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Regionalism versus universalism in US collective security policy 1939-1949

Eric Smith
San Jose State University

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REGIONALISM VERSUS UNIVERSALISM
IN US COLLECTIVE SECURITY POLICY 1939-1949

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Eric Smith
May 2006

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APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Dr. Robert Kumamoto

Dr. Mary Pickering

Dr. E. Bruce Reynolds

APPROVED FOR THE UNIVERSITY

03/25/06

ABSTRACT

REGIONALISM VERSUS UNIVERSALISM IN US COLLECTIVE SECURITY POLICY 1939-1949

by Eric Smith

The viewpoint of United States policy makers on issues of collective security evolved during the decade 1939-1949, in response to internal debate as well as to external events and influences. A key issue was the basis of collective security strategy, with forces in favor of a regional approach contending with those supporting universalism. In 1945, the United Nations Charter established the universal consensus-based Security Council, but also provided for subordinate regional arrangements. A series of related policy decisions made use of the regional provisions of the UN Charter, culminating in 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty. This transition to a regional strategy was facilitated by the availability of existing or adaptable regional concepts. The key step in the transition was recasting the primary purpose of regional organizations from intra-regional security to responsibility for external threats.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Robert M. and Daisy L. Smith, who gave me a love of learning, to my wife Lynnette Van Epps-Smith, who encouraged me to pursue my dream of a degree in History, and to my professors at San Jose State University, who helped to make that dream a reality.

I would like to thank the following individuals for assisting my research. Patricia Dorff, Lilita Gusts, and Marcia Sprules at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City and Patrick Shea of the San Francisco Public Library's Government Information Center helped me locate the CFR's War and Peace Studies. Archivists Sally Kuisel and Marvin F. Russell of the Textual Archives Services Division at the US National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland assisted me in researching U.S. State Department records. I would especially like to thank Professor Regina Gramer of the Department of History at Temple University for graciously sending me a copy of her unpublished paper on the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Introduction

The soon-to-be victorious allies of World War II met at the Dumbarton Oaks estate near Washington, D.C. from late August until early October 1944 to codify the charter for a new international organization to maintain postwar global security. The resulting agreement, which would lead to the Charter of the United Nations Organization, contained a compromise regarding a debate that had continued throughout the war, concerning universal versus regional organization for the postwar security system. In his analysis of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements at the time, Percy E. Corbett, international law scholar and Yale University professor, wrote, "Regional association is probably an irresistible tendency. If so, it should be canalized and disciplined rather than resisted." He continued with a succinct summary of the role of regional organizations, according to Chapter VIII of the agreements, "Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security":

Section C admits the legality of regional organization so long as it is consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The Security Council is indeed to encourage the settlement of local disputes through regional agencies, and is to use them for enforcement action. On the other hand, regional agencies are not to embark on enforcement action save with the authorization of the Security Council. Finally, the Security Council is to be kept informed of "activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of peace and security."¹

1. Percy E. Corbett, "Memorandum Number Thirteen: The Dumbarton Oaks Plan," Yale Institute of International Studies, New Haven Connecticut, November 25, 1944, 11-2, National Archives (hereafter NA) RG 59, Box 94.

Percy Corbett and others who viewed this compromise as a concession to regionalism might have been quite surprised had they known that within a short time power would be completely transferred to regional security organizations operating entirely outside of Security Council authority. Commenting on the proliferation of regional security agencies in the two decades following the establishment of the United Nations Organization, Ronald J. Yalem wrote in 1965:

The formation of mutually antagonistic regional systems so prominent since 1945 is . . . less the cause of international instability as it is the reflection of changes in the structure of world power and ideology that displaced the earlier patterns of the international state system.²

The system of global collective security devised by the victors of the Second World War, which was codified at the Dumbarton Oaks and subsequent San Francisco Conferences and embodied in the United Nations, was a conscious effort to replace the balance-of-power global politics and military alliances of the prewar period with an international structure based on universal consensus, at least among the major powers. This system was dependent on the continuance of the wartime cooperation of its architects. Since the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war as the world's most powerful nations, it may be a truism to say that it was inevitable that they would move into the power vacuum created by the defeat or decline of the prewar powers. Given the legacy of mistrust and ideological differences between the two countries, the tensions

2. Ronald J. Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 12.

between them equally may have necessitated a restructuring of the global political alliance system. This in itself, however, does not explain the rapidity with which the United States abandoned the goal of universal collective security and the high hopes placed in the United Nations Security Council during and immediately following the war. The victors of the war – the Americans, British, and Soviets – each had different motives for participating in the United Nations Organization, but nevertheless each did anticipate that the global security system would serve its own goals.

By 1949, reliance on the Security Council for peace enforcement had been entirely abandoned in favor of a regional approach that would quickly bloom into Yalem's "mutually antagonistic regional systems." The rapid shift in United States global security policy resulted from the fact that the universal basis for security policy was never entirely accepted by U.S. policy makers or by the United States' principal wartime allies; regionalism had continued to play a strong role in security planning even during and after the formation of the United Nations. During the decade from the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, the U.S. approach toward global collective security underwent a series of transformations. Underlying each of these policy shifts was a philosophical tension between regionalism and universalism. At each stage in this process one or the other of these viewpoints was predominant, but by the end of the decade of the 1940s regionalism was the clear victor,

setting the course for the next four decades of U.S. foreign policy.

During the interwar decades of the 1920s and 1930s, concerns over the ability of the League of Nations to guarantee the territorial boundaries and independence of nations which were the victims of military aggression had led to the establishment of regional or quasi-regional arrangements in Europe. In the Locarno agreements of 1925, the major European powers agreed to guarantee the frontiers between Germany on one side and France and Belgium on the other. The “Little Entente” and the “Balkan Entente” established regional groupings of eastern and southern European nations, evolving out of bilateral treaties among them to guarantee their mutual borders.³

In addition to the European regional arrangements, the inter-American system, which predated the League of Nations, continued to develop during this time through a series of conferences dealing with political, economic, and cultural affairs. Treaties between member nations established a formal legal method providing for peaceful settlement of disputes, without, however, imposing a commitment to military action. One characteristic which the inter-American system had in common with European regional arrangements was its exclusive concern with intra-regional affairs. The League of Nations was still viewed as the arbiter of any inter-regional disputes, however imperfectly the League system may

3. Ibid., 38-45.

have operated to ensure collective security.⁴

At the inception of the European war in 1939, U.S. State Department planners began to think in terms of global rather than regional hegemony for the United States at the war's end. The worldview of the State Department's top officials had been shaped by Woodrow Wilson's idealistic principles. President Franklin Roosevelt and other top policy makers were haunted by the failure of the United States to assume global leadership at the end of hostilities in 1918-1919; they did not intend to miss the opportunity a second time. Time and time again they referred to the "mistakes" of the earlier postwar period which they were determined not to repeat.⁵ One of the principal "mistakes" had been the failure to establish an effective international organization with authority to enforce universal collective security; the European regional arrangements which had been established to supplement the League of Nations' security system had failed to prevent the breakdown of the European balance of power.

At the end of 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull established the State Department's Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, the unannounced purpose of which was to identify policies which would benefit the United States in the postwar world. The State Department, lacking in

4. Ibid., 45-50.

5. Robert E. Sherwood would later write that as Roosevelt worked on speeches, "he would look up at the portrait of Woodrow Wilson over the mantelpiece" because "there was no motivating force in all of Roosevelt's wartime policy stronger than the determination to prevent repetition of the same mistakes." Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 227.

resources for such an effort, formed a close relationship with the Council on Foreign Relations to undertake studies in this direction. This private foreign policy research group based in New York City had for decades advocated a universalist approach to foreign policy and an expanded role for the United States in global affairs. The relationship between the Council and State Department foreign policy planners bears special attention, as it played a central role in security planning during the Second World War. Under the influence of the Council's internationalist and expansionist philosophy, the State Department initially set a course for global postwar policy with the intention of fulfilling the previously frustrated Wilsonian vision. During the period 1940-1945, information flowed freely between the Council's War and Peace Studies Project and the State Department planning efforts.

The first shift in postwar global security planning was occasioned by the rapid German military successes in the spring of 1940. With prospects of an imminent German victory in the war, and a seemingly permanent German domination of the European continent, the central concern of American security planning became to define a region which would be defensible both in military and economic terms. This concept, known as the "Grand Area," was developed from studies done by the Council on Foreign Relations. Central to the thinking behind the Grand Area was the need to defend the Western Hemisphere militarily. Additionally, however,

as a result of the Council's economic studies, the need to keep Britain and its Pacific territories in the war became a top priority.

By mid-1941, Britain's survival had been assured. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union which began in June of that year, the focus of postwar security planning shifted back from regional- and survival-based thinking to a global and expansionist strategy. Even before the United States entered the war, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were able to meet near Argentia, Newfoundland, and publish the Atlantic Charter, a series of postwar goals which clearly spelled out a universalist vision. However, missing from the Atlantic Charter, due to Roosevelt's opposition, was a clear statement of support for an international organization empowered to enforce universal security. Here again, Roosevelt was determined not repeat the mistakes of the Wilsonian era; he wanted to avoid attempting to lead the American people into international commitments before laying adequate groundwork. Nevertheless, a universalist international organization would become the goal of the State Department, led by Secretary Cordell Hull, and would be backed by the global philosophy of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Regionalism, though, continued to be a major factor in State Department planning for two main reasons. The first was that Under Secretary Sumner Welles took over the direction of the postwar planning effort and, despite his Council membership, Welles favored regional

solutions for security policy. Welles was influenced by his admiration for the inter-American system as a model for regional organization. His vision of the implementation of an international organization was a system of semi-autonomous regional agencies, headed by an overall council of regional representatives.

Welles' thinking was strongly influenced by one of the most important regionalist threads in U.S. foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine. Concerns over the Monroe Doctrine had contributed to the Senate's rejection of Wilson's League of Nations in 1920.⁶ These same concerns would be a major consideration in the State Department's program for public and Senate acceptance of the United Nations Organization in 1945. Support for a strong Western Hemisphere defensive system from an unlikely source, the Latin American nations, would also turn out to be a main reason for the weakening of the enforcement powers of the United Nations Security Council.

The second factor which promoted regionalism in postwar security planning during this period was the outlook of Franklin Roosevelt himself. Following the publication of the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt's conception of postwar peace enforcement slowly crystallized into what became known as the "Four Policemen." One of the Wilsonian tenets to which Roosevelt had always subscribed most strongly was arms control. At the time of the

6. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), 202, 216-7.

Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt had only a vague idea that Britain and the United States would somehow police the world following the war, with all other nations disarmed. With the addition of the Soviet Union as an ally, the Soviets were added to the proposed postwar police force, which was rounded out, more for political than security reasons, by China. Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept actually came closer to a traditional spheres-of-influence global balance of power than was being considered by leading State Department officials, including Secretary Cordell Hull, for a postwar security structure.

Thus, the regionalist basis in Sumner Welles' planning for the international organization stemmed not only from his appreciation for the inter-American system but also from an attempt to align the structure of the proposed organization with the regionalism of the Four Policemen concept. All this, however, was reversed after Welles was forced out of the State Department by Cordell Hull in August 1943. Hull, a committed internationalist throughout his political career, had consistently opposed any regional basis for the postwar security organization. Once Hull replaced Welles as the leading force in postwar planning, all plans for an underlying structure of regional agencies were abandoned.

Despite Hull's commitment to universalism, regionalism did not entirely disappear from postwar planning. One reason for this was the desire of the United States' principal allies, Great Britain and the Soviet

Union, to preserve their own spheres of influence in the postwar world. The United States, with its traditional reliance on two-ocean security and Monroe Doctrine military isolationism, considered a spheres-of-influence system as most likely to entangle it in future conflicts. With their historical experience of European alliances and balance-of-power arrangements, however, both the British and Soviets instinctively looked toward such a system as the best way to guarantee their own national security.

The Soviets were determined to set up a buffer zone surrounding their borders for protection against future attacks, such as those they had experienced in 1914 and 1941. The ultimate agreement by Joseph Stalin to join the postwar security organization was likely based on his belief that, as one of the Four Policemen, the Soviet Union would get the sphere of influence which he desired. The British were equally determined to preserve control over their empire. Additionally, Winston Churchill proposed establishing a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia, which in his view would be dominated by the combined interests of Great Britain and the United States. The combination of these regional goals on the part of America's allies was sufficient to override the desire for universalism on the part of the State Department and to keep a regionalist element in the planning for a postwar organization through the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of late 1944, where, as seen above, provisions for regional

arrangements were written into the proposed charter for the United Nations Organization.

Following Dumbarton Oaks, regionalism was strengthened in the postwar planning picture from a surprising source. At the Inter-American Conference in Mexico City in February and March 1945, the Latin American countries insisted on a regional means of security enforcement. This was made all the more surprising by the Latin American delegates' invoking of the Monroe Doctrine to force acceptance of their position by the Americans. In what became known as the Act of Chapultepec, the American delegation, headed by new Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr., agreed to a compromise endorsed by President Roosevelt, under which an act of aggression against any Western Hemisphere nation would be considered aggression against all of those nations. The delegates further declared that the Act constituted "a regional organization . . . consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established."⁷

The delegates at Mexico City may have considered their agreement to be consistent with the regional provisions of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, but the regionalism embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, produced at the UN Conference in San Francisco from April to June 1945, was in part a reaction to the Act of Chapultepec. The American

7. *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 75.

delegation to the San Francisco conference experienced internal conflicts over the regionalism implicit in the Mexico City agreement, but pressure from the Latin American nations, combined with the goal of preserving the Monroe Doctrine, persuaded the delegates to support at least some degree of regional security. Attempts to make the Act of Chapultepec a special case, however, were vigorously opposed by both the British and Soviets. America's wartime allies questioned why they should accept universalism at the same time the United States appeared to be setting up its own regional sphere of interest.

The final compromise that was written into the United Nations Charter seemed a reasonable way out of the controversy. Chapter VIII of the Charter followed the Dumbarton Oaks agreements in allowing the establishment of regional agencies, whose actions would be under the direction of the Security Council. Chapter VII, Article 51, in response to the Act of Chapultepec, guaranteed the right of "individual or collective self-defense."⁸ However, this seemingly innocuous statement would become a loophole leading to the "formation of mutually antagonistic regional systems" which Ronald Yalem was to lament in 1965.⁹

A series of connected U.S. policy decisions would follow directly from the adoption of Article 51 in San Francisco in 1945 and would cement the

8. Chapter VII, Article 51, and Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter appear in Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), 1043-4.

9. See above, p. 2.

regional approach to global security policy four years later. The inter-American agreement of 1947 (known as the Rio Treaty), the Vandenberg Resolution of 1948, and finally the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, were all steps in the process which transferred the power and, more importantly, the responsibility, for collective security from the universal control of the UN Security Council to regional organizations operating outside of Security Council authority. The key to this transition was recasting the primary function of regional security organizations from handling intra-regional disputes to guarding against threats of an inter-regional nature. However, even while support for a regional policy was growing, key members of the State Department and the U.S. Congress continued to promote universalism as the national policy. At the moment regionalism gained its final victory with the passage of the North Atlantic Treaty, U.S. officials referred to that document as the fulfillment of the United Nations system.

The collapse of the universalist ideal left the United Nations superseded as the guarantor of peace enforcement by competing regional agencies. Military planning was left not under the direction of the Security Council, but instead under a balance-of-power regional alliance system which was the antithesis of the postwar planning done during the war. As a result the United Nations failed in its primary goal of peace enforcement and became the “debating society” of the Cold War era.

The regional security provisions of the United Nations Charter were

used to justify these developments, but the new regional agencies reflected an inversion of the regionalism-under-universalism philosophy which had produced them. The original provisions for regional arrangements which were negotiated at Dumbarton Oaks would have placed those arrangements within the consensus-based universalism of the United Nations Security Council. But Article 51 of the UN Charter, designed to guarantee every nation the right of self-defense under Security Council authority, was in fact used to promote an aggressive and exclusive foreign policy. This transfer of power to regional agencies represented the abandonment of consensus-based collective security, placing the responsibility for security solely in military methods. Disarmament became an unobtainable goal as the rivals depended on ever increasing arms supplies to ensure their security.

Within a short time following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, commentators began to point out the divergence between the theory that regionalism complemented the United Nations system and the reality that universal collective security was no longer a goal of U.S. policy. As early as 1950, Edgar S. Furniss wrote that the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948, "makes the inter-American system as independent of the world organization as it may wish to be." He went on to state,

Productive discussion would not take place in the United Nations. . . . As guarantor of this independence of the inter-American system stands the veto power which one of its

members, the United States, possesses in the Security Council of the United Nations.¹⁰ By 1954, the issue of regionalization in collective security was linked to the hardening of the Cold War and the increasing nuclear arms race. Historian Lawrence Kaplan wrote that “the difficulty in reconciling NATO with the United Nations lies in the fact that the Charter of the United Nations had not taken into account the later bipolarization of world power.”¹¹ This view was expressed in a more general way by Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons in 1955: “The basic power situation in the world at the conclusion of the war and the conditions governing its future development were such as to be unfavorable to the functioning of the kind of ‘concert’ that the framers of the Charter had envisaged.”¹²

By the mid-1960s, historians and political commentators accepted that the growth of regional organizations in the two decades following the establishment of the United Nations had been caused by, and in turn

10. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., “The United States, the Inter-American System and the United Nations,” *Political Science Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (September 1950): 426.

11. Lawrence S. Kaplan, “Nato and its Commentators: The First Five Years,” *International Organization* 8, no. 4 (November 1954): 457. That same year, the bankruptcy of the theory that regional agencies would operate under United Nations authority was fully demonstrated when the leftist government of Guatemala appealed to the Security Council to stop ongoing aggression from Honduras and Nicaragua. This request, which was backed by the Soviet Union, was blocked by the United States through an inaccurate application of the regional provisions of the UN Charter. The U.S. argued that the Guatemalan request infringed on the authority of the Organization of American States to settle the matter. The OAS was not inclined to take any action on behalf of the Guatemalan government, which was subsequently overthrown. Later, the U.S. admitted to having supplied arms to Honduras and Nicaragua. Richard Hiscoks, *The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 228-31. For another description of this incident which views U.S. actions in terms of traditional Monroe Doctrine policy, see Gordon Connell-Smith, “The OAS and the Dominican Crisis,” in *International Regionalism*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 99-100.

12. Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1955), 25-6.

served, the political purposes of the Cold War adversaries. Ronald J.

Yalem, who wrote extensively on regionalism at this time, maintained that

the growth of regionalism has been more of a pragmatic response to the changing dynamics of international politics than the outcome of a conviction that regionalism was theoretically superior to universalism as a form of international cooperation.¹³

Similarly, Joseph S. Nye commented,

the impetus for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and later of the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was not the traditional United States regional policy but a growing involvement in the global politics of containment in a bipolar world.¹⁴

The series of policy decisions which led from the United Nations Charter to the North Atlantic Treaty cannot be divorced from the global political situation. But, even if the bipolar nature of that situation is accepted as inevitable, that in itself does not sufficiently explain the rapidity with which the United States abandoned its universal security aspirations. Following the end of the Cold War, and with the advent of considerable attention focused on the current trend toward “globalization,” there has been some reexamination of the previous goals of U.S. foreign policy. Neil Smith, in particular, has written a wide-ranging study of the twentieth century, in which he draws parallels between Wilsonian internationalism, postwar universalist security policy, and contemporary globalism. The common component in these visions, according to Smith, is “the optimism of a

13. Ronald J. Yalem, “Regionalism and World Order,” *International Affairs* 38, no. 4 (October 1962): 460. Also see the quote from Yalem which appears above, p. 2.

14. Joseph S. Nye, “United States Policy Toward Regional Organization,” *International Organization* 23, no. 3 (Summer 1969): 722.

world beyond geography” in which the power of regional blocs (political or economic) is limited, yet that goal often conflicts with geographical imperatives such as maintaining regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere.¹⁵

To go beyond Cold War explanations for the triumph of regionalism over universalism as the driving force behind U.S. postwar collective security policy, it is necessary to examine developments during the entire decade from 1939 to 1949. Such an examination will reveal how powerful currents of regionalism, including the “Grand Area” concept of the early wartime period, Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Policemen,” the regional security objectives of the wartime allies, and the continuing presence of the Monroe Doctrine in American policy, were always in contention with the goal of universal peace enforcement.

15. Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Quote appears on 274; see also 404-12.

Chapter 1

The Second Chance: Postwar Planning Begins

On 3 September 1939, just seven hours after the British and French declarations of war against Germany, President Franklin Roosevelt took to the airwaves to give a message to the “whole of America,” stating:

In spite of spreading wars I think we have every right and reason to maintain as a national policy the fundamental moralities, the teachings of religion and the continuation of efforts to restore peace – for some day, though the time may be distant, we can be of even greater help to a crippled humanity.

He went on to say, “when peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”¹ Even at this earliest point in the war, a faint flicker of Roosevelt’s conception of the postwar world can be discerned – a world which would be led by America, not least because of its superior moral principles, and a world in which only through collective security could conditions be maintained for the advancement of those principles. For Roosevelt, whose seemingly unflagging confidence was in part the result of his belief that higher forces were working through him,² the concept that the United States had a preordained purpose to fulfill would be a guiding principle in the days ahead. As he would state during his reelection campaign in the following year, “it is the destiny of this

1. Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR: Into the Storm 1937-1940* (New York: Random House, 1993), 489-90.

2. Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR: The New Deal Years 1933-1937* (New York: Random House, 1986), 38.

American generation to point the road to the future for all to see.”³

Franklin Roosevelt was hardly alone in believing that *this* American generation must be the one to fulfill its particular mission. The corollary to that belief was that the previous generation had failed in its opportunity, that the great work had been left unfinished. While Roosevelt himself, as one recent account stated, “approached the problem of securing peace and stability after World War II as a thoroughly disenchanted Wilsonian idealist,”⁴ there were many others, both within the administration and without, who saw the issues in the same light and who would play leading roles in the construction of the postwar security system. Chief among these in the State Department was Secretary Cordell Hull, whose internationalist views had been shaped by his long conviction that removal of national barriers to economic free trade promoted world peace.⁵ Joining Hull was Under Secretary Sumner Welles, whose 1944 book *The Time for Decision*, an appeal for a postwar world structured on Wilsonian ideals, sold half a million copies and contained an initial chapter, “It Might Have Been,” which was a lament to lost opportunity.⁶

3. Willard Range, *Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order* (Athens, Ga.: Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1959), 185.

4. Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the U.N.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 11.

5. Michael A. Butler, *Cautious Visionary, Cordell Hull and Trade Reform, 1933-1937* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent University Press, 1998), p. x; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), 81.

6. Hoopes and Brinkley, 129; Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944).

Of the extra-governmental voices speaking for the Wilsonian viewpoint, the most important influence on postwar policy would come from the Council on Foreign Relations. Established in the wake of the First World War, the Council was conceived of as continuing the role of the Inquiry, the collection of non-government intellectuals and scholars who had advised Woodrow Wilson. Composed primarily of lawyers, businessmen, and educators committed to internationalism, collective security through international organization, and an expansionist role for America, the Council had been formed with the goal of influencing American foreign policy. In the 1930s, while most Americans wanted a restricted role for the United States in world affairs, Council publications, including *Foreign Affairs* magazine and several influential books, stressed the global scope of American interests.⁷ In the words of one analyst, the Council was

motivated by great power considerations, Wilsonian one-worldism or the belief in global interdependence, the necessity of a general international organisation (as opposed to regional schemes), the belief that the US had vital interests across the entire globe, and a desire to ensure 'predictability' in the world.⁸

Throughout the Second World War, the Council on Foreign Relations would influence postwar foreign policy through its War and Peace Studies Project, a series of reports written by various Council members. The

7. *The Council on Foreign Relations: A Record of Twenty-Five Years 1921-1946* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947); Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Authors Choice Press, 1977, reprint 2004), 11-28; Inderjeet Parmar, *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs 1939-1945* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 106-10; Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 31-2.

8. Parmar, 113.

genesis of this project came just days after the war's outbreak and Roosevelt's fireside chat foreshadowing an expansionist role for America in the unknown and unpredictable time following the war's conclusion. On 12 September 1939, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of *Foreign Affairs*, and Walter H. Mallory, the Council's Executive Director, approached Assistant Secretary of State (and Council member) George S. Messersmith with an offer to make available to the State Department the services of the Council for an expanded study on foreign relations. Stressing that the war presented the United States with a "grand opportunity" to become "the premier power in the world," Armstrong proposed that the Council form several study groups on long-term problems concerning the war and postwar peace plans.

