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Yankees go home! : the 1960 Security Treaty crisis and Okinawa

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YANKEES GO HOME!:
THE 1960 SECURITY TREATY CRISIS AND OKINAWA

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Ruby Takako Smart
April 2003

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "E. Bruce Reynolds", written over a horizontal line.

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ABSTRACT
YANKEES GO HOME!
THE 1960 SECURITY TREATY CRISIS AND OKINAWA
by Ruby Takako Smart

This thesis addresses the topic of the 1960 Security Treaty between Japan and the United States and how it affected Okinawa. It examines the era from the outcome of World War II, to the Peace-Settlement Conference in April 1951, to the implementation of the Security Treaty in regards to U.S. military bases in Japan and Okinawa, and the effects of the Security Treaty in Okinawa itself. In 1960, a crisis was brewing in Japan over the Security Treaty with protests and riots. In Okinawa, protests occurred, but over different issues than in mainland Japan.

Research on this subject reveals that the Security Treaty was viewed differently by the three parties: the United States, Japan and Okinawa. For the United States, the Security Treaty allowed military bases in a region where Communism was a real threat. For Japan, it was a security measure, but at the cost of dependence on the U.S. For Okinawa, the Security Treaty meant bases on a small island, and the hardships of bearing the bulk of the U.S. military presence in Japan. As a result of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, the Reversion of Okinawa to Japan, in 1972, led to better relations between Japan and the United States.

Preface

The 1960s was a decade of complex world change: a decade of radicalism, lost innocence, destruction, and rebirth. During the 1960s, Americans realized that world problems were not just black and white, but shades of gray as well. In the United States, college students questioned their government. They protested against the Vietnam War, believed in “flower power,” and voiced many idealistic interpretations of how the United States should be.

In Japan, a country that was still rebuilding from the mass destruction caused by World War II, the 1960s was also a decade of change. It was a time when millions of Japanese stepped out of character for a little while, and stood against their government.

May and June 1960 were two tense months between Japan and the United States. Japanese students, labor unionists, and opposition political leaders were protesting against the 1951 Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty with the United States, which was due to be revised in 1960. Many Japanese did not want to renew this treaty with the United States because they felt that Japan would continue to be under U.S. control, as it had been since the Occupation. There were also protests over the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan. Because of the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

many Japanese were against such weapons of mass destruction. Protests that began as early as 1958 peaked in May and June 1960, resulting in the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Japan and the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke.

Protests in Okinawa began in the mid 1950s. Okinawa is the largest island within the Ryukyu chain of islands south of Kyushu. The United States' military bases occupy one-fifth of the island. From 1945 to 1972 Okinawa was under the trusteeship of the United States. Okinawa became known as the "Keystone to the Pacific" for the U.S. military, and was a strategic base for any American operation in the Far East. From Okinawa the United States could respond quickly to Communist threats from China or North Korea and the island served as a base for air operations during the Vietnam War. Nuclear weapons were also stored on Okinawa.

Protesters wanted Okinawa to be returned to Japan. They no longer wanted to be under U.S. control. Although Japan retained a "residual sovereign" claim to the Ryukyus, Japan did not govern the islands. In a gesture to ease tensions, the United States returned to Japan the Amami-Oshima islands on December 24, 1954, but was not willing to give up its control over Okinawa. The U.S. military had spent millions of dollars and had set up permanent bases on the island. Many in the State and Defense

Departments believed that Okinawa was an essential base in the Asian-Pacific area, so Okinawa was not to be given back to Japan. Protests over the return of Okinawa grew over the years. Demands for its reversion increased due to the dissatisfaction over the Security Treaty in 1960, and subsequently over the role Okinawa played during the Vietnam War.

The 1960 Security Treaty Crisis led to talks between Japan and the United States, enabling Japan to regain its full sovereign power over Okinawa in May 1972. Designed to avoid a repetition of what had happened in 1960, the 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué led to the agreement of reversion of Okinawa, while permitting the security treaty agreement to remain intact.

Chapter one of this thesis discusses the historical background of Okinawa, as well as the formation of the Peace and Security Treaties. Chapter two discusses the rise of Kishi Nobusuke, the early problems of the Security Treaty and Okinawa's problems with the U.S. military. The cause of the massive protests in Japan in May and June 1960 is the focus of chapter three. Chapter four discusses the outcome of the treaty crisis of 1960, and role of Okinawa in the aftermath. The last chapter is a brief overview of the entire relationship of the U.S. and Japan, and Okinawa after 1960 and 1972 respectfully.

This thesis analyzes why the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis occurred. What happened in Japan during this crisis? Were the Okinawans protesting the same issues as the Japanese?

I am studying Okinawa and U.S. relations because of my close ties with Okinawa. My mother is from Okinawa and I still have relatives living there. Not many people know about Okinawa and its history. Okinawans are a distinct group from the Japanese. Okinawans are also friendly and hospitable.

I am greatly indebted to many people who assisted me in my research for this thesis. First and foremost, I am grateful and thankful to God from whom I draw my strength. I would like to acknowledge the libraries in California and Okinawa where I gathered my research: Clark and Wahlquist libraries at San Jose State University, the University Research Library at the University of California, Los Angeles, the Doe and Main libraries at the University of California, Berkeley, and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

I was fortunate to be able to travel to Okinawa and do some research as well. I would like to acknowledge the University of the Ryukyus and the Okinawa International University, as well as the Okinawa Prefecture Library in Naha and the Okinawa Prefecture Archives. I am deeply indebted to

several people I have met and talked with in Okinawa who have given me valuable information about Okinawa and this time period. Professors Ishara Masaie, Nakachi Tetsuo, Matsuda Setsuko and William T. Randall of the Okinawa International University were willing to take the time to speak with me during their finals. My heartfelt gratitude also to Mr. Shimada Kenmatsu, Superintendent of the Nishihara Board of Education. I am grateful to my uncles Itokazu Yoshiaki and Higa Makoto for helping me find the materials and copying them for this thesis.

I would also like to acknowledge the members of my thesis committee, Drs. E. Bruce Reynolds, Stan Underdal and Robert Kumamoto for their time and generosity in reading this thesis and giving me constructive comments on ways to improve the thesis and myself.

Gratitude also goes to a number of people from San Lorenzo Japanese Christian Church, among whom I would like to mention Emi Sarena, Lester Fujii, Lynne Kishi, Gloria Kama, Aza Jow, Shirley Inouye, and Grace Suzuki for their continuous support and prayers. Appreciation also goes to Phil and Christina Gardner for following up with me about the thesis. I would like to give a very special appreciation to my mother Atsuko Smart whose encouragement kept me going. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother and my Grandmother and Grandfather Higa in Okinawa.

Throughout the thesis, Japanese names have been written in traditional Japanese style, with the surname followed by the given name. All research has been conducted by myself and I accept full responsibility for any factual errors.

Ruby Takako Smart
January 2003
San Leandro, California

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Chapter One

The Calm Before the Storm

To understand the importance of Okinawa to the U.S., one must look at its history. The Ryukyu chain of islands, to which it belongs, stretches for 374 miles between Taiwan to the southwest and Kyushu to the northeast, separating the Pacific Ocean from the China Sea.¹ Some historians believe that Ryukyuan civilization dates from the late Jomon period (ca. 7000B.C. – ca.300B.C.), as the earliest inhabitants in Ryukyu can be dated to 7,000 years ago.² During the fourteenth century, Ryukyu had a diplomatic relationship with Ming China as a tributary state, a connection that encouraged trade and led to cultural influence from China. Ryukyu was recognized by China as a separate nation, and profited from lucrative trade.³

Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyu chain, went through a period of civil unrest from 1314 until the fifteenth century, when the Great Unifier, King Sho Hash, who began his reign in 1421, promoted foreign trade.⁴ Not

¹ United Okinawans Association of Hawaii, Ethnic Studies Oral History Project, Uchinanchu: A History of Okinawans in Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1981), 3.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 6-7.

⁴ George Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1958), 86.

only did trade develop with Japan, China and Korea, it also spread to Southeast Asia regions like the Philippines and Malaya. Trade became the primary focus of the Okinawan economy.⁵

Although China and Japan were on bad terms diplomatically, Okinawa was able to trade freely with both.⁶ The main *han* (feudal domain) in Japan, that traded with Okinawa was Satsuma, in Kyushu. (See fig.1.1-2) Through the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Satsuma depended on Okinawans to act as middlemen in obtaining Chinese goods.⁷ In the sixteenth century, Okinawa became the intermediary in trade between China and Japan, because of severed ties between the two nations. Due to the increased contact, Okinawa began to be increasingly influenced by Japan. The Okinawans began to incorporate Japanese ways as well as the standard Japanese language. They enjoyed two centuries of peace and prosperity until Japan's Tokugawa era (1600-1868).

Due to the extensive trade between Satsuma and Okinawa, Satsuma claimed sovereignty over Okinawa. When the Okinawans refused to

⁵ Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the more familiar term Okinawa will be used to refer to both the main island of the Ryukyu chain and the islands collectively.

⁶ Kerr, Okinawa, 136.

⁷ Ibid.

acknowledge the Tokugawa Shogunate (the central military government of Japan), Satsuma, with the blessings of the Shogunate, conquered Okinawa in 1609 and made its king a prisoner. Okinawa was turned into a vassal state of Satsuma. The country fell into decline because of the abrupt social, economic and political changes. Although Satsuma had full political power over the Ryukyus, Okinawa was permitted to retain some independence and its citizens continued to trade, as middlemen, with China. Okinawa fell under the economic and political control of Japan, but it was still being influenced by Chinese culture. Although defeated, its people began to reconstruct and prosper. During an era known as the "Second Golden Age," Okinawans developed roads and bridges leading to Naha and Shuri during the 17th century. Scholarship increased as the Chinese, Japanese and Ryukyuan languages and schools were developed. Music, dance, painting, calligraphy, and pottery making also flourished.⁸

The Japanese, however, always viewed the Okinawans as second-class citizens. Compared to the pale-skinned Japanese, Okinawans tended to be darker. They also had higher cheekbones and more facial and body hair. The languages were different as well. The dialect that Okinawans spoke, *Hoogen*, combined Chinese and Japanese influences and was considered less refined

⁸ United Okinawans Association of Hawaii, Uchinanchu, 11.

by the Japanese, who considered themselves superior. Okinawans were often rebellious due to harsh treatment from Japan.

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868,⁹ Japan sought international recognition of its sovereignty over Okinawa. However, Okinawa continued to be a thorn in Satsuma's side. Author George Kerr states that the "prominent men of Satsuma, were concerned with the Ryukyu problem [for] it was intolerable that the insignificant Okinawans continue[d] to embarrass Tokyo from time to time while the imperial government was endeavoring to win recognition of its claim to the southern islands." For example, when the ruling King of the Ryukyus was summoned to show his respects to the Meiji Emperor, King Sho Tai declined to go to Tokyo, stating he was ill.¹⁰ In 1872, Okinawa once again defied the government by not paying debts and serving obligations. In October of that year, the Meiji government made Ryukyu into a *han*, "a dependent feudal territory."¹¹ The Okinawans were reluctant to break ties with China, and as a consequence, on March 27, 1879, the Meiji government decided to abolish the *han* and the monarchy of the Ryukyus and

⁹ In 1868, after 250 years of Tokugawa governance, the government was toppled in a rebellion led by the feudal domains of Choshu and Satsuma, who established the Emperor Meiji as the head of Japanese government. This was known as the Meiji Restoration.

¹⁰ Kerr, Okinawa, 361-363.

renamed the islands *Okinawa ken*, making them a prefecture of Japan.

Okinawan King Sho Tai abdicated and Japanese officials from Kagoshima Prefecture (formally Satsuma han) took over all the high offices of the Okinawan government as well as police and teaching positions. Okinawans resented Japanese officials who enforced the Japanese government's rules and regulations.¹²

The first official American contact with Okinawa had been made in 1853 by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, USN.¹³ Prior to his departure for China and Japan, Commodore Perry was given three clear objectives, set out by Acting Secretary of State C.M. Conrad and approved by President Millard Fillmore. According to Benson Grayson, President Fillmore "played a prominent role in drafting the guidance to Perry."¹⁴ The objectives were: 1) to arrange a permanent agreement for the protection of American seamen and wrecked ships, 2) to seek permission for American vessels to enter into one or

¹¹ Ibid., 363.

¹² Ibid., 381.

¹³ Ibid., 307. A good account of Commodore Perry's voyage to Japan is Peter B. Wiley's, Yankees in the Land of Gods: Commodore Perry and the Opening of Japan (New York: Penguin Books, 1990). Kerr's chapter, "The Mouse and the Eagle," is based on personal accounts of Commodore Perry as well as other men who joined him on his trip to Japan.

¹⁴ Benson L. Grayson, The Unknown President: The Administration of President Millard Fillmore (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), 88.

more ports to buy supplies, water, fuel, etc., and 3) to trade. Under objective number two, it was most desirable for the U.S. to get permission to establish a coal depot. If Perry was unable to communicate his objective to the Japanese government, he was given reasonable authority to voice U.S. intentions to protect its citizens.¹⁵

Perry believed that the squadron needed to establish places of rendezvous for supplies. Perry acknowledged the Ryukyu Islands [the Lew Chew Islands] as a possibility for a coal depot and port for U.S. ships. He outlined his beliefs in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy J.P. Kennedy, dated December 14, 1852. As a consequence of the recent elections, the new Secretary of State Edward Everett responded on behalf of the newly elected President Franklin Pierce. Pierce agreed that Perry could establish one or two points in the islands *with the consent of the natives* [emphasis by author] under friendly terms. By no means was Perry to use any force, in Okinawa or Japan, except in defense.¹⁶

Commodore Perry arrived in Naha harbor on May 26, 1853, stopping off on his way to Japan. He recognized Okinawa's strategic importance and

¹⁵ Kerr, Okinawa, 303.

