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Five faces of Saddam Hussein : a thematic analysis of Foreign affairs 1979-2003

James Campbell Bunker
San Jose State University

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FIVE FACES OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

A THEMATIC ANALYSIS
OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1979-2003

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Communication Studies

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

James Campbell Bunker

May 2005

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APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION

Dr. Hanns Hohmann

李文淑

Dr. Wenshu Lee

Dr. Andrew Wood

Dr. Philip Wander

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT

FIVE FACES OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

A THEMATIC ANALYSIS
OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1979-2003

by James C. Bunker

This thesis addresses Saddam Hussein's representation in United States foreign policy from 1979-2003. It employs a thematic content analysis to capture the way in which political elites, policy-makers, and scholars talked about Hussein in *Foreign Affairs*, the most influential publication on U.S. foreign policy. In addition, it draws from rhetorical sources to develop a critical analysis of the dialogue to discuss the implications of U.S. foreign policy on the representations of Hussein's persona.

Research on this subject reveals that there were five distinct faces of Hussein. This analysis indicates that although Hussein has always been a brutal dictator who abused and repressed his own people, he was not always portrayed that way in *Foreign Affairs*. In fact, for a short while he was a reliable friend and ally whom the U.S. aided and abetted. In sum, each face or representation of Hussein coincided with changing U.S. foreign policy interests.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of approximately two years of hard and dedicated work. This journey has been challenging, exciting, rewarding, frustrating, painful, and depressing. The mood swings that one undergoes when they take on a project such as this are monumental in the development of a manuscript. In turn, I would not have been able to survive these emotions without an extremely dedicated support group. It would have been impossible for me to complete this project without their patience, dedication, support, and challenges that they helped me to achieve. For that I am truly grateful.

I am appreciative for the time and sacrifice that my parents have made in my quest to seek a higher education and to heed a scholarly calling. This journey almost ended before it began. My mother was instrumental in helping me finish my Master's degree after life challenges forced me to abandon it the first time. My mother's encouragement motivated me to go back to school and finish what I had started four years earlier. This has been one of the better decisions that I have made. The enjoyment that I get out of learning, research, and teaching provides me with a joy unmatched in other professions. Thank you Mom! My father has also always provided me with an ear in which to speak to in times of need. His patience and support were vital as I pondered which professional steps to take next. My dad also served as my main editor, and had an opportunity to see the progression of this project from start to finish. Thank you Dad!

I cannot thank enough the one person who has challenged me academically in a way in which I never thought was possible. Dr. Wander it would have been impossible for me to finish this project without your dedication and support. You knew when to

push me, and when to give me some time. But, ultimately you never told me what to do. You provided me with options and waited to see which door I would open. There were many times when I just wanted you to answer a question. What I appreciate most is that in the end you found a way to let me answer the question myself. In reflection, I could not imagine anyone else guiding me through this thesis process. With your help I have come to the realization that I have the ability to succeed in this environment as both a scholar and critic. I have also cherished all of our discussions in and out of the classroom. Thank you Phil! I feel fortunate to call you a friend.

Different people come in to your life for drastically different reasons. Sometimes the perfect person is there for you at the perfect time. I feel very fortunate to have met a wonderful woman who motivated me to not only achieve, but to become a better human being. Stacy has been a steadfast supporter of my academic goals since the first day I met her. She took it upon herself to maximize my success by putting things in perspective and placing me in the right environment. Your dedication and loyalty is to be admired. Thank you Stacy!

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I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

Saddam Hussein's political relationship with the United States has lasted over two decades and has undergone dramatic changes since he first became the president of Iraq. During this period numerous political events have defined his persona in the discourse of United States foreign policy. In March 2003, the United States, backed by a coalition of 30 nations invaded Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein from power on the grounds that he was an imminent threat to U.S. national security. However, Saddam Hussein has only rarely been portrayed as an imminent threat since he came to power in 1979. In fact, he has often been portrayed as a fast friend and reliable ally.

We can follow these changes in Saddam Hussein's¹ political persona by tracking the changes in his representation in *Foreign Affairs*, the leading journal on United States foreign policy, based on specific political events that have occurred over the last quarter of a century. A review of this discourse in *Foreign Affairs* reveals five distinct faces of Hussein. At various times he has been portrayed as a Soviet puppet, American ally, dictator, renegade, and archenemy. Situated historically these changes make it clear that each face of Hussein is representative of specific United States' foreign policy interests at different moments in their relationship. In sum, representations of Hussein's political persona coincided with changing United States foreign policy goals in the Middle East.

This approach to studying Hussein's persona in public discourse grows out of previous works in political discourse that have looked at the rhetoric of and about United

¹ From this point forward Saddam Hussein will be referred to as "Hussein."

States foreign policy.² This research concerned itself with the relationships between media content, public opinion, and foreign policy in the United States.³ But there are also studies that specifically addressed television's role in foreign policy.⁴ Research has also explored U.S. press coverage of foreign policy crises,⁵ as well as the influence of the government on shaping foreign policy discourse within the media.⁶ This study considers *Foreign Affairs'* coverage of Hussein's relationship with the United States and its relationship with specific crises such as the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, economic sanctions, September 11th, as well as possession of weapons of mass destruction. This

² Wander, Philip. (1984a). "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 70, 4, p339-361.

³ Soroka, S. N. (2003). "Media, public opinion, and foreign policy." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 8, 1, p27-48. Kull, S. and C. Ramsay. (2000). "Elite misperceptions of U.S. public opinion and foreign policy." In Nacos, B.L. (Ed.); Shapiro, R.Y. (Ed.); Isernia, P. (Ed.), *Decision-making in a glass house: public opinion, and American and European foreign policy in the 21st century* (p95-110). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Isaacs, M. (1998). "Two different worlds: the relationship between elite and mass opinion on American foreign policy." *Political Communication*, 15, 3, p323-345. Bennett, W. L. and D.L. Paletz. (1994). *Taken by storm: the media, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. O'Heffernan, Patrick. (1993). "Mass media and U.S. foreign policy: a mutual exploitation of media influence on foreign policy." In Spitzer, R. J. (Ed.), *Media and public policy* (p187-211). Westport, CT: Praeger. O'Heffernan, Patrick. (1991). *Mass media and American foreign policy*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Seaver, B.M. (1998). "The public dimension of foreign policy." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 3, 1, p65-91.

⁴ Gilboa, E. (2003). "Television news and U.S. foreign policy: constraints of real-time coverage." *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 8, 4, p97-113. Strobel, Warren P. (1999). "The CNN effect: myth or reality?" In Wittkopf, Eugene R. (Ed); McCormick, James M. (Ed.), *The domestic sources of American foreign policy: Insights and evidence*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Jordan, D.L. & B. I. Page. (1992). "Shaping foreign policy options: the role of television news." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36, 2, p227-241. Larson, J.F. & J. Chen. (1992). "Television and foreign policy: U.S. response to the Beijing and Kwangju Pro-democracy movements." *Asian Journal of Communication*, 2, 2, p78-104. Larson, J. F. (1986). "Television and U.S. foreign policy: the case of the Iran hostage crisis." *Journal of Communication*, 36, 4, p108-130.

⁵ Zaller, J. & D. Chiu. (1996). "Government's little helper: U.S. press coverage of foreign policy crises, 1945-1991." *Political Communication*, 13, 4, p385-405. Livingston, S. & T. Eachus. (1995). "Humanitarian crises and U.S. foreign policy: Somalia and the CNN effect reconsidered." *Political Communication*, 12, 4, p413-429.

⁶ Berry, N.O. (1990). *Foreign policy and the press: an analysis of the New York Times' coverage of U.S. foreign policy. Contributions to the Study of Mass Communications*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Malek, A. (1989). "New York Times' editorial position and U.S. foreign policy: the case of Iran." *Gazette*, 42, 2, p105-119.

analysis combines discourse associated with the academic journal *Foreign Affairs* with U.S. government statements about Hussein, and serves as the focus of my study on the discourse of United States' foreign policy.

Foreign Affairs was chosen because it is the United States' most influential publication on international affairs and foreign policy. It is also the international forum of choice for the most important new ideas, analysis, and debate on significant issues in the world. Published since 1922, *Foreign Affairs* is made available by the:

Council on Foreign Relations, a non profit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improving the understanding of U.S. foreign policy and international affairs through the free exchange of ideas. Its 3,400 members include nearly all past and present Presidents, Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, other senior U.S. government officials, renowned scholars, and major leaders of business, media, human rights, and other non-governmental groups.⁷

The Council was founded in 1921 as a "liberal internationalist, scientific research, educational and policy-oriented organization, in the aftermath of World War I and the United States Senate's failure to ratify membership in the League of Nations."⁸ The Council brought together members of various professions such as lawyers, industrialists, bankers, university professors, journalists, and politicians of both parties. The Council's goal was to bring together "men (no women) of both ideas and action, to unite theory and practice in one organization that would at once educate public opinion and advise foreign policy-makers."⁹ The Council, with its wide array of both financial and political backing, has become the most eminent private forum for discussing United States foreign policy to this day.

⁷ *About Foreign Affairs*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 30, 2005, from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/about/>

⁸ Parmar, Inderjeet. (2001). "Resurgent Academic Interest in the Council on Foreign Relations." *Politics*, 21, 1, p32-33.

⁹ Parmar. (2001). p33.

The Council on Foreign Relations has excited a great deal of criticism. One of the earliest actual works was prepared by Dan Smoot in 1962.¹⁰ Smoot believed that the Council on Foreign Relations represents an “invisible government” whose purpose was to convert America into a socialist state and then make it a unit in a one-world socialist system. Shoup and Minter’s 1977 work was also critical of the Council and relied on Marxist and Socialist ideology in development of their analysis.¹¹ Schulzinger’s 1984 study was far less antagonistic towards the Council and provided a scholarly history of the Council after he achieved complete access to their archives.¹² During the 1990s, there was a resurgent interest in the Council on Foreign Relations. There were at least five books dealing with the organization itself.¹³ In addition, there were a number of books and articles that featured the Council on Foreign Relations as a key organization in foreign affairs.¹⁴ Regardless of their motivations, those researchers analyzed the Council

¹⁰ Smoot, Dan. (1962). *Invisible Government*. Dallas: The Dan Smoot Report, Inc.

¹¹ Shoup, Laurence H. and William Minter. (1977). *Imperial Brain Trust*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

¹² Schulzinger, Robert D. (1984). *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs*. New York: Columbia University Press.

¹³ Domhoff, G.W. (1990). *The Power Elite and the State*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Santoro, C.M. (1992). *Diffidence and Ambition: The Intellectual Sources of American Policy*. Oxford: Westview Press. Wala, M. (1994). *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*. Oxford: Berghahn Books. Bundy, W.P. (1994). *The Council on Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs. Notes for a History*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

¹⁴ Smith, J.A. (1991). *The Idea Brokers. Think Tanks and the Rise of the New Policy Elite*. New York: The Free Press. Abelson, D. E. (1996). *American Think-tanks and Their Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*. Basingtoke: Macmillan. Higgot, R. and D. Stone. (1994). “The Limits of Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the U.S.A.” *Review of International Studies*, 20, 1, p15-34. Parmar, I. (1995). “The Issue of State Power: The Council on Foreign Relations as a Case Study.” *Journal of American Studies*, 29, 1, p73-95. Parmar, I. (1999a). “Mobilizing America for an Internationalist Foreign Policy: The Role of the Council on Foreign Relations” *Studies in American Political Development*, p337-373. Parmar, I. (1999b). “The Carnegie Corporation and the Mobilization of Opinion During The United States Rise To Globalism, 1939-1945.” *Minerva*, p355-378. For a more thorough review of the work in the 1990s on the Council of Foreign Relations see: Parmar, Inderjeet. (2001). “Resurgent Interest in the Council of Foreign Relations.” *Politics*, 21, 1, p31-39.

on Foreign Relations in reference either to its history or its role in influencing policy decisions.

Foreign Affairs is a useful vehicle for understanding how government voices and scholars articulated Iraqi foreign policy over time. *Foreign Affairs*' discourse in its ongoing flow about U.S. foreign policy reflected assertions and themes developed during the 24 years Hussein was in power. Discourse based on recurring assertions talks about images, faces, and persona.¹⁵ Each face of Hussein is the result of one of five different turning points in the United States' relationship with Iraq and the Middle East.¹⁶ Face one illustrates the themes that were developed surrounding the emergence of Hussein in the international political arena and his depiction as a Soviet puppet. Face two is dedicated to exploring the discourse that revolved around how events in the Iran-Iraq war led to Hussein's new representation as an American ally. Face three explores the events leading up to Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War in which Hussein was personified as a dictator. Face four explores the discourse of the ten year period of economic sanctions and weapons inspections that occurred between the end of the Persian Gulf War and the tragedy that happened on September 11, 2001, and emphasized Hussein's next face as a renegade. The final face is dedicated to exploring the shift in discourse that happened post-September 11th, when the George W. Bush administration

¹⁵ Persona refers to the overall representation of Saddam's image in *Foreign Affairs* from start to finish. Faces refer to the different representations of Hussein that were seen in different historical contexts.

¹⁶ Each face identified is a rhetorical construction that I think is most reflective of Hussein's persona at a given time. I have taken into account not only the assertions revealed in a certain era, but also the policies of the U.S. government that warranted talking about Hussein in a certain way in different historical contexts. Note that the themes in each face are not mutually exclusive nor were they designed to be. Themes and faces may overlap but their meanings are quite different in changing historical contexts.

declared that Hussein was an archenemy and a threat to U.S. national security and he was forcefully removed by U.S. armed forces.

Goals of the Study

This thesis sets out to identify, describe, and illustrate changes in talk about Hussein in *Foreign Affairs*. Official or scholarly discourse may reveal the truth at any given moment, but rarely takes up the changing political interests, domestic and foreign. This essay explores the ways in which people talk about Hussein in order to answer the following questions about his portrayal in United States foreign policy. How is Hussein rhetorically constructed during each time period by the contributors to *Foreign Affairs*? How is Hussein portrayed by the government and policy-makers in a given era? What political events influenced Hussein's representation in *Foreign Affairs*? What was the status of Hussein's political relationship with the United States in each of these five periods? What United States foreign policy interests shaped each face? What events led to Hussein's depiction as an imminent threat by the George W. Bush administration? All of these questions are answered in this thesis in order to unravel the various representations of Hussein's persona in United States foreign policy.

This thesis should be of importance to all those who are interested in exploring how the rhetoric of United States foreign policy shifts in relation to specific political interests over time. This assessment of Hussein's representation in United States foreign policy makes it clear that each face of Hussein is dependent on different United States

foreign policy goals.¹⁷ Therefore, the purpose of this study is to shed light on how the media and the language of United States foreign policy rhetorically constructs a foreign leader as friend or foe depending upon whether this leader conducts a domestic and foreign policy that is in line with the U.S. interests.

¹⁷ This study is only representative of Hussein's representation in U.S. foreign policy. This study based its discussion on foreign policy by examining *Foreign Affairs*, the preeminent journal addressing U.S. foreign policy from an American perspective. This study does not capture the interests or voices outside the parameters of U.S. foreign policy. Saddam Hussein's representation will be different in other countries. New faces will emerge if research explores Hussein's relationship with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, USSR, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Israel. A review of this discourse could offer different meanings and interpretations of Hussein. Future studies could explore mainstream press representations in each of these countries. These could include Hussein's representation in the *Guardian*, *Al-Ahram*, *Le Mond*, and *Ha'aretz*. These periodicals could provide the voices of independent scholars to give a more accurate portrayal of Hussein's overall persona.

II. METHOD

Thematic analysis is a method driven approach. That is, the information gleaned from the discourse is not the result of a pre-classified theoretical model. In the words of Richard Boyatzis, "Data driven codes are constructed inductively from the raw information."¹⁸ They appear with the words and syntax of the raw information"¹⁹ The advantage is that "working directly from the raw information enhances the appreciation of the information, in addition to eliminating intermediaries as potentially contaminating factors. With a complete view of the information available one can appreciate both gross and intricate aspects of information."²⁰ But there are in my view, two advantages: (a) It enables the researcher to concentrate on finding themes within the data itself without worrying about fitting the information into *a priori* categories; and (b) it allows for previously silenced voices or perspectives to be brought forward and recognized.

Thematic analysis is a way to make sense out of seemingly unrelated material. It is often associated with quantitative research in which the data is translated into statistics. Kimberley Neuendorf defines content analysis as "the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics."²¹ Quantitative research involves a system that relies

¹⁸ Note that the raw information concerning U.S. foreign policy for the purpose of this study is derived from the assertions and quotations pertaining to Hussein and the Iraqi government as expressed in *Foreign Affairs*. I have also incorporated secondary sources from print media and academic sources to either support or contradict themes already established in *Foreign Affairs*. In addition, I have also looked to various government statements from the president, presidential staff, or other government sources to make connections to U.S. foreign policy on Iraq. One of the benefits of using secondary information is that it has allowed me to recognize and address silences in the discourse regarding Hussein.

¹⁹ Boyatzis, Richard. (1998). *Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code Development*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p30.

²⁰ Boyatzis. (1998). p30.

²¹ Neuendorf, Kimberley. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p1.

on coding and classifying content into numerical percentages and statistics. There are definite advantages to using quantitative analysis as a research method. Quantitative analysis attempts to meet the criteria of the scientific method that include: objectivity, intersubjectivity, an *a priori* design, reliability, validity, generalizability, and replicability.²² Demands for coder reliability and validity further reinforce the strengths of generalizations generated from this type of data collection and analysis. The establishment of *a priori* categories also prevents the possible variation of categories over time. In short, researcher consistency is imperative to achieving reliability and validity in any form of quantitative study.

This study draws on the strengths of quantitative content analysis to reveal assertions made about Hussein. Specifically, this research employs a coding process allowing another critic to check the assertions identified in my study. But thematic analysis as used in this study can also be used as a way of analyzing qualitative information.²³ It draws on the strengths of qualitative analysis by relying in the form of quotations, the data necessary not only to evaluate the fit between assertions and

²² Neuendorf. (2002). p11-12.

²³For a more thorough review of the techniques of thematic analysis the following book is required reading and offers eighty different content analysis measurement schemes. Smith, Charles P.; (Ed.), in association with Atkinson, John W., McClelland, David C., and Joseph Veroff. (1992). *Motivation and personality; Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Locally this method was successfully applied in a previous thesis at San Jose state which explored how women and their political image were shaped by the ideologies offered by various news sources. Kane, Melissa. (1986). *Women, Ideology, and Political Image: A Thematic Analysis of National Review and The Nation 1956-1976*. Masters Thesis, San Jose State University. This method was also utilized by Wander, Philip. (1972). "The Savage Child: The image of the negro in the Pro-Slavery Movement." *The Southern Speech Journal*, 37, 4, p335-360. More recently, this method was utilized to explore women and feminism in technical communication. Thompson, Isabelle. (1999). "Women and feminism in technical communication; a qualitative content analysis of journal articles published in 1989-1997." *Journal of Business and Technical Communication*. 13, 2, p154-178.

themes, but also to reflect on the meaning of themes, assertions, and quotations in a historical context.

This research project spans a 24 year period. It moves in and out of contexts in which the meaning of the “data” (assertions, themes, quotations) changes. What was said then had meaning. It also has significance, if only because in the now we are reflecting on what the “data” meant then. But of course, its meaning and significance depend on who was doing the interpreting and for what purpose.²⁴ The “data” also contained silences and anomalies that still speak; but when, where, and to whom still needed to be identified.²⁵ Unusual assertions and anomalies that emerged also provided constructive insights into the understanding of just how Hussein’s image has shifted over time in American discourse. It may be difficult to generalize from my data, but what I offer is a perspective on understanding just how foreign leaders are depicted in print depending on their current political relationship with the United States.

The goal of this study was to inform the reader of these variations in foreign political images that occur over time by looking at the United States’ relationship with Hussein as expressed in the dialogue of *Foreign Affairs*. The depiction of Hussein today differs from the way he was depicted in 1979. The overlying benefit of using both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies is that it allowed me to retain the strengths of quantitative research and at the same time consider political developments that led to shifts in political images reflected in the discourse.

²⁴ Note one of the weaknesses of this method is that it may take quotations out of context. This method is not designed to capture quotations, assertions, and themes in context. Instead it relies on grouping assertions into themes in order to provide a complete narrative on the discourse of Hussein.

²⁵ Silences and anomalies will be addressed in the interpretation section as this study moves beyond content analysis and draws from rhetorical theory for a critical evaluation of the data presented.

The internet and the use of online databases have made it much easier for me to analyze the information in *Foreign Affairs* pertaining to Hussein and Iraq. *Business Source Premier*, an online database, provided me access to all issues of *Foreign Affairs* published since late 1964 to the present. I searched this database for all references to Hussein or Iraq that appeared in both the title and author abstract in each article starting from 1979 to September 2003. During this 24 year time period, there were 101 references to either Hussein or Iraq. These references include articles, editorials, letters to the editor, and book reviews that specifically mentioned either Hussein or Iraq.

After identifying all the articles that referred to either Hussein or Iraq, each article was individually analyzed for references or opinions that refer to Hussein, Iraq, or that of the Iraqi leadership. All references that were identified were then typed with complete quotations on a separate piece of paper with the appropriate bibliographic information. In order to keep track of the bibliographic references, I applied a simple numerical coding process. The number 1.1 would indicate that this quotation referred to the first quotation established in the first article. The number 17.5 would indicate the bibliographic data for this quote was identified by looking at article number 17 and quotation number five. This procedure was applied to all 101 journal entries that mentioned either Hussein or referred to the Iraqi leadership in its discourse.

Upon completing the notation of all references relating to Hussein and Iraq, the next step was to reread the body of raw data in order to assemble assertions and statements made about Hussein and the governing body of Iraq. An assertion, as Budd, Thorp, and Donohew note is “a single idea or thought unit that conveys a single item of

information extracted from a segment of content.”²⁶ Assertions can be found in any phrase, sentence or word. For example, the sentence, “George Washington is tall” contains one assertion about the subject, “George Washington.” The sentence, “George Washington is tall, powerful, and courageous” contains three separate statements of meaning about the subject, “George Washington.” Each assertion that was identified from the discourse about the subjects of Iraq and Hussein was then retyped with the appropriate bibliographic data. The same numbering system was used in the coding of assertions. Bibliographic information for an assertion labeled assertion 15.5 would be found in article fifteen quotation number five. A total of 397 assertions were identified encompassing approximately 52 articles out of the original aggregate of 101.

The next step involved identifying and arranging the assertions into homogenous clusters or themes. In thematic content analysis, the unit of measurement is the theme itself. Richard Boyatzis identified a theme “as a pattern found in the information that at minimum describes and organizes the possible observations and at maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon.”²⁷ For the purpose of this analysis, a theme was defined as the recurrence of one or more times of a single assertion. For example, if two separate quotations implied that Hussein was brutal, then that constituted one of the themes in the discourse that was discovered during a specific time period. Eighty-one themes were identified and encompassed all five faces of Hussein.

²⁶ Budd., Thorp., & Donohew. (1967). *Content Analysis in Communication*. New York: The MacMillan Company, p34.

²⁷ Boyatzis. (1998). p4.

Once assertions were categorized into themes, these themes were then analyzed and arranged into thematic categories. Thematic categories can be defined as being composed of a cluster of themes revolving around a common subject. Eighteen separate thematic categories were identified in order to provide the most accurate representation of Hussein's image in *Foreign Affairs*. From this point, data was arranged with the associated quotations for each of these thematic categories and analyzed to see which quotations would best describe the theme itself. Preserving and displaying the quotations themselves enables the reader to analyze the data and ultimately the themes for him or herself. Furthermore, analyzing my information in this manner also permitted me to double-check my assertions against the themes that were developed, for overall accuracy.

III. INTERPRETATION

This study, in addition to quantitative and qualitative research methodology, drew from rhetorical sources to develop a critical analysis of the discourse and the implications for Hussein's representation in United States foreign policy. Specifically, my research incorporated the critical theories of Michael McGee's *ideograph*,²⁸ Edwin Black's *second persona*,²⁹ and Philip Wander's *third persona*³⁰ and related their work to Hussein's representation in United States' foreign policy, as depicted in *Foreign Affairs*.

