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**Let's go Canada! The great response: The dismantlement and
rebirth of the Canadian military between the two world wars**

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San Jose State University, 1990

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LET'S GO CANADA! THE GREAT RESPONSE:
THE DISMANTLEMENT AND REBIRTH OF THE
CANADIAN MILITARY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Department of History

San Jose State University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

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December, 1990

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ABSTRACT

LET'S GO CANADA! THE GREAT RESPONSE: THE DISMANTLEMENT AND REBIRTH OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

by Robert M. Noonan, Jr.

This thesis addresses the state of Canadian military preparedness between World Wars I and II. After WWI, the Canadian people wanted to withdraw from world politics into isolationism. Simultaneously, the Canadian Government disarmed its military to a bare bones level for economic and political reasons.

When 1939 began, the Canadian people and Government were not prepared to face the reality of the events in Europe and were totally ill-equipped to cope with a new world war. However, the miraculous transformation that occurred in Canada between 1939 and 1942 was a credit to the resiliency of her people. Canada reacted with the greatest response to a crisis in her history. A review of the history that brought Canada to the end of WWI, the events after the Great War and the first three and a half years of the Second World War reveal the magnitude of Canada's great response.

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INTRODUCTION

Few countries are prepared to go to war unless, for a considerable length of time, they had been planning a surprise attack. Canada certainly was not prepared for World War II and, in fact, was less prepared militarily than Poland. How could this happen to a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations when the danger of another European war had been growing for several years? Why was it allowed to happen in a country that knew if war came, Great Britain and the Commonwealth would be drawn immediately into the conflict? The answers to these questions and many others are complex and go to the heart of Canadian history--politically, militarily and economically--between the two Great Wars.

The Canadian people had suffered great losses in World War I and wanted to withdraw from world politics into a shell of isolationism. Simultaneously the Canadian Government, which had never had a tradition of maintaining a

large standing armed force, disarmed and dismembered its military to a bare bones level for both economic and political reasons. Meanwhile, before the Canadian economy could fully develop its potential, which had started to emerge during the First World War, it was hit with the Great Depression.

By the mid 1930's the Canadian people, government and economy were in danger of grinding to a halt. With the threat of Italian or German aggression looming on the horizon, Canada sunk deeper into her shell. Sensing no direct military threat, and being economically depressed, she saw no need to strengthen her armed forces or to develop an arms industry for future potentialities. At the same time, Canada's new Prime Minister was a man who had a deep distrust in anything military and a profound belief that all conflicts could be worked out by direct negotiations. When 1939 began, the Canadian people and government were still not prepared to face the reality of the events in Europe and were totally ill-equipped to cope with the start of a new world war.

However, the miraculous transformation that

occurred in Canada between 1939 and 1942 was a credit to the resiliency of her people. Starting with one of the smallest Air Forces in a world of military powers, Canada ended up with the fourth largest by the end of the war. Having no naval traditions, few ships and fewer shipbuilding yards, Canada was able eventually to hold her own in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic. And, beginning with a minuscule Militia and a total aversion to conscription, Canada was able to field an Army in less than three and a half years. As the recruiting poster said, "Let's Go Canada!" and go she did with the greatest response to a crisis in her history. But few would have predicted the magnitude of the response in 1939 given the previous twenty-year history of Canada. A review of the history that brought Canada to the end of World War I, the events after the Great War and the first three and a half years of the Second World War reveal the magnitude of Canada's great response.

CHAPTER 1
AN UNMILITARY COMMUNITY
CANADA 1867-1914

Colonel C.P. Stacey, the Official Military Historian for the Second World War, has stated in many ways that Canada was an unmilitary community at the beginning of that war. One of the things that he meant by this was that Canada had a long history of believing that the time to prepare for war was after the war had begun. That was not to say that Canadians were pacifists. The country itself was born in conflict. The early French and English settlers often found themselves in conflict with the native Indians. Later European wars, in which Britain and France were on opposite sides, had their counterparts in the New World. The French and Indian War, fought between 1754 and 1760, changed the balance of power in the North American colonies from French to English. The decisive battle was fought in September 1759 on the Plains of Abraham which overlooked the City of Quebec. Here British Maj. Gen. James Wolfe defeated

Louis-Joseph de Montcalm-Gagzon, the Marquis de Montcalm. The forces were about equal except that the 3,150 British regular army troops were supplemented by 1,300 highly-trained soldiers recruited from the colonies of New York and Nova Scotia. On the other hand, the 2,000 regular French soldiers were supplemented by 2,500 French colonial regulars, militia and Indians. Both sides raised and trained their colonial forces only after the conflict began and the forces were disbanded after the hostilities ceased.¹

Militia forces were again raised in British North America during the Revolutionary War. American rebels captured Fort Chambly, Fort St. Jean and Fort Lennox in the autumn of 1775 before they occupied Montreal. They might even have captured the City of Quebec if bad weather and poor leadership had not caused them to turn back. By the spring of 1776 the British regulars and militia had forced the rebellious Americans back across the St. Lawrence and out of British North American territory.² After the United States had gained its independence from Great Britain, over 50,000 Loyalists moved northward and settled in several

British North American provinces. Many of them had fought actively on the British side. From that time the chief military preoccupation of the British North American provinces was their defence against the United States.³ The militia was again tested in 1812-1813, when the United States invaded Upper and Lower Canada in order to use the captured territory as a bargaining chip with which to force Britain to respect United States maritime rights. Although outnumbered at times by as much as five to one, the British regulars and militia forces beat back the American forces at Detroit and Queenstown. Later both British and French-Canadian militia troops defeated the Americans at Chateaugay and Crysler's Farm.⁴ Once again the ability of the citizens in British North America to form militia units rapidly that were strong enough to defeat an invading foe created the myth, in the minds of the people, that a large standing army was not necessary because the militia was all they needed. The small British detachment in Canada was adequate to hold an enemy at bay until the militia could be formed and pressed into service to rout that enemy. However, as an insurance policy, the period following the

signing of the Treaty of Ghent (1814) was marked by the most active fort building period in Canadian history. Included in these projects were the Ottawa-Rideau Canals (which provided a cross country water route from Ottawa to Lake Ontario in the event that the St. Lawrence was cut off), the permanent Citadel at the City of Quebec (which protected the St. Lawrence upriver from hostile war ships), the fort on Isle-aux-Noix on the Richelieu, a new Fort Lennox (also on the Richelieu and which blocked northward travel in the Richelieu from Lake Champlain), and the supply depot on St. Helen's Island, Montreal.⁵

Soon after the outbreak of the American Civil War, the relations between the United States and Great Britain became strained over the "Trent Affair" in 1861. The "Trent Affair" was a diplomatic incident created when a Northern warship stopped a British mail packet (Trent) on the high seas and removed two Southern diplomatic agents traveling to Britain. As an act of prudence and to calm the nerves of the British North Americans, the British Government sent another detachment of troops to her colony in North America as a safeguard against United States incursions across the

virtually undefendable border.⁶ When the American Civil War ended, the British Government--anxious to be freed from the costly obligation of protecting the area north of the United States--was eager to entertain discussions leading to the formation of a confederation of Upper and Lower Canada with the two Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In 1867, after lengthy negotiations, the British Parliament passed the British North America Act which created the Dominion of Canada.⁷

The Act produced a Canadian government based mainly on the British model rather than the American model.⁸ In the Dominion of Canada there would be a House of Commons (with representation according to population) led by an executive (Prime Minister) responsible to that body itself. As a balance, there would also be a Senate with representation being regional rather than proportional by population (each region would have the same number of senators regardless of population considerations). Theoretically, this assured the small provinces considerable influence in a chamber of "sober second thought."⁹ However, as a final check, no act of the Canadian Parliament

became law, after it had passed both House of Commons and Senate, until it received Royal assent. In other words, Britain still maintained the power of reservation and disallowance.

The British North America Act provided that the Federal Union was to establish provisions which would not allow the central government to supersede the provinces entirely. The provinces would maintain autonomy over matters which were local or private to their regions. The French-Canadian province of Quebec took advantage of these provisions to protect its Roman Catholic school system and its right to have French as its primary language. This continued the century long tug-of-war between the Francophone and the Anglophone and, in some ways, weakened the Canadian federation.¹⁰

The new country was not created to be anti-American but, for the rest of the 19th Century, one of Canada's major concerns was to insure that the northern half of the North American continent would not be penetrated or absorbed by the monstrously hungry westward and possibly north-westward expansion of the United States. The fear was genuine since

the great population of the United States could move west faster and in greater numbers than the smaller population of Canada, especially after America finished its first intercontinental railroad.¹¹ The acquisition of Alaska in 1867 presupposed, in the minds of the new Parliament, a land link extending from the Oregon territory straight up the coast to Alaska. This had to be prevented at all costs or Canada would be cut off from the Pacific.¹²

In 1868 the first Militia Act of Confederated Canada continued the principle of liability of the male population to serve in the Volunteer Militia which usually consisted of a small Active Force and a larger inactive or Non-Permanent Force. The task of defending Canada passed to this Militia when the last British forces withdrew in 1871.¹³ Despite almost a century of occasional wars, border disputes and potential crises with their southern neighbor, the average Canadian still saw no close connection between their nation's welfare and a state of military preparedness. They simply felt no need for a large standing army because they did not feel threatened.

From 1874 to 1904, the Militia was under the command

of various British General Officers who tried to develop the Militia into a well-organized, equipped and trained second-line fighting force. Also during this time, a Permanent Force was established, the Royal Military College was started to train officers and an arsenal was built in the City of Quebec.¹⁴ Under the Militia Act of 1887, the British General Officer Commanding was an employee of the Canadian Government and not Britain. He was paid with Canadian funds and he could advise or instruct but he could not dictate policy.¹⁵ In 1904, a Militia Council was formed using the British model and it took over the duties of the General-Officer-Commanding-in-Chief and his staff.¹⁶ The principal military officer became the Chief of the General Staff. It was made clear in the Militia Act of 1904 that liability to serve in the Militia was restricted to service within Canada and for the defence of Canada. Thus the Militia officially assumed the character of a local force, intended to defend the borders of Canada and the interior, but not to take part in overseas expeditions, unless for the actual defence of Canada. Canada was content to maintain the skeleton, but not the body of an army.¹⁷

Colonel James Sutherland Brown, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, wrote an article for Canadian Defence Quarterly in 1924 in which he outlined from his personal experience and knowledge the conditions of the Militia from 1905 to 1924. By 1905, the peacetime Militia (Active and Non-Permanent) numbered 50,000 and was trained as a whole for twelve days a year. With this nucleus, the Minister of Militia and Defence believed that he could quickly raise a force of 100,000 to 200,000 soon after any hostility began which threatened the frontiers of Canada.¹⁸

In 1910, the Inspector General of the Imperial Forces, Sir John French, pointed out that the major weak link in Militia planning was the lack of qualified staff officers. As he noted, staff officers could not learn their duties after a war had broken out. They had to be intelligent, well educated, well motivated and well-paid professionals who could act efficiently in a time of crisis to coordinate all the logistics of organizing, recruiting, training, equipping and dispatching a fighting force to the area of conflict.¹⁹

As the turn of the century approached, Canadians again were reminded that their diplomatic contacts with the world and especially the United States were still managed wholly through the British Foreign Office. Some Canadians in government already knew and others began to understand that the British did not always have the Canadians' best interest at heart. Matters came to a head in 1903 in a dispute over the Alaskan Panhandle boundary. The Klondike gold rush had, as its principal access to the gold fields, the disputed Panhandle of Alaska, which itself might contain gold and whose boundary had never been established.²⁰

The Canadians claimed a boundary which put the heads of the major inlets in Canadian territory and thus guaranteed access to the sea, while the United States claimed a line that excluded Canada from the sea. A panel of six judges (three American, one British and two Canadian) found in favor of the Americans (the British judge voting with the Americans). The decision was so bitterly resented in Canada that, in 1909, the Department of External Affairs was created for the purpose of handling Canada's own foreign affairs. Feeling a need to exercise his domestic freedom

from the mother country, Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier, in 1910, concluded a reciprocal free trade agreement directly with the Americans without going through Britain.²¹

Relations between Canada and the United States began to improve because the United States looked to Canada as an outlet for investments and as a source of raw materials. As a result of the reciprocal free trade agreement, both sides profited from the arrangement which changed only slightly, in 1911, when the Conservative Party under Sir Robert Laird Borden overturned the Laurier regime.²²

Borden came to power intending to bring Canada closer to Great Britain by a larger contribution to the Imperial defence and hopefully by gaining a voice in the determination of the objective for which those forces might be used. As a part of this goal, it was agreed that organization of the units of the Dominion Forces would be modeled after those of the Home Regular Army including means of transportation. Canada agreed to adopt the Field Service Regulations and training manuals used by the Home Regular Army and to adopt as far as possible Imperial patterns of arms, equipment and stores. In essence, the Canadian

Militia would be as British as possible.²³ However, before all these details could be implemented to the satisfaction of both sides, the First World War erupted on the European continent.

Years of careful planning and preparation went out the window thanks to one man--Sir Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence for Canada. A former Colonel in the Militia and a self-proclaimed expert in all things military, he brushed aside the General Staff's contingency plans and imposed his own policy for the organization of the Canada Expeditionary Force. Hughes sent orders directly from Ottawa to officers to mobilize and to proceed to Valcartier, Quebec. He ignored the heads of the Military Districts who, as a result, had no knowledge of the military movements. The 1,500 officers and over 30,000 other ranks who gathered at Valcartier were all volunteers but without any semblance of military organization because the Active Militia had not been called up. It was a mob that had little discipline, little training, no military clothing or equipment and for which no housing provisions had been made. The chaos was not resolved until the men, divided up into brigades and

removed from the interference of Sam Hughes, were shipped off to England for formal training prior to being sent to France.²⁴ Civilian control of the military ruined years of work, planning and coordination between the Active Militia, the Non-Permanent Militia and the British Regular Army.