At that moment the Department was overwhelmed by the crisis and lacked funding for adequate staffing to carry out this type of planning effort internally. Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, also a Council member, expressed interest in the project and shortly afterward agreed to work in cooperation with the Council. On 6 December, the War and Peace Studies Project received its initial funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. The Department, while considering offers of assistance from other organizations, did not offer support to any other private groups.⁹

Eventually the War and Peace Studies Project would produce 682

9. Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, publication 3580, 1950), 19-21; *The War and Peace Studies of the Council on Foreign Relations 1939-1945* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1946), 2-3; Schulzinger, 60-1; Shoup and Minter, 119.

memoranda and draft reports, including 250 on the background of the war and postwar planning. In contrast to the Council's normal role of making public policy recommendations, these studies were made available only to researchers on the project and State Department committees. All of the project's studies were based on the assumption that the United States would play an active role in the war and in the postwar period which would follow. In early 1942, when the State Department expanded its policy making staff in connection with the U.S. entry into the war, many Council members would either join the Department or sit as representatives on the Department's Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy.¹⁰

The influence of the Council on State Department policy can be seen by examining the individuals who played a role in both organizations. Council member Leo Pasvolsky, an economist who became executive officer of the Advisory Committee, would eventually play a leading role in drafting the United Nations Charter. Council Steering Committee chairman Norman Davis became chairman of the Department's Security Subcommittee. Isaiah Bowman, rapporteur of the Council's Territorial Group, presided over the Department's Subcommittee on Territorial Problems. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, vice chairman of the Council's Steering Committee, became a member of both the subcommittees on Political Problems and Territorial Problems. Council Board member

10. CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 11; Schulzinger, 62-3; Notter, 56n.

Myron C. Taylor became chairman of the Subcommittee on Economic Problems, which also included Benjamin V. Cohen of the Council's Economic and Financial Group. Council member Sumner Welles would be, as under secretary of state, a central architect for the Department in postwar security planning. Another Council member, Herbert Feis, was a State Department advisor on international economic affairs. These men, as well as other Council members, would play significant roles in wartime summit meetings and in both the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences which established the structure of the United Nations Organization.¹¹

All of that lay in the future when, on 16 September 1939, just four days after Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Walter Mallory made the Council's offer of assistance to the State Department, Secretary Hull appointed Council member Leo Pasvolsky as his Special Assistant to work on problems of peace. Together, Pasvolsky and Hull would work for an expanded role for the State Department in postwar planning. Pasvolsky pushed for a separate departmental committee to carry on this effort, and at a meeting on 27 December the decision was made to establish a "committee on problems of peace and reconstruction." Officially named the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations on 8 January 1940, its publicly announced purpose was to "gather data on and study both the immediate

11. CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 6-9, 19-24; Shoup and Minter, 148-55; Parmar, 110; Notter, 81-3.

and long-range results of overseas war measures and the manner in which the problems arising from them may best be handled.” Internally, however, there was no need for such vagueness. According to a memorandum written by Pasvolsky, the functions of the committee included a survey of “the basic principles which should underlie a desirable world order to be evolved after the termination of present hostilities, with primary reference to the best interests of the United States.”¹²

Simultaneously, the Council on Foreign Relations was initiating its own parallel effort, which would become known as the War and Peace Studies Project. This was undertaken with goals similar to those of the Department’s Advisory Committee. At a mid-December meeting at the home of Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, who had relayed the Council’s initial offer of assistance to Secretary Hull, the decision was made to establish a number of groups to “engage in a continuous study of the course of the war, to ascertain how the hostilities affect the United States and to elaborate concrete proposals designed to safeguard American interests in the settlement which will be undertaken when hostilities cease.” Four groups were established to carry out the study, Armaments, Economics, Politics, and Territorial.¹³

12. Hull, 1626-7; Notter, 20-1; Stephen C. Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003), 35-6; Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 8; Hoopes and Brinkley, 44.

13. Shoup and Minter, 120; Schulzinger, 62.

Cordell Hull held the responsibility for overseeing all of the postwar planning efforts, both within and outside of the State Department. Hull would be the foremost advocate for a universal international organization in the years to come. He made this view known even before the public announcement of the creation of the Department's Advisory Committee, when he declared in a New Year's 1940 statement, "If peace should come, we shall be confronted, in our own best interest, with the vital need of throwing the weight of our country's moral and material influence in the direction of creating a stable and enduring order under law." He would later write that this "obviously meant a world organization. . . . In my statement I had emphasized the vital need to use our influence toward 'creating' a world order under law, not just joining in."¹⁴

Hull, who wrote that Woodrow Wilson "never ceased fighting for human rights, individual liberty, peace, and humanitarianism," was committed to Wilson's vision of a universal international organization. In his words, "I found difficulty in bringing myself to the conclusion that we should spurn a world organization for peace and disarmament and substitute for it a more or less regional arrangement. Wilson's idea had been to achieve this ideal on a universal basis, within the League."¹⁵ The failure of the United States to maintain its neutrality during the First World War had convinced Wilson that only a "concert of power," not "entangling alliances,"

14. Hull, 731-2.

15. Ibid., 116, 120.

could be trusted to keep the peace in the modern world.¹⁶

Sumner Welles, Hull's rival for power within the Department and for presidential favor,¹⁷ was just as much a Wilsonian as Hull. In 1944, Welles would write of "the inspired phrases of Woodrow Wilson when in 1917 he summoned [Americans] to assume their obligations as citizens of the world, and to recognize their own responsibility which had made this country great."¹⁸ Welles' commitment to the Wilsonian ideal of international organization was as deep as that of Hull. Welles, however, had a different viewpoint on the basis for that organization.

Welles' first post in Roosevelt's State Department had been as assistant secretary for Latin America. Out of this role came a deep appreciation for the inter-American system. He attempted to implement Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy through the principles of collective consultation, nonintervention, and redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine in multilateral terms rather than as a dictate imposed by the United States. These actions had been widely accepted among Latin American countries, resulting in a new willingness for cooperation with the United States. In planning the

16. Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, 39.

17. In his memoirs, Hull would write of Welles' "disloyalty" in "going to the President at times without my knowledge, and even attempting to secure a decision, again without my knowledge," as well as "carrying on personal correspondence with our diplomats and with officials of other Governments" and "defining new foreign policy in his speeches." Hull, 1227-31. Kenneth Davis writes that "like Roosevelt . . . Welles was a son of privilege, the scion of a wealthy and historically distinguished family. . . . He and Roosevelt the President were consequently perfectly at ease, swiftly and sympathetically communicative in each other's company. No such intimacy was possible between Roosevelt and Hull, who differed as radically in mind and temperament as they did in social background." Davis, *FDR: Into the Storm*, 187.

18. Welles, *The Time For Decision*, 393.

postwar international structure, Welles would look to extend this inter-American system globally, stating, "I believe that the regional system of the Americas must be an indispensable part of any international organization which may be established after the war."¹⁹ Based on his experience of the Good Neighbor Policy, such a system would be the best way to guarantee the interests of smaller nations, as long as the regional alliances were not mere power blocs dominated by one great power:

The . . . problem – to give full representation and protection to the interests of the smaller nations – will, I believe, be met by building the world organization upon a foundation of regional systems. . . .

It will be maintained, I have no doubt, that the foundation of any permanent world order upon regional systems runs counter to the third of Woodrow Wilson's five points, namely: "No alliance within any League of Nations" and to the warning contained in his oft-quoted words: "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace" . . .

The danger envisaged by President Wilson in these warnings cannot be overemphasized. However, they will exist only if the nations of the world seek to employ regional systems as offensive or defensive alliances, or as political or economic "spheres of influence" to be exploited for the individual ends of the great powers dominant in each region.²⁰

In this view, in addition to more equitable representation for smaller nations, a greater degree of community solidarity and the assumption that regional defense is easier to establish made a regional basis for security organization preferable. With the lack of a truly universal peace enforcement mechanism in the League of Nations, the inter-American system, as the strongest regional association which had developed during the inter-war years, appeared to exhibit all of these advantages. A common

19. Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order* (Columbia University Press, 2003), Ch. 1, 10-2; Welles, *The Time For Decision*, 240.

20. Welles, *The Time For Decision*, 377-8.

spirit existed among member nations due to similar revolutions against colonial rule. In the period 1923-1938, a conference system had developed which produced a defined legal structure for peaceful settlement of disputes. Finally, relations between the League and the inter-American system countries had offered proof that a decentralized security system could be effective if adequate coordination were achieved.²¹

These two visions of how to implement the Wilsonian ideal, the first a strictly universal international organization and the other based on regional systems, personified in the two top State Department officials, would compete for the next decade among postwar planners, diplomats, and international leaders. In the end both Hull's and Welles' visions would fail, and their failure would bring the ultimate demise of the Wilsonian ideal of international collective security.

In February 1940, the Political Subcommittee of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, which included Sumner Welles among its members, began its first discussions on the future organization of world order. The failure of the League of Nations was contrasted with the success of the inter-American system, and a proposal was advanced to continue the League in collaboration with regional groupings for the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia. In discussions on 19 and 26 April, a "Political Body" was proposed for

21. Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, 7-10, 45-7.

Europe, which was to be composed of regional blocs.²² However, even as the postwar planning effort began, and the debate over universalism versus regionalism took shape, it was cut short by the sweep of the German army across Western Europe.

22. Notter, 22, 24-5, 28; Memorandum [by Hugh R. Wilson] Arising from Conversations in Mr. Welles' Office, April 19 and 26, 1 May 1940, which appears in *ibid.*, 458-60.

Chapter 2

Forced Regionalism: Hemispheric Defense and the “Grand Area”

The swift onrush of German military success in Western Europe in the spring of 1940 had an immediate and dramatic effect on U.S. postwar planning. Quickly extinguished were any thoughts of certain global political and economic dominance by the United States at the war's end, which, it appeared, might be imminent. The dream of implementing Woodrow Wilson's ideal of universal collective security also vanished. Instead, Americans were confronted with the prospect of German control of the European continent and of a large portion of the world's resources for an indefinite future period.

With the Atlantic Ocean no longer a friendly buffer zone, concerned American leaders turned their thoughts to hemispheric defense. President Roosevelt authorized massive increases in naval construction. American officials considered the possibility of a German thrust through French North Africa which would put German aircraft within range of Brazil. Another worry was the potential for German submarine bases in the Azores, Cape Verdes, and Canary Islands.¹ Democratic vice-presidential

1. Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt & American Entry Into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 10, 26.

candidate Henry Wallace wrote in a campaign book that year that the war “is a fight to enable the people of North and South America to develop their resources without paying tribute to Europe.” He went on to say that without its two historic props, European balance of power and the support of the British Navy, the Monroe Doctrine would be in serious jeopardy. However, the U.S. would be “safe from actual attack so long as we are able to prevent enemy powers from establishing naval and air bases in the Americas.”²

The Monroe Doctrine was very much on the mind of Secretary of State Hull as well. Concerned about “German businessmen . . . scattered all over South America,” he was convinced that the fall of Britain would result in a German program to “take over the Latin American countries as virtual dependencies.” Hull quickly worked with Roosevelt to order U.S. warships to show the flag in South American ports. In a number of statements, Hull emphasized that the Monroe Doctrine clearly forbade the transfer of American territory from one non-American state to another (i.e., from a defeated colonial power to Germany). In response to German propaganda that the Monroe Doctrine represented nothing more than American imperialism, Hull worked to shore up Latin American support through plans for all of the American republics to jointly administer the colonial possessions of defeated European nations.³

2. Henry A. Wallace, *The American Choice* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940), 16-20.

3. Hull, 813-30; Notter, 29-30.

The retreat into a regional defense policy virtually necessitated a greater emphasis on the Monroe Doctrine. This is illustrated by one of the first of the War and Peace Project's studies by the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council had been as unprepared for the rapid German military successes as the administration in Washington, and its plans for studies of global interdependence featuring worldwide American vital interests were aborted as they shifted emphasis to the immediate critical need. A study which had been issued by the Council on 17 March 1940, entitled "The Strategic Importance of Greenland," was brought into use when Greenland's mother country, Denmark, was attacked and overrun on 9 April. The report emphasized the significance of Greenland for trans-Atlantic aviation and meteorological observations, and maintained that Greenland lay in the geographical area "within which the Monroe Doctrine is presumed to apply."⁴

This report quickly found its way into the hands of President Roosevelt. Three days after Denmark's fall, the President and the Danish minister to Washington agreed that Greenland belonged to the American continent. On the same day, Secretary Hull called the British Ambassador, Lord Lothian, to his office and informed him of the American government's position that "there is the express application of the Monroe Doctrine by this country regarding Greenland; and that there appeared to be no serious

4. CFR WPS T-B3, "The Strategic Importance of Greenland," 17 March 1940.

question about Greenland forming a general part of this hemisphere as contra-distinguished from the European side of the Atlantic.”⁵

In the Council’s official summation of the War and Peace Studies Project it drew specific attention to this incident as a “concrete example . . . of how group ideas and recommendations were put to use,” and how “Council work . . . entered into the stream of official discussion and action.”⁶ But the Greenland report was just a preliminary step in the major work which the Council would undertake in defining a new regional strategy for a potential postwar situation in which Nazi Germany dominated the European continent. Methods of hemispheric defense were clearly vital to the survival of the United States, but the key questions facing policy makers concerned broader issues: Could the Western Hemisphere be self-sufficient? If not, what other world areas were required as trade partners in order for the United States to continue to prosper? Above all, which resources were required for the U.S. to maintain its viability in the face of a German-dominated Europe?⁷

A study by the WPS Economic Group, issued 15 August 1940, considered “the foreign trade effects of economic integration of the Western

5. CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 15-6; CFR, *A Record of Twenty-Five Years*, 13-4; Notter, 27; “Consideration by the United States of Measures for the Defense of Greenland After the German Occupation of Denmark,” Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 12 April 1940, NA State Department Decimal File 859B.01/143.

6. CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 13.

7. Shoup and Minter, 125.

Hemisphere with the Pacific Area,” including India, Japan and China, as well as the other important commercial countries of southeastern Asia, and Australia and New Zealand.” It concluded that “integration of the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Area would substantially improve the trade situation *for the United States*,” but such integration would not be as advantageous for the southern countries of the Western Hemisphere due to export competition with the Pacific Area countries. The import requirements of the Pacific Area also could not be satisfied solely by the Western Hemisphere.⁸

In an article in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1941, Economic Group members Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren analyzed this further. They began by stating the dimensions of the challenge:

The Nazis have now brought under their political and military control practically all of Continental Europe, except Russia and the Baltic states. The extension of German power over the entire Mediterranean basin and the Near East seems not improbable. The economic potential of this area, assuming that Germany could integrate its industries and agriculture, is enormous. To find a combination of nations which would be equally self-sufficient and equally powerful, . . . one would have to bring together practically the entire non-German world.

Bidwell and Upgren did not advocate such a radical solution, however, noting that the “rival bloc would be scattered over the seven seas” and might first “have to fight a major war with Japan.” Instead, they maintained that the export/import imbalance of a Western Hemisphere bloc was caused by the fact that it contained “only one great industrial population,” the United

8. WPS E-B18, “The Future Position of Germany and the United States in World Trade: A Western Hemisphere-Pacific Area Economic Bloc,” 15 August 1940. Emphasis in the original.

States (as had also been the case for the proposed Western Hemisphere-Pacific Area bloc). Given the fact that the trade relations of the Western Hemisphere were still of the character of a colonial economy, "adequate alternative markets are not available in the Western Hemisphere. They can be found only in one place, namely in the United Kingdom." Bidwell and Upgren therefore concluded that defending American interests could only be done "in close association with the British Empire," and specifically with the United Kingdom itself.⁹

The WPS Economic Group formalized these concepts in an important report issued 24 July 1941, in which it introduced the concept of the "Grand Area." The Grand Area was considered to be that area, excluding continental Europe, which was from an economic point of view "best suited to the defense of the United States." Noting that the Western Hemisphere was inadequate from a resources standpoint, this area would necessarily have to include southeast Asia for its important raw materials and the United Kingdom for its ability to absorb export surpluses. Also added to the Grand Area was the remainder of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the Dutch East Indies, China, and Japan. Given up as lost to German control were continental Europe, North Africa, Turkey, and the Near East. The Soviet Union was not assigned to either bloc "due to its relative

9. Percy W. Bidwell and Arthur R. Upgren, "A Trade Policy for National Defense," *Foreign Affairs* 19, no. 2 (January 1941): 282-96.

insignificance in world trade.”¹⁰

The Grand Area was conceived as the region which the United States could defend “most economically,” i.e., with the least readjustment to its economy. The area could not be overly constricted without a loss of ability to provide adequate materials for its defense. But defense was not its only motivation. In its final form, the Grand Area approaches the “practically entire non-German world” which Bidwell and Upgren had rejected in January as impractical for the basis of a trading bloc.¹¹ It was noted that the Grand Area provided a broader economic base “than the United States, Britain, or the British Empire alone or together,” which would ensure a high degree of self-sufficiency. Such a bipolar world, the report noted, would likely exist “as two huge blocs preparing rapidly for war against one another.”

The study also concluded, however, that the structure of the Grand Area could be adaptable to peacetime conditions. Even German conquest of the Soviet Union would not affect the functioning of the Grand Area. Within this structure, Britain could survive without reconquering any part of continental Europe. A stalemate with the German-controlled bloc could continue for quite a long time. In that situation, the Grand Area would offer powerful weapons of “psychological warfare” to the “subject peoples

10. WPS E-B34, “Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory – The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy,” 24 July 1941.

11. Upgren was additionally one of the authors of WPS E-B34.

of Europe”: maximum economic efficiency, the benefits of international cooperation, and proof that the U.S. and Britain could overcome the economic difficulties of the prewar period. Finally, in the event of an American-British victory in the war, the Grand Area would be a powerful tool in restructuring the postwar world.

The military situation was also forcing the WPS Armaments Group to think along parallel regionalist lines. A report issued 25 November 1940 entitled “Western Hemisphere Security” announced, “the dynamic ideology which carried the Allied Powers to victory in the [First] World War has been utterly discredited by the collapse of the League of Nations and its associated organizations.” Placing the blame on “serious elements of weakness” in the League’s structure, the report concluded that “the world-wide scope of the League’s security system was unrealistic.”

In spite of this outcome, the concept of collective security remained valid, but it should be based on a Western Hemisphere security bloc. The report specified reasons to believe this would be successful: for over one hundred years the nations of the New World had developed a similar worldview “under the influence of geography and the Monroe Doctrine,” distinct from the alliances and politics of Europe; recent inter-American conferences had resulted in a multilateral, “Pan-Americanized” Monroe Doctrine; and, unlike the League system, the defense of the Western Hemisphere could be based on “military realities.” A key feature of this

report, which shows that the Armaments Group of the WPS was in communication with the Economics Group, was its contention that “in no sense, however, would the Western Hemisphere security bloc have to result in Western Hemisphere economic isolation from the rest of the world.” If Britain could remain militarily and politically viable, “every effort should be made to include the British Commonwealth within the liberal trade area of which the New World would represent the core.” Under this arrangement, “‘our’ way of international life may have a chance for survival and expansion in the post-war world.”¹²

While this report advocated that the best solution for Western Hemisphere security would be for its military organization to be a “closed corporation” which would only at some later date consider the inclusion of parts of the British Commonwealth, in practice the prevailing military situation did not permit such luxury of planning. According to the tenets of the Grand Area plan, the Western Hemisphere could not be defended without the raw materials available only from other parts of the world and these materials could not be obtained without the presence of the United Kingdom in the economic trading bloc of the United States. For better or worse, therefore, Great Britain had to be defended, in the words of Bidwell and Upgren, “by every means in our power.”¹³

Not coincidentally, simultaneous with the WPS Grand Area studies the

12. WPS A-B7, “Western Hemisphere Security,” 25 November 1940.

13. Bidwell and Upgren, “A Trade Policy for National Defense,” 296.

U.S. government took a number of actions to provide Britain with military assistance. These included the destroyers for bases deal of August 1940, Franklin Roosevelt's private and public statements in early November advocating allocation to Britain of half of all newly produced U.S. munitions, his announcement of the Lend-Lease plan in December (eventually passed by Congress on 11 March 1941), and increased steps to escort and repair British naval vessels. In January 1941, American, British, and Canadian military planners began preparation for protection of Atlantic shipping and defense of Britain in case the United States entered the war. Concurrently, an agreement was signed placing Greenland under United States control and permitting the U.S. to build military bases there.¹⁴

How much did the Council's WPS studies and reports influence these decisions? Council historians Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter write of the various actions to aid Britain at this time: "It is clear that the Council and the government had an identical worldview and that patterns of influence flowed between them," yet they did not specify how the patterns of influence worked. A clue, however, is given in a description of a meeting at which, on 19 October 1940, Leo Pasvolksy, the State Department's chief postwar planner and a Council member, agreed "with the Council's initial blueprint for world power." Shoup and Minter generally view the Council

14. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979; reprint, 1995), 243-61 (page citations are to the reprint edition); Heinrichs, 10-2, 39, 47.

as wielding inordinate power in the government, amounting to “de facto control over the state.”¹⁵ However, Inderjeet Parmar, who gives a balanced account of the Council’s influence, agrees on the specific instance of this 19 October meeting: “That the CFR placed their ideas before ‘lesser’ officials prior to wider circulation to the political leadership, suggests that influence was flowing in both directions, that there was genuine interaction among like-minded men sharing similar, if not identical, perspectives.”¹⁶

Robert D. Schulzinger, whose history of the Council aims at objectivity, nevertheless generally downplays its influence on the government. Of this period he says only, “important Council figures also directly petitioned the President, Vice-President, and high State Department officials to take forthright pro-allied stands.” However, “even some of the more specific proposals had simply been part of larger trends in the development of war policy of the Roosevelt administration.”¹⁷ Curiously, Schulzinger does not explicitly mention the Grand Area study. One must believe he is not giving sufficient weight to the Council’s influence in this instance. Parmar appears to be quite accurate when he states,

Given the Council’s pre-eminent and privileged position in the State Department’s planning machinery, the CFR should not be seen as “just” another group, or merely as repeating an accepted policy line. The fact is that it was Council members who wrote policy papers at particular times on specific topics and circulated them to appropriate Administration leaders. They acted as catalysts as well as crystallisers of policy

15. Shoup and Minter, 131, 140, 161.

16. Parmar, 115.

17. Schulzinger, 73-4.

thought.¹⁸

In terms of postwar policy, the Grand Area studies were much advanced over any work being done at the State Department during this period. The Department had been overwhelmed by the war crisis and the need for hemispheric defense planning. In the words of Harley Notter, who was to become a key member of the Department's planning effort and to write its official history, at that time "defense . . . had become the guideline of our foreign policy."¹⁹

With the end of the presidential election campaign and the start of 1941, the Department considered how to proceed with the postwar planning effort. On 3 February, a confidential Division of Special Research was established with Leo Pasvolsky as Chief. However, it was decided not to revive the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, since the war situation was considered too volatile to allow meaningful work to proceed. Notter was to write,

The Division of Special Research continued to make headway in its exploratory and other work although handicapped by insufficient personnel, by lack of a superior committee structure to use its research, and by undefined lines of function with respect to postwar matters within the Department. . . . The inadequacy of [eleven officers] to carry out the Division's responsibilities – which widened with events and with each stage of thinking, and with the growing realization that the necessary postwar studies would have to be made chiefly through this staff – was recognized by the Department. Nevertheless, expansion was not yet administratively practicable.²⁰

18. Parmar, 119.

19. Notter, 37.

20. Ibid., 41-2, 53, 57.

This situation within the State Department is another reason to believe that the Council's WPS project, which had been underway for over a year by mid-1941, was of significant influence among policy planners.²¹ The conclusions of the Grand Area study would echo in the decision-making process throughout the war and the postwar period. Eventually wartime events would render some of its conclusions inapplicable; however, others would be reshaped to fit new circumstances.

21. Notter also wrote, "In particular, the Council of [sic] Foreign Relations was preparing valuable studies in its political, armaments, territorial, and economic series, all of which were transmitted to the Division [of Special Research]." *Ibid.*, 56.

Chapter 3

Universal Goals, Regional Methods: The Atlantic Charter and the “Four Policemen”

From 9 August to 12 August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States, met clandestinely with Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain. This meeting, aboard naval vessels anchored off Argentia, Newfoundland, came to be known as the Atlantic Conference, the first of a series of wartime summit meetings. With the United States still officially neutral, it is somewhat remarkable that American officials of the highest level would meet with their British counterparts to discuss common war aims. We have seen, however, the motivations that led the Americans to consider a wartime, and peacetime, partnership with Britain imperative.