¹⁶ Ibid., 305-6. Franklin Pierce became president in March 1853, and Everett took office as his Secretary of State.

its utility as a re-supply and trading port. During his stay Perry made many demands upon the “Lewchewans” and seemed to have forgotten Secretary of State Everett’s injunction against using force against the natives in Okinawa. Perry’s heavy-handedness was demonstrated when he and his crew went directly to Shuri castle to call upon the king. Instead of meeting with the officials of the court, Perry demanded to see the king and barged into the castle. Prior to leaving for Japan, however, Perry drew up a treaty, which was signed both by him and the Okinawans pledging friendship and outlining U.S. intentions for trade and assistance. American interest in Okinawa waned with the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa, though, and Perry’s treaty was not ratified.¹⁷ Perry’s dreams of making Okinawa an open port for the United States died when President Pierce decided not to follow his recommendations. The domestic crisis that erupted in the Civil War meant that subsequent presidents were too preoccupied to concern themselves with Okinawa. As previously noted, after the Meiji Restoration the island was incorporated into Japan.

The next major contact between the United States and Okinawa occurred during World War II, as Okinawa became the final battle site before the planned invasion of Japan. The fight for Okinawa was one of the bloodiest

¹⁷ Ibid., 330,332.

battles of the war, lasting from April through July 1945. Amid great destruction, more than 100,000 Okinawan civilians lost their lives.¹⁸ Japan's unconditional surrender, signed in September 1945, left Okinawa's future uncertain. Prior to the peace negotiations, the United States had considered the future of Okinawa. As early as 1943, in Cairo, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Chiang Kai-shek about China's claims to Okinawa. At that time, Chiang stated he would agree to a joint occupation of Okinawa. The question at that time was who would rule over Okinawa. A "strategic trusteeship," or joint occupation with China, was a possibility. After the war, the U.S. military believed that, since Americans had captured Okinawa, America should have complete sovereignty.

The administration of Okinawa was carried out by the U.S. Navy until the Army took complete control in July 1946. At the head of the administration was the military governor, usually a major general, who also was the commanding general of the Army forces in the Western Pacific. The main purposes of the military government were to help rebuild the economy, government, and public works of Okinawa; establish a taxation system; and to conduct foreign relations and communications. Other goals of the military government, known as U.S.C.A.R. (United States Civil Administration of the

¹⁸ Hiromichi Yahara, The Battle of Okinawa (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1995), xv.

Ryukyu Islands), were to rehabilitate, reorient and reeducate the Okinawans and prevent disease, hunger and unrest throughout the Ryukyu Islands.

U.S.C.A.R. established 13 departments to carry out the rebuilding of Okinawa.¹⁹

Economically, U.S. military bases in Okinawa provided jobs and new housing developments for the Okinawans. Highways and a power generation plant were constructed; harbor facilities and the water supply system were improved; and military facilities and housing were built. The U.S. gave economic assistance to aid in the improvements on Okinawa. Approximately \$177,000,000 was appropriated for Ryukyuan economic assistance in 1946 alone. Okinawans were still able to earn income through trade and fishing. Corporations were created and banks established by the Americans. According to the U.S. military command, Okinawa's economy was rising and doing well.²⁰

Unfortunately, Okinawa was the poorest prefecture in Japan and remained so, even with the military installations and economic assistance.

¹⁹ Civil Information and Education Department, The Ryukyus Story, (Naha: Headquarters Military Government, Ryukyus Command, 1950), 6.

²⁰ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (U.S.C.A.R.) The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance (Naha: Headquarters Military Government, Ryukyus Command, 1950), 13.

The bases severely limited Okinawan farmers' ability to obtain land. In 1957, 41,000 acres of land were occupied by U.S. agencies. To this day, Okinawa is home to three-fifths of all U.S. military personnel in Japan. It houses 47,000 troops and family members on the various bases. Kadena and Futenma Air Bases are the largest. Throughout Okinawa, training facilities, military camps, and firing ranges take nearly twenty percent of the land.²¹

Politically, Okinawa was controlled by the United States military until May 1972, with local governments operating under U.S. military supervision since the first elections for mayors and municipal assemblies in early 1948.²² The Ryukyus were divided into four administrative areas (*gun*tos) in December 1949 and Chief Executives (governors) were elected beginning in 1950.

William Sebald and Nelson Spinks wrote that the "Cold War tensions in the Far East soon emphasized the strategic importance of Okinawa as a United States operation base and area for staging and training troops."²³

²¹ Andrew Pollack, The New York Times, "One Pleads Guilty to Okinawa Rape: Two Other Admit Role: A Sensational trial are a Sensitive, Difficult Time in American-Japanese Relations," November 1995.

²² U.S.C.A.R., The Ryukyus at a Glance, 7.

²³ William J. Sebald and Nelson C. Spinks, Japan: Prospects, Options, and Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968), 35.

Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas A. MacArthur, who presided over the American occupation of Japan, naturally saw the importance of Okinawa. Okinawa was strategically located 730 miles from Korea, 970 miles from Tokyo and 7460 miles from Hawaii, and bases there would facilitate American efforts to stop any threat from Asia. In late 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the Americans would retain bases in the Ryukyu Islands because these were believed to be essential to the defense of the United States' interests in the Far East.²⁴ Okinawa's wartime potential was demonstrated by the fact that, during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, bombers were based there.

From 1947 to 1951, the United States engaged in a long process of developing a peace settlement with Japan. In 1947 General Douglas MacArthur urged that the United States should quickly develop a treaty, arguing that if the United States continued to exercise sovereignty over Japan, Americans would be looked upon unfavorably.²⁵ MacArthur believed

²⁴ U.S.C.A.R., 13.

²⁵ According to Michael Schaller's book, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), by the time MacArthur was 65 (1945), he was beginning to look at his political ambitions. MacArthur believed that S.C.A.P. would serve as his "catapult" into his bid for the presidential race. When he stated early peace in 1947, MacArthur was looking ahead to the 1948 elections. Schaller stated that MacArthur announced his belief that Japan was ready amidst reports that Japan was economically unstable, and unable to be independent. (pg. 135-142) Another account can be read in Schaller's

that Japan should become the “Switzerland of the Pacific,” and that the United States should maintain military dominance in the region.²⁶

MacArthur believed that the United States should retain Okinawa. In a letter to the Secretary of State George C. Marshall, dated September 1, 1947, MacArthur stated that the “control over [the Ryukyus] must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier.”²⁷ If the United States failed to secure Okinawa, MacArthur noted that this failure “might prove militarily disastrous.”²⁸

The Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, directed by George F. Kennan, also believed that a peace treaty should return sovereignty to Japan, but Kennan recommended delay. In his Memoirs 1925-1950, Kennan stated it “was simply madness to think of abandoning Japan to her own devices.”²⁹ It seems that the reason why Kennan did not want an early peace settlement was that he foresaw a possible Communist takeover within Japan

other book, The American Occupation: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

²⁶ Sebald and Spinks, Japan, 35.

²⁷ “General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State,” September 1, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume VI, (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 512.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 376.

since the Occupation had not helped Japan rebuild itself to defend against Communism. Because Japan lacked the economic strength and adequate police and military force to resist Communist pressure in Japan, he felt Japan was not prepared for independence. Kennan laid blame on the Occupation, stating that “the cumbersome occupational establishment was ... parasitical.”³⁰ Kennan was not quite sure how long the U.S. military should retain bases in Japan. In regards to Okinawa Kennan stated, “we should make up our minds that we were in Okinawa for a long time to come.”³¹

The peace treaty was being “negotiated in a period of turbulence in the international arena, with the world political scene shifting from a multiple balance of power system to a bipolar division.”³² The civil strife between the Nationalists and Communists in China came ended in 1949 with the Communists, under Mao Tse-tung, as victors. The shock over the Communist victory in China was compounded by fears created by the Soviets testing their

³⁰ Ibid., 387.

³¹ Ibid., 392. Kennan had reported steps that the U.S. should take to rebuild Japan was to be the last issue to deal with. However, the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson, ignored Kennan’s suggestions about peace with Japan and the U.S. bases problems. Kennan’s report can be found in the Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. VI., 691-706. (For the rest of the thesis, I will refer to the Foreign Relations series as FRUS.)

³² Frederick Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), ix-x.

own atomic bomb that same year. The Berlin Crisis led to further polarization in Europe as well as the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Frederick S. Dunn noted, "The Cold War and the fall of China to the Communists were the events which finally dominated the preparation of a peace treaty for Japan."³³ In the context of the Cold War, Japan would have a role in American global security arrangements as a bulwark between the United States and Asian Communism. This led to the U.S. decision to leave China out of the peace process and take "trusteeship" over Okinawa, under U.N. approval.³⁴

With the ever-increasing pressure of the Cold War, the instability on the nearby Korean Peninsula, the "loss" of China and tensions in Europe, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the State Department believed that it was now important to turn former enemy Japan into an ally. This would best be accomplished through a peace treaty. The State Department believed it had four major groups to contend with in regards to the peace negotiation process: the Communists, the Pentagon, the Allies, and the former enemy. Although Acheson does not mention it, Congress was the fifth major obstacle. One would think that the Communists would be the major group to contend

³³ Ibid., 53.

³⁴ Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-United States Relations (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1970), 18.

with. That was not the case. In fact, the Communists proved to be the least of the problems because in the end they were simply ignored. The major obstacle to the State Department's early peace treaty was the Pentagon.³⁵

The military held fast to its position that a peace treaty was premature. A "secure status" was not viable due to the uncertainties in Asia, (i.e. Communist victory in China). Any early peace treaty would increase U.S. security risks. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the State Department moved quickly to finalize a permanent peace with Japan. The Defense Department wanted to halt peace negotiations until a favorable resolution of the military situation in Korea.³⁶ Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned over Communist opposition to continued retention of U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa.³⁷

It was not until September 1950 that the Defense Department finally agreed to the peace negotiations. Part of the turnabout was due to the replacement of Louis Johnson as Secretary of Defense by General George C. Marshall. The fear of a Soviet-Japanese treaty and General MacArthur's

³⁵ Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the States Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), 428.

³⁶ Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, 45.

³⁷ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 430-435.

memorandum urging a peace treaty caused the Defense Department to reconsider its position. The guarantee of military bases in Okinawa and Japan, and Truman's support for the State Department's position, further influenced the Defense Department to agree to a peace settlement.³⁸

President Harry S. Truman was in a political bind, however. With many Americans believing he had "lost China," the "Red Scare" escalating, and the State Department under attack by Senator Joseph McCarthy, bipartisan support for a peace treaty with Japan was essential because the Republicans dominated the Senate. According to Ronald Pruessen, the "Republicans were preparing a 'veritable witches brew' for public consumption, gearing up for a period of 'partisan in-fighting as bloody as any in, history.'"³⁹ Needing help from the Republicans, Truman and Secretary of State Acheson turned to John Foster Dulles.

The son of a Presbyterian minister, John Foster Dulles went into law but had always taken an interest in foreign relations; influenced by the example of his grandfather, John Watson Foster, Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State. Dulles also was the nephew of Secretary of State Robert

³⁸ Ibid., 432-5.

³⁹ Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 434. It is worth noting that Acheson received a letter from Arthur Vandenberg stating that Dulles's help was necessary for bipartisanship to stand any chance to survive (436).

Lansing, President Wilson's second Secretary of State. He accompanied his grandfather to the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference. A partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, he dealt with international economics and law and traveled widely.⁴⁰ As a member of the Republican Party, Dulles was the presumed choice as Secretary of State of presidential candidate Thomas Dewey in 1948. Dewey lost, however, and by 1949, Dulles was struggling to stay in the limelight. Appointed to fill out a New York Senate term, he lost the Senatorial seat to Herbert H. Lehman and was given secondary appointments with the American delegation to the United Nations.

The Truman administration appointed Dulles both because of his diplomatic experience and his prominence in the Republican Party. Dulles was friendly with the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, and it was believed that the Senate would be more willing to ratify a treaty if a Republican negotiated the terms.⁴¹ John Welfield, in An Empire in Eclipse, states that Dulles was appointed amidst conflicts within the State Department as well as increasing disagreements

⁴⁰ Ibid., 10. Dulles's grandfather also held ministerial appointments in Spain and Russia. At the time of the 1907 Conference, John W. Foster was acting as the Chinese representative.

⁴¹ Ibid., 432-439.

between State and the Pentagon.⁴² Secretary of State Dean Acheson confirms that Dulles was chosen to get the treaty ratified by the Senate, as Dulles had a “good standing with both the Dewey and Taft wings of the Republican Party.”⁴³ Dulles was appointed Foreign Policy Advisor to Acheson on April 6, 1950. His role was to negotiate the peace treaty with Japan and the Allied nations.

One of the problems that Dulles faced was keeping the Allied countries in a peace-making coalition, a difficult task due to the large number of nations involved, as well as their divergent opinions regarding punishment of Japan. For example, France, the Philippines and Australia wanted hefty reparations from Japan, disagreeing with the United States’ non-punitive peace. Great Britain urged limited trading between Southeast Asian and Japan, so that Great Britain would have less competition. Most importantly, many of the Allies feared a resurgent Japan.⁴⁴

⁴² John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988), 47.

⁴³ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 432.

⁴⁴ Yoshida Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis, translated by Yoshida Kenichi (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1962), 250-252.

Another problem that could have halted peace negotiations was the issue of which Chinese government should participate. The British government had already recognized the Communist regime as China's government. Britain's stake in Hong Kong and markets in Shanghai depended on such recognition.⁴⁵ However, the United States, especially the Republican Congress, would only negotiate with the Nationalists and Chiang Kai-shek.

