558 was referred to as the gag-law bill. Section 2 of the bill would have made it illegal

for a newspaper to report on current or past cases of the plague in California. A. B. 559

would prevent doctors or newspapers from reporting cases of plague without first

receiving approval from the California State Board of Health. All reports, and if

warranted, all victims, alive or dead, would have to be first examined by the state Board

of Health. The board's finding would have to be entered into its official report before the

case could be reported to the press. Since it was widely recognized that the California

State Board of Health was in the pocket of the governor and would do his bidding to

suppress any news that would support the contention that plague existed within

California, the passage of A. B. 559 would effectively gag the medical community.

Lastly, Pendleton's bill 560 authorized the state to provide the governor with \$100,000 in

un-audited funds to be used at his discretion to fight the publicity battle against the

plague.¹⁸³ Taken together, the bills would gag the press, gag the medical community, and

give the governor what amounted to unlimited and untraceable funds to control the

political situation. By forcing a battle, for such a cause the governor gained the sort of

notoriety with the general public that politicians cannot long survive.

Gage may have been a fool to think that he could legislate away the plague, but

his grandiloquence drew the 34th session of the Assembly into a political farce in which

many of the players were reluctant actors. The details of the ensuing legislative battle are

beyond the scope of this paper. In the end, however, the governor's forces were able to pass bills that authorized the effective gagging of the medical community and funded the governor's anti-plague slush fund. But the crowning anti-plague legislation, the press gag-law bill, was tabled and abandoned as unconstitutional.

Governor Gage's response to the findings of the federal plague commission extended on the federal level. Since the last thing he wanted was for the federal team to release its findings to the nation and the world, Gage needed to find a way to keep the report quiet. With that goal in mind, Gage formed his own commission of representatives to send to Washington D.C. for the purpose of burying the report. On February 27, at the invitation of the governor and the expense of the Southern Pacific Railroad, a meeting was held in Sacramento which included Gage, senior representatives of San Francisco's leading newspapers, and the head of the legal department of the Southern Pacific, William F. Herrin. Getting so many hostile competitors together to discuss California's response to the federal plague commission's report was nothing short of the formation of a war council. The *Sacramento Bee* quipped, "that any or all of these men could be made to meet under other than London prize ring or Marquis of Queensbury rules -- is certainly a subject for unusual comment."¹⁸⁴ By the end of the conference, the participants decided to send a delegation to Washington as soon as possible to meet with President McKinley and argue the case against federal intervention in San Francisco's plague problem.

The "Special Health Commissioners" sent to Washington included W. F. Herrin of the Southern Pacific, J. P. Young of the *Chronicle*, T. T. Williams of the *Examiner*,

Henry Scott of the Union Iron Works, and Fremont Older of the *Bulletin*.¹⁸⁵ According to the *Bee*, their task was

To effect by political pressure what they have been unable effect by fair means - the removal of Dr. Kinyoun and the prevention of any measures that will admit the existence of plague in San Francisco - but above all their business will be to save San Francisco as the commanding port of the Pacific Coast. Everything will be subordinated to this, and they may even go to the extent of admitting the truth.¹⁸⁶

It is of some interest to note that the editor of Hearst's *Examiner*, T.T. Williams, was included in the governor's group. The *Examiner* was at odds with the governor and the rest of the San Francisco press over the existence of plague in the city. Perhaps, since the *Examiner* had the largest circulation in San Francisco, Herrin and Gage believed it was better to include the *Examiner* in the plan than to exclude the paper and run the risk of that Hearst's papers would attack the plan in the San Francisco press. In any event, the commission was formed, including the *Examiner's* representative, and sent to Washington.

Not surprisingly, politics being what it is, San Francisco's mission to Washington was reasonably successful. California agreed to whitewash San Francisco's Chinatown and the Surgeon General Wyman agreed to act like nothing was happening. Wyman's chief concern was to stop the spread of plague in California. Any sort of reasonable political accommodation that would accomplish his goal was acceptable. Accordingly, a deal was cut whereby the federal government would help hide the plague outbreak and California would help end the outbreak while it could still be contained.

Wyman agreed to bury the federal commission's report to prevent news of conditions in San Francisco from getting out. The MHS agreed to a ban on making any comment or reference to plague in California and to extend that ban across the service's quarantine stations. Further, to lessen tensions, Wyman agreed to remove Dr. Kinyoun from California providing that the San Francisco newspapers would stop personal attacks against him. On their part, the participating San Francisco newspapers agreed to a total ban on the topic of the plague in San Francisco. Finally, Gage, through Herrin and the others, agreed to assist the MHS in cleaning up the plague in San Francisco by disinfecting Chinatown.¹⁸⁷

With the backing of California's two Senators, George C. Perkins and Thomas R. Bard, the deal was signed. Kinyoun's career would be sacrificed for the good of the country and to appease the politically powerful California business interests. A month after the agreement was signed, Kinyoun was removed from San Francisco and transferred to the docks of Detroit, Michigan.¹⁸⁸ One year later, Kinyoun resigned from the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service.

But Wyman had been too quick to deal: during the next year, the eradication campaign in San Francisco was unsuccessful. The disinfection and whitewashing campaign to which Gage had agreed to proved to be heavy on the whitewash and light on the disinfectant. Where the MHS had calculated the need for thirty tons of sulfur to be used, the state Board of Health bragged in their official report that they were able to accomplish the job using just 300 pounds, thus saving the state a substantial sum of money.¹⁸⁹ In fact, Gage's team issued orders not to cooperate with the federal cleanup

operation. The state's health officers had agreed not to mention the plague under the Washington agreement, and they extended their understanding to include not reporting suspected plague cases to the federal health officers.¹⁹⁰

During this period San Francisco also held a mayoral election and elected Eugene E. Schmitz, the Union-Labor Party candidate, as mayor. Schmitz forced the resignation of the sitting Board of Health for its position in support of the MHS, and literally occupied the board's offices. When the new president of the board, appointed by Schmitz, refused to vote as ordered, Schmitz refused to fund the board's annual report for two consecutive years as a means of suppressing news about the plague epidemic.¹⁹¹ It appeared that those determined to suppress the truth had prevailed.

The Plague and Gage's Downfall

Plague was still in the streets in the spring of 1902 when California's election campaign season began. Unfortunately for Gage, the plague wasn't the only issue he would have to address in his re-election campaign. Since early in 1901, when news of the Senate's prison committee had pointed out problems at San Quentin, the *San Francisco Call* had been following the story. The *Call* had started its own investigation after the Senate decided not to pursue the matter due to lack of "corresponding benefit."¹⁹² The animosity that the Gage-Burns interests had shown to the *Call's* manager W. S. Leake during the fight for the Assembly speaker-ship in January, 1901, was now to be paid back in full. Timed to coincide with the primary campaign that would determine if Gage would be chosen by the Republican party to run for re-election, the *Call* launched a

publicity campaign of its own. On May 24, 1902, the *Call* published the results of its investigation under the headline “SCANDAL OF THIEVERY, FORGERY AND CORRUPTION BURSTS UPON SAN QUENTIN PRISON, INVOLVING WARDEN AGUIRRE AS INSPIRING CRIMINAL AND GOV. GAGE AS BENEFICIARY.”¹⁹³

On the same day, the Sacramento Bee reported “ANOTHER CASE OF BUBONIC PLAGUE.”¹⁹⁴ The historical record for May 24, 1902, does not record the state of Governor Gage’s digestion for the day.

