1990

Status generalization and hiring decisions

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San Jose State University, 1990

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STATUS GENERALIZATION AND HIRING DECISIONS

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Sociology

San Jose State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

By

Stanislaw Wojciech Sokolowski

May, 1990

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ABSTRACT

STATUS GENERALIZATION AND HIRING DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF GENDER STEREOTYPES IN EMPLOYEE HIRING PROCESS

By Stanislaw Wojciech Sokolowski

This thesis investigates the role of gender stereotypes in evaluating and hiring job applicants. To test the hypothesis that sex affects evaluators' expectations about applicants' qualifications, experimental subjects rated eight personal resumes and selected the best qualified candidate. Only applicants' experience and education but not sex had substantial main effects on the ratings. Experience had a greater effect than education. Differences also occurred between weights attached to female and male applicants' education, and between weights attached to education and experience by male and female raters. Raters' sex did not affect the selection of the best qualified candidate. Awarding the highest rating to an applicant was a good predictor of selecting that applicant as best qualified. Those who rated a female highest were more likely to stand behind their rating while selecting the best qualified candidates than those who rated a male highest. These findings suggest that gender has a discernible but smaller than initially thought role in hiring decisions.

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I. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS IN EMPLOYEE HIRING PROCESS

The "managerial revolution" in the post World War II economy created a management culture in which college degree became a necessary requisite of a professional manager. Whereas only 27 percent of the 284 presidents and chairmen of large corporations surveyed in 1900 were college graduates, today 94 percent of 850 CEOs surveyed by the Fortune magazine possesses at least a bachelor's degree (Useem, 1989).

The correlation between individual's education (schooling, training, and work experience) and his/her position in the industrial hierarchy has been well established in literature, but the exact nature of this relationship is yet to be satisfactorily explained (Bills, 1988). Although there is little doubt that education constitutes a necessary condition for employment in modern industry, the question remains whether it is a sufficient condition as well. Stated differently, it remains problematic whether:

- (a) individuals are appointed to positions within industrial hierarchy based exclusively on their education and experience; or
- (b) individuals are appointed to positions within industrial hierarchy based not only on their education

and experience, but on some other criteria such as personality, ethnicity, or sex¹⁾ as well.

Those writers who approach the problem from the classical economic theory perspective tend to accept the proposition (a) whereas those who, like Marxists, view the production process as an integral part of broader social relations tend to accept the proposition (b) (Gordon, 1972).

The fundamental assumption of the classical economic theory is that all actors in the economic process, business firms and individuals alike, are rational in that they strive to maximize their profits. Since profits result from the rational use of resources, capital and labor, the employers make their decisions to buy labor exclusively on the basis of the productive skills of the prospective employees. Based on this assumption, the human capital theory claims that education and training are "investments"

1. The distinction between "sex" and "gender" proposed by Unger (1979), and Powell (1987) is observed in this thesis when appropriate. The terms "sex" and "sex differences" refer to objective differences between men and women, whereas "gender" and "gender differences" refer to beliefs about how men and women differ. This distinction is particularly important when person's sex is treated as "high" and "low" status cues that indicate gender differences in expected performance or ability.

in developing one's productive skills to maximize income from one's employment (Becker, 1975; Benewitz & Zucker, 1971; Shultz, 1971a, 1971b; see also Wise, 1975; and Brown, 1982). An alternative approach views educational attainments as an indicator rather than a source of an individual's productive potential (Arrow, 1972; Berg, 1971; Dore, 1976; see also Wise, 1975).

A positive correlation between educational attainments and wage level is confirmed by the national census data (Miller, 1971). In a rudimentary sense, such a correlation is difficult, if not impossible, to question. One can reasonably expect a more qualified employee to occupy a better paid position than a less qualified one. When it comes to comparison of education and earning within the same or closely related occupational categories, however, various studies yield mixed results and little or no relationship is frequently reported (Wise, 1975).

An obvious methodological limitation of correlating education and wages is that statistical correlations, no matter how strong, give little insight as to the existence of causal connection between the phenomena in question, let alone the direction of such connection if it exists. Such correlation could be purely coincidental or the variables could be confounded. Houthakker (1971) suggests that the effect of education on income can be completely explicable in terms of intelligence and parents' income, and the

specific effect of education is non-existent²⁾. Arrow (1972) proposed a model in which educational system acts like a "filter" that does not increase productive skills,

2. Such a view is difficult to defend, unless we assume that intelligence and other personality traits associated with productivity are innate rather than learned. This conjecture has very little empirical support, however (for a discussion see Gould, 1981). Another methodological difficulty arises from the attempt to causally connect parent's and children's income. It is rather difficult to explain how parents' socioeconomic status is transferred onto children without being translated into better training and education (both formal and informal) that wealthy parents can afford. The only alternative would be to claim the existence of some sort of wide spread nepotism. Although nepotism and favoritism undoubtedly play role in some appointments, these practices are not only incompatible with formal policies and laws, but generally considered unethical. Thus, finding reliable empirical evidence to determine its role in labor market is extremely difficult, if not impossible. It appears that intelligence and education are confounded, to say the least. Given the difficulties associated with defining and measuring intelligence, educational level, which can be easily measured, is a more reliable indicator of productive skills.

but merely selects persons who are more productive in the first place. These models imply that there is no causal connection, in its traditional sense, between education and employment, and the former is merely confounded with the latter.

Another statistical flaw in many studies of correlation of employees' education and positions in the industrial hierarchy results from the fact that the applicants who were not hired are automatically excluded from the sample being studied. This results in a biased sample and renders the results obtained from that sample inconclusive. Brown (1982) conducted a study designed to overcome this limitation by including, in his sample, those applicants who were not selected for the job. He found that schooling apparently had little impact on the hiring decision, but work experience, measured as number of years in a supervisory position was strongly related to performance.

Schultz (1971b) acknowledges that factors other than education may play a significant role in individual's career, and investment in human capital will not always yield the expected returns. Specifically, returns from education of females and nonwhite urban males in the labor force are lower. Although Schultz attributes these differences primarily to the failure to invest in their health and education, he also admits that racial and religious discrimination may have been a factor in these

differences. To be sure, the acknowledgment of prejudice and employment discrimination does not undermine the human capital model, even if the role of discrimination were much more pronounced than Schultz wants to admit. The existence of discrimination can easily be accommodated to the human capital model as "given" (classical economic theory is based on what "is" and not, it is said, on what some may think "should be") or "external conditions" that determine different sets of choices available to different classes of individuals. Within his or her gender-determined range of choices, an individual can still choose an occupation to maximize his or her earnings. This explanation, although theoretically possible, would amount to treating certain individuals, such as women and ethnic minorities, as "second-class" citizens, and thus it is politically unacceptable³).

3. The issue here is not only a theoretical but a political one as well. Since the vast majority of people in industrialized countries derive their livelihood from employment, the labor market is, in fact, the testing ground of the legitimacy of political system purport to be a democracy - that everybody has an equal opportunity to achieve economic success proportional to one's skills and effort. Not surprisingly, those who have vested interests in defending the status quo are more inclined to accept the

The insensitivity of the classic economic theory to social conditions under which economic processes take place can be explained by the nature of its basic assumption: that all economic decisions are rational choices of rational decision makers. Rationality is defined as effectiveness in achieving maximum monetary rewards, and as such, it pertains to the means rather than to the ends. Behavior whose objective is different from profit maximization is considered "irrational" and thus excluded from further consideration. Such an approach, arbitrary as it may appear, is nonetheless valid, provided of course that the conclusions based on it are not applied to spheres of social relations that were excluded from it in the first place⁴).

egalitarian model of the labor market, whereas those interested in social change tend to question that model.

4. Economists are sometimes tempted to go beyond this limitation. Milton Friedman develops the notion of laissez-faire system and makes explicit claims that such system by itself is capable of solving various social problems (1962, pp.85-196). Friedman's reasoning apparently commits the petitio principii fallacy, for the conclusion - that free market, in which individuals act only to maximize their profits, can "guarantee" a discrimination - and compulsion - free society - is in fact the basic assumption that underlies the free market model, rather than a result of

Every social theory (economics is no exception) must inevitably make certain assumptions about the nature of human beings and their social organization; the point is, however, to make the most realistic ones. Although the assumption of rationality may well serve the purpose of providing guidelines for managing a business firm, it is poorly suited to explain the entire range of human motivation and behavior that determine all activities taking place within that firm. The conjecture that individuals will always act to maximize their own, let alone their employers', monetary gain is far from being self evident and requires an empirical proof. The fact that earnings are generally proportional to educational level can be explained, for certain practical and theoretical purposes, in terms of investment in and return from productive skills, but it does not give an assurance that everyone will get a return from his investment, or that everyone is willing to invest in the development of productive skills currently demanded by the market in the first place. In fact, the difficulty in physically separating human capital, that is

empirical observations of reality. In other words, the existence of rational, that is bias-free, economic activities is assumed to construct the laissez-faire model, and thus cannot be validly proven by the means of that model.

productive skills, from other aspects of human activities prompted many classic economists to raise serious reservations about the usefulness of that concept, or even to reject it altogether (Kiker, 1971). In order to make the human capital model truly applicable to real life situations, other variables affecting human behavior, besides rational motives, must be included in that model⁵⁾.