How were Dulles and the State Department going to solve these problems? According to Ronald Pruessen, the toughness and the persuasiveness of the United States vanquished any opposition from the Allies. Pruessen writes, "Dulles and others in Washington, found that a one-on-one strategy would make it easier to deal with ostensibly friendly Allies: Something of a 'divide and conquer' concept." Only the American agenda was negotiated with the Allies.⁴⁶

In allaying the fears of Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines regarding a resurgent Japan, the United States entered a trilateral security treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and a bilateral security treaty with the Philippines. In regards to the two Chinas problem, a compromise was

⁴⁵ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 540.

⁴⁶ Pruessen, John Foster Dulles, 462-463.

struck with Great Britain. The solution was to invite neither Chinese government to the peace negotiations.⁴⁷

The next and last major actor that Dulles and the State Department had to face was Japan. Throughout the peace negotiations Japan had a pro-American Prime Minister in Yoshida Shigeru. Japan had feared severe punishment by the Allies, and the conservative Yoshida knew that America was the only country that could intercede on Japan's behalf. According to Welfield, "Yoshida had decided in October 1948 that Japan's best interests might be served with a temporary alliance with the United States, involving the stationing of U.S. forces in Okinawa and the Bonins."⁴⁸ Two and a half years later, in May 1950, the Yoshida offer, as it was known, stated Japan's desire for a peace treaty and acknowledged the importance of U.S. forces remaining in Japan.⁴⁹ To help with the negotiations, Japan's Foreign Ministry and its Treaty Bureau prepared volumes of facts and suggestions regarding Japan's policies, economic stance, population and war damages, and outlined steps for peace with Japan. Still, Yoshida seemed unpredictable

⁴⁷ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 540.

⁴⁸ John Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 46.

⁴⁹ J.W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 375.

to the Americans, especially Dulles, who visited Japan twice to discuss peace.⁵⁰

Dulles's first trip in June 1950 was to get a feel for the negotiations and also to begin the talks about a peace document satisfying to both parties. However, Yoshida and his officials were not ready for the American onslaught. According to Yoshida's memoirs, "Mr. Dulles sounded us on the possibility of Japan's agreeing to a measure of rearmament."⁵¹ According to John Allison, then Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Dulles believed that, without Japanese rearmament, the Senate would not approve a defense commitment, and "military dependence would obstruct political independence" of Japan.⁵² However, Yoshida's tactics with Dulles were based upon his unwillingness to change his stance on certain issues. Yoshida would delay his responses to the Pentagon's demands for Japan to defend itself rather than acknowledge his agreement to allow the United States to have bases in Japan.⁵³ At this first meeting, Yoshida responded ambiguously and

⁵⁰ Michael M. Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 43-51.

⁵¹ Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 249.

⁵² Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 41.

⁵³ Roger Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 54.

non-committedly, which infuriated Dulles. The visit was cut short due to the outbreak of the Korean War.

Dulles returned to Japan a second time in January 1951. Prior to his arrival, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs Allison and Minister to Japan William J. Sebald gave Yoshida a memorandum on the Seven Principles of Peace and a 13-point agenda that Dulles expected Yoshida to accept. During the talks, Dulles kept directing the conversation to Japan's rearmament, stating that in order for Japan to be independent, the Japanese must also rearm as a "moral obligation to assist the free world."⁵⁴ Yoshida argued, in return, that rearmament would impede economic recovery and stimulate a pro-war Japan. Not only did Yoshida stress the importance of economic recovery, but the completion of the democratization of Japan.

During Dulles's second trip to Japan, discussion of a security pact ensued. In his memoirs, Yoshida noted that because of worries of external threats, the Japanese asked for U.S. protection, but did not necessarily want continued stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan.⁵⁵ Dulles, however, made it clear that Japan had to find a way to rearm itself.⁵⁶ Yoshida believed that

⁵⁴ Yoshitsu, Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement, 51.

⁵⁵ Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 265.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 266.

Japan had to sacrifice something in order to have a peace treaty. He knew that Japan's biggest asset was its strategic location in Asia. Bases, Yoshida believed, would draw the U.S. into finalizing a peace treaty as well as protecting Japan. To Yoshida, the retention of bases by the U.S. would allow Japan to have its sovereignty back.⁵⁷

Yoshida stressed Japan's guaranteed cooperation with the United States. To prove this, Japan had formed a police force to protect it from any internal incidents. However, he did not want any conflict between Japan's Constitution, which barred Japan from the use of military force, and the security pact. Yoshida stressed to Dulles that he wanted the U.S. to accept responsibility for safeguarding Japan's security. Dulles argued that the U.S. could not because Japan lacked the power to defend itself. He also informed Yoshida that the Ryukyus and the Bonins would be under strategic trusteeship of the U.S.⁵⁸ Further talks led to the Security Treaty which did not specify U.S. responsibility to protect Japan from external threats. This deficiency in the treaty was corrected later in the 1960 revision.

Yoshida and the Treaty Bureau realized that they had overestimated American willingness to defend Japan and recognized that the bases in Japan

⁵⁷ J.W. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 374.

⁵⁸ Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 266.

were part of an American security policy that called for a rearmed Japan. General MacArthur had revised some of his thinking about Japan's rearmament, which led Yoshida to believe that MacArthur would no longer support Japan's proposals. In fact, according to Roger Buckley, it was General MacArthur who "ordered the establishment of the national Police Reserve (*Kokka Keisatsu Yobitai*) in July 1950.⁵⁹ At staff level talks, the Japanese representatives were not prepared for the American representatives' stubbornness. Most importantly, Yoshida misjudged Dulles. As a result, Yoshida promised Dulles that a 150,000-man Self Defense Force would be built.

Dulles and the State Department worked together with 48 nations, and especially with Japan, to achieve a non-punitive peace settlement. The peace treaty was seen as a declaration of American foreign policy in the Pacific and Asia aimed to keep peace and to stop the spread of communism. The Peace Treaty, however, did have its dissenters. The Soviet Union and Communist China both opposed United States' occupation policies and the treaty. Nevertheless, a peace settlement had been made. In Frederick S. Dunn's view, in a "sharply divided world the negotiators achieved a high degree of

⁵⁹ Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990, 55.

unity in restoring Japan to a represented place in the international system and keeping her aligned with the Western powers.”⁶⁰

Japan and the Allied nations signed the Peace Treaty in San Francisco on September 8, 1951. According to Acheson, it was a good peace treaty that hardly anyone liked.⁶¹ There was reluctant support for the treaty from Australia, extreme objections from the Soviet Union, and regret the lack of participation in the negotiations by the French. Although Acheson does not specifically state why the Allies did accept the treaty, they did so because they were cajoled and pressured to do so by the U.S.

The Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan contained the most significant article regarding Okinawa was in chapter two, titled "Territory."

Article Three States:

Japan will concur any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have

⁶⁰ Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, xviii.

⁶¹ Acheson, Present at the Creation, 541.

the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.⁶²

This gave the United States the right to govern the islands.

The Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty was signed almost six hours after the Peace treaty was signed, at a private meeting between Japan and the United States. According to Yoshida, Secretary of State Acheson stated that the Security Treaty was “the first step towards security in the Pacific.”⁶³

The Security Treaty only reinforced what Article III of the Peace Treaty allowed the United States. The Preamble of the Security Treaty stated that Japan desired “a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the treaty of peace between the United States of America and Japan.”⁶⁴ This was a “request” by the Japanese government to the United States for a security treaty along with the Peace Treaty. Article III is the most significant article in the Security Treaty, as it established the

⁶² “Multilateral-Treaty of Peace with Japan-September 8, 1951,” in Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, Volume III, Part 3 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), 3172-3.

⁶³ Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 263.

⁶⁴ Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, 3331.

context for continued maintenance of American forces on Japan's territory: "The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments."⁶⁵ "In place of requiring Japan, to allow American troops to remain indefinitely in Japanese territory," Frederick Dunn notes, "the proposed treaty provision was put into the form of a request by Japan for American military aid and acceptance by the U.S."⁶⁶

Article III of the Security Treaty facilitated the "containment" of Communism in Asia. It stated that the United States had authority, under U.N. trusteeship, to retain and maintain bases in Japan. Since the article "allowed" the U.S. to maintain bases in Japan and Okinawa, the U.S. forces hoped to stop any Communist threat from Asia.

Local newspaper editorials made Okinawans aware that Okinawa was a low priority for the Japanese during the peace process. According to Professor Akio Watanabe in The Okinawa Problem, the newspapers warned that the U.S. was not going to give up Okinawa, and that Japan's claim to Okinawa was not a serious interest. In "Okinawan opinion, lay deep-rooted

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan, 106.

discontent with the Japanese government's forgetfulness of the fate of Okinawa," he notes. The Japanese had sacrificed Okinawa once during World War II, and now had done so a second time during the peace process.⁶⁷

During the peace negotiations, the Japanese could not voice opposition to the use of Okinawa by the United States. "The Japanese government ha[d] been reluctant to press the matter of the return of Okinawa because of its [Japan's] special relationship with the United States under the security treaty."⁶⁸ According to former Prime Minister Yoshida, the only concerns that he and his Cabinet had over Okinawa were "that the inhabitants of Okinawa [would] continue to be treated as Japanese subjects and economic and other relations be maintained as before."⁶⁹ What Japan wanted in regards to economic and other relations with Okinawa was not gained. Control over Okinawa was entirely by the U.S. military.⁷⁰

Once the Peace Treaty was signed and ratified, nominal sovereignty was returned to Japan, but Article III of the Peace Treaty stated that the United States would be trustee over certain Japanese territories. The

⁶⁷ Akio Watanabe, The Okinawa Problem, 12-15.

⁶⁸ Sebald and Spinks, Japan, 35.

⁶⁹ Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 253.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 262.

Ryukyus, held by the United States under U.N. trusteeship, hosted U.S. bases from which the Americans could protect Japan and police the Pacific. This could be seen as American extraterritoriality within Japan, as United States soldiers and citizens had special privileges.

During the American occupation of the Ryukyus, Okinawa became increasingly culturally independent from Japan. Music, traditional dance, and art began to flourish again. Festivals were celebrated and freedom of religion was exercised. Yet American culture became a heavy influence upon the younger generations of Okinawans.

From the Okinawan perspective, the military bases were both alluring and threatening. Dance parties were held on the bases, and many young women would go and dance with single GIs.⁷¹ However, many crimes were committed by U.S. servicemen. Since 1972, 4,700 crimes have been charged against the U.S. military, ranging from dumping toxic wastes to assaults and murder.⁷² Numerous crimes prior to 1972 were never reported. According to a former Okinawan police officer, Arakaki Tokuyoshi, before 1963 any crimes that were committed by the military would be referred to the military police

⁷¹ Atsuko Smart, interviewed by author, San Leandro, California, February, 1997.

⁷² Sheryl WuDunn, "More Okinawans Dislike U.S. Military Presence," The New York Times, November 4, 1995.

for prosecution. Okinawan police were not able to arrest U.S. citizens and Okinawan courts lacked jurisdiction to try U.S. citizens.⁷³

The Mutual Security Treaty of 1952, signed by Japan and the United States, was made at a time when threats from Russia and China were very real in the wake of the Chinese Communists' defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet Union's successful atomic bomb test, and the outbreak of the Korean War. Because of the Security Treaty, especially Article III, the United States got what it wanted: military bases on Okinawa. The treaty also helped the Japanese because they did not have to worry about outside invasions because of the presence of the U.S. military.

Throughout the rest of the 1950s Japan concentrated upon rebuilding itself economically, and the United States concentrated on saving the world from Communism. However, from mid-1957 to 1959, relations between Japan and the United States again reached a critical point. Within Japan, the issue of revision of the Mutual Cooperation Security Treaty led to heated debates and the emergence of factions within its government. The Security Treaty became an obstacle to Japan's progress as a rising world leader.

⁷³ Arakaki Tokuyoshi, interview by author, Hayward, California, February 25, 1997.

Map drawn by Author.
Not to scale

FIG 1 1

Chapter Two

The Rising Tide

With the Peace and Security treaties signed, the United States and Japan continued with day-to-day issues, not as enemies but as allies. In 1954 an armistice ended the Korean War, but no permanent peace agreement could be reached. That same year, Russia's leader, Joseph Stalin, died and eventually Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the new man with whom to contend. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified the Cold War. The Superpowers teetered like tightrope walkers on the verge of nuclear holocaust.

In the United States, General Dwight David Eisenhower was elected U.S. President in November 1952. John Foster Dulles, who negotiated the treaties with Japan was Eisenhower's obvious choice for Secretary of State. In his own account, Eisenhower stated that:

The selection of Mr. Dulles was an obvious one; the grandson of one Secretary of State and the nephew of another, he had carried on a lifelong study of American diplomacy... Before his appointment he and I had held a number of conversations the international outlook and found ourselves in substantial agreement in our conclusions. He was a vigorous Republican who had represented bipartisanship in earlier years, a man of strong opinions and unimpeachable character.¹

¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1963), 86.

The Eisenhower administration's foreign policy was dictated by events of the Cold War and a desire to control expenditures. "The New Look" involved a policy of brinkmanship, retaliation, and the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrence. It was "maximum possible deterrence of communism at the minimum possible costs."² Eisenhower and Dulles maintained that the United States' role in the world was to keep peace and stop communist aggression. In Asia, the Eisenhower administration would not allow another "loss of China." To keep the peace and make sure Communism did not spread beyond China and North Korea, a strong United States military presence was essential. The United States was able to maintain its military in Japan, especially on Okinawa.