The San Quentin scandal broke with a shout from the *Call*, the lead reading:

Consternation reigns in San Quentin Prison. A scandal which, in its revelation of wholesale crime has had few equals in this State, has burst over the institution, involving Warden Martin G. Aguirre and Henry T. Gage, the Governor of California. Warden Aguirre has been guilty of gross crimes and Governor Gage, his friend, associate and advisor, has been the beneficiary of these criminal acts. The State Treasury has been systematically and craftily robbed by a gigantic ring, of which Warden Aguirre is the inspiration and governing genius. Supplies, clothing and luxuries have been purchased with the money of this State, and fraud, forgery, misrepresentation, deceit, dishonest bookkeeping and the consummate craft of Warden Aguirre have blinded the Prison Directors to the crimes and have filched dollars dishonestly won from the Treasury of the State.

Convicts, the paper alleged, “have been employed . . . to conceal criminal transactions in the maze of crooked bookkeeping, in order that the family of Governor Gage, through the criminal assistance of Warden Aguirre, might thrive upon a dishonoring bounty.”

Furthermore,

Convicts have been employed to manufacture the most costly furniture, which has been sent by Warden Aguirre to friends of his and of Governor Gage in this city and elsewhere. A mammoth nest of official thievery, upon which Warden Aguirre is hatching, has been uncovered. Great firms in this city have been imposed upon, riot has ruled in San Quentin, extravagance there has had no curb, penitentiary records have been mutilated, accounts have been fuddled, convicts have been made to commit new crimes to hide the crime of their official guardians, and the

State has been robbed that Warden Aguirre might show the generosity of a thief and Governor Gage might be the beneficiary.¹⁹⁵

For the *Bee*'s part, the magnitude of the allegations against Gage solicited a stunned reply. Reprinting the *Call*'s charge in afternoon of the 24th, McClatchy could only say:

The Bee would be loath to believe the above. For much as it is opposed to Governor Gage, and vigorous as have been its editorials against him, it has not believed that and does not now believe that Henry T. Gage is personally a dishonest man. There is but one thing for the Governor to do under the circumstances -- call the owner of the *Call* to strict account for the above damaging charges.¹⁹⁶

From that point on, until the Republican Party convention was held in Sacramento at the end of August, Gage's chances at re-election diminished as each day brought bad news to the governor's office. Headline after headline revealed either details surrounding the San Quentin Prison scandal or reported more and troubling cases of plague.

The complexities of local primary politics, even when one knows the players, can be daunting. No attempt is made here to describe the machine politics which took place in San Francisco during the 1902 election primaries. Suffice it to say that the Espee machine that owned the Gage "push" carried the day. Despite the San Quentin scandal, its associated libel suit, and the ongoing plague epidemic that had badly battered the governor's reputation, the machine could still get out the vote for Gage. Furthermore, hoping an unelectable Gage would be the Republican candidate, the Democratic party also turned out its faithful to vote for the governor.¹⁹⁷ Gage won enough delegates during the primary on August 12 to have a very strong mathematical chance at winning his bid to

stand for re-election at the Republican Party State Convention to be held in Sacramento on August 25.

While the Governor's forces were rallying behind the machine in order to provide Gage with enough primary votes to take him to the upcoming party convention, the plague had taken another, dangerous step in its journey towards an epidemic outbreak. As noted above, the *Bee* reported another case of plague the same day that the *Call* broke the San Quentin scandal. In early July, the *Bee* matched the *Call*'s prison scandal by printing a history of the Governor's handling of the plague epidemic in San Francisco. Running on the front pages of the paper for three consecutive days, July 10 through 12, the *Bee* dragged the governor along through the whole sordid mess. By the end of the *expose*, the *Bee*'s disgust for the Gage's mishandling of the epidemic was cold and disdainful:

The public demands to be amused sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. All enjoy reading Munchausen, and have been entertained by other writers of his kind, but when it comes to putting human life in the balance and sacrificing it simply for the almighty dollar, as has been the case in San Francisco, it is another matter. There is no word in the English language which can fittingly express the just contempt and hatred of such a policy among the intelligent, honest, and well informed.¹⁹⁸

By July 15, the fifty-ninth case of the plague was reported in San Francisco. On July 25, the situation turned for the worse when three deaths from plague occurred. One of the victims proved to have died from pneumonic plague.¹⁹⁹ The disease was mutating from a relatively confinable form into a highly contagious and invariably fatal one passed by air-borne transmission. The state Board of Health would do nothing, the San Francisco

City Board of Health was locked in a legal battle with the new mayor over its defense of the plague facts and was itself helpless, and Gage was in full denial of the facts.²⁰⁰

The pneumonic cases were very disturbing to the health officials who were paying attention. M. J. White, Assistant Surgeon, MHS, the federal medical officer in command of the U.S. Plague Laboratory in San Francisco (euphemistically referred to in the San Francisco newspapers as the “Asiatic Laboratory”) wrote to the city Board of Health on August 24 concerning the plague. White was obviously disturbed by the character of the plague cases he was seeing:

During my connection with the plague work here, beginning April 1901, I have watched the course of the disease carefully, making daily observations, and I am now more apprehensive that the disease is likely to spread rapidly than I have been any time heretofore. I say this because the pneumonic cases are beginning to appear, along with increased virulence in the bubonic cases. Approximately the northern half of Chinatown seems to be thoroughly reinfected, and, as I view the matter, it is most imperative that immediate measures be taken to control the new outbreak of the disease . . . While I refer especially to Chinatown, it is considered very important that the extermination of rats throughout the city should be accomplished as soon as possible, especially along the water-front and in the markets.²⁰¹

Upon receipt of the letter, the city Board of a Health took the matter to the Board of Supervisors, who agreed to hold an emergency meeting. According to the reports, Mayor Schmitz was enraged by the supervisors meeting to discuss the plague situation. The mayor’s attempts to end the meeting and disrupt the process was stopped by a solid majority of the supervisors, who told the mayor that the machine’s denial of the epidemic was over (Schmitz’s policy towards the plague had mimicked that of Gage, with both following the directions of the machine.) The mayor was forced to back down in the face

of solid opposition from a newly encouraged Board of Supervisors. The political wind was changing, shifting away from the Gage “push” and the governor’s policy of denial.²⁰²

As the convention neared, it was clear from the press reports that the Republican machine was no longer prepared to back Gage for re-election. The public position of a unified push for Gage was crumbling as the moment of decision approached. Republican newspapers across the state ran stories indicating a general rank and file opposition to the governor’s re-election bid. Two years of plague news, the last of which was dominated by the absurd and dangerous mishandling of the epidemic by the governor for political ends, was having its effect. From Los Angeles, the *L.A. Times*, began an article titled “The Plague in Reality” by saying:

The real “bubonic plague,” attacking the taxpayer, is that of the ward heelers and political hangers-on who are conducting the campaign for Gov. Gage . . . They are a scourge that is fatal, as much to be dreaded and as expensive to contend against as the dreaded Asiatic disease. The microbes of this particular kind of “bubonic plague” attack every part of the body politic. They begin with the candidate for office, no matter whether it be State, county or city, and from him they suck every possible drop of blood . . . The “bubonic plague” germ has spread to every part of the city and State; into every avenue of business and social life. In most cases the conditions are so healthful as to give it no foothold; but it flourishes in the lodging-house districts and in the barrel houses, where morals and health are at a low ebb, and its cost to the candidate and to the taxpayer is so great as hardly to be reckoned.

As the Republican convention started, the Gage forces slipped away like rats leaving a sinking ship. By August 27, the *Chronicle* reported “Herrin On Hand To Help With Funeral.” Indeed, the head of the Espee’s machine had come to town to confer with Gage’s convention manager, Dan Burns. After a brief meeting with Gage’s handlers, the game was up.²⁰³ Dr. George Pardee of Oakland won the nomination.