To that end, the Americans were specifically interested in matters pertaining to the structure of the postwar world. They sought assurance that the British would reach no secret agreements with the Soviet Union, which had entered the war on 22 June with the German invasion, regarding postwar territorial settlements. Additionally, they looked to take from the conference an announced set of principles outlining in general terms the democracies' common vision of an alternative to fascism in the

postwar future.¹ This joint declaration of purpose was finalized on the last day of the conference and came to be known as the Atlantic Charter. The Charter, announced on 14 August 1941, contained eight points couched in non-specific language and covering such Wilsonian values as refusal to seek territorial aggrandizement, national self-determination, free trade, peaceful settlement of disputes, and disarmament.²

Point five of the Atlantic Charter promised “the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.”³ “All nations” here clearly referred to those nations within the U.S.-British economic sphere. In this point, the peacetime goals of the Grand Area, as laid out in WPS E-B34,⁴ specifically the promise that the Grand Area economic bloc would demonstrate the benefits of international cooperation, may easily be discerned. The general benefits of the liberal trading bloc were spelled out in point four, which promised all nations “access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed

1. O’Sullivan, Ch. 3, 11-4; Dallek, 281-2.

2. Notter, 48-51; Hoopes and Brinkley, 26-7; O’Sullivan, Ch. 3, 14-6; Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 43-44; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York: Random House, 1968; New York: Pantheon, 1990), 242-3; Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), 1-17.

3. The Atlantic Charter appears in Appendix B of Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), 975.

4. See above, pp. 35-7.

for their economic prosperity.”⁵ The entire Atlantic Charter may be viewed as an example of the “psychological warfare” to be applied to the “subject peoples of Europe” which WPS E-B34 had explicitly advised, establishing the American-British liberal economic bloc as a model of a better way of life.

Point six of the Charter mentions “the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny,” but it was not at all clear when, or how, this would occur. At the time Germany seemed on the verge of moving to an even stronger position, since it appeared the Nazis would soon be controlling the resources of the Soviet Union. The points of the Charter, then, could adapt to either the peacetime situation or the wartime situation envisioned by the Grand Area study.

The Charter’s final point dealt with collective security and was arrived at with some difficulty. The initial British draft called for a peace “which by effective international organization, will afford to all states and peoples the means of dwelling in security.” Roosevelt, after reviewing the draft, struck out the words “by effective international organization,” explaining to Churchill that such wording would create opposition within the United States. Roosevelt said that he did not favor the creation of a new League of Nations until some time had passed, during which the U.S. and Britain would police the world themselves. When the Prime Minister objected that this would not find favor with internationalists, Roosevelt replied that

5. The Americans were forced to accept softer language on point four than they would have preferred, however, due to the British insistence on shielding their imperial preference rights by adding the clause “with due respect for their existing obligations.” Notter, 51.

“the time has come to be realistic.” However, within a few hours of the conclusion of this meeting, the President was prevailed upon to change his stance by his advisors, including Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and Roosevelt’s long-time confidant, Harry Hopkins. Both men, committed Wilsonians, believed that the American public would be more receptive to international involvement than it had been in 1919. Roosevelt, while still rejecting a specific reference to international organization, agreed to a call for disarming aggressors “pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security.” Sumner Welles, for one, was more than satisfied. He later wrote,

The Atlantic Charter represented the first major reversal of the isolationist policy which the American people had been pursuing since the close of the First World War. . . . [C]learly [Roosevelt] was already convinced that the new American foreign policy . . . would later on be of great help in laying the foundations for a free and secure world.⁶

The Atlantic Charter provided strategic direction for postwar planning, specifically in point eight, which forecast “a wider and permanent system of general security.” Further action at the State Department continued at a slow pace, however. On 12 September Leo Pasvolsky sent a memorandum to Secretary Hull advising that the President assign “to the Secretary of State primary responsibility for preparatory work on all phases of post-war foreign policies, with authority to appoint an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy under his own chairmanship.” This committee would

6. Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 175; idem, *Where Are We Heading?*, 9, 14-9; Divine, 43-4; Hoopes and Brinkley, 38-40; Sherwood, 359-60; O’Sullivan, Ch. 3, 16-7.

coordinate the planning efforts of the existing Division of Special Research, other State Department divisions, other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. Pasvolsky suggested that the committee operate through three subcommittees to handle Political and Territorial, Armaments, and Economic and Financial Problems (thus effectively mirroring the structure of the Council on Foreign Relations' WPS Project).⁷

This plan was generally approved by Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, and President Roosevelt, but its implementation was overshadowed by the growing crisis which led to the entry of the United States into the war. It would not be until 28 December 1941, after the U.S. was formally at war, that the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy was approved by the President. The initial membership list of the new committee was:

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Chairman
Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, Vice-Chairman
Norman H. Davis
Myron C. Taylor
Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State
Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State
Isaiah Bowman
Benjamin V. Cohen
Herbert Feis, State Department Advisor on International Economic Relations
Green H. Hackworth, State Department Legal Advisor
Harry C. Hawkins, Chief of the State Department Division of Commercial Policy
Anne O'Hare McCormick
Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State⁸

7. "Proposal for the Organization of Work for the Formulation of Post-War Foreign Policies," memorandum from Leo Pasvolsky to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1941, NA RG 59, Notter File Box 4.

8. Notter, 58-9, 63-5.

Eight of these fourteen individuals – Welles, Davis, Taylor, Armstrong, Bowman, Cohen, Feis, and Pasvolsky – were at that time members of the Council on Foreign Relations.⁹ Davis was the Council's chairman. Armstrong was its vice-chairman, the editor of *Foreign Affairs* magazine, and a member of both the Council's WPS Political Group and Territorial Group. Cohen was a member of the WPS Economic Group. Bowman was rapporteur of the WPS Political Group.¹⁰

While the State Department was considering how to organize for postwar planning, the Council's WPS Project had begun to study the implications of the Atlantic Charter's provisions. Three days before the Pearl Harbor attack, the Armaments Group issued a report calling on the British and American governments to "undertake to elaborate the security and disarmament references in points six, seven, and eight of the Atlantic Charter." In response to vagueness in the Charter's language, the report recommended that the creation of an agency for "general" security be studied and plans elaborated before the war's end, and that the postwar security system be equipped with an effective international policing mechanism. Declaring the security provisions of the Charter to be just as important as its economic provisions, the report continued,

"the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security" must be

9. Shoup and Minter, 152. Shoup and Minter list Welles' involvement with the Council as "slight," that of Pasvolsky, Cohen, and Feis as "moderate," and that of Davis, Taylor, Bowman, and Armstrong as "great." In addition, Acheson and Berle would become Council members after the war.

10. CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 19-23.

elaborated into a program which, though not a detailed blue-print of a future security system, will be sufficiently specific and tangible to capture the support of those who demand something more than the old order.

This report also contained the first reference for the desirability of “a declaration of policy on the question of regional vs. world-wide security.” In response to the fear that the proposed security system would simply be rule by the victors, the report advised, “the intention of the two governments to proceed where practicable toward the establishment of regional security ‘clusters’ would at least dispel a part of this fear.”¹¹

The issue of whether the postwar security system should be based on universal or regional organization was also raised in a WPS Political Group study issued on 2 March 1942. Entitled “Problems of Postwar International Organization: A Tentative Outline,” it was the first attempt at laying out all of the issues involved in creating the structure of an international security organization. Under Section II, “Basis and scope of organization,” the following list of questions illustrates some of the alternatives suggested:

- A. Universal in scope – to include victors, neutrals, and (sooner or later) the vanquished?
- B. Regional groupings?
- C. A combination of both?
- D. The “United Nations”?¹²

11. CFR WPS A-B33, “The Atlantic Charter and Postwar Security,” 4 December 1941.

12. For most of the war, the term “United Nations” was synonymous with the Allies, i.e., those nations which had subscribed to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, pledging their support for the principles of the Atlantic Charter and for employing full military and economic resources against the “Tripartite Pact [Germany, Italy, and Japan] and its adherents.” Only at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of September to October 1944 did “United Nations” become the official designation of the future international organization. In this paper, the term “United Nations” will refer to the United Nations Organization unless otherwise

- E. An American-British guaranteed order?
- F. An American-British-Russian-Chinese guaranteed order?
- G. A strengthened League of Nations?

...

If regional, what regions:

- The Americas, surely
- Europe probably, but what of Britain?
- The North Atlantic area, but how inclusive?
- The Pacific or Far East, but where does it begin and end?

And by what type of association:

- Pan American Union, probably expanded?
- European Federation or Pan-Europa?
- A North Atlantic "confederation"?
- Nine-Power Pact greatly Amended?

If a combination, what interlocking agreements between the universal and the regional?

...

If a number of regional groupings emerge, what steps should be taken to coordinate their action on overlapping problems?¹³

No concrete recommendations to any of these questions were offered in this report; at this time, the sense is clearly one of groping to define the problem, with no conception of the eventual solution.

By the time the above-mentioned WPS report was issued, the State Department had reinitiated its official postwar planning effort. The first meeting of the new Advisory Committee took place on 12 February 1942, with the subcommittees, in which the majority of the work would be accomplished, commencing meetings beginning 20 February. Although the subcommittees carried on their efforts separately under different chairmen, their membership was largely common to ensure coordinated results.¹⁴ An analysis by the Division of Special Research, issued on

indicated. The United Nations Declaration can be found in Russell, Appendix C, 976.

13. WPS P-B37, "Problems of Postwar International Organization: A Tentative Outline," 2 March 1942.

14. Notter, 78-81.

19 February, raised similar questions concerning the creation of an international organization. With regard to basic structure, it asked:

What kind of enduring international political organization do we want? A central world political organization with membership solely of individual states? Regional associations without a capstone structure, or with one? Continental bloc organizations? Or a composite form? Should it have regional offices or be concentrated mainly in one place?¹⁵

The continuing Soviet resistance to the German invasion and the securing of the Atlantic lifeline to Britain had begun to restore confidence in an eventual Allied victory. Looking forward to the postwar situation, the planners were shifting their focus away from hemispheric defense and economic organization of the non-German world toward a postwar future which once again featured American dominance.¹⁶ The Advisory Committee, and in particular its Political Subcommittee, now proceeded on the basis of a number of critical assumptions: first, unqualified victory by the allies; second, unbroken cooperation of allied strength throughout the war; third, the attainment of international security through the principles of justice and order; and finally, the belief that the United States Congress and its people would demand continued American participation in the maintenance of international peace and security after the war, including military commitments. It was a further conviction of the planners, reflecting the WPS studies, that organized cooperation among the major

15. Department of State Division of Special Research, Postwar Political Problems (Preliminary Analysis), 19 February 1942, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 54.

16. O'Sullivan, Ch. 3, 9.

powers for the maintenance of peace and security needed to be achieved before the end of the war. The State Department, and Roosevelt, considered that waiting until the end of World War I to set up the machinery of peace, and confusing the international organization with the peace treaties ending that war, had been among the mistakes of the Wilson administration which they were determined not to repeat.¹⁷

The Political Subcommittee, under the direction of Under Secretary Sumner Welles, began to focus on the structure of an international organization. Due to illness, Secretary Hull was almost totally disengaged from the planning process during this period. Welles was determined to align plans for the international organization with American values and interests; expansion of those values and interests on a global scale would in turn benefit the United States.¹⁸ He set out to design a structure which combined his admiration for regional associations with Franklin Roosevelt's concept of a postwar alliance of great powers that would be a continuation of the wartime military alliance.

In order to understand President Roosevelt's influence on postwar planning at this point, it is necessary to examine his concept of how a secure world must operate. Earlier in his political career, Roosevelt had espoused basic Wilsonian internationalist tenets: anti-imperialism,

17. Hull, 1294-5, 1634, 1637-9; Notter, 101-2; Schlesinger, 64; Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World Leaders* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 188.

18. Hull, 1638; O'Sullivan, Ch. 4, 2-5.

democracy, disarmament, and collective security. He had campaigned during the 1920s for American entry into the League of Nations, yet he became disenchanted with the League when it proved incapable of handling situations requiring serious military action. Although he enlisted internationalists for his State Department, as a political realist Roosevelt recognized the deep isolationist feeling of the American public and never pushed for American membership in the League. In his 1941 State of the Union message, Roosevelt called for a future world based on the "Four Freedoms": freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. Beyond these vague ideals, however, he was unwilling to commit himself to a specific international program. As noted previously, at the time of the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt feared that any mention of a new global organization as a postwar goal would cause an adverse reaction from the Congress and the public.¹⁹

Prior to the war, Roosevelt particularly held one Wilsonian ideal, disarmament, as a goal worth pursuing. He made a number of proposals promoting disarmament, committed the U.S. to participation in world disarmament conferences, and more than once railed against military aggression and the destructive madness of war. As late as June 1941, Roosevelt voiced the opinion that disarmament was the key to any potential peace terms. By the Atlantic Conference, however, his thinking had

19. Roland N. Stromberg, *Collective Security and American Foreign Policy: From the League of Nations to NATO* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 169; Schlesinger 25-9; Divine, *Second Chance*, 40.

undergone a subtle but important shift. The final point of the Atlantic Charter spoke only of disarming “nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression.” The peace-loving powers would not disarm; they would need military strength in order to enforce the peace.²⁰

Roosevelt’s belief that the strong nations would have to take on the role of policemen had two sources, the failure of the League of Nations to handle cases of military aggression and his belief that small nations could not play a useful role in peace enforcement. He considered the military establishments of small nations to be useless in modern warfare against the military of the larger powers, as well as an unreasonable burden on their populations to maintain in peacetime. Additionally, small nations were constantly embroiled in conflicts which spread into major wars. Therefore only the major powers would be in a position to enforce a postwar settlement.²¹ In this paternalistic system, the major powers would guarantee the security of the smaller nations.

At the time of the Atlantic Conference, only the United States and Britain were considered eligible by the President for this police duty; the Atlantic Charter contained only a vague suggestion that this would somehow be accomplished. Over the following year that view would change. Roosevelt would come to believe that the Soviet Union, for its continuing military efforts and likely powerful postwar position, and

20. Dallek, 42-3, 83, 102, 132, 186; Range, 96-9; Notter, 50.

21. Hull, 1642-3; Welles, *Where Are We Heading?*, 4; idem, *Seven Decisions*, 175; Hoopes and Brinkley, 39.

China, for global and domestic political reasons,²² had to be included. This expanded version of the “Four Policemen,” as Roosevelt began calling them privately,²³ was inherently in opposition to a consensus-based, universal international organization, and to the equality of nations promised by the Atlantic Charter. Yet the concept demonstrated the *realpolitik* methods of Franklin Roosevelt. He was aware that to obtain the cooperation of his wartime allies, the British and especially the Soviets, in a postwar organization, he would have to offer them a privileged position in its operation. As Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley state, “this distinction between great and small nations quickly became a fundamental element of all U.S. postwar planning.”²⁴

For Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s friend and confidant, it was obvious that any plan for a postwar organization must in some way include the concept that the powerful and victorious nations would police the world. The challenge was how to balance this with the Wilsonian ideal of a universal international organization. Welles believed he had the answer: construct the international organization as a superstructure over a collection of regional associations, each of which would be modelled on the inter-American system. Welles’ thinking clearly reflected Roosevelt’s global power concepts:

22. See below, p. 80, note 4.

23. Hoopes and Brinkley, 46.

24. Ibid.

Personally, I had come to believe that in the future international organization the difficulty arising from the need to reconcile the sovereign equality of all states with the inevitable demand by the major military powers to retain such freedom of action as might be required – at least during an initial period – to assure them of security, might best be solved by establishing the new world organization upon a foundation of regional organizations, each subordinate to the ultimate control of the world organization. Such regional systems, similar in general nature to the inter-American system of the Western Hemisphere, would be required to assume the primary responsibility for maintaining peace in their respective parts of the world.²⁵

Under Welles' plan, if a dispute could not be resolved by a regional council or if a dispute arose between regions, it would be referred to an executive council, consisting of the great powers as permanent members and other nations on a rotating basis. This implied that authority would be retained by each great power in its own sphere of influence.²⁶

The Political Subcommittee, which from the start was recognized as the principle subcommittee of the Advisory Committee, began meeting from 21 February 1942.²⁷ As active chairman, Welles was in position to implement his plans for the structure of the postwar organization. At this time, Welles viewed the creation of an international organization to be a two-step process; initially an interim body would be charged with peace enforcement during the armistice process, and subsequently this body would either be replaced by or evolve into a permanent organization.²⁸ Initial discussions

25. Welles, *Where Are We Heading?*, 23.

26. O'Sullivan, Ch. 3, 6-7; Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919-1999* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 152-3; Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 184-5; Neil Smith, 380; Hoopes and Brinkley, 69; Welles, *Where Are We Heading?*, 23-7.

27. Notter, 96. Hull, 1636-7, wrote, "the only phase of our postwar planning that actually came to fruition before I retired from the Department was that which related to an international organization, . . . which in my thinking was always the central and decisive problem of the postwar future."

28. Minutes of the Political Subcommittee [P Minutes] 1, 7 March 1942, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

concerned the operation of the preliminary body, but they may also be considered as reflective of planning for the design of the later, permanent organization.

The subcommittee's meeting minutes reflect a strong emphasis on the Four Policemen concept. By the meeting of 28 March, plans had begun to crystallize around a certain structure, with Welles commenting that "before our minds can be made up on definite organization we must determine some foundation for thought, in the form of hypothetical workable organization." The subcommittee had earlier decided that "any body charged with security would have to contain representatives of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China; any delegation that was involved would thereby place the police power of all other states in the hands of those four countries." Arguments put forward in favor of regional representation to the central executive included that "it would provide adequate participation by small United Nations,"²⁹ that it might establish a desirable pattern for later international organization, and that it might give *quasi* recognition to the regional aspirations of peoples of regions rather than alone to states. . . . Regional representation in the decision body was decided upon."

The discussion subsequently considered which potential regions should be included in an advisory capacity for this central executive power, with

29. In this meeting, the term refers to the wartime Allies (see above, p. 49, note 12).

the consensus favoring representation for the Western Hemisphere (or the American Republics), Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Western Pacific Area, and the "Mohammedan" region.³⁰ The basic structure was then agreed upon:

Mr. Welles summarized the "tentative" conclusions which had been reached. A United Nations Authority shall be composed of all the United Nations. An executive committee thereof shall be composed of representatives of the four major powers: the United States, Britain, Russia, and China, with the addition of hand-picked representatives from the five regions mentioned.³¹

That the design of the "United Nations Authority" would be an American-run process was also made clear at this meeting:

Mr. Taylor inquired who would initiate this organization. Mr Welles replied that the United States would initiate it once we have formulated our ideas in this subcommittee; if they are accepted by the Advisory Committee, and then if the President approves, the United States would consult with the British, the Russians, and the Chinese, and then the other United Nations. That would be the procedure.³²

By June 1942, the Political Subcommittee had taken on the task of designing the new international organization, and had advanced its thinking on regional organization. Several possibilities for Scandinavian, Western European, Central European ("Danubian federation"), and Eastern European regional groupings were considered. In the meeting of

30. Discussion was vague on which actual countries might represent these regions. Welles suggested that "possibly the Mohammedans should be represented, or could be represented, by India. [!] . . . Mrs. McCormick thought that perhaps some other state than India would have to represent the Mohammedan world."

31. P Minutes 4, 28 March 1942, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

32. Operation of the international body was to be entirely run by the Four Policemen. At one point in this meeting, a discussion ensued over who should select the individuals who would be regional representatives. "Mr. Welles suggested that the four major powers might declare: 'We won the war, we won back for you your self-esteem and independence, and we wish your advice in all decisions. Therefore, we want representatives from yourselves, by regions, to sit with us in the making of all decisions. For that purpose we have selected these men from you to join us in our deliberations.'"

6 June, in the spirit of designing a better League of Nations, it was noted that “the creation of regional unions might keep many regional problems from coming to the world organization. The League had been too much concerned with such problems.” It was suggested that voting in the international organization might be by regions, but doubts were raised that the American people would agree to submitting their policies to “decision by the majority of the Latin American governments,” whereupon it was considered that the great powers might be given special status or considered as separate regions.³³ A memorandum on a proposed Central European Union issued on 12 June listed the following “Summary of Functions of Regional Organization”:

- (1) Security relations with the outside world and with international organization;
- (2) Intra-regional security and order by means of a regional constabulary or gendarmerie;
- (3) Foreign relations of the union and cognizance of external relations of component states;
- (4) Intra-regional economic relations;
- (5) Economic relations with the outside world.³⁴

However, at this point Secretary Hull intervened, quashing further planning for a postwar international organization and suspending the meetings of the full Advisory Committee, although allowing its subcommittees to continue operating. The reasons for this action are not completely clear. In his memoirs, Hull attributed it to “anxiety over the influences that inevitably would bring their forces to bear against the

33. P minutes 9-14, 2 May-6 June 1942, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

34. “A Central European Union (as so far considered),” 12 June 1942, NA RG Notter File, Box 55.

constructive views for the peace settlement and world improvement contemplated by the committee.” Presumably he was referring to possible objections by isolationists; however, the committee’s work was not available to anyone besides State Department planners and the Council on Foreign Relations WPS researchers, all of whom were dedicated internationalists. Hull himself, in a radio address on 23 July 1942, publicly called for “some international agency” for peace enforcement,³⁵ hardly the thing to do if he wished not to draw attention to the policy. It is more likely that what lay behind this decision was the intra-Department power struggle between Hull and Welles and their disagreement over a regional versus universal basis for the international organization. President Roosevelt apparently decided the issue by supporting Hull.³⁶

Hull’s intervention may have interrupted Welles’ efforts to design the postwar organization, but it did not halt them. In response to Hull’s contention that the idea required further in-depth study, Welles proposed the creation of a new Special Subcommittee on International Organization to examine the structure of other international organizations, to draft the constitution for a postwar body, and eventually to suggest ways that this body could be endowed with sufficient military capability. With the

35. Notter, 91-95; O’Sullivan, Ch. 4, 8; Hull, 1637-8.

36. Roosevelt valued Hull in the secretary’s official capacity and though he might have been on better personal terms with Welles, and even have been philosophically more in agreement with him, the President in these situations invariably backed his secretary. Hoopes and Brinkley, 51, write that “although the written record is sketchy, it is clear that the President strongly supported Hull’s position. Welles apparently sought to get around Hull by going directly to FDR, but the ploy failed.”

continuing absence of Secretary Hull due to illness, Welles moved the planning effort, and its regional focus, to the new subcommittee beginning on 17 July 1942, and appointed himself its chairman. Besides Welles, the subcommittee's members were Bowman, Cohen, Hackworth, Armstrong, Pasvolsky, and a new member not from the original Advisory Committee, James T. Shotwell.³⁷ Except for Hackworth, all were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, with Shotwell being one of the Council's founders and a member of the WPS Political Group.³⁸

Universalism versus regionalism was one of the first topics considered by the subcommittee. A "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization" included the following:

The basic international organization must be as nearly universal as possible. There will be important regional groups such as that developing in the Western Hemisphere and those already projected by agreement of some Central European governments-in-exile. Such regionalism is healthy, providing it meets the following test: Does it strengthen the international organization and make its task easier? . . .

Speaking of the Inter-American system, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles said, "It should constitute a cornerstone in the world structure of the future."³⁹

For Welles, the charter of the new subcommittee was an invitation to fix the perceived faults in Wilson's League of Nations, and the solutions would include more regional "cornerstones." According to his later account,

37. P Minutes 17, 27 June 1942, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55; O'Sullivan, Ch. 4, 8; Notter, 108. Allowing the creation of the new subcommittee may have been the price Hull paid to obtain the President's support in temporarily suspending forward progress on the design of the international organization. It certainly bears the stamp of a Rooseveltian compromise.

38. Shoup and Minter, 151; CFR, *War and Peace Studies*, 22.

39. Special Subcommittee on Political Problems – International Organization [PIO] Document 5, "Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization," 7 August 1942, NA RG 59, Box 86.

“at that stage the members of the departmental committee were almost unanimously of the opinion that any new world structure should be based on regional organizations similar to the Organization of American States.”⁴⁰

By late October, the subcommittee had produced a “Provisional Outline of International Organization.” This outline specifically mentions that “the basic principles for the organization of peace [are] those set forth in the Atlantic Charter.” This was to be the first of a series of plans produced by the subcommittee, shaped by Welles, which attempted to implement those universal principles through regional methods. This initial plan specified as “central bodies” an International Organization of Justice, an Organization for Disarmament and Security, a Political Organization, an Economic Organization, an International Organization for Health and Social Welfare, an Organization on International Cultural Relations, Technical and Administrative Agencies, and an Administrative Body. The outline specified that “in each of the above fields . . . there shall be regional organizations similar to the central bodies.”⁴¹

In early December, the first of a series of draft constitutions for the international organization was issued, elaborating in detail the functions of the bodies defined in the original outline. Article 13, “Regional

40. Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 184.