The task at hand has more than purely theoretical significance. The view that education is a sufficient condition for obtaining employment commensurate with individual's productive skills forms a theoretical

5. This of course does not imply that economy is treated as logically dependent on or reducible to psychology or sociology, just as the latter cannot be reduced to, say, chemistry or physics on the assumption that humans are composed of proteins and have certain mass. On the other hand, there is a shared general "consistency of views" among sciences. When a physicist says that it is impossible to defy the law of gravity, a psychologist would call a "hallucination" (that is "false perception") when one experiences that one's body can levitate. Analogously, when a classic economist proposes a model that is built on a single assumption of rationality in human behavior, his model, although not necessarily false, may be too simplistic to adequately explain and predict the real-life phenomena.

foundation for social policy and government welfare and employment programs (such as CETA, GAIN, or JOBS). This political dimension of the human capital theory has been consciously advanced by its proponents (Schultz, 1971a, 1971b) and criticized by the opponents (Shaffer, 1971). For example, Bovard (1989), while implicitly accepting the basic tenets of human capital theory, attacks government programs for not teaching proper productive skills and blames these programs for high unemployment rates among socially disadvantaged groups. Although the logic of Bovard's arguments is not convincing⁶), the question raised by his

6. Bovard claims that "[f]or twenty five years, government programs have warped work ethics, helped disillusion generations of disadvantages youth, and deluged America with fraudulent statistics" (1989, p.57). He falls short, however, of substantiating these rather strong allegations. His evidence is mostly anecdotal. He nonetheless draws a rather dramatic conclusion that "unemployed rates have soared among groups targeted by government programs" (1989, p.62). Given the context of this assertion, the reader is supposed to believe that government training programs rather than discriminatory policies or the economic system itself are to be blamed for that.

Although the problem of unemployment lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that involuntary

article is a legitimate one: is education provided by federal programs a "bad investment" in "unproductive" human capital, or perhaps there is some other reason, such as employment discrimination, for the disproportionately high unemployment rate among certain classes of individuals?

Those who view the process of production of material goods as an integral part of a larger social structure claim that actors in the economic process strive not only to maximize their pecuniary profits, but to preserve their privileged position within the social structure (Galbraith, 1985; Gordon, 1972; Hartmann, 1976, 1979; Nash, 1983). Decision makers, businesses and individuals alike, may also strive to implement a managerial model giving them maximum control over the production process (Braverman, 1974), long-term market stability (Galbraith, 1985), or other non-monetary benefits, such as job stability, promotion opportunity, autonomy, authority, hazards, and organizational settings (Jencks, Perman & Rainwater, 1988).

Empirical studies of inner city labor markets in large urban areas indicate that characteristics conventionally associated with productive skills - like educational level

unemployment exists in both developed and underdeveloped economies even under perfectly competitive conditions and is a function of that market's equilibrium rather than the skills and work habits of the employees (Malcolmson, 1981).

and vocational training - had little influence on the employment prospects of large numbers of urban employees. In many instances, Black applicants who were rejected for jobs seemed nominally as qualified as White applicants who were hired (Gordon, 1972). Green (1983) and Keller (1983) report almost total absence of Anglo-American males from all but skilled and white-collar jobs in the Silicon Valley electronic industry. The low paying, tedious manual jobs (electronic assembler) are occupied predominantly by women and minorities (mostly Asians and Mexicans)⁷). This

7. Segregation of the Silicon Valley's job market cannot be explained only in terms of discriminatory hiring policies, but, as Green (1986) and Hartmann (1976) suggest, should be viewed in a large social context that shaped class structure and the economic market place. Thus, the conspicuous absence of Hispanics from the Silicon Valley's "managerial class" (they constitute only 6 percent of the incumbents of executive and administrative positions) can be explained by the low percentage of Hispanic college graduates, but the latter phenomenon itself requires an explanation.

Hispanics form the largest ethnic minority in Santa Clara County (17.5 percent of the population), but only 8 percent of the Hispanic population have attended a four-year college, as compared to 25 percent of college graduates in the county population at large (ABAG, 1987, 1989). A simple

segregation is attributed to the effects of international competition with the cheap labor in the Third-World countries. Gender segregation is also discernible in higher levels of industrial hierarchy. Although between 1970 and 1986 the percentage of women holding executive positions increased from 15.9 to 36.9 percent, gender is still a serious obstacle in breaking into senior management (Powell, 1987).

Although labor participation of women in Silicon Valley is 7 percent greater than the national average (ABAG, 1989), the segregation of labor market is clearly discernible. A recent survey⁸⁾ of the Santa Clara County residents indicate

Bayesian analysis leads to a conclusion that the probability that a managerial position incumbent is a Hispanic college graduate is about 6 percent.

However, treating the low percentage of Hispanic college graduates as "given" amounts to giving up any meaningful sociological explanation of this phenomenon. Only a thorough analysis of historical conditions and socio-economic forces affecting the status of the Hispanic population and having impact on their family structure, social mobility, schooling, etc. can provide a valid explanation of the statistical contingencies in question.

8. The 1988 Presidential Election Survey conducted by Geoffrey Tootell, Sociology Department, San Jose State

that men dominate engineering positions whereas women cluster in secretarial and clerical occupations. On the other hand, the data also reveal equal participation of both sexes in managerial/administrative occupations. Only 6.5 percent of all female respondents were housewives and .5 percent unemployed, as compared to 28.9 percent employed on clerical and 15.4 percent on "caring" positions (nurses, social workers, counselors, and teachers). As for the male respondents, only 1.3 percent were unemployed, 25.5 percent held engineering positions, and 20.3 percent - technical positions. Of all respondents holding clerical positions, 93.5 percent were women. In contrast, 81.3 percent of all respondents holding engineering jobs were men. Men constituted 56.4 percent of all technical positions and 50.0 percent of all managerial-administrative positions reported.

The clustering of women and minorities in subordinate and menial jobs, observed in empirical studies of the labor market, led to the development of the segmented (called also dual) labor market model (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Gordon, 1972) which claims that the American labor market consists

University (unpublished) surveyed 381 randomly selected registered voters in Santa Clara County. Since the prediction of the election result based on the sample was accurate within a 3-percent range, the sample can be considered fairly representative.

of two separate and distinct sectors. The primary sector, dominated by white males, is characterized by high wages, good working conditions, employment stability and ample opportunity for upward mobility. The secondary sector offering less attractive, low-paying jobs with no or little job security and advancement opportunities is dominated by ethnic minorities and women.

Differences between men's and women's careers have been explained by a variety of social and economic factors ranging from gender stereotypes (both applicant's aspirations and expectations and recruiter's beliefs about applicant's interests and abilities), to organizational and legal barriers to employment, social roles and responsibilities, to job opportunities and to composition of pool of job incumbents (Powell, 1987). Hartmann (1976, 1979) claims that job segregation by sex is a legacy of patriarchal social relations characteristic of feudalism. In her polemic with the Marxist claim that the development of capitalism eliminated social stratification created by earlier modes of production, she argues that this stratification was transferred to industrial relations in order to cut labor costs and control the labor force⁹).

9. To be exact, Marx did admit that "within capitalist production there are always certain parts of the productive process that are carried out in a way typical of earlier

Rubery (1978) reaches similar conclusions by analyzing the historical development of labor relations in the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

Despite the fact that labor market models based on classical and Marxian economic theories are often presented as competing paradigms (Gordon, 1972), they are not contradictory, unless one accepts a rather radical view that the profit motive actually excludes all other human motives from the market (Friedman, 1962). These two models can be easily reconciled by (a) including long-term gains, control of the market, economic stability, and personal benefits into the definition of profit, and (b) distinguishing between "objective" and "subjective" rationality of economic decision makers. Thus, a person motivated exclusively by monetary gain may subjectively assess certain measures as profitable even though they are not such in an objective sense. For example, a labor-cost conscious manager may

modes of production, in which relations of capital and wage labour did not yet exist" (1977, p. 1042), but he considered such processes as anomalies. It appears that the major intent of Hartmann's argument is opposition to "economic determinism" within Marxism and acknowledgement that economic processes are also influenced by the superstructure (social - political relations). In this respect it is generally consistent with the purpose of this thesis.

avoid hiring women because he mistakenly believes that their productive skills are low and work habits undesirable (Gordon, 1972).

The objective of this study is to examine whether and to what degree gender stereotypes affect the decision to hire a job applicant. The following hypothesis is proposed: social status (gender) of the applicant affects the employer's expectations about that applicant's job skills and abilities, and thus has an effect on the hiring decision.

II. APPLICABILITY OF STATUS GENERALIZATION THEORY TO LABOR MARKET RELATIONS

The essential element of the hiring process is to evaluate whether or not the applicants have the qualifications that are required to successfully perform job duties. Since the appointing officers typically do not have an immediate and direct way to assess the actual skills of any given applicant, they have to make judgments based on cues, either deliberately presented or "given off" by the applicant.

The status generalization theory (Berger, Rosenholtz & Zelditch, 1986; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway & Rosenholtz, 1986; Webster & Driskell, 1978) explains how different expectations are formed based on different kinds of cues. In a social interaction situation the actors determine the important features of that interaction (such is their attitudes and behavior toward other actors) based on the perceived status of each actor. In particular, people look for indicators of occupational prestige, educational level, community importance etc., which they organize into that person's status. The status, in turn, create certain expectations as to that person's abilities to perform tasks at hand. The whole process can be schematically depicted as follows:

STATUS CUES => STATUS => EXPECTED ABILITY => BEHAVIOR

The observable status cues, which can be any physical characteristics that differentiate between people, lead the observer to ascribing the observed individual into a particular category of people. The membership in that category is associated with a particular level of skills and abilities that the incumbents are believed to possess. Stated differently, by "ascribing" to an individual a given status category, a particular expectation state as to her/his skills and abilities is developed. The relationship thus described is causal: changes in the status cue composition of an individual produces different expectation states and, consequently, different behavior of and toward this individual (Berger et al., 1986). In other words, the expectation state determines the interaction between two individuals, provided of course that the status formation is a mutual process, and both individuals share the same norms and values which allow the same interpretation of same cues.

The causal relationship claimed by the status generalization theory can be defended only on the assumption that the cognitive process leading to the formation of expectation states is always sequential and proceeding from "raw" empirical observations to general ideas. This assumption has been extensively criticized in philosophical literature as empirically unwarranted.