In the end, it is hard to say what caused Governor Gage the most damage. Gage was a governor who seemed to believe that he could invent his own reality. Throughout his administration, Gage was unequalled in his ability to alienate his constituency. Perhaps, after campaigning against the railroads, his single-minded support of the Southern Pacific during his administration caused many to doubt his sincerity. Certainly his public humiliation during the San Quentin Prison libel trial exposed his criminal debauchery to the voting public. But just as certain, a central theme of Henry T. Gage's administration was what has become known as the "bubonic plague incident." In his farewell address to the California legislature on January 5, 1903, Gage assuredly spent a considerable portion of his speech rehashing his position on the plague, holding to the notion that it did not exist in California.²⁰⁴

In January 1903, state health officials met in Washington D. C. to discuss the plague outbreak in California. The official report of the meeting held that the California State Board of Health had acted "in gross neglect of official duty" and that Governor Gage had acted to obstruct the work of federal health officials and had endangered not only the health of the citizens of California but of the entire nation. The meeting ended with a resolution for a complete nationwide quarantine against California unless the state took immediate action to resolve the problem.²⁰⁵ Faced with the possibility of an enforced quarantine of its ports and borders, California finally relented. San Francisco's business community got the message, and on February 3, 1903, reversed course. Now, instead of militantly denying a plague epidemic, the business community now declared itself shocked to learn that plague existed and ordered Sacramento to act immediately "to

end the danger from bubonic plague so that the confidence of the Boards of health of other states may be restored and that no injury may result in commerce."²⁰⁶

Gage's successor, Pardee, a former member of the Oakland Board of Health and a physician in active practice, declared on January 19, 1903, that "Whatever the (U.S.) Marine Hospital Service desires me to do in the way of public health preservation will be done."²⁰⁷ Over the next year, city, state, and federal health officials remodeled Chinatown, building out rats and their fleas. By the summer of 1904, health officials declared the plague epidemic officially over. Modern science had won out over ignorance and big money politics. Of the 126 reported cases of plague in San Francisco, 122 people had died.²⁰⁸ Infected rats survived the eradication campaign and made it out of the city by foot and by rail, taking the plague with them into the golden hills of California and beyond. While a plague epidemic had been avoided in San Francisco, *Yersinia pestis* had won a foothold in North America.

CONCLUSION

In his farewell speech to the California Legislature, out-going Governor Gage spoke with bitterness when discussing the outbreak of bubonic plague which had vexed his administration since March 1900:

In my first biennial message, January 7, 1901, I referred, at some length, to the subject of certain false and exaggerated reports concerning the alleged existence of bubonic plague in San Francisco, which, through the interest, ignorance, or recklessness of a few persons, were indiscriminately published in the year 1900, and thereafter intermittently continued.

The falsity of the reports has been frequently proved, but, unfortunately, through the ill-designed efforts and action of Dr. J. J. Kinyoun, assuming to represent the United States Marine Hospital Service at San Francisco, and of the members of the San Francisco Board of Health, much damage nevertheless accrued to the various commercial, industrial, and other productive interests of the State, injuring alike the laborer, merchant, farmer, and fruit-grower.²⁰⁹

Until the end of his term Gage maintained and enforced an institutional denial of the bubonic plague epidemic. Gage's position, wrong-headed as it was, did not materialize out of thin air. Rather, it was a calculated response to a conflict that had been building in California for several years, a conflict between the federal Marine Hospital Service and California's state and local political machinery. Furthermore, Gage's response to San Francisco's public health crisis was not unique. Indeed, the history of similar events suggest that Governor Gage's response was in many ways predictable.

As this thesis attempts to show, three central factors, when combined, led to the 1900 San Francisco public health and political crisis. First was an inherent conflict of

interest between San Francisco's business leaders, who wanted to keep things quiet, and public health officials, who needed the community's open support in order to manage the situation. The conflict generally followed a pattern of events played out before in other communities suffering from epidemic disease and fearful of the consequences of being quarantined.

The inherent conflict was well known to Dr. Kinyoun, the man at the center of the storm. On April 17, 1901, in an address to the meeting of the California Medical Society, held in the legislative chamber of the State Capitol, Kinyoun quoted a recently published work by J. F. Payne regarding the plague epidemic of 1665, and the competing interests of health and wealth:

So, in 1664, when the news came of a destructive pestilence in Holland, there was some feeling of alarm. The government proposed stringent rules of quarantine and exclusion, which the citizens and commercial classes, in the interests of trade, steadily opposed, so that nothing decisive was done . . . Up to Christmas 1664, there were many cases of a mild form of plague, found to be the forerunner of a severe epidemic. But the matter was kept quiet, and as the deaths were few, little evidence was furnished by the bills of mortality . . . it remained dormant until spring. In July the epidemic broke out in explosive violence.²¹⁰

Dr. Kinyoun gave his speech in Sacramento, on his way out of California, having been vilified in the San Francisco press, accused of gross incompetence and worse by the governor, and abandoned as a political scapegoat by Surgeon General Wyman, all for trying to protect the San Francisco from bubonic plague. As Kinyoun put it to the gathered crowd of doctors, "In case a quarantine or health officer has the misfortune to apprehend or discover a case of plague or cholera, and obeying the law of the land, or the higher law, duty, makes known his discovery, he must be prepared to be subjected to

every species of abuse known to man.”²¹¹ Kinyoun had paid a high price for his role in protecting the public’s health in the face of overwhelming political opposition.

Second, California’s political machinery in 1900 was complex, corrupt, and controlled by a monolithic, if not monopolistic, transportation industry controlled by the Southern Pacific Railroad. The Espee’s influence started with control of the governor’s office and permeated down through the layers of local politics until it reached into the pocket of the lowest public servant. The political environment in which the medical crisis was played out was thick with intrigue.

By describing some of the interrelated politics at play in California during the period covered, this thesis has detailed some of the complexity of competing interests affecting how the plague outbreak was handled. This study describes the competition between medical schools for seats on the San Francisco Board of Health, Winslow Anderson’s activities as a political doctor during the epidemic, and the battle of words fought out between medical journals. This thesis has shed some light on the role San Francisco’s medical community played during the outbreak.

Starting from a focus on San Francisco’s Board of Health, this study has tied the city’s medical community to the larger political sphere until ultimately arriving at the governor’s door in Sacramento. The political aspirations of Dr. Anderson, Dan Burns, and Governor Gage were all intricately tied to the 1900 epidemic. In describing some of the personalities associated with San Francisco’s plague outbreak, this history tries to flesh out some of the complex political and social interrelationships that contributed to California’s response to the epidemic and campaign of denial.

Third, the United States Marine Hospital Service, an agency of the federal government, was driven by its own political interests concerning affairs in California and elsewhere. In 1884 the MHS began the process of federalizing the nation's quarantine inspection programs. Starting in 1896, the MHS began a concerted effort to wrest control of San Francisco's quarantine inspection away from local authorities. The process of assuming control of quarantine inspection in San Francisco was met by resistance from local authorities, as it was in Texas, New York and Louisiana. The MHS victory set the stage for a much larger political fight to erupt in 1900.