41. PIO Document 99, “Provisional Outline of International Organization,” 28 October 1942, NA RG 59, Box 87.

Arrangements,” contained a clause that would survive more or less intact through all such documents up to and including the United Nations Charter:

Nothing in this instrument shall be deemed to affect such regional arrangements, associations, or agreements, now existing or which may be entered into, provided these arrangements are not inconsistent with the aims and purposes of this instrument. The Council [executive body] or the General Conference [political representative body] may encourage the establishment of such arrangements, associations, or agreements, when deemed desirable to give effect to the general purposes of the International Organization.⁴²

The proposed regional grouping for Council representation was detailed in another document:

A possible allocation of fifteen seats on the Council might be the following:

United States

Great Britain

Soviet Union

China, Thailand, Korea

Central American Group: Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador, Venezuela

Central South American Group: Brazil, Ecuador, Peru

Southern South American Group: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay

Central West European Group: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland

South West European Group: Portugal, Spain, [Italy]

North European Group: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, [Germany]

Central and North East European Group: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland

South East European Group: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia

Middle Eastern Group: Afghanistan, Arabia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Persia, Syria, Turkey

British Dominions: Australia, Canada, Eire, India, New Zealand, South Africa

Pacific Group: Indo-China, Malaya, Netherlands Indies, Philippines, [Japan]⁴³

This tentative grouping should have revealed some pitfalls of regional

42. PIO Document 123, “Draft Constitution of International Organization,” 3 December 1942, NA RG 59, Box 87.

43. PIO Document 125, “Group Representation on the Council,” 14 December 1942, NA RG 59, Box 87. Enemy states in brackets in the original, indicating membership at some future time.

organization for the purpose of global representation. Not only are the British Dominions and the Pacific Group not actual regions with common security and economic interests, but placing certain groups of nations (e.g., France, Germany, and Austria, or Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina) in completely distinct regions also seems unworkable. Nevertheless, the Draft Constitution, after more revision, was finally ready to present to the President, and, on 19 June 1943, Roosevelt gave his approval to the plan.⁴⁴ In the final revision of the Draft Constitution, however, representation on the Council had been reduced and the regional divisions made more general. The Council was to include eleven representatives: the Four Policemen plus two representatives each from Europe and the Americas, one each from the Far East, the British Dominions, and the Middle Eastern States.⁴⁵

In the final analysis, the regionalism of the Draft Constitution was predicated on Sumner Welles' desire to embody Roosevelt's Four Policemen concept in a framework which he considered workable, due to his experience with the inter-American system. But it also represented more. Welles believed that regionalism could prevent the type of territorial disputes that had destroyed the imperfect League of Nations system, by replacing ultranationalism with "the development of constructive economic

44. PIO minutes 44, 19 June 1943, NA RG 59, Box 85; Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 189.

45. "Draft Constitution of International Organization," 14 July 1943, Notter, 472-83.

and financial policies in each area.”⁴⁶ All of the postwar planners considered it imperative to avoid one of Wilson’s “mistakes” by beginning the design of the postwar organization before the end of the war,⁴⁷ and Welles felt that the proposed system could be an effective compromise between those administration officials who favored strictly universal organization, such as Secretary Hull and Vice-President Wallace, and others such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson who thought in terms of traditional alliances and balance-of-power.⁴⁸

On that hope, Welles was mistaken. Cordell Hull, whose commitment to internationalism had an economic basis, believed that the exclusivity of regional blocs was one of the main causes of conflict in the world. He would never accept any kind of regional compromise. Hull, who had not involved himself in the planning process for almost all of this period, was about to take up its direction once again, with dramatic consequences for the planned structure of the postwar international organization.

46. Welles, *The Time For Decision*, 381.

47. For example, CFR WPS P-B52, “A Yardstick For Postwar World Organization,” 5 October 1942: “This yardstick can be expressed in the following terms: *the commitment of the United States to an international organization in the postwar world is not likely to be greater than the commitment to joint international action during the war.* . . . The failure to make a commitment during [World War I] was the best evidence that America would not make a full and firm commitment to a common strategy in the peace.” Emphasis in the original.

48. O’Sullivan, Ch. 4, 12.

Chapter 4

Universalism Ascendant: Cordell Hull Takes Charge

Drafting a constitution to fulfill idealistic goals in committee meetings was one thing; quite another was to convince the British and Soviets, who had serious security concerns of their own, to agree to the plan. Franklin Roosevelt, who took a back seat to no one in delivering an idealistic phrase but became a realist whenever decisions were required, knew the effort was pointless if he could not obtain the approval of his wartime allies.

As J. Tillapaugh wrote,

Roosevelt liked Welles' ideas because they combined the reality of regional power with the idealism of a world agency, and he operated with a strong regional orientation in his dealings with Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill. . . . [The Big Three leaders] expected that each would take the lead on a regional basis in military enforcement actions, not excluding the others but rather joining together for overall supervision in the future United Nations.¹

The British were already on board with the desire for a new global organization, but only if that organization protected their imperial rights and economic trading bloc privileges. In a radio address given on 21 March 1943, Prime Minister Churchill proposed that a future "world institution" should rest on subordinate regional councils, including a Council of Europe

1. J. Tillapaugh, "Closed Hemisphere and Open World? The Dispute Over Regional Security at the U.N. Conference, 1945," *Diplomatic History* 2 no. 1 (Winter 1978): 27.

and a Council of Asia.² This model, were it to have been extended globally, could have put Britain in a position via its imperial possessions to ensure a predominant role in most regions.³ In Washington on 22 May, Churchill met with a group of American officials including Vice President Wallace, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Sumner Welles, and Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Churchill proposed a supreme World Council for peace enforcement with subordinate councils for Europe, the Western Hemisphere, and the Pacific area. The members of the World Council would sit on those regional councils in which they had direct interests. Not only does this plan show Churchill's intention to have Britain play key roles in the major regional councils, it also demonstrates his clear commitment to a balance of power strategy, especially in Europe, where the regional council would be composed of up to twelve members representing both large individual nations (including the United States) and confederations of smaller states.⁴

The process of securing British and Soviet agreement to the State Department's plans would be spread out over a number of conferences and several years. The regional concerns of the allies would meet head-on with

2. P Minutes 58, 5 June 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

3. Neil Smith, 382, writes, "British regionalist proposals therefore represented a thinly veiled defense of worldwide empire against U.S. globalism." Kolko, *The Politics of War*, 462, wrote that Britain's main goals were control of its Empire and attaining a predominate position in Europe.

4. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Volume IV: The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 717-8; Tom Connally, *My Name Is Tom Connally* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), 256-7.

the internationalist philosophy of Cordell Hull, but first Hull needed to confront the regionalist preferences of the President. Hull had taken over active leadership of the Political Subcommittee on 30 January 1943, in his words because “a stage had been reached where we should begin to arrive at definite decisions.” When he learned the details of the Draft Constitution then being prepared by Welles’ International Organization Subcommittee, Hull strongly opposed its regional basis, but he recognized that “there was a basic cleavage between [President Roosevelt] and me on the very nature of the postwar organization.” Despite frequent meetings with the President to expose him to the internationalist viewpoints of advisors such as Taylor, Bowman, Davis, and Pasvolsky, Roosevelt continued to display general agreement with Churchill’s regional ideas. Fearing that this trend toward regionalism might endanger the postwar international organization, Hull instructed the Political Subcommittee to give the topic special study.⁵

Universalism versus regionalism was discussed in a series of subcommittee meetings in May and June 1943. Early on, the subject of Churchill’s call for regional councils was discussed. Hamilton Fish Armstrong related a conversation with Anthony Eden, in which the British Foreign Secretary had said that Churchill intended to make American participation in the postwar organization easier by stressing its regional aspect. However, commented Armstrong, this actually played into the

5. Hull, 1638-43.

hands of American isolationists by emphasizing foreign military commitments. Since Americans generally wished to avoid alliances, Armstrong declared, "international collaboration on the widest possible basis" would have more appeal. Additionally there was general agreement that the American people would not favor entering any world organization in which the American government would not have a voice in matters that affected American interests, wherever those interests might lie.⁶

In the following meeting, the subcommittee discussed the Monroe Doctrine, in response to Myron Taylor's question regarding how the United States could take part in European regional affairs while seeking to exclude European nations from the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. After a long discussion there was general agreement that the Monroe Doctrine should be viewed, at least in terms of international organization issues, as less of a "hands-off" policy than a policy of resisting the domination of weaker nations by stronger ones. In this sense the Monroe Doctrine could be extended worldwide. Regionalism was also discussed in this meeting, with Armstrong making the point that membership in a region was determined less by geography than by where a nation's interests lay. Therefore, while regional arrangements were desirable for cultural and other activities, "in the political field the world approach gives us the biggest scope for our activities."⁷

6. P Minutes 54, 1 May 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

7. P Minutes 55, 8 May 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

Two documents issued by the Political Subcommittee at the beginning of June 1943 show the transition in thinking away from regionalism which was occurring at this point in time. The first, "Development To Date of the Idea of Regional International Organization," declared that "there is no common description of what a regional organization should do, nor of what the regions should be." Reviewing Churchill's proposal, it commented that this would be a return to traditional British foreign policy, which seeks "to limit British commitments to regions of special British interests, as opposed to universal general commitments." The document implied that the inter-American system could not be used as a general model for regional organization, since unique conditions in the Americas had resulted in overcoming diversity over time.⁸

The second document, "Possible Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Organization," pointed out the potential dangers for the international organization of a regional basis. These included a possible profound change in the relationships between states if affairs were handled by regions instead of by individual nations, and the weakening of the international organization's security power through inter-regional conflicts. The return to closed trading blocs and competing regions

8. Political Subcommittee Document [P Document] 227, "Development To Date of the Idea of Regional International Organization," 3 June 1943, NA RG 59 Nottter File, Box 58. One reason the document gives for the uniqueness of the Western Hemisphere system is "the restraint which consistently is exercised by the greatest state of the region in the use of its overwhelming economic power and its predominant political power." Presumably, great powers in other regions could not be counted on to demonstrate such "restraint."

dominated by individual great powers might result.⁹

Finally, an important meeting of the Political Subcommittee was held on 5 June, in which extensive discussion took place over the balance between regional and universal organization. Given Secretary Hull's hands-on leadership of the subcommittee at this time, it is perhaps no surprise that Sumner Welles was not present at this meeting. Isaiah Bowman, summarizing the two recent documents and reviewing Churchill's statement, declared that the real danger in regional organization lay in the possibility of inter-regional conflicts between regions dominated by great powers. The inter-American system could not be assumed to be a model for regional organization, Bowman contended, since unique factors had caused it to evolve over a period of time. He also stated that regionalism in Europe had brought nothing but a series of conflicts, and declared that Churchill's proposal suggested only a reluctance on the part of the British to enter into worldwide obligations. Stanley Hornbeck related similar concerns regarding the Pacific area, stating that there was no analogy between the community of interest which had evolved in the Western Hemisphere and the lack of similar common interests among Pacific region nations.

As to the utility of regional organizations, James Shotwell commented that some issues may be purely local in character, but "any question that

9. P Document 228, "Possible Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Organization," 3 June 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 58.

does affect the interests of the great powers must become one of general concern.” Armstrong voiced the opinion that, “concerning the question as to *where* such a line should be drawn, the answer is in favor of a universal rather than a regional organization. Concerning the question as to *how* such a line should be drawn, the answer is to see that the United States is represented at least at one stage of [every] discussion.” Finally, Anne O’Hare McCormick commented that “The more we discuss regions, the more we discover that there are no regions. . . . There is an Atlantic region, a Pacific region, and a region for this hemisphere, all of them including some of the same countries. . . . There is no more a true region than there is an absolutely independent country.”¹⁰

The official summation of this meeting included the following comments:

Changes in the Concept of Regionalism

Geography no longer serves as an adequate basis for regionalism. Since most important activities are now carried out along functional lines, the term “regions” connotes a separatism that does not exist. . . .

Relation between Regional and World Organization

Although the first goal should be the establishment of a universal authority with substantial flexibility, there is necessity for regional authority and responsibility. The character of regional arrangements probably cannot be written into the instrument for an international organization because of wide variation in the nature of international implications of local issues. . . .

The subcommittee agreed that the primary need is for a strong world organization capable of maintaining peace. Regional organizations were thought necessary to deal with purely local problems, but they should be subordinate to the universal body. . . . The universal organization should not be constructed on regional organizations as its basis.

Role of the United States

10. P minutes 58, 5 June 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55. Emphasis in original.

The United States should be represented at one or more stages of all political discussions, so that it can precipitate or retard action as the situation and its conception of morals and interests might dictate. . . .¹¹

The importance of this meeting may be judged by the following memorandum to Sumner Welles, which accompanied the copy of the meeting minutes:

The meeting of the Subcommittee on Political Problems last Saturday arrived at an approximate consensus as follows: That universal international organization should not be founded upon regional structures; that regional organizations should have limited functions for local purposes only . . . and that regional organizations should not be established, preferably, until the main parts of universal organization had been established.¹²

Simultaneously, one of the Council on Foreign Relations' WPS studies showed a similar transition in thinking away from regionalism as a basis for international organization. The Armaments Group concluded that it was doubtful that any of the proposed regions possessed adequate military self-sufficiency or sense of unity for security purposes. It also concluded that regional organizations would not be competent to defend attacks from great powers, and that "the security functions which could safely be transferred to a regional organization are relatively few and unimportant." On the question of what regions might be established, this study echoed the State Department subcommittee opinion that the inter-American system should not be taken as a model since "the security aspects of this organization have been limited," and "the development of this feeling of

11. Ibid.

12. Memorandum from Harley Notter to Sumner Welles, 8 June 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 55.

regional unity is likely to be so slow that [a regional] organization could not safely be entrusted with security responsibilities for many years.” The study also comments that inter-regional conflicts would be better handled by a world-wide organization, and that the continued existence of the European imperial systems “is incompatible with any effective regionalization of security responsibility outside Europe.” Overall, the study concluded that “the suggested regional basis of security organization would not seem to be practicable.”¹³

Cordell Hull would later write that following its discussions on regionalism, “the [Political] subcommittee . . . expressed itself as being overwhelmingly in favor of a universal rather than a regional basis for an international organization.” In July 1943, the subcommittee issued a summary of its conclusions detailing the arguments against regionalism. This likely helped in the struggle to bring Roosevelt around to this opinion. Hull wrote, “in various meetings at the White House, my associates and I presented these arguments to the President with all the force we could. As summer arrived he began to turn toward our point of view.”¹⁴

Events external to the State Department were combining to make the design of the international organization a critical issue in the summer of 1943. In March, Republican senators Joseph Ball and Harold Burton along

13. CFR WPS A-B90, “Problems Involved in Regional vs. World-Wide Security Organization,” 21 June 1943.

14. Hull, 1640, 1646; Political Subcommittee Summary of Views: March 1942 to July 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 58.

with Democrats Carl Hatch and Lister Hill had offered a Senate resolution (the so-called "B₂H₂ resolution") calling for the immediate creation of a United Nations Organization as the nucleus of a postwar peace agency. In April, defeated 1940 Republican presidential candidate Wendell Willkie published his book *One World*, which called for American involvement in securing the postwar peace. The book was an immediate bestseller and the idea of international organization became a popular cause. Democratic Congressional leaders warned Roosevelt that unless he took some action the issue threatened to become a negative one for the Democrats in the 1944 campaign.¹⁵

The immediate concern was to have a plan to present to the British at the summit conference which was to take place at Quebec on 11-24 August. The improving prospects of the Allies in the war gave impetus to the need for postwar plans; the same pressures that the Congress and the American people were feeling relating to the end of the war were being felt by Allied leaders. While the main purpose of the Quebec conference was military planning, some definition of postwar issues was also on the table. Roosevelt

15. Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1940-1948* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 92; Dallek, 419. The administration wished to proceed at its own pace on postwar issues and it opposed the Senate resolution, which was bottled up in the Foreign Relations committee by Chairman Tom Connally. Nevertheless, Congress and the American public, while unaware of the developing State Department plans, were increasingly in favor of a postwar international organization. Divine, *Second Chance*, 85-97. This bipartisan outlook would continue throughout the remainder of the decade. Although the Democrats and Republicans would have significant differences over a number of foreign policy issues, on the specific issue of international organization party leaders would remain in substantial agreement. The Republicans would win control of the Senate in the 1946 elections with Arthur Vandenberg replacing Tom Connally as chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, and their roles would switch again following the Democrats' victory in 1948. However, there would be no major shift in the Senate's position on administration policy concerning international organization.

and Hull looked to obtain British approval for a Four-Power Declaration on general postwar intentions. Roosevelt had responded to the concerns of Congressional Democrats by saying this declaration would contain a statement regarding postwar international organization.¹⁶ The President looked for less specificity in its terms than his Secretary of State would have preferred, however; the section of the draft declaration concerning international organization was merely a recasting of the language of the Atlantic Charter:

That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁷

At this time the only specific State Department plan which could be presented to the British was the Draft Constitution proposed by the Welles Special Subcommittee on International Organization, which focused on the interim "United Nations Authority" and provided representation in the executive body on the basis of regional associations. Hull, given his personal preference for universal organization, reflected in the recent conclusions of the Political Subcommittee, was determined to strike this regional bias and replace it with a universal one. A memorandum was to be added to the draft of the plan specifying the change.¹⁸ Welles strongly

16. Notter, 187-8; Dallek, 419-20; Russell, 122-4; Hoopes and Brinkley, 83-5.

17. Notter, 553.

18. Russell, 120-1.

objected to this, as indicated by Harley Notter's notes:

Welles is Acting Secretary, from eleven o'clock today [11 August], and is taking the position that he and not Pasvolsky will transmit the memorandum to the President. And furthermore, he opposes the statements in the memorandum which object to regional structure and organization, and consequently he is insisting and is carrying through the sending to the President [sic] of the full draft as worked out by him and his committee of the United Nations protocol which embodies the whole regional principle. Since he could not override the memorandum, he chose to write a letter to the President in transmitting the memorandum, in which he himself upholds the regional principle.

Welles delivered the material to the President that evening and promised him that the UN Protocol would be reduced to propositions and submitted to him.¹⁹

At Quebec, Roosevelt obtained agreement from the British to the general direction of the Department's planning effort, although he avoided specifics and, in contrast to the universalist phrases of the proposed Four Power Declaration, he continued to stress that enforcement power would remain in the hands of the Four Policemen.²⁰

This contention during the preparation for the Quebec conference proved to be the final act in the power struggle between the Secretary of State and his Under Secretary. On 10 August, Hull had informed the President that either Welles must go or he would resign. The proximate weapon employed by Hull was a personal scandal involving Welles resulting from an incident which had occurred some years previously,²¹ but the more obvious cause

19. Harley Notter notes, "Communications with FDR," 11 August 1943, NA RG 59 Notter File, Box 54. Roosevelt wanted the plan reduced to a series of general "propositions" instead of a detailed document, since he wished details to be worked out with the British, and eventually the Soviets, at a later date. This also would have made the substitution of a universal basis for a regional one easier to accomplish on the fly.

20. Dallek, 420; Hoopes and Brinkley, 83-4; Russell, 123-4; Hull, 1238-9, 1646-7.

21. The incident, involving a 1940 accusation by a train porter of an intoxicated sexual advance by Welles, is described in Hoopes and Brinkley, 78-82. President Roosevelt was aware of this and another similar report, but refused to dismiss Welles. However, by 1943, political opposition to Welles made it inevitable that the story would become public.

was the continuing “disloyalty” shown by the Under Secretary,²² as well as his strong influence with the President.

That Hull would take this action even while in the midst of preparing for a major international summit conference is certainly significant. It may have been that Hull simply judged this the opportune moment to strike at his rival, or that the attempt by Welles to go behind Hull’s back in the matter of the memorandum over universalism versus regionalism was considered the final straw by Hull. But the possibility cannot be discounted that Hull, feeling that the future of the international organization was at stake, wanted to ensure that Welles would not be able to move the President back to supporting his brand of regionalism. In any case, following Welles’ abrupt resignation on 22 August, Hull was at long last firmly in charge of postwar planning.²³

22. See above, p. 26, note 17.

23. Roosevelt wished to ease Welles out by sending him to the upcoming Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow but Welles declined, apparently because he felt the rumors surrounding his impending resignation would make such a mission ineffective. Dallek, 421; Hull, 1230-1. Dallek gives the date of Welles’ resignation as 25 September but Hull clearly places it during the Quebec conference. Hoopes and Brinkley, 81, date it 22 August.

Chapter 5

Universalism Triumphant: Moscow to Dumbarton Oaks

At the Quebec Conference, British agreement to participate in a general universal postwar organization had been secured. At least in the view of the Americans, traditional British resistance to commit to worldwide involvement, rather than only in regions where British interests were concerned, was overcome. The next step was to convince the Soviets. Franklin Roosevelt realized that without the participation of both of his wartime partners, no postwar organization could have a chance of success.

In meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in late May and early June 1942, Roosevelt had emphasized his desire for a postwar settlement which would not feature a new international organization but instead would leave the United States, Russia, Britain, and possibly China responsible for international security. Roosevelt knew that this implied spheres-of-influence approach would appeal to Stalin. The Soviets continued to place more reliance on traditional military alliances and balance-of-power considerations than on the concept of an international organization.¹ As late as September 1943, a WPS study reported:

1. Jonathan Soffer, "All for One or All for All: The UN Military Staff Committee and the Contradictions within American Internationalism," *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 48; Range, 99, 172-3; Hoopes and Brinkley, 46; Dallek, 342; Schlesinger, 40; Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), 13.

There is good reason for believing that the Soviets intend to exert their newly acquired power through the "sphere of influence" technique and informal collaboration with Britain and the United States rather than through any generalized European political organization.²

Roosevelt, however, was convinced that the Soviets would see that their security and interests lay in participating in an international organization rather than seeking a separate path outside of it. Although a three-power summit conference was not to take place until November in Tehran, Secretary Hull's attendance at a meeting of allied foreign ministers in Moscow during 19-30 October would be the occasion to convince the Soviets to sign the Four Power Declaration, including the provision for the international organization.³ Persuading the Soviets to agree to the terms of the Quebec document was Hull's personal moment of triumph.⁴ Upon returning to Washington, Hull addressed a joint session of Congress on

2. CFR WPS P-B71, "European Regionalism and Postwar World Organization," 27 September 1943.

3. Hull, 1256-7, 1281-2, 1299-1301, 1306-7; Range, 183; Welles, *Where Are We Heading?*, 28-30; Hoopes and Brinkley, 88-90; Russell, 133-7.

4. The stickiest part of the negotiation was getting the Soviets to agree to accept China as an equal signatory. Neither the British nor, especially, the Soviets favored allocating to China such a prominent place in postwar considerations, but Roosevelt had multiple reasons for wanting to include the Chinese in the Four Policemen. China could fill the Far Eastern power vacuum against either Soviet expansionism or Japanese resurgence; recognition of great power status for China would deflect criticism that the white races were seeking to dominate the world; support for a democratic China had a following among the American public. Perhaps most important, however, was that in a Three Power postwar alliance, a standoff between the Americans and Soviets would leave Britain as the power broker. To include China as a reliable U.S. ally would reduce British power and prevent any possibility of a British-Soviet Old World alliance aimed at the United States. Thus, British and Soviet opposition to China was based not merely on the weakness of the Chinese military capability. Both powers recognized the global political considerations inherent in the policy, as well as the contradiction between the universalist expressions of the Atlantic Charter and the regionalism expressed by the Four Policemen concept. Dallek, 390-1; Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 186; Neil Smith, 388; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, 268-9; Gowan, "US : UN," 12. Gaddis Smith, 12, argues an opposite view that Roosevelt "was an infatuated captive of the myth that China under Chiang Kai-shek was one of the world's great powers and deserved to be treated as such." Most evidence suggests that in fact Roosevelt viewed this as a useful fiction. Weinberg, 186, wrote that Roosevelt believed China could become a military power in "40 or 50 years time."