An alternative view treats cognition as apperception - a process of organizing empirical cues by a priori

perceptual structures or categories (in the Kantian sense). Expectation states can be thus interpreted as such structures. People enter any interaction with an a priori notion of social ranks which organize their perception of empirical cues (such as perceived differences between people). From this point of view, social statuses, status cues, and expectation states are merely different aspects of human perception of social reality rather than independently existing phenomena. The advantage of this interpretation over the causal argument is bypassing the "chicken-and-egg" pitfall of causation, an example of which is the discussion whether expectation states are caused by behavioral cues or vice versa (Lee & Ofshe, 1981; Berger & Zelditch, 1983).

The situation in which the status generalization takes place must meet three scope conditions: task orientation, group orientation, and power-prestige order of the group.

"First, we deal only with groups engaged in tasks, i.e., actions in which there is (a) a goal, (b) some idea of the difference between success and failure in achieving the goal, and (c) some idea that the contributions of group members affect success and failure in achieving it. Second, we deal only with groups, i.e., sets of two or more individuals who think of themselves as jointly responsible for the outcome on who are therefore oriented toward a collective decision. Third, we study primarily the power-prestige order of the group, and order that includes only the task-related activities of the members: (a) the opportunities given to members to perform (e.g., by being asked questions, or simply by being looked at); (b) the performance-outputs of the members (such as opinions, suggestions, or information relevant to the task); (c) the evaluations of these performance outputs

communicated by the members; and (d) influence, i.e., resolution of disagreements in the favor of one rather than another member's view" (Berger et al. 1980, p.9).

The status generalization theory further asserts that when a diffuse status characteristic differentiates members of a group, the cultural expectations associated with that characteristic are activated. Thus, characteristics denoting social status become the basis of the expectations the members form for both their own and their partners' performance at the group task, even when these characteristics are not explicitly relevant to the task at hand. The expectations are accepted without a proof, that is, the bearer of high status cues does not have to prove that s/he does have the ability to perform the task at hand because such an ability is automatically ascribed to her/him (the so-called burden of proof principle). In the same vein, it is also assumed that a low status person has a relatively lesser ability to perform the task. It is possible, however, that both high and low expectation states associated with certain people are disproved by experience, but the process of disproving expectation states is rather difficult, for people are reluctant to change the stereotypes they hold about their fellow human beings (Berger et al., 1980, 1986).

In the earlier versions of the theory (e.g., Webster & Driskell, 1978; Berger et al., 1980), two types of status

characteristics were typically identified: diffuse (labeled D) such as ethnicity, sex, or age, and specific (labeled C), examples of which are occupation, skills, or training. Both D and C status cues lead to the development of expectation states. Later versions of the theory (Berger et al. 1986), however, provide a refined classification of status cues based on two dimensions: EXPRESSIVE (cues "given off" during interaction) v. INDICATIVE (deliberately presented and explicit labels), and TASK (providing information about performance) v. CATEGORICAL (providing information as to what group or category the actors belong). The resultant fourfold classification encompasses the following types of cues:

TASK-INDICATIVE - statements about one's ability to perform the task at hand (e.g., "I have experience with this type of problem.")

CATEGORICAL-INDICATIVE - cues indicating one's general ability and/or education (e.g., "I have a Ph.D.")

TASK-EXPRESSIVE - cues expressing one's confidence (e.g., eye contact, speech speed and fluency, posture, etc.)

CATEGORICAL-EXPRESSIVE - cues that are specific for a particular category of people (e.g., skin color, sex, etc.)

The last category is essentially identical with diffuse status cues, whereas categories Task-Indicative and Categorical-Indicative cues are identical with specific status cues. Task-Expressive cues are generally

"behavioral" or "demeanor" cues. This category of cues was added after a debate with Lee and Ofshe (1981) who claimed that the person's behavior, can produce similar perception of that person's ability and competence as diffuse and specific status cues.

In order to apply the status generalization theory to the hiring process, we must first determine whether the latter meets the scope conditions of the former. Although it is immediately apparent that the hiring process is task-oriented (there is a definite task to be performed, and a definite outcome is expected), the second scope condition, collective orientation, requires some explanation.

It is possible to distinguish two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, types of collective orientation: that of actors directly involved in the interaction, used for example in the Webster and Driskell (1978) experiment, and that of a relatively neutral observer/evaluator observing but not directly participating in the interaction, used in the Lee and Ofshe (1981) experimental design. The first type creates a much greater potential for interference from subject's "ego defense mechanisms" than the second one. Being confronted by a partner whose judgments directly contradict those of his own, the subject is likely to activate, at a certain point, defensive face-saving techniques which may substantially alter the initial perception of the status characteristics and/or their

relative weights. To alleviate this problem a runs test of randomness should have been conducted to detect possible patterns in the distribution of decisions.

In the second type of interaction, such interference is less likely to occur because the observer/evaluator focuses primarily on evaluating other participants against each other, and only then comparing their judgments with his own.

Webster and Driskell (1978) used an experimental design in which the subjects performed, in a team, 23 evaluative tasks. After they entered their answers, in 20 (out of 23) cases they were presented with a different choice made by their team-mate. The dependent variable was the frequency of times the subjects made the same final as the initial choice $P(s)$: the higher the $P(s)$ value, the lower the influence $(1 - P(s))$.

Although Webster and Driskell interpreted the obtained ordering of three experimental conditions as evidence for the combination rather than elimination hypothesis, their scores describe aggregates (the sum of all 23 decisions), whereas combination vs. elimination is an individual decision. Thus, their experiment does not rule out the possibility that only elimination or both elimination and combination actually take place in individual instances of making decisions. The experimenters implicitly assumed that the subjects formed their expectations about their team-mates at the beginning of the experiments, and these

expectations affected their uniformly throughout the experiment. In other words, they assume that the instances of changing the initial decision occurred in a random order throughout the session.

It is worth noting, however, that exactly the same aggregate results would have been obtained if the instances of changes formed some specific pattern, e.g., all occurred sequentially at the very beginning or very end of each session. This hypothetical, but not detected (and thus not ruled out) by the Webster and Driskell's design, ordering of individual decisions has a significant bearing on the interpretation of the results. One can hypothesize, for example, that in the initial trials the subjects based their expectation about their partners' task-related ability exclusively on their test scores and disregarded (eliminated) their ethnicity, whereas in the remaining trials they based their expectations based exclusively on the partners' ethnicity, disregarding the test scores.

Why did this shift occur? One can hypothesize that since the decision, from the subjects' view point, was "my choice vs. somebody else's choice," the subjects had stakes in that decision (e.g., saving their own face or ego). In the initial phase of the session they might have been more "reasonable" and "task-oriented" and made a decision that, given the circumstances, appeared to be the most purpose-rational. However, facing repeated contradiction of their

own initial choice, their initial or task-orientation might have been replaced by a desire to have "one's way" and "save one's face." Consequently, dormant racial stereotypes might have emerged and swayed the subject's initial evaluation of the partner's ability.

Job applicant evaluation is a situation in which either one or both types of collective orientation may occur. When evaluation is done by a panel, the orientation among panel members is of the first type, and orientation between each panel member and the applicant is of the second type. When evaluation is done by a single officer, however, only the second type of collective orientation is salient. As to the applicants, their collective orientation is effected through competition. Although applicants usually do not interact face-to-face with their competitors, they assume their existence as a matter of common-sense knowledge, and this knowledge affects their performance (everybody acts to "outdo" others).

In the light of the foregoing discussion it is clear that status differences between the applicant and the rater may influence the evaluation. Such influence is likely to be offset by the rater's clearly superior power defined by institutional framework in which the evaluation takes place. This is especially true in situations in which interaction within institutions is determined largely by Weberian legal - rational authority. It is possible, however, that when

the traditional forms of authority have deep roots (Hartmann, 1976), the roles and norms may affect or even override rater's legal - rational authority defined by her/his position within the organization. Thus, the possibility of influence from "traditional" gender differences between raters and applicants must be tested empirically.

The foregoing discussion raises the issue of the significance of institutional framework to the status generalization and expectation states formation processes. Far from being a "neutral backdrop" of social processes, the institution both formally (through explicit rules and regulations) and informally (through implicitly "given off" values, norms and attitudes) determine the shape and content of that interaction. Useem found that actions and attitudes of the top management have a decisive bearing on a wide range of corporate characteristics, including recruitment and hiring policies. The chief executive has a direct impact on the recruitment policies, and "an indirect effect as well by setting a tenor for the organization... if the chief executive has publicly advocated [a certain hiring policy], the probability is increased by a factor of 3 to 10 that his senior managers have made the same public advocacy" (1989, pp.42-43).

Useem's findings can be easily reconciled with the status generalization theory. Since expectation states are

not invariable properties of the actors, but arise from social interaction between them, it follows that institutional framework is a powerful determinant of the status generalization and expectation state formation processes. It furthermore follows that generalizability of the results of experiments assessing the expectation state formation processes is contingent on two factors - selection of the experimental subjects and type of institution conducting the experiment. This problem will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapter.

III. MEASUREMENT OF STATUS CUE INFLUENCE IN HIRING PROCESS: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES.

The hiring process consists essentially of three stages: the evaluation of applications, job interviews, and the final selection of the best qualified candidate. All subsequent information on hiring procedures and types of job resumes were obtained from the following sources: seminars at the Monterey chapter of the PRO-FILE Job Club sponsored by the California Employment Development Department, and "Placement Manual," San Jose State University, Career Planning and Placement, Spring 1989.

This study focuses on the initial stage of that process - evaluation of job applications or resumes. There are essentially three types of resumes: chronological (frequently considered outdated), functional, and targeted. The chronological resume, as its name indicates, presents all pertinent information about the candidate in a chronological order. The functional resume presents that information organized by fields of expertise, whereas the targeted (or functional-targeted) resume is a functional resume which contains only information that is related to the job for which the person is applying.