Canada found herself at war in 1914 through no action of her own. She had not been consulted and had not taken part in any of the diplomatic exchanges which led to the war. But she was legally committed to the war because she was part of the British Empire. However, the extent of Canadian participation was in her own hands, since the principle of autonomy had been established during the Boer War when the Canadian Government sent only a voluntary unit. The French-Canadians were strongly opposed to sending Canadians to Europe, while the rest of Canada was far more supportive of helping the mother country.²⁵

The Regular Canadian Militia was tactically trained and equipped to fight under British command and thus was sent directly to France. It was later greatly enlarged by the huge swell of volunteers who, after training in England,

began to see action in France in the spring of 1915. The Canadian government requested that Canadian units be kept together and formed into the largest formation possible. Thus the First, Second, Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions were combined to form the First Canadian Corps which, under the command of Canadian Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur Currie, was victorious at Vimy Ridge in April 1917. Although the Canadian Corps went on to win other battles, Vimy Ridge has been recognized as the signpost to the world that Canada had established herself as a nation-state.²⁶ Toward the end of the war, the British Government, under Prime Minister David Lloyd George, formed the Imperial War Cabinet, of which the Prime Minister of each of the Dominions was a member. Their proposed function was to advise on the conduct of the war and to plan for the peace. The idea of a British Commonwealth of Nations was slowly emerging as evidenced by resolutions which constituted the formation of the Imperial War Cabinet. Resolution IX stated that the British Empire was made up of self-governing nations as well as colonies.²⁷

The significance of these events in Borden's mind

was emphasized the next year by Borden when he addressed the Imperial War Cabinet on June 21, 1918. He stated:

A very great step in the constitutional development of the Empire was taken last year by the Prime Minister when he summoned the Prime Ministers of the Overseas Dominions to the Imperial War Cabinet. We met there on terms of perfect equality. We met as Prime Ministers of self-governing nations. . . . It is only a little more than fifty years since the first experiment in Federal Government was undertaken in the Empire. And from that we went on, in 1871, to representation in negotiating our Commercial Treaties, in 1878 to complete fiscal autonomy, and after that to complete fiscal control and the negotiation of our treaties. But we have always lacked the full status of nationhood. . . . Well, that day has gone by. . . . Every Prime Minister who sits around that board is responsible to his own Parliament and to his own people.²⁸

As far as Borden was concerned, his country had just won its sovereignty and his next step was to have that fact recognized by the rest of the world. The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 provided the perfect opportunity if Canada could win her own seat at the peace table.²⁹

The representatives of the United States Government (with their ingrained suspicion of British Imperialism) objected, believing that Britain was trying to pack the conference with her own puppets, but the representatives of Canada countered that she had suffered probably more deaths

during the war than the United States and was thus entitled her rightful place at the table. In the end, Canada was given the same status as smaller allied nations like Belgium. Never did Canada imagine that she could have great influence upon the European settlement; she was merely seeking recognition from the rest of the world that she was a sovereign nation.³⁰

CHAPTER 2
AN ISOLATIONISTIC COMMUNITY
CANADA 1918-1922

Back home in Canada Prime Minister Borden's hard-won overseas triumphs were seen by many to be merely symbolic and a few thought that Borden's insistence on Parliamentary ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was grandstanding.¹ The exhausted members of Parliament and the public had other concerns on their minds. Over 640,000 Canadians had served in uniform and 400,000 had gone overseas during the war. They wanted to be demobilized as soon as possible and they desired to go back to their old jobs or have new jobs provided for them. And most importantly, they wanted a War Bonus or a Discharge Bonus of between one thousand and two thousand dollars per man.² Could Canada afford to grant such a request?

Financially, Canada had emerged from the war with little damage. True, the national debt had soared from half

a billion to two billion dollars, but a large portion of that was offset by the monies owed by Britain for war materials supplied by Canada. The real cost was in human lives--60,661 dead and over 169,000 wounded. The cost in death benefits, hospital care, rehabilitation and retraining of veterans was going to be staggering. The Government was not going to be able to cover all these expenses and also pay a War Bonus of any amount. The money simply was not available.³

When the First World War ended, Canada was in a position to emerge onto the world scene as a new industrial nation. Favored by geographic location over her sister Dominions, Canada could more easily trade with Great Britain and Europe. At the same time, her annual trade with the United States approached the largest amount of trade conducted between any two nations in the world. Canada's land mass was greater than that of Australia, or even that of the United States and she had more than twice as much cultivatable land as Australia. Her riches included metals, coal, water power and timber. In the Prairie Provinces, over fifty percent of the employable men were engaged in

agriculture and their agricultural output was second only to that of the United States. Canadian industry had grown well during the war and was ready for its own industrial revolution.⁴

The first decade of the twentieth century had been marked in Canada by expansion, abundant immigration, development of railways, multiplication of towns, and substantial prosperity. But all this was abruptly interrupted by the advent of the First World War. To handle the crisis, the Union Government passed the War Measures Act, using the British model, which gave the Cabinet sweeping powers to regulate most sectors of national life. A new army of public servants moved to Ottawa to run the new agencies like the Board of Grain Supervisors, the Food Control Office, the War Trade Board and other regulatory boards created to keep the economy stable.⁵

When the war ended there was a generalized desire to return to pre-war conditions. The attitude of many Canadians was conveyed in the thought, "Forget the rest of the world, let's take care of Canada." Business wanted all the wartime regulations removed. The soldiers wanted their

old jobs back and the war-weary civilians wanted government revenue spent on social programs rather than the military. Understandably, only the businessmen seemed to win their post-war demands, largely because they already controlled the politicians, the media and public opinion. As a result, tariffs were raised to protect manufacturers, government controls were lifted for merchants and farmers and inflation was regulated. Meanwhile, the veterans' demands came to a head in Calgary in February, 1919 when a quarter of a million ex-soldiers and their supporters demanded a two thousand dollar Reestablishment Bonus. After it was announced that the projected total cost of such a bonus would come to over a billion dollars, business leaders, politicians, the public and even some veterans leaders, who had supported it, turned against the idea and it was killed.⁶

Meanwhile, the Union Government was becoming more separated from the isolationist mood of the country as it forged ahead in its effort to have Canada acknowledged as a sovereign nation. Besides winning the right to ratify and sign the Treaty of Versailles, the Union Government also won

the right for Canada to be admitted into the League of Nations on its own rather than as part of the British Empire.⁷ It was ironic that at the time that Canada was taking her place among the governments of the world at the League of Nations, the mood of the country was turning away from Europe and any entanglements in European politics. Actually, the two events that gained Canada a measure of independence--the Great War and the Paris Peace Conference--also intensified a mood of isolationism.⁸

Consistently, the Union Government was equally out of step with the public mood when it wanted to raise the strength of the Active Permanent Militia to 10,000 men. At the same time it was noted that, during the period of the Great War, the Non-Permanent Militia regiments, for all practical purposes, had ceased to function--they remained in existence largely as paper units. Maj. Gen. Sir William Otter was appointed to head a special committee, at Government request, to consider the future of the Militia and to make recommendations as to how it should be reconstructed. A not too unexpected conclusion of this committee was that one of the problems of defence in the

near future for Canada might still be the possibility of an American attack. The reasoning behind this conclusion was that the United States might be ripe for a Bolshevik-style takeover which could, in turn, threaten to spread north.⁹

As a result of elections, the Union Government went out of power in December, 1921 before it had completed a military policy to go along with its newly reorganized Militia. At that moment, the state of the Canadian military, as viewed by the Canadian military, was pathetic. The entire Royal Canadian Navy consisted of one light cruiser, two destroyers, and a couple of submarines.¹⁰ The Militia was not up to strength or adequately trained. The 1920 budget for the Militia annual drill was only \$481,000, when in 1914 it had been \$1,876,000. In 1921 the training budget rose to \$1,160,000 which was enough for the Militia to train for nine days in the field instead of the authorized thirty days.¹¹ The General Staff had wanted a law which would create a compulsory peacetime force, i.e., a standing army of some size. But the plan was dismissed immediately because of the bitter memories of the problem

produced when conscription was introduced during the Great War.¹²

For better or for worse, the mood of the country was for isolationism and disarmament. Canadians felt safe behind their Atlantic and Pacific moats. The United States was not an enemy but a friend whose navy supported the British Navy in keeping Canada secure. Canadians wanted no more European entanglements. What they really cared about was food, clothing, fuel, consumer goods and all available at a reasonable price and in abundant supply.¹³

William Lyon Mackenzie King became leader of the Liberal Party in 1919 partly because of his aversion to the military mind set. As the Leader of the Opposition Party in the House of Commons he stated, during a June 16, 1920 debate on the Militia estimates, that: "There is no world menace. The Minister says that this expenditure is needed for the defence of Canada--defence against whom? There is no answer to be made."¹⁴ The isolationistic French-Canadians loved it and gave Mackenzie King sixty-five Liberals from Quebec in the 1921 elections which, along with the support of the rest of the country, insured that he

became the next Prime Minister of Canada.¹⁵

King's domestic party loyalty affected his relations with British governments because as a Liberal he disliked Tories whether they be Canadian or English. As Stacey noted, it was just his bad luck that the Liberal Party was not in power in Britain between the two World Wars. If they had been in power, relations with Britain might have been different. Since he viewed the Lloyd George coalition as Tory in all but name, he decided to take control of foreign policy himself as soon as possible. He forced Loring Christie to resign from the Department of External Affairs so that he could run the Department himself. This he did until 1925 when he turned the Department over to Professor Oscar Douglas Skelton who had been an advisor to King at the 1923 Imperial Conference.¹⁶

Mackenzie King reflected the Canadian misgivings about the Tenth Article of the Covenant which formed the League of Nations. It read:

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise

upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.¹⁷

There was a great fear that some day this Article would force Canada into a dangerous foreign complication which might lead to war against an aggressor nation. King knew he would be hard pressed to get popular support for an action of this type, especially when he could not support it himself. Isolationism was the preferred policy, so up went the barriers to immigration to keep the infection of European politics out of Canada. In a similar vein, the Canadian Government in 1922 refused to grant a British-requested interest-free loan for the relief of famine in Russia.¹⁸ The general focus of the Canadians and their Government was inward rather than outward.

Equally disturbing was the British notion of joint responsibility for British adventures overseas, i.e., if the Empire needed Canada's help anywhere in the world, it would automatically be forthcoming. Such a situation arose with the Chanak Incident in September, 1922. On September 15, 1922, the British Government telegraphed the Canadian Government of their intention to stop Turkish aggression into Europe by holding on to Constantinople and the

Gallipoli Peninsula as a demilitarized zone according to the Treaty of Sevres, to which both Britain and Canada were signatories. This was being done to protect the British interest of keeping the Straits of the Dardanelles open and neutral. The British Government wanted to know if the Canadian Government wished "to associate themselves with the action we are taking and whether they would desire to be represented by a contingent." Mackenzie King was told of the request by the press before receiving the official request in the mail. This British carelessness of releasing the story before completing diplomatic contact with Canada annoyed King greatly as did their presumption of Canadian compliance to their request. He cabled London to say, "It is the view of the Dominion Government that public opinion in Canada would demand the authorization of Parliament as the necessary preliminary to the dispatching of a contingent to participate in conflict in the Near East." He went on to add, "the feeling of the Government is that the situation does not now call for any military participation by Canada." In essence, King had withdrawn the Canadian Government from a collective commitment to the Empire.¹⁹

The crisis passed, the Turks did not attack at Chanak and the British did not have to go to war. But Mackenzie King had discovered the convenient formula of remitting any decision involving the use of Canadian forces overseas to Parliament which thereby avoided having to make any decision at the moment. It was not a new ploy but one that would serve him well through the years.²⁰ The real problem the Chanak Incident pointed out was the continued British Foreign Office attitude toward the colonies. As James Eayrs stated:

To the men of Whitehall, the civilization of the colonies, whether newly contrived by expatriated Britain or the child of the primordial jungle, was not merely different to their own, it was inferior to it. Colonial peoples were like children and were to be treated with all the kindness and severity of the Victorian parents. [He went on to say that] Canadians exposed to the Englishman's sense of effortless superiority, his condescension, his ignorance of their people's ways of doing things, developed anti-Anglo-Saxon attitudes.²¹

Actually, Canada was in no shape militarily to help Britain at Chanak, even if they had wanted to. The general revulsion from all things military, the end of the post-war boom in 1921, and the subsequent recession had led the Mackenzie King Government, with the full approval of most

citizens, to reduce the armed forces almost to nonexistence. George Graham, the Minister of Militia and Defence, proposed a unified defence department in his 1922 National Defence bill. He proclaimed, "What I want to accomplish, if I possibly can is to have a well-organized, snappy defence force that will be a credit to Canada without being too expensive." Inexpensive was an understatement, Graham's entire 1922-23 defence budget was only \$12,242,930 (Army, Navy, and Air Force). For Canada's military, the Liberal defence policy was far more cheap than snappy.²²

It was to be remembered that the Militia Act of 1919 had been changed to increase the Permanent Force from 5,000 to 10,000 men and the Non-Permanent Militia was reorganized to consist of eleven divisions of infantry and four divisions of cavalry (about 140,000 men). In fact, however, the 1921 strength of the Permanent Militia was only 4,125 while the strength of the Non-Permanent Militia was less than 35,000.²³ In February, 1920, the Cabinet acted by an Order-In-Council (PC 395) to authorize the formation of the Royal Canadian Air Force and to start it with 1,340 officers and 3,905 airmen. By 1922, the R.C.A.F. actually had

sixty-nine officers and 238 airmen and was engaged mainly in civil flying rather than military operations.²⁴

By 1919, the Royal Canadian Navy, with its three capital ships, had been cut back to only 500 officers and men. The Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserves had been completely disbanded. When Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa Flow visited Canada in that same year he was appalled. He recommended an immediate rebuilding program to form a fleet consisting of seven cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines, three parent ships and eighteen anti-submarine patrol boats. He believed that the fleet should be in place no later than 1934 and that the R.C.N. have a minimum of 8,500 officers and men. Unfortunately, the Union Government was slow to act on the proposal and the new Mackenzie King Government slashed the 1921 Naval budget of \$2,500,000 to \$1,500,000 in 1922. The Navy would have to get by on that alone.²⁵

In 1922, Parliament passed the National Defence Act by which the Department of Militia and Defence, the Department of the Naval Service, and the Air Board were replaced by a single Department of National Defence under

one Cabinet Minister.²⁶ Unfortunately, unifying the services under the Department of National Defence made budgeting conflicts worse. Far from resolving inter-service rivalries for funds, the struggle actually intensified in the new Defence Council as the Army outranked and outnumbered the Navy and the Air Force.²⁷ For all intents and purposes, the military in Canada had been reduced to a ceremonial level and the thought of Canada sending "a contingent" to Chanak was laughable.