At the top of the MHS sat Walter Wyman, a career civil servant who had an appetite for power, the cunning to manipulate situations to his advantage, and the ethical ambiguity which allowed him unrestricted movement towards reaching his objectives. In many ways, Wyman's actions as surgeon general contributed to the adversarial environment associated with the 1900 plague outbreak in San Francisco. According to John Hamilton, the previous surgeon general, "The real need is for a Department of Public Health; at its head a commissioner who will not rule the Department by fear or favor; who will neither farm out the best positions in the service to personal favorites and sycophants, nor spend thousands of public money uselessly, and who will carry out the law with regard to conscience, right and the wishes of the people."²¹² After being pushed out of the MHS, Hamilton became one of Wyman's harshest critics, and as editor of the *Journal of the American Medical Association* (1893-1898), he was in a position to make his views widely known within the medical profession. As one of Wyman's officers put it, "In considering these charges, the animus which actuates them must be borne in mind.

It must be remembered that Dr. Hamilton was once Surgeon-General of the Marine Hospital Service, and wanted to be again, but could not, and his bitter personal enmity to Surgeon-General Wyman has been notorious.”²¹³

It is clear from this study that Wyman did play favorites with his officers. Like managers the world over, if he liked an officer, he tended to overlook inadvertent infractions of his rules. If, on the other hand, an employee managed to get on his bad side, no amount of fixing was likely to redeem the sinner in Wyman’s eyes. And so the service was probably split between those on Wyman’s personal lists of good and bad soldiers in the service of his army. Two of his medical officers, Milton Rosenau and Joseph Kinyoun, who feature large in this story, appear to have fallen onto different lists.

Despite all criticism of his style and methods, Wyman was successful in his plan to federalize the nation’s public health system. In doing so, Wyman’s agency helped protect the lives of the nation from the endless misery of epidemic diseases. In San Francisco, the MHS won out in the end against the entrenched forces of the state’s business and political interests. As it had in New York and New Orleans, the logic of a *public* health campaign against an epidemic threatening the community won out over ostrich like attempts by the local business elite to hide the facts and carry on as usual. San Francisco learned the same hard lessons that its sister ports around the nation had come to understand: “The question of excluding epidemic diseases is one that is as much a federal question as the tariff or the postal service; and since public health is public wealth, it follows that the federal government should take prompt cognizance of a matter that deeply concerns the whole nation.”²¹⁴

Indeed, public health *is* public wealth. As we enter a new century we would do well to remember the lessons learned by past generations.

NOTES

---

1 W. H. Kellogg, "The Plague--Report of Cases," *Occidental Medical Times* 14:7 (July 1900): 197.

2 W. H. Kellogg, "Present status of plague with historical review," *American Journal of Public Health* 10:11 (November 1920): 835-844.

3 Vernon B. Link, "A History of Plague in the United States of America," *Public Health Monograph* No. 26, Publication No. 392 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955)

4 Silvio J. Onesti, "Plague, Press, and Politics," *Stanford Medical Bulletin* 13:1 (February 1955): 1-10; Victor H. Haas, "When Bubonic Plague Came To Chinatown," *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 8:1 (January 1959): 141-147; and Loren George Lipson, "Plague in San Francisco in 1900," *Annals of Internal Medicine* 77:2 (August 1972): 303-310.

5 Philip A Kalisch, "The Black Death in Chinatown: Plague and Politics in San Francisco 1900-1904," *Arizona and the West* 14:2 (1972): 112-136.

6 Joan B. Trauner, "The Chinese as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco, 1870-1905," *California History* 57 (1978): 70-87.

7 Nayan Shah, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Nayan Shah, "San Francisco's Chinatown: Race and the Cultural Politics of Public Health, 1854-1952." Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1995.

8 Charles J. McClain, "Of Medicine, Race, and American Law: The Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 1900," *Law and Inquiry* 13, no. 3 (1988): 447-513.

9 Alan Mayne, *The Imagined Slum: Newspaper Representation in Three Cities, 1870-1914* (Leicester University Press: Leicester, London and New York, 1993), 3-56.

10 Guenter B. Risse, "The Politics of Fear: Bubonic Plague in San Francisco, California, 1900," in *New Countries and Old Medicine: Proceedings of an International Conference on the History of Medicine and Health*, Auckland, New Zealand, 1994, ed. Linda Bryder and Derek A. Dow (Auckland, New Zealand: Pyramid Press, 1995.), 1-19.

---

11 *San Francisco Examiner*, August 25, 1899.

12 The title, "Supervising Surgeon-General" was changed to the current "Surgeon General" in 1902 by and act of Congress. This study uses the terms interchangeably.

13 Kellogg, "Present status of plague," 838.

14 Kinyoun to Dr. Bailhache, August 9, 1900, p. 61. MS C 464, Joseph J. Kinyoun papers, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland. [Hereafter called "Kinyoun papers."]

15 M. S. Craft to T. J. Turner, 24 August 1879, National Board of Health, Reel 15; quoted in Margaret Humphreys, *Yellow Fever in the South*, Health and Medicine in American Society Series (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 93, n. 38.

16 A. N. Bell, "The U. S. Marine Hospital Service and Quarantine," *The Sanitarian* 12 (January to June, 1884): 326.

17 Margaret Humphreys, *Yellow Fever in the South*, Health and Medicine in American Society Series. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 87.

18 *Picayune*, 22 November 1878; quoted in Margaret Humphreys, *Yellow Fever in the South*, Health and Medicine in American Society Series (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 87-88, n. 20.

19 Humphreys, 87-88.

20 *Ibid.*, 88.

21 Thomas P. Monath, "Yellow Fever Virus," in Gerald L. Mandel, et. al., eds., *Principles and Practices of Infectious Diseases*, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1985), 923-926; quoted in Margaret Humphreys, *Yellow Fever in the South*, Health and Medicine in American Society Series (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 6, n. 2.

22 "John B. Hamilton (1879-1891)," Office of the Surgeon General, accessed March 24, 2002, <[http:// www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/ history/biohamilton.htm](http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/history/biohamilton.htm)>.

23 For a general overview of the National Board of Health and its struggle with

---

the Marine Hospital Service, see Wyndham Miles, "A History of the National Board of Health, 1879-1893," TMs. (photocopy) pp.160-225. MS C 237, Wyndham Miles papers, History of Medicine Division, National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland.

24 Miles, 211, and "John B. Hamilton," Office of the Surgeon General.

25 Bess Furman. *A Profile of the United States Public Health Service 1798-1948*. (U. S. Department of Health Education and Welfare, National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine: U. S. Government Printing office, 1969), 199.

26 Humphreys, 129.

27 Joseph Holt. "The New Quarantine System," *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal* 72 (June 1885): 535-545.

28 Humphreys, 129.

29 Ibid.

30 "John B. Hamilton," Office of the Surgeon General.

31 Furman, 201.

32 Furman, 214.

33 Ibid., 214-221.

34 Ibid., 208-211.

35 *National Quarantine Act, Statutes At Large*, 27, sec. 2, 108, 114. (1893).

36 Ibid.

37 Cochran to Wyman, 10 October 1992, Marine Hospital Service Records, Alabama State Board of Health; quoted in Margaret Humphreys. *Yellow Fever in the South*, Health and Medicine in American Society Series. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1992), 130-132, n. 48.

38 "The National Quarantine" *Harper's Weekly*, August 26, 1893, as reprinted at <<http://www.fortunecity.com/littleitaly/amalfi/100/quaran93.htm>>.

---

39 R. M. Swearingen, "The Relation of Federal to State Quarantine." *Sanitarian* 39 (1897): 427-434.

40 Ibid.

41 Walter Wyman, "The Quarantine System of the United States," *Sanitarian* 39 (1897): 418-427.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Wyman to Rosenau, June 28, 1897. #4289, Rosenau papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, Chapel Hill.[henceforth called "Rosenau papers."]

45 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, August 7, 1897.

46 A. N. Bell, editorial, *Sanitarian*, 39 (1897): 451.

47 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Lyman G. Gage, May 14, 1897.