In Japan, the treaties signified the closing of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. Japan concentrated on rebuilding its economy, which experienced phenomenal growth. From 1952 to 1958, the gross national product grew at an average rate of seven percent per year.³ Exports to Southeast Asia amounting to 480 million dollars worth of goods made up 32

² John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 164.

³ George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34.

percent of Japan's total exports in 1954,⁴ but growth was mainly due to the increase of trade with the United States. During the Korean War, Japan supplied the U.S. military with ammunition and other military supplies. Professor Walter LaFeber, in The Clash, notes that Japan, "A once war-devastated economy that had survived on aid and narrow markets suddenly became infused with capital."⁵ It was also to Japan's advantage not to have a large military while enjoying the protection afforded by the U.S. bases in Japan.

The relationship between Japan and the United States was, at its best, friendly. Both nations believed that peace and world order was a necessity, and that trade was important for good relations. However, in the view of British scholar Roger Buckley, "for most of the 1950s the United States took Japan for granted."⁶ Further, the constant push by Washington, especially by Dulles, for Japan to rearm was a point of frustration. To ease the tensions between the U.S. and Japan, Dulles announced in Tokyo, on

⁴ "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington," August 31, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXIII (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 114. (For the rest of the chapter, I will refer to the Foreign Relations as FRUS).

⁵ Walter LaFeber, The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 293.

⁶ Roger Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 69.

August 8, 1953, that the Amami-Oshima islands would be returned to Japan.⁷ On December 24, 1953, Japan received its Christmas gift from the United States: the return of these islands. However, for security reasons according to Dulles, Okinawa and the Bonins were kept under U.S. trusteeship.⁸ In a recent study that was published in Okinawa, military command historian Gordon Warner wrote that, on his departure from Okinawa after a fact-finding mission in November 1953, Vice-President Richard Nixon stated that "The United States will control Okinawa so long as the communist threat exists."⁹ This did not please many Okinawans, especially those who wanted the island returned to Japan. As early as 1950, the Ryukyuan Society launched "The Struggle for the Return of the Ryukyu Islands to the Motherland," giving voice to the desire for reversion.¹⁰ Although initially not a popular movement, the Ryukyuan Society would grow in the later half of the 1950s and continue to do so throughout the 1960s.

⁷ Gordon Warner, The Okinawa Reversion Story: Peace-War-Occupation-Reversion, 1945-1972 (Urasoe City, Okinawa: Shoseido Company, Ltd., 1995), 93.

⁸ "U.S. Returns Group of Isles to Japan; Will Hold Okinawa," The New York Times, December 24, 1953.

⁹ Warner, The Okinawa Reversion Story, 94.

¹⁰ Ibid., 73. The Ryukyuan Society would undergo one or two name changes throughout the 1950s and the 1960s.

In 1954, under Prime Minister Yoshida, the Japanese Parliament, the Diet, passed two laws dealing with Japan's Self-Defense Forces. The establishment of the Defense Agency and a Self-Defense Force Law was the result of Japan's desire to have closer relations with the U.S. However, the relationship was complicated when in March 1954, the United States tested a hydrogen bomb near Bikini Island. A Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, was in close proximity to the testing site. The fishermen were poisoned by and some died from the radiation from the new weapon. Japan protested to the United States over the test, as well as American storage of nuclear weapons in Japan. "The Lucky Dragon crisis began in earnest a twin campaign against nuclear weapons (usually American ones) and the existing US-Japan Security Treaty," Buckley notes.¹¹ A two million dollar indemnity was accepted by the Japanese; however, the debates over this issue led to the fall of Yoshida.¹² He lost his office to Hatoyama Ichiro and the new Democratic Party founded by Kishi Nobusuke. On December 9, 1954, Hatoyama was chosen as the new Prime Minister of Japan.

Hatoyama immediately diverged from Yoshida's policies. His primary goals were to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and begin trade with

¹¹ Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990, 59.

¹² LeFeber, The Clash, 311.

China, which was seen as a potential “goldmine” market for Japanese products. Hatoyama played down the Japanese-U.S. relationship and tried a more independent approach by having a more flexible foreign policy.¹³ An example of Japan’s new approach was in August 1955. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and Kishi went to Washington discuss revision of the Security Treaty of 1951. Shigemitsu complained about the one-sided nature of the treaty. Dulles countered by saying that the treaty was unfair to the United States because Japan was not obligated to aid the U.S. in times of crisis.¹⁴ Dulles would only consider revision when Japan built up its forces and revised its constitution. This meeting caused an uproar in Japan and led the Hatoyama Cabinet to shift away from the U.S. and move closer to the Soviet Union.

In Washington, Dulles worried over Japan’s growing independence and the American reaction to Hatoyama became a serious concern. In the Department of State papers from the Foreign Relations of the United States an enclosed document to the National Security Council Report dated April 9,

¹³ George R. Packard III, Protest in Tokyo, 42.

¹⁴ John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study on the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988), 108. Also see Paul Bailey’s Postwar Japan: 1945 to Present (Cambridge, MA: Blackwells Publishers, Inc., 1996), 94, and Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 129.

1955, noted concerns over Japan and the USSR and China. The report instructs, "Take the position with the Japanese Government that the U.S. does not object to... diplomatic relations with the USSR, but does oppose... diplomatic relations with Communist China."¹⁵

Even though they had adopted policies that disturbed Washington, the Japanese did not want to alienate the U.S. The United States was a valuable trading partner and a source of economic aid. Although the Security Treaty issue remained unsolved, communications did improve. When Foreign Minister Shigemitsu returned from the August 1955 meeting, Kishi reported to Hatoyama that he believed that Japan's future domestic policies should be considered from an international point of view.¹⁶

From June 1955 to October 1956 Japan conducted talks with the Soviet Union. A fishing agreement was reached in May 1956. However, the Soviets did not want to discuss the Northern Islands and a peace treaty. In October 1956 Hatoyama went to Moscow to seek agreements on the Northern Islands as well as restoration of diplomatic relations. The existing state of

¹⁵ "National Security Council Report," April 9, 1955, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, 59. The report goes on to talk about other US-Japan matters and objectives, clearly stating that the US did not want Japan to be closely associated with any Communist area.

¹⁶ Dan Kurzman, Kishi and Japan: The Search for the Sun (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1960), 289.

war was concluded and diplomatic relations were established.¹⁷ However, a peace treaty was not negotiated and Habomai and Shikotan islands were kept under Soviet control. Threats from both the Soviets and the Americans stood in the way of a peace treaty. The Soviets had warned Japan of their disapproval of the American occupation of Okinawa, and would only conclude a peace treaty under certain conditions, while the United States threatened to keep Okinawa if the Japanese made a deal with the Soviets. To this day Russian possession of the islands north of Hokkaido is a constant and bitter issue between Japan and Russia.¹⁸

In the meantime, China and Japan had begun to trade and the Chinese made some effort to normalize relations with Japan. However, further development of a trading relationship was halted due to US pressure on Japan to trade with Taipei, and diplomatic ties did not materialize.¹⁹

Although Hatoyama was able to start diplomatic relations with Moscow, get fishing agreements, obtain the return of Japanese prisoners of war and insure Japan's entry into the United Nations, he was unable to solve the problems of the critical northern islands or obtain a peace treaty. After

¹⁷ Kurzman, Kishi and Japan, 294.

¹⁸ Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990, 63-65.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

Hatoyama returned from Moscow, he became ill and never recovered, which forced him to resign.

When Hatoyama stepped down, Ishibashi Tanzan was selected as the new prime minister. After two months, Ishibashi also resigned because of poor health. While Ishibashi was ill, Kishi, who was second to Ishibashi's party in the vote, served as acting prime minister. On February 26, 1957, the "young" Kishi (he was 60 years old) took office.

Kishi Nobusuke was born in November 1896 in Yamaguchi Prefecture to the well-known Choshu samurai clan of Sato. Kishi was educated in fine schools and graduated from Tokyo University. Kishi married his cousin, taking his wife's family name.²⁰ After graduation from Tokyo University, Kishi worked for the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, where his work ethic became well known to the top officials. From 1933 to 1937 Kishi served as the second highest official in the Commerce and Agriculture Ministry and was directly involved with Manchukuo. In 1937 he was transferred to Manchukuo and assigned as the Vice-Minister of the Industrial Department of Manchukuo, where General Tojo Hideki was in charge. In 1939 Kishi was

²⁰ Kishi was the name of his father's family. When Nobusuke's father married his mother, the father took on the Sato name. When it was time for Nobusuke to marry, his uncle arranged for him to marry his cousin and retake the Kishi name. On more about Kishi's family background, as well as a full biography, please see Kurzman's Kishi and Japan the Search for the Sun, chapter one.

transferred back to Tokyo where he became Vice-Minister of Commerce and Industry. On October 18, 1941, Tojo became Prime Minister and Kishi was offered the Minister of Commerce and Industry portfolio. On December 1, 1941, Kishi was one of the signatories to the Resolution of War. Kishi felt that World War II was a fair and just war against Western power in Asia.²¹ In 1944, with the war going badly for Japan, Kishi played a crucial role in toppling Tojo. On July 19, 1944, at a special Cabinet meeting, Kishi stood up and stated that the Cabinet needed to take responsibility for the war. This forced an *enbloc* resignation of the Cabinet and forced Tojo to step down. When the war ended, Kishi was tried as a war criminal and was sent to Sugamo Prison for three years. On December 24, 1948, he was released.

Kishi could not keep away from politics long. When he was depurged in April 1952, he joined the Liberal Party, of which his younger brother Sato Eisaku was a member. Immediately Kishi found a position of importance within the party. He was sent to Germany to study Germany's reconstruction. But while in Germany, he heard that the Liberal Party had split up and he went back to Japan. Then on November 24, 1953, with Hatoyama, Kishi formed the Democratic Party. On November 15, 1955, Kishi combined the Liberal and Democratic parties as the new Liberal Democratic Party. When

²¹ Kurzman, Kishi and Japan, 174.

Kishi lost his bid for prime minister to Ishibashi, he became foreign minister. As already noted, Ishibashi resigned and Kishi took office on February 27, 1957.

At this time, Japan's economy was steadily rising. His first diplomatic mission as prime minister took Kishi to Washington in June 1957 to discuss the Security Treaty. His second trip was a good will tour to Southeast Asia in November 1957 to promote trade, but also to apologize for Japan's mistakes during World War II.

Kishi went to Washington to discuss several issues, the most important of which were the Security Treaty and the possible reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins. Kishi's primary goal was to seek a revision of the Security Treaty, as some Japanese had begun to protest against the existing pact. A major point of Japanese discontent with the Security Treaty was the Japanese's sensitivity to its one-sided nature. When Japan signed the Security Treaty in 1951 the treaty reflected the imbalance of power between Japan and the United States.²²

American forces were empowered to intervene in Japanese internal affairs, but they were not obligated to defend Japan from outside

²² Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 129-135.

attacks/invasions. Second, the Security Treaty contained no time limit for revision. There were no provisions requiring consultation with Japan concerning U.S. military actions. Japan had no say about the stationing of nuclear weapons and the United States had complete freedom of use of bases in Japan.

There were several other points where the Japanese felt that the Security Treaty caused or would invite problems. First, the Japanese were protesting over the use of the bases within Japan, not necessarily including Okinawa. Second, many Japanese believed that the Security Treaty forced Japan's cooperation in American military tactics in Asia. In other words, in case there was a war between the U.S. and another Asian nation, Japan would be "obligated" to side with the Americans. Third, many Japanese feared threats from other Asian countries, especially China, due to the Security Treaty. Fourth, there was strong opposition to the build-up of the Self-Defense Forces. Some claimed that the SDF was a military force and therefore was illegal under Article Nine of the Constitution.

Another important bilateral issue related to problems with American soldiers in mainland Japan, was the case of Army Specialist 3rd Class William S. Girard. On January 20, 1957, Girard shot and killed an elderly Japanese woman who was collecting scrap metal after training exercises at a

firing facility. This case became an internal political issue as well as an international conflict between the United States and Japan.²³ In the United States members of Congress were upset with Eisenhower, who was pondering whether to let Girard be tried in Japan. Some members of Congress proposed a bill (the Bow Bill) which would have denied any national jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel. However, this bill was defeated. Girard's attorneys in the U.S. brought a motion of injunction against the government of the U.S. to keep Girard from being handed over to the Japanese courts. However, the courts allowed Girard to be tried in Japan under Japanese jurisdiction.²⁴ Girard, the first American soldier to be tried in Japanese courts, was given a three-year suspended sentence and immediately sent back to America.

In Japan many protested against the specific action of the soldier as well as against the military and the Security Treaty generally. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II, nephew of General MacArthur, warned Eisenhower that if the United States denied Japan the right to prosecute, the United States would alienate Japan and other free Asian states. The Girard case,

²³ Schaller, Altered States, 128.

²⁴ "Memorandum of a Conversation, President's Guest House," June 19, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, 368. This particular document is a record of a conversation between Prime Minister Kishi and Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, discussing the Girard case and the efforts of Girard's attorneys and their attempts in the Supreme Court.

Michael Schaller believes, “spurred Eisenhower to reexamine the security pact with Japan.”²⁵

Two months prior to Kishi’s visit to Washington, Parliamentarian Takaoka Daisuke visited Okinawa on the invitation of General Lyman Lemnitzer, the U.S. Commander of the Far East. Subsequently, Takaoka proposed to Kishi that the U.S. should turn over the civil administration of Okinawa to Japan, Okinawa should be allowed to fly the Japanese national flag, and all American troops in Okinawa should move to the north end of the island. A Time article titled “Japan: The Courteous Guests” stated that “[this] report... is expect[ed] to build up public opinion behind Premier Kishi in his forthcoming talks in Washington. Kishi will certainly want to talk about Okinawa.”²⁶

Two weeks prior to Kishi’s visit, Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10713 providing for the administration of the Ryukyus. The military governor of Okinawa would be titled high commissioner. The Defense Department would control the administration of the island, while the State Department

²⁵ Schaller, Altered States, 128.