The critical approach to foreign policy rhetoric considers the ways ideology is incorporated into political discourse. McGee, for example, was interested in exploring the building blocks of political discourse by examining how ideology manifested in slogans and terms or what he calls ideographs "are preserved in rhetorical documents and have the capacity to control public belief and behavior."³¹ According to McGee an ideograph:

is an ordinary language term found in political discourse. It is a high order abstraction representing a collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable."³²

²⁸ McGee, Michael Calvin. (1980). "The ideograph: A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 66, 1, p 1-16.

²⁹ Black, Edwin. (1970). "The Second Persona." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 56, 2, p109-119.

³⁰ Wander, Philip. (1984b). "The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory." *Central States Speech Journal*, 35, winter, p197-216.

³¹ McGee. (1980). p5

³² McGee. (1980). p15.

In more practical terms an ideograph is a dictionary definition of a political subject or term that by the nature of its design provides the audience with a way in which to both see and interact based on its meaning.

In the context of this study, Hussein is less an historical subject than an ideograph existing and taking on meaning in the political discourse of *Foreign Affairs*. Hussein had meaning because he was portrayed as an important figure in the politics of the Middle East. Thus the meaning of Hussein is not based on a personal relationship or truths about him; rather it is about how he/it figures into the words of others. The ideograph “Saddam Hussein” in *Foreign Affairs* is what elites and policy-makers say about him. The ways in which elites and *Foreign Affairs* described “Saddam Hussein” had an impact on how the public perceived him and justified taking certain actions against him.

This study addressed how the meanings of the ideograph “Saddam Hussein” changed due to specific events in his political relationship with the United States. These changes in ideograph are evidenced in the five faces of Hussein, each of which had different meanings and implications for affecting policy towards Iraq. Each face of Hussein provided a distinct meaning about him, and in turn elicited different responses that suggested alternate behaviors were appropriate when considering this ideograph.

McGee did not address the moral implications that are inherent in an ideograph. An ideograph marks an important term in political discourse, noting it over time in various historical contexts. This study goes beyond pointing out that Hussein was an ideograph in *Foreign Affairs*, because as Edwin Black remarks, “there is something

unsatisfying about criticism that stops short of appraisal.”³³ This study does not simply define the ideograph Saddam Hussein. It seeks to understand and comprehend the motives and policies for representing Hussein this way or that in different periods. Black’s concept of a second persona considers the audience. Not the actual audience, but the audience implied in the discourse.

To arrive at a moral understanding of Hussein in the discourse of United States foreign policy requires us to analyze not only the words that described him, but also how words were used to describe him in different situations. Examining the Saddam Hussein ideograph reveals different faces with different meanings and policy implications. There are explicit implications, but there are also implicit implications, implications talked about and implications not talked about. Thus a critical approach will take up not only what the discourse says - - the manifest content but also what the discourse does not say, the silences in the discourse. Silences make the critic wonder why and investigate further. What political goals or policies led to these silences and why were they justified in terms of policy?

Philip Wander introduces a third persona into rhetorical theory to address the problems of silences. I became aware of silences through the course of my work. But by confining myself to *Foreign Affairs* I was unable to point out what was missing in its dialogue. Therefore, upon completion of thematic analysis, I sought outside sources both to corroborate the themes I discovered and to point out what they left out. Ideological criticism of this nature “calls for an augmentation of the concept of audience in rhetorical

³³ Black. (1970). p109.

theory to include audiences not present, audiences rejected or negated through speech and/or the speaking situation. Wander calls this audience the third persona.³⁴ The third persona is interested in bringing forth that which was not discussed in the second persona. The second persona was constructed in such a way that it was only concerned with the meanings of how Hussein was depicted in *Foreign Affairs* and the moral implications. The second persona does not take into account the silences, that which is not said, or in some cases negated. These silences have meaning as well.

Wander's third persona addresses the reasons and ideologies behind omissions in the text that might have led to different meanings or interpretations of Hussein.

The third persona, therefore, refers to being negated. But being negated includes not only alienated through language and "it" that is the summation of all that you and I are told to avoid becoming, but also being negated in history, a being whose presence, through relevant to what is said is negated through silence. The moral significance of being negated through what is and is not said reveals itself in all its anguish and confusion in context, in the world affairs wherein certain individuals and groups are, through law, tradition, or prejudice denied rights accorded to being commended or measured against ideal to human beings.³⁵

These silences included voices that were not heard in *Foreign Affairs*. Silences were addressed in this study in four ways. First, it recognized that anomalies in the discourse deserved further attention. Anomalies were themes that emerged that were inconsistent with Hussein's representation in a particular face. Second, this study addressed silences in the manifest content. Why were themes present in one face and not in others? Third, this study explored secondary sources to see what was not talked about in *Foreign Affairs*. Finally, this study addressed the voices that were not heard that might have

³⁴ Wander. (1984b). p209.

³⁵ Wander. (1984b). p210.

provided different meanings of the Hussein ideograph. *Foreign Affairs* is a journal that discusses Hussein from an American perspective. This journal lacks voices from Middle Eastern sources for whom the meaning of Hussein might be drastically different, including those from Iraq and Iran. Recognizing these silences in the discourse of Hussein's representation in *Foreign Affairs* accentuates our understanding and provides different meanings. The third persona goes beyond simply finding alternative meanings for an ideograph, it seeks to understand the policies that justified their omission in the first place.

IV. FACE OF A PUPPET

Chapter Introduction

This chapter begins by analyzing the introduction of Hussein's persona in *Foreign Affairs* as the next potential great Arab leader in the Middle East. This is an imperative starting point because it provided a valuable premise in that it indicated that the United States was unclear on how to interpret Hussein's actions in Iraq in the early 1980s. Early accounts in *Foreign Affairs* indicated that he was beholden to the Soviet Union, thus providing the premise for Hussein the puppet.³⁶ Special attention was also given to the themes that developed in the course of the Iran-Iraq war, as this was the event that led to the shift in American foreign policy that revealed the next face of Hussein as an American ally.

Predictions and Interpretations of the Rise of Hussein in the Middle East

Hussein first appeared in the discourse of *Foreign Affairs* in an article Claudia Wright, a Washington correspondent of the London *New Statesman*, published in 1979, which proved to be a pivotal year in the development of Middle Eastern politics.³⁷ These developments have lasted well into the next century. Although Hussein had not yet been

³⁶ In determining to label Saddam's first face as a Soviet Puppet I relied on themes in the discourse and I took into account historical context and the combination of the political relationships between the U.S., USSR, and Iraq.

³⁷ Lucas explores four seminal events that occurred in 1979 that had a drastic impact on the region. "Chronologically, they were the culmination of the Iran Revolution with Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran on February 1; the signature on March 26 of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty which put the seal on the Camp David Accords brokered by President Carter the previous September; Hussein's assumption of full power as President of Iraq on July 17; and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27." Lucas, Ivor. (2004) "1979: Year of Destiny in the Middle East." *Asian Affairs*, 35, 1, p3.

talked about he was still a dominant force in the Baath³⁸ party since 1968. Few people of the Western world were aware (in 1979) of the man who developed into one of the most dominant figures in Middle Eastern politics over the next 24 years. In the beginning, neither writers nor politicians were sure what impact Hussein would have in the Persian Gulf.

This chapter begins by exploring a prevailing theme in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* that suggested that Hussein had the potential ability to emerge as one of the dominant leaders in Arab affairs in the 1980s. The discourse that surrounded Hussein's political entrance to the world stage paved the way for the first face of Hussein in the United States evolving foreign policy towards Iraq as a Soviet puppet. These early articles indicated that Hussein possessed both the potential for brutality and the political effectiveness to become a dominant leader in Middle Eastern affairs. These articles also attempted to compare Hussein to historical leaders of the Arab world's past.³⁹ There were references to both Hammurabi and King Sargon II of Assyria, both of whom were

³⁸ The Baath party, meaning the party of the Resurrection or Renaissance, was established in Damascus in the early 1940s by two Syrian Schoolteachers, Michel Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim. "A radical, secular, modernizing party, its ideology is a patchy mixture of pan-Arabism and socialism, which can be reduced to three organizing principles: unity, liberation, and socialism. This holy trinity, as the Baathists tend to call it, constitutes a unified metaphysical whole. None can be fully achieved without the attainment of other two; all are means to promote the ultimate goal of the spiritual rebirth of the Arab nation." Karsh, Efraim and Inari Rautsi. (1991). *Saddam Hussein a Political Biography*. New York: The Free Press, p12. For a more thorough review of Baath politics in Iraq see Baram, Amalia. (1989) "The Ruling Political Elite in Bathi Iraq, 1968-1986: The Changing Features of the Collective Profile." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21, 4, p447-493.

³⁹ Elaine Sciolino makes the interesting point that "official (Iraqi) propaganda compared Hussein to Nebuchadnezzar, Hammurabi and Saladin and revised their histories to fit his vision." Sciolino, Elaine. (1991) *The Renegade State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis*. New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, p50. This is an interesting point because it raises the question of whether this theme as addressed in *Foreign Affairs* was inadvertently a byproduct of Hussein's internal propaganda machine.

powerful, clever, and brutal Arab leaders.⁴⁰ The emphasis on brutality was significant because these were the first indicators of Hussein's aggressive behavior that received substantial attention in future faces as his persona continued to evolve. Furthermore, this emphasis on brutality provided a backdrop to the fact that political violence in Iraq is far from an anomaly.⁴¹ Military coups and violent takeovers had been common during Iraq's turbulent political climate of the twentieth century. "Since the fall of Faisal II and the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, there have been at least 11 attempted coups, two armed rebellions and a full scale war in the Kurdish provinces."⁴² Understanding the history of violence in Iraq is essential because it provides a backdrop to comprehending how violence had become an acceptable tool in the Hussein regime.

Continuing the Iraqi tradition of political violence, Hussein ordered the execution of twenty one party officials who resented or disagreed with the transfer of total power of the Baath party to him after he replaced President Al-Bakr.⁴³ Wright is the first person to

⁴⁰ Hammurabi was the greatest ruler in the first Babylonian dynasty and ruled from approximately 1792 B.C to 1750 B.C. Sargon II was an Assyrian king who ruled from 722 to 705 B.C whose empire included present day Iraq.

⁴¹ Charles Tripp in his book, *The History of Iraq* discusses the part violence has played in the brief history of Iraq. "Any state is to some extent an organization that disciplines and coerces. In Iraq, the imposition of a political order that challenged existing values and interests, or that created and maintained systems of privilege, has meant a readiness to use coercion. Beginning with British ideas of order, the use of violence to suppress dissent, much of which took a violent form itself, has been reproduced and elaborated by central governments in Baghdad since the foundation of the state. Indeed, control of the means of violence has been one of the lures for those who seized the state apparatus. The result has been not only the prominence of the armed forces, but also the proliferation of security services which have introduced a baneful logic to Iraq's political life. The use of violence in political life has, therefore been an important part of Iraqi history." Tripp, Charles. (2000). *A History of Iraq*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p6-7.

⁴² Wright, Claudia. (1980, October 26). "Behind Iraq's Bold Bid." *The New York Times*, Section 6, p43.

⁴³ Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr with Egyptian help in 1967 helped orchestrate an internal coup within the government of President Abdul Rahman Arif. The bloodless coup exiled Arif, and installed al-Bakr as Iraq's fourth president. Al-Bakr became the leading face of the Baath party and Iraqi pan-Arabism and was praised as the "leader of the revolution." Al-Bakr is best known for supporting Hussein as his Vice President. As the president got older, more and more authority was gradually delegated to Hussein, and by

compare Hussein to influential and violent Arab leaders of yesteryear. Her comments below discussed the events of Hussein's consolidation of power and represented one of the most interesting themes that the early discourse revolving around Hussein disclosed:

Over 50,000 demonstrators roared their approval and chanted, "Death to the traitors! As he looked down, Hussein might have contemplated the example of King Sargon II, the Assyrian king and clever military tactician whose battle success is celebrated in 2,500-year-old-reliefs from the throne room at Dur-Saharukin, today displayed in the splendid Iraqi Museum. In one, Sargon stands in his chariot reviewing his victorious army, while soldiers build a pile of his enemies' heads in tribute."⁴⁴

Wright's comparisons to Hammurabi revealed the potential brutal effectiveness that Hussein might have possessed as a leader in the Arab world. She argued that "if Saddam Hussein at 42, is to survive another 30 years of political life, does he anticipate having to purge or kill off young Turks like Adnan Hussein every 10 or 15 years? Will the President seek to impose a benign despotism in the fashion of Hammurabi for at least another generation?"⁴⁵ Adnan Hussein had been the newly appointed Deputy Premier in Hussein's new government. He was among the twenty one party leaders sentenced to death in a purge by Hussein in August of 1979. Wright's two comments provided further support for the argument that historically violence had been a powerful tool in the Iraqi political system.⁴⁶ More importantly, her linkage of Hussein to Sargon II were an early

the mid-1970s the vice president had established virtual de facto rule over the entire nation. On July 16, 1979 the 65 year old Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr stepped down, ostensibly on health grounds, and Hussein assumed the presidency in a move that was widely regarded as little more than a formality.

⁴⁴ Wright, Claudia. (1979). "Iraq New Power in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*, 58, 2, p257.

⁴⁵ Wright. (1979). p271. Ofra Bengio indicated that "Hussein's regime has resorted even more than his predecessor's to executions as a means of eliminating political opponents. In the first half of 1980 alone 500 people from all classes of the population were put to death." Bengio Ofra. (1982). "Saddam Husayn's Quest for Power and Survival." *Asian and African Studies*, 15, p331.

⁴⁶ Despite the ruthlessness of Hussein's purges, Karsh (1991) claimed that they do have a rationale behind them. Specifically that, "Saddam does not engage in purges for their own sake. He does so because he is convinced that they are vital for his survival, and that if he does not strike at his opponents, real or

indicator of the depths of Hussein's brutality that was exemplified in the discourse of another generation as Hussein's faces continued to evolve in the discussion of U.S. foreign policy.

Moving beyond these historical comparisons to brutal leaders of yesteryear there were many assertions that sought to describe Hussein's own internal desire to become a dominant contender in the political affairs of the Persian Gulf.

President Hussein's goals appear to be to consolidate his near-total power, to use Iraq's considerable oil resources to give the people the skills, opportunities and comforts of the modern world, and to move Iraq and himself into positions of leadership in the Persian Gulf, the Arab World and the third world.⁴⁷

These desires led to alliances and clashes with the U.S. government as the image of Hussein underwent many transformations that could be seen clearly in the discourse of *Foreign Affairs*. There was a consensus among many contributors that Hussein was ambitious enough to take on the idea of restoring Nasser's dream of a Pan-Arab unity in the Middle East. One such author believed "that Hussein is the first Modern day Iraqi leader to dream of restoring the power of the ancient Mesopotamian city-states."⁴⁸ Their comments made it apparent that Hussein wished to project himself forward and become an active participant in Arab affairs. "The outlines of his Iraqi foreign policy are also clear" on this issue. "First and foremost, Iraq is Arab, and no ideological or practical line of policy will be tolerated if it were to put non-Arab interests ahead of Iraqi Arabism or

imaginary, they will get him first. The underlying impulse for his purges is insecurity, the fear that his ambitions will be thwarted. Every purge, every execution, has its purpose." p40.

⁴⁷ Kifner, John. (1980, July 5). "Iraq's President Changes His Image As He Consolidates His Near Total Power." *The New York Times*, Section 1, p2.

⁴⁸ Wright. (1979). p257. These views are also consistent with those expressed by Bernard Gwertzman (1980, September 28). "Iraq Settles an Old Score and Displays a New Strongman." *The New York Times*, Section 4, page 1.

nationalism.”⁴⁹ This theme affirmed that some foresaw that the political ambitions of Hussein provided the foundation to make him a dominant competitor in the Persian Gulf whether he assumed the face of a puppet, ally, dictator, renegade, or an archenemy to U.S. national security.

However, it is significant to note that there were also dissenting voices who expressed that Hussein’s political ambitions would never result in Iraq becoming a focal-point in the Middle East, specifically members of the State Department. Wright summed up this position by arguing:

At the State Department, where the Iraq desk is even more isolated from the senior policy-makers of the Near Eastern Bureau than the unrecognized U.S. Interest section is isolated from the political affairs in Baghdad, it is now almost a reflex action to label Hussein as a bluff artist, paranoid about internal dissent and so beholden to the Soviet Union as to be incapable of autonomous foreign policy, let alone the delicate task of coordinating inter-Arab economic and diplomatic objectives.⁵⁰

This position is presumably attributed to the general ignorance of Hussein’s capabilities and his inexperience in politics outside of Iraq. However, what is essential to derive from this discussion is that it revealed the first face of Hussein in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. In this case, dialogue surrounding Hussein in the early 1980s exposed Hussein as a puppet of the Soviet government. This face of Hussein is further cultivated in the subsequent discourse which explores Hussein’s relationships with his neighbors, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.

⁴⁹ Wright. (1979). p273.

⁵⁰ Wright. (1979). p260.

Hussein - the Face of a Soviet Puppet

This section explores themes that discuss how Hussein related to and was interpreted by the outside world. Authors in the early 1980s focused on how Hussein interacted with his Arab neighbors, the Soviets, and the Americans. Exploring Iraq's relationship with his Arab neighbors was imperative because Hussein's attitude of indifference to Arab opinion foreshadowed the theme of defiance that became a critical aspect of Hussein's persona when his image underwent the transformation from ally to dictator in subsequent discourse. Exploring Hussein's relationship with the Soviet Union is essential to understanding the development of the first face of Hussein in American foreign policy as a Soviet puppet. Hussein the puppet was further augmented by examining how *Foreign Affairs* contributors depicted Hussein's volatile relationship with the U.S. before and during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war.

Iraq's relationship with the Middle East and the West were ambiguous at best during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Iraq had taken quite an ambivalent and threatening stand in the politics of the Persian Gulf region prior to the Iran-Iraq war. During this time period Hussein did not appear to be concerned with how Iraqi intentions were interpreted by other countries in the Gulf region.⁵¹ Wright summed up this position by stating that, "Iraqis are used to isolation in the Arab world, and in the past have been stolidly indifferent to Arab critics."⁵² However, it is important to note that Hussein's indifference to Arab opinion did not necessarily void him of Arab support during the Iran-Iraq war. In fact, Hussein received countless financial and military support by Gulf

⁵¹ This character trait receives a lot of attention in later sections that focus on themes of defiance.

⁵² Wright Claudia. (1980). "Implications of the Iran-Iraq War." *Foreign Affairs*, 58, 2, p298.

countries in order to insure that Iran would not win the war and resume dominance in the Gulf. Dankwart Rustow, a political scientist at the City University of New York Graduate School, supported my argument in his response by suggesting that:

the (Iraqi) threat disappeared in 1980-81 with the stark failure of Saddam Hussein's aggression against Iran. Instead there now loomed the far more ominous danger of a victory by Iranian revolutionary forces. The logical response of threatened Gulf monarchies was to extend financial, commercial and military aid to prevent an Iraqi defeat, and for Iraq gratefully to accept such conservative Arab support.⁵³

As stated earlier Arab countries at the time were wary that an Iranian victory might lead to the reestablishment of Iranian dominance in the Middle East that occurred under the late Shah⁵⁴ in the 1970s.⁵⁵ The support Hussein received from these Arab countries foreshadowed the financial and military support the U.S. would contribute to Hussein in the future as his persona shifted for the first time from Soviet puppet to American ally.

As tumultuous as Iraq's relationship was during this time period with its neighbors, the Western world had even more trouble interpreting Hussein's actions. Iraq had developed strong ties with the Soviet Union during the last half of the 20th century. "Since the first Baathist coup of 1958, led by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem, Iraq has

⁵³Rustow, Dankwart. (1985). "Realignments in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs*, 63, 3, p588. Wright's (1980). comments are also supportive of this and indicate that Iraqi prosperity cannot be ensured without heavily relying on the goodwill and cooperation of neighbors who depend on Iraq substantially less than Iraq needs to rely on them. p277. Rustow. (1985). also expressed how with the progression of the Gulf War the Saudis, Jordanians, Soviets, and Americans to varying degrees supported the Iraqi position in the conflict. p588.

⁵⁴ Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a former ally of the U.S. ruled Iran as shah (king) from 1941 until his overthrow in January 1979.

⁵⁵This viewpoint is also shared by David Lamb who contended that "the Arab countries backing Hussein were all moderates and basically pro-Western." Furthermore, "these countries all share Washington's view that an Iranian victory and the resulting spread of Islamic fundamentalism would threaten the region's stability." Lamb, David. (1983). "Iraq-Iran: Two Journeys." *The Washington Quarterly*, 6, 2, p183.

been militarily dependent on the Soviet Union.”⁵⁶ Rustow’s comments provided further credence to this point when he argued that, “Iraq had been closely aligned with Moscow in the 1960s and 1970s, vocal in its stand against Israel, an active claimant to Arab leadership, and a recurrent threat to its immediate Arab neighbors.”⁵⁷ The importance of these two comments is that they discussed Iraq’s military connection to the Soviet Union and helped to establish the argument for Hussein as Soviet puppet. However, despite Iraq’s military dependence on the Soviet Union prior to 1980, it was also verifiable that Hussein was aware of the political ramifications of Iraq’s relationship with the Soviet Union, as seen in the following comment:

The same underlying nationalism ensures that, in Iraq’s case, the relationship with the Soviet Union must always be a contingent one. The Soviet friendship with the Iraqis they regard as the corollary of their enmity toward the United States. Hussein whose public speeches are not always easy to interpret, has put this matter succinctly: “Our relationship with the Soviet Union is not linked to any special time, but to our understanding of the extent and nature of the Arab struggle, as well as to what the Soviet Union can do to help the Arab nation, through agreement on strategies, mutual interest or both.”⁵⁸

Wright’s comments indicated that Hussein did not necessarily view himself as a puppet of the Soviet Union despite how others perceived him. Hussein appears to have aligned himself with the Soviet Union out of economic, political and military necessity.⁵⁹ Note that Hussein’s relationship with the Soviet Union did not stop him from taking an aggressive stance with the Communist party in Iraq. “In 1978, the Government executed

⁵⁶ Wright. (1979). p262.

⁵⁷ Rustow. (1985). p588.

⁵⁸ Wright. (1979). p274.

⁵⁹ The Soviet Union was Iraq’s most important trading partner. Iraq imported \$1.77 billion worth of Soviet goods in the previous year. Wright. (1980 October 26). p43.

21 members for taking part in political activities in the army, and within a year hundreds of Communists had left the country. The party, which has been a legal part of the political scene for more four decades, became (virtually) inactive.”⁶⁰ However, Iraq’s historical relationship with the Soviet Union did serve as a deterrent to Iraq’s willingness to develop diplomatic relations with the U.S.⁶¹ This deterrent was compounded by the fact that the U.S. still essentially depicted Iraq as a Soviet puppet well before the Iran and Iraq war. Furthermore, in 1980 Iraq was suspicious of any potential destabilizing political maneuvers by the U.S. Wright, in an article for the *New York Times*, argued that Hussein foresaw that the U.S. and Israel were “two major impediments to the emergence of a stronger and more independent Arab world.”⁶² However, these previous comments were a testament to Hussein’s willingness to change sides and obtain new allies in order to achieve political and military goals. It is also clear that Hussein did not trust the U.S. at the time. Wright’s following comments captured the level of Iraqi animosity towards the U.S. prior to their involvement in the Iran-Iraq war.

The Iraqi attitude toward the U.S. and toward Israel, which is regarded as entirely an American creature, is less complicated. First, as I have already indicated, the Americans are perceived as directly threatening military intervention and occupation, if necessary, through the Gulf, while Israel is seen as potentially

⁶⁰ Wright. (1980, October 26). p43.