The targeted job resume is a highly structured document that essentially contains three types of information: a candidate's education (categorical-indicative status cue),

experience (task-indicative status cue) and name ("giving off" the candidate's sex, that is categorical-expressive status cue). For that reason it can be easily used in a rigorously controlled experimental situation without the risk of creating an unnatural setting that threatens the generalizability of the results. The possible influence from other status cues (e.g., candidate's race, physical attractiveness, or age) can be efficiently and unobtrusively eliminated. The purpose of this experiment was to assess simple and joint effects of various status cues presented in job applications on the evaluation of the applicant's "hireability" for the job (i.e., her/his expected productive skills and abilities). Its design is based on the single-evaluator model, so its collective orientation is of the second rather than the first type (see discussion on collective orientation in the preceding chapter).

There are three types of status cues normally presented in a resume: the applicant's work experience (task-indicative), education (categorical-indicative), and sex (categorical-expressive). In this study, each of these status cues had two values, "high" and "low": managerial job-related experience (EX+) vs. lack of such experience (EX-), B.A. degree in business administration (ED+) vs. lack of such degree (ED-), and male (M) vs. female (F) respectively. The experimental design was based on the

combination of these status cues. There were eight experimental within-subject conditions:

1. M ED+ EX+	2. F ED+ EX+
3. M ED- EX+	4. F ED- EX+
5. M ED+ EX-	6. F ED+ EX-
7. M ED- EX-	8. F ED- EX-

These eight conditions were repeatedly presented to the subjects in the form of personal resumes of people applying for the job described as a managerial position with a strong potential for advancement.

The subjects were given a folder containing eight job resumes. They were instructed to evaluate each applicant in the following aspects: the overall professional impression created in each application, each applicant's qualifications to perform the job for which he/she is applying, and the likelihood that the subject would hire each candidate for that particular job.

The procedure was controlled by a specially designed computer program. The subjects followed instructions that appeared on the screen in order to enter their responses. Before they started working on the actual task, they had a chance to practice entering their answers and working with the computer.

Evaluations were performed in the following manner. The program displayed a highlighted name of a candidate and the question "How professional do you think this applicant

is?" Each subject had to find an appropriate application in the folder and make an evaluation. In the lower part of the screen a ruler ranging from 1 to 100 was displayed, and the cursor was positioned in the middle of that scale, under the mark "50." The left hand end of the scale was labeled "not at all professional," and the right hand end was labeled "highly professional." The subjects entered their answers by positioning the cursor under a desired value (instructions how to move the cursor and enter the answers were permanently displayed on the screen).

After the answer was entered, the program asked to confirm it, and then the next question about the same applicant was displayed - "How competent for the job do you think this applicant is?". The left hand end of the scale was labeled "not at all competent," and the right end had the label "highly competent." After an answer to this question was entered and confirmed, the third question was displayed - "What is the likelihood that you would hire this applicant?" The labels on the scale were, respectively, "very unlikely" and "very likely." Identical sets of procedures were repeated for each applicant.

The sequence in which names of applicants appeared on the screen was random in order to reduce possible systematic influence of initial evaluations on the subsequent ones. In order to increase independence of each measurement from one

another, the subjects could not record, review or alter their previous answers.

After the evaluation of all applicants had been completed, the subjects were instructed to select an applicant whom they saw as the best qualified for the job, and type her/his full name on the keyboard. To maximize independence of this measure from the previous measurements, the subjects were not informed about the nature of this task before they had completed evaluating all applications.

Information was also collected about each subject's age, sex, education, and managerial work experience. Questions regarding subjects' age, sex and education were straightforward. Managerial work experience was conceptualized as the respondent's formal authority (Do you give orders of various kinds? Are you able to impose sanctions on your subordinates on your job?), his/her participation in decision-making (Do you directly participate in making decisions on your job?), and the subject's independence and autonomy on the job (Are you able to design broad aspects of your job? Do you engage in non-routine problem solving on a regular basis on your job? Do you put your ideas into practice in a regular and pervasive way on your job). The "high" value was assigned to those respondents who answered "Yes" to all three questions referring to authority and decision making, and to at least one question regarding his/her autonomy.

The applications, job description, instructions to the subjects, and a sample screen printout can be found in Appendix 1.

Rating scales ranging from 1 to 100 are commonly used for various evaluations, ranging from job applicant evaluation procedures in the industry and civil service to test scores and to percentages, and thus they are easy to interpret intuitively. Moreover, such scales can be treated as an interval measure, for the level of measurement depends on the ambiguity of scale rather than the volatility of the measured object. For example, distance that is typically measured at the ratio level, can also be measured at the ordinal level by the Likert scale employing such subjective categories as: Very Long, Long, Medium, Short, Very Short. Conversely, "subjective" evaluations or impressions can be measured at the interval level if the same yardstick, in this case a scale displayed on the computer screen, is used.

An interval scale by definition requires that distance between the scale's markings must be equidistant. Although the "markings" on the Likert scale are not necessarily equidistant because categories corresponding to each marking are not clearly defined (for that matter, categories Very Short, Short, Medium etc. are ambiguous and thus not equidistant as well), but they are equidistant on a scale whose markings are defined by consecutive integers. Thus a marking defined as "3" on such a scale is not defined as

"very likely," "interesting," "strongly oppose" and the like, but as mere "3 units," just as the marking "3" on a measuring tape means nothing but "3 centimeters."

The fact that people interpret markings on a scale by endowing it with some psychological meaning has nothing to do with the scale itself. People often do the same with the measuring tape, so "3" could mean "closer" to someone used to the metric scale, but "farther apart" another one used to the U.S. measurement units (e.g., 3 inches is over twice as long as 3 centimeters). It would be absurd, however, to argue that the measuring tape is not a ratio measure because the units are not "psychologically equidistant."

Low reliability of the measurement may result either from the ambiguity of the scale itself or from the volatile and changing nature of the measured phenomenon. Measurements of the length of a rubber band are unreliable because of the extensibility of the measured object and not because the ruler used for the measurement is not a ratio measure. Thus, that results of repeated measurements significantly vary does not automatically mean that the scale used is not interval or ratio.

The three scales used in this design, however, are not conceptually independent, especially that perceived Competence is likely to heavily influence ratings on the two other scales - Professional Impression and Likelihood of Hiring. Although using a single scale, Competence, would

have been sufficient from the standpoint of status generalization theory, the reason behind using three different but related scales is that managers sometimes give "unprofessional appearance" (whatever that is) as an excuse to disqualify otherwise competent applicants. Whereas the notion of "Competence" is relatively specific and well defined, "Professional Impression" is broad and vague. So if the "Likelihood of Hiring" rating reflects the evaluator's intent to hire an applicant which cannot be justified by his or her qualifications (e.g., the "Likelihood of Hiring" is low despite an applicant's qualifications or unjustifiably high despite his/her lack of qualifications), the evaluator may want to rationalize his/her decision by inflating or deflating that applicant "Professional Impression" score accordingly. Consequently, an inspection of correlations between the three measurement may give some clues as to possible gender bias in the ratings.

The possible influence of the factors that are unrelated to an applicant's competence level might take one of the following forms: (a) all applicants are "hired" based on the professional impression they create rather than their competence, (b) female applicants are hired based on the professional impression (i.e., "unprofessional impression" is used as an excuse to rate the females lower than the males on the Likelihood of Hiring scale), and (c) male

applicants are hired based on the professional impression (i.e., "professional impression is used as an excuse to rate the males higher than the females on the Likelihood of Hiring). Consequently, one of the following patterns would emerge: (a) the ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated with the Professional Impression than with the Competence scales, (b) ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated with ratings on the Professional Impression scale for the females than for the males, and (c) ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated for the males than for the females.

In addition to the three metric measures described above, one categorical dependent variable was used - selecting the best qualified applicant. Although theoretically each of the eight applicants could have been selected as best qualified, only two and possibly four applicants could be considered as serious choices: M ED+ EX+, F ED+ EX+, and possibly M ED- EX+, and F ED+ EX-. The reason for including the ED- EX+, but not the ED+ EX-, applicants among the potential best qualified candidates is the frequently reported finding that schooling has little effect on hiring decisions (Brown, 1982; Wise, 1975; Houthakker, 1971). By contrast, work experience is frequently reported as having significant impact on hiring and promotions (Brown, 1982; Bills, 1988; Useem, 1989). In

the light of these reports, it is unlikely that applicants without any managerial experience would be seriously considered for a position that specifically asks for such experience. However, the job description used in the experiment did not list a college degree among the required qualifications, so the applicants with some college background and managerial experience could be considered as having qualifications comparable to those holding a four-year degree.

The subjects were volunteers recruited from the SJSU student body. Of the total 139 subjects who participated in the study, 77 (55.4 %) were females and 62 (44.6 %) were males; 116 (83.5 %) were 23 years of age or younger, 16 (11.5 %) between 24 and 30 years of age, and the remaining 7 (5 %) - over 30 years of age.

The rationale behind these definitions of age category boundaries was that 23 years is the age at or before which most undergraduate student receive their degrees. Consequently, those who are 24 or older are likely to be "returning students," that is people who discontinued their education for some time and then decided to complete it. Stated differently, these age categories include classes of people that might be substantively different, which is not the case if an arbitrary but aesthetically pleasing (e.g., 10-year increments) criterion is used to measure age.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION.

The following hypothesis, derived from the status generalization theory, was tested: gender affects evaluation of applicants' skills and his/her selection for the job. Specifically, it was hypothesized that (a) males are more likely to be selected as best qualified candidates than females, (b) the sex of the best qualified candidate selected for the job is affected by the raters' sex, (c) there are significant non-zero differences between the ratings of the female and male applicants, and (d) the differences between ratings of male and female applicants are affected by the status characteristic of the rater.