When the Great War ended, the general population of Canada wanted to put away forever the weapons of war. At the same time, Mackenzie King continued the process started by Borden to disengage Canada from military commitments to Great Britain or any other body which could draw Canada into another war. For the next fifteen years, this would be the central focus of Canadian policy.

CHAPTER 3
AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
CANADA 1922-1929

At the Imperial Conference of 1921, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George acknowledged that the Dominions had been fully accepted into the community of nations of the world and each had achieved full national status. The Dominions were responsible for their own local defence, had the right to control their own tariffs and could negotiate their own trade agreements. However, what had not been clarified was what part each Dominion was to play in shaping the Grand Strategy of the Empire.¹

Attending the conference for Canada was Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen who reminded Lloyd George of one fact that would influence Canadian relations with Great Britain on an ever-increasing basis over time and that fact was the closeness of the United States. He said:

Canada is a neighbor of the United States. . . . we share with them a great portion of the American

continent. Their trade with us is second in magnitude in the comparison of their trade with the countries of the world, and may easily become the first. . . . The course of the United States policy in every field affects Canada. [He then went on to make this independent assertion.] It has developed through the years not as a matter of sudden departure or acquisition but as a matter of growth out of the necessities of the case, that in the determination of questions affecting not the Empire as such and the United States, but affecting the United States and Canada, the Dominion (of Canada) should have full and final authority.²

Canada had already taken advantage of the freedom to negotiate separate treaties in 1919 when Sir Douglas Hazen, Chief Justice of New Brunswick and formerly Borden's Minister of Marine and Fisheries, negotiated two fishing treaties in Washington. Once negotiated, he signed them for Canada in conjunction with the British Ambassador in Washington. Unfortunately, neither treaty was accepted by the United States Senate. Early in 1923, a new treaty, which concerned the protection of the halibut fisheries and to which both sides had common agreement, was ready for signature. Mackenzie King seized the moment as an opportunity to show, however weakly, Canada's autonomous diplomatic position in the world by having Ernest Lapointe sign the Treaty for Canada alone on March 21, 1923.³

With this symbolic victory Mackenzie King pressed on for what he hoped would become fuller Canadian autonomy in foreign policy. He chose as his next battle ground the use of Canadian forces by the Empire for conflicts far from the shores of Canada. On February 1, 1923, Mackenzie King reminded Parliament of what he had told the Foreign Office earlier during the Chanak Incident, which was that "the Parliament of the Dominion alone must decide what part, if any, Canada would take in the active conduct of a war when her shores were not actually being attacked."⁴ On March 6, 1923, King received backing from the Opposition Party when Richard Bedford Bennett expressed the same opinion by stating that "no force can leave this country except with the consent of this Parliament."⁵

Mackenzie King carried his battle to the 1923 Imperial Conference where he challenged the idea of a common Empire foreign policy. Allied with King were the new Irish Free State and the Union of South Africa, both which wanted Imperial foreign policy ties loosened. King believed that each country of the Commonwealth should have its own foreign policy and conduct that foreign policy in accordance with

its own interests. As he asserted:

Canada has steadily widened the range of foreign affairs with which she deals through her own Parliament and Government. . . . It is not possible that this evolution which has proceeded steadily and with increasing acceptance for more than two generations should now be reversed. [He also restated his conviction that] . . . the responsibility for engaging in any war or contributing to it shall rest exclusively with the Parliament of Canada.⁶

Mackenzie King wanted two things: first, both independence (without using that word) in the use of Canadian forces overseas and in handling Canadian foreign policy; and secondly, the close relationship between Britain and Canada to continue uninterrupted in order to avoid absorption into the United States sphere of influence. King knew that Canada was not the center of the world, but as he tried to loosen the binding tie of British influence over Canada, he did not want to see Canada overwhelmed by the influence of the United States which was growing economically every day. As Stacey saw it, what King really would like to have achieved was parity in the relations with both Great Britain and the United States.⁷

For encouragement, Mackenzie King took two aides to

the 1923 Conference. One was O.D. Skelton of Queen's University and biographer of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who would become Under Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1925. Skelton deeply impressed King with his paper entitled "Canada and the Control of Foreign Policy" by stating in print what King felt in his heart. It did not matter to King that while the paper may have been good politics, it was also bad history because it ignored all the work done by Borden and Meighen at previous Imperial Conferences.⁸ In addition, King brought along John W. Dafoe, editor of the Manitoba Free Press, who was also a strong advocate of an independent foreign policy. By the close of the Conference, King had achieved what he set out to accomplish, but he did not get the support of the delegates of Australia or New Zealand who wanted closer consultation and relations between the Dominions and Great Britain in the area of foreign policy.⁹

The Foreign Office was in a position to win either way the Conference decided. Whitehall was in favor of a common Empire foreign policy only so far as it was a policy under the complete control of the Foreign Office. If the

Dominions insisted on consultation, then Whitehall would pursue its own foreign policy, while the Dominions would pursue theirs.¹⁰

Ironically, during his address to the Conference, Mackenzie King reminded the other Prime Ministers that Borden had secured the right to appoint a Canadian diplomatic representative at Washington. However, neither Borden nor his successor, Meighen, had made an attempt to make such an appointment.¹¹ If King had been so anxious to establish his own foreign policy, then why did he wait until 1927 before appointing Charles Vincent Massey to the Washington post? Stacey believed that King did not think that the appointment of a representative at Washington was very important. Even after appointing Massey, King seldom gave his Washington representative or the High Commissioner in London much work to do. As Stacey said: "When he had important business with London, he sent a Prime Minister-to-Prime Minister cable; when he had important business in Washington, he got on the overnight train and went to Washington to see the Secretary of State or the President."¹² King preferred to hold tight to the reins

of control of foreign affairs rather than have several individuals as spokespersons for Canada around the world.

Mackenzie King reaped what he had sown in 1923 with the Locarno Treaties of 1925. Negotiated, in large part by Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, and initialed by all parties at Locarno, Switzerland in October, 1925, the treaties were seen by the world as a new hope for lasting peace in Europe. In essence they were treaties of mutual assurance under which France, Belgium and Germany accepted and agreed to maintain their existing boundaries (including the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland). Great Britain and Italy would guarantee these undertakings. True to the 1923 agreement whereby Britain and the Dominions were free to pursue their own foreign policy, the British Conservative Government of Stanley Baldwin had not consulted the Dominions or invited them to take part in the negotiations. However, they had been fully informed throughout the whole process. Great Britain had gone out of its way to ensure that the Dominions were free from obligation through Article IX of the Guarantee Treaty. Article IX declared: "The present treaty shall impose no

obligation upon any of the British Dominions or upon India, unless the government of such Dominion or of India signifies its acceptance thereof."¹³

The Canadian Government was trapped. Great Britain had negotiated the treaty based on their own self interests, which was their right, ahead of the interests of the Dominions. Each Dominion was free to choose to sign on to the treaty or not. At the 1926 Imperial Conference King chose Ernest Lapointe, his French-Canadian Minister of Justice, to state that while "the treaty involves additional obligations in a European field which, while of interest to us as to all the world, is not our primary concern." Canada was not going to sign, and this moved them further away from Great Britain as far as foreign policy was concerned. Lapointe went on to point out that, even by not signing, Canada was in some ways still obligated because she was a member of the British Commonwealth. And King further declared later at the Conference that if Britain was threatened "Canada would do her part." So in a way the Canadian Government was obligated whether it liked it or not.¹⁴

Also out of the 1926 Imperial Conference came the famous Balfour definition of the relationship of Britain and the Dominions. The wording, chiefly authored by South African Prime Minister Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog, declared of the Dominions that:

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁵

Mackenzie King's primary contribution to the wording was the substitution of "autonomous Communities" for "independent states." King told Hertzog that he did not like the word "independent" because he said it would be looked upon as a parallel to that of the United States in 1776.¹⁶

It would take another five years to reduce the decisions of the Imperial Conference of 1926 to legislative form. A committee was set up to examine the changes needed to lessen Dominion subordination. Formal steps were also taken to change the position of Governors General of the Dominions as Imperial Officers and instead made them the Official Representatives of the King, appointed on the

advice of Dominion Cabinets.¹⁷

After various Dominion Parliaments had passed addresses requesting a statute to be passed by the British Parliament, the Statute of Westminster was enacted in 1931. This Act ended all legislative supremacy of the British Parliament over any Dominion Parliament and made them, when they proclaimed the Act, sovereign states sharing a common Crown. The Commonwealth had become a legal reality and Canada was finally totally autonomous from Great Britain.¹⁸ Again the word "autonomous" was used in Canada when discussing the Statute of Westminster because, as Mackenzie King had stated, the word "independence" would have provoked explosive criticism in too many quarters.¹⁹

While Canada was making such great strides in gaining freedom of action at home and abroad, the mood of a good portion of the people in Canada was in favor of disarmament at home and abroad. As a result, many Canadians gave strong support for the work of the League of Nations toward disarmament and for such agreements as the Treaty of Locarno, the Geneva Protocol, the Washington Naval

Conference, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact which was said to outlaw war.²⁰

Viscount Grey of Fallodon put the isolationists' view eloquently when he wrote:

While one nation arms, other nations cannot tempt it to aggression by remaining defenceless. The increase of armaments that is intended in each nation to produce a consciousness of the strength, and a sense of security does not produce those effects. On the contrary, it produces a consciousness of the strength of other nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts.²¹

Mackenzie King reflected the feeling of his people closely because he was one of the most unmilitary products of his unmilitary society. He hated war and all for which it stood. He was determined to cut back the budget of those who made war. The military budget, when he became Prime Minister, was \$31 million (1920-21). By 1922-23 King had slashed that budget down to \$13 million--to meet the total needs of the Army, Navy and Air Force.²²

The services were forced to make major cuts on their own. The 1925-26 budget for the Royal Canadian Air Force was \$1,880,850 which paid all the expenses to fly and maintain nine fighters and six reconnaissance planes as well

as for the pilots, ground crews and auxiliary personnel.²³ There was no money left for new equipment. Also by 1926, the Royal Canadian Navy had been reduced to only two destroyers and four minesweepers.²⁴

The Militia fared no better. In 1922-23, Militia estimates were cut restricting training to nine days, not in the field but at each local headquarters. When the budget was slashed again in 1924, the Minister of National Defence declared that the level of training was "inadequate to produce an efficient force."²⁵ Even when the old weapons and old uniforms began to show painfully obvious signs of wear, nothing was done to replace them. Everything was left over from World War I, obsolescent if not obsolete, ineffective if not useless.²⁶ Desmond Morton described the situation succinctly in his Canada and War:

Militia Battery commanders reminisced about wartime barrages and husbanded the ten rounds a year they were allotted for peacetime practice. Permanent Force sergeants became expert at detecting 'snowbirds', men who would join in the fall and desert in the spring when the drill season began. Canada's soldiers could see tanks, anti-tank guns, armored cars and machine gun carriers--but only in the newsreels. Canada had none.²⁷

Mackenzie King had forced a cutback in the military

which bordered on the criminal. True, Canada had no apparent enemy at the time, but the state to which the Permanent Force had been reduced was so low that it was questioned whether it could effectively mount a defence of Canada for any length of time. The Non-Permanent Force was in worse shape since it existed largely on paper. Some regiments, to keep a semblance of order, voluntarily turned in all their training pay from all the ranks, including officers, in order to pay for one full-time clerk. That clerk was responsible for keeping every aspect of the regiment in a state of readiness during the fifty-one weeks of the year when they were not actively training. It was only due to the public spirit of the officers and men of these regiments, many of whom could have used the training wage dearly, that the regiments even continued to exist at all.²⁸

To the Canadian soldier, it was his duty to defend the nation at whatever the cost. They knew, even if the public and the politicians were blind to the facts, that complete disarmament was just as likely to produce a war as would full standing armies. What was needed was a balance

of power produced by properly armed nations who were neither too powerful to be a threat nor too weak to be a temptation. The soldiers knew that it was human nature to put one's trust in strength and not weakness. The history of man was filled with examples of the strong plundering the weak and there was no reason to doubt that things would be any different when the next strong man came along. There was one certain fact in the minds of the leaders of the military and that was that someday, somehow, Canada's armed forces would be needed in circumstances no one could predict and it was their job to see that they would be ready.