⁶¹ In contrast to Hussein being portrayed simply as a Soviet puppet Amazia Baram argued that “long years of close and highly beneficial cooperation in the political, military, economic and technological fields, however, did not convert Saddam into an unconditional supporter of the USSR nor did it convince him to trust them. In his speeches, and in the decisions of the Regional Leadership under him, the USSR was always treated with an ambivalent attitude, admitting important common aims and ideals, but also stressing ideological and political differences, the fact that Iraq had nowhere else to turn, and that Iraqi –USSR relations depended on Soviet complete understanding of Iraqi sensitivities.” . Baram, Amazia. (1980). “Saddam Hussein a Political Profile.” *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, 17, p116.

⁶² Wright. (1980, October 26). p43.

ready to annihilate the country by nuclear attack⁶³ from the east. In more immediate terms the Iraqis feel that American pressure on Arab oil policy and the potential for Israeli economic expansion in the Middle East (with or without Egypt) constitute fundamental challenges to the goals and methods of Iraqi economic development. The political mobilization of the country's youth, Hussein's diplomatic campaigns in Europe, Africa and the Arab world, the use of the 'oil weapon' these are all elements of a single anti-American, anti-Zionist strategy that will not be softened.⁶⁴

It is apparent in Wright's comments that Hussein expressed concern over any intervention attempts by the U.S. prior to the Iran-Iraq war.⁶⁵ This was why Iraq had maintained ties with the Soviets in order to serve as a countermeasure to any U.S. moves in the Gulf.⁶⁶ It is also the reason Hussein's first face was represented as a Soviet puppet in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy.

Another issue that compounded the portrayal of Hussein as Soviet puppet is that the discourse suggested that the U.S. did not foresee Hussein's potential importance in the Gulf, and were unsure of how to interpret his actions during the early years of his administration. It is also conceivable that Hussein relished in the ambiguity of the United State's interpretation of his current disposition as a Soviet puppet. The following commentary illustrated just how incomplete the U.S. information was concerning Hussein and Iraq in 1980:

⁶³ The first mention of Hussein's nuclear ambitions was mentioned by Wright. (1979). p263, in which she discussed how "Iraq may be developing a military capability unmatched by its allies, with a potential for threatening Israel which has not existed before. This is Iraq's potential nuclear capability. With the development of the French-build Osirak reactor near Baghdad, it may be intent on acquiring the material and technology for arming these missiles with nuclear warheads."

⁶⁴ Wright. (1979). p274.

⁶⁵ Hussein's concerns may have been historically justified. A recently declassified British document indicated that Nixon was prepared to take over oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi in reaction to the oil embargo imposed in 1973. Alvarez, Lizette. (2004, January 1). "Britain says U.S. planned to seize oil in '73' crisis" *New York Times*, Section A; Page 4.

⁶⁶ This view was supported by Wright. (1979). p264.

Mindful of Hammurabi's advice, Hussein is little troubled that many Western observers regard him and his colleagues on the RCC⁶⁷ as wild men of the Arab World. Beyond their borders, they prefer to be feared rather than liked or understood. They are confident that among Arab states, the Baghdad regime is the least knowable, the most unpredictable, and the most difficult for Western or Soviet intelligence services to penetrate.⁶⁸

These comments suggest that the U.S. government during the early 1980s was unfamiliar with Hussein's Baath regime. This might have been due to the combination of Iraqi anti-Americanism, Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union, U.S. relations with the former Shah, and simply not having any open diplomatic channels with Iraq in the 1970s.⁶⁹

The U.S. lack of diplomatic relations with Iraq and their belief that Iraq was beholden to the Soviet Union all contributed to constructing the first image of Hussein in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. Discourse surrounding the Iran-Iraq war indicated that there was a shift in the assertions about Hussein, thus providing the foundation for Hussein's second representation in the expression of U.S. foreign policy. However, before I make note of themes associated with Hussein as an ally, it is imperative that I discuss other themes associated with the puppet image.

The allegation that Hussein was a Soviet puppet implied that he was under the control of another, in this case the government of the Soviet Union. Iraq had allied itself with a nation in which the U.S. had been engaged in a progressive Cold War since the end of World War II. At this time the U.S. interpreted Iraq's relationship with the Soviet Union as unproductive and negative to the interests of U.S. foreign policy. These

⁶⁷ RCC refers to Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council

⁶⁸ Claudia Wright. (1979). p258.

⁶⁹ In an article in the *Washington Quarterly*, Lamb. (1983) argued "that before the war started Iraq was considered one of the more wild-eyed radicals in the Middle East. You could not pick up a newspaper in Baghdad in those days without reading about the satanic policies of the United States or the need to destroy Israel or the evils of the conservative governments in the Gulf." p183.

negative interpretations were also prevalent in the implied character assertions about Hussein in the early 1980s while he was still being characterized as a Soviet puppet.

These negative character assertions developed into significant themes that increased in importance as Hussein's persona continued to evolve. The negative character assertions that revolved around Hussein as a Soviet puppet tended to follow two lines of argument in the discourse of *Foreign Affairs*. First, there were the negative characteristics that were attributed to Hussein when put in comparison with that of Iran. Iraq's secularist and modern nature had prompted verbal retaliations from the Ayatollah Khomeini.⁷⁰ In the Middle East the emancipation of women and secularism were not generally viewed as positive traits.⁷¹ References to Hussein as an infidel were also commonplace as those expressed by Rustow in which he declared that, "Tehran has made the counterclaim that Iraq's Shiite Arab masses were ready to shake off the yoke of that infidel Sunni Saddam Hussein."⁷² One has to understand that Iran's Shiite majority is substantially more religious than the secularist Baath party. The word infidel refers to one who doubts or rejects a particular religious doctrine, system, or belief.⁷³ Such religious references were definitive of the clash in cultures that led to an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ , Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the religious leader who from exile led the popular revolution that toppled Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in 1979. Khomeini was named imam (a successor of Mohammad) and ruled as the supreme leader of Iran until his death 1989.

⁷¹ These traits are discussed in more detail as Hussein's faces transforms from puppet to ally.

⁷² Rustow. (1985). p586.

⁷³ *The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition*. Copyright © 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company.

⁷⁴ Viorst, Milton. (1986). "Iraq at War." *Foreign Affairs*, 65, 2, p357, indicated that Khomeini when alluding to his personal enemies list referred to Hussein and his infidel Baath party.

These religious references ultimately led to Iran declaring that Iraq had been corrupted by the secularism of the Baath party. Milton Viorst, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, reached the determination that “by the standards of Iran’s revolution, Baathism has made of Baghdad not a model for the future, but a den in which the virtues of Islam have given way to modernist corruption.”⁷⁵ Charges of corruption and oppression were two distinct tactics that the Ayatollah utilized when referring to Hussein and the Baath party. Khomeini believed that these statements would help to unite the Shiite’s majority in Iraq against the Baath government.⁷⁶ The importance of the dialogue between these two nations is that it provided the framework for future discussions regarding the oppression and corruption of the Iraqi government. The discourse illustrating these themes of oppression and corruption as portrayed in the propaganda war⁷⁷ by Iran and Iraq increase exponentially as writers in *Foreign Affairs* explore these attributes in subsequent discourse.

The beginning of the Iran-Iraq war also marked the manifestation of personal negative assertions about Hussein’s character that can be attributed to his delineation as a Soviet puppet. The majority of these comments referred to his brutal style of rule and suppression of internal dissent. Viorst put forth the argument that “little seemed to separate Saddam Hussein, sparkplug of the Baath Party and later president, from the

⁷⁵ Viorst. (1986). p356.

⁷⁶ This viewpoint was supported by Sciolino who commented that if Iran defeated Iraq, Iraq would be annexed to Iran and the Iraqi people would free themselves from the talons of the tyrannical clique and link themselves with that of the Iranian nation. Sciolino, Elaine. (1983). “Iran’s Durable Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs*, 61, 4, p906.

⁷⁷ These two articles in the *New York Times* specifically addressed the terminology of the propaganda war as expressed by both Iraq and Iran. Ibrahim, Youssef. (1980, October 7). “Iran and Iraq Fill the Airwaves with Angry Rhetoric.” *New York Times*, Section A, p14. and Kifner, John. (1980, December 8). “In Propaganda War, Iraq’s and Infidel, Iran a Racist.” *New York Times*, Section A, p16.

ruthless Iraqi generals who had ruled before him.”⁷⁸ These comments were yet another early indicator of Hussein’s ruthlessness which was magnified in later portrayals. Writers during this era were also critical of how Hussein generally dealt with his populace. One writer indicated that the “price Iraqis pay to Baath for their religious and cultural tolerance, is a rigorous and sometimes brutal suppression of political dissent.”⁷⁹ “Since 1973, the regime has reacted forcefully at least twice to suppress public demonstrations by the Shiites.”⁸⁰ Regardless of religious differences it becomes clear early in his presidency that Hussein did not tolerate political opinions that differed from his own.⁸¹ In a *New York Times* article, R.W. Apple is supportive of this theme and indicated that “no word of criticism of the ‘leader president’ as Mr. Hussein is often called, creeps into the state controlled press.”⁸² To combat criticisms there was a strong incentive to take preventive measures, diplomatically, economically, and militarily in all aspects of Hussein’s political life.⁸³ Amazia Baram, in an article published in the *Jerusalem Quarterly* offered a rationale for the reasons behind Hussein’s purges and suppression of internal dissent in which he argued that:

⁷⁸ Viorst. (1986). p354.

⁷⁹ Viorst (1986). p356. Rustow. (1985). is also supportive of this position and argues that Hussein had ruthlessly eliminated overt opposition in Iraq, yet had done more than any other predecessor for the social integration of the Shiite majority, p586.

⁸⁰ Wright. (1979). p265.

⁸¹ Former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Richard W. Murphy was quoted as saying that “There is no clear challenge to Saddam, either inside or outside the country. He has taken every precaution to eliminate challenges to his personal leadership. The people around him are extreme loyalists.” Sciolino, Elaine. (1990, August 26). “Confrontations in the Gulf: In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, All Real Power Settles at the Top.” *New York Times*, Section 1, part 1, p18.

⁸² Apple, R.W. (1983, November 23). “Omen In Iraq: The Case of The Vanishing Brothers.” *New York Times*, Section A, p2.

⁸³ A reporter in the *Guardian* summed up Hussein’s view of criticism perfectly. In that “Saddam cannot and will not tolerate any opposition or criticism. You are either for or against Iraq.” Keel, Paul. (1988, September 1). “Saddam Hussein’s new faces of power: The growing force of the president in Baghdad.” *The Guardian*, (London). The irony of the comment is not lost on me. In a later time when discussing the war on terror George W. Bush is quoted as saying “You are either with us or against us.”

If we look for a pattern behind all these details, it emerges that Saddam was determined not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, Qassem, the Arefs and the Baath rule of 1963, mistakes that eventually led to their destruction. Thus central leaders of the previous regime who seemed to present a threat were eliminated. The fatal mistakes made by Qassem and Aref, of allowing Baath leaders to live in relative peace were never to be repeated.⁸⁴

Regardless of the rationale offered for the purges, Hussein had established a pattern of being preemptive to ensure total control of the Iraqi State. This pattern was further illustrated in:

Hussein's refusal to tolerate the formation of independent factions within the RCC or ministries, whatever views they might have held. (Hussein also) struck, as his Assyrian models might have recommended, before his opponents had any chance to threaten him, in a manner which clearly signaled what others might expect if they were tempted in the future.⁸⁵

As Hussein's persona continued to undergo shifts, this pattern of preemptiveness will in future representations be classified as deceitful and deceptive behavior. Wright was very astute at pointing out that Hussein's ruthless behavior was also combined with a political savviness that kept him firmly in control of the Iraqi populace.⁸⁶ "As Tariq Aziz⁸⁷ declared, Saddam Hussein knows that he cannot repress internal political opposition forever, and is mindful of the need to mix a show of mercy and generosity with a stroke of ruthlessness, as if perhaps to compensate for his lack of Nasserist charisma."⁸⁸ These comments about Hussein's suppression of internal dissent were pivotal because they

⁸⁴ Baram. (1980). p121.

⁸⁵ Wright. (1979). p268.

⁸⁶ Karsh. (1991). were supportive of this argument in which they asserted that "the purges marked the beginning of the Saddamization of the Baath, and in consequence the entire nation. The purges provided the ultimate proof of Saddam's naked manipulation of others to achieve his ends and of his unbridled ruthlessness." p117.

⁸⁷ Tariq Aziz has been a member of the Baath party since 1950. He served in various administrative positions in the Iraqi government including foreign minister from 2001-2003.

⁸⁸ Wright. (1979). p268.

provided another indicator for a pattern of rule that Hussein had established in Iraq as early as 1979.

Discussion about Hussein's brutality and thirst to crush internal dissent were negative themes that can be attributed to his first image in U.S. foreign policy. References to his brutal and ruthless rule escalated and gained prominence in future portrayals, especially those focusing on the transformation of his image to that of a dictator and renegade. However, there will be no major emphasis on these particular themes as Hussein's persona underwent its first significant change in his relationship with the U.S. from Soviet Puppet to an American ally. This was significant because the absence of such negative discourse associated with Hussein's next representation implied that he was not engaging in these brutal activities while he was an ally of the U.S. History has revealed that Hussein has always been a ruthless and brutal political leader who has always crushed internal dissent decisively. What is important to derive in this next chapter is that this absence of negative discourse paralleled the U.S. development of a positive relationship with Hussein in order to combat the problematic Ayatollah in Iran. There was a distinct lack of discussion regarding these negative character themes of Hussein after diplomatic relations resumed. The next chapter focuses on the issues that led the U.S. to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq and transform Hussein the Soviet puppet into Hussein the U.S. ally fighting the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

V. FACE OF AN ALLY

Chapter Introduction

This chapter begins by analyzing the events that led up to Hussein's newest representation in U.S. foreign policy as an American ally. Specifically, this chapter addresses issues that led the U.S. to developing a strategic alliance with Iraq in order to counterbalance Khomeini's influence in the Gulf. A review of the discourse indicated that the themes that emerged painted a relatively positive picture of Hussein's persona. Hussein will be portrayed as a "Knight of Arabism" and a positive influence in the Persian Gulf Region. Attention was also given to themes that discussed Saddam's trustworthiness and support for the emancipation of women. This manifestation of Hussein's persona as an ally is derived from the discourse that only shed light on positive qualities associated with Hussein and did not emphasize negative characteristics during a time in which the U.S. had beneficial diplomatic relations with Iraq.

The Iran-Iraq War Transforms Hussein into an Ally

Iranian victories in the Iran-Iraq war served as the catalyst that altered the diplomatic status between the U.S. and Iraq and enabled the emergence of Hussein the American ally. As early as 1982, Washington began to abandon the neutrality policy during the conflict and tilt in favor of Iraq.⁸⁹ This translated into military and financial

⁸⁹ For a quick description of the reasons for the U.S. tilt towards Iraq see: Brummer, Alex. (1985, March 20). "Why America 'tilts' towards Iraq / The US Attitude to the Gulf War." *The Guardian* (London).

support for Iraq's war with Iran.⁹⁰ The U.S. government was prepared to arm Hussein against the religious fundamentalist Khomeini who was considered more problematic at the time. The U.S. relationship had consistently deteriorated with Iran after the overthrow of the Shah and declarations by the provisional government that Iran no longer served American interests in the Persian Gulf and discontinued all past military agreements. This disintegrating relationship was further compounded by Khomeini's endorsement of the Iranian students who stormed the U.S. embassy in October of 1979 and abducted 66 American hostages in protest over the Shah's entrance into the U.S.⁹¹ This situation endured for fifteen months and led to the complete severance of a once close relationship between the U.S. and Iranian governments. The two nations have viewed each other's international maneuvers in the Persian Gulf with suspicion ever since. The loss of a valuable ally in the Middle East provided a valuable motive for the U.S. to look for other political solutions in the Persian Gulf. In 1983, future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Iraq in one of the United States first attempts to resume diplomatic relations with Hussein and activated the first transformation of his political persona. By the midpoint of the war in December of 1984, the U.S. State Department had removed Iraq from the nation's list of terrorist sponsors and formally

⁹⁰ Michael Sterner suggested that the U.S. feared that Iraq might collapse after a string of successive victories by Iran in 1982 and began to abandon their neutrality policy and tilt towards Iraq. Sterner, Michael. (1984). "The Iran-Iraq War." *Foreign Affairs*, 63, 1, p129.

⁹¹ It is interesting to note that prior to problems in the war with Iran, Hussein is reported to have said that "With the issue of the hostages in Iran, we think the United States is trying to use events as an excuse to seek to expand its presence in this area to make a comeback." Wright. (1980, October 26). p43. This is an interesting point because it implies the suspicions Hussein had regarding U.S. intentions in the region prior for his need for military and economic assistance.

resumed diplomatic relations after a 17 year hiatus, thus signaling the transformation of Hussein the puppet into Hussein the ally.

These dramatic political changes in the Gulf led to one of the most interesting comments that highlighted the adjustment in U.S. foreign policy and marked the finalization in Hussein's transformation into an American ally. Elaine Sciolino, a Council on Foreign Relations' Edward R. Murrow Fellow, captured Khomeini's animosity towards this new alliance between Iraq and the U.S. Specifically, she referred to Khomeini's interpretation of "Saddam Hussein as a pro-American mercenary."⁹² This assertion was quite different from those of earlier writers who portrayed Hussein as beholden to the Soviet Union. The creation of Hussein the ally can be attributed to American fears of how an Iranian victory might impact the Persian Gulf in the future. Nevertheless, the U.S. was aware that the presence of an ally in the region could be used to counterbalance Iran's influence in the Gulf. Hussein's materialization as an ally inevitably led to a decrease in the negative character assertions and the emergence of positive themes prior to his invasion of Kuwait in 1990. One of these positive themes was the continuation of discourse which compared Hussein to past distinguished Arab leaders.

Hussein's transformation into an American ally did not alter this earlier theme that compared Hussein to influential leaders of Arab's Mesopotamian and Babylonian past. New assertions and themes emerged that compared him to instrumental leaders in the 20th century Arab world. Most significant were numerous comparisons to Gamal

⁹² Sciolino, Elaine. (1983). "Iran's Durable Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, 61, 4, p912.

Abdel-Nasser, a prominent leader in Egypt in the 1950s and 1960s.⁹³ Nasser had been very influential in Middle Eastern politics and concerned with restoring Pan-Arab unity.

William Quandt, a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Study Policy Studies Program, at the Brookings Institution, made comments typical of these comparisons “in many ways, Saddam Hussein was emulating a much more imposing figure from recent Arab history, Gamal Abdel-Nasser of Egypt. Like Nasser, Saddam Hussein implied that there was a void in the Arab world that could only be filled by a strong leader.”⁹⁴ “Not surprisingly, Saddam Hussein read the susceptibility of the Arab popular opinion to a strong leader very well.”⁹⁵ Hussein believed that he had the potential to fill this void that Quandt implied existed in the Arab world.⁹⁶ This theme perhaps was better captured by Fouad Ajami, a professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at the John Hopkins University.

Not the most articulate of leaders, Saddam Hussein found his themes as he went along. He annexed the dreams and resentments of other Arabs, appealing to their atavistic impulses. Hurriedly he rolled out his own map of a phantom Arab nation and picked up an old weapon. In the barracks and academies there had once been a vision of Arab history, a memory of a time when the Arab world was supposedly one and whole, a tale of betrayal at the hand of European powers, and the dream of a leader that would set history right again. That was the material that Gamal Abdul al-Nasser of Egypt had worked with three decades ago, and that was the material that Saddam Hussein would try to revive.⁹⁷

⁹³ Gamal Abdel Nasser led a nationalist movement in 1952 that ousted the Egyptian monarchy and transformed Egypt into a Republic. Nasser became leader of Egypt in 1954 and subsequently negotiated an end to Britain's 72-year occupation of Egypt. Ruling dates 1954-1970. Baram. (1980). indicated that Hussein “was greatly influenced by Nasser's personality and teachings (while in Cairo); Nasserite ideological influence is particularly evident in his concept of Socialism, p116.

⁹⁴ Quandt, William B. (1990). “The Middle East in 1990.” *Foreign Affairs*, 65, 1, p50.

⁹⁵ Quandt. (1990). p53.

⁹⁶ Quandt. (1990). p51, suggested that Hussein's answer to the problems of Arab society was a simple one, power, or in somewhat more glamorous wording, an independent Arab will

⁹⁷ Ajami, Fouad. (1990). “The Summer of Arab Discontent.” *Foreign Affairs*, 69, 5, p2.

The importance of these comparisons to Nasser is that they carried highly different connotations from those of Hammurabi and Sargon II. Gone were the links to brutality and ruthlessness that those earlier leaders possessed. Links to Nasser indicated that Hussein had come of age and was ready to fill the gap of a unifying leader in Arab politics. "His brutal past, it was said, was surely behind him; he had matured and changed. Hussein now let the disgruntled read into him what they wished. He offered himself to the imagination of the thwarted. He was a second Nasser, said a Jordanian, but a Nasser with teeth."⁹⁸ This rise in popularity paralleled Hussein's growing relationship with the U.S. In the beginning Hussein assumed the face of a Soviet puppet and was characterized as an emerging leader with a thirst for brutality. Hussein the ally was portrayed as a hero leader and savior of the Arab people.

Hussein the ally in *Foreign Affairs* was a proponent of Middle Eastern virtues who wanted to restore Pan-Arab unity. "In the West Bank and Gaza, they had been waiting for an Arab cavalry, and Saddam Hussein was the Knight of Arabism riding to their rescue. He was the Second Saladin, said a school teacher in the town of Beit Jajjar, on the West Bank."⁹⁹ This same author would later assert that "to be sure, some Arab intellectuals among the Palestinians and the North Africans said that Saddam Hussein expressed the 'hidden anguish' of the Arab soul when he (later) moved against Kuwait."¹⁰⁰ Other authors were supportive of this position and further stated that, "Iraq's Saddam Hussein has presented himself as the defender of the Palestinians."¹⁰¹ These

⁹⁸ Ajami. (1990). p3

⁹⁹ Ajami. (1990). p4.

¹⁰⁰ Ajami. (1990). p8-9.

¹⁰¹ Quandt. (1990). p53.

were all important statements because they stipulated that Hussein had presented himself, and had been accepted, as being a legitimate defender of the Arab people. Hussein the ally was depicted as a modern day crusader defending Middle Eastern virtues. These references to Saladin and Nasser all gave substance to the perception that some believed Hussein had the capability to unite the Arab world and be a positive force in the region. It is interesting to note here that prior to the Persian Gulf War, Hussein was seen as a relatively positive influence in the region. Hussein the ally was a hero-leader, a Knight of Arabism, a defender of the Arab people, and a pro-American mercenary. His cruelty and brutish behavior were downplayed in print until Hussein provoked the U.S. by threatening its economic interests in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This provocation in Kuwait led to another shift in U.S. foreign policy that unveiled another image of Hussein in the discourse. However, before we examine Hussein the dictator, it is imperative to review other positive themes that emerged while Hussein was still represented as an ally.

The creation of Hussein the ally led to the manifestation of several new positive themes in Hussein. What makes this so significant is that in no other era or representation of Hussein were any positive themes identified. These positive attributes were in direct correlation with the shift in Hussein's status with the U.S. during the Iran-Iraq war. Hussein had become "our kind of guy," thus pre-empting any potential negative dialogue that might have emerged. The unveiling of positive discourse and themes surrounding Hussein is the highlight of Hussein the ally's representation in *Foreign Affairs*. Special attention during this time period was given to the freedoms that

women in Iraq were granted in contrast to other Arab countries in the region.¹⁰² Viorst, published an article in 1986 that explored how Hussein's Baathism supported education and technology and the emancipation of women:

To experience Baathism as a culture, it is necessary to see Baghdad. Look beyond the panels that everywhere display the likeness of Saddam Hussein, bemedaled in uniform or embracing his children, in Bedouin headdress or in elegantly tailored Italian suites, atop a stallion or, least convincingly, on his knees in prayer. It is the women who are the index of Baathism. They make their presence felt in the daytime in shops and offices and, in the evening, many come out to stroll. Most wear Western clothes. They walk with men, sometimes hand in hand, along the avenues. They picnic with their families in the parks and dine with them in the fish restaurants on the banks of the Tigris. Some dance with male companions in the cabarets of the major hotels. Their presence gives the city, despite the scarcities and tensions of wartime, a more debonair quality than that of any other Arab capital.¹⁰³

These words expressed by Viorst were written during the Iran-Iraq war and contrasted the nations of Iraq and Iran.¹⁰⁴ Iraq was presented as a secular and exceedingly modernized nation in terms of the rest of the Middle East. The emancipation of women, support for education, and material prosperity were all in direct conflict with the ideology expressed by Khomeini in Iran. In fact, Viorst argued that, "like Zionism, Baathism speaks of creating a new society, freed of the shackles of an oppressive past. It supports education and technology, the emancipation of women, economic development

¹⁰² This view is consistent with Wright's article in the *New York Times* in which she argued that "Iraqi women are among the most emancipated in the Arab world. They drive their own cars, follow the latest European fashions and don't hesitate to challenge men for jobs." Wright. (1980, October 26). p43.