18 November 1943 to announce the fulfillment of his long-held universalist dream: "There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power."⁵

With both major allies having agreed to the Four Power concept, Roosevelt could proceed to the first summit conference of all three leaders, in Tehran from 28 November to 1 December. There, Roosevelt emphasized to Stalin the exclusive role that the Four Policemen would have in enforcement decisions. Stalin favored a regional approach that was more along the lines of Churchill's thinking than what the State Department had been planning. However, on the final day of the conference Stalin told Roosevelt that he agreed the international organization should be universal rather than regionally based.⁶ Stalin had not changed his preference for a traditional military alliance between the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union, but Roosevelt's emphasis on the exclusive enforcement role of the Four Policemen likely convinced him that he was in essence getting what he desired.⁷ Rather than the idealism expressed in the Four Power Declaration at Moscow a month earlier, at Tehran Roosevelt's approach was to establish a basis for pragmatic power-sharing in postwar

5. Hull, 1647-8.

6. Dallek, 434-6; Hoopes and Brinkley, 100-2; Weinberg, 125.

7. State Department official George Kennan would later write, "Insofar as Stalin attached importance to the concept of a future international organization, he obviously did so in the expectation that the organization would serve as the instrument for maintenance of a great power hegemony – a US-UK-Soviet hegemony, that is – in international affairs. . . . [T]he world organization would then be expected to serve as a means of enlisting British and American support in the maintenance of this [Soviet] sphere of influence." George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1967), 220.

arrangements.⁸

Despite this seeming convergence toward an overall universal structure for the postwar international organization, there was no clear plan to proceed on to the consideration of specific details. At Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had suggested a Three-Power committee to coordinate planning. Hull, fearing “undue publicity” and pressure from other nations to be included, requested that coordination proceed in an informal manner. Probably Hull, having recently taken control of the State Department planning process and now in his moment of personal triumph, wished to keep planning concentrated in the Department. Much effort would be required to rework the plans inherited from Welles. In any case, since the U.S. plan was well advanced over any thinking the British or Soviets had done, it was bound to have the most influence on future planning. When the British Embassy on 26 November 1943 requested clarification on the procedure to be followed in implementing the points of the Four Power Declaration, the State Department responded that discussions would continue when the United States had definite proposals to offer.⁹

8. Hoopes and Brinkley, 100-2; Welles, *Seven Decisions*, 172, 190; Notter, 200-2; Russell, 155-6; Thomas M. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy 1944-1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973), 2; Gaddis Smith, 73-4; Soffer, 51; Connally, 265. Connally wrote that “by early 1944, F.D.R. said that both Churchill and Stalin had agreed to stop pushing for regional postwar organizations and were no longer opposed to a single world-wide organization.” Neil Smith, 389-90, speculates that Stalin’s agreement to a worldwide basis for the international organization may have been a quid pro quo for Roosevelt not pushing overly hard on the question of postwar boundaries for Poland.

9. Hull, 1300-1, 1650-1; Hoopes and Brinkley, 90-1; Notter, 247.

The Department's postwar planning effort from this point was taken over by the Informal Agenda Group. This group was originally a few close advisors to the Secretary and, as its name implies, was never announced and possessed no official status. The group had no appointed chairman, but meetings were held in the office of Leo Pasvolsky, who acted as chairman. Besides Pasvolsky, its members included Isaiah Bowman, Norman Davis, Myron Taylor, and Sumner Welles before his resignation. Welles' successor as under secretary, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., attended after his appointment in September 1943. Also participating were James Dunn and Stanley Hornbeck, ranking political advisors of the Department, Green Hackworth, the Department's legal advisor, and Harley Notter, chief of the Division of Political Studies.¹⁰

The Informal Agenda Group began concentrating on the design of the international organization on 9 December 1943 and within two weeks had completed a plan for an international organization "in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, of Point 4 of the Moscow Declaration, and of the Congressional Resolutions." Hull transmitted this plan to the

10. Notter, 169-71. He wrote, "This name for it continued to be used until, on June 14, 1944, it was designated the International Organization Group. The group functioned under this title only until July 10, 1944. It was absorbed at that time into the structure of the American Group, which it had proposed for the conduct of the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and any further negotiations leading to a general international organization. Thus the Agenda Group was, in fact, never disbanded, but ended by becoming the corps of advisors at international conferences leading to the establishment of the United Nations." Shoup and Minter, 153, comment that the senior members, except Hull, were also members of the Council on Foreign Relations, and "four out of the six were active in Council affairs, with Davis and Bowman filling key roles in the War and Peace Studies Project."

President.¹¹ However, in contrast to the equality of nations featured in the language of those documents, the plan delegated peace enforcement power to an Executive Council dominated by the Four Policemen, either with sole responsibility or as permanent Council members in combination with some number of elected members.¹² Pasvolsky proposed the idea of a single Council for security matters in which some powers would be shared between the Four Policemen and lesser nations, while delegating all other responsibilities to a general assembly of all nations.¹³ This would become a feature of all future plans for the international organization and would eventually be embodied in the United Nations Charter.

The proposed Executive Council thus contained inherent ambiguity regarding regionalism. Certainly to Hull's way of thinking, it represented a high degree of internationalism. If it did not fulfill the equality of nations ideal which was called for in the Atlantic Charter and the Moscow Declaration, it did represent a universal consensus-based decision making body. On the other hand, the way the Four Policemen concept had been represented by President Roosevelt to his wartime allies, particularly to the Soviets at the Tehran Conference, the plan implied a spheres-of-influence

11. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State (Hull), 29 December 1943, Notter, 576-7.

12. Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 23 December 1943, Notter, 577-81.

13. Hilderbrand, 31-2. He comments that the State Department planners clearly favored this principle but also suggested the alternative of enforcement to be exclusively the responsibility of the Four Policemen, "in light of Roosevelt's well-known views on the matter."

basis.

One feature totally absent from the new design, based on the Political Subcommittee discussions of the previous spring and summer, was any reliance on the Welles plan's concept of underlying regional councils. Led by Hull, planners had no intention of including any such provision. But as the planning effort proceeded, they would be forced to confront the fact that regional organizations could not be completely discounted. Even as early as the Political Subcommittee's discussions of the previous summer, the continuing existence of these organizations was an accepted fact, and their relationship to a universal organization was the subject of debate.

A subcommittee reported stated,

The Political Subcommittee reached the consensus that regional authorities were necessary for dealing with purely local problems, but that regional bodies should be subordinate to the world organization. The Subcommittee seemed to agree that the universal international organization should have original jurisdiction over broad international disputes . . . [h]owever, it was urged by some members that the world organization should not interfere in disputes being handled satisfactorily by regional organizations. . . .

While the existence of certain regional authorities was considered likely, and the use of regional machinery to settle certain disputes was assumed, it was proposed by the International Organization Subcommittee that the general international organization be empowered to take under consideration a case on the initiative of any state. . . .¹⁴

Two WPS studies issued just prior to this are of interest for the attitude they display toward regional organizations. A WPS Armaments Group study on the inter-American system commented that "the primary purpose of a regional security system is to provide the basis for the localized

14. "Tentative Draft of Permanent International Organization Functions, Powers, Machinery, and Procedures," 30 August 1943, p. 70, NA RG 59, Box 89.

application of force, and the underlying assumption is that it will be easier to provide for the use of force by this method than through a world-wide agency," although it noted that the inter-American system "has produced elaborate machinery for pacific settlement [but] no arrangements for sanctions."¹⁵ In evaluating Winston Churchill's continued proposals for postwar regional councils,¹⁶ a WPS Political Group study stated,

It is clearly impossible at this stage to lay down any blueprint of the working relationships of a European and a world organization. These relationships must be flexible enough to meet needs which cannot yet be foreseen, provided it always be kept in mind (1) that the two levels of cooperation must be complementary and not mutually exclusive, and (2) that the sphere of action of the European regional organization must not only be consistent with but subsidiary to the functions and authority of the over-all organization.¹⁷

These WPS documents parallel the general attitude of Department planners as the planning effort moved forward; if regional organizations could not be avoided, and might even be useful for some purposes, to quote Percy Corbett, the goal should be to ensure that they be "canalized and disciplined rather than resisted."¹⁸ An International Organization

15. CFR WPS A-B95, "The Inter-American System as a Criteria for Regional Security Organization," 2 November 1943.

16. Although his opinion was not universally shared by British officials, as a telegram from the American Embassy in London to the State Department on 18 May 1944 demonstrated: "In a conversation with [Foreign Secretary] Eden last evening he said, among other things, that there had been some divergence of view in British circles with regard to the timing of the organization of post-war security organizations. The Prime Minister had inclined to the view that it might be better to proceed first with the formulation of regional organizations such as a council for Europe and perhaps a similar organization for the Pacific, et cetera, later proceeding to the organization [of] some central international mechanism. Mr. Eden felt, on the contrary, that it would be much wiser to proceed with the formulation of the central organization first, whereupon, when this was firmly established, the regional organizations could be proceeded with." NA State Department Decimal File 500.CC/46

17. CFR WPS P-B71, "European Regionalism and Postwar World Organization," 27 September 1943.

18. See above, p. 1.

Subcommittee document in January 1944 attempted to set out questions of “distribution of functions between the general and regional organizations,” including whether permanent or ad hoc regional machinery would be required, whether regional decisions should be appealable to the general organization, which intra-regional disputes might involve the general organization, and how intra-regional and inter-regional disputes should be handled.¹⁹ A second document commented that the international organization’s “executive council should have authority to make use of regional or group arrangements and procedures to facilitate the carrying out of its responsibilities.”²⁰ A third advocated “the formation on a regional basis, in advance of any emergency, of combined forces composed of contingents drawn from the various nations in the ‘region’ which would at intervals exercise together under the control of some duly appointed supreme commander.”²¹

These issues were systematized in a document on 28 April 1944. Stating that “the problem is to ascertain the relationship which should exist between the proposed general international organization and regional organizations in the performance of . . . security functions,” it went on to

19. PIO Document 177, “Maintenance of Peace and Security: Regional Aspects,” 11 January 1944, NA RG 59, Box 90.

20. PIO Document 165e, “Supply and Use of Forces for the Enforcement of Peace and Security by the International Organization,” 28 January 1944, NA RG 59, Box 90.

21. PIO Document 166, “Post-War Security: Possible Military Organisation [sic],” undated, NA RG 59, Box 90.

list a number of assumptions:

- A. Regional arrangements would continue in existence or be developed in a manner not inconsistent with the purposes of the general organization.
 - B. The general international organization would have security functions unlimited in geographic scope.
 - C. Regional organizations would also function in security matters appropriate for regional handling, . . . either on their own initiative or by reference from the general organization . . .
 - D. The United States, and the other states with special responsibility for security, would have membership both in the general organization and in the respective major regional organizations.
- ...

The report commented that regional organizations might be requested to assist the general organization in specific disputes, and that regional machinery might be used. Regional organizations were seen as suitable for arbitrating intra-regional disputes. However, the general organization must have the power to intervene if regional procedures were not likely to succeed. These would likely include intra-regional disputes where only one great power existed in the region (the inter-American system was used as an example of this), and where more than one great power existed but stood on opposite sides of the dispute (such as in a potential European organization). This document anticipated many intra-regional disputes, but noted that inter-regional disputes “may be potentially the most dangerous to world peace.” In conclusion it stated, “it seems likely that the division of functions between the general organization and the regional organizations should leave the major responsibility for the prescription and

adoption of enforcement measures with the general organization.”²²

Several points in this report are of interest, since it demonstrates the trend in thinking toward the topic of regional organizations at this time. The document clearly states that regional organizations would exist, and should be subordinate to the worldwide organization. However it also anticipates that regional organizations might at some times act on their own initiative, as well as at the direction of the general organization. It assumes that the purpose of regional organizations would be to handle intra-regional disputes, although it fails to anticipate the bipolar nature of the postwar world. In doing so it incorrectly assumes that many of the postwar disputes will be intra-regional in character, and thus it overestimates the importance of regional security organizations designed to deal only with intra-regional issues.

On 1 February 1944, the British once again requested an exchange of views on the points of the Four Power Declaration, and the State Department finally responded on 17 February with a “Topical Outline” regarding the proposed international organization.²³ The outline was also transmitted to the Soviets. The British and American views were substantially in agreement, but the Soviet response on 5 April stated that a number of “fundamental questions” should be addressed first. Among

22. “Relation of the General International Organization to Regional Organizations in Performance of Specific Security Functions,” 28 April 1944, NA RG 59, Box 85.

23. Notter, 256-7. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, “Topical Outline,” 17 February 1944, NA RG 59 Lot 60-D 224, Box 43.

these questions was the relationship of any regional systems to the general security system.²⁴

By 29 April, the Department was ready with a "Possible Plan for a General International Organization," which by 18 July had become the "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization." These were elaborations on the plan proposed to the President at the end of the previous December. Each contained identical language regarding the position of regional organizations, in line with the thinking that subcommittee documents had developed. Recognition of the existence of regional agencies was listed under "General Character of an International Organization":

The organization should be so constituted as to make possible the existence of regional organizations or other arrangements to function on their own initiation or by reference from the general organization on matters of security and peace which are appropriate for regional adjustment. The general organization should at all times be kept informed of the activities in matters of security and peace undertaken by regional organizations or under regional or other arrangements.

And, under "Pacific Settlement of Disputes":

Where feasible, regional or other arrangements should be employed to bring about adjustment or settlement of local or regional controversies.

However, no reference to regional organizations was made under the section dealing with "Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the Peace and Action with Respect Thereto."²⁵

24. Notter, 257, 262.

25. "Possible Plan for a General International Organization," 29 April 1944, Ibid., 582-91; "Tentative Proposals for a General International Organization," 18 July 1944, Ibid., 595-606. The December plan had been approved by the President on 3 February 1944, opening the way for work to continue on these lines.

These proposals, which would be the basis for the American position at a great power conference to discuss details of the international organization planned for Washington, D.C. in August, were sent to both the British and the Soviets. The British response was received on 22 July and that of the Soviets on 12 August. The Soviet response contained no position on regional agencies; this time it was the British who objected on this point, once again strongly favoring a Council of Europe, even though the universalists in the British Foreign Office appeared to have won the upper hand from the Prime Minister, at least temporarily.²⁶

The British position caused the Americans to review thoroughly the issue of regional organizations. Again the conclusion was that these organizations must be subordinate to the general organization. However, they were willing to accept that regional organizations could have jurisdiction, although not exclusively, over intra-regional disputes; that regional means of enforcement could be used if consistent with the purposes of the general organization; that the Executive Council should be kept fully informed on regional action taken or contemplated; that the Executive Council should utilize regional agencies where practicable; and, importantly, that the great powers would inevitably exercise a controlling

Ibid., 256.

26. Russell, 393; Hilderbrand, 164-5. Neil Smith, 391, describes how, in April 1944, Churchill had drawn a sketch of a "tripod of world peace" for Isaiah Bowman, showing regional councils for the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia under the umbrella of a "Supreme Council" of the three major powers (excluding China). Weinberg, 158, wrote that "for Churchill, some international association drawing together the various regional councils was really an afterthought and not of particular importance."

influence within their respective security regions.²⁷ On this last point, the implicit regionalism of the Four Policemen concept was clearly displayed. Overall, however, the American position strongly emphasized the superior position of the international organization.

The conference took place at the Dumbarton Oaks estate near Washington from 21 August to 7 October 1944.²⁸ On the matter of regional security organizations, the Soviets took no stand; the disagreement was between the British and the Americans.²⁹ The British position favored not just regional security organizations, but also regional subcommittees for the proposed military advisory commission.³⁰ This was unacceptable to

27. Russell, 399-400.

28. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference actually consisted of two separate trilateral meetings, the first between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, the second between the U.S., Great Britain and China. The Soviets, still not wishing to allocate to China such a large role in the postwar arrangements, refused to meet directly with Chinese representatives. Issues involving postwar collective security were decided in the first phase of the conference. Hilderbrand, 61-2, 229-44.

29. However, it appears that the Soviets were starting to see the usefulness of regionalism for their sphere-of-influence goals. A telegram from the London Embassy to the State Department on 22 December 1944, two months after Dumbarton Oaks, discussed an article written by "the Russian publicist Malinin" in the Moscow weekly *War and the Working Class* which opposed regional blocs or spheres of influence but continued, "This does not mean that 'regionalism' has no part to play in the future organization of world security. . . . [T]he world organization to be set up after the war should be divided into sections of which the European section would be one. . . . [W]e hope that it will be realized in Russia that regionalism in this sense should apply not only to military security, but should include also special provision for political and economic cooperation." A followup telegram from Ambassador Averill Harriman stated that "Malinin" was likely a pseudonym for former Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, and "evidently emanates from high Soviet circles and throws considerable light on Soviet thinking with respect to that section of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and to the question of regional security in general." NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 500.CC/12-2244. This can be interpreted as showing that the Soviets were considering a potential Council of Europe as beneficial to their postwar European position.

30. This was designated the Military Staff Committee in the United Nations Charter. This committee was organized, and still meets to this day, but has never taken any effective action. See Soffer, "All for One or All for All." The British proposals stated, "if Regional *Political* Councils were set up as part of some world organisation, it would follow that they should have Military Advisory Staffs, and this might facilitate local co-operation." Tentative Proposals by the U.K. for a General International Organization, 22 July 1944, FRUS

the Americans, who viewed such a provision as a slippery slope toward an underlying regional basis for the entire security organization. The discussions became entangled in the tricky areas of U.S. Congressional approval for international use of U.S. military force and the interim security arrangements to be put in place before the war's end; with armies already in the field, it was unclear what effect the provisions of an international organization would have on existing alliances. The decision to consider interim arrangements separately, however, allowed the participants to focus again on the basic question of regionalism. A compromise was reached which removed some of the more restrictive language surrounding regional organizations from the U.S. Tentative Proposals.³¹

The final agreement permitted regional action only if authorized by the newly-named Security Council.³² Thus, Chapter VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements stated:

1. Nothing in the [proposed United Nations] Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action
2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the

1944 1:689. Emphasis in original.

31. Hilderbrand, 166-70.

32. Among the decisions made at Dumbarton Oaks were those related to nomenclature. The United States insisted on carrying over the name of the successful wartime alliance, "United Nations," to the new organization. The Executive Council was renamed Security Council largely to satisfy the Soviets' desire to emphasize the nature of its role. *Ibid.*, 105-6; Hull 1683-4.

Security Council.

3. The Security Council should be kept informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies . . .³³

Despite the minor compromise in the language permitting the existence of regional security agencies, at the Dumbarton Oaks conference Cordell Hull and the State Department planners achieved their main objective, an international organization in which peace enforcement was universal and firmly under control of the Security Council.³⁴ Hull resigned as secretary of state the following month, described by Franklin Roosevelt as "the Father of the United Nations," and was replaced as secretary by Stettinius.³⁵ Within a few months, however, the victory Hull had won on behalf of universalism over regionalism would begin to unravel, under pressure from an unlikely source.

33. "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization," Notter, 617. Tillapaugh, 27, stated that the section on regional organizations was written by Leo Pasvolosky "with almost no consideration by British and Russian officials."

34. Hull feared that the Republicans would make the Dumbarton Oaks agreements a campaign issue in that year's presidential election. However, the Republican candidate, Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, and his foreign policy advisor, John Foster Dulles, were both internationalists who approved of the administration plan. In front of the press, Hull and Dulles both signed an agreement endorsing the plan and pledging to exclude it as a campaign issue. This agreement delighted Hull, who had feared that partisan differences might destroy American participation in the international organization, as they had in the case of Wilson's League of Nations. Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1940-1948*, 121-5. This is another example which shows that the leadership of the two parties shared the same basic view on the issue of international organization. See above, p. 75, note 15.

35. Hull, 1715-9.

Chapter 6

Regionalism Reborn: Mexico City and San Francisco

In July 1944, the WPS Political Group had issued a study exploring methods by which the inter-American system could be integrated into the processes of the proposed international organization. It is a fascinating document, as it precisely anticipates issues which would come into dispute only a few months later. The study identified potential means of interconnecting the two organizations, including participation of a major Latin American state on the world body's Executive Council, reciprocal agreements between the two organizations, and joint consultations in mutual areas of concern. In the area of security, it advocated close correlation of activities with clear-cut responsibility for intra-regional disputes to lie within the scope of the regional organization. Calling for flexible relationships between the two bodies, the document stated:

When the proposed United Nations organization . . . reaches the blueprint stage, one of the most complex problems confronting its designers will concern the status of pre-existing and emergent regional groupings in respect of the world structure. The precise manner in which this problem will present itself cannot now be foreseen. . . . Indeed, the reconciliation of regionalism and universalism in international organization is likely to prove fully as complicated as the adjustment of local and central jurisdictions inside a federal state.

Stating that it was difficult to foresee the best means of cooperation without first knowing the respective roles great and small states would play in the

implementation of security, the document proposed a *modus operandi* which included the following provision:

The members of the inter-American system, subject to the approval of the world organization, could negotiate a regional security convention by which the respective responsibilities of the United States and the Latin American countries, in respect of Hemisphere policing and armaments, would be defined.¹

Generally the concerns of the WPS studies throughout the war ran parallel to those of State Department planners, but this appears to be a study whose conclusions were either overlooked or generally ignored. Possibly this was due to the single vision of universalism which Hull was enforcing on the Department process at this time, or possibly it shows the waning influence of the Council's input. In any case, it accurately predicted issues which were to become points of contention at the next scheduled meeting in the series of Western Hemisphere conferences, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace to be held in Mexico City from 21 February to 5 March 1945.

A post-Dumbarton Oaks WPS Armaments group report more closely reflected the Department's opinions. Stating that "there is need to examine the problem of regional and special security groupings in an effort to ascertain whether they may be a source of weakness or strength to the new organization," it advocated that creation of regional arrangements should wait until after the establishment of the international organization to avoid demonstrating a lack of faith in the new system. On the question of the

1. CFR WPS P-B84, "The Inter-American System in the Postwar World," 5 July 1944.

already existing inter-American system, the report found it “scarcely to be regarded as a regional arrangement of the kind envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks draft,” questioned “whether the existing Inter-American system can be developed into a genuine security arrangement,” and advanced the opinion (although not in so many words) that the inter-American system really lay within the United States sphere of interest and was not of concern to either Britain or Russia. Finally the document concluded, in perfect alignment with Department opinion, that “regional organization presents many dangers and few advantages to the future maintenance of security.”²

As State Department officials prepared for the Mexico City conference, they had two simple and clear goals, to investigate strengthening the inter-American system and to secure agreement from the Latin American governments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The new under secretary, Joseph Grew, at a meeting on 26 January 1945 with Assistant Secretary for Latin America Nelson Rockefeller and the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the American republics, stated that “the way should be paved at Mexico City . . . to develop and strengthen the Inter-American System in order that it might play its proper role in the postwar world.” Regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, Grew told the diplomats that much successful hard work had been done and much yet remained. He emphasized that

2. CFR WPS A-B119, “Problems of Regional Security Organization,” 28 November 1944.

inevitably some nations would not find the plans to be perfect, but the important thing was to give the new organization a chance to develop and grow.³

These points were further elaborated in several draft agendas and resolutions on “International Organization” and on “Improvement and Strengthening of the Inter-American System” in January 1945. The Political Working Group produced a final agenda in February, including the following points under “consideration of problems of international organization for peace and security”:

- (a) World Organization.
 - 1. General support for World Organization.
- (b) The further development of the Inter-American System, and its relation to the World Organization.
 - 1. Strengthening of Inter-American System, relationship between Inter-American System and World Organization, and means to effect those objectives.
 - 2. Declaration of Inter-American objectives and principles susceptible of general application.
 - 3. Joint guarantees of boundaries.⁴

For those who were paying attention at the State Department, though, the storm clouds gathering on the horizon should have been obvious. On 8 January, George S. Messersmith, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico,⁵ wrote a lengthy letter to Secretary Stettinius detailing the point of view of “our Latin friends,” including the following analysis:

3. Minutes of meeting in Room 285, State Department, 26 January 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 500.CC/1-2645.

4. NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW.

5. Messersmith, as assistant secretary of state, in 1939 had received the Council on Foreign Relations’ offer of assistance in postwar planning to the Department. See above, p. 21.

They see Russia definitely bent on establishing spheres of influence . . . They see Britain not only bent on maintaining the Empire and Empire preferences but extending their field of influence over a good part of Western and Northern Europe. In this situation the Latin American Republics at present see us endeavoring to maintain certain principles in the political and economic field with little chance of immediate success of carrying them through. . . . [T]heir conception is that without definitely forming what may be called an American bloc, for this would merely be following the line of Britain and Russia, that if this hemisphere is to have any chance of having the ideas to which it is attached control [sic] it must work together very closely now and in the postwar period. . . . There is a feeling among these states that during the last year or so we have become more interested in the world picture and become less interested in the American picture. . . . They think, however, in terms of their security, political and economic, and they want to find it in this hemisphere.⁶

J. Tillapaugh has argued that the real concern of the Latin American countries was not the potential for interference from an extra-regional source such as the Soviet Union. Rather, their main worry was over the possibility that the United States would revert to an interventionist policy within the region and would use its Security Council veto to block any attempt to interfere with its actions. Thus they looked for their own security within a consensus-based regional institution separate from the great power-dominated United Nations.⁷

In any case, in addition to Messersmith's letter, there was an abundance of evidence from the Latin Americans themselves that they viewed the upcoming regional conference as anything but an occasion to rubber stamp the Americans' postwar security plans. On 7 February, State Department official Donald W. Rowland sent a memorandum to

6. Letter from Ambassador George S. Messersmith, American Embassy, Mexico City, to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 25 January 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW/1-2545. In this letter, on which he has hand-written "Important," Messersmith attaches a copy of his comments to the Secretary.