48 Furman, 214.

49 Furman, 214.

50 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, December 10, 1895.

51 Ibid., 214.

52 Ibid., 214-215.

53 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Lyman G. Gage, May 14, 1897.

54 "Plague on the Gaelic," *San Francisco Call*, April 8, 1896.

55 "Plague Raging in the Orient," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 10, 1896.

56 San Francisco Chronicle, April 16, 1896; "Along The Water Front," San Francisco Call, April 19-20, 1896; and "Guarding Against Oriental Plagues," San Francisco Chronicle, April 19, 1896.

---

57 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, June 15, 1896.

58 Rosenau papers, San Francisco City Board of Health to Wyman, July 1, 1896.

59 Ibid.

60 Rosenau papers, "Defies The Federal Government," and "The Board Of Health Defiant," n.p. July 2 or 3, 1896. The clippings were collected by Rosenau and indicate the sort of press concerning the struggle that he found interesting and useful to preserve. Rosenau did not keep citation notes indicating which San Francisco newspapers the cuttings came from. The dates listed are an educated guess based on the content of the articles.

61 Rosenau papers, "Local and Federal Authority Equal." n.p. July 3, 1896.

62 Ibid.

63 "John B. Hamilton," Office of the Surgeon General.

64 "Federal Authority Alone Recognized," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 11, 1896.

65 Furman, 215.

66 Rosenau papers, Chalmers to Carlisle, January 20, 1897.

67 Rosenau papers, Wyman to L. G. Gage, May 14, 1897.

68 Rosenau papers, telegram, Wyman to Rosenau, January 24 1897.

69 *Public Health Reports*, (January 22, 1897): 65-66.

70 *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 21, 1897.

71 "Quarantine at San Francisco," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 26, 1897 and "Government Wins," *San Francisco Bulletin*, January 26, 1897.

72 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, January 28, 1897.

73 "More Quarantine Trouble," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 12, 1897.

74 Rosenau papers, Wyman to L. G. Gage, May 14, 1897.

---

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 "Single Control of Quarantine," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 19, 1897.

78 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Harrison J. Barrett, June 23, 1897.

79 Rosenau papers, Subpoena issued to Rosenau, July 23, 1897 and Wyman to Rosenau, August 7, 1897.

80 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, June 28, 1897.

81 "State and Federal Officers In Conflict On Quarantine," *San Francisco Examiner*, September 18, 1897.

82 Ibid.

83 Rosenau papers, undated attachment to letter, Wyman to L. G. Gage, May 14, 1897. Part of Wyman's May 14, 1897 formal request for the MHS to take control of the San Francisco quarantine inspection is a resolution by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce addressed to American ship owners using the port of San Francisco. In the resolution is a request that the ship owners refuse to pay local inspection fees and help pay for the litigation of a proposed test case challenging local inspection authority. The Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company took up the challenge, and ordered their captains to refuse cooperation with the local inspection. The resulting policy lead to several conflicts in the harbor. See "Single Control of Quarantine," *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 19, 1897 and "'Who Bosses the Yellow Flag?'" *San Francisco Call*, September 13, 1897.

84 "A Sinecure And An Incubus," *San Francisco Call*, January 18, 1898.

85 Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, July 23, and August 7, 1897.

86 Ibid.

87 "The Quarantine Troubles," *San Francisco Call*, March 30, 1898 and Rosenau papers, Wyman to Rosenau, August 20, 1898.

88 Furman, 220-221.

---

89 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to Senator F. M (Francis Marion) Cockrell, January 24, 1901. p.8; Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. p. 33. The date Kinyoun gives of "late 1899" for his conversation with Wyman appears to be at odds with the timing of events, and probably should read "1898." Kinyoun and his laboratory had moved to Washington in 1891. While Kinyoun had served in temporary duty away from Washington during the 1890's, he had always returned to run the hygienic laboratory. From the context of the note, it appears that Kinyoun had been given assurances that he was to continue as the lab's permanent director.

90 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. p. 4.

91 There is some indication from various sources that plague may have arrived in San Francisco in 1898, but the cause of death was not suspected at the time and no bacterial examination was done.

92 "Plague Ship Nippon Maru Arrives Flying a Yellow Flag And Goes Into Quarantine," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 28, 1899.

93 Ibid.

94 Up until World War I and the mechanization of warfare, deaths from illness within the military were significantly greater than those caused by battle injuries. The US military was no exception. During the Spanish war, deaths from disease exceeded the battle death rate by five to one, with 5 battle deaths per thousand vs. 26 deaths per thousand caused by disease (5:26 ratio). During the US Civil war, northern forces suffered a 33:65 death ratio. According to the US military, by 1919, efficiencies in warfare and medicine had changed the balance. As of February 1919, the US military reported that American European Forces (A. E. F.) were suffering from a 57:17 death ratio, or 3.3 battle deaths for every disease fatality. At that, the disease ratio had been inflated by the influenza pandemic: "but for the influenza epidemic...the disease rate would have been cut in half." The drop in death from disease was due "largely to the inoculation requirements of the army, and secondly to the efficient work of the medical corps." Mechanization of warfare also played a part in tilting the statistics. While the US battle death rate had reached a new high mark, at 57 deaths per thousand, the British expeditionary forces had experienced a withering 110 deaths per thousand in battle by 1919. "Deaths in Battle 57 Per Thousand," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1919.

95 "Yellow Plague at Santiago," *San Francisco Call*, June 22, 1899; "Yellow Fever at Santiago," *Sacramento Bee*, June 21, 1899; and "Yellow Fever On A Transport," *Sacramento Evening Bee*, July 6, 1899.

96 "Yellow Fever Rages in Mexico," *San Francisco Call*, July 2, 1899.

---

97 "Plague Spreading," *Sacramento Evening Bee*, June 9, 1899 and "The Plague at Oporto," *San Francisco Examiner*, August 19, 1899.

98 *National Quarantine Act, Statutes At Large*, 27, sec. 2, 108, 114. (1893).

99 "Death From Plague On Nippon Maru," *San Francisco Call*, June 26, 1899.

100 "No Danger from Bubonic Plague," *San Jose Mercury*, June 27, 1899.

101 "Plague Ship Nippon Maru Arrives Flying A Yellow Flag and Goes Into Quarantine," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 28, 1899. By the time the Nippon Maru sailed for San Francisco with plague aboard, it had been known for some time that there was a relationship between rats and plague. While the specifics of the connection were still unknown, science and folk wisdom had agreed that rats, as the news article pointed out, were the "great disseminators of the bubonic plague."

102 *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 28, 1899 and "Died Fleeing From the Plague," *San Francisco Bulletin*, June 28, 1899.

103 At the time of the incident, the bacteriologist for the San Francisco Board of Health reported finding plague bacteria. Kinyoun did his own examination and determined that there was no plague. The controversy was played out in the San Francisco press during late June and early July, 1899. In Link's "A History of Plague in the United States of America," (1955) he supports the San Francisco Health Department's contention that plague bacteria was found. In *Plague*, written in 1985, Charles T. Gregg also supports the position that plague bacilli was found in the bodies. Writing in 1994, Guenter Risse, in "Politics of Fear," supports Kinyoun's contention that no plague bacteria was found. As Laurie Garrett points out in her book, *Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health*, even in 1994, during the plague outbreak in India, health officials there could not initially determine the bacteriological identity of the disease. The Indian officials could only say that the bacteria was morphologically "similar" to *Yersinia pestis* (p. 39).

104 In 1898, 47,741 people in the United States were injured or killed in railway accidents. "Railway Kills More Than War," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 16, 1899.