¹⁰³ Viorst. (1986). p356.

¹⁰⁴ This viewpoint is also supported by Elaine Sciolino who stated that "Women enjoyed more freedom in Iraq than almost anywhere else in the Arab World. They drove cars, dressed as they pleased, went to college, voted and held more than 10 percent of the seats in the showcase National Assembly." Sciolino (1991). p99. Roger Hilsman was also supportive of this position and indicated that "twice as many women attended primary schools in Iraq before the Gulf War as in Kuwait and three times as many as in Saudi Arabia." Hilsman, Roger. (1992). *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?* Novato, LYFORD Books, p234. You can also see evidence of this theme in the *New York Times* by Apple. (1983, November 23). who discussed "how most women went without veils and were free to hold any kinds of jobs that they could obtain." p2.

and material prosperity.”¹⁰⁵ These were all freedoms that seemed to be lacking in other parts of the Middle East including Saudi Arabia, a longtime ally of the U.S.¹⁰⁶ This depiction of Hussein was consistent with the U.S. willingness to accentuate the positive discourse surrounding their new Arab ally.

Hussein the ally was also depicted in print as someone who could be trusted. Stanley Reed, *Business Week*'s Middle East specialist, quoted the king of Jordan as stating, “days after the Iraqi invasion the king told NBC news that Saddam Hussein was a person to be trusted and dealt with. And he called the Iraqi president an Arab patriot in the eyes of many.”¹⁰⁷ The fact that some viewed Hussein as someone who can be trusted was a strong barometer of Hussein the ally. The discourse in *Foreign Affairs* which now focused on Hussein's positive traits was not concerned with exploring his brutality and ruthlessness during the majority of the 1980s while he assumed the face of an ally. The discourse within *Foreign Affairs* did not discuss any of these negative assertions and themes in print during this period.¹⁰⁸ It was not in line with U.S. interests to focus on negative characteristics of a leader who was at the time an asset. Irene Gendzier, a historian, summed up the attitude regarding supporting the dictatorship of Iraq in the 1980s quite well: “In the Iraqi case, doing business with dictators was justified in terms of oil and national security, even though evidence of the brutality of the regime was well

¹⁰⁵ Viorst. (1986). p355.

¹⁰⁶ The *Economist* also depicted the positive treatment of women in Iraqi society when compared to other countries in the Middle East. The good part of Saddam Hussein's war. (1984, March 24). *The Economist*, Section: World Politics and current affairs, (U.S Edition p31).

¹⁰⁷ Reed, Stanley. (1990). “Jordan and the Gulf Crisis.” *Foreign Affairs*, 69, 5, p21.

¹⁰⁸ I did find an article published in the New York Times that discussed Hussein's brutality and suppression of internal dissent during this time period. See: Sciolino, Elaine. (1985, February 3). “The Big Brother: Iraq under Saddam Hussein.” *New York Times*, Section 6, p16.

known.”¹⁰⁹ Gendzier’s comments helped to clarify that there was no apparent need to muddle a relationship in which the U.S. had gained a valuable fortification against their common enemy Iran, with negative character accusations concerning Hussein.

This materialization of positive discourse proved to be the anomaly over Hussein’s twenty four year relationship with the U.S. The majority of that time would not be spent discussing Hussein the ally. Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to a dramatic shift in the representation of Hussein’s image in *Foreign Affairs*. This can be attributed to Hussein no longer being depicted as an “American mercenary” but rather as a leader who had fallen out of political favor with the current U.S. government. This next chapter focuses on analyzing Hussein the ally’s transformation into Hussein the dictator by examining the shift in discourse that surrounded his invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s.

¹⁰⁹ Gendzier, Irene L. (2002). “Invisible by Design: US Policy in the Middle East.” *Diplomatic History*, 26, 4, p601.

VI. FACE OF A DICTATOR

Chapter Introduction

The invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, marked the beginning of the next shift in Hussein's persona from a valuable ally to a dictator. This chapter focuses on analyzing the discussion in *Foreign Affairs* that transformed Hussein from an ally to a dictator in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy as expressed in *Foreign Affairs*. It is imperative to begin by exploring the events leading up to his invasion of Kuwait. It is essential that we begin discussing Hussein the dictator by analyzing new themes that suggested his ambitious and aggressive behavior now constituted a threat to the countries in the region and the economic interests of the U.S. government. The materialization of Hussein as a threat provided the foundation for Hussein the dictator in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. Hussein's metamorphosis was a pivotal point in the evolution of his overall persona because at no point prior to the Persian Gulf War had he been characterized as a dictator in the discourse of *Foreign Affairs*. This chapter analyzes in detail the discussion that insisted on categorizing Hussein as a dictator, tyrant, or strongman. Hussein's transition to a dictator focused on his absolute rule in Iraq and his unwillingness to compromise his goals for the sake of international unity. Furthermore, sufficient detail was given to analyzing the recurrence of the brutality, ruthlessness, and cruelty themes associated with Hussein the dictator. The return of this negative discourse was placed in the context of Hussein's declining status with the U.S. after his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 in order to construct his dictator image.

Historical Background for Hussein's Invasion of Kuwait

The roots of Hussein's grievances with Kuwait were both historical and economical in nature following his war with Iran in the 1980s. Historically, Hussein's grievances with Kuwait go back to the early 20th century when the British carved up the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Following World War I, Sir Percy Cox, a British High Commissioner, established by imperial decree the modern day borders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq at what would become known as the Uqair conference. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait appeared to have accepted these new borders, but for the most part Iraq felt slighted from this British reorganization. According to Glen Frankel, "Iraq was denied a viable outlet to the Persian Gulf, and a sense of injustice would fester over three generations and would be a major factor in the eight year war with Iran and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait."¹¹⁰ Hussein offered many rationales for the occupation of Kuwait. "But the one that resonated deeply in the hearts and minds of both his own people and of the Arab world in general is his claim to have redressed a wrong inflicted by British imperialism."¹¹¹ Historians did mention that Hussein's arguments and the lines drawn by the British did indeed make Iraq feel disrespected by the results of the Uqair conference. This decree in the nineteenth century provided the historical foundation for a border dispute that escalated for another eighty years. However, Hussein's grievances against Kuwait were not only historical in nature. There were definite economic concerns of that prompted his invasion of Kuwait. After eight years of war with Iran,

¹¹⁰ Frankel, Glen. (1991). "Lines in the Sand." In Micah L Sifry and Christopher Cerf's *The Gulf War Reader*. p16-20. New York: Times Books a Division of Random House.

¹¹¹ Frankel. (1991). p17.

Hussein's coffers were empty and there were extensive debts owed to both Arab and foreign creditors. Hussein also was under the impression that he was owed financial support from Kuwait and other countries following his conflict with Iran as expressed in this following comment:

In the summer of 1990 Kuwait was left to the tender mercies of the Iraqis. The Kuwaitis were in the way of a state possessed of considerable power, as sense that the world around it owed it a great debt for the service it had performed in its long struggle against the Iranian revolution. Saddam Hussein had been a protector and gendarme. He now came to collect what he saw as the fair wages of the work he had done.¹¹²

Ajami's comments gave credence to the belief that Hussein felt slighted by the Arab countries which had backed him and supported him during his extended cultural war with Iran. However, regardless of Hussein's motivations for his occupation of Kuwait the framework had been provided for another conflict in the Persian Gulf region. These factors combined with Hussein's ambition and history of aggression led to the formation of Hussein the dictator in *Foreign Affairs*.

Hussein's Ambition and Aggression Start to Constitute a Threat

Ambition has been a hallmark trait of Hussein's character since his failed assassination attempt on Iraqi leader Abdul Karim Kassem¹¹³ in 1959. Hussein had been known as a rising force in the Baath party since the 1960s. His calculated (by his standards) but reckless (by American military analysts' standards) invasion of Iran a

¹¹² Ajami. 1990). p1.

¹¹³ Kassem, Abdul Karim (1914-1963) premier of Iraq and leader of the military coup that in 1958 overthrew the monarchy of King Faisal II. Kassem's rule lasted until February 8, 1963, when a coup led by Iraqi air force officers, most of them members of the nationalist Baath party ousted Kassem's government. Kassem was executed on the following day.

decade earlier was an early indicator of the grandiose plans he had for the Iraqi nation.¹¹⁴ Hussein's tactics during these earlier adventures were often overlooked by his benefactors while he assumed the roles of both a puppet and ally. His next attempt at gulf mastery provided the basis for a shift in discourse which introduced him as Hussein the dictator and resulted in another change in U.S. policy in the gulf.¹¹⁵ In order to fully understand this transition in Hussein's character we must first examine the early discourse surrounding the Persian Gulf War that categorized him as ambitious, reckless, and eventually a threat to the safety of the Middle Eastern community. The following passage by Ajami eloquently captured Hussein's ambitious attempt of claiming dominance in the Persian Gulf:

From the town of Takrit in the Tigris Valley, Saddam Hussein rose and reached for it all: mastery of the gulf, establishment of a new center of Arab power in the land between the two rivers. His was the third bid in the post-World War II years to dominate the politics of the Arab/Muslim region. The first was Nasser's, the second was Khomeini's. The third bid could not succeed. It was too cruel, too blunt, its audacity helped forge a coalition determined to thwart it.¹¹⁶

Hussein's invasion of Kuwait was his next attempt at seeking to gain a more prominent position in the gulf and to bring attention to the dictatorship of Iraq. In looking for the reason for Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, Quandt asked the question that "what other than raw ambition has fueled Saddam Hussein's drive for hegemony."¹¹⁷ During his war with

¹¹⁴ Otto Friedrich argued that "what distinguishes Saddam Hussein from the rulers of other lands is that he is not content merely to 'be' President. He has a vision – some would say a delusion – of grandeur for himself and for Iraq; but the only way he knows to pursue the dream are to bully and take." Friedrich, Otto. (1990, August 13). "Master of His Universe." *Time*, 136, 7, p23-24.

¹¹⁵ According to Edward Peck, "Getting rid of Saddam Hussein has been the cornerstone of our Iraq policy since his 1989 invasion of Kuwait, when he changed from good guy –who we helped defend, along with our oil interests, against Iran – to a really bad guy." Peck, Edward. (2001). "Doing it all Wrong in the Middle East." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 12, 4, p14.

¹¹⁶ Ajami. (1990). p17.

¹¹⁷ Quandt. p51.

Iran, Hussein the ally's ambitious and aggressive nature was often overlooked. However, Hussein's newest attempt at hegemony did not receive the same positive support he had previously obtained during his conflict with Iran. Instead of being characterized as an instrument of Arab redemption, his attempt at gulf domination instead inspired new themes that categorized him as a leader promoting an aggressive foreign policy.¹¹⁸

Hussein's occupation of Kuwait and the aggressiveness of his government provided the foundation for many assertions that identified him as the leader of a nation that was intent on being the preeminent influence in the Gulf. Writers of this era took great pains to compare Hussein's attempt at dominance in the Gulf to that of Khomeini's the decade before. One author captured this theme in the following assertion: "No sooner had the Arab/Muslim world said farewell to the wrath and passion of the Ayatollah Khomeini's crusade than another contender rose in Baghdad."¹¹⁹ Hussein's bid for power in the Gulf did possess similarities to Khomeini's failed bid the decade before. Both leaders sought to control the Persian Gulf for their own national interests and ideological agendas. However, there were two key differences in these campaigns. The most obvious is that Iran's overall objective was to spread a fundamental brand of Islam across the entire Middle East. Whereas Iraq, a more modernized and secular nation, was more interested in securing prominence and wealth with its invasion of Kuwait. The next key difference is the shift of alliances that occurred with each attempt. The U.S. and

¹¹⁸ Hans Magnus Enzenberger compared Hussein's continuing aggression to Hitler's a half a century earlier. To paraphrase, "Saddam Hussein is driven by the urge for aggression. He will manipulate any cause or provide any reason to justify his aggression." Enzenberger, Hans Magnus. (1991, February 9). "The Gulf War: The second coming of Adolf Hitler Hans Magnus Engzenberger views Saddam Hussein in the mirror of German history and concludes that he must be destroyed." *The Guardian (London)*.

¹¹⁹ Ajami. (1990). p1.

many Middle Eastern countries provided the financial and military backing for Hussein the ally to ensure that Khomeini failed in his attempt to impose Iran's ideology beyond its borders. Hussein the dictator's invasion of Kuwait sparked a coalition that was determined to thwart his plans for Kuwait and the Middle East. Hussein, impeded by his declining relationship with the U.S., now found himself not only at odds with the Middle Eastern community, but his former ally as well.

It is apparent that Hussein was attempting to increase Iraq's economic status when he moved into Kuwait in 1990 and to settle a long historical feud of border disputes.¹²⁰ The audacity of Hussein's actions provided the basis for many to believe that Hussein was continuing a reckless pattern that he had established with his abortive invasion of Iran. However, as stated earlier there was one key difference between the two conflicts. Previously Hussein had been depicted as an ally while he was engaged against Iran. Hussein did not receive that same luxury as his image changed into a dictator upon his invasion of Kuwait. Hussein's occupation of Kuwait upset the balance in the Middle East and generated a formidable concern for the U.S.¹²¹ Quandt's remarks typified America's newfound cynicism toward Hussein and the problems his invasion created: "Saddam Hussein of Iraq (had) upset the patterns of Middle East politics by his reckless

¹²⁰ Ajami. (1990). p2, stated that "Saddam Hussein rallied against the colonial borders of the Arab world. Those borders were false and contrived, he said, and they had placed Arab demographic weight on one side and Arab wealth on the other."

¹²¹ Bush, George H. W. (1990, August 2). Remarks and an exchange with reporters on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. "The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait. We call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all the Iraqi forces. There is no place for this sort of naked aggression in today's world, and I've taken a number of steps to indicate the deep concern that I feel over the events that have taken place. Needless to say, we view the situation with the utmost gravity. We remain committed to take whatever steps are necessary to defend our longstanding, vital interests in the Gulf."

invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.”¹²² Various comments expressed during the Persian Gulf War described Hussein’s ambition as a reckless attempt at gulf mastery. Hussein’s offensive foray threatened the stability of the entire gulf region, not to mention his own fate.¹²³ Moreover, *Foreign Affairs* assertions provided the assumption that Hussein’s latest change in persona was attributed to the fact that his occupation of Kuwait now threatened Saudi Arabia, a crucial commercial ally of the U.S. Saudi Arabia’s concerns prompted calls for foreign help in dealing with Hussein. “The tyrant has to be contained, “an influential Sheikh wrote,” lest his tyranny spread. The gulf states had a right to ask for foreign assistance to protect themselves against a treacherous brother.”¹²⁴ There was credence to the idea that Hussein believed that the U.S. would not interfere when he entered Kuwait in August of 1990. David Gergen, editor at large for *U.S. News and World Report*, took the position that “in August of 1990 Hussein apparently thought the U.S. would allow him free passage. Had he not menaced Saudi Arabia as well, he might have been right.”¹²⁵ In the words of President George Bush, “A line has been drawn in the sand” against any Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.¹²⁶ The threat of a forcible takeover of Saudi oilfields prompted the U.S. to then identify Hussein as a potential

¹²² Quandt. (1990). p49.

¹²³ Quandt. (1990). p51, stated that “Iraq, which had all the ingredients to become a relatively modern and prosperous country in the late 1970s, was posed once again in 1990 to tackle its internal problems. But its hero-leader mortgaged his country’s future for the second time by his grab for Kuwait’s wealth.”

¹²⁴ Ajami. (1990). p9.

¹²⁵ Gergen, David. (1991). “America’s Missed Opportunities.” *Foreign Affairs*, 71, 1, p5.

Ajami. (1990). p16, indicated that the House of Saud was very concerned with the Iraqi invasion. Specifically, “they knew the panic of their country and the magnitude of the Iraqi threat. To them fell the task of drawing out the moral horrors and violations of custom and precedent committed by the Iraqis in Kuwait.”

¹²⁶ Apple. R.W. (1990, August 9). “Confrontation in the Gulf: U.S. may send Saudis A force of 50,000; Iraq proclaims Kuwait annexation.” *New York Times*, Section A, p1.

threat to American economic interests in the Gulf.¹²⁷ Hussein the dictator's hazardous invasion of Kuwait marked a departure from the way his persona had previously been depicted in print. Hussein was no longer a "pro-American mercenary" and an ally in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. Hussein the dictator was perceived as the personification of a threat that could be harmful to the U.S. economic interests in the Persian Gulf.

Hussein had always been a threat to his neighbors in the Gulf despite the lack of such assertions in print in previous representations. There was little doubt that Hussein's overall character had undergone major dramatic changes while he had been the president of the Iraqi governing body. What had changed though is that Hussein the dictator no longer was an ally engaged in a war against a vocal opponent of the U.S. Moreover, Hussein was no longer receiving blank checks from the Middle Eastern community to prevent an Iranian victory. However, the financial and military contributions from these countries and the U.S. provided an unfortunate side effect. Unbeknown at the time this former alliance contributed to the materialization of the threat Hussein's dictatorship now posed in the region. "This is how Saddam Hussein himself rose to become such a threat in the first place: everyone had indulged him because he was seen as a bulwark against the revolutionary turmoil of the Iranian state."¹²⁸ Ajami's comments gave credence to the

¹²⁷ In an interview noted Iraqi historian, Charles Tripp, discussed that there was a "strong thesis which argues that the capture of Kuwait was, in a sense, the first move in a game with Saudi Arabia. He didn't want to capture Saudi Arabian oil wells, but what he wanted to do was basically be paid to withdraw from Kuwait. He thought that (the invasion of Kuwait) would be a ploy whereby he could recover the billions that he now owed through some kind of arrangement with Saudi Arabia and perhaps with Kuwait itself." Gross, Terry (Anchor). (2002, September 25). "Charles Tripp discusses the history of Iraq and the rule of Saddam Hussein on *Fresh Air*." National Public Radio.

¹²⁸ Ajami. (1990). p19.

belief that the current and future images of Hussein as a dictator, renegade, and archenemy were partially attributed to the aid he received from the U.S. and Middle Eastern nations.

Regardless of who was at fault for the creation of the threat Hussein the dictator posed, he was portrayed as one.¹²⁹ Nations and writers then reflected on the new threat and the problems Hussein posed for his neighbors. President Ozal of Turkey was aware of the dangers presented by Hussein on his border with Iraq. His opinions were captured by Bruce Kuniholm, director of Duke University's Institute of Policy Sciences and Public Affairs:

President Ozal was mindful of the larger context within which Saddam Hussein Hussein's actions were to be seen. He emphasized that his stand was one of principle: it concerned the norms of international behavior and the fundamental tenets of the U.N. Charter. Ozal was also mindful, however, of the serious threat Hussein posed, and of the necessity of taking risks to effect Turkey's interests.¹³⁰

Hussein the dictator's aggressive takeover of Kuwait now was represented as a violation of international law. Turkey's nervousness highlighted the growing danger of Hussein's dictatorship in the region.

Hussein's persona had now undergone a radical change due to the implications that he was now a threat. Not only had Hussein become a danger to his neighbors, he was characterized as a direct threat to American economic interests in the Gulf.

Hussein's invasion of Kuwait represented a turning point in which the American public

¹²⁹ For a brief explanation of the culpability in the U.S. relationship with Iraq see: Hornick, Richard. (1990, June 11). "With a little help from friends: how the U.S. and its allies share the blame for Iraq's emergence as one of the world's most dangerous nations." *Time*, 135, 24, p34. and Lacayo, Richard. (1992, June 8). "Did Bush create this monster." *Time*, 139, 23, p41-43.

¹³⁰ Kuniholm, Bruce R. (1991). "Turkey and the West." *Foreign Affairs*, 70, 2, p46.

first became aware of how threatening Hussein could be to the economic interests of the U.S. His ruthlessness and bullying tactics previously overlooked by the U.S. government and public while he was an ally became more prominent in discussion. Faced with the disintegration of a former viable relationship, President Bush's official statements indicated that he had become more concerned with the welfare of the Iraqi people. In his words, "The brutality against innocent civilians will not be tolerated and cannot stand. No one is more determined to see this aggression turned back than I am, and I will not change on that fundamental point of morality."¹³¹ President Bush, in a presidential news conference, went as far as to compare Hussein the dictator's actions to that of Hitler's a half a century before.¹³² Previously there had been sparse references to Hussein's morality in the twelve years of discourse in *Foreign Affairs*. Gergen's subsequent comments are a symbol of this transition, "First, in contrast to most other foreign policy threats Americans could readily see that Saddam Hussein's invasion posed a clear and present danger to their own well-being."¹³³ Gergen's evaluation of Hussein was emblematic of Hussein the dictator's representation in *Foreign Affairs*. Hussein was now described in print as a danger to the American public and government's economic

¹³¹ Walker, Martin and Ed Vulliamy. (1990, November 2). "Bush presses home withdrawal demand. President Bush compares Saddam Hussein unfavorably to Hitler." *The Guardian (London)*.

¹³² Bush, George H. W. (1990, November 1). The Presidents News Conference in Orlando Florida. For a perspective on Hitler as a historical analogy to Hussein's invasion of Kuwait please see MacDonald, Scot. (2002). "Hitler's Shadow: Historical Analogies and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait." *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 13, 4, p29-59.

¹³³ Gergen. (1991). p5.

interests.¹³⁴ Gergen's assertions revealed how Hussein's persona in U.S. foreign policy shifted away from the development of any positive themes concerning Hussein.

Hussein Manifests into a Dictator Upon Becoming a Threat

Hussein's threat status resulted in the manifestation Hussein the dictator in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. Prior to 1990, no article in *Foreign Affairs* referred to Hussein as either a dictator or tyrant. During and after the invasion of Kuwait there were numerous references to Hussein as a tyrant, dictator, or despot. Attention now was riveted to discussing the emergence of his dictatorship and the role it played in the Persian Gulf. This completed the transformation of Hussein from an American ally into a dictator as expressed in the *Foreign Affairs*.. This change in discourse was represented in the following statement, which presented Hussein

as not a writer of treatises on Islamic government nor a product of high learning in religious seminaries. Not for him were the drawn-out ideological struggles for the hearts and minds of the faithful. He came from a brittle land, a frontier country between Persia and Arabia, with little claim to culture and books and grand ideas. The new contender was a despot, a ruthless and skilled warden who had tamed his domain and turned it into a large prison.¹³⁵

These comments indicated that Hussein was no longer just the leader of Iraq when referred to in print. Writers now attached words such as despot, dictator, and tyrant when referring to Hussein. He was presented as a man who was feared and possessed no scruples. Hussein the dictator resulted in numerous new and old negative themes

¹³⁴ This theme eventually escalated into the last face of Hussein when he was portrayed as an enemy threatening the security of the U.S.