Table 1 below presents the frequency distribution of all candidates selected. A cursory glance at that table reveals that the hypotheses that male applicants are more likely to be selected as best qualified candidates is not supported by the data. The most frequently selected candidate was the ED+ EX+ female. A female applicant was selected as the best qualified candidate by 80 subjects, that is by 57.5% of the total sample. As expected, the ED+ EX+ applicants were selected most often, in 79.9% cases. However, 20 subjects (14.4% of the sample) selected the ED- EX+ applicants. By contrast, the ED+ EX- applicants were selected by only 3 subjects (2.1% of the sample).

**TABLE 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE
BEST QUALIFIED APPLICANTS SELECTED**

	COUNT	PCTG .
SELECTED AS BEST QUALIFIED		.
1. M ED+ EX+	44	31.7%
2. F ED+ EX+	67	48.2%
3. M ED- EX+	10	7.2%
4. F ED- EX+	10	7.2%
5. M ED+ EX-	1	.7%
6. F ED+ EX-	2	1.4%
7. M ED- EX-	4	2.9%
8. F ED- EX-	1	.7%
N = 139		

This frequency distribution does not support the claim that the applicants' gender has a discernible influence on being selected as the best qualified candidate. It does suggest, however, the importance of both education and experience as a selection criterion. When each of these two factors is considered alone (i.e. B.A. degree but no managerial experience, and managerial experience but no B.A. degree), some raters seem to disregard education and make their selection based only on applicants' managerial experience. Indeed, two subjects reported during the postsession interview that they disregarded education in their ratings (see Appendix 2).

Three subjects (2.1% percent of the sample) selected the ED+ EX- candidates, and five subjects (3.6% of the sample) selected the least qualified, that is ED- EX-,

applicants. These selections are probably a result of peculiarities in raters' hierarchy of values. One rater, for example, reported that she gave preference to the applicant with civil service background (who happened to be the ED+ EX- female).

In order to test the hypothesis that the effect of the status characteristics of the rater on the selection of the best qualified candidate of a particular sex for the job was tested by analyzing frequency counts in contingency tables designed to measure the correlation between each of the three variables defining the rater's status, managerial work experience, age, and sex, and the best qualified candidates selected.

Table 2 below presents the frequency distribution of best applicants selected by the rater's sex. A chi-square test failed to detect any significant correlation between these two variables. Since the number of cells with the expected frequency less than five was high (10 of 16 or 62%), attempts were made to collapse categories in order to reduce the number of such cells. These efforts failed to bring the significance level of the chi-square test closer to the .05 level, and it was concluded that the data do not support the hypothesis that raters' sex has a significant effect on the selection of the best qualified applicant.

**TABLE 2: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF
BEST APPLICANTS SELECTED BY EVALUATORS' SEX**

APPLICANT SELECTED	EVALUATOR'S SEX	
	FEMALE	MALE
1. M ED+ EX+	22	22
Column pctg	28.6%	35.5%
Row pctg	50.0%	50.0%
2. F ED+ EX+	41	26
Column pctg	53.2%	41.9%
Row pctg	61.2%	38.8%
3. M ED- EX+	5	5
Column pctg	6.5%	8.1%
Row pctg	50.0%	50.0%
4. F ED- EX+	6	4
Column pctg	7.8%	6.5%
Row pctg	60.0%	40.0%
5. M ED+ EX-	0	1
Column pctg	0.0%	1.6%
Row pctg	0.0%	100.0%
6. F ED+ EX-	2	0
Column pctg	2.6%	0.0%
Row pctg	100.0%	0.0%
7. M ED- EX-	1	3
Column pctg	1.3%	4.8%
Row pctg	25.0%	75.0%
8. F ED- EX-	0	1
Column pctg	0.0%	1.6%
Row pctg	0.0%	100.0%
N = 139		

Similar tests were conducted for other characteristics describing raters' status: managerial work experience and age. The first test did not yield any significant results.

The frequency distribution of the best qualified applicants selected by raters' age are displayed in Table 3.

TABLE 3: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF BEST QUALIFIED APPLICANTS SELECTED BY RATERS' AGE

		BEST QUALIFIED APPLICANT SELECTED	
		FEMALE	MALE
EVALUATOR'S AGE			
23/YOUNGER		71	45
Column	pctg	88.8%	76.3%
Row	pctg	61.2%	38.8%
24/OLDER		9	14
Column	pctg	11.3%	23.7%
Row	pctg	39.1%	60.9%

The categories were collapsed in order to reduce the high number of cells with the expected frequency less than five. The chi-square test results were $\chi^2 (1, N=139) = 3.83$, $p < .05$ before the Yates correction, and $\chi^2 (1, N=139) = 2.98$, $p < .08$ after the Yates correction. Even though the Yates correction for continuity does not necessarily yield more accurate p values (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984), the uncorrected significance level was borderline. Moreover, the number of subjects in the "24/OLDER" category was much smaller than in the "23/YOUNGER" category. Consequently, it was concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that raters' age has an impact on selecting an applicant.

Before presenting the results of testing the hypotheses that there are non-zero significant differences between ratings of the male and female applicants, and that these differences are affected by the sex of the raters, a closer look at the scales used to measure these differences should be considered.

Based on the author's observations that women are often perceived as less likely to be hired for managerial positions, it was hypothesized that the possible influence of the factors not related to an applicant's competence might take one of the following forms:

- (a) the ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated with the Professional Impression than with the Competence scales, indicating that all applicants are hired based on the professional impression they create rather than their competence;
- (b) ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated with ratings on the Professional Impression scale for the females than for the males; this suggests that female applicants are hired based on the professional impression (i.e., "unprofessional impression" is used as an excuse to rate the females lower than the males on the Likelihood of Hiring scale); and
- (c) ratings on the Likelihood of Hiring scale would be more closely correlated for the males than for the females, suggesting that male applicants are hired based on the

professional impression (i.e., "professional impression is used as an excuse to rate the males higher than the females on the Likelihood of Hiring).

Table 4 displays the Pearson product-moment correlations for the ratings on all the three scales per condition.

**TABLE 4: PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS
BETWEEN APPLICANTS RATINGS ON THREE SCALES**

	PROF.IMPR. LIKE./HIRING	COMPETENCE LIKE./HIRING	PROF.IMPR COMPETENCE
1. M ED+ EX-	.778	.839	.808
2. F ED+ EX-	.867	.904	.865
3. M ED- EX+	.829	.891	.850
4. F ED- EX+	.838	.930	.828
5. M ED+ EX-	.728	.823	.737
6. F ED+ EX-	.760	.888	.764
7. M ED- EX-	.692	.878	.711
8. F ED- EX-	.724	.883	.756

N = 139

Note: all correlations are significant at $p < .001$

High correlations between all ratings are no surprise, since as it has already been mentioned, these three scales are not conceptually independent. The correlation coefficients for Competence and Likelihood of Hiring are higher than for both Professional Impression and Likelihood of Hiring, and Professional Impression and Competence for all eight conditions. The correlation coefficients for the females are higher than those for the males except for the correlation between Professional Impression and Competence

for conditions three and four, where the coefficient for the female is slightly lower than that for the male.

These data do not reveal any of the patterns of differential correlations described above. Consequently, there is no reason to suspect that the evaluations were based on the perceived competence level of each applicant, and a single measure of hireability (i.e., expectation state about an applicant job performance) can be used for further analyses. Since the Likelihood of Hiring is conceptually closer to "hireability" than Competence, it will be subsequently used as a single measure of expectation states about applicants' job performance.

Another problem associated with the scales is the interpretation of the values. Table 5 displays mean scores and standard deviations by applicants' sex and competence level indicated by their education and work experience.

TABLE 5: MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF HIRING SCALE.

	APPLICANT'S SEX			
	FEMALE		MALE	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
ED+ EX+	82.76	15.39	83.64	12.73
ED- EX+	67.83	20.22	67.81	21.84
ED+ EX-	54.50	23.00	49.31	23.37
ED- EX-	47.28	21.70	53.35	23.24

N = 139 per cell

A brief look at the data in Table 5 reveals that even the least qualified applicants scored, on the average about 50 points which is the median value of the scale used (each of the three scales ranged from 1 to 100). An explanation of the relatively high mean scores of the unqualified candidates is based on the measurement procedures. Each time this scale was displayed on the computer screen, the question "What is the likelihood that you would hire this applicant?" was displayed, and the cursor was automatically positioned in the middle of a ruler at the value 50 (see Appendix 1). The left hand end was labeled "very unlikely," whereas the right hand end had the label "very likely." The raters could either enter their answers without changing the cursor position (in that case 50 was entered), move the cursor to the right to increase the value, or move it to the left to decrease the value (the identical procedures were of course used for all three scales, except that different questions were asked and different labels at the end of the ruler displayed). Thus, the value "50" can be interpreted as the neutral starting point. Moving away from it toward the left (lower scores) represent an increasing degree of incompetence, whereas moving toward the right (higher scores) represent an increasing degree of competence or hireability. In this light, the scores below 50 should be interpreted as "unqualified," about 50 as "marginally qualified," and above 50 - as "highly qualified."

The hypotheses that there are non-zero significant differences between ratings of the male and female applicants, and that these differences are affected by the status characteristics of the raters were tested by the repeated measures analysis of variance (the MANOVA procedure on SPSS/PC+). The following within-subjects factors were used: applicants' sex (SEX), education (EDUC), and experience (EXPER). The special contrasts specified were: -1 for "F", "ED-", and "EX-", and +1 for "M", "ED+", and "EX+" respectively. The between-subjects factor was raters' sex (EVSEX).

This design resulted in eight within-subject effects being tested. Additionally, for each within-subject effect the between-subject effect was tested as well. Table 6 displays the results of an analysis of variance of the mean scores on the Likelihood of Hiring scale. The mean scores per raters' sex are displayed in Table 7.