²⁶ “Japan: The Courteous Guests,” Time (April 15, 1957): 43.

would be in charge of Okinawa's foreign relations.²⁷ This was a major concern for Kishi and the Japanese. Kishi acknowledged that Okinawa was an important U.S. base and that most Japanese accepted that, but indicated that he could not understand why the U.S. military had to hold political and administrative power in Okinawa.²⁸

When all was said and done, both the push for change in Okinawa and efforts to revise the Security Treaty failed. In their joint communiqué of June 21, 1957, Eisenhower and Kishi agreed that the Security Treaty would be discussed later. Although Kishi stressed Japan's strong desire for the return of Okinawa, Eisenhower emphasized that as long as threat and tensions existed in the Far East, the present status was necessary.²⁹ However, Japan received good news regarding the removal of U.S. troops from mainland Japan and 500 million dollars in aid.³⁰

While mainland Japanese had a variety of concerns connected with the Security Treaty, Okinawans targeted one issue: the bases. According to

²⁷ Department of State Bulletin, Volume 37, No. 941 (July 8, 1957), 52-58. Included on the pages are the Eisenhower-Kishi communiqué, Kishi's remarks to Congress, and the text of the Executive Order 10713.

²⁸ "Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington," June 19, 1957, FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XXIII, 372.

²⁹ Department of State Bulletin, 52.

³⁰ "Memorandum of a Conversation," June 21, 1957, FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XXIII, 411.

Professor Ishihara Masaie, of the Okinawa International University, Okinawans protested against the bases, not the Security Treaty nor America.³¹ When the Japanese government was trying to normalize relations with Russia and China in 1955-56, Okinawans were trying to establish some kind of understanding about U.S. rule over the island.

In May 1955, six Okinawan representatives went to Washington to appeal to Congress regarding the land problems with the military. Promises were made to the Okinawans that the issue would be looked into, so a fact-finding mission was sent to Okinawa under the leadership of Congressman Melvyn Price of Illinois. From October 23-26, 1955, Price and his committee visited different areas in Okinawa. Okinawan hopes for a sympathetic report were dashed in early June 1956 when the committee's report upheld the military procedures of land acquisition and one lump sum payment. By June 1956 many land-owning Okinawans were furious over land acquisitions by the U.S. military. As early as 1949 the State Department announced intentions to retain land for permanent U.S. military bases. From the signing of the Peace Treaty up to 1958 the military had acquired land by leasing. Owners were to be paid in one lump sum, but many owners did not agree to the

³¹ Ishihara Masaie, Professor of Ryukyu Studies, Okinawa International University, interview by author, 22 July, 1998, Ginowan City, Okinawa.

payments. Tensions grew each year. In 1953 a Land Acquisition Procedures committee was created and, according to local critics, “governed new appropriation [of lands] using troops and bulldozers to acquire one piece of land after another.”³²

Strong reaction in Okinawa and in Japan sparked unrest. In Japan, newspapers began to report the situation in Okinawa. This created new awareness among mainland Japanese that Japan’s “residual sovereignty” had little practical meaning.³³ As many as 300,00 people protested against the Price report and the American military in Naha and other Okinawan cities. On June 20, 1956, the Okinawan “island wide struggle” was created. This was a group of people, teachers and land-owners who organized rallies to protest against the military. The land acquisition issue helped Okinawans learn to speak out and attempt to gain one freedom at a time.

Both the State and Defense Departments tried to decrease tensions in Okinawa and Japan. In August 1956 Ambassador to Japan John Allison warned Washington not to give the impression that the military was going to

³² Editorial Committee, Government of Okinawa, Okinawa: The 50 Years of Postwar Era (Naha, Okinawa: Okinawa Government, 1995), 118.

³³ “Letter from Secretary of State of Defense (Wilson),” June 22, 1956, FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XXIII, 180.

be in Okinawa permanently or the U.S. would lose Japan as an ally.³⁴ By September 21, 1956, the State and Defense Departments had agreed that slow and minimal acquisition of land should be made. Although the lump sum payments were strongly endorsed, options would be available to landowners who would not accept the lump sums. Most importantly it was decided that Ryukyuan points of view should be studied prior to any further discussions between Okinawan landowners and the military.³⁵

According to Professor Masaaki Aniya, the "U.S. military rule in Okinawa exhibited the basic characteristics of priority for all things military and a disregard for human rights."³⁶ The commanding generals of the Far East served as military governors on Okinawa from 1948 to 1957. The Okinawan people did, however, have a "self-rule" government known as the Government of the Ryukyu Islands that was created by U.S.C.A.R. in April 1952.³⁷ One of the jobs of the military governor was to appoint the chief

³⁴ "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State," August 14, 1956, Ibid., 200-1.

³⁵ "Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State," September 21, 1956, Ibid., 232-234.

³⁶ Aniya Masaaki, "International Peace Symposium '96 in Okinawa" in Coming Out of War and Ethnic Violence (Ginowan City, Okinawa: Okinawa International University, 1996), 282.

³⁷ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, (U.S.C.A.R.), Ryukyus at a Glance April 1954, 7.

executive of the Government of the Ryukyus, but on the city and town level, Okinawans were able to vote for mayors and assemblymen.

This mixture of military rule and democracy created problems from late 1956. With the death of the pro-American Chief Executive Higa Shuhei, General Lemnitzer, Governor of the Ryukyus as well as the commanding general of the Far East, appointed the mayor of Naha City, Toma Jugo, as the new Chief Executive. Toma's appointment became effective on November 11, 1956.³⁸ More than a month later, the citizens of Naha elected the man that the Americans feared the most, Senaga Kamejiro, as Toma's replacement. A known Communist, Senaga had been arrested two years earlier for harboring a criminal.³⁹

Right away the military government sought to oust Senaga from office. According to a U.S. News and World Report article, "A Red Mayor in Key U.S. Base," the Americans could throw Senaga out; however, because of American pride in the success of *limited* self-government, they restrained themselves. The article further stated that "Senaga can be recalled, but only after he has served a year. The Okinawan National Assembly could approve a law banning his Okinawa People's Party from holding office,... If the Naha city

³⁸ Warner, The Okinawa Reversion Story, 101.

³⁹ Armando Sanchez, Okinawa: Past and Present (Los Angeles: E.M.S. Glenny, 1993), 29.

council votes 'no-confidence' when Senaga presents his budget,... the council will be dissolved and a new election held."⁴⁰ That was exactly what had happened. The conservative businessmen of Naha and the Americans did not support Senaga. Governor of the Ryukyus General Lemnitzer had cut off all financial support from Naha. The Bank of the Ryukyus froze Naha's city accounts.

Because of Naha's poor financial state, the city council voted "no-confidence," and new elections for the mayor office took place. However, when the new elections were held on August 4, 1957, Senaga was once again voted into office, and more Socialist Party members were elected to the assembly. The U.S. was criticized for the military's attempt to get rid of Senaga.⁴¹

On November 25, 1957, the High Commissioner, Major General James E. Moore, who came into office in August, took it upon himself, without notifying either the Defense or the State Departments, to oust Senaga. He froze the assets of the Bank of Ryukyu and halted any other economic aid to the City of Naha. Moore also involved himself in the political arena by decreeing changes in the Okinawa assembly by-laws, barring felons convicted

⁴⁰ "A Red Mayor in Key U.S. Base," U.S. News and World Report (February 22, 1957): 80-83.

⁴¹ "For U.S., A Boomerang," U.S. News and World Report (August 16, 1957): 76-77.

of any crime from public office and changing a requirement that two-thirds of the members be present for a quorum. Senaga's supporters were sufficiently numerous that they could block votes on measures they opposed by staging walk outs. Under Moore's provision, if a simple majority of assemblymen were present, a vote could be cast.⁴² Again Senaga was ousted and this time a new mayor, Kaneshi Saichi, was elected in January 1958.⁴³ The success of this second removal sparked days of criticism from the Japanese press stating that Senaga's ouster was "undemocratic and 'dictatorial' and was pointed out as an example of the lack of practice of democracy [in Okinawa] by the United States."⁴⁴

Why did the Okinawans vote for the Communist Senaga in the first place? One reason was Senaga's campaign staff, which transported people to the polls on the rainy election day, December 25, 1956. More importantly, Senaga voiced what other Okinawans believed: Okinawa should revert to

⁴² "Letter From Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague)," December 11, 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XXIII, 544-546. Information can also be found in "Okinawa: The General and the Mayor," Time (December 9, 1957):32-35.

⁴³ "On Okinawa, They Want Us Out," Newsweek (January 27, 1958): 38.

⁴⁴ "Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague), December 11, 1957" FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIII, 545.

Japan immediately.⁴⁵ Senaga not only campaigned to restore Okinawa to Japan but pledged to settle the Okinawa land claims against the U.S., break up the U.S. bases in Okinawa and ban nuclear weapons from Okinawa.⁴⁶ According to Professor Ishihara, "The U.S. revealed its intentions to establish nuclear weapons facilities, and to keep the base land in perpetuity."⁴⁷ By June 1956, Okinawans were ready to vote for candidates who were against the U.S. military.

Many Okinawans feared the U.S. military. Numerous incidents involving military equipment made life insecure for them. Unexploded bombs and hand grenades in the hills pose a threat even today. Underwater hazards also caused death and injury. For example, near Ie Shima Island, on April 17, 1958, forty people were diving for scrap metal from a sunken ship from World War II called the Canada Victory when munitions exploded, killing them all. Although the divers were violating the law, many Okinawans believed that the military was responsible for clean-ups and for the safety of the people.

⁴⁵ "A Red Mayor in Key U.S. Base," U.S. News and World Report, 80.

⁴⁶ "For U.S., A Boomerang," U.S. News and World Report, 77.

⁴⁷ Ishihara Masaie, "International Peace Symposium '96 in Okinawa," in Coming Out of War and Ethnic Violence (Ginowan City, Okinawa: Okinawa International University, 1996), 163.

Okinawans also had problems with soldiers. Women in particular had to guard against violence. According to Professor Johan Galtung, at his keynote address at the International Peace Studies Symposium 1996 in Okinawa, "the U.S. military violence against the civilian population [was] very well documented,"⁴⁸ with rape the most common violent crime and murder the second most common. Some Okinawans hoped that an increase in the number of night clubs and brothels would not only be profitable, but reduce the incidence of rape.⁴⁹ Even with a one-hundred percent increase in brothels since World War II, however, rapes still occurred. Fights often erupted involving drunken soldiers at nightclubs and bars, sometimes leading to murders.⁵⁰ Many incidents were not reported, but those that were frequently remained unsolved.⁵¹ If a serviceman were accused, he would not face a Japanese court and would not be tried in Okinawa.⁵²

⁴⁸ Johan Galtung, "Coming Out of War and Violence: Okinawa and Ulster," in Coming Out of War and Ethnic Violence (Ginowan City, Okinawa: Okinawa International University, 1996), 9.

⁴⁹ "On Okinawa, They Want Us Out," Newsweek (January 27, 1958): 38.

⁵⁰ Barton M. Briggs, "The Outraged Okinawans," Harper's Magazine (December 1958): 58-59.

⁵¹ Arakaki Tokuyoshi, interview by author, 25 February, 1997, Hayward, California.

⁵² *Ibid.*

The public also had to be aware of military vehicles. Pedestrians were sometimes hit or even run down by U.S. military jeeps. Atsuko Smart noted that a family member and later on a schoolmate were struck by military jeeps whose drivers did not stop. The relative survived, but the junior high school boy was killed. To her knowledge none of the servicemen involved in such incidents were either caught or tried in Okinawa.⁵³ Because of the carelessness of military personnel, many Okinawans felt endangered by those who were supposed to protect them.

Not only did 1956 bring to light land acquisition and military problems, the American administration of the Ryukyus was a sore point for Okinawa and Japan. For the Japanese, it was a question of their sovereignty over the islands. For the Okinawans it was the feeling of being under the control of an occupying power. One example of the U.S. administration's power that made Okinawans feel helpless was the conversion of B-yen, the military scrip currency, to the American dollar.⁵⁴

By 1957-58 the U.S. had plans to isolate Okinawa from Japan politically and economically. This was accomplished politically for the successful ouster of Mayor Senaga Kamejiro of Naha and the high

⁵³ Atsuko Smart, personal interview, February, 1997, San Leandro, California.

⁵⁴ Government of Okinawa, Okinawa, 174.

handedness of High Commissioner James Moore. Economically, the conversion of the currency to U.S. dollars would show the natives where the finances were coming from. Okinawans, however, felt powerless and subjected in using the currency of the occupation force.

Early discussions about conversion were discouraging. The State and Defense Departments felt it would benefit the economy of Okinawa, but would also increase "the reversionist sentiment in the Ryukyu Islands."⁵⁵ Even President Eisenhower, in his memorandum to Secretary of State Dulles in June 1958, did not initially approve of the conversion of the currency.⁵⁶ However, by August 1958, plans were drawn and decisions were made to convert. Prime Minister Kishi was aware of the U.S. plans and he understood how the conversion would take place and that it would be beneficial to Okinawa; however, he did not accept the plans. Kishi said that the Japanese people would protest against the U.S. and its administration of Okinawa.⁵⁷ Despite Kishi's warning, the United States executed the conversion of the B-

⁵⁵ "Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Roderick)," August 2, 1957, FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XXIII, 436.

⁵⁶ "Memorandum From President Eisenhower to Secretary of State Dulles," June 4, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XVIII, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), 31-33.