¹³⁵ Ajami. (1990). p1.

emerging after his invasion of Kuwait.¹³⁶ Rune Ottosen's (1995) study even found that the term Hitler was linked to Hussein in twenty-five percent of all cases pertaining to U.S. news coverage of the Gulf War.¹³⁷ Ajami's comments also provided a buttress for these newly constructed negative themes which focused on how Hussein controlled the Iraqi people through the institution of fear:

Arab/Muslim society had not been able to produce democratic politics or to check the tyranny of despots who step forth and claim it all. That society knows a tyrant when it sees one, and it may obey. For the Iraqi strongman there was no love, he had not tapped that kind of sentiment. He had presented himself as a man to be feared.¹³⁸

Ajami's comments were important for several different reasons. First, there was the assertion that democracy had not been able to flourish in the Middle East or Iraq. The lack of democratic politics in Iraq were discussed in more detail as Hussein was portrayed as an archenemy to the national security of the U.S. During this period there was an escalation in discourse surrounding the lack of democracy in Iraq as a reason for going to war. Second, the lack of democracy in Iraq was now associated with the word tyrant. The use of the word tyrant was helpful in demonizing Hussein in *Foreign Affairs*. Finally, the assertion that he was a man to be feared provided the groundwork for the return and escalation of previous themes that emphasized Hussein's brutality, cruelty and ruthless behavior.

¹³⁶ These assertions were also displayed in this comment by a reporter from the *Guardian* who compared Hussein's actions to Hitler. Hussein was "a dictator, whose 'Republic of Fear' bears comparison in its own modest way to the totalitarian monstrosities presided over by Stalin and Hitler, attacked and occupied, without due provocation, an independent sovereign state, murdering its citizens, destroying its property, and plundering its wealth with a ruthlessness of a Nazi blitzkrieg." Ruthven, Malise. (1992, February 6). "The War to Hush Saddam's Mouth." *The Guardian (London)*. p26.

¹³⁷ Ottosen, Rune. (1995). "Enemy Images and the Journalist process." *Journal of Peace Research*, 32, 1, p99.

¹³⁸ Ajami. (1990). p8.

The U.S. had been aware of Hussein's brutality and ruthless behavior for decades. These themes did appear in the first chapter of analysis when Hussein was presented as a Soviet puppet. There was a complete absence of these themes in the coverage of Hussein the ally. However, these themes made a re-emergence after Hussein's transition from ally to dictator following his invasion of Kuwait. Quandt, indicated that now Hussein's "regime was seen as brutal, even by Middle Eastern standards."¹³⁹ Writers during this period suggested that Hussein's behavior was no longer constricted by the rule of law or morals as expressed in the following statement:

Saddam Hussein's bid closed a circle; the pan-Arab arguments and radical sensibility of the 1950's returned. The new bid, though, had behind it the cruelty of the man at the helm of the Iraqi state, its weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein's conviction that he lived in a political world shorn of all restraints and scruples. Saddam had implicated much of this world (gulf Arabs, Egyptians) and powers beyond (Americans, French) in his anti-Iranian and anti Shia drive, in the cruelty of what he did at home. It is no wonder he was impervious to judgment, why he acted as though he himself had been betrayed by the furious response to his invasion of Kuwait.¹⁴⁰

There is a lot of information to glean from this author's assertions and the implications for Hussein the dictator. First of all, Ajami pointed out that Hussein had been engaging in brutal and cruel acts against his own people in Iraq. This theme gains prominence in the next chapter when Hussein is represented as a renegade. There is also significant attention to Hussein's brutality and suppression of his own people as dialogue shifted to discuss the inner workings of Hussein's dictatorship. Second, Ajami also pointed out that Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. (WMD). This assertion was pivotal in analyzing Hussein's last representation in U.S. foreign policy when he was constructed as

¹³⁹ Quandt. (1990). p51.

¹⁴⁰ Ajami. (1990). p13.

an archenemy to the U.S. national security. Hussein's possession of WMD was the primary reason for the George W. Bush administration's justification for war with Iraq in 2003. Finally, the author made the point that the countries in the Middle East and the U.S. were aware of Hussein's suppression of his own people. These qualities were overlooked while Hussein the ally was immersed in a war with Iran during the 1980s. As indicated earlier, the U.S. and various Middle Eastern governments were well prepared to finance and arm Hussein against what was perceived at the time as the bigger threat to the sanctity of the Persian Gulf. Hussein's invasion of Kuwait resulted in a change in all of those past allegiances. Ajami provided the assumption that Hussein might have been justified in his bewilderment at the furious response his invasion of Kuwait received from his former allies. However, in the discourse of Hussein's persona in U.S. foreign policy, it is irrelevant. Hussein's persona had already undergone an irreparable shift into a dictator that only spiraled downward in the remaining 12 years of his dictatorship.

Hussein's brutality, long overlooked due to his former alliance, was now a topic that warranted increased discussion due to the shift in Hussein's political relationship with the U.S. At this point, the negative assertions and themes surrounding Hussein escalated. There was increased attention to Hussein's unwillingness to bend to the U.S. will, as well as significant focus on the horrors and atrocities that he had committed on his own people.¹⁴¹ The next chapter captures this escalation as the analysis discusses the

¹⁴¹ Of particular significance during Hussein's dictator face is the first mention of Hussein's slaughter of the Kurds in a book review by John Campbell three years after the fact. However, there was no significant attention given to this in any of the articles of this era. Campbell, John C. (1991). "Human Rights in Iraq/ Human Rights in Syria/ The Israeli Army and the Infitada (Book). *Foreign Affairs*, 70, 2, p197.

evolution into Hussein the renegade who committed numerous atrocities against his own people and defied international will.

VII. FACE OF A RENEGADE

Chapter Introduction

Hussein's defeat in his pursuit of Kuwait introduced the next phase in a series of image changes that captured the continuous shifts in his relationship with the U.S. as seen through the discourse of *Foreign Affairs*. The once formidable ally in the U.S. bid to leverage the Ayatollah's power in Iran now took every foreseeable step to defy the will of both the United Nations and the U.S. This chapter tracks the development of Hussein's dictator stature by focusing on Hussein's persistent doggedness to defy the U.S. and international will as derived from the United Nations decrees following his defeat in the Persian Gulf War.¹⁴² From this historical juncture contributors discuss the deception and defiance of Hussein in not conforming to economic sanctions and weapons inspection efforts. Secondly, discourse was analyzed to determine who was responsible for the effects of economic sanctions in Iraq. Discourse in *Foreign Affairs* made it apparent that the U.S. attempted to demonize Hussein by emphasizing discussion that outlined Hussein's responsibility for human rights violations against his own people. Compounded with the human rights violations the reader is able to also see an escalation of earlier themes of brutality and ruthlessness that illustrated Hussein's transgressions against his own people. *Foreign Affairs* now explored the inner workings of Hussein's dictatorship and emphasized traits that made him a renegade in the international community. Discourse during this time period revealed Hussein the renegade.

¹⁴²The following provides a list of all U.N. resolutions passed on Iraq. President's Report to Congress. (September 12, 2002). "A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations." Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Hussein is Defiant and Deceptive

Hussein's persona following his invasion of Kuwait had inherently cast him in the role of a dictator in the eyes of U.S. foreign policy. The former ally's current image now revealed a man who had always possessed both aggressive and oppressive intentions. Hussein's political ambitions shattered his former viable relationship with the U.S. Perhaps Hussein's resentment at the U.S. treatment of him following his invasion of Kuwait was one of the main precursors for a new theme that illustrated his defiance of economic sanctions and inspections. As a result of sanctions the dictatorship of Hussein had risen up and become both defiant and deceptive regarding any international and American attempts to police his nation and enforce ceasefire agreements with the United Nations in accordance with his absolute removal from Kuwait.¹⁴³

Hussein's refusal to adhere to the United Nations directives had antagonized the world and especially the U.S. government. The 1990s epitomized an era in Iraq in which economic sanctions were cast upon Hussein and the Iraqi people. The general assumption was that Hussein would concede to international pressure and allow weapons inspections and disarmament to commence. However, despite pressures from the U.S. and the international community Hussein continually refused to back down and hindered any attempts at effective weapons inspections. It became apparent that a prominent new theme had developed after the Persian Gulf War and preceding George W. Bush's

¹⁴³ Typical of the reporting of Hussein's defiance is this first line in a *New York Times* article which stated, "Two years after he invaded Kuwait, President Saddam Hussein remains a formidable figure in this part of the world, defying the United Nations and stirring up Arab feelings against conservative Persian Gulf Monarchies that joined the United States in trying to overthrow him." Lewis, Paul. (1992 July 31). "Immovable Object: Granite Regime of Saddam Hussein Seems Little Worn by Political Storm." *New York Times*, Section A, p6.

invasion of Iraq in 2003. An intense centralization of discussion emerged depicting Hussein as both defiant and deceptive to the collective will of international pressure to disarm and allow weapons inspections in Iraq to proceed without any major impediments.¹⁴⁴

A review of the articles during this time period indicated that commentary addressing this new theme followed two lines of argument. The first aggregate focused on Hussein's lack of cooperation with weapons inspections and his refusal to comply with international intentions. The second cluster dug deeper and addressed what implications Hussein's lack of cooperation for international law meant for international order as a whole. Furthermore, contributors to the journal discussed what steps must be taken for arms inspections to have their desirable effect.

As previously indicated there was a vast amount of literature that addressed Hussein's refusal to conform to sanctions following his evacuation of Kuwait in 1992. Moreover it appears that inspections had been a complete and utter failure due to Hussein's unwillingness to budge in the face of international pressure. Daniel Byman, a policy analyst for the RAND¹⁴⁵ Corporation, addressed this issue by saying, "Hussein

¹⁴⁴For a background on the U.S. position of this matter see the following document that provides a background of the Bush administration's argument which outlines Hussein's defiance of previous United Nations resolutions. President's Report to Congress. (September 12, 2002). "A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations." Washington D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. Other literature analyzed over this ten year period was supportive of this new trend in discourse. Laurie Mylroie discussed how "some U.S. officials have called Saddam stupid. They underestimate him. His cunning and amorality make him extraordinarily deceptive, a quality honed during two decades of rule. Saddam's ability to fool the entire world while it watched him mobilize his forces to invade Kuwait was no small feat. But it was only one episode in a long personal history of neutralizing his enemies by trickery." Mylroie, Laurie. (1993). "Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait." *Orbis*, winter, p132.

¹⁴⁵ Initially, RAND (the name of which was derived from a contraction of the term *research and development*) focused on issues of national security. Eventually, RAND expanded its intellectual reserves

refused to take UNSCOM¹⁴⁶ seriously and neither declared the contents of his WMD arsenal nor cooperated in its destruction.”¹⁴⁷ This theme was further supported by the comments of Gregory Gause III, a political scientist, at the University of Vermont, who argued that “it is a fool’s game to expect Hussein to voluntarily live up to any obligation he incurs.”¹⁴⁸ John and Karl Mueller took this argument one step further and argued that “unsurprisingly Hussein has not cooperated with allowing sanctions to have these effects regardless of the human cost.”¹⁴⁹ The importance of these statements is that these academics illustrated the steps that Hussein undertook to defy international pressure and the U.S. will. Hussein was now portrayed as non-cooperative, deceptive and deceitful.

The U.S. could not comprehend how Hussein allowed the sanctions to continue despite the staggering effects that they have had on the Iraqi people. One source indicated that by 1998 the Iraqi infant mortality rate had risen from 3.7 percent to 12 percent. Breakdowns in sewage, sanitation, and electrical systems had also reportedly caused an increase of 40,000 deaths annually of children under the age of five, and 50,000 deaths annually of older Iraqi’s.¹⁵⁰ It becomes apparent to me that the U.S. failed to recognize that it was in Hussein’s best interests to continue to deceive and defy international law by thwarting arms inspections and continuing the process of economic sanctions. Rather

to offer insight into other areas, such as business, education health, law, and science. In short just another think-tank.

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

¹⁴⁷ Byman, Daniel. (2000b). “A Farewell to Arms Inspections.” *Foreign Affairs*, 79, 1, p121.

¹⁴⁸ Gause III, F. Gregory. (1999). “Getting it Backward on Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 3, p54-65.

¹⁴⁹ Mueller, John and Karl Mueller. (1999). “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.” *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 3, p43-53.

¹⁵⁰ Mueller. (1999). p49. This information was consistent with information reported in the *Africa News* which discussed that “Utilities key to the people’s health were destroyed. In the aftermath, and the subsequent sanctions, an estimated one million Iraqis, among them, according to the United Nations, 600,000 children have died of malnutrition, disease and other effects of the war.” “The World Has Changed, So Must America.”(2001, October 9). *Africa News*.

than admit failure and show weakness, Hussein had determined that the best course of action was to remain a thorn in the U.S. side and to reestablish his power base by utilizing Iraqi suffering as a propaganda tool for enforcing his continued rule over Iraq.¹⁵¹

John and Karl Mueller's comments are a precursor to subsequent discourse about the effects of sanctions in the latter part of this chapter. These two made the point that Hussein was unwilling to bend to economic sanctions despite the effect that were having on the Iraqi people. This issue was further explored when the argument centered around who was responsible for the consequences of sanctions dictated to the Iraqi people and the human rights violations imposed on the people by Hussein as discourse shifted to reveal certain horrors within his regime. However, there was one important lesson to be learned by Hussein's unwillingness to comply with sanctions and inspections. Hussein by nature had always been a survivalist. Hussein had always done what was necessary to stay in power through either diplomatic, military, or brutal measures.¹⁵² Hussein's continuous defiance epitomized that "survival, not suicide, seems to be Saddam Hussein's chief goal."¹⁵³ He continued to do what was in the best interests of Hussein

¹⁵¹ This argument was supported by Gause. (1999) p56, who asserted that "Saddam and his henchman are content to use the Iraqi people's suffering for their own purposes and even deliberately increase it to score propaganda points."

¹⁵² This viewpoint was supported by Karsh (1991) who argued that "in the permanently beleaguered mind of Saddam Hussein, politics is a ceaseless struggle for survival. The ultimate goal of staying alive, and in power, justifies all means. Plots lurk around the every corner. Nobody is trustworthy. Everybody is an actual or potential enemy. One must remain constantly on the alert, making others cower so that they do not attack, always ready to kill before being killed." p2.

¹⁵³ Mueller (1999). p53. Ofra Bengio's comments also supported the Mueller's conclusion and he argued that "any attempt to answer these questions must begin with the understanding that Saddam has turned survival into an art. He has held on to power longer than any other ruler of modern Iraq, outlasting kings and presidents alike. His own brutal personality, a carefully developed set of control mechanisms, the mistakes and double messages of his Western enemies, the weakness of the Iraqi opposition, all have helped Saddam hold on, and are still at work." Bengio, Ofra. (2000). "How Does Hussein Hold On." *Foreign Affairs*, 79, 4, p101.

himself, not the Iraqi nation. One of the great failures of the U.S. diplomatic measures was the failure to realize that Hussein never linked sanctions to hindering his own efforts at maintaining power. It simply provided another propaganda tool which could be used to exploit the Iraqi masses against the U.S. and the United Nations in order to control Hussein's dictatorship.

An analysis of the preceding comments made it apparent that Hussein's attempts at defiance overshadowed any successful attempt for weapons inspections and sanctions to have a positive effect and return Hussein to the good graces of the international community. Now that the discourse had indicated that Hussein as a dictator had proved to be both a defiant and deceptive foe, the discourse shifted to discuss how the U.S. must react to Hussein's techniques of deceptive diplomacy. Therefore, discourse about Hussein inherently attempted to provide solutions for his lack of cooperation with inspection efforts. Although discourse still emphasized his deceitful nature, discourse began to discuss what steps were necessary to rectify Hussein's unconvincing diplomatic overtures. Contributors such as Byman advocated that "it is particularly likely (that inspections will remain unsuccessful) if the U.S. and its allies are unwilling to back up the inspectors with force, which would let Iraq return to its old tricks of deceiving them or denying them access."¹⁵⁴ Byman raised an excellent point in that there was no incentive for Hussein to cooperate with inspections. In his words, "as long as there was not significant punishment for defiance, Iraq will not budge."¹⁵⁵ Furthermore, Byman argued that "because of the Baathist regime's deception techniques, only clandestine

¹⁵⁴ Byman. (2000b). p120.

¹⁵⁵ Byman. (2000b). p127.

means can obtain the necessary data for robust inspections, the locations of the programs, the extent of ongoing research, the amount of material truly destroyed and so on.”¹⁵⁶

Byman was conscious of the fact that current sanctions engaged against Iraq were not having the desired effect of having Hussein bend to the rule of international law.

In order for Hussein to not impede inspections, the U.S. needed to take more drastic measures to gain compliance on this issue. These measures included the possible use of force and the ouster of Hussein in a policy referred to as regime change by the Clinton administration.¹⁵⁷ Byman concluded “that only massive campaigns comparable to Desert Fox will make the Iraqis blink, and in the end America’s allies offer little support for such a campaign, particularly if Saddam Hussein links his defiance to the sanctions, which most of America’s key Arab allies dislike.”¹⁵⁸ Byman’s conclusions foreshadowed George W. Bush’s liberating invasion in his pursuit of the removal of Hussein three years later in his efforts to crush terrorism. Byman feared that “other states will learn from Baghdad’s example, cheating or ignoring their commitments if they will pay no price.”¹⁵⁹ Byman’s comments were also indicative of the concerns that leaving Hussein in power might have an adverse impact on the region. If the U.S. wanted to develop a stronghold in the Middle East it must ensure that Hussein was neutralized in some fashion. The first step in this neutralization process is illustrated by discourse

¹⁵⁶ Byman. (2000b). 127.

¹⁵⁷ The Clinton administration’s policy regarding Iraq shifted towards regime change with this quote by President Clinton. “However, over the long-term the best way to address that threat is through a government in Baghdad -- a new government -- that is committed to represent and respect its people, not repress them; that is committed to peace in the region.” Clinton. Bill. (1998, November 15). Presidential Statement on Iraq, Briefing Room the White House.

¹⁵⁸ Byman. (2000b). 129.

¹⁵⁹ Byman. (2000b). p 130.

which categorized Hussein as an international renegade committing human rights violations against his own people.

This tactic is important for discussion because it marked the beginning in the discussion where blame was put exclusively on the shoulders of Hussein for the consequences that sanctions were having on the Iraqi people. Furthermore, exorbitant¹⁶⁰ attention was given to listing and condemning Hussein's atrocities against his own people as discourse demonized Hussein and portrayed him as an international renegade. Therefore, this next section explores the dialogue surrounding Hussein's violations of human rights and the adverse effects that economic sanctions have had on the Iraqi people. These two themes combined with the continued discourse emphasizing Hussein's brutal and reckless nature captured the shift in which Hussein's face changed once again from a dictator into a renegade.

Human Rights Violations Transform Hussein into a Renegade

Discourse generated in the mid 1990s captured Hussein the renegade's relationship with the U.S. Specifically, the U.S. and the contributors of *Foreign Affairs* wrote about the human violations occurring in Iraq, and assigned blame for the residual effects of human sanctions on the Iraqi people. These two issues were pivotal in that they constituted a shift from looking at the dictatorship of Iraq as an entity, to focusing on the horrors occurring within Hussein's regime in order to reveal him as a renegade operating outside the parameters of law in the international community.

¹⁶⁰ Assertions discussing Hussein's persecution of his own people almost tripled at this point in time.

Hussein's brutal and indifferent nature to the Iraqi populace were not highlighted in *Foreign Affairs* during the relatively peaceful relationship that the U.S. enjoyed with Hussein during the 1980s while he was our armed ally waging war against Iran. However, like discourse surrounding his dictator representation, images and words of his atrocities received a more prominent position in the discussion and unwrapped the package of the discursively instituted renegade.

Anthony Lake, an assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, writing in "Confronting Backlash States," marked the beginning of this new shift in discourse. He argued that, "backlash states (like Iraq) have some common characteristics. (They are) ruled by cliques that control power through coercion, they suppress basic human rights and they promote radical ideologies."¹⁶¹ Lake's comments indicated the willingness of the U.S. to intervene in the welfare of the Iraqi people in order to ensure that basic human rights were afforded to all Iraqi citizens. Lake went on to conclude, "that the U.N. resolutions also reflect the international consensus in support of an end to Hussein's repression of the Iraq people. Working closely with U.N. agencies and international human rights organizations, we are calling attention to the plight of Iraqi citizens who have been brutalized by this regime and insist on having human rights monitors inside the country."¹⁶² Lake's comments were a distinct shift in discourse of the official government position on Hussein's human rights violations that have occurred during his presidency. Hussein indeed did use chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabjah in 1988. A *New York Times* article published in 1993 discussed

¹⁶¹ Lake, Anthony. (1994). "Confronting Backlash States." *Foreign Affairs*, 73, 2, p49-50.

¹⁶² Lake. (1994). p51.

information gained from Iraqi files which detailed atrocities committed against the Kurds and paved the way for a possible case of genocide.¹⁶³ Lake re-raised the Kurdish question in which he mentioned that “Iraq the regime is responsible for both war crimes and crimes against humanity, a regime whose invasion of Kuwait and gassing of its own people have rendered it an international renegade.”¹⁶⁴ Despite the lack of discourse previously on this subject, Lake’s article was the first in a series of articles that explored human rights violations in Iraq and the unintended consequences that economic sanctions were having on the Iraqi people.¹⁶⁵ Gause, mimicked Lake’s argument in which he asserted that “Saddam Hussein remains the core issue. While he rules, Iraq will continue to threaten its neighbors, American interests, and its own people.”¹⁶⁶ The combined outcome of these authors’ comments was that they reached the conclusion that Hussein was not only a threat to his own neighbors but to the well being of his own people as well. Hussein’s aggressive policies repeatedly felt by neighboring countries such as Iran and Kuwait now were seen as having a direct effect on his own people. There was substantial attention now being paid to how his policies led to human rights abuses within his own country. Instead of focusing on Hussein as the dictator of a foreign country, *Foreign Affairs* emphasized human rights violations occurring within Iraq itself. The issue of who was responsible for these abuses was compounded by discourse that sought

¹⁶³ Miller, Judith. (1993, January 3). “Iraq Accused: A Case of Genocide.” *New York Times*, Section 6, p12.

¹⁶⁴ Lake. (1994). p49-50.

¹⁶⁵ Fuller, Graham E. and Ian O. Lesser. (1997). “Persian Gulf Myths.” *Foreign Affairs*, 76, 3, p48. These authors noted that “Saddam’s rule in Iraq has been extremely harmful for the regions as well as for his own people.”

¹⁶⁶ Gause. (1999). p65.

to define who was accountable for the economic sanctions against Iraq; Hussein the renegade or the sanctioners themselves.

The real victim in this debate was the Iraqi people. Hussein himself had continued to be unaffected by United Nations' policies that had tried to detain and suppress his aggressive nature. Although not reported on in depth, the Iraqi populace paid a heavy burden for the U.N. sanctions imposed upon them to deter Hussein.¹⁶⁷ Brian Goss's 2002 study found that in an analysis of 650 *New York Times* articles addressing the sanctions issue over a three year period, only twenty addressed the impact that sanctions were having on the Iraqi civilian population.¹⁶⁸ The irony of this unintended effect of sanctions is not lost on Adeno Addis, who addressed this issue in *Human Rights Quarterly* by stating:

It is the ordinary citizens that will shoulder the harsh effects of sanctions and, ironically that have the least chance to affect the policies and actions of those regimes. The irony becomes even more pronounced when one realizes that sometimes those sanctions are imposed supposedly in support of the human rights of citizens of the target states. We should not expect economic sanctions to bring about the changes in the behavior or policy of regimes that are often targets of such sanctions, for there are no economic or political costs to the leaders of those regimes.¹⁶⁹

Despite the ineffectiveness of this policy there was considerable debate which wanted to assign blame for the effects of the sanctions themselves. Who indeed was responsible for the suffering that has been inflicted upon the people of Iraq?

¹⁶⁷"Since their introduction in 1990, comprehensive economic sanction on Iraq have raised substantial concerns about the impact of coercive measures against governments when the populations in question have no democratic rights." Brown, Sarah Graham and Chris Toensing. (2002). "Why Another War? A Backgrounder on the Iraq Crisis." *Middle East Research and Information Project*, 2, p6.