**TABLE 6: EFFECTS OF APPLICANTS SEX EDUCATION
AND EXPERIENCE BY RATERS SEX.**

Source of Variation	SS	DF	MS	F	Sig of F
WITHIN CELLS	176749.72	137	1290.14		
CONSTANT	4406245.77	1	4406245.80	3415.31	.000
EVSEX	4.13	1	4.13	.00	.955
WITHIN CELLS	27903.54	137	203.68		
SEX	75.68	1	75.68	.37	.543
EVSEX BY SEX	189.29	1	189.29	.93	.337
WITHIN CELLS	55834.03	137	407.55		
EDUCATION	19945.15	1	19945.15	48.94	.000
EVSEX BY EDUC	27.91	1	27.91	.07	.794
WITHIN CELLS	88468.84	137	645.76		
EXPERIENCE	162841.74	1	162841.74	252.17	.000
EVSEX BY EXPER	70.34	1	70.34	.11	.742
WITHIN CELLS	31511.03	137	230.01		
SEX BY EDUC	1721.01	1	1721.01	7.48	.007
EVSEX BY SEX BY EDUC	194.53	1	194.53	.85	.359
WITHIN CELLS	24536.04	137	179.10		
SEX BY EXPER	3.42	1	3.42	.02	.890
EVSEX BY SEX BY EXPER	275.45	1	275.45	1.54	.217
WITHIN CELLS	31289.77	137	228.39		
EDUC BY EXPER	12195.82	1	12195.82	53.40	.000
EVSEX BY EDUC BY EXPER	1284.71	1	1284.71	5.63	.019
WITHIN CELLS	26539.16	137	193.72		
SEX BY EDUC BY EXPER	2372.21	1	2372.21	12.25	.001
EVSEX BY SEX BY EDUC BY EXPER	241.91	1	241.91	1.25	.266

**TABLE 7: MEAN RATINGS ON LIKELIHOOD OF HIRING
BY RATERS SEX**

WITHIN-SUBJECT CONDITION:								
EX+				EX-				
ED+		ED-		ED+		ED-		
M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
EVALUATOR'S SEX								
F	84.75	83.64	67.19	67.14	46.31	54.73	54.16	48.13
M	82.26	81.68	68.58	68.68	53.03	54.23	52.35	46.23

Neither the within-subject effect of sex (i.e., differences between ratings of male and female applicants) nor the between-subject effect (i.e., differences between ratings of male and female applicants attributable to the sex of the raters) was significant. However the within-subject effects of education and experience were significant, but in neither case the effect of raters' sex on differences between the ratings of the ED+ and ED-, and EX+ and EX- applicants was significant.

As to the two-way interactions between the within-subject factors, however, the sex of the applicants did make a difference in an interaction with their education. This difference is unaffected by the raters' sex, however. The combination of applicants' sex and experience did not produce any significant differences either. The joint effect of applicants' education and experience on the ratings was significant. Moreover, this effect was

different for male and female evaluators. The joint effect of all three within-subject factors was also significant, but unaffected by the raters' gender.

As expected, applicants' experience had a greater influence on the ratings than education. The sizes of these main effects are: ED+ = 4.3, ED- = -4.3, EX+ = 12.2, and EX- = -12.2. The two- and three- way significant effects are displayed in Tables 8 through 12.

**TABLE 8: INTERACTION EFFECTS (RESIDUALS):
APPLICANTS EXPERIENCE BY EDUCATION.**

	ED+	ED-
EX+	3.5	-3.5
EX-	-3.5	3.5

**TABLE 9: INTERACTION EFFECTS (MEANS):
APPLICANTS EXPERIENCE BY EDUCATION.**

	ED+	ED-
EX+	83.2	67.8
EX-	51.9	50.3

As expected, applicants with a B.A. degree benefited in relation to those without a degree (Table 8). Moreover, education and managerial seem to have a positive synergistic effect, that is the applicants having both managerial

experience and a B.A. score considerably higher than those having either a degree or managerial experience (Table 9).

**TABLE 10: INTERACTION EFFECTS (RESIDUALS):
APPLICANTS SEX BY EDUCATION.**

	ED+	ED-
M	-1.3	1.3
F	1.3	-1.3

The interaction shown in Table 10 suggests that female applicants benefited from having a B.A. degree, whereas the male applicants were "hurt" by it in relation to females. A closer look at mean scores per condition (Table 5) reveals that although in the EX+ category the differences between mean scores of male and female candidates (both with and without a B.A. degree are minuscule), the opposite is true in the EX- category. Specifically, the ED- EX- female scored the highest in the entire group, whereas the ED+ EX- male scored actually lower than the ED- EX- male.

**TABLE 11: INTERACTION EFFECTS (RESIDUALS): APPLICANTS SEX
BY EXPERIENCE BY EDUCATION.**

	EX+		EX-	
	ED+	ED-	ED+	ED-
APPLICANTS SEX:				
M	.2	-.2	-2.8	2.8
F	-.2	.2	2.8	-2.8

The interaction between applicants' sex, education and managerial experience suggest that women benefited from the inconsistent (one high one low) job-related cues (i.e., experience and education), whereas men benefited from consistent (both high or both low) job-related cues. This was especially true among the EX- candidates.

**TABLE 12: INTERACTION EFFECTS (RESIDUALS): RATERS SEX
BY APPLICANTS EXPERIENCE BY APPLICANTS EDUCATION.**

	EX+		EX-	
	ED+	ED-	ED+	ED-
RATERS SEX:				
M	-1.2	.7	1.5	-1
F	1.2	-.7	-1.5	1

The interaction between the raters' sex, and applicants' education and managerial experience indicates that applicants reporting inconsistent (one high one low) job-related cues (i.e., experience and education) benefit from being evaluated by male raters, whereas applicants reporting consistent (both high or both low) job-related cues are treated favorably by male evaluators.

These findings suggest that although sex (both of the applicants and the raters) does not have any major effects on the ratings of the applicants' job qualifications (negligible main effect), it nonetheless affects those ratings in connections with other factors - education and

managerial experience. Consequently, qualified versions of the initial hypotheses were accepted: (a) significant differences may occur between weights attached to female and male applicants' education, and (b) significant differences may occur between weights attached to education and experience by male and female raters.

Finally, a test was conducted to determine whether the raters tend to select as best qualified that candidate whom they awarded the highest rating on the Likelihood of Hire scale. For that purpose a new categorical variable "Highest Scoring Applicant" was created. The categories used include: "M ED+ EX+," "F ED+ EX+," "M ED+ EX+ = F ED+ EX+," which denotes a situation when both M ED+ EX+ and F ED+ EX+ received the same rating which was also the highest rating, "OTHER M," which refers to a situation when a male applicant other than the "M ED+ EX+" was awarded the highest score, "OTHER F," if the above was true about a female applicant, and finally "OTHER MATCH," when two or more applicants other than ED+ EX+ received matching and highest ratings. Table 13 presents frequency distribution of the highest ranking applicants by best candidates selected.

**TABLE 13: HIGHEST SCORING APPLICANT
BY BEST QUALIFIED CANDIDATE SELECTED**

BEST QUALIFIED CANDIDATE SELECTED				
	M ED+EX+	F ED+EX+	OTHER M	OTHER F
HIGHEST SCORING APPLICANT:				
ED+EX+	25	14	2	1
row pctg	59.5%	33.3%	4.8%	2.4%
col pctg	56.8%	20.9%	13.3%	7.7%
F ED+EX+	6	36	3	2
row pctg	12.8%	76.6%	6.4%	4.3%
col pctg	13.6%	53.7%	20.0%	15.4%
M ED+EX+ =				
F ED+EX+	4	8	0	1
row pctg	30.8%	61.5%	0.0%	7.7%
col pctg	9.1%	11.9%	0.0%	7.7%
OTHER M	4	2	6	0
row pctg	33.3%	16.7%	50.0%	0.0%
col pctg	9.1%	3.0%	40.0%	0.0%
OTHER F	2	4	2	7
row pctg	13.3%	26.7%	13.3%	46.7%
col pctg	4.5%	6.0%	13.3%	53.8%
OTHER MATCH	3	3	2	2
row pctg	30.0%	30.0%	20.0%	20.0%
col pctg	6.8%	4.5%	13.3%	15.4%

The chi-square test was performed and the following values obtained: $\chi^2 (15, N=139) = 81.92, p < .00005$.

Generally those subjects who awarded the F ED+ EX+ applicant the highest score, also selected her as the best qualified candidate (76.6% and 61.5% of those who awarded her a score equal with M ED+ EX+). By contrast, 59.5% of the subjects who awarded the highest score to the M ED+ EX+, and only 30.8% who gave him a rating equal to the F ED+ EX+, selected

him as the best qualified candidate. These findings indicate that: (a) awarding the highest rating to an applicant is a good but not perfect predictor of selecting that applicant as best qualified, and (b) those subjects who awarded the F ED+ EX+ the highest score are more likely to stand behind their rating while selecting the best qualified candidates than those who awarded the highest score to the M ED+ EX+. A possible explanation of this tendency is that some raters might have desired to, as one subject expressed it during postsession interviews, "compensate for the fact that women were discriminated in the past" and thus selected the woman over the man.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The results of this study provide only partial corroboration of the hypothesis that gender plays a significant role in evaluating a job applicant's skills. Contrary to predictions based on status generalization theory, the main effect of sex on the applicants' scores was negligible.

Experience proved to be more important than education as a criterion in evaluating job applicants. Experience and education have a positive synergistic effect both on ratings and selecting the best qualified candidate. These findings are consistent with the results obtained by Bills (1988) who used personal interviews with appointing managers and appointees to assess importance of various factors affecting hiring decisions.