⁵⁷ "Memorandum From Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower," August 11, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 50-51.

yen to the American dollar on September 16, 1958. Things did not go smoothly. Inflation and high prices for goods were not acceptable to the public, and as Kishi warned, angry Okinawans and Japanese spoke out against the United States.

The period from 1952 to the end of 1958 was a time of growth and independence for the government of Japan. Economically and politically Japan was stable. It was also a time to test the waters where the United States was concerned. The Japanese knew that for true independence they had to break away, at least a little, from America and seek other diplomatic relations. In 1958 and the coming years, Japan would grow stronger and push America for equality. The Americans not only had to adjust to Japan's growth, but experienced outraged protests. No longer could the United States take advantage of Japan through the Peace and Security treaties. Either the U.S. would conduct business with Japan according to the status quo, and possibly lose close ties with Japan, or it had to treat Japan on more equal terms. In Okinawa, the period 1952 to 1958 was also a time of growth. Okinawans learned that they had a voice and they used it. It was a time to fight against the occupation forces where human rights were being ignored and where victory could be achieved. In the case of the land acquisition, in July 1958, the new High Commissioner, Donald P. Booth announced that

payments for the land would be on a yearly basis instead of in a lump sum.⁵⁸

This victory was a stepping stone for the Okinawans, and their voices only grew louder.

⁵⁸ Government of Okinawa, Okinawa, 119.

Chapter Three

The Tide that Turned into a Tsunami

As 1959 approached, Japan and the United States began the process of revising the 1951 Security Treaty. The American public felt that Japan was getting a “free ride” with the United States’ military presence in Japan, while Japan was not building up its own defense. The Japanese public viewed the American military in a different way, believing that their continuing dependence on America would not allow Japan to be fully independent and accepted as a world power. Many Japanese feared that the presence of the American military would lead Japan into unwanted conflicts.

A growing number of Japanese did not want any American military presence in Japan, nor did they want Japan to re-arm itself. These people believed that Japan needed to stay neutral and unarmed. This kind of philosophy led to protests and riots of May and June 1960. College students, labor workers and political parties protested against the United States and the Security Treaty, calling for the end of land base occupation by U.S. forces and termination of the unfair treaty. Many of the protestors believed that the Security Treaty had hampered Japan’s foreign relations, especially with the Soviets and the Chinese.

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke believed differently. He thought, based on his talks with President Eisenhower in 1957, that with the upcoming revision of the Security Treaty in 1960 Japan would finally be able to have a treaty on its terms, or at least have a treaty on a mutual basis. Only with revision would Japan have a more prominent role in world politics.

In Okinawa, however, protests were based on a particular matter, the American military bases of which Okinawans disapproved. As discussed in chapter two, Okinawans fought against military use of Okinawan soil. The movement for reversion back to the “motherland” (Japan) grew steadily, and by April 28, 1960, it had grown so strong that the U.S could no longer ignore it.

Two factors created the pressure for changes in the Security Treaty: resurgence of Japanese nationalism and discontent with the presence of U.S. troops and bases in Japan.¹ Professor Michael Schaller, in Altered States, notes that a National Security Council study stated that “unless Washington revised the security treaty, ‘basic U.S. interests with respect to Japan would

¹ George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 33. Packard’s book is an excellent source of information about the Security Treaty Crisis. In it he talks about the background actions within the Japanese Government, and what Prime Minister Kishi was doing. His later chapters describe in detail what was going on in May and June 1960 that sparked the major protests in Tokyo.

be endangered.”² As early as February 1958, plans were forming about the revision of the Security Treaty and the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. A telegram from U.S. Ambassador Douglas A. MacArthur II to Secretary of State Dulles and Assistant Secretary Robertson states, “I fully agree it is a matter of greatest urgency to reappraise our policies with respect to Japan and Ryukyus in order to bring about timely readjustments which are essential if our relations are to be put on durable and dependable basis.”³ MacArthur was concerned that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan was beginning to falter because of the imbalance of power between the two.

Two days before Christmas 1958 the Department of State compiled a memorandum to analyze current trends in Japan. A six-point note about relations between Japan and the U.S., based on estimates prepared by the CIA and military, summarized the main issues of the relationship: Japan’s economy, dependency on U.S. defensive strength, Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union and China, nuclear weapons on American bases in Japan, and working with Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Point three involved the

² Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 130.

³ “Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, February 12, 1958, 8 p.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XVIII (Washington, D.C.; United States Government Printing Office, 1991,) 4. (For the rest of the chapter, I will refer the Foreign Relations as FRUS).

negotiations for revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the future of base positions. If the treaty went through, the U.S. would be able to keep their bases for at least five years. If the treaty failed, the base situation would be threatened.⁴

To the Japanese, the presence of U.S. troops and the Security Treaty were one and the same because the Security Treaty allowed the troop presence that caused resentment. Many resented the differences in living standards between the Japanese and the U.S. military, the differences in wages between household workers and civilians on bases, and the transgressions of off-duty soldiers violating traffic laws as well as human rights. Other factors causing resentment were the acquisition of farmland for military use and the continued occupation of Okinawa.⁵ The Security Treaty, written during the Korean War, had reflected the imbalance of power between the U.S. and Japan, and many Japanese wanted change.

According to author Fred Greene, the central issue in the Japanese debate was whether the Security Treaty was valuable to Japan. Did the disadvantages of the Security Treaty outweigh the value? For the opposition,

⁴ "National Intelligence Estimate," Document 41, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 114-116.

⁵ Schaller, Altered States, 128-129.

the treaty served primarily U.S. interests, and in case of war the U.S. might drag Japan into it.⁶

From 1955 to 1960, the opposition groups grew in influence. Mostly backed by the Socialist Party in Japan, they tried to make the Japanese public aware of their misgivings about the Security Treaty and relations with the U.S. Sydney Gifford noted about the opposition's beliefs, "[that the] Security Treaty symbolized the interests of 'Wall Street capitalism' as well as its [Japan's] implication in the intrigues of 'Western Imperialism,' including the 'criminal' reliance on nuclear weapons."⁷ The Socialists, true to their nature, believed that American interests in Japan were money and land.

However, in March 1959, a new movement was organizing and making public its beliefs. The "People's Council for preventing Revision of the Security Treaty" was growing in numbers and in voice. This group had the support of thirteen others, including the Socialists, the Japanese Communist Party, the *Sohyo* (or labor unions) and the *Zengakuren* (or the college students union). This was the beginning of a progressive wave of opposition to the Security Treaty and Kishi. They formed to alert people to the "wrong doings"

⁶ Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations (Washington D.C.: The Rawlings Institute, 1975), 5.

⁷ Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers, 1890-1990 (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1994), 157.

of the Security Treaty. The central theme of this group was absolutely uncompromising opposition to the Security Treaty. The People's Council, as it was known, originally thought that the U.S. military bases were for Japan's protection, but after the Korean War and the conflict in the Taiwan Straits (Quemoy and Matsu, 1958), the council saw the bases as American outposts. As "hosts" of these outposts, Japan would be a participant, willing or not, in U.S. conflicts.⁸ The revised treaty was a threat to peace and democracy.⁹

According to Edwin Reischauer, the Leftist challenge to the Security Treaty would have been minor if not for a few factors. First, was the involvement of the press in Japan. The Japanese press took a leftist stance against the treaty and Kishi. Second, was the news of a U-2 plane being shot down over the Soviet Union. This event concerned the Japanese and intensified the debate over the treaty because the plane was thought to have taken off from a military base in Japan. If that was the case, the U-2 incident would draw Japan into a conflict in which it wanted no part. Third was the proposed visit of President Eisenhower to Japan. Wanting to ratify the treaty

⁸ David J. Lu, Japan A Documentary History, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 514.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 515.

before Eisenhower's visit, Kishi held a sudden surprise vote for ratification in May 1960.¹⁰

Throughout the first six months of 1959, the treaty revision issue was basically laid out in Article IV of the Security Treaty, which states:

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementations of this Treaty, and at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.¹¹

This article was the key to Japan's increasing involvement as well as Japan's biggest fears. However, to the U.S., the fact that consultation would take place was a minor issue compared to maintaining the bases. The U.S. needed the bases in Japan to keep Communist threats at bay. According to Schaller, Ambassador MacArthur urged Dulles to make changes for consultation so "that [the] American forces... continue to enjoy Japan's goodwill and access to its logistical facilities."¹² In April 1959, the Japanese government, with a strong Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) majority in the House, granted base

¹⁰ Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 280.

¹¹ See Appendix B.

¹² Schaller, Altered States, 139.

rights to the U.S., reflecting, according to Schaller, a “mutual desire to maintain international peace and security in the Far East.”¹³

For the Japanese, George Packard points out, “The major controversy involved the area to which the new mutual defense pact would apply.”¹⁴ The term “Far East” was an object of major contention within the Japanese government. No one could give a precise definition of what the Far East entailed. What was the Far East? Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro had given the Lower House an interim report; when questioned about the definition of Far East in article IV, he could not give a straight answer. Thus the opposition and the press denounced Kishi and Fujiyama’s evasiveness.¹⁵

By May 1959, Kishi and his Cabinet came up with nine points for negotiations for the revision of the Security Treaty.

1. Clarifying the relationship of the treaty to the UN’s Charter.
2. Clarifying the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Japan politically and economically.
3. Clarifying American obligation to defend Japan, while restricting Japan’s involvement.
4. Establishing the area of the treaty as territory of Japan.
5. U.S. forces to remain in Japan, but consultation before any U.S. military actions.
6. Eliminate “internal disturbance” clause.

¹³ Ibid., 140.

¹⁴ Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 71.

¹⁵ Ibid., 154-155.

7. Eliminate clause requiring U.S. prior consent for third parties to stay in or pass through Japan.
8. Consultations over the execution of the treaty.
9. A limit of ten years duration for the treaty, with a year's notice to abrogate.¹⁶

U.S.-Japanese negotiations began to take serious form from August 1959 through December of that year.

Anti-treaty sentiments surfaced in March 1959 under the leadership of the People's Council for preventing Revision of the Security Treaty. However, the People's Council already had practiced for what was to come.

According to Packard, the leftists had a dress rehearsal for May/June 1960 with protests against Kishi's Police bill in October-November 1958. The bill would have allowed the police more power in preventative actions, interrogations, search, and arrests. Many feared that the bill would lead to violations of human rights. The leftists used different tactics to block passage of the bill, including trying physically to block the entrance of the Diet building, as well as trying to remove the speaker of the House from the podium. The Police bill never made it to the floor. However, these new tactics by the leftists were a foretaste of what would happen within two years time.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ibid., 76-77.

¹⁷ Ibid., 103.

By the end of December 1959, the revised Security Treaty was ready to be signed by both the U.S. and Japan. Arrangements were made to have the treaty signed in Washington. The People's Council had other ideas.

Thoroughly opposed to the Security Treaty, the People's Council took different steps to stop the signing and later on the ratification of the treaty.

As stated earlier in this chapter, the Socialists began to develop tactics to stop the Security Treaty from forming. The first occurred during the fight over the Police Bill. A second episode took place on November 27, 1959, when the People's Council stormed the Diet building demanding an end to the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Although this tactic did not stop the government from continuing to revise the treaty, it foreshadowed things to come. However, the actions of this group were widely criticized by the Japanese public.¹⁸

The third move by the People's Council occurred when Kishi was preparing to go to Washington to sign the revised Security Treaty, an incident Packard calls "the First Haneda Incident." On January 15, 1960, members of the People's Council, mostly *Zengakuren*, marched on Haneda airport hoping to keep Kishi from leaving the country. Plans were to disrupt operations in the terminal building, and have students lie on the runway. However, the police stopped the rally within the terminal building and arrested some of the

student leaders in charge of planning the disruption at Haneda. The next morning, Kishi flew to the U.S. Students who were taking the train from the south, and had planned to lie on the runway to stop Kishi at Haneda, were too late.¹⁹

Prime Minister Kishi was well received in the United States. He was on the cover of Time magazine (January 25, 1960) and Newsweek called him the friendly salesman from Japan.²⁰ On January 19, 1960, Kishi and his aides met all day with President Eisenhower and his cabinet members and signed the revised Mutual Security Treaty. Many different issues, from Japan's domestic problems to economic issues between the two nations, were discussed at length.²¹

The new Security Treaty was basically the same as the 1951 version, with a few exceptions. The United States was now obliged to defend Japan, but Japan was not required to help the U.S. in any of its military endeavors in the Far East. The United States also had to consult with the Japanese

¹⁸ Robert Trumbull, "Leftist Outbreak Alarms Japanese," The New York Times, December 6, 1959.

¹⁹ Packard, 173-177.

²⁰ Ibid., 178-179.

²¹ "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, January 19, 1960," Document 133, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 260-261.

government whenever the U.S. needed to use military forces that involved bases in Japan. The document did eliminate two points of contention for Japan; first, the U.S. could no longer intervene in Japan's domestic problems, and second, Japan no longer had to get U.S. permission to let third parties into Japan. However, the U.S. maintained its number one priority, the bases. John Welfield, in Empire in Eclipse, states, "Certainly, the new treaty, like the old, was essentially a base lending agreement."²² After signing the new Security Treaty, Kishi came back to seek ratification.

Hints of real problems in Japan soon became apparent to the U.S. A telegram from Ambassador MacArthur to the State Department, dated February 8, 1960, reported a conversation with Prime Minister Kishi. First, Kishi pointed out that there would be possible boycotts by the Japanese Socialist Party, actions that could gain sympathy from the Japanese people. The second point regarded the anti-government protests in Japan. These problems, Kishi stated, might force him to dissolve the Diet and call for new elections. If Kishi had to do this, it would jeopardize ratification.²³ Schaller adds that the "State Department cautioned that any delay in ratification

²² John Welfield, Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System, (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988), 141.