105 While outside the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the political chicanery taking place at the board of health was not in the least bit unique. Political corruption during this period of "bossism" in America has been well documented. Of the many excellent books covering the topic, San Francisco is discussed in William A. Bullough, *The Blind Boss and His City: Christopher Augustine Buckley & Nineteenth-*

Century San Francisco (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1979) and Walton Bean, *Boss Ruef's San Francisco* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1952). Additionally, the works of Franklin Hichborn should not be missed.

106 "Talk of a New Medical Society," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 21, 1899.

107 *Pacific Medical Journal*, editorial, 42 (July 1899): 427.

108 Earlier in his political career, Burns fled to Mexico to avoid prosecution in California, and picked up the nickname "Mexican Dan," or, as often as not, just "The Mexican."

109 Dan Burns' bid for the U.S.Senate failed.

110 "Health Office Is Hard Hit," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 27, 1899, and "Crimmins and Kelly Getting Even On Burns," *San Francisco Examiner*, July 28, 1899.

111 "A Small Army of City Tax Eaters," *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 2, 1899.

112 Ibid.

113 "San Francisco Notes," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 33:7 (August 12, 1899): 432.

114 "City Hospital To Be Closed," *San Francisco Examiner*, September 3, 1899; "Planning A New City Hospital," *San Francisco Examiner*, September 7, 1899; and "A Doctor Gives Up A Position," *San Francisco Examiner*, September 21, 1899.

115 "Health Board Raid On Funds," *San Francisco Examiner*, October 1, 1899 and "County Hospital Costs Too Much," *San Francisco Examiner*, October 3, 1899.

116 Furman, 199.

117 Frank Norris, *The octopus, a story of California* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.,1901)

118 Trauner, 70-74.

119 Ibid.

120. Ibid.

---

121. The Globe Hotel's decline from a gold rush era palace to a symbol of Chinatown's filth and decadence is well described in Nayan Shaw, *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2001), 32-120.

122 "Nothing But Suspicion," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 8 and "Plague Fake Exploded." *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 9, 1900.

123 "Remove the Board of Health," *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 8, 1900.

124. Kalisch, 117.

125. *San Francisco Bulletin*, March 8, 1900, quoted in Kalisch, 117.

126. Kengla, "Newspapers and the Plague," *Occidental Medical Times* 14:2 (April, 1900): 122.

127 Kalisch, 118-121.

128 *Sacramento Bee*, March 8, 1900, March 22, 1900 and April 6, 1900.

129 "San Francisco Newspapers and the Plague," *Occidental Medical Times*, (April, 1900): 118-119. Emphasis added, the previous election being the 1899 gubernatorial race won by Henry Gage.

130 "The Plague," *Occidental Medical Times*, (June 1900): 118.

131 Silvio J. Onesti, "Plague, Press, and Politics," *Stanford Medical Bulletin*, 13:1 (February 1955): 4.

132 Charles T. Gregg, *Plague: An Ancient Disease in the Twentieth Century*, 2d ed. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1985), 73-83.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.

135 Association of State and Territorial Directors of Health Promotion and Public Health Education, Plague, <<http://www.astdhphe.org/infect/plague.html>> accessed March 24 2002 and CDC Plague Home Page, <<http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/plague/>> accessed 1 February 2002.

---

136 Kinyoun papers. Letter. Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901, 13. This letter, as well as two others in the collection describe in great detail the inside story of Kinyoun's experience. While the records of the Marine Hospital Service in the National Archives contain a significant amount of official correspondence, the addition of having Kinyoun's private opinions is invaluable in understanding the political atmosphere in which the story is played out.

137.Ibid.

138 McClain, 470.

139.Ibid., 472-473.

140.Kinyoun papers, letter. Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. 8.

141.Louis Kengla, "The Plague," *Occidental Medical Times* 14:6 (June 1900): 185.

142.Kalisch, 122.

143.Wong Wai v. Williamson, Civil Case No. 12937. A full description of the event can be found in Charles J. McClain, "Of Medicine, Race, and American Law: The Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 1900," *Law and Inquiry* 13, no. 3 (1988): 447-513.

144. Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. 13-20 and Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "Dear Dr. Bailhache," August 9, 1900. Coombs, Frank Leslie (1853-1934). District Attorney for Northern California, 1899-1901. U.S. Representative from California 1st District, 1901-03; defeated, 1902. In a private letter, Kinyoun wrote: "It was equally certain that an agreement had been entered into between the Governor and his political adherents; that if Coombes [sic] did his part so as to secure my conviction, or removal, that the price for his treachery, he was to be made the nominee of the republican party for Congress. This latter was done by the machine, Coombes [sic] having little or no opposition."

145 Dr. Bailhache was more to Kinyoun than a close colleague within the Marine Hospital Service with whom he could confide. It appears that Dr. Bailhache was Preston H. Bailhache, confidante of John Hamilton and the Marine Hospital Service's agent within the National Board of Health during the fight for supremacy and survival between the two services. As a close political ally of John Hamilton, Bailhache was a holdover within the Wyman administration, and very possibly a political thorn in the side of the

---

Wyman, who had successfully outmaneuvered Hamilton for the job of Supervising Surgeon-General. In addition, Dr. Bailhach was Joseph J. Kinyoun's uncle, and very likely the man who introduced Kinyoun to the Marine Hospital Service.

146 Kellogg, "Present Status of Plague with Historical Review," 840.

147 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to Senator F. M. Cockrell, January 24, 1901. 3.

148 McClain, 482-489.

149 Ibid., 496-506.

150 Telegram from Governor Gage to John Hay, Secretary of State, June 13, 1900.. In appendix to the *Report of the Special Health Commissioners*. (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1901), 16.

151 McClain, 501-506.

152 *Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed by the Governor to Confer with the Federal Authorities at Washington Regarding the Alleged Existence of Bubonic Plague in California*. (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1901), 17-18.

153 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. p. 15; "Quarantine Fake Explodes," June 19, 1900; "His Recall Is Demanded," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 20, 1900. "All Quarantine Orders Have Been Suspended," *San Francisco Examiner*, June 19, 1900.

154 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. 15.

155 "Has Kinyoun Gone Mad?" *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 2, 1900 and "Indecencies Of Kinyoun," *San Francisco Chronicle*, October 3, 1900.

156 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), RG 90, PHS, Central Files, 1897-1923, file #5608, box 627, telegram, Kinyoun to Wyman, October 12, 1900. Original coded message with translation in brackets reads:

Have received request committee Chamber Commerce to present myself explaining actions regarding treatment longing [cabin passengers] coptic in quarantine comfort [September 30] was at Autocracy [Port Townsend], comfort [September 30] knew nothing of circumstances until my returning commanding [October 4]. Adage [Lumsden] report charges without foundation attitude few longing [cabin passengers] probably due to ignorant of vessels possible infection bumpkin [plague]; sensational

---

articles in author [San Francisco] press effort to effect transfer because my reports to bureau regarding bumpkin [plague] and actuated by locuacity [Governor] and bravado [Southern] pacific; whole matter political attack; lunacy [general population] kept in ignorance of facts; my letter forwarded committee bureau explains; have informed committee matter must be referred to bureau with request for instructions abutment [Kinyoun]. (Not signed)

157 NARA, RG 90, PHS, Central Files, 1897-1923, file #5608, box 627, letter, Kinyoun to Wyman, October 12, 1900.

158 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. 22.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid., 23.

161 Ibid., 24.

162 "Will Not Publish Kinyoun's Fakes," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 8, 1901 and "The Case of Kinyoun," *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 9, 1901.