Fortunately for the military, Colonel The Honourable James Layton Ralston was appointed Minister of National Defence on October 8, 1926. Finally, one of their own was put in charge of the military. Ralston had been a field commander in World War I. He had been wounded three times in battle, awarded the Distinguished Service Order with bar, and recommended for the Victoria Cross.²⁹

Thanks to the tireless efforts of Ralston, the military budgets slowly started to climb again. By 1929, the total was up to \$21,070,015. However, Canada, under the

Liberal Government, was not going to be thought of as the Merchants of Death, but they were at least beginning to rearm to the level whereby they might be able to defend themselves. The Great Depression soon intervened to reverse the efforts of Ralston as every sector of the economy began to suffer. Drought and grasshoppers were destroying the prairie crops. The price of wheat and all raw materials collapsed. Industry started a cycle of layoffs and tax revenues tumbled. With all of Canada's economic problems, there was not going to be enough money to rebuild the military.³⁰

CHAPTER 4

THE STRANGE CASE OF "BUSTER" BROWN

CANADA 1921-1929

Hidden under the fabric of secrecy during the 1920's was a military plan called "Defence Scheme Number One" (war with the United States). This plan was "unearthed" by James Eayrs in the early 1960's, at a time when the anti-war movement was beginning to surface in the United States because of the Vietnam War. Defence Scheme Number One and its author, Col. Sutherland "Buster" Brown, became the favorite example for any anti-military historian who wanted to show how insane the military had become in their effort to justify their existence. Eayrs comments were most biting:

The occupational disease of the military planners is a malady which might be described as 'strategist's cramp,' and its symptoms are a kind of creeping paralysis of the imagination when it comes to assessing the influence of a changing political and technical environment upon the fortunes of his country.¹

Eayrs and others appeared to give little attention to the historical background under which Defence Scheme Number One evolved. Also misunderstood was the reason for and value of strategic military contingency plans. After World War I, the Canadian Government was only interested in the intricate and disturbing economic question created by the end of that war. Industry needed to convert back to civilian production. An "army" of workers needed to be re-employed and possibly re-trained for different employment than they had before the war. Wages, prices, labor unions and employers all needed control to keep inflation in check. Economy was best achieved by cutting the military budgets and disarming the country. The isolationistic mood was very strong and so there was little thought given to the military. In one key area this was critical. The Canadian Government gave no direction to the military as to what Canadian military policy was to be after the war and what it should become in the future.²

Foremost in the minds of the General Staff was the disaster created by Sam Hughes. The General Staff wanted to avoid Ministerial improvisation should another crisis occur

in the future. It was their desire to produce as many well-developed contingency programs as possible in order to be able to maintain control of the use of military forces in a time of need.³ The guidance, as to what direction the plans should be focused, came from the British Imperial General Staff. It was their opinion that Canadian military planning should focus on two main areas: a struggle involving the Empire which would require the assemblage of a Canadian Expeditionary Force or a direct attack on Canadian soil by some outside force which would require a holding action by the Canadian Militia until the rest of the Empire could come to the rescue. Four possible threats were delineated: a European force, the United States, Japan or a combination of any of the above. It was then decided by the General Staff that three main Defence Schemes should be constructed: one for the defence of Canada against the United States, one for the defence of Canada against Japan and one for the organization and dispatch of an Expeditionary Force to help the Empire in case of a European threat.⁴

The first possible threat facing the General Staff

in 1919 was one of internal subversion or violence from either the Great War Veteran's Association or the Bolsheviks. By 1921, these two threats had evaporated. Gen. J.H. MacBrien, Chief of the General Staff, issued a memoranda urging that preparation be made immediately for an American war because this was the one contingency which would require an instantaneous response. It was assumed that there would be some warning in conjunction with an attack on Canadian soil from Japan or Europe. The General Staff therefore singled out the United States as a threat because they believed that America could possibly be susceptible to communist influence which could spill over into Canada. In addition, there was the uncertainty of what the United States would do for its own protection in the event of Canadian neutrality during a war between America and Japan. A worst case scenario would have the United States attacking Canada in combination with a international coalition attacking the British Empire.⁵

This was not to say that the Canadian General Staff actually believed that an attack by the United States was imminent or even probable. What was needed was a

contingency plan in the event of the unexpected. Strategic planning was the responsibility of the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Col. James Sutherland Brown. Brown took up his task with enthusiasm and circulated for comment a first draft of Defence Scheme Number One on April 12, 1921. Brown declared that work on "Defence Scheme Number Two" (war with Japan) and "Defence Scheme Number Three" (the dispatch of a seven-division Expeditionary Force to Europe) would proceed after the American plan had undergone final revision.⁶

Col. Brown worked on Defence Scheme Number One between December 1920 and April 1921. His two hundred page report assumed that, in the event of a war with the United States, America would send "flying columns" into Canada to capture key locations before the Canadian Militia could mobilize. Brown proposed to have similar rapidly mobilized "flying columns" which were pre-trained and ready to deploy in the event of war to seize Spokane, Seattle, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Albany, parts of Maine, and bridgeheads across the Great Lake frontiers.⁷

Brown's plan was not designed to conquer the United

States but was designed to create time until reinforcements could arrive from Great Britain and other parts of the Empire. It was assumed that the Royal Navy would still be supreme in the North Atlantic and that reinforcements would have no problem getting into Canada. However, after the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 created a parity between the United States Navy and the Royal Navy, Defence Scheme Number One had to be modified to order the attacking Canadian columns to fight a delaying/withdrawal back into Canada in the hope that eventually reinforcements would arrive to stem the American invasion.⁸

Brown believed that he had devised a plan that was the best answer to America's overwhelming size and power. On the basis of his studies at the British Army Staff College before World War I, he reasoned that Canada had to avoid a strictly defensive confrontation and instead force the United States to react to Canadian initiative by seizing key American territory. When the Americans counterattacked, the Canadians could stage a fighting withdrawal in which they destroyed major road and rail networks, bridges and all telephone/telegraph communications as they went.⁹

The first draft of Defence Scheme Number One received mixed reviews. Some officers believed it unwise to launch such an audacious attack while other officers complained that the tasks assigned to them were too difficult. However, Lt. Col. H.D.G. Crerar told a War Office conference that "Canadian prospects in a North American war would be encouraging given preparation, energy and boldness." Brig. Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, contended up to 1924 that Canada's military capability would be "far from hopeless" if the Empire acted in time. Few questioned Brown's fundamental premise of the necessity of strong and immediate Imperial assistance in response to an American incursion or that planning for such an eventuality was a waste of time.¹⁰

A number of Military District Commanders proposed to undertake field trips into their potential battlefields for the purpose of observation and reconnaissance. They were denied that right and so the task fell to the senior regimental staff officers. Here was a ready-made training exercise. On their own time and at their own expense they obtained road and rail maps of their assigned areas. Some

even ventured as far as taking scenic tours across the border and discovering how woefully inadequate road maps were in depicting terrain. Still, armed with these crude tools, hypothetical classroom exercises could be developed to improve tactical training of junior officers. During the summer camps, the regiments could also design training exercises in the capture of roads or bridges, in the destruction of roads, bridges and communications and in fighting a sustained defensive retreat. Again, all these hypothetical exercises would, in fact, closely resemble the kinds of tactics needed to carry out Defence Scheme Number One. For ten years the Militia had a clear goal and purpose for their training exercises which would have been lacking without Defence Scheme Number One.¹¹

It was realized by the General Staff that Defence Scheme Number One did not conform with the Department of External Affairs assessment of America as a friendly neighbor. It was also realized that the plan would have horrified a misunderstanding public if it had been revealed at the time, which is why it was only circulated to the senior commanders of the Militia regiments (Active and

Non-Permanent). Defence Scheme Number One was a worse case scenario of strategic planning and its use was never seriously considered as a real possibility. Gen. MacBrien did use the plan, without revealing any of its details, as a ploy to get Parliament to increase the Militia budget so that a large enough Active Force could be created to carry out the plan. His last attempt, like all the previous ones, failed in 1926.¹²

After 1926 Defence Scheme Number One was dead even though it remained in the files. The new focus of General Staff planning was Defence Scheme Number Three, the Canadian Expeditionary Force for overseas duty. Defence planners shifted their focus from preparations for home defence to preparations to establish a rapidly mobilized field force to fight beside Imperial forces.¹³ In 1931, Gen. McNaughton, the new Chief of the General Staff, officially declared Defence Scheme Number One dead and a short time later the Commanders of each of the Military Districts were ordered to destroy all copies of the plan.¹⁴

However, Defence Scheme Number One had served a very useful purpose. It was not the deranged plan of a junior

staff officer who decided single-handedly to commit the entire Canadian Militia to a foolhardy invasion of the United States. It was one of several master plans developed over the years as training exercises to give the Militia (who were left leaderless by the Government) direction, focus and purpose.

It should come as no surprise that while Brown was developing Defence Scheme Number One, his American counterparts were working on a plan to invade Canada. After the Great War, the American Army War College was reconstituted to deal with the function of the United States Army and its preparedness for war. Part of the course work called for the identification of possible enemies--either current or future--preparation of war plans against enemies, codification of all staff directions to implement the war plans and testing of those theories through a series of war games.¹⁵

War planning was the major duty of the Army War Plans Division which organized the plans, submitted them to the Chief of Staff for approval and then held them in readiness for use in case of an order from the President.

These hypothetical plans for action against specific situations were color coded, i.e., white (internal disturbances), grey (Caribbean countries), rainbow (League of Nations), red (Britain), orange (Japan), green (Mexico), black (Germany), and blue (a master plan to meet any possible combination of enemies). The plans, which had little relation to contemporary international, political or military alignments, outlined probable scenarios and directed the missions to be accomplished with the resources at hand.¹⁶

The originals of almost all these plans were produced as classroom exercises of the War College. The 1919-20 class studied Canada under the heading of "Activities of Committee Number One"(sic). The students contacted the Chief of the Engineers for information about the geography of the border areas of Canada and the Military Intelligence Division of the Army supplied an estimation of Canadian military strength. One of the students, Maj. H.C. Platt, drew up a set of plans based on the information gathered. It was a very poor first attempt due to the lack of good intelligence.

Members of the next class did better. Col. J.M. Dunn, Col. H.B. Black and Col. E.D. Peele reported on the road conditions in Canada from Quebec to North Hadley, via Sherbrooke based on visual observations. The 1921-22 class did a study of airdromes and radio stations and then redrafted the plans for invasion of Canada to concentrate on seizing control of the St. Lawrence.¹⁷ The plan was updated each year as was the plan for each of the other countries or situations listed earlier. It was ironic that by 1928, Canada had been assigned its own color (crimson) but in 1929 the faculty and students of the War College were ordered no longer to cross the border into Canada for reconnaissance.¹⁸ One wonders what Eayrs would have thought had he uncovered the activities of the Army War College at the same time that he made his discovery about Col. Brown. In reality, the actions of Col. Brown and the American War College students were routine staff exercises on which could be built a framework for war games, militia exercises or actual combat assignments.¹⁹ For the Americans, these exercises continued until early 1942. By the late 1930's, planning for the overseas operations was tabled because of the political

climate in the United States. Only exercises involving Canada (crimson) and Mexico (green) continued. In fact, on the eve of World War II, the Army's main field exercise was a mythical invasion of Mexico while a combined Army/Navy operation focused on repelling an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Honolulu in Hawaii.²⁰

But for all of Col. Brown's behind the scene activity which produced material that was used to a positive advantage in Militia training exercises, there remained the cold fact that the average Canadian soldier felt abandoned. Brig. Gen. J.A. Gunn wrote in Canadian Defence Quarterly in 1925, that although Canada faced no actual enemy, things could change rapidly. In his opinion the state of readiness of the Militia was poor because of the lack of governmental support. He was disappointed to see so many officers and men disheartened after they had given so much of their time, energy and resources. As he said: "Only deep belief in the value of the Canadian Militia and true patriotism to the British Empire had kept these soldiers faithful to the Service. They cannot go on in this condition much longer."²¹

Gen. Gunn also observed that the 3,000-man level of the Permanent Force could only be 50 percent efficient in meeting the needs of Canada. A 5,000-man force--the level authorized before 1919 and half the size of the force authorized after 1919--would be about 90 percent efficient. It would take a force approaching 10,000 men to meet all the prescribed responsibilities of the Canadian Militia.²²

On March 8, 1926, Gen. Sir Arthur W. Currie, the Commander of the First Canadian Corps in World War I (the unit that gained the great victory at Vimy Ridge) delivered a speech to the Canadian Club in Montreal. In it he echoed the call to support the Canadian Militia. He saw the Militia soldier as a man with a desire to serve his country which would lead that man to adopt what would become a second profession. The Militia was moved by tradition, patriotism and the call of duty. He went on to observe:

The maintenance of a Defence Force is not a large premium for Canada to pay for the insurance of national security. . . . It is unreasonable then that we should not do our share by maintaining in adequate fashion the civilian force which has never failed us in the past [and] which will never fail us in the future.²³

The frustration of the military in its battle with

the Mackenzie King Government for some kind of direction and support was stated by Gen. MacBrien, the Chief of Staff, in a memorandum dated October 4, 1926. In the memorandum he made this clear declaration:

We have had no clear statement of military policy since 1905. Certain policies and conclusions arrived at between 1914 and 1918 were effective only for the War. It is desirable that the Canadian Government should decide on the size of the military force it is prepared to maintain in peace, which for sound military reasons should be of sufficient size to form a nucleus to absorb, command, organize, train and put in the field the manpower of this country.²⁴

Unfortunately for MacBrien and his successor no such direction ever came. When Gen. McNaughton became the Chief of Staff in 1929, the state of military preparedness was still declining. When McNaughton retired in 1935, the Militia was barely capable of the home defence and lacked the modern weapons to fight anywhere in the world. The Militia was probably in the worst shape it had ever been during the first third of the twentieth century.²⁵

CHAPTER 5
AN ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED COMMUNITY
CANADA 1930-1935

The Great Depression hurt Canada as much as it did the rest of the world. But it also completed a process which began during the Great War. That process involved a Canadian shift of economic focus and dependence from the United Kingdom to the United States. A shift which Britain was forced to encourage because of her sagging economic strength. When the war began, Britain had agreed to finance the Canadian war costs for food and war supplies for her troops overseas. However, by mid-1915, the British Government had to turn to the Canadian Government to raise a loan to meet the rising British war debt. As a result, Canada sought United States financial support. In 1917, after the United States entered the war, the American Government started loaning money directly to Britain through the New York banks, while the government of the United

Kingdom was asking Canada to underwrite all shipments of foodstuffs to England. Ironically, as G.L. Granatstein pointed out, the more Canada tried to help the Mother Country, the deeper she became financially entangled with the United States. By the end of the war, Canada had become almost completely caught up in the American economic orbit.¹

During the mid-twenties, Canada enjoyed her share of the spiraling North American boom. There was money to be spent on American cars (mass produced at Oshawa and Windsor, Ontario), American movies and American jazz. Some Canadians were as interested in the fate of American baseball teams, the adventures of American movie stars or the antics of gangland heroes as they were in their own affairs. Unfortunately, the boom started to go bust in Canada before it did in the United States. In 1928, the wheat farmers of Canada brought in their largest crops ever but the world market could only buy four-fifths of it and, as a consequence, many farmers suffered financial ruin. Canadian paper mills and mines were also overproducing which drove down prices and profits. With the decline in shipments of

agricultural goods, paper products and ores, the railroads suffered. Soon, the downward spiral hit the automobile manufacturers and the home builders. By 1930, a year after the United States stock market crash, Canada was in its worst depression, one which would last almost ten years.²