7. Tillapaugh, 35.

Assistant Secretary of State Rockefeller, stating:

Foreign Minister Velloso of Brazil has stated that amplification of the Dumbarton Oaks plan to secure greater representation for small nations would be sought at the Conference, and the Foreign Minister of Venezuela has said the same. Velloso . . . noted that the "traditional inter-American continental fraternity" might serve as a basis for world organization.⁸

On 12 February a telegram to the State Department from the Embassy in Santiago, Chile, declared:

Chile intends to make a broad reservation as regards Dumbarton Oaks provisions . . . With respect to regional agreements or systems Chile believes existing Pan American system should be perfected and given explicit preference in settlement of regional conflicts, excluding the world system until failure occurs.⁹

On the same day, the Honduran Ambassador to the United States, Julián R. Cáceres, wrote a letter to Rockefeller, stating:

One of the most appropriate means of strengthening the inter-American system with a view to solving problems that arise would be that of broadening, with more immediate effectiveness, the powers of the Pan American Union . . . [I]t is advisable for the Pan American Union to be the liaison organization or catalytic agent, so to speak, between the authority that is vested in the Security Council and the pursuit of its aims that may be connected . . . with the functioning of the inter-American system in the western hemisphere.¹⁰

On 14 February, State Department officer Philip W. Bonsal sent Rockefeller a memorandum of proposals to be placed before the conference which included the following under "Inter-American System":

BOLIVIA intends to present a declaration for an American system of collective security.

8. Memorandum from Donald W. Rowland to Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Reaction in the Other American Republics on the Mexican Conference," 7 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW.

9. Telegram from American Embassy, Santiago, Chile, to Secretary of State, 12 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW/2-1245.

10. Letter from Honduran Ambassador Julián R. Cáceres to Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller, 12 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710.11/2-1245.

COLOMBIA will propose annual meeting of Foreign Ministers and the creation of a permanent political body.

The DOMINICAN REPUBLIC will propose an American League of Nations.

ECUADOR will present outline for reorganization of inter-American system.

MEXICO will propose resolution on relationship between general organization and the inter-American system and a second resolution for strengthening the machinery of the inter-American system.¹¹

Finally, in a letter to Nelson Rockefeller on 20 February, Ambassador Messersmith noted that he had information that “the Ecuadorian Delegation will present a resolution providing for a revision of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference,” and commented that “the Ecuadorian Delegation is going to be one of the troublesome ones.”¹²

Sandwiched between the crucial Big Three summit conference in Yalta in February and the start of the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in April, the Mexico City meetings were likely viewed by the Department as of minor importance in comparison. It is understandable that Stettinius, relatively new to the office of secretary and arriving in Mexico City directly from Yalta, may have been unprepared for the controversy about to occur. Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, though, given the above communications, should have anticipated the positions the Latin American nations would take, yet he apparently believed the conference

11. Memorandum from Philip W. Bonsal to Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Proposals To be Placed Before Conference By Other American Republics,” 14 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW.

12. Letter from George S. Messersmith to Nelson Rockefeller, 20 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 500.CC/2-2045.

would go smoothly.¹³

President Roosevelt had purportedly told Colombian President Eduardo Santos in January that the United States would support a regional security pact proposal at Mexico City.¹⁴ Thus the Americans may not have been completely taken by surprise by the introduction of three separate major resolutions to Committee III, dealing with inter-American security issues, by Brazil, Uruguay, and Colombia, each offering some form of permanent regional security system.¹⁵ They were completely caught off guard, however, by a new draft presented by a conference subcommittee attempting to synthesize the first three. This contained even stronger language pledging all nations to take military action upon the vote of a simple majority of the American states. This draft was, in fact, on the verge of being adopted by the committee. This was completely unacceptable to State Department delegates like Leo Pasvolsky, for its extreme regional bias, as well as to Congressional delegates for its commitment of U.S. troops without the authorization of Congress. Only parliamentary tactics

13. Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Herring, ed., *The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), 268; Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 116.

14. Ibid., 115; Russell, 562. Exactly what Santos was promised is unclear, however. Roosevelt was well-known for the political skill of getting anyone to believe that he had the President's agreement on any issue being discussed.

15. *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21-March 8, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946). Uruguay's was Draft Resolution No. 29, "American Pact of Peace and Mutual Guaranty," 155-6; Brazil's was Draft Resolution No. 37, "Declaration of Principles of States," 178-9; Colombia's was Draft Resolution No. 42, "Declaration on Solidarity Against All Aggression," 185-7, and was the strongest of the three, calling for "mandatory immediate action" against aggression.

employed by Senator Warren Austin, a member of the U.S. delegation, managed to delay the vote.¹⁶

Fevered negotiations ensued, both among the delegates and between the U.S. Delegation and President Roosevelt in Washington. A compromise was reached when language was agreed upon declaring that an attack on any state in the region would be considered an attack on all and would require immediate collective consultation on measures to be taken, up to and including the use of military force. Use of force would not be an obligation, however. Chapter VIII of the Final Act of the Conference, titled "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity," which immediately became known as the Act of Chapultepec, declared that it was creating

a regional arrangement for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this Hemisphere. The said arrangement . . . shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established.¹⁷

The compromise which produced the Act of Chapultepec was made possible only by the personal intervention of President Roosevelt. This was confirmed by a telegram from Stettinius to the President on 1 March. This telegram also shows to just what extent the Americans had been maneuvered into a corner by the Latin American nations, with the success or failure of the Conference riding on finding acceptable language to define

16. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 118; Russell, 561-2. Austin first asked for an English copy of the draft, then requested to consult with Senator Connally before the vote took place.

17. Ibid., 563-6; The Act of Chapultepec appears in *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference*, 72-5.

the regional security arrangement. Stettinius wrote:

Along the lines of your conversation a combined declaration has been worked out which provides first, that every attack against the territory, sovereignty, or political independence of an American state shall be considered as an act of aggression against the signatories. Second, in the event of an aggression or a threatened aggression there shall be consultation in order to agree on the measures to be applied. . . . [U]pon the establishment of a world security organization compulsory action shall be carried out in harmony with the charter of that organization.

. . . . We believe that the proposal conforms to your objective as outlined in your conversation with President Santos and that it is essential to the success of the conference.¹⁸

In the final analysis, universalism did not have sufficient champions at Mexico City. One feature of the negotiations was the disengagement of Stettinius, who was still dealing with leftover issues from Yalta much of the time.¹⁹ One historian has commented that the Secretary did not appear to recognize the implications of the regionalism to which the United States was committing itself.²⁰ Certainly Roosevelt, with his well-demonstrated bias toward the implicit spheres-of-influence regionalism of the Four Policemen, would not be the ultimate protector of universalism in a case like this, where the U.S. faced having to begin the United Nations Conference in San Francisco immediately after a repudiation from the

18. Telegram from Secretary Stettinius to President Roosevelt, 1 March 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW/3-145.

19. During the controversy over the proposed inter-American security pact, Stettinius' diary entries show that he was concerned over what the French attitude would be at the upcoming San Francisco conference toward the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta agreements, as does a telegram from Joseph Grew at the State Department in Washington. Campbell and Herring, 269, 271-2, 278-80; Telegram from Joseph Grew to Secretary Stettinius and Leo Pasvolksy, 27 February 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 500.CC/2-2745.

20. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 116, writes that "Hull would have moved quickly to squelch the regional movement, but Stettinius failed to comprehend its full significance." He also suggests that Rockefeller preferred a Western Hemisphere regional security system.

nations of its own hemisphere.²¹ The Congressional delegates at Mexico City favored regional security because protection of the Monroe Doctrine was ever one their major concerns, and the representatives present from the Joint Chiefs of Staff backed hemispheric military defense.²² At the bottom of Stettinius' telegram of 1 March, the President penned "OK FDR." Although no one appreciated it at the time, in doing so he had also opened the door to all of the regional security agencies which were to come later, and to the destruction of the Wilsonian ideal of universal collective security, even before the United Nations Organization was established.

Reaction to the Act of Chapultepec was swift in Britain, foreshadowing the controversy which would attend the upcoming United Nations Conference in San Francisco. The London *News Chronicle* wrote:

By deciding to form the American Republics in a League of Nations of the Western hemisphere, the inter-American conference at Mexico City yesterday took the biggest stride in the direction of regional security that has yet been taken anywhere in the world.

That article went on to say that the Act had caused the Monroe Doctrine to "become outdated." The *Times* of London commented,

There is the contention that no international organization can be effective which does not add the weight of the Americas to the settlement of European disputes, and that if this is denied no underpinning is left for the insistence that Russia should not be interested "regionally" in eastern Europe or Britain in western Europe. What the legalist will make of it all remains to be seen, but there will be a great argument about it.

21. In January 1945, Roosevelt had candidly told a bipartisan group of seven Senators that postwar spheres of influence were a reality which the United States was powerless to prevent. He felt the United Nations would ameliorate the situation, however, and it would also be essential in assuring the U.S. did not retreat into isolationism once again. Dallek, 507-8.

22. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 111, 116-7.

An editorial in the *Manchester Guardian* called the agreement “something of a surprise,” asking “does not the Act of Chapultepec rule out intervention by the security council in the Western Hemisphere?” Stating that “there is a certain danger that [regional agreements] may end by making the general organization almost redundant,” it concluded by saying, “the Act of Chapultepec may prove an awkward precedent.”²³

The surprising outcome at Mexico City set internationalists scrambling once again to confront the issue of regional security organizations, an issue which had seemingly been laid to rest at Dumbarton Oaks. A WPS report issued just before the start of the United Nations Conference called for greater clarification of the obligations of regional agencies under the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, “otherwise, there is a risk that . . . the new organization will be no more successful than the League of Nations in creating a workable balance between global and regional security groupings.” The report developed several arguments against lodging significant power in regional agencies and went on to stress the universalist outlook:

Clearly, it is not in the interest of the United States so to disinterest ourselves in European and Asiatic developments until we face a threat to ourselves which can be dispelled only by a costly war. . . . [T]he existence of the central organization with a monopoly of security power will tend to enforce a kind of collaboration among the great powers . . . To grant any considerable amount of policy-making authority to a regional agency would be to frustrate hopes of achieving this great-power solidarity which must

23. Reports from British press appear in a telegram from the London Embassy to State Department, 5 March 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW/3-545.

be the basis of all effective security planning.²⁴

One of the arguments against significant regional security pacts concerned a key point relating to the Security Council voting formula which had been decided upon at Yalta, featuring a veto power for the permanent members in peace enforcement measures.²⁵ The report noted:

It is not at all probable that states which have concluded a regional security pact will be satisfied with a procedural arrangement which will allow a distant great power, which may not have any interests in the region, to prevent the regional organization from undertaking action which it considers desirable.²⁶

This, as will be seen later, would be one of the key issues leading to the development of a North Atlantic security pact.

The implications of the Act of Chapultepec hung over the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. These included the appearance that the United States was setting up a private regional sphere of influence, that it supported separate regional security systems (even though nominally under the supervision of the Security Council), and that the U.S. was determined to have it both ways – to protect the Monroe Doctrine while simultaneously expecting a voice in decisions regarding every other area of the globe. The vision of an open political and economic world projected by Cordell Hull and the internationalists, both in the State Department and in the Council on Foreign Relations, as Neil Smith has recently written,

24. CFR WPS A-B121, "The Authority of a Regional Organization," 16 April 1945.

25. Russell, 531-3; Dallek, 510.

26. CFR WPS A-B121.

“awkwardly contradicted the hemispheric privilege and exceptionalism enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine.”²⁷

The unexpected death of Franklin Roosevelt less than two weeks before the United Nations Conference was to begin, combined with Hull’s departure from the State Department several months earlier, left a vacuum at the top level of postwar security planning. Neither Secretary Stettinius nor the new president, Harry Truman, possessed a deep understanding of the issues involved.²⁸ At San Francisco, the U.S. delegates turned instinctively to Leo Pasvolsky, who had been Hull’s principal advisor on security planning, for guidance on the issue of regional versus universal security.²⁹ Pasvolsky, now unencumbered by Roosevelt’s view of how regionalism served great power relations, felt free to enforce his and Hull’s view of universalism, which was backed by the Council on Foreign Relations’ internationalist viewpoint.

If the Latin Americans thought they had won acceptance of a regional security agreement at Mexico City, they were dismayed to learn at San Francisco that the battle would have to be fought all over again. Instead of

27. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 114-21; Hoopes and Brinkley, 192-6; Peter Gowan, “US : UN,” *New Left Review* 24 (Nov./Dec. 2003): 19; Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), 118; Neil Smith, 404.

28. State Department official Charles E. Bohlen, who had served in the Moscow embassy prior to the war, later wrote that Truman “was an obscure vice-president who got to see Roosevelt much less than I did and who knew less than I did about United States foreign relations.” Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 212. Additionally, Stettinius’ relations with Truman were awkward from the start. Rumors swirled before and during the San Francisco conference that he was about to be replaced as secretary by James F. Byrnes, which indeed happened immediately following the conference. Schlesinger, 73-5, 245-8.

29. Tillapaugh, 30.

moving to enshrine the Act of Chapultepec in the United Nations Charter, Pasvolsky stated the opinion that the Act's provisions were only temporary and that it would be superseded when the UN came into operation.³⁰ Moreover, while he agreed that self-defense was the right of any nation, Pasvolsky denied the right of collective action without Security Council approval.³¹

When they heard of these U.S. positions, the Latin Americans were furious over apparently having been misled at Mexico City. In combination with the fears of other smaller states that the big powers were running roughshod over them in the new international organization, their concerns escalated into a crisis which threatened to wreck the conference. Stettinius learned of the full extent of their anger only when he became trapped in a stalled hotel elevator with several delegates from Latin America who harangued him for nearly half an hour. Earlier the Latin Americans had enlisted a sympathetic Nelson Rockefeller,³² who in turn sought out Arthur Vandenberg, the U.S. delegate on the regional committee. Together, Rockefeller and Vandenberg decided that something had to be done to

30. The provisions of the Act of Chapultepec could be implemented under the President's wartime emergency powers. The compromise at Mexico City had avoided the necessity of negotiating a treaty, a more complicated undertaking requiring Senate approval. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 119; Vandenberg, 365.

31. Tillapaugh, 30; Minutes of Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegates Held at San Francisco, 16 April 1945, FRUS 1945 1:593-7.

32. Rockefeller, who had not been appointed as a delegate, attended the conference on his own initiative to supervise Latin American policy. Stettinius had been shocked to find him there, organizing meals and other services for Latin American officials. Schlesinger, 129-30.

regain Latin American support.³³

Advised by Rockefeller and several Latin American diplomats, Vandenberg wrote a letter to Stettinius criticizing Pasvolsky's position on regional security. While Pasvolsky initially fought the move to seek a compromise with the Latin Americans, the United States delegation as a whole realized that something had to be done to defuse the crisis. After several days of bitter internal debate in a number of long sessions, a formula was agreed upon, in contrast to Pasvolsky's opinion, framing the question of regional security in terms of collective self-defense.³⁴

The U.S. delegation made a strenuous effort to protect the Monroe Doctrine without legitimizing an unlimited number of spheres-of-influence regional organizations. Their first attempt mentioned the Act of Chapultepec specifically, in an attempt to make it a special case.³⁵ This was met with fierce opposition from the British and Soviets, and the Americans were forced to back off. Eventually a compromise was reached which intended to allow regional agencies and the Security Council to

33. Tillapaugh, 33-4; Vandenberg, 186-8; Hoopes and Brinkley, 194; Schlesinger, 176-8.

34. Minutes of Thirty-First through Thirty-Sixth Meetings of the United States Delegates Held at San Francisco, 7-11 May 1945, FRUS 1945 1:617-28, 631-40, 642-52, 659-60, 664-71. The collective self-defense formula was devised by U.S. delegate Harold Stassen, assisted by Rockefeller. A team headed by delegates John Foster Dulles, James Dunn, Isaiah Bowman and Pasvolsky (who technically was an advisor, not a delegate) fashioned the plan into a proposal. Schlesinger, 182-3; Tillapaugh, 38; Hoopes and Brinkley, 196.

35. Minutes of Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegates Held at San Francisco, 12 May 1945, FRUS 1945 1:659-60. Isaiah Bowman urged that it was obligatory to identify the historical chain "beginning with Monroe and ending with Chapultepec," and wanted a specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec in the U.S. draft. Accordingly, the American proposal included: "In the application of this provision the principles of the Act of Chapultepec and of the Monroe Doctrine are specifically recognized."

function in harmony by providing both for self-defense and for permanent regional defense associations.³⁶

The compromise answered the concern of the Latin Americans, as WPS A-B121 had anticipated, that no response to aggression could be taken until the Security Council acted and that a veto might paralyze the Council.³⁷

Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter included the following self-defense provision as Article 51:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council . . .³⁸

With the adoption of this article, members of the U.S. delegation were convinced they had protected both the Monroe Doctrine and the provisions of the Act of Chapultepec, while simultaneously preserving the superior authority of the Security Council.³⁹ Senator Vandenberg, who had worked behind the scenes with Assistant Secretary of State Rockefeller to find an arrangement which would satisfy the American republics,⁴⁰ wrote:

[U]nder the Chapultepec agreement “self-defense” in the Western Hemisphere is a

36. Francis O. Wilcox, “Regionalism and the United Nations,” *International Organization* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 792.

37. Furniss, 420.

38. *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII, Article 51, Russell 1043-4. Emphasis added.

39. Leo Pasvolksy stressed that the U.S. could always take action in the Western Hemisphere under the right of self-defense, but could block unwelcome interference by other great powers with its Security Council veto. Neil Smith, 405-6; FRUS 1945 1:591-2, 607-9.

40. Vandenberg, 187-90; Russell, 694-6, 704.

partnership affair and . . . the Monroe Doctrine is still part of it. . . . I do not see how we could tolerate a possible situation in which (under the Charter) we could not deal with a bad Pan-Am situation at all because (1) we are not permitted to act under Chapultepec and (2) the Security Council is stopped by a Russian or British or a Chinese or a French veto.⁴¹

Regional security organizations were covered by three separate Articles in Chapter VIII of the Charter. Following the language of the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, “regional arrangements or agencies” were to function exclusively under the direction of the Security Council. Article 53 stated that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.” Article 54 added, “the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies.”⁴² Unlike situations of self-defense specified by Article 51, Chapter VIII regional agencies were to have no authority to engage in independent action.

The United Nations Charter appeared to define a flexible arrangement which ensured ultimate authority would remain in the Security Council, but it was clear that Article 51 included an exception to the Council’s universal control which had not been present in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Moreover, none of the concerns regarding the mechanisms by which regional security organizations would be interconnected with the Security Council had been addressed, leaving the operations of regional

41. Vandenberg, 189.

42. *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VIII, Articles 53-4, Russell, 1044.

associations completely ambiguous.

Neither the Soviets nor the British had ever dropped their preference for regional security blocs.⁴³ Earlier in the conference, the Soviets had sought explicit protection for their regional system of bilateral treaties with European countries, nominally to guard against a resurgence of German militarism.⁴⁴ Now the U.S. was demonstrating its desire for special consideration regarding its own hemisphere. As WPS P-B84 had predicted, “the reconciliation of regionalism and universalism in international organization” was indeed proving complicated.⁴⁵

43. Kolko, 463. At Yalta, Stalin had once again stated his desire to formalize the Big Three bloc system as the foundation for world order.

44. Russell, 690-2; Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 164; Neil Smith, 405. The Soviets at that time had concluded five such bilateral treaties: with Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Yugoslavia, and the Polish Lublin Government. Russell, 690n. Protection for these treaties was written into the United Nations Charter under Chapter VIII, Article 53: “regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such [enemy] state.” An article in the Soviet press on 29 March had declared that these European regional security relations were more important than the world organization to the Soviet Union. Campbell and Herring, 311. Tillapaugh, 29, wrote, “the Russians had made known that, contrary to Big Three understandings, they would not submit their recently created interlocking regional system to the authority of an unproven international organization.”

45. See above, pp. 95-6.

Chapter 7

Regionalism Ascendant: The Rio Treaty and the Vandenberg Resolution

The terms of the Act of Chapultepec remained in effect only during the war, but the Act contained a “Recommendation” stating that “following the establishment of peace, the Governments of the American Republics [should] consider the conclusion . . . of a treaty” to include the potential use of force to meet threats or acts of aggression.¹ That the resurgence of regionalism was viewed as a serious threat by internationalists is shown by a WPS report issued within weeks after the San Francisco Conference. The report’s first sentence states, “the Act of Chapultepec contains implications of serious import for the effective development of the United Nations security system.” Noting that the language of the United Nations Charter had not brought clear-cut definition to the relationship between the Security Council and regional security organizations, the report called for the permanent inter-American treaty to finally resolve these issues:

Although it is now too late to modify the text of the United Nations Charter, there will be opportunity to insert clarifying provisions into the permanent inter-American security treaty that the United States has pledged itself to negotiate with the other American republics.

Advocating that “the overriding authority of the world Organization must

1. *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference*, 75.

be maintained at all times," the report warned of the dangers of a retreat into hemispheric isolationism:

It would be tragic if an excessive emphasis upon American regionalism were to put this country in a position where it could not have a voice in the discussion and adjustment of controversies in other areas of the world . . . The greater the "autonomy" of the inter-American system, the broader the interpretation that Russia, France, and other European powers are likely to give to the Charter provisions which exempt their anti-German treaties from the purview of the United Nations; and a similar trend toward "freedom of action" may be expected from other regional combinations (e.g., the Arabian League).²

The decision to call a conference to negotiate an inter-American security treaty had been announced by Stettinius at San Francisco, after agreement by President Truman, as a way to reduce the pressure from the Latin Americans to include special protection for the Act of Chapultepec in the UN Charter.³ The date for the conference was fixed for 20 October 1945 but a dispute between the United States and the Latin Americans over the status of Argentina first forced a change to March 1946 and then an indefinite postponement.⁴ This dispute was not resolved until 1947, when an Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace was

2. CFR WPS A-B122, "The Proposed Inter-American Security Treaty and the United Nations," 31 July 1945.

3. Campbell and Herring, 366-71; Tillapaugh, 39-40.

4. Josef L. Kunz, "The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 1 (January 1948): 111. The position of Argentina, whose pro-German government did not sign the wartime United Nations Declaration until 27 March 1945, had caused considerable debate at the Mexico City and San Francisco conferences. The Latin American nations generally supported Argentina's participation but the U.S. looked upon her basically as an enemy state. Schlesinger, 66-7, 132-5; Hoopes and Brinkley, 189-92; Russell, 569-72, 631-3; Campbell and Herring, 309-10, 324-5. Due to its ongoing dispute with the Perón regime, the U.S. government sought to exclude Argentina from the inter-American security treaty by negotiating it through diplomatic channels instead of at a conference. The Latin Americans resented this high-handed approach and, worse, viewed the American desire to intervene in Argentina as a return to pre-Good Neighbor Policy days. Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 188.

scheduled for Rio de Janeiro from 15 August to 2 September. Secretary of State George Marshall gave the position of the United States toward the conference before it convened:

Conference is special *ad hoc* meeting with only purpose that of converting temporary Act of Chapultepec into permanent peace treaty in accordance Part II [sic], Resolution VIII, Mex City Conference. Such treaty must be consistent with provisions UN Charter concluded after Mex City. Such treaty is essentially political rather than military agreement, establishing terms of inter-American political solidarity for the maintenance of peace and security.⁵

The agreement which resulted from this conference, known as the Rio Treaty, was careful to acknowledge the supremacy of the UN security system. Article 1 pledged the signatories “not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”⁶ Article 3 reaffirmed the principle of the Act of Chapultepec that an attack on any one state would be considered an attack on all and required “each of the said Contracting Parties . . . to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.” While thus legitimizing the treaty under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Article 5 also made clear that it was establishing a regional association under Chapter VIII:

The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the

5. Telegram from Secretary of State Marshall to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics except Nicaragua, 3 July 1947, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Consultation 4/7-347.

6. This and subsequent references to the text of the Rio Treaty taken from “Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,” *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 2, Supplement: Official Documents (April 1948): 53-8.

United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.⁷

Secretary Marshall, as head of the U.S. delegation, confirmed that this represented the view of the State Department in a telegram to Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett: "Parties shall send Security Council complete information, in accordance articles 51, 54 Charter [sic]."⁸

While Article 54 of the UN charter required regional agencies to inform the Security Council of activities "undertaken or in contemplation," Article 51 only required measures of individual or collective self-defense to be "immediately reported" after the fact. The Rio Treaty, by conforming to the language of Article 54, clearly established the "Inter-American Peace System" (as it is called in the Preamble) as a regional "arrangement or agency" under the UN Charter. Gerhard Bebr, writing in the *American Journal of International Law*, later termed the Rio Treaty "perhaps the only clear-cut regional arrangement of the type envisioned by Articles 52-54."⁹

However, a subtle but significant shift in the attitude toward collective security had resulted from the two-year delay in convening the Rio Conference. While State Department officials were committed to placing

7. Emphasis added.

8. Telegram from the Chairman of the United States Delegation (Marshall) to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 August 1947, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Consultation 4/8-2647.