163 NARA, RG 90, PHS, Central Files, 1897-1923, file #5608, box 627, telegram, Kinyoun to Wyman, January 10, 1901. Original coded message with translation in brackets reads "By reason of infamous statements and libelous charges made by Loquacity [Governor] arsenal [California] in message, I most respectfully request publication in full my letter Confab [December 6] inadvertently dated Comport [November 6]. Every statement made therein true and fully justified. Laquacity [Governor] has by implication charged me being accessory to inoculating dead bodies with imported bumkin [plague] germs in order to foist upon community bumkin [plague] scare. This reflects on service as well as Abutment [Kinyoun]. Great stress now being laid press dispatch from Washington stating that Above [Surgeon General] no longer any confidence in reports sent by Abutment [Kinyoun] regarding the bumpkin [plague] here as no further mention is made in public health reports. Abutment [Kinyoun] being disgraced and discredited. Situation demands action be taken by Above [Surgeon General] or allow me to defend myself. Rumors of Congressional investigation which I hope are true."

164 Kinyoun papers, Kinyoun to "My Dear Aunt and Uncle," June 29, 1901. 8.

165 Kalisch, 126.

166 Anderson's trading on his college's reputation to support the Governor's

---

policy of denial would end up costing dearly. Over the next several years the reputation of the college would be tainted by questions of professional competency. By 1902, several members of its founding faculty would resign in protest over Anderson's support of the Gage's policy of denial, and within a few years the college would close its doors under a cloud of controversy. Louis Kengla, "Dr. Frisbie's Resignation," *Occidental Medical Times* 16:7 (July 1902): 182, and Kellogg, "Present status of plague with historical review," 838-840.

167 *Pacific Medical Journal*, (August 1900): 610, quoted in *Occidental Medical Times*, (August 1900): 353.

168 "Truth is Mightier," *Sacramento Bee*, January 10, 1901.

169 "The Personnel of the New Legislature," *Sacramento Bee*, January 7, 1901.

170 "Plague is the Burden of the Governor's Message," *Sacramento Bee*, January 9, 1901.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 "Truth is Mightier," *Sacramento Bee*, January 10, 1901.

175 Ibid.

176 Kalisch, 127-128. and Lipson, 306.

177 "A Remarkable Record," *Sacramento Bee*, part two of three, July 10-12, 1902.

178 "Federal Commission Has Practically Finished," *Sacramento Bee*, February 18, 1901.

179 "The Report of the Government Commission on the Existence of Plague in San Francisco," *Occidental Medical Times*, (April 1901): 101 -117.

180 "Gage in the Dumps Over That 'Conference,'" *Sacramento Bee*, February 19, 1901.

---

181 "Gage Rebuked by President," *Sacramento Bee*, January 31, 1901.

182 In yet another case of convoluted California politics, Pendleton, elected by Gage supporters, had won his chair despite the popularity of Alden Anderson of Suisun. Anderson lost, reported the *Bee*, because he had been supported by W. S. Leake, manager of the *San Francisco Call*, who was an annoyance to Republican Party boss Daniel Burns of San Francisco. ("Yesterday Settled Speakership Fight," *Sacramento Bee*, January 7, 1901) While the decision on the speakership is a seemingly small detail, this snub by the Gage "push" to Leake and the *San Francisco Call* will later become an ironic detail in Gage's fight for re-election in 1902. Leake was named as a defendant in Gage's libel suit against the *Call* for exposing the San Quentin corruption scandal. The *Call*, with Leake in the lead, had done much to defeat Burns in his extraordinarily contended bid for a Senate seat in Washington the previous year. The Burns faction in the Assembly wanted to send a message that alliance with Leake, by plan or coincidence, was political poison. With Pendleton chosen as Gage's inside man, Assembly Bills A. B. 558, 559 and 560 were introduced to the house.

183 "Plague Day in the Assembly," *Sacramento Bee*, February 12, 1901. "Debate in Senate on Plague Appropriation," *Sacramento Bee*, February 15, 1901. Note: In 1901, homes in downtown Sacramento were frequently being advertised for well under \$1,000 in the *Sacramento Bee*, which puts the size of the Governor's slush fund into a bit of perspective.

184 "More Pressure Upon McKinley. Remarkable Plague Conference Held Here Last Night," *Sacramento Bee*, February 28, 1901.

185 *Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed by the Governor to Confer with the Federal Authorities at Washington Regarding the Alleged Existence of Bubonic Plague in California.* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1901)

186 "More Pressure Upon McKinley," *Sacramento Bee*, February 28, 1901.

187 "Infamous Compact Signed by Wyman," *Sacramento Bee*, March 16, 1901. Lipson, 7.

188 "Kinyoun Ordered to Detroit Mich.," *Sacramento Bee*, April 15, 1901.

189 *Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed by the Governor to Confer with the Federal Authorities at Washington Regarding the Alleged Existence of Bubonic Plague in California.* (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1901), 8.

190 Kalisch, 130-132.

---

191 Onesti, 4. San Francisco Board of Supervisors, *Municipal Reports*, (1901/1902): 481-492.

192 *Sacramento Bee*, March 8, 1901.

193 "Scandal of Thievery," *San Francisco Call*, May 24, 1902.

194 "Another Case of Bubonic Plague," *Sacramento Bee*, May 24, 1902.

195 "Scandal of Thievery," *San Francisco Call*, May 24, 1902.

196 "Startling Charge Against Gage," *Sacramento Bee*, May 24, 1902.

197 Several articles indicate that the democratic vote in California's open primary was heavy for Governor Gage. The reasoning behind the democratic support appears to have been split by those who voted in favor of Gage. Some supported Gage because he was the "machine" candidate and the likely winner. Their votes were cast in favor of Gage in order to maintain their relationship with the "machine." Others, who disliked and opposed Gage, voted for the Governor in the belief that if he became the Republican candidate for Governor, he would loose to the Democratic candidate in the fall election. See "Lining Up For the Primary," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 3, 1902; "Fight for Existence To Be Made By Gage Machine," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 5, 1902; and "Democratic Votes Won For the Bosses," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 12, 1902.

198 "A Remarkable Record," *Sacramento Bee*, part three of three, July 10-12, 1902.

199 "Three More Cases Of Plague Appear In San Francisco," *Sacramento Bee*, July 25, 1902. "

200 Ibid.

201 "The Board of Supervisors, the Mayor, And the Plague," *Occidental Medical Times*, (September, 1902): 384 - 387.

202 Ibid.

203 "Herrin On Hand To Help With The Funeral," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 27, 1902.

---

204 Second biennial message of Governor Henry T. Gage, in *Journals of the Senate and Assembly of California 35th Session*, vol. 1. 1903, (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1903), 27-42. Loren George Lipson, "Plague in San Francisco in 1900," *Annals of Internal Medicine*. 77:2 (August 1972): 308. Hichborn, Franklin, *California History, 1891-1939*, (University of California, Los Angeles, 1951), unpublished manuscript. Haynes Foundation collection. 711-712.

205 Ibid. 134.

206 Ibid.

207 Gregg, 46-47.

208 Ibid.

209 Second biennial message of Governor Henry T. Gage, in *Journals of the Senate and Assembly of California 35th Session*, vol. 1. 1903. (Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1903), 27. Governor Gage's first biennial address was delivered in writing to the Legislature on January 8, 1901. Gage never actually gave the speech. See *San Francisco Chronicle*, January 9, 1901, and the *Sacramento Bee*, January 9, 1901.

210 Joseph Frank Payne, *Thomas Sydenham*, Masters of Medicine series (London: T. F. Unwin, 1900), quoted by J. J. Kinyoun in "Society Proceedings," *Occidental Medical Times*, 15:8 (August, 1901): 294.