The Provincial Premiers needed financial help from the Federal level but since all except two of them were Conservatives, Mackenzie King was reluctant to shoulder the financial burden. He was not going to aid the opposition parties and he refused to amend the British North America Act to allow the provinces the subsidies that they needed.³ King called for Federal elections that summer because he believed that most people wanted the central government to remain in control and because he felt confident of his political position even though he had no new programs to alter the worsening economic situation. Not unexpectedly, the economic disaster cost King the 1930 election. The Canadian economy was too dependent on exports of primary products such as wheat, newsprint, ores, etc. and the loss of export markets due to a cutback in orders which forced manufacturers to begin employee layoffs. Unemployment

within the trade unions went from less than four percent in September 1929 to over ten percent in June 1930 and threatened to continue to rise. The average Canadian could see what was coming and was not sure if the central government would respond at all. As a result, the Conservatives resoundingly defeated the Liberals. On August 7, Richard Bedford Bennett became the eleventh Prime Minister of Canada, to a large extent because he had promised action. Unfortunately, the Great Depression would drive Bennett from office only five years later, possibly as the most unpopular Prime Minister in the history of Canada.⁴

He certainly was not helped by the fact that he was a millionaire, a bachelor, a loner, not highly educated, besides being very sensitive to ridicule. He was accused of being a one-man government since, in the first year and a half of office, he added to his responsibilities as Prime Minister those of Secretary of State for External Affairs and Minister of Finance. Bennett seldom consulted his Cabinet Ministers or listened to their advice. Being a workaholic helped but the burden was more than any one man

could carry because there was not one area of the economy or one part of the country that did not cry out for immediate help. As a result, once again foreign policy had to take second place to the economy.⁵

Immediately following the elections, a confident Bennett called a special session of Parliament to handle the crisis. They voted twenty million dollars (out of a total federal budget of \$500 million) for emergency relief work and entrusted the administration of the spending to the provinces and municipalities (which was normal policy). During the 1920's, the provinces had taken on the responsibility of social welfare and relief costs within their localized areas. Suddenly, the Depression made these expenses unbearable even with a share of the twenty million dollar emergency fund. The provinces were going to need massive amounts of aid from a central government that was still trying to pay off its World War I debt. Money was going to become so scarce that by 1934 the relief aid was too low to make much of an impact on the average community.⁶

Unfortunately for Prime Minister Bennett, a good

number of the woes of Canada in the early 1930's were beyond the control of any man. For instance, the Prairie Provinces were hit hard by a seven-year drought, a grasshopper plague and wheat rust. This produced the bleak news to the 1930 graduation class of an Edmonton high school that not more than five percent of them would be able to find immediate employment.⁷

Another more important and far-reaching economic problem, which quickly went out of control, was the start of "tariff wars." On June 17, 1930 President Herbert Hoover signed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Bill into law. This he did over the protests of a thousand American economists and the warning from William Phillips (the American Minister to Canada) that the measure would drive Canada back to the British economic sphere and delay the opportunity of establishing a continental partnership. The heart of this politically self-serving Bill was 890 changes in existing revenue laws, which mainly benefitted the farmer, by raising tariffs an average of 30 percent. Bennett chose, in retaliation, to introduce the sharpest tariff increase in Canadian history. Included were tariffs on iron, steel,

machines and textiles. As Phillips had warned, Canada returned to British preferred rates.⁸

The protectionist policy undoubtedly saved some Canadian firms from bankruptcy and protected some Canadian jobs. But the policy also seriously inhibited recovery in the base areas of the economy that depended upon exports. In addition, the preferential tariff agreements with the United Kingdom increased trade within the Commonwealth while severely limiting import/export markets for Canada outside the Commonwealth. As the Depression steadily deepened, resentment within the business community rose against the Government because its policies were not working.⁹

Naturally, all this legislative activity did not help either the United States or Canada. The Depression deepened, exports continued to decline and unemployment grew in both countries. By 1932, almost a quarter of Canada's labor force was unemployed, including 70,000 single men. A year later Canadian national income had been cut almost in half. Bennett was desperate to reverse the tariff war and began negotiating a new trade agreement with the United States.¹⁰

Bennett used the 1930 Imperial Conference to focus on Imperial trade preferences, urged Britain to abandon free trade and to install a system that favored the Commonwealth. With great sensitivity, Canada tried to protect her home producers while not excluding foreign goods. Preference would be given to Imperial producers when there was no threat to home producers. In fact, Canada indicated willingness to lower certain tariffs in exchange for export of Canadian wheat.¹¹

Two other events transpired at the 1930 Imperial Conference. The first was Canadian reaffirmation of the work of the 1926 Imperial Conference leading to the Statute of Westminster. The British Government had hoped that the Canadian Conservative Government would change its mind and continue to allow London to have the final say on amendments to the Canadian Constitution. However, Bennett chose to take no action that would be inconsistent with the wishes of the Canadian Parliament. The other event saw Bennett attending a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, which Canada had routinely avoided so as not to appear to imply some general commitment to British military

arrangements. During the meeting, the British again asked that the Dominions make themselves responsible for the immediate reinforcement, at the outbreak of war, of particular areas outside their own territory. The idea horrified Bennett who later requested that his name be removed from the official minutes of the meeting and instead have it noted that he was there only as an unofficial observer.¹²

When King George V assented to the Statute of Westminster on December 11, 1931, a century long process had reached its logical conclusion. Six Dominions were given complete legislative autonomy once their Parliaments accepted the Statute. Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State had already accepted while Australia and New Zealand did so in 1942 and 1947, respectively. But, unfortunately for Newfoundland, the Depression caused it to declare bankruptcy and ask the United Kingdom to take over financial (and essentially legislative) control in 1933. For Canada, this meant that Imperial review of federal legislation was abolished and that Canada now had full diplomatic powers (as any independent country would).

Canada became an autonomous country which shared its monarch and its citizenship with the United Kingdom. However, the Provinces got a codicil in the Statute which still required any amendment to the British North America Act to be approved by the British Parliament.¹³

Few of Canada's by now ten million people noticed the significance of the Statute of Westminster. The urban unemployed, the rural poor, the farmers driven by drought and dust, the underpaid teachers and social workers, the ruined businessmen and the labor leaders all considered this a time of struggle. But perhaps the greatest struggle was between the national and local governments over ways to ease the burden of these people. Ideas were few and rhetoric was plentiful, so little got done. Unemployment climbed to its highest level in 1933 when 826,000 were without work. Over and above this figure was the unknown number of those underemployed.¹⁴

Canada had gone off the gold standard in 1929 so, therefore, Bennett believed that the best way to manage the money supply was to create a central bank. This proved important because production in Canada's largest industries

had slowed to a virtual trickle. Only thirty-one railcars were produced in 1933 and no locomotives (an 88 percent drop in production). Automobile production dropped from 128,496 in 1929 to 30,606 in 1933 and trucks and buses dropped from 25,762 to 6,062. The net result was that, with fewer goods in production and fewer workers producing, there was less money in circulation and thus the need for tighter regulation to keep both prices and interest rates down.¹⁵

Prime Minister Bennett's first attempt to improve relations with the United States and hopefully put a lot of Canadians back to work was the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty of 1932. The project had as its goal to make a continuous water highway from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Ocean. The various sections of the canal system would be connected by a series of locks. The project was to cost Canada \$270,976,000 and the United States \$272,453,000. Unfortunately, the project was dead before it could get started. It was rejected by the United States Senate and opposed by the Premiers of Ontario and Quebec.¹⁶

In 1932, the Chief of the General Staff, Maj. Gen. McNaughton, proposed that the Department of National Defence

establish and administrate unemployment relief camps for single, homeless, unemployed men. There was a fear that since the men were not eligible for relief they would crowd into the cities and create trouble. On the other hand, those who reported to the camps would be clothed, housed and fed in exchange for useful work. By June 1933, over eight thousand men had enrolled. Even though the army was in complete charge of all aspects of the camps, they did not insist on military discipline and, in fact, those in charge wore civilian clothes. This was not going to be a covert way of increasing the Militia. Unfortunately, the lax control did not produce a sense of esprit de corps. Many of the men felt abandoned by their country and humiliated by their slave wages.¹⁷

By 1934, the camps had become hotbeds of protest as the men, paid twenty cents a day, got tired of what they saw as meaningless tasks such as building roads to nowhere and airstrips for aircraft that did not exist. Actually, the true significance of all their work would not become apparent until after the start of the Second World War. In 1935, a group of these "Twenty Centers," worked up by

Communist agitators, left their camp and marched on Vancouver, British Columbia demanding a fifty-cent-a-day wage. Failing to arouse enough attention, they jumped eastbound freight trains and headed toward Ottawa. On July 1, the protesters, now two thousand strong, had reached Regina, Saskatchewan where they were forcefully dispersed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The days of the work camps clearly were numbered. The wheels of industry had begun to turn again in early 1936, so the camps could be phased out of existence. But to their credit they gave work to 170,291 single men over their four year lifetime.¹⁸

Prime Minister Bennett took to the airwaves with a series of five radio addresses to the nation in January 1935. Without consulting his Cabinet or caucusing his party, he announced sweeping "New Deal" type reforms. He believed that the economic system had to be brought under control in order to create employment and end the dole. Men had to be taken off welfare and put back to work. The whole economic system had to be changed to preserve it from complete failure. Unfortunately, Bennett failed to consult the members of his own Conservative Party before launching

what may have been a desperate bid for reelection. By choosing to call his reforms "New Deal," Bennett sounded like a radical American which did not sit well with some Canadians. But Bennett lunged ahead and submitted five specific measures to the Parliament: unemployment insurance, minimum wages, maximum hours, marketing boards and the extension of federally-supported farm credit. Conservatives felt that this was socialism; Liberals denounced it as a pre-election ploy; and businessmen were appalled at the creation of an economic dictatorship in Ottawa. Reluctantly, Parliament passed the five measures before dissolving for the elections. Many in Parliament believed that the measures were unconstitutional and would be struck down by the courts. They were right.¹⁹

The elections in October turned into a public opinion poll on how much change the Canadian people thought the country needed. While R.B. Bennett was losing support within his own party for additional reforms, Mackenzie King was advocating that no further action be taken. What King did not tell the people was that he really had no policy. He believed that most of what Bennett proposed or had

enacted was beyond the limit of what Parliament could do under the British North America Act. King was also absolutely opposed to amending the Act to allow Parliament more freedom. The only thing King promised was to end the chaos and the marches on Ottawa, but he never explained how this would be accomplished. Caution was King's mantle--caution in governmental intervention in the social economy, caution in changing dominion/provincial relations and caution in foreign policy, especially if it meant war. King would let Parliament decide these key issues relieving him of the burden of making the decisions himself.²⁰

In reality, no party in power at this point of Canadian history could have won reelection. What was surprising was that while the Liberal Party won a huge majority of seats in Parliament, its overall popular vote was a minority. The Liberals won 173 of the 245 seats in the House of Commons while receiving only 45 percent of the popular vote. The Conservative Party retained only thirty-nine seats while receiving 30 percent of the votes. The important difference was the emergence of multiple-minority parties which captured 25 percent of the

popular vote and gained thirty-three seats in the House of Commons. These parties included the socialist Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, the pro-Quebec Union Nationale Party, the Alberta-based Social Credit Party, and a reformist Reconstruction Party. The people had spoken. Slightly over half of the electorate wanted change but they were greatly divided on what kind of change. The other half of the electorate wanted a status quo and that is what they got. The Liberal Party also returned Liberal governments to seven of the nine provincial legislatures in the 1935 election.²¹

It should come as no surprise, with 25 percent of the work force unemployed and the government ransacking its budgets to find over a billion dollars to pour into relief aid between 1929 and 1936, that the defence budget would be the obvious place to rob. Since Army Gen. McNaughton was the Chief of Staff, he saw to it that the budgets for the Air Force and Navy were the most severely cut. The 1931-32 Air Force budget was \$4,130,000, but dropped to \$1,730,000 for the 1932-33 budget, and \$1,684,000 for the 1933-34 budget. It did not start to go up again until the 1934-35

budget which was \$2,262,000, while the 1935-36 budget rose again to \$3,777,000.²² The Canadian Parliament's lackadaisical attention to basic military preparedness flew in the face of some very ominous warnings sounded at the time.

Flight Lieutenant G.R. Howsam, writing for the Canadian Defence Quarterly, warned in 1931 that it was no longer improbable for Canada to be attacked from the air. Carrier-borne aircraft could assist landing forces in the capture of several Pacific Coast islands. These islands then could be converted to airfields for long-range bombers. In 1931, Canada had no defence against such an attack. As Howsam pointed out, Canada had only a few obsolete fighters, no bombers and no anti-aircraft guns. He went on to note that it was the sense of the Imperial Conference of 1926 that each part of the Empire was responsible for providing its own protection. For that protection he recommended the immediate production of modern fighters to shoot down enemy bombers and bombers to hit enemy carriers well out to sea.²³ But, the Government was not going to listen to a lowly flight lieutenant.

On the other hand, British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin addressed the same subject when he spoke to the British House of Commons on November 10, 1932. He had this to say about future wars:

There is no greater cause of that fear than the fear of the air . . . fear of being killed or seeing a wife or child killed from the air. . . . In the next war you will find that any town which is within reach of an aerodrome can be bombed within the first five minutes of war from the air. Whatever people may tell you, the bomber will always get through. . . . I will not pretend that we are not taking our precautions in this country. Any Government in the world under the present circumstances would be guilty of criminal negligence had they neglected to make their preparations.²⁴

Finally, Judge Uriah McFadden, writing in Canadian Defence Quarterly, asked the question:

Does not the recent achievement of Italy of landing a fleet of aeroplanes at Chicago show that the mighty Atlantic cannot control the air? What Italy has done, other countries can do. [He went on to warn] It is not beyond the realm of probability that some envious power may look on Canada with her vast resources as a country of easy conquest.²⁵

But the Canadian Air Force budget remained at a level which allowed for no new plane purchases.