¹⁶⁸ Goss, Brian Michael. (2002). "Deeply concerned about the Welfare of the Iraqi People: The Sanctions Regime against Iraq in the New York Times (1996-1998)." *Journalism Studies*, 3, 1, p83-99.

¹⁶⁹ Addis, Adeno. (2003) "Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil." *Human Rights Quarterly*, 25, p585.

One school of argument suggested that the only real villain is Hussein himself. “In an important sense, therefore, the cost of the sanctions are being caused by Saddam Hussein’s policies rather than the sanctioners, an argument the latter often make in their own defense. If the Iraqi dictator would only do as they demand, they argue, the sanctions would be removed.”¹⁷⁰ This argument assumed that Hussein accepted the demands as legitimate and that he took into consideration the well being of the citizens of Iraq. History and his pattern of repressive rule have clearly ruled out this argument as being fallacious. Hussein had always been a renegade more concerned with his own ambition and lavish style of living than the concerns of his own people.¹⁷¹ The key difference was that Hussein’s continually changing relationship with the U.S. now focused on themes that conveyed and exploited the face of a renegade. Diplomatically it was in the U.S.’s best interests to demonize Hussein in the eyes of public opinion.¹⁷² Fifteen years earlier it was more politically astute to overlook Hussein’s transgressions against his own people while he was an ally. Not that Hussein himself is not to be blamed for the standard of living that the Iraqis found themselves in. “Saddam Hussein certainly bears responsibility for the suffering of the Iraqi people.”¹⁷³ Make no mistake about it; his rule led to new levels of human impoverishment in his country. However,

¹⁷⁰ Mueller. (1999). p51.

¹⁷¹ Byman. (2000). p131.

¹⁷² Adeno. (2003). p573, raised an alternative viewpoint when he disputed traditional assumptions and “argues that sanctions are processes through which the sanctioning community defines its identity through the act of disassociating itself from the target regime, the troublesome evil other.” This was an interesting article from a cultural standpoint because it includes the concept of demonization when analyzing the sanction issue.

¹⁷³ Gause. (1999). p59.

trends in the discourse also indicated that the suffering of the Iraqi people and the repercussions of sanctions were not only the fault of Hussein..

Hussein might indeed have been the culprit when it came to violating the civil liberties of Iraqi citizens and the core cause of the imposed sanctions. "Saddam Hussein had not cooperated with allowing the sanctions to have (their intended) effects regardless of the human cost."¹⁷⁴ However, there was a great deal of discourse that explored how the effects of the sanctions went beyond Hussein himself.

It is morally obtuse to dismiss the issue by saying, as Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright did in May 1998, the fact that Iraqi children are dying is not the fault of the United States, but of Saddam Hussein. It is ridiculous for the United States to be blamed for the dictatorial and cruel, barbaric ways that Saddam Hussein treats his people.¹⁷⁵

Gause's comments reflected the complexity of the sanctions process and to some degrees the profound failure of this policy. Hussein himself seemed to be relatively unaffected and well attuned to finding the loopholes in the sanctions process and manipulating them for his own benefit.¹⁷⁶ Despite the financial constraints imposed on him, Hussein himself had managed to prosper which was depicted by Byman:

Saddam Hussein has spent what limited money he controls on arms and lavish rewards for his followers, not only the well-being of the Iraqi people; money earmarked for humanitarian purposes often goes unspent; the regime smuggles humanitarian goods out of Iraq to sell on the black market; and the Iraqis living in the parts of northern Iraq under U.N. control fare better than those under the Baath thumb.¹⁷⁷

The contributors discussing the consequences of sanctions against Iraq overwhelmingly concluded that sanctions had failed in their intended effect to either

¹⁷⁴ Mueller. (1999). p50.

¹⁷⁵ Gause. (1999). p59.

¹⁷⁶ Mueller. (1999). The Muellers note that Hussein "seems more interested in maximizing the nations' suffering for propaganda purposes than relieving it." p49.

¹⁷⁷ Byman. (2000). p131.

remove Hussein from power, or get him to bend to the will of the United Nations. In a 2002 review article, Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull discussed how readdressing conventional sanctions and focusing on smart sanctions might have more effectively targeted Hussein's regime by focusing on arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel restrictions and protected vulnerable social groups from collateral damage.¹⁷⁸ When discussing collateral damage, Eric Rouleau, the former French ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, agreed with the premise that:

Saddam Hussein has been the number one violator of human rights in Iraq, but sanctions are in fact now causing more deaths and suffering than the regime itself...if the U.S. cannot or will not help the Iraqis to remove Saddam Hussein, then it must not prolong their suffering and damage their country in the indefinite sanctions alone policy.¹⁷⁹

These comments were also supported by well known academics such as Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, and Howard Zinn who in a letter to *The Independent* wished to end sanctions against Iraq and argued that, "this is not foreign policy; it is sanctioned mass-murder that is nearing holocaust proportions. If we remain silent, we are condoning a mass slaughter that is being perpetrated in our name."¹⁸⁰ Rouleau's comments are powerful in that they marked the beginning of a shift in diplomatic discourse that sought to look for new answers to the Iraqi situation other than economic sanctions.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Tostensen, Arne and Beate Bull. (2002). "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible." *World Politics*, 54, p373-403.

¹⁷⁹ Rouleau, Eric. (1995). "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*, 74, 1, p169.

¹⁸⁰ Chomsky, Noam., Said, Edward., and Howard Zinn. (1999, January 21). "Letter: Stop killing Iraqis." *The Independent (London)*, Section comment, p 2.

¹⁸¹ For a comprehensive evaluation of U.S. policy toward Iraq since the end of the Gulf War see: Byman, Daniel. (2000a). "After the Storm: U.S. policy toward Iraq since 1991." *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, 4, p493-516. The following articles also addressed U.S policy toward Hussein and made suggestions for the new Bush administration to consider. Yaphe, Judith S. (2000). "Iraq the Exception to the Rule." *The Washington Quarterly*, 24, 1, p125-137. O'Sullivan, Meghan. (2001). "The Politics of Dismantling Containment." *Washington Quarterly*, 24, 1, p67-76.

What Rouleau as well as other contributors did was to stimulate the need for a change of policy in Iraq because the effect of sanctions had only snared the Iraqi people in a trap that they could not remove themselves from. Gause was more forceful in his argument when he asserted that:

American policy makers need to recognize that the only 'box' into which sanctions put Iraqis is coffins. The primary responsibility for this tragedy obviously rests on Saddam Hussein and his henchman, who were content to use the Iraqi people's suffering for their own purposes and even deliberately increase it to score propaganda points.¹⁸²

Despite the argument over who was responsible for sanctions it became clear that Hussein the renegade had no desire to conform to international law. The discourse captured both the failure of sanctions as a diplomatic policy and Hussein's lack of empathy for his own people. His lack of compassion for the Iraqi people was clearly displayed in this discourse that epitomized him as an international renegade incapable of caring for the welfare of the Iraqi state.

The conception of Hussein being a renegade is not an epiphany in his representation in U.S. foreign policy. In the words of Noam Chomsky, "Saddam Hussein is a murderous gangster, just as he was before August 2, when he was an amiable friend and favored trading partner"¹⁸³ of the U.S. However, it is notable that the escalation of discourse surrounding Hussein the renegade continued to increase as his relationship with the U.S. deteriorated. Efforts to vilify and demonize Hussein were displayed in the discourse. Future dialogue moved beyond Hussein's human rights abuses and his utter lack of compassion for the consequences of sanctions on his own people and focused on

¹⁸² Gause. (1999). p56.

¹⁸³ Chomsky, Noam. (1991, January 10). "A stand on low moral ground. The response to Saddam Hussein's aggression is unprecedented because he stepped on the wrong toes. The U.S. is upholding no high principle in the Gulf, nor is any other state." *The Guardian (London)*.

portraying him as an archenemy who must be removed. Hussein's traits of brutality, ruthlessness, and aggressive behavior continued to be further addressed. These traits that had escalated in each of his successive representations as Soviet puppet and dictator exploded in full force as Hussein is painted not only as a renegade but also as the leader of a rogue state beyond redemption in the international community. This categorization of Iraq as a rogue state provided the framework for the final phase of Hussein's political existence as an archenemy threatening both the economic interests and the national security of the U.S.

Hussein's Unlawfulness Transforms Iraq into a Rogue State

The literature in *Foreign Affairs* had portrayed Hussein as an international renegade for his continuous persecution of his own people and his failure to comply with sanctions. Terms such as dictator, villain, and tyrant have been associated with him in print since his invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Hussein's brutality and ruthlessness have been signature traits of his since the beginning of his presidency in 1979. His actions during the era of economic sanctions and weapons inspections were no different in nature. Hussein was painted as a both a renegade and a villain in the diplomatic community who committed atrocities against his own people.

Clinton, during the 1990s, practiced a policy of containment in order to minimize Iraq's threat to the region and his own people: "All measures taken by the U.S. against Iraq so far were exclusively designed to contain Iraq's threat to the region but not to free

the Iraqi people from the horrors of Saddam Hussein.”¹⁸⁴ Discourse surrounding the freedom and liberation of the Iraqi population came later when he was categorized as an archenemy by the George W. Bush administration. At this juncture, contributors of *Foreign Affairs* were content to just discuss the evils of Hussein’s regime. There was an inherent attempt to define who was responsible for the effects of economic sanctions. Byman indicated that “Saddam Hussein, not the United States, appeared to be the villain.”¹⁸⁵ Several books were released during this era exploring Hussein’s persecution of the Kurds with the overall “result being a horrifying picture of Saddam Hussein’s regime.”¹⁸⁶ This demonization of Hussein’s regime was the next step in Hussein final representation as an archenemy to both the Iraqi people and the national security of the U.S. of America. “Americans have always tended to over personalize hostile forces in the world. The vilification of Saddam Hussein is only the latest example.”¹⁸⁷ Numerous studies have been undertaken either looking at the demonization of Hussein or the personalization of the Iraqi conflict.¹⁸⁸

Efforts were undertaken to classify Hussein’s regime as a criminal regime in the eyes of the diplomatic community. Gause captured this new theme:

¹⁸⁴ Rouleau. (1995). p152.

¹⁸⁵ Byman. (2000b). p121.

¹⁸⁶ Quandt, William B. (1996). “Book Review” Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds. By Human Rights Watch/Middle East.” *Foreign Affairs*, 75, 3, p152.

¹⁸⁷ Talbott, Strobe. (1990, September 3). “The search for the supervillains.” *Time*, 136, 10, p40.

¹⁸⁸ Rojo, Luisa Martin. (1995) “Division and rejection: from the personification of the Gulf conflict to the demonization of Saddam Hussein.” *Discourse & Society*, 64, 1, p49-80. Toth, James. (1992). “Demonizing Saddam Hussein: Manipulating Racism as a Prelude to war.” *New Political Science*, 21-22, p5-39. Ottosen, Rune. (1995). “Enemy Images and the Journalist Process.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 32, 1, p97-112. Kuusisto, Riikka. (1998). “Framing the Wars in The Gulf and in Bosnia: The Rhetorical Definitions of The Western Power Leaders in Action.” *Journal of Peace Research*, 35, 5, p603-620. Savarese, Rossella. (1993). “The European Press and Saladin the Fierce.” *European Journal of Communication*, 8, p53-75. and Lakoff, George. (1991). “Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf.” *Peace Research*, 23, 2-3, p25-32.

Indyk¹⁸⁹ stated the administration's goal in Iraq is to 'establish clearly and unequivocally that the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgments irredeemable.' While reiterating the U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq, he left little doubt that a regime change in Baghdad is the ultimate goal of American policy.¹⁹⁰

Regime change became a policy of the U.S. towards Iraq as early as 1994.

Byman argued that "toppling Saddam Hussein is the only outcome that can satisfy the vital U.S. interest in a stable and secure Gulf region, because, to a degree unique among contemporary tyrannies, the Iraqi regime is Saddam Hussein. The vast majority of Iraqis want him out, though only those with a death wish say openly."¹⁹¹ John and Karl Mueller mentioned that, "if some Iraqi opposition groups show real and credible promise of being able to overthrow the dictator, they might be given support."¹⁹² However, Bengio Ofra, a senior research fellow at the Moshe Dean Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, argued that a:

change [in Iraq's administration] would do the West little good, since Saddam Hussein's offspring are apt to be as thuggish and dangerous as their father. The West's shrewdest course of action therefore is to wait Saddam Hussein out while doing what it can to nudge Iraq's battered elites into replacing their overlord with some more responsible and less brutal autocrat."¹⁹³

Ofra's comments echoed the policy of containment long since championed by the Clinton administration when dealing with Hussein.

¹⁸⁹ Martin Indyk was a special assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council.

¹⁹⁰ Gause. (1994). p57.

¹⁹¹ Byman, Daniel., Kenneth Pollack & Gideon Rose. (1999). "The Rollback Fantasy." *Foreign Affairs*, 78,1, p25. In another article Byman indicated that "Saddam Hussein's regime is loathed by most of the Iraqi populace, but he has maintained power by creating a pervasive and seemingly omnipotent internal security apparatus." Byman, Daniel, Pollack, Kenneth, and Matthew Waxmen. (1998). "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past." *Survival*, 40, 3, p129.

¹⁹² Mueller. (1999). p53.

¹⁹³ Ofra. (2000). p91.

The idea of containment was that as long as Hussein was contained within his borders there was no real threat to the outside world.¹⁹⁴ “With or without the help of sanctions, containment and deterrence have rather good track records as policies for dealing with menaces far more significant than that posed by contemporary Iraq, with its demoralized and potentially mutinous army.”¹⁹⁵ “In Iraq, the United States confronts a police state led by an erratic tyrant whose limited but potentially serious capacity for regional action is currently subject to constraint.”¹⁹⁶ Containment at the time was seen as the optimal way in which to deal with Hussein’s defiance and “the Clinton Administration was apparently content to live with the end of international monitoring and inspections and to manage the threat Hussein poses through a combination of the sanctions and the new, more aggressive military posture.”¹⁹⁷ It is worth noting that all three of these contributors saw Hussein more as a nuisance to be contained, than as a threat or enemy to be disposed of. However, it is important to note that Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, policy analysts at RAND, indicated that a “forward presence may permit a swifter response with massive force, only the nearly unprecedented aggressiveness of a Saddam Hussein would call for such an intervention.”¹⁹⁸ It was this thought of an aggressive response by Hussein that ultimately led the way for Hussein the archenemy to be labeled a threat to the U.S. national security. Four years later with the horrific picture

¹⁹⁴ For a description of the policy regarding the rise and fall of containment in Iraq see: Sicherman, Harvey. (1997). “America’s alliance anxieties: The Strange Death of Dual containment.” *Orbis*, 41, 2, p223-240.

¹⁹⁵ Mueller. (1999). p53.

¹⁹⁶ Mueller. (1999). p51.

¹⁹⁷ Gause. (1999). p55.

¹⁹⁸ Fuller. (1997). p51.

of September 11, 2001 fresh in our minds the George W. Bush administration deposed Hussein by force, a move that Clinton administration never seriously considered.

Iraq's categorization as a rogue state¹⁹⁹ began in 1994. Lake insisted that "there are a few backlash states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. For now they lack the resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten democratic order being created around them. Nevertheless, their behavior is often aggressive and defiant."²⁰⁰ Lake's comments echoed future cries by the George W. Bush administration which wanted to classify Hussein the renegade as a archenemy who undermined democracy and persecuted his own people.

The concept of Iraq being a rogue nation is further developed in the post September 11th era when George W. Bush portrayed Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an axis of evil in his State of the Union Address and is captured by these comments from the President:

Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.

¹⁹⁹Addis. (2003). p605, offers a fairly adequate definition of a rogue state or renegade regime in the following: "A regime may be designated as an renegade regime if it engages in massive violations of internally guaranteed rights of its citizens or when it considers it a sufficiently good reason to use war as a means of advancing what it regards as its rational interest. Renegade regimes aggressively deprive their citizens' human rights and they aggressively attempt to vanquish outsiders through the use of war."

²⁰⁰ Lake. (1994). p45.

They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.²⁰¹

Bush's incendiary comments combined with the failure of Iraq to comply with economic sanctions and weapons inspections and with the need to find a target for American hostility following September 11th led the way for Hussein the archenemy to be removed from power. No longer content with the policy of containment, George W. Bush increased talk vilifying and targeting the dictator/renegade for immediate removal from the international arena. The next chapter discusses in detail the development of Hussein's pariah state and the issues that led to Hussein's classification as an archenemy and to him being removed from power in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.²⁰²

²⁰¹ Bush, George W. (2002, January 29). The President's State of the Union Address, Washington, D.C.

²⁰² On March 20, 2003 the U.S. and the United Kingdom and other members of this small coalition invaded Iraq as part of the U.S. "War on Terror" without explicit approval of the United Nations Security Council. This was the second act in the George W. Bush administration's "War on Terror" following the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in November of 2001 for supporting members of Al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the terror attacks on September 11, 2001. In contrast to past foreign policy objectives, the use of a pre-emptive force was authorized to target so called rogue nations in the document detailing the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002). The primary goal of this pre-emptive strategy was to prevent U.S. enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This pre-emptive strategy focused on how small rogue nations were a danger to the U.S. national security. This document also included a comprehensive strategy to combat (WMD). In short, this strategy authorized "pro-active counter proliferation efforts." (p14). The policy now being that the U.S. would deter and defend the threat before it was unleashed. This national security strategy was pivotal in justifying the potential threat that Hussein posed to the citizens of the U.S. as leader of a rogue nation. This justification for the invasion of Iraq was also a highly controversial topic among the U.S. populace. At the time of the invasion, public support for the war on Iraq fluctuated just above fifty percent approval. The reason for this divisiveness was that many people questioned the legitimacy of President Bush's arguments for going to war and authorizing a pre-emptive strategy on a nation that was not directly affiliated with the events that occurred on September 11th, 2001. James Pfiffner addressed this issue in an exploration of George W. Bush's arguments for war with Iraq. This article examined various statements by President Bush and his administration: first, about the implication that there was a link between Hussein, al Qaeda, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11; second, about Iraq's nuclear weapons capacity; and third, about Hussein's chemical and biological weapons and his ability to deliver them. Pfiffner, James P. (2004). "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 34, 1, p25-46.

VIII. FACE OF AN ARCHENEMY

Chapter Introduction

The events that occurred on September 11, 2001, forever changed how Americans began to view their national security interests at home and abroad. Anger, suspicion, and awe described the feelings that the majority of U.S. citizens felt over the brazen attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This event highlighted a significant shift in the rhetoric surrounding Hussein in the discourse of both American policy and in *Foreign Affairs*. Hussein, whose representation took the face of a renegade in the last chapter, was transformed into an archenemy as the Bush administration sought to portray him as an aggressive risk-taker who was a direct threat to the national security of the U.S. Hussein's previous record of using biological and chemical weapons and his pursuit of a nuclear research program were offered as compelling reasons for the seriousness of the threat that he now posed.²⁰³ This factor combined with any link that Hussein might have to Al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the attacks on the World Trade Center, provided the necessary motives for George W. Bush to justify the war with Iraq and advocate the removal of Hussein the archenemy who represented a threat to U.S. national security.²⁰⁴

This chapter focuses on the discourse that transformed Hussein into an archenemy as represented by George W. Bush. In continuance with his renegade image, Hussein's human rights violations were discussed in the media and in *Foreign Affairs*. Hussein

²⁰³ The following articles discuss U.S. policy towards Iraq in relation to the alleged strategic threat posed by Hussein to the region. Zunes, Stephen. (2001). "Foreign Policy by Catharsis: The Failure of U.S. Policy toward Iraq." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 23, 4, p69-86. and Pena, Charles. (2002). "Axis of Evil: Threat or Chimera." *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 13, 3, p40-57.

²⁰⁴ Teather, David. (2002, June 17). "Bush Gives CIA green light to kill Saddam." *The Guardian*, (London), p15. In an interview in April, President Bush said: "I made up my mind that Hussein needs to go. That's about all I'm willing to share. The policy of my government is that he goes."

continued to both be depicted as a threat to his own people and responsible for representing a party that undermined democracy in the Middle East. Hussein was also labeled as an aggressive risk-taker who was not only defiant, but irrational in his ambitious pursuits for a stronger Iraqi nation. Hussein was also accused of sponsoring terrorism and being a rogue state operating outside the parameters of international law. These themes when assembled together represented Hussein as an archenemy who needed to be removed from power by the U.S.

Hussein Undermines Democracy

Brutality and ruthlessness have both been traits of Hussein that have been written about in *Foreign Affairs* with some frequency. The post September 11th era was no exception as these traits of Hussein and his human rights violations gained a new level of notoriety.²⁰⁵ However, there was a critical new twist to these past themes. These negative traits of Hussein now combined to develop the more complex theme of Hussein's unwillingness to let democracy flourish in Iraq and the Middle East. Specifically, it was argued that the Baath party under Hussein undermined any attempt to establish democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ This shift is clearly seen in Powell, Colin. (2003, February 5). Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, New York City. "Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the patterns of behavior that I have identified is Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will of this council, his contempt for the truth, and most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1990 and 1988 was one of the 20th century's most horrible atrocities, 5,000 men, women, and children died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to 89 included mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jailing, ethnic cleansing, and the destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shiva Iraqis and the Mash Arabs, whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium."

²⁰⁶ The following provides comments from the House of Representatives discussing the benefits of an invasion of Iraq. The following comments are from Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican from California, discussing the possible use of force against Iraq in a house debate. "We're not talking about war

This theme of democracy in the Middle East was a new and important issue that had developed in the post 911 era. Discourse generated specifically addressed this issue instead of just focusing on generic statements about Hussein's ruthlessness and brutality and dictatorial style. There was an increase in discourse discussing the suppression of internal dissent that Hussein had practiced quite actively over a 24 year period. You will recall from Hussein's first face as a Soviet puppet that this attribute had long been a part of his overall representation. David Hoffman, president of Internews, recalled that "independent voices and views in Iraq were suppressed. Many Iraqis were killed or tortured for daring to openly disagree with Saddam Hussein's regime."²⁰⁷ Dissent, a cornerstone of democratic politics, was actively assailed and attacked in Hussein's regime. Yitzhak Nakash, an associate professor of Middle Eastern history at Brandeis University, and author of *the Shi'is of Iraq*, was supportive of this position and argued that "the Baath party also executed senior Shiite Arab clerics, notable members of the Sadr and the Hakim families, to make sure that a strong and unified Shiite religious establishment capable of playing a role in national politics did not emerge."²⁰⁸ These statements continued to illustrate Hussein's attempts to curb any opposition to his absolute rule. The difference is now these traits were being linked to the more powerful

on Iraq. That's totally misleading. We're talking about helping the people of Iraq liberate themselves from this monster and, in doing so, alleviate a major threat to the security and well-being of the people of the U.S. There is nothing for us to apologize about in terms of helping those people free themselves from a tyrant who is renowned in the world among all tyrants. We are talking about helping them, liberating them. They will be dancing in the streets waving American flags just as the people of Afghanistan still are grateful to us for freeing them and helping them free themselves from the horror of the Taliban and bin Laden who held them in their tyrannical grip for years." THREATS AND RESPONSES; Excerpts From House Debate on the Use of Military Force Against Iraq. (2002, October 9). *New York Times*, Section A; Column 1; National Desk; Pg. 14.

²⁰⁷ Hoffman, David. (2003). "Who Reports? Who Decides?" *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 4, p210.

²⁰⁸ Nakash, Yitzhak. (2003) "The Shiites and the Future of Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 4, p19.

theme of the inability for democracy and freedom to flourish in the Iraqi nation.