Sex did have discernible effects in conjunction with other variables (experience and education). Women benefited from having a B.A. degree, whereas men were better off without a degree. Another interesting finding is that women benefited from the inconsistent (one high one low) job-related cues (i.e., experience and education), whereas men benefited from consistent (both high or both low) job-related cues.

These findings is difficult to interpret because it is possible that some participants evaluated the applicants' qualifications "in general" rather than in relation to the

specific job whose description was included with the applications. If this was the case, the evaluation was not whether an applicant's qualifications meet the criteria specified in the job description, but what is his/her competence for jobs on the market in general. Consequently, certain specifics of the applicants' resumes (such as private vs. public sector work history, titles of the occupied positions, etc.) might have exerted a greater influence on the hireability ratings than it was originally intended. If this really took place during the experiment, the obtained results can no longer be interpreted as effects of applicants' sex, education, and experience, but as effects of other factors (such as those just mentioned) as well.

Unfortunately, the experimental design did not provide adequate safeguards against this possibility. Including a job description in a package and instructing participants that they should use it as a criterion in their evaluations is not enough. A control measure of the applicants' general competence or hireability level, administered separately from the measure of competence or hireability for the particular job used in the experiment (e.g., in the form of pre- or post-testing) should have been employed. An alternative approach would be asking the subjects to make evaluations for two different jobs. Since none of such measures were utilized, the reader must be warned to treat

the interpretation of the findings presented in this section with caution.

Assuming that most of the subjects followed the instructions and did, in fact, evaluate the applicants' hireability for the particular job specified in the description, the following explanation of the findings is proposed. The differential effect of education on male and female applicants might result from the fact that the raters used education to compensate women for their inferior-to-men social status. Stated differently, when both candidates are lacking managerial experience, the female with a degree could be seen as an equivalent of a male candidate without a degree. However, this effect appears to be non-existent among candidates with managerial experience, probably as a result of strong influence of that experience on the perception of applicants' hireability.

A possible explanation of the phenomenon that female applicants benefited from "inconsistent" job-related cues (in the sense described in the preceding paragraph), whereas male applicants were better off when reporting "consistent" cues may lie in the stereotype that men are better qualified for managerial positions than women. The managerial experience reported by men are consistent with this expectation, whereas the lack of such experience constitutes a proof that the candidate must be lacking necessary qualifications. Women, by contrast, are expected to lack

managerial qualifications, and when their resumes show that they are lacking either necessary experience or education (EX- or ED-), this information is redundant with that expectation and does not add anything new to what has been already expected.

However, when the applicants report the second job-related cue as high (EX+ or ED+), this stands in contrast with the expectation and thus becomes more salient in forming expectations about that candidate's managerial qualifications. An analogy can be drawn to a situation in which a failing student suddenly writes a passable paper and receives a good grade for it, but if the same paper were written by a good student, it would be seen as barely satisfactory.

If this explanation is correct, it indicates a possibility that the cues that are consistent with expectations based on stereotypes become less salient and weigh less in evaluation of that person. When the cues are inconsistent with stereotypical expectations, however, they become more salient and tend to play a more pronounced role in that person's evaluation.

High ratings were significantly correlated to selecting the best qualified applicant, but women benefited (in terms of having a greater chance of being selected) from high ratings substantially more than did men. Finally, the male evaluators were equally likely to select either a male or a

female candidate, but the female evaluators were almost twice as likely to select a female candidate.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these results regarding status generalization, human capital, and segmented labor market theories. First, the status generalization theory asserts that different and conflicting status cues are combined rather than some of them eliminated (Berger et al., 1986). To be sure, Berger et al. claim that "if task cues are pitted against categorical cues of an initially irrelevant diffuse characteristic, task cue should show a stronger effect on dependent behaviors" (1986, p.14). But the results of this study indicate that the effect of some task cues (i.e., work experience) can be strong enough to effectively reduce the influence from an applicant's sex or even education to insignificant levels. There is also evidence to support the claim that, in case of two conflicting specific cues, the one that is inconsistent with the diffuse cue (that is gender stereotype) becomes more salient and weights more in evaluation, whereas the cue that is consistent with the diffuse cue is insignificant in that evaluation.

On the other hand, there is also evidence suggesting that some task and categorical cues (e.g., experience and education) are combined, as predicted by status generalization theory, and even have a synergistic effect. It appears, therefore, that both elimination and combination

of status cues can take place, depending on the nature of specific cues and their relationship to the task at hand.

A second observation concerns the causal argument presented by Berger et al. (1986). Although it is not quite clear what kind of causality (sufficient, necessary, or both) the authors had in mind when they wrote that "changes in the status composition of a group will, by producing changes in expectation advantages, also produce changes in task cue levels" (1986, pp.12-13), it appears, from the wording of the quoted statement, that changes in status composition constitute a condition that is sufficient to produce changes in task cue levels. The results of this research show that this is not necessarily so, and particular expectations (rating on Likelihood of Hiring) may or may not lead to a behavior that is consistent with those expectations (selecting the candidate ranked as the most qualified). In particular people may and do consciously act to contradict gender stereotypes, especially when they have to choose between equally qualified applicants. It is a moot point, however, whether a hiring decision aimed to "compensate for past discrimination" or to contradict gender stereotypes is an action that is free from "gender influence" altogether, or an action that originates in expectations that originate in the "alternative" perception of women as the "discriminated" rather than the "weaker" sex.

As to the stratified labor market model, the hypothesis that social gender stereotypes significantly affect hiring decisions was not supported by the results of this study. To be sure, gender did result in differential evaluation of experience and education of male and female applicants, but its main effect was negligible. Moreover, the selection of the best qualified candidate was not significantly correlated to the rater's and applicant's sex. It can be concluded, therefore, that differential treatment of men and women in the workplace is not a result of norms and values shared by the majority of our society.

This, of course, does not mean that such stereotypes do not exist or do not exert their influence on evaluating other people. However, the results of this study seem to suggest that when evaluation is conducted in an institutional setting openly committed to meritocracy and egalitarianism, the effect of gender bias on hiring decisions can be significantly reduced. By implication, if discriminatory practices in hiring women do occur in corporations, it is likely that these practices are caused not by misconceptions about victims' competence, originating in societal values and stereotypes (Kanter, 1977), but are more or less deliberate and purposeful individual acts and policies (Hartmann, 1976).

This view is further supported by Bills' (1988) findings that some of the managers he interviewed reported

preferential treatment of men over women. This finding is particularly noteworthy, because Bills did not even intend to search for clues of gender bias. He acknowledged that asking direct question "if the sex (or age or race) of the candidate influenced [the] hiring decision" is inappropriate because it "can be construed as accusative and compromise the candor of the interview" (1988, p.95). Despite these constraints, however, some of the interviewees openly admitted giving men preferential treatment over women.

The results of this study suggest that the primary criterion in evaluating job applicants is work experience, and the role of gender stereotypes in that evaluation is minimal. One practical consequence of these findings is that explicit fair employment policies (both corporate and national, such as EEO and Affirmative Action), rather than educational campaigns and training aimed at eliminating gender stereotypes (e.g., prevention of sexual harassment courses offered to Federal employees), are a key element in promoting equal opportunity in the job market. These policies, if properly enforced, can not only counteract openly sexist or racist attitudes among appointing officers, but also allow women and minorities to gain the most valuable asset determining their careers - work experience.

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APPENDIX 1

INSTRUCTIONS

You are about to participate in an experiment investigating the dynamics of the job applicant evaluation process. Here is what you are going to be doing.

Imagine that your boss in your work asks you to evaluate eight resumes of people applying for a job. Those applications and the job description are included in your folder.

The applications which you are actually given have been modified to conform to the standard format known as the functional-targeted resume. This format of job resume is the "latest trend" in job searching strategies. The functional-targeted resume contains only the information that is relevant to the position being applied for. This information includes: applicant's name, address and phone number, his/her education, and related work experience. Other information, such as chronological work history, unrelated work experience, statement of career objectives, and so on are not included.

You are going to be the selecting official. Use the information provided in each functional-targeted resume, evaluate each applicant in the following aspects:

- the overall professional impression created in his application

- his qualifications to perform the job s/he is applying for

- the likelihood that you would hire this applicant,

In your evaluation, please use the following guideline:

"HIRING WHICH CANDIDATE WOULD Be MOST BENEFICIAL TO THE COMPANY?"

Use your own judgment and knowledge of the job market and 1

employment policies. Do not forget to refer to the job description.

To perform this task, you will use the computer terminal at your desk. Using the terminal is easy - all you have to do is to follow simple instructions displayed on the screen.

The experiment has three stages. During the first stage, the program will select candidates' names and will ask you questions about those candidates. The order of applications in the folder is not the same as they will appear on the screen.

During the second stage just follow the instructions on the screen. During the last phase you will be asked nine questions about you. Questions about your job refer to your

most recent position on the job. If you have never worked, answer "no" to all job-related questions in this section.

Before you start working on the actual task, you will have a chance to practice entering your answers and working with the computer. You may use the sample application during the practice session.

There are no time limits for the completion of all the tasks, but on average the whole procedure should take you about 20 -25 minutes.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding the task, after the study is over please feel free to share them with the experimenter.

Are there any questions? I will show you to your seats. You may begin working on the task.

JOB DESCRIPTION

THIS IS A MANAGERIAL POSITION WHICH OFFERS, FOR THE RIGHT CANDIDATE, A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR A QUICK PROMOTION TO THE TOP EXECUTIVE LEVEL.