²³ "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, February 8, 1960, " Document 149, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 285-286.

might prompt the Senate to postpone action until after the summer 1960 recess.”²⁴ In March, the State Department and MacArthur realized that anything Kishi did would weaken his position.²⁵

In Japan, Kishi tried to bide his time. Within the Diet, debates occurred constantly. The government was not ready for such a huge political challenge. A simple majority was needed in both houses to ratify the treaty. Since Kishi’s party was in the majority, he believed the treaty could pass through the Lower House easily. Such was not the case.²⁶

The Socialists, from the very beginning, began to delay any proceedings on the treaty. However, according to Packard, Kishi and Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama jeopardized ratification by being elusive in answering the Socialists questions about how the treaty came about, the definition of the term “Far East,” and limits on U.S. troops within Japan.²⁷ Kishi and Fujiyama’s non-responsiveness frustrated not only members of the Diet, but also the protestors outside.

²⁴ Schaller, Altered States, 145.

²⁵ “Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, March 27, 1960,” Document 151, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 288-289.

²⁶ Packard, 186-194.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 198-199.

The mass media made the lack of action apparent to the public.

Packard points out that the *Asahi Shimbun*, which at the beginning of treaty negotiations favored revision, became critical of Kishi for not clarifying points raised in the Diet.²⁸

The People's Council continued to try to stop the ratification of the treaty during the April debates in the Diet. This group tried different measures to prevent the Lower House from passing the treaty by the April 26 deadline. Action was necessary to allow time for the Upper House to act by May 26, when the Diet would end its regular session. On April 26, the group demonstrated outside the Diet and several thousand *Zengakuren* charged the main gates. Violence erupted between the police and the students, and many were hurt. Leaders of the group of *Zengakuren* were arrested. No further incidents occurred until early May.

On May 1, 1960, a U.S. U-2 spy plane from the U.S. base in Adana, Turkey, crashed deep within the Soviet Union. At first the United States claimed the plane was a weather research plane. However, when Nikita Khrushchev produced the pilot and the reconnaissance photos, the U.S. was forced to tell the truth. Many Japanese, both politicians and common citizens, now felt that they could not trust the U.S. The State Department

²⁸ Ibid., 214-215.

had reassured Kishi and the government of Japan that they would not use U-2 planes based in Japan for intelligence missions over non-Japanese territory without prior consultation.²⁹ Nevertheless, the U-2 incident, with the lie and then the admission by the U.S. government, was detrimental to Kishi and the passage of the Security Treaty.³⁰

Given the new mistrust of the U.S. government, Kishi and his supporters decided that a push was needed in order to ratify the treaty. It was declared, on May 15, that the Diet session was going to be extended. Kishi was facing the May 26 deadline, and the extension allowed him extra time to press for ratification. The LDP also declared that May 20 was the new date for the Lower House to vote and send the treaty to the Upper House.

On May 19 the Diet convened and the LDP proposed a 55-day extension of the regular Diet session. The Socialists immediately delayed matters. Speaker of the House Kiyose Ichiro was forced to call a recess, which lasted for almost four hours. When the session resumed at 4:30 p.m., the Socialist members left the building, stating that the meeting was improper.³¹ The day

²⁹ "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, May 9, 1960," Document 153, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 292.

³⁰ Schaller, Altered States, 149. Also the U-2 incident and its impact in Japan is mentioned in Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 229-233, and LaFeber, The Clash, 320.

³¹ Packard, 238.

continued in a chaotic manner. The Socialists staged a sit-in to stop the Diet session. The politicians engaged in pushing and scuffling. Police efforts to remove the sit-in protestors, as well as those who tried to remove Speaker Kiyose, made matters worse. Order was called for the treaty hearing after the removal of the Socialists. The treaty ratification was passed, but without the two socialist political parties present.³²

The tactics of Kishi and his followers were highly criticized. Kishi's "high-handedness" was thoroughly splashed on front pages of newspapers in Japan. However, despite all the negative press and constant protests by the Socialists, Kishi continued his plans for the passage of the treaty.³³

Since the Lower House had passed the treaty, the Upper House was now forced to decide the treaty's fate. In the Upper House of the Japanese parliament, if a bill is not decided within 30 days of introduction, the bill is automatically ratified; but Kishi chose not to wait. Kishi knew that Eisenhower was going to visit Japan. Ratification of the Security Treaty would be seen as a gesture of goodwill to the American president. After several negotiations by the LDP with Upper House members, it was decided

³² "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, May 20, 1960," Document 155, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 295-297.

³³ *Ibid.*, 242-251.

that a vote to ratify the treaty would take place on June 16. Socialists and the People's Council members, hearing of this new move, quickly formed to demonstrate against the vote. During this time, some members of Kishi's own political party joined the Socialists in calling for his resignation.³⁴

As all of this was occurring, concerns over Eisenhower's visit to Japan were growing in the U.S. Eisenhower had promised Kishi in January that he would visit Japan in the summer. As tensions mounted and protests and demonstrations intensified, Eisenhower and his aides reconsidered his trip.³⁵

To see how bad the situation was, Eisenhower's Press Secretary, James Haggerty went to Japan. On June 10, Haggerty was met by Ambassador MacArthur. As soon as the car carrying Haggerty, Thomas Stephens, and MacArthur left the airport, it was surrounded by thousands of student protestors. For about an hour, Haggerty, Stephens, and MacArthur were trapped, while the car was being pushed, stoned, and tires slashed. Miraculously, no one was injured during the incident.³⁶

On June 15, the *Zengakuren* members of the People's Council began to demonstrate to stop the Upper House from voting. The day began with the

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ "Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower, Washington, May 23, 1960," FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 301.

workers doing sit-ins at their places of work. The students then converged on the Diet. The protestors and police clashed and chaos spread throughout the city. When the smoke cleared, hundreds of police and students were injured, eighteen police trucks had been destroyed, 196 arrests were made, and one person was dead. Kamba Michiko from Tokyo University was crushed under the feet of her comrades when police pushed the students back to the gate of the Diet building.³⁷

On June 16, Kishi, after meeting with his advisors, stated in a news conference that it was not an appropriate time for Eisenhower's visit. Prior to the news conference, telegrams were sent to Eisenhower to notify him of the cancellation.³⁸ Eisenhower, who was already sailing from Manila, Philippines, sent an expression of regret about the unfortunate situation.³⁹

Protests continued from June 18-20. Some 300,000 students demonstrated outside the gates of the Diet building, while 12,000 police were ready for the students. All parties were waiting to see if the treaty would

³⁶ "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, June 10, 1960," FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 331-332.

³⁷ Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 296-297.

³⁸ "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, June 16, 1960," FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 363-364.

³⁹ Robert Trumbull, "Japan Cancels Eisenhower Trip to Forestall Any Mob Attacks; Washington Sees Prestige Hurt," The New York Times, June 17, 1960.

pass in the Diet. After midnight, on June 19, the treaty passed. The House of Councilors signed and ratified the Security Treaty on June 23, 1960.⁴⁰ That same morning, Kishi announced that he would resign as Prime Minister, stating that Japan now needed a new government and leader to help Japan out of the mess. In July, Kishi stepped down, and Ikeda Hayato became the new Prime Minister.

Kishi was disgraced. He could not handle the outpouring of protests and criticism. Although the treaty passed, it was a double-edged sword. The treaty made Kishi famous, for all the wrong reasons.

Many would say, and even Ambassador MacArthur was reported to have said, that the downfall of Kishi was due to the Communists from the Soviet Union and China helping the leftists. It was believed that the Communists financed their fight against the treaties. However, both Schaller and Welfield state that was not the case. The issue was less the treaty itself than the way in which the treaty was presented to the Diet. Schaller says that even former Ambassador MacArthur conceded that the Communists and Socialists had less to do with the crisis than other occurrences. According to the Ambassador, "Conservative infighting, random events like the U-2 shootdown, Kishi's lack of popularity and mismanagement of the treaty

⁴⁰ Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 303.

ratification process, rather than a Communist conspiracy, the ambassador admitted, had contributed to a crisis atmosphere.”⁴¹ The protestors did have some impact, although they still represented the minority of the Japanese population. The protests were mostly in the metropolitan area of Tokyo. Most ordinary Japanese citizens went about their normal activity.⁴² Also, if the leftists hoped to take away political control from the Liberal Democratic Party, they were sorely mistaken. In fact, in the November elections, the LDP received more power from the people; they gained ten more seats in the House of Representatives.⁴³

The issue of Okinawa reversion was down played during the first six months of 1960. Within Okinawa, groups of protestors came together and formed a coalition dealing specifically with returning to the Motherland, and getting rid of the bases in Okinawa. Labor unions and teacher unions formed the Reversion Council on April 28, 1960. The Council had a few basic demands, including the right of Okinawans to fly the Japanese flag, to choose their own Chief Executive, and to have representation in the Japanese Diet.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Schaller, Altered States, 160.

⁴² Welfield, Empire in Eclipse, 160-161.

⁴³ Ibid.

The first large-scale protest activity that the Council performed took place during Eisenhower's visit to Okinawa in early July. Despite Eisenhower's cancellation of his trip to mainland Japan, plans for a visit to Okinawa remained intact. In fact, government documents state that it was more essential for the President to visit Okinawa after the riots in Japan.⁴⁵ The council staged a large demonstration to petition for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. However, Eisenhower never saw the demonstration. During his visit, he met with Chief Executive Ota Seisaku. They talked briefly about economic concerns as well as immigration issues and grievances.⁴⁶ Eisenhower's stay was cut short by two hours and he was quickly flown to his next destination, Korea.

According to Professors Ishihara Masaie and Nakachi Tatsuo, the Reversion Council made their platform noticed. In April 1960 the Council was most effective in getting Okinawans to support their cause.⁴⁷ The

⁴⁴ Government of Okinawa, Okinawa: The 50 Years of the Postwar Era. (Naha, Okinawa: The Office of Editorial Committee, 1995), 177.

⁴⁵ "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan, Washington, June 12, 1960," FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 354.

⁴⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation, Okinawa, June 19, 1960," FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 371-374.

⁴⁷ Ishihara Masaie, Ph.D., Nakachi Tetsuo Ph.D., personal interview, July 1998, Ginowan City, Okinawa, Japan.

Reversion Council, *Fukkikyo*, had made reversion to Japan its number one priority and would continue to work to achieve its goal throughout the 1960s, a campaign which had its ups and downs.

Despite the Council's failure to make its complaints directly known to Eisenhower, it was nonetheless a starting point for an important movement for reversion in the coming years. The Reversion Council eventually would get Japan and U.S. to hear their grievances.

Chapter Four

Surveying the Damage

After the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, the United States finally determined that the sentiments of the Japanese people could no longer be ignored. The fact that the docile Japanese people were no longer docile became a matter of great concern to the United States. It now became apparent that the U.S. had to try to improve relations between the two countries.

Immediately after the crisis in July of that year, Ikeda Hayato replaced Kishi as prime minister and in the same month Kishi faced an assassination attempt. Months after the crisis, the well-known secretary-general of the Socialist Party Asanuma Inejiro, who publicly criticized Kishi and the LDP and encouraged the protests in May and June, was killed during a party meeting by a college student nationalist, in full view of television cameras.¹ The turbulent early sixties were quite different from the peaceful image of Japan we have today.

¹ Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 161.

Under the leadership of Ikeda, Japan began to concentrate on its economy. From his short time of being head of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), Ikeda pronounced a goal for Japan to double its income. Focusing on making money would certainly ease the ill feelings in Japan from the riots of early 1960. Ikeda's economic design worked. By 1964, Japan had risen to sixth place in the global market. Three years later, Japan surpassed France, Great Britain, and Germany.²

Ikeda also sought a new relationship with Communist China. According to Schaller, China's relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating fast, so China sought out Japan for trade.³ However, Walter LaFeber argues that in promoting a trade relationship, Japan "slowly ate away the ties between Japan and the United States."⁴

For the Americans, government interests slowly shifted from Japan to Vietnam. With escalating deployment of U.S. troops by John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the eyes of the world were focused on the U.S. and Vietnam. However, Japan also remained a focus throughout the conflict since

² Walter LaFeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 326.

³ Schaller, Altered States, 166.

⁴ LaFeber, The Clash, 326.

the U.S. was using bases in Japan. Japan would continually be on the minds of the president and the government.

President Kennedy appointed a professor of Japanese studies at Harvard, Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, as ambassador to. Kennedy was impressed with Reischauer's descriptions of Japanese and U.S. relations of 1960 as a "broken dialogue." Reischauer's ambassadorship was largely unopposed and he was approved for the job in 1961. Throughout his five-year stint as ambassador, Reischauer had difficult times easing tensions between Japanese intellectuals and American capitalists.⁵ Reischauer even faced heavy opposition to his attempts to discuss the Okinawa issue from High Commissioner Lt. General Paul Caraway. Caraway described Okinawa as "essential to America's future military position in the western Pacific."⁶ He saw diplomatic initiatives as meddling. Caraway also saw the reversion of Okinawa as a detriment to the entire American military position in the Far East.⁷

⁵ Professor Reischauer wrote about his experiences as Ambassador to Japan, as well as the rest of his life, in his autobiography, My Life Between Japan and America (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1981).

⁶ Schaller, Altered States, 171.

⁷ Ibid., 172.

Okinawa, still under the trusteeship of the United States, became a central base for the Americans to supply bombers and naval ships during the Vietnam conflict. Nuclear weapons were still being harbored, along with nuclear submarines that carried such weapons. Military dominance of society in Okinawa was apparent in every corner of the island.

The relationship between the United States and Japan continued to be on edge. Japanese prime ministers met with the American presidents asking for economic help, and the United States still received privileges of land use for bases. However, there were movements within the U.S. government to begin to deal with the "Okinawa problem."