Hussein's attempts to undermine democracy do not stop at persecuting only those who opposed him. Attention was also given to Hussein's manipulation of the media for his own benefit. Hoffman addresses this issue when he discusses how: "Iraqi's have long suffered under the dictatorship of Hussein who manipulated the news and information Iraqis received through a monopolistic state-run media."²⁰⁹ What these last three statements illustrated in the course of this discourse about Hussein is that his brutality and ruthlessness were now represented as being the polar opposites of the values supporting democracy.²¹⁰ Now that the discourse had characterized Hussein as a direct opponent of democracy, it also paralleled political talk which wanted to transform the Middle East into a democracy. "For example, Bush administration officials claimed that toppling Hussein would uphold the sanctity of U.N. Resolutions, eliminate a murderous government that brutalized its citizens, deprive Osama Bin Laden of a key ally, and bolster democracy in the Middle East."²¹¹ This issue of Hussein undermining democracy was further heightened when contributors to *Foreign Affairs* discussed how to develop a democratic nation in Iraq.

Specifically, "in discussing electoral and party systems for Iraq, the question arises whether certain groups that have undermined democracy in the region, specifically,

²⁰⁹ Hoffman. (2003). p210.

²¹⁰ Talbott (1990, September 3) raised a great point when trying to understand how Americans assume other countries wish to have the same democratic culture as ourselves. In his words, "The great American presupposition is that other societies want to be like us. If they're not acting like us, it must be because of some Lucifer-like figure. Saddam Hussein is a rascal and a brute of the first order, but the more fixated we are on him, the more likely we are to miss the underlying social and political fact that he appeals to a lot of people who are not like us at all." p136.

²¹¹ Rubin, James P. (2003). "Stumbling into War," *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 5, p46-66. James Rubin is the former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1997-2000.

the clergy, the military, and the Baath party should be banned from politics altogether.”²¹² This statement provided support for Hussein’s unwillingness to let democracy flourish in Iraq. The Baath party which he epitomized had long undermined any attempt at democracy. In fact, the majority of the people of Iraq have been incapable of understanding what living in a non-dictatorial society might even entail. Ajami argued that “the sacking of a terrible regime with such a pervasive cult of terror may offer Iraqis and Arabs a break with the false gifts of despotism.”²¹³ These contributors make two important points. First, Hussein’s regime is irreversibly linked to undermining any attempt at freedom or democratic reform. Second, they imply that Hussein must be removed from power in order for democracy to develop in Iraq.²¹⁴ Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser determined that: “Saddam Hussein’s continued rule in Iraq is extremely harmful for the region as well as for his own people.”²¹⁵ As a result, Hussein had been constructed as a brutal and ruthless leader who was a threat to his own people who needed to be removed from Iraq before the seeds of democracy could be planted in Iraq and provide the foundation for George W. Bush’s vision of a new world order in the Middle East. Expanding upon this idea of Bush’s quest for democracy in the Middle East was Jon B. Alterman in an article published in *The Washington Quarterly*:

²¹² Dawisha, Adeed and Karen Dawisha. (2003). “How to Build a Democratic Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 3, p46.

²¹³ Ajami Fouad. (2003). “Iraq and Arab’s future.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 1, p15.

²¹⁴ Note there were dissenting voices that questioned the role of the U.S. spreading democracy in Iraq who were not heard in *Foreign Affairs*. Most notable is this excerpt from Edward Said who talked about the U.S. obstruction of basic human rights. Specifically, “In the Middle East, the United States has routinely obstructed struggles for human rights. The U.S. has sided with every entrenched and rooted power against struggles for women’s rights, for minority rights, for rights to free assembly and free speech. All as a matter of policy.” Said, Edward. (1991.) “The Intellectuals and the War.” *Middle East Report*, no. 171, p15.

²¹⁵ Fuller. (1997). p48.

The Bush administration's Middle East strategy has some rather expansive goals. Unwilling to content itself merely with eliminating the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda or forcing Saddam Hussein's regime from power, the administration has committed itself to creating a post-Saddam Iraq that will be an exemplar to the region: a nation that is strong, democratic, and free. As such, the administration is betting that the new Iraq will lead to the rise of liberty, freedom, and democracy in the Middle East; extinguish the flames of regional radicalism and hold the key to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.²¹⁶

This theme was developed in greater detail as a link was made between the suppression of his own people and how his aggressive behavior had become both irrational and a threat to his neighbors as well as antagonistic towards the U.S. Therefore, this next section discusses how Hussein's aggressive traits transformed him into an archenemy threatening the U.S.

Hussein is Irrational and an Enemy to U.S. National Security

Hussein's aggressive behavior has been a hallmark trait of his since well before the Iran-Iraq war. Literature in *Foreign Affairs* continued to address this topic in each of his successive representations. The personification of Hussein as an archenemy to the U.S. is no exception. Following September 11th, 2001, there was an increase in discourse that discussed Hussein's aggressive and bellicose behavior. A series of articles explored these core traits of Hussein's personality and attempted to compare and categorize his behavior. Kevin Pollack, a senior fellow and deputy director for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, talked about "Saddam Hussein's unparalleled record of aggression and violence."²¹⁷ Pollack also deemed Hussein to be

²¹⁶ Alterman, Jon B. (2003). "Not in My Backyard: Iraq's Neighbors' Interests." *The Washington Quarterly*, 26, 3, p149. Great Article which explored the possible reasons for failure of democracy in Iraq.

²¹⁷ Pollack, Kevin M. (2002). "Next Stop Baghdad." *Foreign Affairs*, 81, 2, p45-46.

“fundamentally aggressive and risk-acceptant.”²¹⁸ Richard Betts, Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University compared Mao to Hussein when he stated that “Mao was considered as fanatically aggressive and crazy as Saddam Hussein is today.”²¹⁹ There was an attempt by these scholars to link Hussein’s aggressiveness to his irrational behavior as when Betts compared Mao’s actions to Hussein’s in Iraq. This link is imperative because it suggested that Hussein’s actions in Iraq might not be rational and therefore by default insane.

This link to Hussein’s mental state was crucial because it provided support for the argument that Hussein was now an archenemy of the U.S. The argument is subtle but it can be seen by examining the statements of various contributors to this journal. Eliot Cohen, a reviewer for *Foreign Affairs*, suggested that “the Iraqi dictator has consistently flouted the rules of rational calculation beloved by political scientists.”²²⁰ Hussein’s mental health has long been an issue in determining to what extent he posed a threat. However, I would argue that Hussein himself considers his way of thinking rational in a context different from those of western thought. “He is an inveterate gambler and risk-taker who regularly twists his calculations of the odds to suit his preferred course of action. He bases his calculations on assumptions outsiders often find bizarre and has little understanding of the larger world.”²²¹ Hussein’s way of thinking had eluded most Americans since well before his presidency. As you may recall during Hussein’s first phase as a Soviet puppet, intelligence services knew very little about the man’s way of

²¹⁸ Pollack (2002). p37.

²¹⁹ Betts, Richard K. (2003). “Suicide from Fear of Death.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 1, p41.

²²⁰ Cohen, Eliot. (2002). “Military, Scientific, and Technological Book Reviews.” *Foreign Affairs*, 81, 6, p187.

²²¹ Pollack. (2002). p36.

thinking or questionable actions. The inability to comprehend Hussein's behavior might have been a precursor for his mental health. However, regardless, the link and the assumption that he is insane was made.²²²

The association to Hussein's mental stability was compelling because it provided a connection to reassessing Hussein as a threat to both the region and the national security of the U.S., thus laying out the basis for his next representation as an archenemy. During the late 1990s there was a considerable amount of literature in *Foreign Affairs* that assessed the magnitude of Hussein's threat to the Persian Gulf Region. Fuller and Lesser argued that "Saddam Hussein's continued rule in Iraq is extremely harmful for the region as well as for his own people."²²³ Others claimed that it was necessary "to keep Saddam Hussein from developing terrible weapons with which he can once again threaten his neighbors."²²⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, took a more serious stance when he argued that:

the continued rule of Saddam Hussein poses a danger to the stability and security of the region. He has threatened his neighbors while doing everything possible to acquire weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of

²²² Saddam Hussein. (World Beaters). (2003, March). *New Internationalist*, p29. Hussein was referred to as a psychopath in the following periodical. More Saudi Writer's comment on Iraq. (1999, January 12). *Riyadh Daily*. The editors of this newspaper refer to the psychiatric case of Hussein. In contrast, others see Hussein as not insane by the terms of the modern concepts of mental health. Persaud, Rajendra. (1991, January 18). "Health: Saddam, sanity and the age-old traits of the dictator. Despite the parallels between Hitler, Stalin and the Iraqi President, psychiatrist Rajendra Persaud believes that, on the evidence available, Saddam cannot be diagnosed as clinically insane/Psychology." *The Guardian (London)*.

²²³ Fuller. (1997). p48. Note I did find one article that talked about how the various regimes around Iraq would be affected by Hussein's removal. In some cases it appeared that Hussein's removal might have an adverse impact on the authorities of the ruling regimes. See Myre, Greg. (2003, March 4). "Threats and Responses: The Arabs; Gulf leaders Split on Urging Saddam Hussein to Step Down." *New York Times*, Section A, Foreign Desk, p12.

²²⁴ Mueller. (1999). p50.

international law, even during the last several years, then subject to the most restrictive supervision in the history of international arms control.²²⁵

Hussein had been represented in the past as an economic threat to the U.S. Previously the Clinton:

administration had identified both Iraq and Iran as significant threats to America's interests in the region. It had developed a policy, known as 'dual containment' to deal with those threats by isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system, and encouraging a regime change in Iraq.²²⁶

It was clear that Hussein had been identified previously as an economic threat prior to the events of Sept 11th. However, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the commentary in this journal signaled a distinct shift in the discourse that captured the elevation of Hussein from being just a threat to U.S. economic security, to an archenemy that now represented a dire national security threat.²²⁷

The first step in this process can be traced back to discourse which categorized Hussein as a rogue state and a sponsor of terrorism. Iraq had been previously identified as a:

backlash state along the lines of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Libya. For now they lacked the resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten

²²⁵ Brzezinski, Zbigniew., Scowcroft, Brent., and Richard Murphy. (1997). "Differentiated Containment." *Foreign Affairs*, 76, 3, p24.

²²⁶ Gause III, F. Gregory. (1994). "The Illogic of Dual Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 73, 2, p56.

²²⁷ Bush, George W. (2003, March 6). Presidential Press Conference, East Room of the White House. These following remarks by George W. Bush were typical of the outline of the threat being portrayed by the Bush Administration at this time. "Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes. He possesses weapons of terror. He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists -- terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other peace-loving countries. Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to our people, and to all free people. If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and unacceptable risks."

democratic order being created around them. Nevertheless, their behavior is often aggressive and defiant.²²⁸

Jahangir Amuzegar, a former minister and economic Ambassador in Iran, referred to how “Iran was tied to Iraq and North Korea in an axis of evil”²²⁹ as defined by the Bush administration. Categorizing Iraq as a backlash state, rogue state, or simply an axis of evil were words in this journal that helped develop Hussein’s last face as an archenemy to the U.S. The Bush administration went to great lengths attempting to connect Hussein’s rogue regime to terrorism, which heightened the danger of his overall persona. Richard K. Betts, a director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and member of the National Commission on Terrorism, captured this development when he argued that the “crucial difference between a rogue state and a terrorist group is that the state has a return address.”²³⁰ Bett’s comments were representative of the debate among contributors discussing the significance of Hussein’s ties to terrorism in the Middle East. This provided another buttress for the argument that Hussein was an archenemy who needed to be dealt with decisively before he could do any potential harm to the national security of the U.S.

The question has been raised about the extent of Hussein’s involvement with terrorist activities as expressed by the George W. Bush administration.²³¹ Madeline Albright, former Secretary of State, pointed out that “the administration’s claim that

²²⁸ Lake. (1994). p45.

²²⁹ Amuzegar, Jahangir. (2003). “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 1, p46.

²³⁰ Betts, Richard K. (2003). p40.

²³¹ Bush. (2003, March 6). “Iraq is part of the war on terror. Iraq is a country that has got terrorist ties. It’s a country with wealth. It’s a country that trains terrorists, a country that can arm terrorists. And our fellow Americans must understand in this new war against terror that we not only must chase down Al-Qaeda terrorists, we must deal with weapons of mass destruction as well.”

Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat was poorly supported, as was its claim of alleged connections to Al-Qaeda.”²³² Pollack argued that “Iraq is indeed a state sponsor of terrorism, but on the grand roll of such sponsors it is well behind Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, North Korea, Libya, and several others.”²³³ Pollack further reiterated that “if one were to list Saddam Hussein’s crimes against humanity in order of their importance, his support for terrorism would rank low.”²³⁴ These two agreed that Hussein was a patron of terrorism. They just disagreed with Bush’s analysis that Hussein was an imminent threat based on his past connections to terrorism.²³⁵ Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and former ambassador to Israel, asserted that the “elimination of one of the terrorists’ patrons and the lowered profile of others might further lessen the appeal for a Palestinian community already coming to the realization that violence has been nothing short of disastrous for its cause and circumstances.”²³⁶ Indyk made the most forcible assertion possible by advocating the removal of Hussein because he provided support for terrorism.

²³² Albright, Madeline K. (2003). “Bridges, bombs, or Bluster.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 5, p7.

²³³ Pollack. (2002). p46.

²³⁴ Pollack. (2002.) p46.

²³⁵ Daniel Benjamin, a member of the National Security Council from 1994 to 1999 discussed the dangers and Bush’s government’s misconception of Iraq’s alleged ties to Al Qaeda. In his words, “Iraq and Al Qaeda are not obvious allies. In fact, they are natural enemies. A central tenet of Al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology is that secular Muslim rulers and their regimes have oppressed the believers and plunged Islam into a historic crisis. To contemporary jihadists, Saddam Hussein is another in a line of dangerous secularists, an enemy of the faith who refuses to rule by Shariah and had habitually murdered Sunni and Shiite religious leaders in Iraq who might oppose his reign.” Furthermore, “like other Middle Eastern rulers, Saddam Hussein has long recognized that Al Qaeda and like minded Islamists represent a threat to his regime. Consequently, he has shown no interest in working with them against their common enemy, the United States. This was the understanding of American intelligence in the 1990s. In 1998, the National Security Council assigned staff to determine whether that conclusion was justified. After reviewing all the available intelligence that could have pointed to a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq, the group found no evidence of a noteworthy relationship.” Benjamin, Daniel. (2002, September 30). “Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda are not allies.” *New York Times*, Section A, p25.

²³⁶ Indyk, Martin. (2003). “A Trusteeship for Palestine.” *Foreign Affairs*, 82, 3, p51.

Expanding upon this viewpoint was Albright discussing the Bush administration's attempts at linking Hussein to Al Qaeda.²³⁷ The realization of this terrorist connection provided one more justification for Hussein's final representation as an archenemy to the U.S.

At this juncture, discourse shifted to discussing arguments and rationales for removing Hussein from power. Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institute, and former Deputy Secretary of State, discussed how "Bush based his argument on Saddam Hussein's record of repeatedly attacking his neighbors, using weapons of mass destruction, and flouting past attempts to carry out inspections and enforce existing U.N. resolutions."²³⁸ Bush's rationale for war was also supported by the Clinton administration, although they advocated the term regime change.

Bill Clinton had also deemed Iraq a substantial threat, both because of its apparent capability to field weapons of mass destruction and because of its demonstrated willingness to use them.²³⁹ For these reasons, coupled with Hussein's history of gross human rights violations and his refusal to comply with the demand of the international community, the Clinton team had also supported regime change in Iraq.²⁴⁰

²³⁷ Albright (2003). "To bolster the decision to oust Saddam Hussein, administrations officials lumped his regime together with Al Qaeda, describing them as complementary halves of the same existential threat." p4-5. Note there were many who questioned whether Hussein would provide financial and military support to Al-Qaeda. Mearsheimer, John, and Stephen. Walt. (2003, February 2). "Keeping Saddam Hussein in a Box." *New York Times*, Section 4, editorial desk, p 15. These two argued that "Mr. Hussein is not going to give Al Qaeda weapons of mass destruction. Saddam would have little to gain and everything to lose since he could never be sure that American surveillance would not detect the handoff. If it did, the United States response would be swift and devastating." From the European perspective they were concerned with the failing links to Al-Qaeda and the Bush administration's motives for war. See Greenslade, Roy. (2002, August 5). "Media: Hawks and doves: The UK's media are united in their view of Saddam Hussein's character and the repellant nature of his repressive regime, says Roy Greenslade. But, they cannot agree on how to get rid of him." *The Guardian*, (London), p8.

²³⁸ Talbott, Strobe. (2002). "From Prague to Baghdad" NATO at Risk." *Foreign Affairs*, 81, 6, p48-49.

²³⁹For a history of the Iraq's acquisition of WMD and theories regarding their possible use see: Bahgat, Gawdat. (2003). "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq and Iran." *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, 28, 4, p423-449. and Shaw, Eric. (2003). "Saddam Hussein: Political Psychological Profiling Results Relevant to His Possession, Use, and Possible Transfer of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to Terrorist Groups." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 26, 5, p347-364.

²⁴⁰ Rubin, James P. (2003). p46-47.

In the words of Ajami, “a predator had risen in the region and a great foreign power, the inheritor of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, had checked his bid for hegemony.”²⁴¹

These last three statements provided evidence for the seriousness of the change in Hussein’s threat level status and the desire of the U.S. government to remove him from power because he represented a threat to our national security. The use of the term “weapons of mass destruction,” history of human rights violations, and attacks on neighbors by this journal all combined to represent Hussein as an enemy to the welfare of the region, U.S. interests, and paralleled the administration’s own comments on this issue.²⁴²

The representation of Hussein as an archenemy implied that it was imperative for the U.S. to act quickly and decisively to protect its interests in the Gulf region as well as our national security. George W. Bush advocated removing Hussein to insure that he was never a threat to democracy or world peace again. This theme was expressed in the comments of Talbott who asserted that “Bush will probably make a case similar to the one he made in New York City: the only way to end the menace Saddam poses to the

²⁴¹ Ajami. (2003). p6.

²⁴² Vice President Dick Cheney’s following comments epitomize the combination of all the factors that led to Hussein to be categorized as an archenemy of the U.S. In his words, “Should all (Hussein’s) ambitions be realized, the implications would be enormous for the Middle East and the U.S. and for the peace of the world. The whole range of weapons of mass destruction then would rest in the hands of a dictator who has already shown his willingness to use such weapons and has done so, both in this war with Iran and against his own people. Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror and a seat at a top ten percent of the world’s oil reserves. Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or another nation to nuclear blackmail. Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction; there is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and, and against us. Cheney, Dick (2002, August 26). Remarks by Vice President Dick Cheney at the Opening Session of the 103rd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Affairs, Nashville Tennessee.

world peace is to eliminate Saddam himself.”²⁴³ This statement was one of the most strongly worded statements I came across arguing the case for Hussein’s removal from power. It also epitomized to what extent Hussein’s persona in *Foreign Affairs* had deviated from the original representation 24 years earlier. Hussein, once a puppet, ally, and dictator had now been transformed into a renegade who was an archenemy of the U.S. and would be forcefully removed from power.

Hussein’s images in the discourse of *Foreign Affairs* and by contrast U.S. foreign policy have evolved considerably over this 24 year period. Each of these representations was visible in the discourse of this journal. A review of Hussein’s character also enabled the reader to identify that the brutal and indifferent nature of Hussein to his populace and his neighbors has been present since the beginning of his dictatorship. The key lesson to be learned from this analysis is that the way Hussein was framed in discourse was dependent upon the U.S. relationship with him at the time. Hussein was always a bad person, in fact for a short period he was a bad person whom the U.S. and our allies aided and abetted. The purpose of this thesis was to draw the parallels between each successive face of Hussein and transitions in U.S. foreign policy in order for the reader to understand how the transformation of perceptions of a world leader’s character was dependent upon American interests at the time. Puppet, ally, dictator, renegade, and archenemy were all terms that were situational in context when it came to interpreting the persona of Saddam Hussein.

²⁴³ Talbott, Strobe. (2002). p48-49.

IX. DISSCUSSION

The discourse relative to Hussein's representation in *Foreign Affairs* has been diverse and emblematic of each image assigned to him in the discourse of U.S. foreign policy. The language and assertions constructing Hussein's various faces underwent changes during his 24 year rule. It is imperative that we understand that each face coincided with U.S. foreign policy interests. In short, *Foreign Affairs* constructed the Hussein that best represented U.S. foreign policy interests in a particular era.

This chapter summarizes these changes in Hussein's persona and discusses what implications these faces had for U.S. foreign policy. This discussion also considers the silences in *Foreign Affairs* and offers reasons for their existence. Each face is different. Each face also invites different interpretations and different meanings depending on the historical context. Hussein's representation in the late 1970s reflected the U.S. Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union. *Foreign Affairs* saw him as a puppet. Hussein the puppet appeared during the peak of the Cold War, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were jockeying for position in the Persian Gulf. At this time, Hussein was dismissed as a wild eyed Arab radical by members of the State Department.²⁴⁴

From the beginning of Hussein's presidency, his brutality was often linked to his oppression of internal dissent. These traits to some degree were linked to Hussein in every future face, except when he was personified as an ally. There is no question that Hussein employed brutality to consolidate his control of the Iraqi state. For this reason,

²⁴⁴ Wright. (1979). p260.

early writers compared him to ancient Babylonian and Assyrian leaders such as Sargon II and Hammurabi, also accomplished and brutal leaders in the Arab world. Furthermore, in Iraq's history, violence had been an acceptable, if not necessary and predictable political tool since the conception of the state following the fall of the Ottoman Empire. What these historical comparisons with Sargon II and Hammurabi did was legitimize Hussein's quest for hegemony in the gulf region through the use of violence. The use of violence in Iraq became acceptable or understandable when placed and situated in Iraq's recent as well as ancient history.

At this time it was morally excusable to make these links. Writers in *Foreign Affairs* commented on, but were not overtly concerned at this time, with Hussein's brutal style of rule. It was mentioned but no one condemned Hussein for it or considered alternatives to his approach to government. This link to historical Arab leaders also provided the justification for themes discussing the potential impact that Hussein might have had in Middle Eastern politics. Despite being allied with the Soviet Union and relatively unknown in the U.S. diplomatic and intelligence circles, some writers did foresee the potential influence that Hussein came to have in this region. Claudia Wright argued that despite Hussein's propensity for violence he might have been capable of restoring the power of the ancient Mesopotamian city-states and Nasser's dream of Pan-Arab unity in the Middle East.²⁴⁵ These assertions marked the grandiosity of Hussein's ambitions. Yet, this was exactly what contributors in *Foreign Affairs* were discussing at this juncture of Hussein's relationship with the U.S. *Foreign Affairs* had presented

²⁴⁵ Wright. (1979). p257.

Hussein as a legitimate but relatively unknown contender in the politics of the Persian Gulf. This was hampered by his relationship with the Soviets. His persona was that of a Soviet puppet.²⁴⁶

The Iran-Iraq war was a pivotal point in Hussein's political relationship with the U.S. In the beginning, Hussein was a tool of the Soviet Union. This provided further justification for his portrayal as a puppet in U.S. foreign policy. The war with Iran also provided the starting point for further negative assertions about Hussein to appear in print to help justify the U.S. representation of him. The war gave birth to assertions that described Hussein as an infidel and emphasized the corruption and ruthlessness of Hussein's government. These negative assertions were discussed in detail to contrast Iraq with Iran's fundamentalist form of Islam. For the most part these assertions expressed Iran's animosity towards Hussein in light of events taking place in the Iran-Iraq war.

However, there were no specific assertions that dealt with the Iraqi populace other than those asserted during the propaganda war with Iran.²⁴⁷ It is worth mentioning that at this point in his political career, Hussein was not constructed by *Foreign Affairs* (or the State Department) as a bad guy in U.S. foreign policy. There were hints of his brutality in his quest to consolidate power, and there were hints that dissent was suppressed. But, Hussein the Soviet puppet did not at this time justify *Foreign Affairs* to take a real

²⁴⁶ As my analysis indicated Hussein's persona in foreign policy evolved due to specific U.S. foreign policy interests at a particular time. Political events, such as the ramifications of the Iran-Iraq war instigated the first change in Hussein's persona as the war progressed negatively in Iraq's favor.