THE SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATE SHOULD POSSESS THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS:

- KNOWLEDGE OF MARKETING RESEARCH AND STRATEGIES
- KNOWLEDGE OF COMPLEX BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
- ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE HUMAN RESOURCES
- ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE MATERIAL RESOURCES
- ABILITY TO MAKE SOUND BUSINESS DECISIONS
- ABILITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS
- GOOD COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS AND ABILITY TO PRESENT IDEAS IN A CLEAR AND CONVINCING MANNER

RESUME

1250 Amarillo Ave.
Palo Alto, CA 94303

(415) 493-4561

RICHARD F. PERRY

EDUCATION: B.S. Degree, Business Administration,
San Francisco State University,
Concentration in Marketing

EXPERIENCE:

Applied Survey Research Group,
999 Mission St. Suite 12, San Francisco,
CA 94103

MANAGER, Marketing Research

- Managed the Marketing Research Department
- Designed marketing research measuring potential markets, consumer motivation, and effectiveness of advertising
- Assessed the effectiveness of marketing strategies, using statistical methods of data analysis
- Wrote reports and made recommendations regarding specific marketing, techniques, strategies, and philosophies
- Supervised a staff of six researchers and two clerk typists

The Northcom Corporation, 1233 Laurelwood Rd.
Santa Clara, CA 95054

ASSISTANT MANAGER, Personnel Department

- Supervised recruitment, interviewing, and testing programs
- Developed and maintained a security system for personnel files
- Conducted studies, prepared reports and provided special staff work for top management regarding the development of departmental policies, goals, and objectives
- identified problem areas and recommended appropriate solutions to the Assistant Director

RESUME

555 Oakland Ave. Apt 2C
Oakland, CA 94611

(415) 653-6342

WILLIAM M. GAYNES

EDUCATION: B.S. Degree, Business Administration,
California State University, Hayward,
Concentration in Management

EXPERIENCE:

Lite-On, Inc. 720 S. Hillview Drive
Milpitas , CA 95035

CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE

- Interfaced with customers and internal staff
- Received, entered and processed purchase orders
- Tracked the overall service level with respect to quality
- Filed documents and enter data to a computerized database
- Maintained departmental file and database system
- Wrote and distributed reports

Silberman & Son, 3334 Shattuck Ave
Berkeley, CA 94712

JEWELRY SALES

- Assisted and advised customers purchasing fine jewelery
- Received and processed purchase orders
- Prepared sales reports and inventories
- Performed clerical and office tasks as needed

3244 Lennon Dr
San Jose, CA 95030

RESUME

(408) 448-9124

PETER E. CONROY

EDUCATION: courses in Social Sciences
California State University, Fullerton

EXPERIENCE:

New-Way Corporation of America,
2300 Gateway Boulevard, Fremont, CA 94538

MANAGER, Product Marketing

- Managed operations of the Marketing Department and supervised a staff of twelve employees
- Developed promotional material
- Organized response to sales field questions
- Coordinated technical and promotional information system
- Participated in sales presentations, demonstrations, and trade shows
- Conducted research and cooperated with senior management to develop, implement, and assess marketing strategies

The Ardan Corporation, 45663 Sepulveda Blvd.
Culver City, CA 90230

ASSISTANT MANAGER, Human Resources

- Assisted in all phases and aspects of the employee recruitment and evaluation process
- Assisted in the development and implementation of recruitment and evaluation policies
- Administered the fringe benefit program
- Conducted orientation meetings for new employees

RESUME

120 Showers Dr.
Mountain View, CA 94040

(415) 949-6731

LINDA M. DRAKE

EDUCATION: B.S. Degree, Business Administration,
California State College, Bakersfield,
Concentration in Management

EXPERIENCE:

Jupiter Computer Products, Inc.
4912 Woodruff Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90025

MANAGER, Sales and Marketing

- Managed the operations of the Sales and Marketing Department
- Planned, implemented, and evaluated the effectiveness of sales and marketing strategies, and advertisement campaigns
- Conducted studies and made recommendations for top management regarding specific marketing strategies and advertisement campaigns
- Supervised the staff of the Sales and Marketing Department (eight employees)

Ampco, Inc., 1139 Monterey Road
Bakersfield, CA 92250

ASSISTANT MANAGER, Operations

- Supervised staff and operations of the Service Department
- Identified specific problem areas and recommended solutions to the senior management
- Advised Departmental Program Managers regarding the development and maintenance of specific program definitions
- Prepared reports and provided input for top management regarding departmental goals, objectives, and policies

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San Jose, CA 95126

RESUME

(408) 985-8666

PATRICIA T. COOK

EDUCATION: Courses in Psychology and Social Sciences
San Jose State University, California

EXPERIENCE:

South Bay Systems, Inc., 1500 A Mabury Road,
San Jose, CA 95133

OFFICE MANAGER, Sales Department

- Coordinated and directed general office operations
- Planned, implemented and evaluated company's sales and marketing strategies
- Participated in making decisions regarding hiring, contracts, purchases, sales and marketing strategies
- Supervised ten employees
- Trained clerical staff in office practices and procedures

Banta Corporation, 888 Villa St. Suite 500,
Mountain View, CA 94041

ASSISTANT MANAGER, Marketing / Public Relations

- Interfaced with customers and employees
- Tracked and assessed the quality of products and services, identified potential problems and recommended solutions
- Assisted in development and implementation of policies regarding product/service quality, and marketing strategies
- Developed promotional material and administered technical and promotional information system

RESUME

655 Clara Vista Dr.
Santa Clara, CA 95054

(408) 986-2588

CYNTHIA L. ROBINS

EDUCATION: B.S. Degree, Business Administration,
San Diego State University, California,
Concentration in Marketing

EXPERIENCE:

Santa Clara County Government,
120 Younger Street San Jose, CA 95115

ASSISTANT II, Department of Social Services

- Screened and assisted visitors and answered phone calls
- Interfaced with clients and representatives of civic organizations and government officials
- Assisted clients in finding appropriate services
- Assisted clients in filling out applications for services and filing required documents
- Filed documents and maintained files
- Wrote reports for the program supervisor

Digital Research, 9800 La Brea Ave., Suite 406,
Inglewood, CA 90010

TECHNICAL WRITER

- Wrote and maintained technical documentation for software products
- Interfaced with customers and engineers to obtain information regarding various aspects of product use
- Edited and proofread technical documentation for proper style, grammar and punctuation

RESUME

120 E. Remington Dr. Apt. 622
Sunnyvale, CA 94087

(408) 749-6421

MICHAEL K. ANDREWS

EDUCATION: Courses in Political Sciences
California State University, Fresno

EXPERIENCE:
Intertec Corporation, 6640 Stewart Drive,
Sunnyvale, CA 94086

PUBLICIST, Public Relations

- Created and placed publicity in all mediums
- Interfaced with the public, media, civic organizations, and government officials
- Responded to public inquiries regarding company's policies and business activities
- Monitored company's public image and made recommendations for the senior management

California Consumer Group, 1050 Mission Street
Santa Cruz, CA 95060

CUSTOMER ASSISTANT, Public Relations

- Participated in public outreach and information programs aimed at raising the awareness of product quality and safety issues
- Interfaced with customers and business representatives
- Assisted customers in obtaining information about quality and safety of specific products
- Wrote letters and reports

RESUME

3258 Alma St. Apt. 145
Palo Alto, CA 94305

(415) 856-5112

SUZANNE B. HOLT

EDUCATION: Courses in Psychology
California State University, Chico

EXPERIENCE:

Prostar, Inc., 3480 Clipper Ct.
Fremont, CA 94538

CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVE, Customer Services

- Interfaced with visitors and contacted customers over the phone
- Accepted and processed purchase orders
- Assisted customers and provide them with relevant information regarding products and services
- Maintained and updated computerized databases and files
- Prepared reports and inventories for the department supervisor

Autotech International Corporation
2220 E. Bayshore Road, Suite 320,
Palo Alto, CA 94303

ASSISTANT, Human Resources

- Participated in job interviews, skill evaluation and other phases of the recruitment process
- Kept personnel and payroll records
- Assisted job applicants in filing employment applications
- Assisted employees in obtaining information regarding fringe benefits, promotion opportunities and other personnel functions
- Entered data, typed letters and memos, maintained and updated files

SAMPLE SCREEN PRINTOUT

Applicant's name: JOHN Q. DOE

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT YOU WOULD HIRE THIS APPLICANT?

Move the cursor under the dot that represents your answer
and then press <a>

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1 = go left (smaller numbers)
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r = go right (larger numbers)

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very unlikely

very likely

[illegible]

Is this correct? (y/n and press <Enter>)

APPENDIX 2

STATEMENTS FROM PARTICIPANTS

After completing the study each subject was asked to submit comments regarding his participation in this research. Most subjects stated that the procedure was straightforward and that they either did not have any comments or inquired where they can learn about the results. However, twelve subjects decided to make verbal comments to the experimenter. These comments are summarized below (letters "M" and "F" in the parentheses indicate the subjects' gender):

1. (F) "I tried to be objective and give an equal chance to men and women. I wanted to give a chance to a civil servant because of her background."

2. (M) "The resumes did not provide enough information for making a selection... no dates, no work history.... I would have to see the candidates before making a decision."

3. (M) "I tried to be objective and give equal consideration for both education and experience."

4. (F) "I did not pay attention to education or sex, only experience. I would want to interview the candidates before making the final decision."

5. (F) "I paid attention to experience to determine how people can help the company from bottom up. I did not pay much attention to education, only business experience."

6. (M) "During the experiment I became harsher and harsher in my evaluations."

7. (M) "I selected Linda and Richard [F ED+ EX+ and M ED+ EX-], but then decided for Richard because he had the word 'research' in the resume, and research was in the job description."

8. (F) "It would be beneficial to include how long applicants held positions listed in their resumes."

9.(F) "I would like to see candidates first before making the decision to hire."

10. (M) "I selected a woman because of the past discrimination of women."

11. (M) "I needed more time to do an adequate job. About 30 more minutes."

12. (M) "There were only two candidates that were qualified. I selected the woman....I do not remember her name..."