Between February 1961 and November 1963, eight notes and documents exchanged between the State Department and the embassy in Japan show that the U.S. was concerned over its relationship with Japan. After the 1960 crisis, this focused mostly on the Ryukyus (Okinawa).⁸ Ikeda

⁸ Such documents are "Memorandum of Conversation," Washington, June 21, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), Vol. XXII, 698. This document discusses the subject of the Ryukyu Islands, from flying the Japanese national flag over government buildings, to the return of the civil administration from the U.S. to Japan. Another example document, "Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)," Washington, April 6, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), Vol. XXII, 738. This document discusses negotiations between Japan and the United States and the funding of the Ryukyus.

in his meetings with President Kennedy would bring up the issue of Okinawa and the return of the island chain to Japan.⁹

Reischauer stressed that the government should reconsider the issue of Okinawa, while Caraway was determined not to give back Okinawa. These were very conflicting views from men upon whom the president relied. In July 1961, Kennedy sent Carl Kaysen as head of a task force on the Ryukyus. The next year Kaysen reported that the military needed to change its attitude. He sided with the State Department which “urged greater home rule for Okinawans, elections of a local chief executive, transfer of authority from American military to civilian administrators, and cooperation with Tokyo in improving the local economy.”¹⁰ Caraway, however, remained an obstacle. Not until the summer of 1964 were Reischauer and the Japanese government able to work on the Okinawa issue. After General Albert Watson II replaced Caraway as High Commissioner that summer, Reischauer and the State Department could negotiate with greater ease.

In November 1964, Japan’s new prime minister, Sato Eisaku. Sato, the younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke, continued the status quo relationship

⁹ Schaller, Altered States, 171.

¹⁰ Schaller, 172.

with the United States, with some attempts to resolve the issue of Okinawa. In Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations, Nicholas Sarantakes describes Sato's first attempt to talk about Okinawa with President Lyndon Johnson. After two months in office, Sato traveled to Washington to talk to Johnson. Sato pointed out that the U.S. had not moved forward since Kennedy's statement in 1962 about transferring administration of the island. Secretary of State Dean Rusk answered Sato with diplomatic silence.¹¹

The escalation of the Vietnam War and Japan's growing demands made Okinawa's reversion a key issue for the rest of the decade, and a continuing problem for Presidents Johnson and Nixon.¹² Japan had made the reversion of Okinawa a national concern and Okinawan protests could no longer be denied. "Faced by the escalation of the Vietnam War and the 1970 revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, both governments agreed that reversion was the only way to maintain US military bases in Okinawa and to

¹¹ Nicholas Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000,) p. 137.

¹² Ibid.

protect the political partnership of the two nations in the future," declares a history published by the Okinawa Prefectural Government.¹³

During this time period, the mid 1960s to 1970, the Vietnam War had a heavy impact on the "Okinawa problem." Okinawa became a supply, training, and departure point for the U.S military and the numbers of U.S. personnel increased in Okinawa. Land was taken to expand military facilities. Accidents and crimes rose. The Reversion Council was in the forefront protesting the U.S. military.¹⁴ Okinawa was in turmoil when reversion was seriously talked about in 1969.

Sato and Johnson agreed in November 1967 that a Joint Committee should look into the reunification of Okinawa to Japan.¹⁵ In Okinawa, more concessions were being made to Okinawan demands, beginning in March

¹³ Government of Okinawa, Okinawa: The 50 Years of the Postwar Era (Naha, Okinawa: The Office of Editorial Committee, 1995), 235.

¹⁴ Government of Okinawa, Okinawa, 234-235. In this section titled, "The Vietnam War and Battle station Okinawa," it sites different examples of the wrong doings of the U.S. military during the Vietnam conflict. On June 11, 1965 during a parachute exercise, a dropped jeep landed on a small girl. A high school girl was stabbed by a U.S. soldier on May 30th, 1970. A housewife was struck and killed by a U.S. soldier driving a jeep. In many of the instances where U.S. soldiers did harm and even murdered Okinawans, those soldiers did not face a civilian court. Many of the suspects were tried in military courts and were usually sent home. In an interview with the author's mother and Arakaki Tokuyoshi, who was a police officer during the late 1960s-early 70s, stated that crimes committed by U.S. Soldiers were almost a weekly, if not daily occurrence in Okinawa.

¹⁵ Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations, 137.

1967. The first popular election for chief executive was held in November 1968.

In November 1969, Sato traveled to Washington to iron out the issue of reversion. In a Sato-Nixon communiqué, Sato requested the return of Okinawa to Japan. Because of difficulties in Vietnam and tensions at home, Nixon agreed to return Okinawa. The reversion would take place in three years.

A document in the Nixon Library in Yerba Buena, California, discusses the relinquishment of Okinawa:

By 1969, American control of the island of Okinawa,...
had become an irritant in U.S.-Japanese relations.
President Nixon realized that the goal of maintaining
and further developing a good relationship with Japan
would be strengthened by returning the island [Okinawa].¹⁶

Nixon was worried about relations with Japan. Also, there was the added pressure of the need to revise the Security Treaty, which was up for renewal in 1970. The only way to keep a good relationship, as well as keep the Security Treaty going, would be to return Okinawa to Japan.

The document states that Nixon, facing opposition from some people in the U. S., held meetings with Prime Minister Sato to set into motion the

¹⁶ "Healing a Final Wound of War," Display in Nixon Library, Yerba Buena, California, fourth paragraph.

process to revert Okinawa. The U.S. would no longer hold a trusteeship over the island, as per the United Nations Charter back in 1951. In April 1970, Okinawan representation was allowed in the Lower House and two seats in the Upper House of the Diet.¹⁷ By early 1972, negotiations were completed, and a ceremony took place in Tokyo, Japan, with Vice-President Spiro Agnew as the U.S. representative.

The document concludes: "By this action, the United States had relaxed what had been a major impediment to improved U.S.-Japanese relations."¹⁸ On May 15, 1972, Okinawa reverted to Japan. Although the United States did not have trusteeship over the island, the United States still had what it wanted: the bases.

¹⁷ Sarantakes, Keystone, 236.

¹⁸ "Healing a Final Wound of War," seventh paragraph.

Chapter Five

The Voice of the Rippling Waves – Conclusion/Epilogue

“The gulf separating American and Japanese perceptions of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan could jeopardize the alliance between these two important countries,” noted former Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro.¹ The alliance of which Mr. Hosokawa spoke is based on the Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. In an essay in Foreign Affairs, Hosokawa stated that many Japanese feel that the alliance is beneficial; however, they would like to see fewer troops on Japanese soil.²

Since the end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the economic disaster in North Korea, and economic reform in China, Japan is no longer under any serious military threat. Yet approximately 100,000 American troops are still stationed in Japan and Okinawa, costing the Japanese government \$4 billion annually.³

After World War II, Okinawa was a prize that the U.S. sought. Keeping Okinawa under U.S. control would further the American objective of keeping

¹ “Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed,” Foreign Affairs Volume 77, No. 4, (July/August 1998): 2.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 5.

peace within that region. The U.S. would gain this with the Peace and Security treaties.

In the early postwar years (1946-47) the question of security became an issue. Initially, the U.S. thought that the United Nations would handle this issue; however, as tensions intensified between the Soviet Union and the U.S., the U.S. assumed more responsibility. The victory of Mao Zedong in China and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea led the U.S. to see Japan's value as a base. In the Japanese Constitution, written by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (S.C.A.P.), Article Nine states that Japan is never to arm itself or have a standing army for defensive purposes. The no-war clause states that the Japanese people forever renounce war, and that land, sea, and air forces are never to be maintained.⁴ This was a problem for the U.S., which wanted Japan to become responsible for its own defense.

Okinawa, the largest island of the Ryukyu chain of islands, was the likely spot for a military installation, as it is the best strategic location in the Pacific. As an official document of the U.S. government stated, "The strategic importance of Okinawa has been recognized for many years."⁵ From

⁴ Hane, Mikiso, Modern Japan: A Historical Survey (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 351.

⁵ United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus, The Ryukyu Islands at a Glance, 12.

Commodore Perry's arrival in Naha in 1853, through World War II, to the present, Okinawa has been viewed as a very important strategic area.

In September 1951, Japan, along with 48 Allied nations, signed a peace treaty officially ending World War II. Japan officially lost all of the territories that it took from 1931 to 1945, and the U.S., along with a few other Allied nations, under the new United Nations Charter, was to oversee the restoration of Japan. However, the U.S. and Japan signed another treaty that was separate from, but coexisted with, the Peace Treaty. This Security Treaty permitted the U.S. to gain land in Japan for military use. Since 1952, this treaty between the U.S. and Japan has been revised four times: 1960, 1970, in the 1980s, and 1996. Protests and riots broke out in 1960 and 1969.

As a result of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, the U.S. was able to retain permanent bases in Japan, especially Okinawa, but Japan was noted to have full sovereignty over the island. Okinawa under U.S. trusteeship was able to house nuclear weapons, have a portion of the island for practice ranges, as well as permanent housing and airfields. After the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis, the U.S. finally determined that the reversion of Okinawa was an acceptable sacrifice to improve Japanese-American relations.⁶

⁶ "Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, Tokyo, December 16, 1960," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. XVIII, 413-423.

During the 1960s, many Okinawans protested the presence of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, as well as the use of airbases during the Vietnam conflict. The U.S., in order to avoid another treaty crisis with Japan, agreed to the reversion of Okinawa. To keep its bases in Okinawa, it was best to give Okinawa back to Japan. After the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, subsequent revisions of the Security Treaty met with little resistance.

In September 1995, a 12-year-old girl was kidnapped and raped by three U.S. servicemen in Okinawa. This crime sparked heavy protests from the Okinawans to get rid of the bases. Okinawa's governor, Masahide Ota, vowed that the U.S. bases would be gone by the year 2015. The Mutual Security Treaty was in danger for a time, but it was revised in 1996 to permit maintenance of 100,000 U.S. troops in Japan.

Critics ask, "Is the Security Treaty needed anymore?" Okinawa continues to be the poorest prefecture in Japan. The U.S. military is not popular among Okinawans. Most importantly, the Cold War is over. According to Chalmers Johnson, in Blowback, Okinawa is America's last Asian colony.⁷ The Mutual Security Treaty served its purpose, in that Japan

⁷ Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2000), 64.

is under the protection of the U.S. military. However, Japan has its own Self Defense Force comparable in size to most other countries' military forces.

Many people in the Pentagon and throughout the U.S. believe that Okinawa is still vital to U.S. "interests" in Asia, however. When China was "practicing" launching missiles towards Taiwan, some believed that the fast response of the U.S. military, stationed in Okinawa, was what stopped China from further "practices." Some believe that the U.S. presence in Okinawa deters Chinese aggression. The bases on Okinawa served their purposes as airfields and military training facilities during the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. The presence of the U.S. military helped deter the further spread of Communism in Asia. South Korea still benefits from the U.S. presence in Japan because of the short distance for any reinforcements that might be needed against a North Korean attack. Now in 2003, in the wake of missile tests near Japan and North Korea's latest confession concerning its pursuit of nuclear capabilities the U.S. presence in Okinawa seems even more important.

Okinawa's biggest concern about the Security Treaty is Japan's lack of role in U.S. base placements. In an article in the National Geographic Magazine, Arthur Zich states, "Okinawans have grown increasingly restive over both the size of the U.S. presence... and what they see as Tokyo's half-

hearted efforts to redistribute it more equally throughout the country.”⁸

Okinawans are tired of being treated like second-class citizens.

I spent several weeks in Okinawa visiting relatives as well as researching this thesis. The island was beautiful and I remembered some parts of it from when I first visited 19 years earlier. While I stayed with my grandparents and uncle, I saw what the years had done to Okinawa, especially in Naha, its capital. Unfortunately, I saw and heard the impact of the U.S. bases as well. The military consumes valuable space on the island. Every morning I would wake up to helicopter or plane noises. There were military vehicles on highways as well as on city streets. Weekenders from the bases were everywhere; military families were seen on beaches and in restaurants. It was as if Okinawa had to cater to the Americans.

Lands that the U.S. bases occupy could be used for farming and building more businesses. The military continues to train, using hills as bomb targets; airplanes continue to roar over elementary schools; traffic is stopped one or two times a day for military training. The question remains, in the 21st century, does the Security Treaty benefit Japan, and most importantly, how will it affect Okinawa?

⁸ Arthur Zich, “Okinawa: Claiming it Birthright,” National Geographic, Volume 191, No. 6, (June 1997): 93.

How did the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis between Japan and the U.S. affect Okinawa? Japan ultimately gained sovereign control over Okinawa, while the U.S. retained control over the bases. These bases continue to be a thorn in the Okinawans' side. The Reversion Council ultimately achieved the goal of returning Okinawa to Japan, but still the Okinawans have failed to attain freedom from the American military.

Appendix A

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers.

On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has disarmed.

There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism had not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan,

in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power of powers.

ARTICLE II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right

of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third party.

ARTICLE III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

ARTICLE IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

ARTICLE V

This treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

In WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and
Japanese languages, this eight day of September, 1951.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Dean Acheson

John Foster Dulles

Alexander Wiley

Styles Bridges

FOR JAPAN:

Shigeru Yoshida

Appendix B

TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan. The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will

enter into force on the date on which they thereof have exchanged the instruments of ratification in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area. However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

FOR JAPAN:

Nobusuke Kishi

Aiichiro Fujiyama

Mitsujiro Ishii

Tadashi Adachi

Koichi Asakai

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Christian A. Herter

Douglas MacArthur 2nd

J. Graham Parsons

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