At the same time, the Royal Canadian Navy was in equally dire straits. In 1931, the R.C.N. had a total of

four destroyers (two old Canadian and two new British). By 1933, the Chief of the General Staff, Gen. McNaughton had recommended that \$2 million dollars should be cut from the Naval budget of \$2,422,000. Unfortunately, the \$422,000 would not even meet the payroll.²⁶ It was to be remembered that by 1934 Viscount Jellicoe had recommended that the R.C.N. consist of seven cruisers, twelve destroyers, six submarines, eighteen patrol boats and three parent ships. Canada was not prepared to defend her own shores or ports from naval intrusion with a budget of only \$422,000. Gen. McNaughton believed that Canadian coasts and ports could be adequately protected from the air although he refused to allow the Air Force sufficient funds to meet the challenge. The Chief of Naval Staff, Commodore Walter Hose went to the Minister of National Defence, Dr. D.M. Sutherland, in protest. After much debate within the office of the Minister of National Defence and the House of Commons, the 1933-34 Naval budget was passed at \$2,222,000.²⁷

With Gen. McNaughton as Chief of the General Staff, the Militia should have been sound, but it was not. By the

end of 1931, Canada's Militia was at its lowest point in the twentieth century. The Permanent Force was very under strength at 3,688. The Non-Permanent Active Militia barely existed. There was no pay, save an occasional streetcar ticket or cup of coffee and sandwich in thanks for their meeting the country's military responsibilities. It took a strong public spirit to keep these men going, especially when the pacifists grew louder in their anti-military rhetoric. Officers had to provide their own full-dress uniforms which cost about one hundred dollars each. Regimental clerks, sometimes paid by voluntary contributions from the soldiers themselves kept up with the mountain of paperwork needed to organize the once-a-weeknight training classes and the once-a-year field exercises.²⁸

The Permanent Force was trained using British Regular Army manuals, tactics and, where possible, equipment. To qualify for higher rank a Permanent Force officer had to take exams that were checked by the War Office in London. The end result was that the Permanent Force was British through and through. These regulars were then, in turn, used to train the Non-Permanent Active

Militia. Sadly, there were very few veterans of World War I left to give the training a proper prospective, especially when the training was no longer carried out in the field during the summer. There was no money to pay for it. The N.P.A.M. budget for 1930-31 was \$2,324,000 and for 1931-32 was \$2,606,000 which averaged out to only fifteen dollars per man per year. Training had to be accomplished at the local armories which tended to be barren of supplies. Artillery practice was with the garrison ceremonial guns for which there was no live ammunition. Nothing frustrated Gen. McNaughton more than the lack of production of ammunition. Since almost all munitions production plants had been converted to other purposes because of the tenor of the isolationistic times, most ammunition, from small to large caliber, had to be purchased from the United Kingdom. In 1930, it was estimated that it would cost thirty-five million dollars to build the munitions complex needed to supply the yearly requirements of the Canadian military. Neither the money nor the interest was there to get the project off the ground.²⁹

The 1933-34 Militia budget reached an all-time

post-war low. The Permanent Force was to receive \$4,910,034 and the N.P.A.M. was to receive \$1,994,000. With that kind of funding, Militia training was focused mainly on officers and certain specialists. However, a large number of units carried out additional training at the regimental level on their own time and without pay because, in most cases, Canadian national pride and spirit had no monetary barriers.³⁰

The situation in Europe was beginning to change and as a result, the Empire was advised to begin re-arming as a precaution. In 1933, the Canadian Militia was notified that the British General Staff had abandoned its ten-year-rule, i.e., that the United Kingdom would not be involved in a major war for at least a decade. But Prime Minister Bennett ignored the warnings and continued to cut funds from the military to pay for needed social programs elsewhere. Finally, just before retiring, Gen. McNaughton wrote a memorandum entitled "The Defence of Canada." In it he candidly presented the dismal situation of the military, that being the fact that Canada was virtually defenseless. His list of deficiencies was appalling. Other than obsolete

World War I rifles and ammunition, the common soldier had no weapons. There was not a single modern anti-aircraft gun in Canada. The stock of artillery shells available would last about ninety minutes under combat conditions. Coastal defence was almost nonexistent. The Royal Canadian Air Force had only twenty-five planes which were solely be used for training. There was not a single bomb to drop on anybody.³¹ McNaughton's report had little time to impact the Bennett Government before Mackenzie King became the new Prime Minister. However, world events were about to start producing changes anyway.

The most immediate and significant change came in trade with the United States. This was a holdover from the Bennett administration which, in the spring of 1933, had begun negotiations on a reciprocal trade agreement. President Franklin D. Roosevelt could not respond to Bennett until he could get Congress to pass the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, which was signed into law on June 12, 1934. To Bennett's dismay, part of the new law required that a Committee for Reciprocal Information had to hold public hearings which were not begun until March 1935. Bennett

lost his hope to present the voters with a signed trade agreement before the election. The American slow pace of action or, as some believe, deliberate delay until after the Canadian elections, allowed Mackenzie King to take credit for Bennett's work.³²

Less than a month after taking office, King signed the Canadian-American Trade Agreement in Washington. Canada and the United States gave each other most-favored-nation status in trade. While Canada kept her other agreements with the United Kingdom, the clear shift in trade was to the United States. Over time Canadian-American trade was to grow to enormous proportions. By mid-1939, the United States provided 60 percent of the foreign capital invested in Canada while Britain had 36 percent. At the same time, Canada exported 20 percent more to the United States than it did to England and imported four times as much from the United States as from Britain. From this point, Canada's economic focus was primarily on the United States and ever decreasingly with Great Britain. By the start of World War II, Canada would not only be looking to the United States economically, but militarily and politically as well.³³

CHAPTER 6
A DIVIDED COMMUNITY
CANADA 1935-1939

The new Mackenzie King Government was sworn in on October 23, 1935. King was determined to keep his promise of "no precipitate action" by which he meant no social legislation, limited government expenditure, no military build-up, limited political involvement with Great Britain and the Commonwealth and no entanglements in European problems. The Canadian-American Trade Agreement negotiations gave King the perfect opportunity to go to the other North American center of Isolationism, Washington, D.C.

Some weeks later, on November 8, King was an overnight guest at the White House. Roosevelt ended the evening with the announcement that King could feel free to pick up the telephone and talk to the President freely from that point on. Thus began a new and auspicious relationship

between Roosevelt and King which would overshadow anything King had ever had with a British Prime Minister.¹

Occurring at the same time as this triumph was the potentially disastrous Ethiopian crisis. During the last weeks of the Bennett administration, Italian aggression against Ethiopia threatened the peace of Europe and would prove the deathblow to the League of Nations. By this time, Canada had become experienced at fleeing commitments to both the Empire or the League of Nations. Separated from the sordid diplomacy of Europe by the Atlantic, Canada enjoyed the luxury of near disarmament while lecturing the delegates to the League of Nations on the necessity for world peace.² In the spring of 1934, Conservative A.D. McRae moved the following resolution in the Senate: "That this House is of opinion that Canada should withdraw from membership in the League of Nations, and that no further money should be voted to the League." Behind his resolution, which died from lack of strong support, was the fear that Article X of the League Covenant could obligate Canada to go to war.³

So it was, with little respect for the institution

of the League of Nations and little experience in foreign affairs, that Canada found itself confronted with the Italian/Ethiopian crisis. The Canadian Government had no firsthand knowledge of what Mussolini was going to do because it did not have its own legation in Rome as was its right after the passage of the Statute of Westminster. The Canadian Department of External Affairs chose to rely upon the British Foreign Office for its intelligence. This intelligence was naturally slanted in the direction of British foreign policy which, in this case, was considering backing the League of Nations in its attempt to invoke sanctions against Italy before Italy actually attacked Ethiopia. There was always the danger that Italy might retaliate and attack Britain in some way. The thought of Canada being dragged into a war with Italy was horrifying, especially coming in the midst of a general election. Mackenzie King and his lieutenant, the Minister of Justice, Ernest Lapointe, vocally attacked the idea by saying that they were strongly opposed to being drawn into any war, that Canada had no interest in Ethiopia and that the crisis was not worth the life of a single Canadian citizen.⁴

The Canadian representative to the League of Nations was Howard Ferguson, the High Commissioner in London. He was assisted by Walter A. Riddell, who had been the Advisory Officer at Geneva for ten years. Ferguson asked the Bennett administration for instructions. The reply came from O.D. Skelton, who had remained as the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. Skelton felt that no statement should be made. Bennett disagreed and told Ferguson to support the British and French proposals. The League of Nations failed to act quickly enough to prevent the October 3rd attack of Italy on Ethiopia. The League of Nations then declared that Italy was in violation of the League Covenant and thus warranted sanctions. Ferguson voted in favor of the resolution and appointed Riddell (on October 10) to represent Canada on the Co-ordinating Committee which would determine which sanctions would be applied. After the October 15 victory of Mackenzie King, Ferguson returned to London to resign. Riddell was left as Canada's representative at the League of Nations.⁵

Riddell, acting against the orders of Skelton, drafted one of the five proposals on sanctions submitted to

the General Assembly on October 19 for action on October 28. Mackenzie King reluctantly agreed to what had been done to that point but insisted that no new actions be taken. On November 2, Riddell participated in discussions concerning further sanctions to be added to those already proposed against Italy. Riddell suggested that the vital commodity of oil be added to the list. This "Canadian Proposal" was flashed around the world by the press at Geneva. Mackenzie King told the House of Commons that he was amazed to read of it in his Monday morning newspaper.⁶

It was subsequently announced that Riddell had spoken on his own initiative and not on behalf of the Government of Canada. Riddell tried to defend himself with the excuse that he was operating with meager instructions and no basic statement of policy as a guideline. King replied to Riddell that the action he took was not in conformity with Canadian interests and not within the scope of his authority. Riddell was recalled and all Canadian support for sanctions ceased. Riddell later wrote that, "It was a time when the international situation was still fluid, when aggression could have been halted, and World War II

might have been prevented."⁷ Mackenzie King had no interest in the problems of Ethiopia and was deeply annoyed that he and his Government had been placed in a position to be criticized at home and abroad. His Government was going to focus on the problems at home and ignore the rest of the world. King told the House of Commons: "This is such a thing as a sense of proportion in international affairs as in all else. Do honorable members think that it is Canada's role at Geneva to attempt to regulate a European war?"⁸

On the one hand, the Ethiopian crisis did point out that Canada could become involved in another European conflict despite all her best efforts to stay neutral. It was, therefore, in Canada's best interest to be somewhat prepared militarily. When Ian Mackenzie became the Minister of National Defence, he did an immediate inventory of the situation. He reported to Mackenzie King that the state of the Militia was "astonishing and atrocious." He urged that the Prime Minister quadruple the defence budget. King disagreed because the Canadian economy had not sufficiently recovered from the Depression to warrant such an increase and there was the danger that the Canadian people might

interpret such a move as a prelude to war. King chose the middle ground of a gradual military build-up to satisfy the extremes within the House of Commons--the Conservatives wanted a massive build-up while those in the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation wanted no build-up at all.⁹

On the other hand, Mackenzie King wanted to make one thing clear. Any use of the Militia, whether in support of the Empire or in Canadian self-defence, would only result from a direct action of the Parliament. However it was not clear, if some part of the Empire were attacked, whether Canada would come to their aid. If Canada did not, then it would sever the last ties to the Commonwealth. The Isolationists supported this concept of "Canada First." But they did not think it through to its conclusion. Without the protection of the Empire, Canada would have only the United States to protect her in the event of a direct military confrontation. If that happened, it would not be long before Canada would be absorbed into the United States. Lt. Col. E.L.M. Burns said: "Our forces are poorly equipped and trained because so few Canadians are interested in defence questions, and few Canadians are interested

because there is no enemy at our gates." The public was far more concerned with "sovereignty" rather than "security" and thus did not understand the broad problem of defence.¹⁰

What the military wanted was not the creation of a large army, but to maintain the possibility of creating a large army on a reasonable notice. In reality, the raison d'etre of the Militia was not for direct defence of Canada but rather indirect defence outside of Canada against a foe that threatened to interfere with Canada's economic livelihood. However, after Germany violated the Versailles Treaty by repossessing the Rhineland in 1936, the threat to world peace increased. Canada said nothing because Mackenzie King believed that silence was golden. As he told a fellow member of Parliament, "as little as possible of the European situation (Italy or Germany) should be discussed as possible." It was King's decision to have nothing to do with European politics. He explained the lack of discussion of the European problems as being "due to our slow emergence from the colonial attitude of mind, our relative immunity from any serious danger of war, our preoccupation with achieving economic recovery and the unparalleled complexity

of our position as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations."¹¹

Mackenzie King was walking a fine line. He wanted to stay out of European entanglements while still remaining a responsible member of the world community. He knew that he needed to begin to rearm Canada, but he did not want to alarm the Isolationists. He also wanted to remain a faithful member of the Commonwealth which required a stronger military while deepening the relationships with the United States which was strongly isolationistic. In King's mind, all these things were compatible and achievable.¹²

The military, however, believed their task to be absolutely impossible. By 1936 the General Staff was in such dire straits for money that there was a freeze on any new recruits for any of the services. Some of the Non-Permanent units were at skeleton levels. For example, the Grenadier Guards had eighty-nine men who were recruited before the freeze went into place. They also had seventy-eight men who only had a year's service experience. This left the regiment with a mere thirty-six officers and thirty-one other ranks who were "veterans." That made a

total of 234 men in a regiment which should have had over eight hundred.¹³

As a way of increasing the military budget without arousing too much attention, the Department of National Defence decided to reorganize the Militia. The Militia would be reduced from eleven infantry divisions down to six infantry divisions and one cavalry division. In turn, the 135 infantry and machine gun battalions would be reduced to six tank and eighty-five infantry and machine gun battalions. The thirty-five cavalry regiments would be reduced to twenty, of which four would be armored car units. The reorganization was more in line with the actual forces on hand--6,888 officers and 41,873 other ranks (Permanent and Non-Permanent forces).¹⁴

Military planning now shifted to Defence Scheme Number Three, the Canadian Expeditionary Force. The plans called for this force to be a rapidly mobilized force which could move quickly to anywhere ordered. Unfortunately, what was missing in all these plans was the availability of modern weapons, ammunition and, in particular, transportation. Also crucial was the need for stepped-up

training. With the large number of new recruits and lack of seasoned veterans, the regiments had to start all over again to create new cohesive units. This process would take time, but time that the budget was not willing to pay for. The 1936-37 Militia budget was \$7,904,700, which was only \$1,066,700 more than the low 1932-33 budget. At first all the action involved bureaucratic pencil pushing.¹⁵