9. Gerhard Bebr, "Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem," *The American Journal of International Law* 49, no. 2 (April 1955): 176. See also Hans Kelsen, "Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of the United Nations," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 4 (October 1948): 792.

the inter-American security system in a position distinctly subordinate to the United Nations Security Council, answering concerns of internationalists such as those raised in WPS A-B122,¹⁰ once again no attention was paid to actual mechanisms of coordinating the regional system with the global apparatus. Since 1945, the failure of the United Nations to operate efficiently in performing its intended functions had become apparent. Soviet "blocking tactics" in the use of the Security Council veto and the failure of the Military Staff Committee to begin operation cast doubt over the UN's ability to carry out peace enforcement.¹¹ Administration leaders had increasingly come to accept that the U.S. could not simply retire to the sidelines militarily and expect the United Nations to handle postwar security. President Truman was less inclined to seek accommodation with the Soviets than Roosevelt had been. Young pragmatists like George Kennan, who advocated a spheres-of-influence policy to limit Soviet expansion,¹² were becoming influential State Department officials. All of this served to advance the desire for a more

10. One former isolationist who had seen the light and become an internationalist was also concerned on this point. A letter from Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to Secretary Marshall on 8 August 1947 stated, "I raise the question whether . . . Article 2 should not spell out the fact that it is 'subject to the provisions of Articles 51, 52, 53, and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.' I do not think we can be too scrupulous in preserving the overriding authority of the parent organization." NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Consultation 4/8-847.

11. Acheson, 194; Soffer, "All for One or All for All," argues that the vagueness and contradictions in the functions and makeup of the Military Staff Committee were more responsible for its failure than American-Soviet tensions.

12. Randall B. Woods and Howard Jones, *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order* (Athens, Ga.: The University of Georgia Press, 1991), 105-7.

independent regional security capability than would have been the case two years earlier.

A result of this was a corresponding shift in emphasis on the type of aggression which should be the concern of a regional organization. All planning leading up to the United Nations Charter had assumed that the predominant, if not exclusive, field of a regional organization would be intra-regional disputes. The United States, however, was now looking to the Rio Treaty to include cases of inter-regional aggression. In a series of private meetings at the conference, Marshall expended considerable effort attempting to convince Latin American officials, most of whom held the opposite viewpoint, that the treaty should not make any distinction between inter- and intra-regional aggression.¹³

In the end, the treaty did distinguish between “continental” and “extra-continental” aggression, but only in regard to the measures to be taken in response. The provisions of the treaty relating to aggression would “refer to all cases of armed attack, without any distinction between a non-American armed attack and an American one, against an American state.”¹⁴ This,

13. Memorandum of Conversation of 19 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Bramuglia; Memorandum of Conversation of 20 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Peruvian Foreign Minister Enrique García Sayán; Memorandum of Conversation of 20 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Carlos Morales; Memorandum of Conversation of 21 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Senator Lt. Gen. Pedro Aurélio de Goes Monteiro of Brazil; Memorandum of Conversation of 21 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Ismael Gonzalez Arévalo, Guatemalan Minister to Peru; Memorandum of Conversation of 22 August 1947 between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Edmé Manigat of Haiti, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Consultation 4/9-847.

14. *Report on the Results of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1947), 35.

in essence, was the first example of a discontinuity in the concept of regionalism, in which the burden of collective security, even in cases of aggression from an extra-regional source, was transferred from the international to the regional organization.

The Rio Treaty also went beyond the Act of Chapultepec in the obligations it imposed on the signatories. Chapultepec had only required immediate collective consultation in the event of an attack. The Rio Treaty additionally pledged each signatory to assist in meeting the attack. Despite Secretary Marshall's characterization of the treaty as political rather than military, this was a specific obligation which could not be avoided.¹⁵

However, this commitment was not viewed with alarm by Americans, and in particular not by the United States Senate. The U.S. had traditionally been committed under the Monroe Doctrine to military action to protect the Western Hemisphere. The Rio Treaty therefore was seen fundamentally as restating the regionalism of the Monroe Doctrine in the form of a multilateral treaty rather than as a new and dangerous military obligation.¹⁶

Three months after the Rio Treaty was signed, it was ratified by the

15. Charles G. Fenwick, "The Atlantic Pact," *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 2 (April 1949): 312.

16. Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989), 113. This viewpoint had also been applied to the Act of Chapultepec, which Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally had described as "a new Monroe Doctrine, backed by all the Americas instead of just the United States." Report from William G. Blocker, U.S. Consul General in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, to the Secretary of State, 5 March 1945, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 710 Conference W and PW/3-545. Also see Connally, 270, 319-20.

Senate by a vote of 72 to 1. The overwhelming positive vote represented not only the fact that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, particularly Arthur Vandenberg and Tom Connally, had participated in determining the American position at Rio. As Edgar Furniss wrote, “the vote on the Treaty must also be interpreted as concrete endorsement of the regional approach to American security, which by the end of 1947 had won all but complete acceptance over the universalist approach.”¹⁷ Vandenberg was certain that this was just the first step in basing future security on regional organizations. He wrote,

With scrupulous regard for the United Nations – acting strictly within articles 51, 52, 53, and 54 of the United Nations Charter – we have demonstrated how like-minded, peace-loving members of the United Nations can make so-called regional arrangements which build peace and security for themselves and for the world, regardless of confusion in higher U.N. councils.¹⁸

The key to this acceptance of regionalism in security policy was the concept that pacts such as the Rio Treaty not only operated within the framework of the United Nations Charter, but that they also strengthened the operation of the Charter and enabled the UN system to work as originally intended. To understand this reasoning, it is necessary to examine a subsequent Congressional action, the Vandenberg Resolution.

At the time, Josef Kunz wrote that “the Treaty certainly had in view the fact that the Security Council is paralyzed by the veto.”¹⁹ In spite of the

17. Furniss, 422-4.

18. Vandenberg, 371.

19. Kunz, 120.

fact that the United States had not involved its wartime allies in the design of the international organization until Dumbarton Oaks, resulting in vagueness and uncertainty in its peace enforcement machinery, and although all of the major powers including the Americans were significantly concerned with regional security matters, the blame for the inability of the Security Council to operate as intended was placed on the use of the veto by the Soviets. Thus Vandenberg, now chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to a constituent on 14 April 1948:

I agree with you that the United Nations must be used in every possible way to create collective security through peaceful means. The great fundamental difficulty is that practically all our American efforts in these directions are aggressively opposed by Soviet Russia and her satellites. This is true in the United Nations where we are constantly met by a Russian veto.²⁰

The State Department shared this attitude. On 5 May 1948, Secretary Marshall made a statement before the House Foreign Relations Committee in which he said,

The aspirations of the people of the world as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations have been shaken by developments since the summer of 1945. It gradually became apparent that the postwar conditions anticipated at [the United Nations Conference in] San Francisco were not being realized.

Marshall blamed "the inability on the part of the United Nations to prevent aggression" on "the exercise of the veto power in the Security Council and the lack of a United Nations police force." But, significantly, he saw agreements such as the Rio Treaty as a way out of this dilemma:

The necessary steps for self-protection against aggression can be taken within the

20. Vandenberg, 401.

Charter of the United Nations. The Charter recognizes in article 51 the right of individual and collective self-defense. . . . Articles 52, 53, and 54 provide for regional arrangements dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security. . . . By such arrangements under article 51 of the Charter and the articles providing for regional arrangements, constructive steps have been taken to bulwark international security and the maintenance of peace.²¹

Marshall's statement to the House Foreign Relations Committee was part of a hearing on a House bill containing proposals to strengthen the United Nations. A number of resolutions for the same purpose had also been introduced in the Senate, including proposals for redrafting the UN Charter, world government, an international army, or complete world disarmament. Senator Vandenberg at this time began to look for some compromise solution which would result in "strengthening the United Nations without destroying it."²² The result would be the Vandenberg Resolution, which would for the first time put the United States Senate on record as favoring regional security solutions over the universalism represented by the United Nations.

The driving force behind this process was the connection between the State Department and the Senate through Vandenberg and Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. In his memoirs, Vandenberg (writing in the third person) assigns to himself the genesis of the idea:

In view of his conviction that an answer to the Russian attitude must be found within the United Nations, Vandenberg took another look at Article 51 of the Charter . . . In addition Articles 52, 53, and 54 of the Charter permitted the existence of regional

21. Department Of State *Bulletin*, 16 May 1948, 623-5.

22. Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, and Francis O. Wilcox, "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 4 (October 1949): 664-5; Vandenberg, 399-400.

arrangements for dealing with problems of international peace and security, and the Rio de Janeiro Conference of Western Hemisphere nations had drafted a hemispheric treaty under these articles. This sequence of events was assuming more importance in Vandenberg's mind as he noted when he wrote to Nelson Rockefeller on April 28, 1949 [actually 1948], that Article 51 was becoming "the key provision so far as effective hope for organized peace is concerned. I would not be surprised to see it ultimately used as the basis for a complete reorganization of the United Nations inside the Charter and outside the veto."²³

In reality, Lovett placed this idea in Vandenberg's mind. Beginning in January 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had approached the Truman administration about the possibility of an American military assistance pact for Western Europe.²⁴ In a conversation with Vandenberg on 11 April, Lovett suggested that the United States "treat the North Atlantic area as an extension of the Rio treaty." Vandenberg was cool to the idea, but indicated

that he and his Committee had been considering . . . the possibility of a Senate resolution which might refer to the present situation in the UN, the importance of making that body an effective instrument for the maintenance of international peace . . . and dealing with the problem of security in general terms.

Lovett told him that any such resolution should include "some reference to the determination of this country to take such steps as might be necessary to bring about the international peace for which the UN was presumably designed."²⁵

Shortly thereafter Secretary Marshall expressed his view to the House Foreign Relations Committee that "necessary, constructive steps" included

23. *Ibid.*, 403.

24. Cook, 112-34 *passim*.

25. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, April 11, 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.20/4-1148.

the establishment of regional arrangements. Sir Nicholas Henderson, second secretary at the British Embassy in Washington, later wrote, "Vandenberg therefore seized upon the idea and embodied it in a resolution, taking care to omit from it any prominent role for [President] Truman."²⁶

The administration got what it wanted from the maneuver, though: Congressional support for a regional security policy which would accelerate negotiations with the British regarding a military pact.

Details of the resolution were ironed out between Vandenberg and Lovett over a one-month period from that first meeting on 11 April until a final draft was ready on 11 May.²⁷ In a second meeting between the two men plus Secretary Marshall and John Foster Dulles on 27 April, Vandenberg "vigorously supported the concept of the 'limited and natural' regional arrangements and indicated he would be prepared to have the Senate resolution support some such formula."²⁸

The Vandenberg Resolution was unanimously approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and passed by the full Senate by a vote of 64 to 6 on 11 June 1948. The resolution put the Senate on record in support of:

Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the [United Nations] Charter.

26. Sir Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 27.

27. Connally, 328, wrote that "[Lovett] and Vandenberg became most secretive about what Lovett was doing with the resolutions."

28. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), April 27, 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 501/4-2748; Vandenberg, 406.

Association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.²⁹

“Within the Charter and outside the veto” became a catchphrase for Vandenberg and others who were intent on preserving the original purpose of the United Nations. They believed the alternative would be the demise of the UN either through inaction, in which case the use of the veto would paralyze all efforts toward collective security, or through well-intentioned but disastrous efforts to reform or replace the international organization. In introducing the resolution in the Senate, Vandenberg described it in these terms:

It is an answer which encourages individual and collective self-defense against armed aggression within the Charter and outside the veto. It asserts our interest in regional arrangements, specifically invited by the Charter, as a means to renew its effectiveness for peace. . . . It is a paraphrase of the Rio Treaty which the Senate overwhelmingly approved. It is a plan to make the Charter work in behalf of individual and collective self-defense against armed aggression. . . . It never steps outside the United Nations Charter.³⁰

The Rio Treaty had created an agreement strictly according to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter governing regional security arrangements. However, the Vandenberg Resolution, by emphasizing that an organization which took its authority solely from Article 51 could operate “within the Charter and outside the veto,” pointed the way to regional alliances entirely outside of Security Council control.

29. Ibid., 406-11. Text of the full Vandenberg Resolution appears in Ibid., 407.

30. *Congressional Record – Senate*, June 11, 1948, Vol. 94, Pt. 6, 80th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 7802.

Chapter 8

Regionalism Triumphant: The North Atlantic Treaty

The Vandenberg Resolution served the purposes of the Truman administration, since at that time it had been in secret talks with European governments regarding a mutual defense treaty for several months. The idea of a North Atlantic security agreement was not new; the smaller northern European nations had been advocating it for some time. In a memorandum in June 1942, Netherlands Foreign Minister Eelco van Kleffens wrote that “the organization of the security of the Atlantic and of the countries bordering on that ocean should be undertaken by the United States of America, Great Britain, and the other powers of good will belonging to that region.”¹ In July 1944, A State Department Political Subcommittee document noted,

The Norwegian Foreign Minister [Trygve Lie, who in 1946 became the first Secretary-General of the United Nations] has consistently maintained that the general international organization should be supplemented by regional arrangements and has suggested the creation of a North Atlantic Federation subordinate to the general organization, a proposal that has been favorably received by the Belgian and Netherlands Foreign Ministers.²

Four years later, the Norwegians were to play a crucial role in the events

1. P Document 223a, “Official Commitments and Views Pertaining to Permanent International Organization,” 15 July 1943, NA RG 59, Box 57.

2. P Document 223d, 14 July 1944, NA RG 59, Box 57.

that led to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Beginning in January 1948, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin initiated a series of diplomatic communications in pursuit of his goal of “organizing and consolidating the ethical and spiritual forces of Western civilization” to oppose the designs of the Soviet Union in Europe. There were conflicting views in the U.S. State Department. Soviet experts Charles Bohlen and George Kennan opposed a formal alliance; as Kennan later wrote, he saw “no need for a full-fledged military relationship at that stage of the game.” Kennan’s view was that the U.S. should focus on Western Europe’s economic strength through aid efforts such as the Marshall Plan.³

Rebuffed for the moment on the idea of a formal military alliance with the United States, Bevin engineered a tightly binding military assistance pact between Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Known as the Treaty of Western Union, or the Brussels Pact, it was signed on 17 March 1948.⁴ This was just an interim step in Bevin’s goal, however. When the Soviet Union approached Norway with a request for a “treaty of friendship,” and Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange told the British and Americans that he feared this would imply Soviet demands on Norwegian territory and possible hostilities between the two countries, Bevin continued his campaign for a North Atlantic treaty. In a message to

3. Cook, 113-5; Kennan, 407-11.

4. Cook, 117-22.

Secretary Marshall, he wrote,

The most effective steps would be to take very early steps, before Norway goes under, to conclude under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations a regional Atlantic Approaches Pact of Mutual Assistance, in which all of the countries directly threatened by a Russian move to the Atlantic could participate.⁵

Gradually, the State Department came to reflect the view of European Affairs advisor John Hickerson, who wrote in a memorandum regarding Bevin's initiative:

In my opinion a European Pact modelled on the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro is the best answer to the security problem for Western Europe. For such a pact to be really effective, the United States would have to adhere. I believe that this country could and should adhere to such a treaty if it were clearly linked up with the UN.⁶

In a conversation with the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel, Hickerson said, "This country would be sympathetically disposed and would at least give [a regional defense organization] very careful consideration. If it were associated with the Charter of the United Nations, it might receive a favorable reception."⁷

Hickerson's position became the basis for official Department policy. A meeting on 19 March 1948 laid out options for the basis of a treaty:

- (a) A treaty of reciprocal military assistance, based on Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, to be negotiated with selected countries, but not necessarily on a regional basis. . . .
- (b) A regional treaty, in accordance with Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, providing for the establishment of a North Atlantic-Mediterranean Regional Organization which also would undertake reciprocal military assistance

5. Ibid., 122-5.

6. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, 19 January 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/1-1948.

7. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 21 January 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/1-2148.

in accordance with Article 51.⁸

The phrase “not necessarily on a regional basis” reflected a competing opinion that the proposed alliance should offer a global alternative to the UN, consisting of free nations. This option was rejected as too unwieldy and difficult to implement.⁹ The final report of the Policy Planning Staff recommended,

A mutual defense agreement under the Charter of the United Nations. This agreement should:

- (1) Include as parties the present Western Union countries and other free nations of Europe and the Middle East who may wish to adhere. . . .
- (3) Provide that an armed attack against any one of the parties shall be considered as an attack against all of them and that each of the contracting parties agrees to take armed action against the aggressor in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.¹⁰

At this point, Under Secretary Lovett and Senator Vandenberg began their conversations leading to the Vandenberg Resolution, which put the Senate on record as supporting regional security associations. On 11 May Lovett wrote:

As soon as similar resolution has been initiated in House, if not sooner, we would begin talks with British, French, and Benelux here. . . . We would explore with them problem of increasing security [sic] of Scandinavians and other Western Europeans through integration into or association with Brussels system or otherwise.¹¹

The United States was ready to begin exploratory talks with those nations,

8. Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff, 19 March 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/3-1948.

9. Minutes of the United States–United Kingdom–Canada Security Conversations, Held at Washington 23-24 March 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/3-2348.

10. Report Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff Concerning Western Union and Related Problems, 23 March 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/3-2348.

11. Telegram from Under Secretary Lovett to U.S. Ambassador in London, 11 May 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/5-1148.

“pursuant to the Vandenberg Resolution,” on 29 June 1948.¹² Discussion continued between the U.S., Canada, and the European nations during the summer and fall of 1948. However, completion of the treaty was delayed due to two events, the U.S. presidential election and the reorganization of the State Department in January 1949, which included Dean Acheson replacing George Marshall as secretary.

Both the report of the Policy Planning Staff and the Vandenberg Resolution had linked regional organizations to the United Nations Charter only through Chapter VII (Article 51) of the Charter and not through Chapter VIII (Articles 52, 53, and 54). This would be a key policy debate in the framing of the North Atlantic Treaty.¹³ State Department officials, led by Hickerson, were determined to use the language of the Rio Treaty wherever possible in drafting the new pact,¹⁴ but in the time since the Rio Treaty had been passed, the Vandenberg Resolution had given birth to the notion that regional associations based solely on Article 51 could be more effective by operating “within the Charter but outside the veto.” As Secretary Acheson would later write in his memoirs,

12. Telegram from Secretary Marshall to U.S. Embassy in Paris, 23 June 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/6-2348.

13. The complete background and development of the North Atlantic Treaty is beyond the scope of this paper. An excellent general account, although lacking citations, is Cook, *Forging the Alliance*.

14. Minutes of the United States–United Kingdom–Canada Security Conversations Held at Washington 31 March 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.00/3-3148. The U.S. favored the language of the Rio Pact over that of the Brussels Pact because the latter bound all the signatories to automatic military assistance in the event of aggression against any one, which was unacceptable under the U.S. Constitution. Memorandum of Meeting, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (Working Group), 15 July 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.20/2-3-49.

We started out with two ideas . . . The idea of an attack on one considered as an attack on all came from the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the idea of allies jointly and severally taking measures to restore peace and security came from Article 51 of the United Nations Treaty. . . . To apply these ideas to Europe was new, but that hurdle had been passed in the Vandenberg Resolution.¹⁵

The decision to link the treaty to the United Nations Charter solely through Article 51 was not entirely clear cut, however. In the treaty negotiations, initially the Europeans insisted on viewing the pact as creating a full regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter. In one meeting, Henri Bonnet, representing France, noted that “regionalism is integrated in the whole setup of the United Nations consciously . . . [I]t is a way to build the pillars of peace, in order to prepare the complete success of universalism later,” and added,

We must not forget that at San Francisco the quarrel came to an end and the insertion of . . . Chapter [actually Article] 52 in the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes regionalism, embodies . . . regionalism into universalism. . . . I think it’s a complete justification of the Pact and we should show it in the way it has been drafted.

Sir Oliver Franks of Britain commented:

The Pact as it is conceived now has in my eyes at least to be in complete conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, including one or two very important documents – Article 52. Very important if one thinks of the controversies which have taken place on that question of regionalism vs. universalism.¹⁶

Under Secretary Lovett at this time also noted the difficulties which would ensue if the treaty were not linked as tightly as possible to the UN Charter. Referring to “the supporters and proponents of the United Nations

15. Acheson, 280-1.

16. Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, 13 December 1948, NA RG 353, State Department General Records, Box 1.

who see in the consultative function of the Pact . . . a threat to the authority of the Security Council,” he declared, “if we bend this thing beyond a point we will in effect set up a competitor of the Security Council itself.”¹⁷

A few months later, though, opinions had shifted due to concerns surrounding the responsibility of regional organizations, under Chapter VIII, to keep the Security Council fully informed of their actions. Article 54 required reporting to the Security Council all actions “undertaken *or in contemplation* . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security,” as had been promised by the Rio Treaty. Additionally, Article 53 stipulated that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.” It was unclear whether these requirements would commit the North Atlantic alliance to reveal all potential defense plans to the Soviet Union, as well as to make any action under those plans subject to a Soviet veto.

Generally the opinion of the negotiators was that only responses to armed aggression would need to be reported under Article 54, but that nevertheless the safer course would be to avoid any Chapter VIII commitments if possible. In a meeting on 15 March 1949, van Kleffens, representing the Netherlands, showed this uncertainty:

The Hague [i.e., the Netherlands government] seems to see . . . a real antimony between Article 51 and Chapter 8 . . . The chief thing that worries them is the duty under Article 51 [actually Article 54] to keep the Security Council at all times fully informed of activities . . . [I]t seems to the Hague that the compatibility of the Charter would be weakened if we rely only on Article 51 and do not say it is a regional

17. Ibid.

arrangement under Chapter 8.

Sir Oliver Franks added:

It can be argued, for example, point by point that because the articles of Chapter 8 of the Charter say certain things, we are powerless to act. We have got to report everything, we have got to do so-and-so and so-and-so. . . . My suggestion would be that we base ourselves primarily on 51 and only secondarily on Chapter 8. . . . [W]e are not creating a simple-minded regional organization, we are rather creating something based on self-defense and on common interests of countries in an area.

Exactly how the treaty might have been based “secondarily” on Chapter VIII is not clear. Presumably, either it would claim to conform to those provisions or not. One way out of this ambiguous situation was offered by Hume Wrong of Canada:

The political considerations really override the legal and we should maintain the position . . . that the treaty did rest squarely on Article 51 but contained in itself nothing that was contradictory to the terms of Chapter 8.¹⁸

This may be appreciated as a fine line but it satisfied the letter, if not necessarily the spirit, of conformance to the United Nations Charter. Acheson, who had originally stated his opinion that the treaty created a regional association under the terms of both Article 51 and Chapter VIII, and that the two functions could operate separately,¹⁹ was won over by this argument, stating:

Now if somebody says, “Do you square with Chapter 8?” I think the position we ought to be in is not saying, “We look to Chapter 8 for authority,” but saying, “Of course we square with Chapter 8. There is not a word that is contrary in any way in this treaty.”²⁰

18. North Atlantic Pact Discussions, 15 March 1949, NA RG 353, State Department General Records, Box 1.

19. Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, March 7, 1949, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.20/3-749.

20. North Atlantic Pact Discussions, 15 March 1949, NA RG 353, State Department General Records, Box 1.

This position could be easily accepted by other officials such as Hickerson and Bevin, who had from the start opposed considering the North Atlantic alliance as a regional association under Chapter VIII.²¹ The agreed minutes of interpretation on the treaty reflect the thinking developed in the meeting of 15 March:

The primary purpose of this Treaty is to provide for the collective self-defence of the Parties . . . [T]he Parties will, in their public statements, stress this primary purpose, recognized and preserved by Article 51, rather than any specific connection with Chapter 8 or other Articles of the United Nations Charter.²²

Henri Bonnet's view that regional organizations were part of the conscious design of the United Nations Organization would have aligned perfectly with the public position of administration officials. In the words of Lawrence Kaplan, "the Truman administration appeared to feel compelled at every opportunity to link the UN Charter with the North Atlantic Treaty as if the alliance were an organ of the Security Council or the General Assembly."²³ The reasoning had been provided by the Vandenberg Resolution: the paralysis of the Security Council caused by Soviet vetoes could best be fixed by regional security solutions, and the operation of the United Nations would thereby be strengthened. A memorandum by Charles Bohlen spelled out this argument in detail:

Article 51 is unequivocal in its general recognition of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense – and that is what the sabotage of the machinery of the

21. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 76-7.