211 "Society Proceedings," *Occidental Medical Times*, 15:8 (August 1901): 294.

212 *Journal of the Americal Medical Association* 29 (1897): 758

213 A. C. Smith, "The ship Island Quarantine," *Times-Democrat*, November 7, 1897, quoted in *Sanitarian*, 39 (1897): 525-530.

214 *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal*, (November 1892): 373-374.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Manuscript Materials

National Archives (Washington DC).

U.S. Public Health Service. Record Group 90. Central Files. 1897-1923. File #5608.
National Archives at College Park. College Park, MD.

National Library of Medicine (Bethesda, Maryland).

MS C 464. Joseph James Kinyoun papers. History of Medicine Division. National
Library of Medicine. National Institutes of Health. Bethesda, MD.

Southern Historical Collection. University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill).

#4289. Milton Rosenau papers. Southern Historical Collection. Wilson Library.
University of North Carolina Library at Chapel Hill.

Newspapers and Journals:

Journal of the American Medical Association. 1894-1902.

Los Angeles Times. 1899-1903.

Merchants' Association Review (San Francisco). 1900-1903.

New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal.

Occidental Medical Times 1899-1903.

Pacific Medical Journal. 1899-1903.

Sacramento Bee. 1899-1903.

Sanitarian.

San Francisco Bulletin. 1896-1903.

San Francisco Call. 1896-1903.

San Francisco Chronicle. 1896-1903.

San Francisco Examiner. 1896-1903.

Washington Post.

Articles

Bell, A. N. "The U. S. Marine Hospital Service and Quarantine." *The Sanitarian* 12 (January to June, 1884): 326.

_____. editorial. *Sanitarian*, 39 (1897): 451.

Holt, Joseph. "The New Quarantine System," *New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal* 72 (June 1885): 535-545.

Swearingen, R. M. "The Relation of Federal to State Quarantine." *Sanitarian* 39 (1897): 427-434.

Wyman, Walter. "The Quarantine System of the United States." *Sanitarian* 39 (1897): 418-427.

Government Documents

California Blue Book, or State Roster. Sacramento: State Printing Office. 1899, 1903.

Journals of the Senate and Assembly of California. Sacramento: State Printing Office. 1901, 1903.

National Quarantine Act. Statutes At Large. 27. sec. 2. 108. 114. 1893.

Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed by the Governor to Confer with the Federal Authorities at Washington Regarding the Alleged Existence of Bubonic Plague in California. Sacramento: State Printing Office. 1901.

San Francisco Board of Supervisors. *Municipal Reports.* 1898-1905.

U.S. Public Health Reports. Washington DC. U. S. Government Printing office. 1896-1905.

Secondary Sources

Books

Anderson, Kay J. *Vancouver's Chinatown: Radical Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980.* McGill-Queen's studies in ethnic history. ed. Donald Harman Akenson. no. 10. Montreal, Kingston, London and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1991.

Bean, Walton. *Boss Ruef's San Francisco.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1952.

Blackford, Mansel G. *The Politics of Business in California, 1890-1920.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 1977.

Craddock, Susan. *City of Plagues: Disease, Poverty and Deviance in San Francisco.* Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 2000.

Delmatier, Royce D., Clarence F. McIntosh, and Earl G. Waters. *The Rumble of California Politics, 1848-1970.* New York, London, Sydney, and Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. 1970.

Furman, Bess. *A Profile of the United States Public Health Service 1798-1948.* U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare. National Institutes of Health, National Library of Medicine: U.S. Government Printing office. 1969.

Gregg, Charles T. *Plague: An Ancient Disease in the Twentieth Century.* 2d ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1985.

Hichborn, Franklin. *The System.* San Francisco: Press of the James H. Barry Company. 1915.

- Humphreys, Margaret. *Yellow Fever And The South*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1992.
- Issel, William, and Robert W. Cherny. *San Francisco, 1865-1932: Politics, Power, and Urban Development*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. 1986.
- Kraut, Alan M. *Silent Travelers*. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, Inc. 1994.
- Mayne, Alan. *The Imagined Slum: Newspaper Representation in Three Cities, 1870-1914*. Leicester University Press: Leicester, London and New York. 1993.
- Melendy, Brett H. and Benjamin F. Gilbert. *The Governors of California*. Georgetown, California: The Talisman Press. 1965.
- Norris, Frank. *The octopus, a story of California*. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. 1901.
- Shah, Nayan. *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 2001.

Articles

- Haas, Victor H. "When Bubonic Plague Came To Chinatown." *The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 8:1 (January 1959): 141-147.
- Kalisch, Philip A. "The Black Death in Chinatown: Plague and Politics in San Francisco 1900-1904." *Arizona and the West* 14:2 (1972): 112-136.
- Kellogg, W. H. "Present status of plague with historical review." *American Journal of Public Health* 10:11 (November 1920): 835-844.
- Link, Vernon B. "A History of Plague in the United States of America." *Public Health Monograph* No. 26, Publication No. 392 Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. (1955): 1-11.
- Lipson, Loren George. "Plague in San Francisco in 1900." *Annals of Internal Medicine* 77:2 (August 1972): 303-310.

McClain, Charles J. "Of Medicine, Race, and American Law: The Bubonic Plague Outbreak of 1900." *Law and Inquiry* 13, no. 3 (1988): 447-513.

Onesti, Silvio J. "Plague, Press, and Politics." *Stanford Medical Bulletin* 13:1 (February 1955): 1-10.

Risse, Guenter B. "The Politics of Fear: Bubonic Plague in San Francisco, California, 1900," in *New Countries and Old Medicine: Proceedings of an International Conference on the History of Medicine and Health*, Auckland, New Zealand, 1994, ed. Linda Bryder and Derek A. Dow. Auckland, New Zealand: Pyramid Press, 1995. 1-19.

Trauner, Joan B. "The Chines as Medical Scapegoats in San Francisco, 1870-1905." *California History* 57:1 (1978): 70-87.

Tutorow, Norman E. "A Tale of Two Hospitals: U.S. Marine Hospital No. 19 and the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital on the Presidio of San Francisco." *California History* 75:2 (Summer 1996): 154-185.

"John B. Hamilton (1879-1891)." Office of the Surgeon General. <<http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/history/biohamilton.htm>>. accessed March 24, 2002.

"The National Quarantine" *Harper's Weekly*, August 26, 1893. reproduced at <<http://www.fortunecity.com/littleitaly/amalfi/100/quaran93.htm>>. accessed March 24, 2002.

Dissertations:

Rose, Alice. "Rise of California Insurgency: Origins of the League of Lincoln-Roosevelt Republican Clubs 1900-1907." Ph. D. diss., Stanford University. 1942.

Nayan Shah, "San Francisco's Chinatown: Race and the Cultural Politics of Public Health, 1854-1952." Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. 1995.

Trauner, Joan Burton. "From Benevolence To Negotiation: Prepaid Health Care In San Francisco, 1850-1950." Ph. D. diss., University of California, San Francisco. 1977.

Walker, Wesley. "A History of Plague in California." Ph. D. diss., Stanford University. 1948.

Manuscripts

Hichborn, Franklin. *California Politics, 1891-1939*. University of California, Los Angeles, 1951. unpublished manuscript. Haynes Foundation collection. Los Angeles, CA. Microfilm.

Miles, Wyndham. "A History of the National Board of Health, 1879-1893." MS C 237. Wyndham Miles papers. History of Medicine Division. National Library of Medicine. National Institutes of Health. Bethesda, MD.