²⁴⁷ Note there were early indications of Hussein's brutality. However, my analysis made it clear that the assertions detailing Hussein's brutality were linked to purges within his regime as he worked on consolidating his power once he assumed the presidency in 1979.

in-depth look at how he ruled or the impact his policies were having on his populace. In the early 1980s, there was little or no talk of the atrocities being committed within Hussein's regime.

The U.S. turned a blind eye to the welfare of the Iraqi populace throughout the 1980s, while Hussein was engaged in a war with Iran. During this war Hussein assumed a new role in U.S. foreign policy, a role in which rumors of brutality within his regime had no place. Khomeini's rise in Iran and the downfall of the pro-U.S. Shah government was the genesis for Hussein, the U.S. ally. This change in meaning indicated a different response to Hussein. The quest to retain a foothold in the region led to political relations with Iraq, bringing with it military assistance and foreign aid to check the threat of Khomeini's Iran.

The importance of the Iran-Iraq war on Hussein's relationship with the U.S. was enormous. The U.S. and countries in the region were wary that a hostile Iran might enjoy the type of power the Shah had previously enjoyed over the Persian Gulf. The U.S. was concerned because diplomatic relations had deteriorated considerably with the fall of the Shah and Khomeini's support for taking and keeping Americans hostage. The U.S. was left with very few options in order to (a) deal with the growing danger of Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalist state, and (b) at the same time maintain its influence in the Gulf.

Hussein's hostility towards Iran provided an alternative that suited U.S. foreign policy interests in 1983. Hussein's invasion of Iran may have been miscalculated, but it had the benefit of deterring Iran's growing animosity away from the U.S. When Iranian victories tilted the balance of the war in favor of Iran, the U.S., to protect its economic

interests, began aiding and arming Hussein. The support that Hussein received from the U.S. and the USSR was instrumental in developing the military machine that Hussein established in Iraq, the bulk of it provided by the Soviet Union, U.S., France, and Germany. Thus, in pursuit of economic and political gain, they and we built up his military might and armed him with WMD.²⁴⁸ There is a silence here. *Foreign Affairs* mentioned that the U.S. provided financial and military support for Hussein during the 1980s. It neglected to mention the extent to which he was a creature of Western powers. It was excusable to arm a tyrant, because it suited U.S. political interests in Iran.

In order to understand the rush to arm Hussein, one must remember that the Middle East has historically been one of the major markets for arms sales.²⁴⁹ During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq imported some \$52 billion dollars worth of arms alone.²⁵⁰ According To Gary Milhollin, Director of the University of Wisconsin's Project on Nuclear Arms Control, an organization in Washington that tracks nuclear exports and the spread of nuclear weapons,

In the five years before the Persian Gulf War, for example, the Commerce Department licensed more than \$1.5 billion of strategically sensitive American exports to Iraq. Many were for the direct delivery to nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile sites. Companies like Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell,

²⁴⁸ "The West also sold Iraq the technology to make chemical and biological weapons and many of the technologies to produce nuclear weapons. Iraq has made far more use of chemical weapons than any other Middle Eastern country. It is known that Iraq turned in the late 1970s and early 1980s to U.S. and British firms for aid on constructing chemical processing plants, which were clearly intended to produce chemical weapons. When these efforts failed, the Iraqis turned to firms from West Germany, Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, obtaining most of the components they needed." Cordesman, Anthony. (1991). "No End of a Lesson? Iran and the Issue of Arms Transfers." *RUSI Journal*, 136, p4.

²⁴⁹ "The Middle East spent some \$180 billion on arms imports during 1978-1988 with \$104 billion of this total being spent during 1984-1988. The major states in the region consume some 30-33 percent of the world's arms imports. The Soviet Union has long been the principal supplier to the Middle East, and sold \$26.6bn out of a total of \$89.1bn worth of arms imports to the region during 1984-1988. The U.S. was second, selling a little over \$16.3bn, and France was third, with sales of \$12.8bn." Cordesman. (1991). p8.

²⁵⁰ Cordesman. (1991). p3.

International Computer Systems, Rockwell and Tektronix sold high-performance electronics either to Saad 16, Iraq's major missile research center; to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, which set up Al Atheer; to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, responsible for Atomic-bomb research; or to Nasr State Enterprise, in charge of Iraq's missile and nuclear procurement. Honeywell even did a feasibility study for a powerful gasoline bomb warhead intended for an Iraqi-Egyptian missile.²⁵¹

Several studies released during the 1990s discussed the arming of Hussein by the U.S. and its allies.²⁵² The U.S. and its allies provided arms or WMD in the 1980s in order to serve its interests in the Persian Gulf. The technology, warheads, biological and chemical agents - we provided them. In 2003 Hussein's WMD became the reason for our invasion. *Foreign Affairs* in the 1980s did not recall our arming of Hussein. And it said nothing about him being a brutal dictator.

Hussein in 1980s foreign policy became the ally. And there was no mention made of removing our ally from the Department of State's list of terrorist sponsors in order for us to send economic and military aid. As Richard Lacayo has written: "In 1982, three years after Jimmy Carter placed Iraq on the State Department's list of nations supporting terrorism, Ronald Reagan removed Iraq from the list, reopening the way for U.S. aid. The Reagan administration moved quickly to provide Iraq with over \$400 million in loan guarantees to buy American grain."²⁵³ The U.S. embraced an ally with

²⁵¹ Milhollin, Gary. (1992, March 8). "Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb" *New York Times*, Section 6, p30.

²⁵² Friedman, Alan. (1993). *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. New York: Bantam Books. Jentleson, Bruce W. (1994). *With Friends Like These, Reagan, Bush, and Saddam 1982-1990*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Mantius, Peter. (1995). *Shell Game: A True Story of Banking, Spies, Lies, Politics, and the arming of Saddam Hussein*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

²⁵³ Lacayo. (1992, June 8). p2.

known terrorist ties at the time! The reason? Iran.²⁵⁴ Strobe Talbott noted our obsession with Iran at the time:

There was the mutual odium between the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and the country he kept calling the "Great Satan." So thoroughly did American politicians and citizens reciprocate Khomeini's loathing that U.S. policy in the 80s tilted toward none other than Saddam Hussein. The enemy of our enemy was our friend. It turns out that the enemy of our enemy became our even greater enemy, because Saddam, more than Khomeini, is bent on aggressive territorial expansion.²⁵⁵

The fear of Iran justified arming a brutal tyrant. Hussein was an ally because he was fighting the fundamentalist leader of Iran. Accordingly, *Foreign Affairs* focused its attention not on the U.S. but on Iraq's war with Iran. There was no mention, during this era, of Hussein's brutality, his suppression of internal dissent, ruthlessness, or corruption. Hussein's slaughter of the Kurds was noted in a book review²⁵⁶ in *Foreign Affairs*, three years after the event had taken place. *Foreign Affairs* was not interested in the slaughter of the Kurds. It was, to put it crudely, interested in the slaughter of Iranians by our ally.

Many of the crimes committed by Hussein were perpetrated while he was an ally of the U.S. He used chemical weapons against his own people while he was our ally. Again no mention of this issue by *Foreign Affairs*, or by our government at this time. The Reagan administration played down the March 1988 massacre of Halabja in which

²⁵⁴ During the Iran-Iraq war the potential for influence by the U.S. and the Soviet Union on Iran was seen as being a greater prize than that of Iraq. This is one reason the U.S. remained neutral in the conflict and would not endorse or provide aid to either party prior to 1983. There was a hope that the U.S. would be able to resume diplomatic relations with Khomeini in Iran and perhaps retain some of the influence they had obtained under the pro-U.S. Shah's government. However, the continued hostility of the Khomeini regime towards the U.S. would prevent this from happening.

²⁵⁵ Talbott. (1990, September 3). p40.

²⁵⁶ Campbell. (1991).

Hussein murdered 5000 civilians with chemical weapons. Stephen Zunes notes that then Vice-President George Bush blamed Iran for the massacre:

When ABC television correspondent Charles Glass revealed sites of Saddam's biological warfare programs in early 1989, the State Department denied the facts presented and the story essentially died. Glass later observed that the State Department now issues briefings on the same sites.²⁵⁷

When a 1988 Senate Foreign Relations committee staff report brought to life Hussein's policy of murder in Iraqi Kurdistan, Senator Claiborne Pell introduced the Prevention of Genocide Act to put pressure on Hussein's regime. The first Bush administration had the measure killed. It was never implemented because the U.S. did not want to criticize an ally. He was not seen as an ally by the Iranians or by the Kurds. But he was only seen as an American friend, ally, a positive force for peace in the Middle East. Foreign policy analysts talked about Hussein as a "Knight of Arabism" and a potential successor to Nasser's idea of Pan-Arab unity. He could be trusted to represent the interests of both the U.S. and an "independent Arab will." He was also applauded during this time period for his sensitivity to women's issues.

Hussein supported the emancipation of women, and the use of advanced technology, and reforms in education. These are attributes of Hussein the ally. This progressivism disappears, along with our role in arming him, when Hussein emerges as a monster a few years later. The George W. Bush administration stressed the liberation of

²⁵⁷ Zunes. (2001). p70.

Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban.²⁵⁸ No mention was made that Iraqi women had enjoyed liberties for over two decades.

Americans need to analyze this information about women based on Middle Eastern standards. Part of my childhood was spent in Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s. I understand the stringent standards that Islamic women were held accountable to when presenting themselves in public. Women's rights in Saudi Arabia compared to those enjoyed by women in the U.S. did not exist. Women in Iraq, on the other hand, were free to hold jobs, not wear veils, and appear in public. By Middle Eastern standards these was very progressive. But, in Saudi Arabia, another ally of the U.S., this was heresy. That is why the depiction of these women's liberties was a significant and positive step in Hussein the ally. The appearance of positive themes in *Foreign Affairs* coincided with U.S. foreign policy. Presenting a positive image of Hussein served U.S policy interests at the time.

The end of the war with Iran, and the invasion of Kuwait, represented the next significant turning point in U.S./Iraq relations, when Hussein the dictator appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. His rationale for this invasion was twofold. First, to settle a border dispute tracing back to the development of the Iraqi nation with the fall of the Ottoman empire. Second, to get compensation from other Gulf countries for protecting them from

²⁵⁸ Bush, Laura. (2002, March 8). Remarks by Mrs. Laura Bush at the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, International Women's Day. This is an excerpt from the First Lady's speech: "People around the world are looking closely at the roles that women play in society. And Afghanistan under the Taliban gave the world a sobering example of a country where women were denied their rights and their place in society... Today, the world is helping Afghan women return to the lives that they once knew.... Our dedication to respect and protect women's rights in all countries must continue if we are to achieve a peaceful, prosperous world.... Together, the United States, the United Nations and all of our allies will prove that the forces of terror can't stop the momentum of freedom."

Iran. Policy-makers and historians argued that Hussein's annexation of Kuwait was a miscalculated gamble. Others argue that Hussein believed the U.S. was willing to overlook his invasion of Kuwait because he was a valuable ally. The U.S. attitude towards Hussein's actions might have been different if he had not threatened Saudi Arabia, a vital economic America ally, and our main source of oil.²⁵⁹ Hussein's occupation of Kuwait and encroachment upon Saudi Arabia might have been an attempt to leverage the Saudi kingdom for cash to halt his advance and compensate him for his war with Iran.²⁶⁰ Hussein might not have had any real intentions of invading Saudi Arabia, because he was aware of the close political relationship the Saudis enjoyed with the U.S. Regardless of his thinking, however, it became clear that his impact on Saudi Arabia threatened U.S. economic (oil) interests.

Hussein's (miscalculations) of U.S. economic interests and oil policy had a strong impact on his persona in *Foreign Affairs*. Hussein the ally disappeared, along with any mention of positive or progressive traits or achievements. The focus now turned inward to look at the actual workings of his dictatorship. There were no assertions about Hussein being a dictator in *Foreign Affairs* until 1991. This theme and the representation of his dictatorship was not discussed until 12 years after he became president of Iraq. It is naive to think that Hussein was not a dictator in the previous 12 years. He became a dictator as soon as he assumed power in 1979. Early on, in relation to U.S. interests, he was a

²⁵⁹Gergen. (1991). p5, comments pointed out that Hussein made a fatal mistake in menacing Saudi Arabia, a vital economic American ally.

²⁶⁰Gross. (2002, September 25).

Soviet puppet. Then, with the war against Iran, he became an ally, and it was only when he invaded Kuwait and posed a threat to Saudi Arabia that he finally became a dictator.

Hussein's emergence as a dictator became the motivator for *Foreign Affairs* to explore the inner workings of his dictatorship. He was no longer referred to as a "pro-American mercenary,"²⁶¹ but a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. Once Hussein became a threat, the horrors that had been occurring since his inauguration as president of Iraq in 1979 began to surface. President George H.W. Bush expressed presidential concern for the Iraqi citizens for the first time since resuming diplomatic relations in 1983.²⁶² Writers in foreign policy began to explore the atrocities. Stories about assassinations of Iraqi citizens began to appear, along with the stories about Hussein's unwillingness to conform to U.N. sanctions.

Hussein the renegade was unwilling to comply with sanctions regardless of the human cost. The infant mortality death rate quadrupled. Breakdowns of infrastructure led to more than 100,000 deaths annually of the young and elderly.²⁶³ Hussein the renegade defied international law and used the negative impact of sanctions as a propaganda tool for rallying his people. Still the moral question remained: Who was responsible for the deaths? Hussein or those who imposed the sanctions? Overall

Foreign Affairs held that Hussein bore a large degree of responsibility for the impact of

²⁶¹ The following comments were voices in the Arab world that provided a different interpretation for Saddam's new relationship with the U.S.. Nafa'a, Hassan. (2001, November 15). "Creating Monsters from Saddam Hussein to Bin Laden." *Mideast Mirror*, Section Arab/Islamic World. This periodical is a digest of news and editorial comments in the Arab, Persian, Turkish and Hebrew news media and stated that "The Arab peoples know that Saddam Hussein was America's number one agent in the region who waged war against Iran on behalf of Washington. Muslim peoples know that bin Laden was also America's man who fought the Soviet Union on behalf of The U.S. Nevertheless, once their roles were over, and once they began demanding a price for their services, they evoked America's wrath."

²⁶² Walker. (1990, November 2).

²⁶³ Mueller. (1999). p49.

sanctions on the Iraqi civilians. Still there were writers in *Foreign Affairs* who thought that the sanctioners themselves should bear some of that responsibility. Regardless, the U.S. erred in their analysis of Hussein, assuming that sanctions would force Hussein to bow to international pressure.

In retrospect, based on Hussein's history, and persecution of his own people, the belief that Hussein was concerned with the welfare of Iraqi suffering was misguided. The sanctions did not alter Hussein's standard of living. Sanctions did impact people who had no say in a totalitarian state - the poor, the Kurds, etc. who had no power in the previous twelve years. *Foreign Affairs* did address the moral ramifications of sanctions, which by some estimates caused more deaths than both wars in Iraq.²⁶⁴ Most Americans remain ignorant of the "collateral damage" caused by the sanctions. This is not surprising, since mass media in the U.S. did not talk about this. Michael Goss's study of the *New York Times* indicated that only 20 out of 650 articles addressed sanctions impact on the civilian population.²⁶⁵

Not so in mass media in the Middle East.²⁶⁶ Laura Drake discussed Americans' lack of concern about sanctions in Cairo's *Al Ahram*. She argued that:

²⁶⁴ See: Mueller. (1999)

²⁶⁵ Goss. (2002).

²⁶⁶ Esmat Abdel-Meguid, Secretary-General of the Arab League was quoted saying, "I can assure you that all Arab League countries without exception have taken a very clear stance on easing the suffering of the Iraqi people." Diab, Mervat. (1992, June 4). "Arabs tired of US led sanctions." *Al Ahram Weekly*. In another article a Kenyan newspaper lashed out at the U.S. for the continued persecution of the Iraqi populace: "The World has changed, So Must America." (2001, October 9). *Africa News*. There was also a high degree of animosity toward the U.S. as a result of sanctions and some felt that Iraq was being unfairly punished as evidenced by this article. Who is the real villain: Saddam Hussein or Sanctions? (1994, October 10). *Mideast Mirror*. The Saudi Arabian viewpoint regarding sanctions was contrary to other Arab views as expressed in the following editorial. "The brutality of the Iraqi regime is unparalleled in history. Evidence of this is its attitude toward the Iraqi people, who have been suffering as a result of Saddam Hussein's non-compliance with provisions of US resolutions. And this is why the tyrants in

In America, the subject of Iraq's continued suffering under a devastating civilian trade embargo was entirely unknown to the general population. The American people have forgotten about Iraq because it was no longer reported and because it no longer affected their lives.²⁶⁷

Foreign Affairs was of little help here, with its dearth of writers from the Middle East. People more likely to argue that sanctions were causing widespread illness and death or what, in military terms, is called "collateral damage." This euphemism disconnected the public from the moral implications of a failed sanctions policy. (The public needs to be aware that policies we support do not only have positive implications.) Negative implications include loss of life.

The issue of morality and the impact of sanctions on Iraqi civilians led to the emergence of the portrayal of Hussein the renegade. U.S. foreign policy discourse now focused on human rights violations occurring within Iraq. Articles published in the late 1990s and thereafter escalated talk about past and present atrocities, thus, demonizing Hussein the renegade in *Foreign Affairs*. The U.S. was now willing to intervene to insure that basic human rights were available to all Iraqis. Hussein was now investigated for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Hussein's massacre of the Kurds was finally alluded to three years after the fact in *Foreign Affairs*,²⁶⁸ an issue silenced while he was an ally. The slaughter of the Kurds now was an asset for U.S. foreign policy interests and warranted discussion.

Baghdad are being ostracized. The present actions of the Iraqi leaders will ensure that Saddam Hussein and his men remain pariahs for some time to come." Editorial: Kingdom's support. (1994, October 12). *Riyadh Daily*

²⁶⁷ Drake, Laura. (1994, February 17). "Comment: The silent everlasting war against Iraq." *Al Ahram Weekly*.

²⁶⁸ Lake. (1994).

The demonization of Hussein enabled the U.S. to classify Iraq as a criminal regime. This shift encouraged discussion about options for removing Hussein from power. Regime change, continued sanctions, and containment were all discussed as possible solutions. The 1994 U.S. classification of Iraq as a rogue state facilitated Hussein's removal from power. This supported arguments about Hussein threatening his neighbors, undermining democracy, and persecuting his own people. The image of Hussein the renegade was instigated by the Clinton administration. But, George W. Bush reinforced it after the horrific events of September 11, 2001.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers represented a significant event in American history and our relationship with Hussein. This was the first time since Pearl Harbor that the U.S. had been attacked on our own land. The results were tragic and thousands lost their lives. This event united and infuriated the will of the American people and government to eradicate all terrorism. In two months the U.S. dismantled the Taliban's government in Afghanistan for their support of Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin-Laden, the perpetrators of September 11th. Afghanistan was the first target in the Bush administration's war on terror. The next target was Hussein the archenemy.

September 11th provided the motivation for the emergence of Hussein the archenemy in U.S. foreign policy. Hussein the renegade had been tolerated in the past. But, in the post September 11th era Hussein the archenemy was depicted as an imminent threat, against democracy, a possessor of WMD, and a terrorist. Hussein's brutality was now represented as preventive to the development of democracy in the Middle East in *Foreign Affairs*. This coincided with George W. Bush's objective to bring democracy to

the Middle East to combat terrorism. Bush argued that the American ideals of democracy and freedom would prevent future terrorism. Currently it is impossible to determine if this outcome will be achieved. Realistically, the impact of the U.S. attempts to foster democratization in the Middle East will not be determined for decades.

Foreign policy discourse alluded to Hussein the archenemy's sanity. This argument was based on Hussein's irrational behavior. Earlier discourse indicated that Hussein the puppet's intentions and actions were hard for Western political strategists to decipher. The invasions of Iran and Kuwait were irrational to most Western analysts. In Hussein's mind, these were reasonable, rational, calculated, and achievable goals. The key lesson to be learned from this argument is that the linkage to Hussein's sanity supported the argument that he was a danger to our national security.²⁶⁹

The arguments for Hussein's connection to terrorism and possession of WMD provided the necessary leverage for instigating the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and removing Hussein the archenemy from power. The arguments and rationale for connecting Hussein to terrorism and advocating his removal were discussed in *Foreign Affairs*. His past connection to terrorism was instrumental in the development of Hussein the archenemy. This process first began when Hussein the renegade was categorized as a rogue state. Later George W. Bush referred to Hussein as being representative of an Axis of Evil. Bush repeatedly linked Hussein to Al-Qaeda to provide public support for his removal. Noam Chomsky pointed out that "after the September 11th attacks, virtually no one regarded Iraq as responsible. By December 2002 the figure had risen to almost half the

²⁶⁹Hussein might have possessed an ego and suffered from megalomania, but his actions weren't warranted clinically insane in *The Guardian* by psychiatrist, Persaud. (1991, January 8).

population.”²⁷⁰ Madeline Albright, the former Secretary of State, believed that Hussein linkage to Al-Qaeda and his representation as an imminent threat were overstated by the Bush administration.²⁷¹ Other writers indicated that Hussein may indeed have been a patron of terrorism, but in the grand scheme of things his support paled in contrast to those of other nations.²⁷² To this date there has been no credible evidence for a Hussein/Al-Qaeda connection.

Hussein’s possession of WMD were written about in *Foreign Affairs*. This analysis preceded arguments detailing whether Hussein had WMD, because this study’s data collection ceased in September 2003. Fifteen months later, more details have emerged about Hussein’s possession of WMD. At this date, our government has canceled all major investigations to find WMD in Iraq. Intelligence that argued Hussein possessed WMD was faulty. There was no accountability within the George W. Bush administration when WMD were not discovered in Iraq. Bush even joked about not finding WMD at a black-tie event for radio and television journalists in Washington.²⁷³

Whether or not Hussein the archenemy represented an imminent threat was debated in *Foreign Affairs* from two different ideological viewpoints. The Bush administration argued that it was only a matter of time before Hussein used WMD, or provided it to terrorists.²⁷⁴ Others believed that Bush misled us about the dangers of

²⁷⁰Chomsky, Noam. (2003, April 03). “Turkey and the U.S. War on Iraq: An Interview Noam Chomsky and Znet.” *Znet*. Retrieved March 17, 2005 from http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=3382§ionID=51.

²⁷¹ Albright. (2003).

²⁷² Pollack. (2002).

²⁷³ Teather, David. (2004, March 26). “It’s no laughing matter say critics, as Bush jokes about search for WMD.” *The Guardian (London)*, Guardian Home Pages, p3.

²⁷⁴ There was still no mention about how Hussein acquired his WMD.

Hussein. This is a divisive ideological issue with no real solution. One of the benefits of this study is that it breaks down this argument and allows the reader to determine whether Hussein was indeed an imminent threat.

You may not agree with all my conclusions. But you do have the opportunity to analyze the arguments and themes detailing Hussein's transition in foreign policy discourse to make your own. The purpose for this study was to help others understand the historical relationship between the U.S. and Hussein, and address the moral implications of U.S. foreign policy. Hussein the renegade and Hussein the archenemy were not indicative of the entire relationship. Hussein the ally was drastically different than his other representations. Hussein the ally provided a glimpse he possessed positive and progressive traits that were seen when he was useful to U.S. interests.

The key lesson to be learned is that Hussein's changing faces coincided with changing U.S. political interests. Each face is representative of how the U.S. wanted Hussein to appear at a given time. Hussein himself has never changed, it is only the U.S. representation of him that has changed. Noam Chomsky noted that Hussein was always a "murderous gangster" and brutal dictator who repressed his people. It just was not always reported in *Foreign Affairs*. In conclusion, the foreign policy talk surrounding Hussein, or any other leader, is far more complex than a series of assertions in a given era. This analysis of representations of Saddam Hussein provides an account of how the portrayed persona of a foreign leader coincided with U.S. foreign policy. Changes in U.S. foreign policy impact the words we use to describe and interpret another leader's actions, and are based on our specific political interests. These policies have moral

implications that need to be addressed and recognized to induce change. Lastly, we must be aware that the persona is not always representative of all facets of the person, rather only representative of the images the United States paints at a given moment.

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