On April 1, 1937, Brig. Gen. G.R. Pearkes assumed command of the Alberta Military District. G.R. Stevens noted that this appointment was taken as a sign of the changing times. The general population of the Province of Alberta was ahead of the Government in its feeling that that moment was the right time for all Canadians to stand up and be counted against the rise of tyranny in Europe. The average Canadian was beginning to rethink his isolationistic view in the light of world events, while Mackenzie King looked only to the internal concerns of Canada.¹⁶

Parliament did not reflect the changing mood of some of the people and continued to vote meager increases in the Militia training budget. In 1937-38 it rose by \$522,000 and in 1938-39 it rose by less than \$500,000. Ironically

enough, in 1938-39 (just before World War II) 46,521 officers and men were trained in the field, while in 1913-14 (just before World War I) over 55,000 men had trained. Canada was not even up to World War I standards yet.¹⁷

Even the Canadian General Staff realized the sad state of affairs that had affected the level of Militia training. By definition, a "first-line force" was one which was prepared to take the field within a week or two after mobilization. Canada had no first-line force. Again by definition, a "second-line force" was one which was only partially organized, equipped and trained and which could not take the field until a long time after the outbreak of war. This, in essence, was the Active Permanent Force. Behind them was the Non-Permanent Active Force which was made up of a small number of volunteers and which would be greatly expanded in a time of war by a flood of volunteers. It was barely equipped or trained and would not be ready for combat for at least a year after mobilization. Despite all the promises, Canada was not prepared to come to the aid of the Empire in the event of a war.¹⁸

At the same time that the Militia was being

gradually upgraded, the Royal Canadian Air Force was being rapidly expanded. In 1936-37, the R.C.A.F. budget jumped by over one and a half million dollars to \$5,821,824. At that point the R.C.A.F. had eight Permanent and seven Non-Permanent squadrons. Lacking was any quantity of first-line fighters. But this was rectified in 1937 when Parliament passed a R.C.A.F. budget of \$10,108,000 which included funds for new aircraft. The R.C.A.F. was clearly receiving the highest priority in the rearmaments race and for good reason. Because the Militia and the Royal Canadian Navy would not be able to repel an invading force or protect Canadian shores from danger, the R.C.A.F. was being built up as a first line of defence until the other services could catch up.¹⁹

By 1939, the Minister of National Defence wanted the R.C.A.F. to have 527 airplanes divided up into twenty-three squadrons (eleven Permanent and twelve Non-Permanent). The Permanent Air Force would be made up of 7,259 officers and men, while the reserve force would have 5,025 men.²⁰

Coincidentally, with the rapid R.C.A.F. expansion,

Canada received a request from Britain to train its fighter pilots. Mackenzie King turned down the request because he believed that it would jeopardize Canada's sovereignty. In reality, he did not want to do anything which might jeopardize Canada's isolationistic position, held most strongly by Quebec. King believed that if Canada had to go to war that the most important aspect of preparedness was the fact that Canada was united, which had to include Quebec. However, with this position, King began to move further away from the feelings of some of his own people and the needs of the Empire for a strong defence.²¹

On May 26, 1938 both J.S. Woodsworth and R.B. Bennett raised the question in the House of Commons about the potential for Germany making Anticosti Island a colony. A German survey team had been spotted on the Island in 1937. Mackenzie King reassured the House that his Government had no intention of relinquishing control of an island that sat in the middle of the vital Gulf of St. Lawrence. But King did little to dispel the rumors that the Germans were meticulously charting the waters of the St. Lawrence for future reference in case of war.²²

Last and usually least was the condition of the Royal Canadian Navy. Denied its own training college because of the closure of the Royal Canadian Naval College, the R.C.N. had to depend entirely on British resources to train officers and skilled ratings. As a result, they returned to Canada with Royal Navy attitudes as well as expertise. In 1936, a Joint Staff Committee recommended that the pitifully small R.C.N. be increased to include six destroyers and four minesweepers. Parliament concurred but voted a budget of only \$2,395,000 for 1936-37. Fortunately, Parliament doubled the budget for 1937-38 to nearly five million dollars. This allowed the R.C.N. to double its manpower to 191 officers and 1,799 ratings. Canada purchased two old destroyers each year from the Royal Navy and the Canadian shipyards produced two new Fundy-class minesweepers each year. By 1939, the R.C.N. with a budget of \$8,800,000 had eight destroyers, five minesweepers and a few small motor patrol vessels. It was a start, be it all a very small start.²³

While the Mackenzie King Government was allowed a modest military buildup, the Prime Minister's mind was on

other pressing matter. C.P. Stacey has noted Mackenzie King's relationship with the spirit world and believed that King's "conversations" with the spirits were a product of King's own vivid imagination. Be that as it may, King became convinced that he had been given "a special mission from God to set the world right and restore peace." Because he had developed a good reputation as a conciliator in industrial disputes in his early career, King believed that personal discussion by leaders of antagonistic forces would abate hostility and result in better understanding.²⁴

Mackenzie King shared his idea with British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in October 1936 and suggested that Baldwin should go personally to Berlin to meet with Adolph Hitler. Baldwin turned down the idea without comment. Mackenzie King then went to British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden with the idea that King might try to go to Berlin to meet Hitler. Eden liked the idea, but O.D. Skelton talked King out of the trip.²⁵ Maj. T.V. Scudamore wrote in the Canadian Defence Quarterly that:

I have always affirmed that the German people, as apart from the Government, are essentially a peaceful race and today I cannot believe that the

National Socialist party wants any war; they want recognition as an equal amongst the nations and they want to establish regular work and wages amongst their people at home.²⁶

King strongly supported this view and believed that all that was needed to maintain peace was a good dialogue.

After the subjugation of Austria by Germany in March 1937, Mackenzie King reverted to his previous strategy of saying nothing. He believed that, "the least that is said means the least being stirred up in the Commons and in the Press and in the minds of the people." King told the House of Commons that:

We shall try to keep in mind the difficulties and dangers that other countries are facing, but we shall not assume that it is our duty or within our power to work out their problems for them. . . . we shall be doing the task that lies to our hands, our Canadian task.²⁷

In May 1937, Mackenzie King went to London to witness the coronation of King George VI and to attend the Imperial Conference (the last before the war). There he told the Commonwealth delegates:

Opposition to participation in war, any war, is growing. It is not believed that Canada itself is in any serious danger. It is felt that the burdens left by our participation in the last war are largely responsible for present financial difficulties. There is wide impatience with the

inability of Continental Europe to settle its own disputes. The isolationist swing in the United States, its renunciation of war profits and neutral rights in order to keep out of war, have made a strong impression on Canadian opinion. . . . There is outspoken rejection of the theory that whenever and wherever conflict arises in Europe, Canada can be expected to send armed forces overseas to help solve the quarrels of continental countries about which Canadians know little.²⁸

While attending a reception at Buckingham Palace on May 10, the German Ambassador to Great Britain, Baron von Ribbentrop, suggested to King that he visit Germany and meet with the German leaders. After receiving encouragement from Anthony Eden and incoming Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, King agreed to the visit scheduled for the end of June. After a two-day tour of the presentable institutions of the New Order, King met first with Herman Goring and later in the day with Hitler.²⁹

The scheduled half hour meeting lasted for two hours. Hitler mesmerized King with an open and friendly manner leaving King with the impression of "a man of deep sincerity and a genuine Patriot." King, for his part, conveyed the message that he had promised Britain to deliver. It was that while Canada was free to choose to go

to war or not, Canada would go to war if Britain were attacked by some foreign power. However, there was some doubt as to whether Hitler heard the message as a warning because of the way King chose to express it. Unfortunately, King fell victim to the Nazi charm and left Germany believing that "they are men with whom it should be possible to work with a good deal of trust and confidence." King had been assured that there would be no war with Germany as far as the German leaders were concerned.³⁰ King returned home with the feeling that he had successfully completed his divine mission.

A year later the world seemed on the precipice of a world war as Germany demanded a solution to the Sudetenland problem. This time it was Chamberlain who flew to Germany several times during the last two weeks of September 1938. Chamberlain hoped that there would be some way, short of war, to work out the problem. The solution found was to dismember Czechoslovakia in the name of peace. The world would come to view the "Munich Agreement" as a spineless and shameless surrender of the right of a small nation in order to serve the self-interests of larger

nations. Chamberlain returned to England to wave his piece of paper that "guaranteed peace in our time."³¹

Mackenzie King was ecstatic. For two weeks he had been sending Chamberlain notes of encouragement because he believed Hitler was a man with whom the British Prime Minister could bargain. On September 29, King sent a cable to Chamberlain. In it he said:

The heart of Canada is rejoicing tonight at the success which has crowned your unremitting efforts for peace. . . . My colleagues in the Government join with me in unbounded admiration at the service you have rendered mankind. Your achievement in the past month alone will ensure you an abiding and illustrious place among the great conciliators whom the United Kingdom, the British Commonwealth of Nations and the whole world will continue to honour.³²

King did not give Czechoslovakia a second thought much as he had earlier dismissed Ethiopia. Peace was the important goal and appeasement was an appropriate tool to achieve it.

Mackenzie King had gone into this crisis with an extra boast of confidence. He had the backing of the United States. On August 18, 1938, President Roosevelt delivered an address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. During his speech, Roosevelt declared:

The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of

the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canada soil is threatened by any other Empire.³³

American commitment was comforting but neither the United States nor Canada was in any position to go to war in 1938.

After Munich, Canada had to get serious about rearming. Senior officers were sent to Washington to purchase whatever they could. Their list included small arms, machine guns, cannons, coastal defence guns, tanks and airplanes. Unfortunately, the United States had little available to sell. In her belated drive to rearm, Canada found herself in a new arms race with most of Europe. Britain's armaments industry was hopelessly backlogged because Britain herself had not begun to rearm until this point. It was spring of 1939 before Canada received from England four anti-aircraft guns, five mortars, eighty-two Vickers machine guns, ten Bren guns, seven anti-tank rifles and two light tanks. This was hardly enough weapons for a company of soldiers.³⁴ Fifteen years of military neglect had taken its toll.

While Mackenzie King still believed in

appeasement, the Canadian people were beginning to change their mind. The Ottawa Citizen editorialized in March 1939 that, "No British war is going to find this country neutral." Events in Czechoslovakia proved appeasement a failure and it was abandoned by Chamberlain. King strongly disagreed and lost confidence in Chamberlain's judgment.³⁵ In a major foreign policy address to the House of Commons on March 30, 1939 Mackenzie King said:

I have spoken a good deal of war and the possibility of war. . . . While there is no ground for an easy-going optimism, neither, I believe, is there ground for persistent pessimism. . . . I do not believe in the prophecies of inevitable wars and forecasts of the inevitable collapse of civilization and a return to the dark ages. . . . We have tremendous tasks to do at home. . . . We must, to a greater or less extent, choose between keeping our house in order, and trying to save Europe and Asia. The idea that every twenty years this country should automatically and as a matter of fact take part in a war overseas for democracy or self-determination. . . . seems to many a nightmare and sheer madness.³⁶

The Prime Minister never gave up hope and he believed his prayers were answered when he received a message from Hitler inviting a number of Canadian students and officers to visit Germany for three weeks as the guests of the Third Reich. Mackenzie King viewed the invitation

"as evidence of those unseen forces that guided his own and the world's destiny." Here was an opportunity to practice appeasement at the eleventh hour. Desperate to stop the war before it could begin, the sixty-five year old Prime Minister immediately accepted the invitation, inviting himself along and set the visit for November 1939 (sic).³⁷

Mackenzie King's last effort to keep the country together with war looming on the horizon was to stage manage a Royal visit. Planned during the Imperial Conference of 1937, the visit could not have been more auspiciously timed. The British Cabinet wanted to advise King George VI to cancel the trip but felt that it was necessary to strengthen the ties between Canada and Britain at that crucial moment in history. Mackenzie King shrewdly chose the old French-Canadian capital of Quebec to start the Royal visit in June. The Quebec isolationists were the most important to be won over in the event that war broke out. The King and Queen did their task to perfection. Not even the Prime Minister had expected the Royal visit to be so successful. Not only in Quebec but all over Canada, isolationistic feelings dulled, disagreements with the central government

lessened, and the general public began to look on the future with a limited degree of optimism. Mackenzie King had succeeded in uniting Canada, if somewhat artificially and temporarily, and this would prove significant as September 1939 approached.³⁸

CHAPTER 7
AN UNPREPARED COMMUNITY
CANADA 1939-1940

The slaughter of Canadians in World War I had been so appalling that "never again" had become the frequent isolationist cry in the twenties and thirties. In addition, the Great Depression that Canada had suffered through for nearly ten years brought about hardships which, in some cases, produced strong feelings of resentment toward government at all levels--federal, provincial and municipal. Mackenzie King was well aware of these sentiments when he attended the 1937 Imperial Conference. He successfully campaigned against any ideas that would entangle Canada in an Imperial foreign or defence policy which might lead to war. He gave strong support to a policy of economic and political appeasement to prevent conflict. And, as a demonstration of his conviction, he met with Adolf Hitler shortly after leaving the Conference. King returned to

Canada spouting his convictions that a European war could be averted if Hitler were handled correctly.¹

King was delighted with the September 1938 Munich Agreement because it proved his assessment of the value of appeasement. Six months later when German troops entered Prague, King refused to change his mind about appeasement. Neville Chamberlain, on the other hand, belatedly recognized that appeasement had failed and turned his attention to reconfirming the guarantees for Poland. To do this, Britain needed a show of support from the Dominions so as to face Hitler with a united front.²

On March 20, 1939, King delivered a brief statement on the European situation in the House of Commons. After admitting that "the form and place of the latest disturbance was a surprise to me, [sic] as it had been to many governments more nearly concerned and more minutely informed." He went on to characterize the German action as "a wanton and forcible occupation." In his mind it was not clear what the democracies should do next, but before he moved on to his next point he abruptly stopped his speech and left the House of Commons, supposedly to find a missing

part of the address. In fact, he spent the next forty-five minutes on the telephone to the London Foreign Office getting their approval of the rest of his speech, i.e., was it strong enough to satisfy their requirements. Returning to the House of Commons, King delivered his most positive declaration of willingness to participate in a European war by saying:

If there were a prospect of an aggressor launching an attack on Britain, with bombers raining death on London, I have no doubt what the decision of the Canadian people and Parliament would be. We would regard it as an act of aggression, menacing freedom in all parts of the British Commonwealth.³

London was satisfied while newspapers in the mid-west of Canada panned the speech as too indecisive; and the press in Quebec attacked the speech as too provocative.