22. Henderson, 104.

23. Kaplan, 3.

United Nations has forced the nations signatories to the North Atlantic pact to invoke. . . . [T]he determination of the nations associated in the North Atlantic Pact to do what they can to further the peace and security within the general framework of the Charter, by necessity of their own efforts, will materially enhance the possibility of creating in the world the conditions under which the United Nations was designed to function.²⁴

The Senate debate on the treaty reiterated this view. The Foreign Relations Committee stated in its official report, “The treaty is expressly subordinated to the purposes, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter, and is designed to foster those conditions of peace and stability in the world which are essential if the United Nations is to function successfully.”²⁵ In the floor debate, Senator Connally stressed that “it is soundly and solidly based on Article 51 of the Charter.” He referred to “the long catalog of thirty Soviet vetoes,” and responded obliquely to the Chapter VIII issue by stating,

I am well aware . . . [t]hat Article 51 does not envisage the establishment of any collective self-defense arrangements in advance of an armed attack. What would the exponents of this theory have us do – wait until western Europe is overrun and call a conference to determine the countermeasures that should be taken? Obviously, both individual and collective self-defense measures must be prepared in advance if they are to be effective.²⁶

Senate staff members Heindel, Kalijarvi, and Wilcox wrote, “Clearly collective self-defense would be an empty right if groups of states were unable to coordinate their defense efforts.”²⁷ Vandenberg defended the pact as “a supplement to the United Nations Charter, not as a substitute . . . It involves us in no obligation not already implicit in our signature to the

24. Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen), NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 711.00/4-1449.

25. United States Congress, Senate, *Senate Executive Report 8*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949.

26. *Congressional Record – Senate*, July 5, 1949, Vol. 95, Pt. 7, 81st Cong. 1st sess., p. 8815-7.

27. Heindel, 640.

United Nations Charter.”²⁸ On the strength of the argument of a security solution “within the Charter and outside the veto,” the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty on 21 July 1949 by a vote of 82 to 13.

Policy makers, particularly in the Senate, not only sought to justify this policy of regionalism by deriving it from the provisions of the UN Charter, but also by identifying it with the Monroe Doctrine. This argument was subtler and less legalistic than the case of adherence to the United Nations framework and was based on two distinct concepts. The first was that the North Atlantic alliance was in essence a regional extension to the Monroe Doctrine. The second was that a common policy of early deterrence underlay both the Monroe Doctrine and the North Atlantic alliance.

The first concept can be seen in explicit references to the Monroe Doctrine in Senate debate on the treaty. Senator Connally specifically stressed the continuity of American policy:

The North Atlantic Treaty is the logical outgrowth of the policies which we have evolved during the last few years. It follows naturally upon the commitments of mutual aid and collective self-defense undertaken by the Declaration of Chapultepec, the United Nations Charter, and the Rio Pact, which put into treaty form the Monroe Doctrine. . . . The treaty which the Committee on Foreign Relations now presents for favorable Senate action is but the logical extension of the principle of the Monroe Doctrine to the North Atlantic area.²⁹

Senator H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey alluded to a reformulation of the Monroe Doctrine in terms of collective defense, stating, “The North Atlantic Treaty has exactly the identical purpose and is a logical development of our

28. Vandenberg, 497.

29. *Congressional Record – Senate*, 5 July 1949, Vol. 95, Pt. 7, 81st Cong. 1st sess., p. 8819.

original Monroe Doctrine conception. . . . The Act of Chapultepec and the Rio Pact are evidence of the development of a unilateral Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral doctrine.”³⁰ Foreign Relations committee staff members Heindel, Kalijarvi, and Wilcox wrote,

In the Rio Pact of 1947, [the Monroe Doctrine] was converted into a Western Hemisphere Doctrine in which we and all the Latin American States agreed to consider an attack on any signatory as equivalent to an attack on all the other signatories. The obligation in the North Atlantic Treaty with respect to the North Atlantic community is thus similar in character to that of the Rio Pact.³¹

The idea that establishing a principle of common defense would itself serve to deter potential aggression was put forth by President Truman in his inaugural address when he said, in reference to the North Atlantic Treaty, “If we can make it sufficiently clear, in advance, that any armed attack affecting our national security would be met with overwhelming force, the armed attack might never occur.”³² Vandenberg, in a spirit unreminiscent of United Nations universalism, wrote,

[The treaty’s] invincible power for peace is the awesome fact that any aggressor upon the North Atlantic Community knows in advance that from the very moment he launches his conquest he will forthwith face whatever cumulative opposition these United Allies in their own wisdom deem necessary to beat him to his knees and to restore peace and security.³³

Senator Connally stated, “The deterring effect of a warning in advance is clearly illustrated by the Monroe Doctrine.” He added, “We now have a

30. *Congressional Record – Senate*, 21 July 1949, Vol. 95, Pt. 8, 81st Cong. 1st sess., p. 9911.

31. Heindel, 663.

32. *New York Times*, 21 January 1949, p. 4.

33. Vandenberg, 495.

frontier of collective security and defense in Europe.”³⁴

The numerous arguments advanced in support of the North Atlantic Treaty referring to it as a “global Monroe Doctrine” reflect its reliance on regionalist precedent. In order to downplay the internationalism of the expansion of U.S. commitment in Europe, reference was made to the traditional American regional policy. Even though State Department European Affairs advisor John Hickerson characterized the North Atlantic pact, during the treaty negotiations, as “one of the most far-reaching changes in our foreign policy in U.S. history”³⁵ and State Department official Charles Bohlen would later call it “a totally new course in foreign policy,”³⁶ public pronouncements regarding the treaty stressed its essential continuity with American policy.³⁷ Since the United States previously had been committed to intervention in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine, a commitment to intervene in Europe could be represented as a natural extension of existing policy.

34. *Congressional Record – Senate*, 5 July 1949, Vol. 95, Pt. 7, 81st Cong. 1st sess., p. 8817-8.

35. Memorandum of Meeting, Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (Working Group), 15 July 1948, NA RG 59 State Department Decimal File 840.20/2-349.

36. Charles E. Bohlen, *The Transformation of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 94.

37. An example of the effect of this argument comes from pacifist Norman Angell: “It is commonly assumed . . . that the pact is a radical departure in American policy, a break with tradition, and . . . a playing with the dangerous fire of European military alliances. . . . If it were more generally realized that the Atlantic Pact is thus truly in the main current of American policy and tradition, much of the instinctive opposition to it would be lessened.” Angell, “The Atlantic Pact in the American Tradition,” *Yale Review* 28 (June 1949): 597.

Conclusion

Regionalism Inverted

While the establishment of the United Nations had been a triumph for internationalists, it had also offered something for isolationists. A universal consensus-based collective security system promised global order without the risk of “entangling alliances” and security that would not require a resort to war. To avoid the possibility that the United States would slide back into isolationism, Franklin Roosevelt, his State Department, and Congressional leaders had labored long and hard to create their vision of the United Nations Organization as the vehicle for American international involvement, and to convince Congress and the public to support it. The promotion of the North Atlantic Treaty as the fulfillment of the UN system shows that no leader was willing, only four years later, to admit openly that the United States was abandoning the UN strategy.

The proponents of the North Atlantic Treaty clearly intended to emphasize its essential continuity with existing American security policy. Several of their arguments made reference to the progression of events, from the Act of Chapultepec, derived from the Monroe Doctrine, through the drafting of the UN Charter, the Rio Treaty, and the Vandenberg Resolution, as representing a single policy thread which led to the North

Atlantic Treaty. And yet the North Atlantic alliance was the very antithesis of Cordell Hull's vision of "no need for spheres of influence, alliances, balance of power."¹ How had this crucial transformation occurred?

While a progression of related policy decisions did take place from 1944 to 1949, the logical flaw in the continuity argument is that each step in the process modified rather than preserved existing policy. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were the purest expression of the universalist ambition for global peace enforcement, although they did allow subordinate regional security associations under control of the Security Council. The Act of Chapultepec forced a crucial change to be made to the Dumbarton Oaks plan, permitting regional agencies to operate outside of Security Council direction for self-defense purposes. The Rio Treaty established a regional agency under the definition of the United Nations Charter, but it included the key concept that the regional organization should be responsible for extra-regional as well as intra-regional aggression. The use of Article 51 to justify the Rio Treaty inspired the Vandenberg Resolution and the concept of "within the Charter and outside the veto," which enabled the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty. That alliance finally abandoned all pretense of being a regional association under Chapter VIII of the Charter and established itself as standing fully independent of Security Council control.²

1. See above, pp. 80-1.

2. By the time Arthur Vandenberg wrote his memoirs in 1952, portraying the North Atlantic Treaty as an essential policy continuity was no longer a necessity. At that time, writing in the third person, Vandenberg claimed, "Thus the ground work in which Senator Vandenberg had had such a prominent part during

The regionalism of the North Atlantic Treaty was thus the inversion of the goal of consensus-based, universal collective security. It was clearly a military alliance, although few at the time envisioned a transatlantic bureaucracy or a unified military command structure.³ Ironically, the treaty was promoted by administration officials not only as being in complete accord with the United Nations system, but as actually strengthening and even completing that system. Thus regionalism was characterized as saving the UN system from the paralysis of the Soviet veto.

But the regionalism of the North Atlantic Treaty was not only an inversion of United Nations universalism. It was also an inversion of United Nations *regionalism*. Not only had Cordell Hull's "no spheres of influence" vision been overturned, but so had Sumner Welles' vision of universal collective security constructed on a base of regional agencies. Welles had been, in his way, just as much of a Wilsonian in outlook as Hull; both had posited universal collective security as the ultimate goal. Where Hull had viewed any regional authority as a potential threat to the strength of the universal organization, Welles had looked to the proven performance of the inter-American system as an example of how regional associations could be the basis of a universal system.

negotiations on Article 51 at San Francisco provided a foundation four years later for an entirely new departure in American foreign policy." Vandenberg, 474. However, as the foregoing examination has shown, the policy change was the result of a gradual process over that four-year period.

3. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 197; Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), 32-4. The North Atlantic Treaty *Organization* came into existence only after the first demonstration of Soviet atomic bomb capability in August 1949.

The key to this second policy inversion was recasting the primary function of regional organizations from intra-regional security to one of guarding against extra-regional threats.⁴ In all planning done up to and including the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the primary, if not exclusive, concern of regional organizations was assumed to be intra-regional, which reflected the functioning of regional systems during the interwar period. In Sumner Welles' initial design for the international organization, any inter-regional issues not solvable by regional councils would be referred to the general organization.⁵ This assumption was also built into Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

Beginning with the Rio Treaty, however, a shift in emphasis occurred in which regional agencies were viewed as responsible for handling inter-regional aggression, which previously had been considered the sole domain of the United Nations Security Council. While intra-regional and inter-regional security functions were more or less in balance in the Rio Treaty, the North Atlantic alliance was exclusively concerned with extra-regional threats. For that reason, and not just because of concerns over potentially having to reveal military plans to the Soviet Union, it was necessary for the framers of the North Atlantic Treaty to define it only in terms of Article 51 of the Charter and not as falling under the provisions of Chapter VIII; in

4. In Sumner Welles' advocacy of regional systems, he warned that they would become a threat to world order only when employed "as offensive or defensive alliances, or as political or economic 'spheres of influence.'" See above, pp. 27, 58-9, 87-8.

5. See above, Chapter 3.

spite of the Europeans' view that the treaty defined a traditional regional association, it was actually an outward-looking defensive alliance. In fact, it hardly defined a "region" at all; in line with the 1943 discussions of the State Department's Political Subcommittee, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were bound together more by their interests than by a common geographical setting.⁶

Moreover, the idea that a regional organization operating outside of Security Council authority on the basis of Article 51 could assume the *responsibility* for collective defense under the United Nations Charter is a complete misreading of the intent of the Charter. As Danesh Sarooshi has written, "the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of peace under the Charter rests with the [Security] Council. This responsibility cannot be delegated, but only the power to carry out action required to fulfil [sic] this responsibility."⁷ Article 51 grants only temporary power for self-defense action "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." It does not envision permanent formal military alliances not subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII.

6. In this regard, the inclusion of Italy in the signatories to the treaty caused some difficulty in considering the treaty to be defining a "regional" organization under the UN Charter. At one point in the discussions, Under Secretary Lovett commented on "the problem of a regional association which is truly regional in a geographic sense and regional in a security sense, and you have because of that the question of how far can that region legitimately go without making it ludicrous." Transcript of Proceedings, Discussion of the Western European Situation, 5th Meeting, 9 July 1948, NA RG 353, State Department General Records, Box 1.

7. Danesh Sarooshi, *The United Nations and the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 283.

The replacement of the original United Nations concept of regionalism, what may be called the Dumbarton Oaks-style of regional organization, with North Atlantic Treaty-style regionalism completed the failure of the Wilsonian ideal of universal collective security, as Hull or Welles had respectively envisioned it. Peace enforcement and military planning were left in the hands of competing regional agencies, placing the responsibility for security solely in military methods. The Wilsonian goal of disarmament was also abandoned as the rival regional agencies depended on ever increasing military capacity to ensure their security.

This inversion of collective security policy, in the guise of strengthening the United Nations system, was the result of a combination of factors. As this paper's examination has shown, at all times during the period 1939-1949, forces in favor of regionalism contended with those in favor of universalism. At one time or another, regionalism had been abetted by the Grand Area concept, Franklin Roosevelt's Four Policeman strategy, the example of the inter-American system, British and Soviet advocacy of regional councils to effect spheres of influence, and American efforts to preserve hemispheric exceptionalism and the Monroe Doctrine. These concepts of regional forms of security ultimately allowed North Atlantic Treaty-style regionalism to replace the Dumbarton Oaks model and contributed to the ineffectiveness and eventual demise of the United Nations collective security system.

It is tempting to view U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty (subsequently NATO), plus the parade of other treaty organizations which followed, as little more than the extension of the Council on Foreign Relations' Grand Area plan to a new setting. In this view, the Soviet Union replaces Germany as the antagonist but much of everything else remains the same. The goal is still to organize the optimum area in which the U.S. can prosper with the least readjustment to its economy. The region to be politically and economically organized appears quite similar to the Grand Area: the Western Hemisphere plus the Pacific area and southeast Asia, Great Britain and the remains of the British Empire. In this analogy, the only major new addition is Western Europe; having been won back from Germany, the Western alliance is determined to preserve it from Soviet domination. The application of the Grand Area plan to peacetime had stressed the possibility of a long stalemate and the weapons of "psychological warfare" available to the liberal economic bloc.⁸

In Shoup and Minter's analysis, this reimagined Grand Area was the basis of "a United States-dominated world order." Expanded American security interests were required in "strategically necessary" areas. They make the Grand Area concept the centerpiece in their argument that America's ruling capitalist class has influenced foreign policy through the Council on Foreign Relations. They argue that one of the keys to the

8. See above, pp. 36-7.

revived Grand Area plan was the postwar integration of German industry into the Western economic system.⁹ This idea is problematic. Regina Gramer has written that the Council favored “Germany’s recovery and her integration into a European political economy,” however she also stated that Germany had always been at the center of the Council’s thinking and that “in 1922 and in 1923 the Council had recommended the reintegration of Germany into the world trading system,” facilitating the loans that fueled the spectacular growth of German industry in the late 1920s.¹⁰ Thus the Council’s attitude toward postwar Germany was consistent with its prewar view, which predated the Grand Area concept.

Other ideologues also have identified the Grand Area plan as the basis of American neoimperialism in the postwar world.¹¹ Sinister motives are not required, however, to see echoes of the Grand Area plan in the postwar actions of the United States. As Joyce and Gabriel Kolko wrote,

All agreed, in principle, as [Secretary of State James F.] Byrnes put it in August 1945, that “in the field of international relations we have joined in a cooperative endeavor to construct an expanding world economy based on the liberal principles of private enterprise, nondiscrimination, and reduced barriers to trade.” To attain these goals the United States would have to preserve “private enterprise,” or capitalism, in as wide an area of the world as possible.¹²

9. Shoup and Minter, 162-3, 172-6, 189-95.

10. Regina Gramer, “Problem Germany: The Contribution of the Council on Foreign Relations to the American Century, 1939-1949,” unpublished paper, Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture, Rutgers University, 3 February 1993.

11. For example, see Noam Chomsky, *What Uncle Sam Really Wants* (Tucson: Odonian Press, 1992).

12. Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 23.

Moreover, the Council on Foreign Relations was dominated by internationalists, and even the plan's authors thought "in the event of American-British victory, much would have to be done toward reshaping the world," and that the Grand Area would be a useful instrument to effect the necessary changes.¹³ That a regionalist strategy would find the Grand Area concept equally useful is to be expected.

Assigning the Grand Area concept a disproportionate degree of influence on the development of North Atlantic Treaty-style regionalism would be incorrect, however. The idea of the Grand Area was only one of the strong regionalist influences which had operated during the preceding decade. Another was the global political viewpoint of Franklin Roosevelt, including his concept of the Four Policemen. While Roosevelt's view toward regionalism versus universalism in the postwar international organization was malleable, reflecting his pragmatic approach toward finding a system that would achieve his overall goals,¹⁴ the Four Policeman concept clearly had a spheres-of-influence component. In Roosevelt's original thinking, they would be the only nations to remain armed. As planning for the postwar organization progressed, the inherent regionalism of the Four Policemen mixed uneasily with the notion of an association of free and equal nations.

13. CFR WPS E-B34, "Methods of Economic Collaboration: Introductory – The Role of the Grand Area in American Economic Policy," 24 July 1941.

14. Range, 186-7.

Sumner Welles tried valiantly to design an international organization which incorporated Roosevelt's great power concepts while still retaining a universal character. Roosevelt, though, knew that a necessary condition for the establishment of a postwar security organization was the participation of Britain and Russia, and that to obtain it he would have to offer them a preeminent role along with the United States. Churchill and Stalin were consistently more concerned with their own regional security issues than with establishing a universal organization, which they correctly viewed as an American-designed instrument for projecting U.S. global power.¹⁵ Roosevelt therefore emphasized the regionalist aspect of embedding the Four Policemen into the international organization, with the British at Quebec and with Stalin at Tehran.¹⁶

The British continued to push the idea that some security functions should be delegated to regional councils, eventually resulting in the Chapter VIII provisions for regional agencies. These provisions also reflected the view of the U.S. planners, in spite of Cordell Hull's bias against basing collective security on regional councils, that regional organizations had at least a subordinate role to play in the international structure. But, as the preceding examination has shown, at no time were any concrete plans developed detailing how the functions of regional organizations were to be interconnected with those of the international

15. Kolko, *The Politics of War*, 275; Neil Smith, 377-9.

16. See above, pp. 76-7, 81-2.

organization.¹⁷ Thus the Security Council ultimately represented the confusion, contradiction, and ambiguity over regional versus universal goals and methods at the heart of the peace enforcement mechanism.

This ambiguity, when combined with postwar great power competition, ensured the eventual failure of the universal collective security system. The instrument which brought it down was Article 51, which resulted from the final powerful regionalist influence on United States policy, the hemispheric exceptionalism represented by the Monroe Doctrine. While projecting power globally in the postwar world, U.S. leaders, especially Congress and the military, were simultaneously determined not to give up the country's dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. In protecting this position in the face of Latin American concerns that the United States' attention to its global interests was compromising their own security, the Americans found themselves maneuvered into agreeing to the Act of Chapultepec.¹⁸ In turn to protect that agreement, and to answer British and Soviet indignation over the U.S. intention to carve out its own sphere of influence, a formula had to be found to coax all sides into supporting this

17. There were calls to clarify this relationship before the establishment of the international organization, especially from the Latin Americans. See above, Chapter 6.

18. See above, pp. 101-3. Ironically, the Latin Americans had themselves invoked the Monroe Doctrine in insisting on establishing a Western Hemisphere security system. While this may have helped the Americans to claim that the Act of Chapultepec had created a multilateral Monroe Doctrine, it also "astounded" the U.S. delegation in Mexico City, according to one of its members, Senator Warren R. Austin, since the Latin Americans had previously regarded the Monroe Doctrine "as a sort of club over their heads." *Congressional Record—Senate*, March 12, 1945, Vol. 91, Pt. 2, 79th Cong. 1st sess., p. 2026. However, as J. Tillapaugh has argued (see above, p. 99), the Latin Americans may have actually viewed a regional security organization as a weapon *against* the Monroe Doctrine.

further concession to regionalism.

Article 51 appeared to be a masterstroke of compromise at the time, but it contained the kernel which would grow into an unlimited number of regional security agencies operating outside of Security Council authority. However, this effect was unforeseen by its authors. They viewed this solution as a way, in Percy Corbett's words,¹⁹ to "canalize and discipline" regionalism, not as a way to promote it. Only later, when international tensions unforeseen at the time arose, would Article 51 become of prime importance in the onset of the Cold War.

In their commentary on Edward Stettinius' diaries, Thomas Campbell and George Herring wrote, "The high point of 'universalism' had occurred during the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Erosion set in thereafter, corresponding closely with the deterioration of relations among the wartime Allies."²⁰ Clearly, the American policy toward collective security cannot be separated from the postwar development of a bipolar global political world. However, at Dumbarton Oaks the regional concerns of the great powers, including those of the United States, were not adequately addressed. Those concerns were simply elided, and adequate mechanisms for incorporating regional issues into the international organization were never devised.

The lack of a solution for regional issues was itself one of the causes

19. See above, p. 1.

20. Campbell and Herring, 334.

of the failure of United Nations consensus-based security. When the universal system seemed unable to meet the security needs of the United States, the ability of American policy makers to rely on preexisting regionalist concepts such as the Grand Area, the Four Policemen, the example of the inter-American system, and a “global” Monroe Doctrine, further facilitated the abandonment of United Nations consensus-based security. Thus, in an increasing spiral of regionalism, the failure to handle regional issues helped expose weaknesses in the UN Security Council system, and the availability of existing, or adaptable, examples of regional policies resulted in their acceptance as an alternative.

Thomas Campbell has also argued that President Truman inherently favored more of a regional approach to postwar global strategy than his predecessor, and that as early as 1945 the new Truman administration was already considering the United Nations a “facade” which would reassure the American public that international peace was being safeguarded, all the while anticipating an Anglo-American bloc and a strategy of containment and confrontation with the Soviet Union.²¹ Others have maintained that such an outlook was arrived at only some time later.²²

There is no question, though, that by 1947 the policy of relying on the UN for collective security was being abandoned in favor of an “outside the veto”

21. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, 145-7, 155-8.

22. Cook, 10, states that Truman tried to make Roosevelt’s UN policy work until 1947. Others also claim that events in 1946 caused a shift in the administration’s position. Kolko and Kolko, *The Limits to Power*, 52-3; Woods and Jones, 98-128 *passim*.

strategy, demonstrated by the Rio Pact. Simultaneously, young State Department officials led by George Kennan were advising the Truman administration to take a harder official line with the Soviets.²³ The “containment” policy was, in essence, regionalism which borrowed heavily from the Grand Area plan, and it went hand-in-hand with North Atlantic Treaty-style collective security.

Robert Hilderbrand concluded his thorough study of the Dumbarton Oaks conference by stating, “At the heart of the new organization’s political difficulties lay the expansive postwar ambitions of the Great Powers themselves.” He attributes these ambitions to the fact that “traditional nationalism was replacing the prevention of the next war as the dominant force in postwar policy-making.”²⁴ This view assumes that national interest was not always the basis of postwar planning. In fact, the State Department’s first official committee formed to study issues of the postwar world did so “with primary reference to the best interests of the United States.”²⁵ American leaders, most of whom had seen two world wars, understood that none of their goals could be achieved if future wars were not prevented. They were still looking for the most effective method to

23. Although the impetus for a Western military alliance, which Kennan initially opposed, came from the Europeans. See above, pp. 127-9. As noted, Kennan favored economic aid over direct military assistance, and he also opposed an unlimited global commitment. Kennan led a committee whose report was the basis of the Marshall Plan. Woods and Jones, 146-7, 154-7; Kennan, 463.

24. Hilderbrand, 246.

25. See above, pp. 23-4.

prevent conflict, but by 1947 they no longer sought it through global consensus.

What undermined the United Nations collective security system was less nationalism, which was understood by the framers of the United Nations Charter, than regionalism, toward which they had shown an ambiguous attitude. Forces in favor of regionalism had, throughout the period of the war, caused the question of regionalism versus universalism in the Charter's design to be left unresolved. Equivalent forces in favor of regionalism, combined with the availability of existing or adaptable regional solutions, over the next four years caused the ultimate demise of the ideal of universalism. The inversion of the primary function of regional security organizations from intra-regional security to responsibility for external threats was the key step in the transition from a policy of universalism to one of regionalism.

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Abbreviations

CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
NA	National Archives
WPS	Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace (War and Peace Studies Project of the Council on Foreign Relations)

Collections

- U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md.
Records of the Department of State:
Record Group 59, Boxes 4, 43-94.
Record Group 353, State Department General Records, Box 1.
State Department Decimal File 500.CC, 501, 710 Conference W & PW,
710 Consultation, 711.0, 840.00, 840.20.
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