The French-Canadian stories got King's attention. He was overly sensitive to the feelings of the French-Canadians and uncertain as to how they would ultimately react if war actually broke out. The possibility that a war could split Canada was foremost in King's mind. Especially when, a month before, the eccentric Mayor of

Montreal, Camillien Houde, made this absurd remark to a

Y.M.C.A. audience:

If war comes and if Italy is on one side and England on the other, the sympathy of the French-Canadians in Quebec will be on the side of Italy. Remember that the great majority of French-Canadians are Roman Catholics and that the Pope is in Rome. We French-Canadians are Normans, not Latins, but we have become Latinized over a long period of years. The French-Canadians are Fascists by blood, but not by name. The Latins have always been in favor of dictators.⁴

On March 27, the leader of the Conservative opposition party, Dr. R.J. Manion, gave an interview to the Evening Telegram in which he said, "I am one of those who do not believe there is any such thing as neutrality during a war in which Britain is engaged." This put him in agreement with Mackenzie King's statement of a week earlier. When asked about the sticky question of conscription, Manion replied, "I do not believe that Canadian youth should be conscripted to fight outside the borders of Canada. Canada can play her part in the Empire. . . through volunteer units."⁵

Three days later a full debate took place in the House of Commons on both Canada's response in case of war

and the issue of conscription. In his lengthy remarks, Mackenzie King reviewed the events of the past several years which led up to the present European crisis. He gave high praise to the work of Chamberlain saying that "Mr. Chamberlain made the emphatically right choice in striving to prevent the outbreak of war. . . . There seemed to be good reasons for hoping that war had not merely been postponed, but had been averted." However, when it came time to speak about Canada's obligation to help Great Britain in time of war, King reverted to his old standby:

If Canada is faced by the necessity of making a decision on the most serious and momentous issue that can face a nation, whether or not to take part in war, the principle of responsible government which has been our guide and our goal for a century past, demands that that decision be made by the Parliament of Canada.⁶

Some politicians believed that King was backtracking on his strong statement of March 20 in order to please the voters in Quebec. Actually, he was merely repeating his long-held belief that it was up to Parliament to decide if war came. When the time came, King wanted the general population to believe that participation in the war was their idea. On the other hand, both Manion and King were playing to the

voters of Quebec with their "no conscription" pledge. Canadian politics were far more important than external affairs.

While the politicians continued their verbal sparring, the military was left to flounder as war approached. The "unmilitary community" had not been preparing for war and were not yet ready to accept the military build-up necessary for a war. Captain R. John Pratt wrote in the Canadian Defence Quarterly:

In no country that I have visited have I seen the man in uniform treated with less respect than in the Dominion. Any sensitive officer can testify to the atmosphere of general disapproval that becomes apparent in any public place that he may enter in uniform. This public hostility, which would be regarded as high treason in a totalitarian state, places us in the position of continually apologizing for our existence. It not only prevents men from enlisting, but seeks to rob us of the few we have. It results in Defence votes so small that we cannot equip our units in a manner likely to attract the right type of recruits.⁷

Newsreels had shown the average Canadian the slaughter of the Spanish Civil War, the retaking of the Rhineland, the assumption of Austria and the rape of Czechoslovakia. But all this was far away, across the vast Atlantic Ocean. Canada was safe and immune from European

problems. Therefore, a state of readiness of the Canadian military was of little importance to the average Canadian.

In the summer of 1939, the Militia training had been intensified but the Militia was poorly equipped. Most units still used the World War I Ross rifles which had proven to be inadequate for even that war. In all of Canada there were only sixteen light tanks, twenty-three anti-tank guns, four anti-aircraft guns and less than two hundred machine guns. Canada's sole munitions plant produced 3.7-inch shells for guns that Canada did not possess--the shells were being manufactured for the British. The 4,001 men in the Permanent Force and 86,500 men in the Non-Permanent Active Militia, although poorly equipped, did serve as the skeleton for the army that was going to be needed. This small nucleus of dedicated and self-sacrificing men had endured years of neglect and still remained a well trained professional force that would once again make Canada proud.⁸

The other two services were in an equally unprepared state. The Royal Canadian Air Force could muster 4,153 officers and men--three-quarters in active service.

They were divided up into eight squadrons: two general purpose, two general reconnaissance, one fighter, one bomber, one torpedo-bomber and one army cooperation squadron. The R.C.A.F. had 270 aircraft of twenty-three different types, but only fifty-three were combat operational and less than thirty were modern.⁹

The Royal Canadian Navy was manned by 932 active officers and sailors with 191 men in reserve. They served aboard Canada's eight destroyers which were ten to twenty years old, and five minesweepers, which were newly built. The force was totally inadequate to patrol the thousands of miles of coastline on both sides of the continent.

On August 31, 1939 the Chief of the Naval Staff submitted a report to the Minister of National Defence which forecast that the approaches to the St. Lawrence, Halifax and Saint Johns, Newfoundland were all vulnerable to German surface raiders or submarines. At the same time, he noted that there were no ships available on the Atlantic coast which were fitted with anti-submarine detection systems. Lastly, the Chief of the Naval Staff declared that when fresh and salt water meet, such as at the mouth of the St.

Lawrence, anti-submarine detection devices fail to detect submarines.¹⁰

As events reached their climax at the end of August, the National Defence Headquarters ordered out detachments from 106 Non-Permanent Active Militia units for guard duty of federal buildings, the St. Lawrence canal system and other vulnerable points. Also called up were units to man the coastal defences. In all, the August 25 alert placed ten thousand men on active duty overnight. It would be October before their duties were taken over by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.¹¹

The next day the Ottawa Citizen printed the text of a message that Mackenzie King sent to both Hitler and Polish President M. Ignace Mascicki. King was still looking for a way to avoid the war when he said:

The people of Canada are of one mind in believing that there is no international problem which cannot be settled by conference and negotiation. They equally believe that force is not a substitute for reason, and that the appeal to force as a means of adjusting international differences defeats rather than furthers the end of justice. They are prepared to join what authority and power they may possess to that of the other nations of the British Commonwealth in seeking a just and equitable settlement of the great problems with which nations are faced.¹²

In a similar vein, King cabled Chamberlain with the dumbest suggestion he ever made. It was his idea to have the British King and Queen make a personal appeal to Hitler for peace on behalf of all mankind. Chamberlain replied tersely that now was not the appropriate time for such an action.¹³

When the German army marched into Poland on September 1, 1939, the Vancouver Island fortifications were manned by Victoria's Fifth Regiment. The four Pacific-stationed destroyers left Esquimalt bound for Halifax via the Panama Canal, while the Royal Canadian Air Force sent all its aircraft to the east coast for coastal defence. Unfortunately, some of them were forced down in Maine by bad weather. These aircraft would have been interned by neutral America if they had not been able to get airborne before Great Britain officially declared war. Also, the American-built aircraft that were ready for delivery were flown to the border and then towed across into Canada.¹⁴

To some extent the wheels had been set in motion

to gear up for war before Parliament met to declare officially a state of war. On August 30, the Emergency Council--consisting of the Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence, Fisheries, Finance, Mines, and Resources, and the Senate Government Leader--came into being and immediately invoked the War Measures Act. The law, left over from World War I, gave the Governor General in Council, i.e., the Cabinet, authority to issue orders in Council and regulations on anything it may "deem necessary or advisable for the security, peace, order and welfare of Canada." This gave the Cabinet virtual dictatorial powers over the Canadian public.¹⁵ Meanwhile, true to his word, Mackenzie King called Parliament into special session for a meeting, scheduled for September 7, to decide the question of war.¹⁶

Great Britain and France officially declared war with Germany on September 3. The next day the British liner, Athenia, was sunk off the west coast of Scotland. She had left Liverpool and was bound for Montreal carrying mainly Canadian and American passengers. Suddenly the war nobody wanted and everyone hoped would be avoided was

killing Canadians. The sober truth hit home hard. However, Canada did not automatically enter the war when Britain declared war on Germany. Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, did declare war on September 3 as obedient servants of King George VI.¹⁷

On the evening of September 3, Mackenzie King broadcast a message to the Canadian people. In it he stressed that Canada had as its first concern the defence of Canada. Canada had to be strong and secure in order to be able to help Britain and Parliament would decide the extent of that help. In the meantime, the Army, Navy and the Air Force were being called up for active duty. King ended the address with the thought that whatever Parliament chose to do, it would be of its own free will. He had two ideas in mind when he made this statement. One was to make the point of Canada's autonomy and the other was to keep the country united, in that whatever Parliament decided, all interests within Canada would have an opportunity to have their say and this, most importantly, would include the French-Canadians.¹⁸

There was a second reason for the delay in

declaring war. The Canadian Government explored the possibility that a neutral Canada might provide a "back door" through which Britain could obtain American airplanes and other war materials despite the United States Neutrality Act. The question proved too difficult to answer in the short time available because the Canadian Government was not able to get the United States Government to commit to the plan. Roosevelt was going to have a difficult time as it was getting the Neutrality Act changed in order to get some supplies to Britain and France. The Canadian question would have complicated the process too much.¹⁹

Governor General Lord Tweedsmuir delivered his Speech-from-the-Throne on September 7, 1939 to open Parliament. In it he said:

As you are only too well aware, all efforts to maintain the peace of Europe have failed. The United Kingdom, in honouring pledges given as a means of avoiding hostilities, has become engaged in war with Germany. You have been summoned at the earliest moment in order that the government may seek authority for the measures necessary for the defence of Canada and for co-operation in the determined effort which is being made to resist further aggression. . . . Proposals for further effective action by Canada will be laid before you without delay.²⁰

Thus Lord Tweedsmuir set the tone for the emergency session of Parliament. Mackenzie King followed the next day with this ironic declaration:

I never dreamed that the day would come when, after spending a lifetime in a continuous effort to promote and to preserve peace and goodwill in international as well as in industrial relations, it should fall to my lot to be the one to lead this dominion of Canada into a great war.²¹

As the most unmilitary man in Canada, Mackenzie King was totally unprepared to lead his country into war. But he had no choice. Industry had to be mobilized; profiteering had to be curbed; an army had to be raised. All of this was going to cost a lot of money and Parliament had to start thinking in terms of large budgets rather than small budgets. C.P. Stacey felt King was fortunate to have the strongest cabinet in Canadian history when the war started, and it was this Cabinet that got the job done.²² King concluded his remarks with this statement:

We did not decide we would have to go into war willy-nilly; we decided that the policy as therein set forth was what we believed the Canadian people wished to have given effect; and we have summoned Parliament to express here, as representing the Canadian people, its will and its wish in the matter of this country entering this war voluntarily. . . . The people of Canada will, I am

sure, face this grave situation with calm and confidence and, above all else, in a spirit which will serve to preserve the unity of our country and the maintenance of its freedom.²³

It is to Mackenzie King's great credit that he brought his country into World War II united, i.e., with the backing of the Opposition Parties and the French-Canadians. King's most important ally in this was his Minister of Justice, the French-Canadian Ernest Lapointe. In a moving address to Parliament on September 9, he said in part:

Much has been said about an expeditionary force. Applications are pouring in--and they are coming from Quebec also--from people who want to enlist. Does any member of the House think any Canadian Government, whether this or any other, could stop the thousands of volunteers who would like to fight for Britain and France? . . . For the sake of unity we cannot be neutral in Canada. . . . The whole Province of Quebec--and I speak with all the responsibility and the solemnity I can give to my words--will never agree to accept compulsory service or conscription outside Canada. . . . Provided these points are understood, we are willing to offer our services without limitation and to devote our best efforts for the success of the cause we all have at heart.²⁴

The Official Proclamation of War came on Sunday, September 10. Canada was now united with Great Britain in the great struggle for democracy. At the same time, this very act separated Canada from the United States. On

September 5, Roosevelt invoked the sanctions of the Neutrality Act which embargoed the export of arms, munitions and materials of war to any of the belligerents. Fifty million U.S. dollars in arms shipments to Britain and France were immediately halted. Roosevelt also declared a State of National Emergency which allowed him to: fix prices on food and fuel, control foreign and domestic banking, enlarge the armed forces, close radio stations and seize any vessels in United States waters. Americans found out very quickly that neutrality had its costs. On September 10, Roosevelt added Canada to the list of embargoed countries as dictated by the Neutrality Act. In a way, this pleased Mackenzie King because it showed that the United States recognized Canada's right to choose independently between war and peace.²⁵

Political consensus for a declaration of war was one thing; the military and industrial capability to back it up was another. Much would have to be done before Canada would be able to make more than a token contribution. Mobilization orders went out on September 1 for the immediate formation of two infantry divisions. By the end of September, 58,337 men had volunteered for service in the

Army. In the cities many men joined because they were still looking for work. Hunger outweighed patriotism. In the mid-west, enlistment was slower because it was harvest season. Practicality won out over patriotism. But as soon as the crops were in, those in the mid-west joined up. Canada did not lack manpower, but it did lack the foresight to plan for the feeding, clothing and equipping of so many men. The Edmonton Journal reported that Officers of the Edmonton Regiment were buying boots for their men with monies from the officers' mess fund because Supply could only furnish forty pairs of boots for every one hundred men. As each regiment reached its full strength, it was officially dismissed as a Militia unit and recommissioned into the Canadian Active Service Force.²⁶

The Canadian Chief of the General Staff, Maj. Gen. T.V. Anderson originally proposed a full mobilization of all three services which he estimated would cost five hundred million dollars. True to form, Parliament trimmed this back to one hundred million dollars. With this reality Anderson decided to halt Naval expansions for the time being, rapidly enlarge the Air Force for home defence and plan for a two

division mobilization. One division--about 23,000 men, including support personnel--would be sent to England in December. The other division would remain in Canada for home defence. It was Mackenzie King's desire to limit the number of Canadians sent overseas so as to avoid any possibility of needing conscription. He also had no knowledge of strategic or tactical planning and thus understood little of the immediate needs of Great Britain. O.D. Skelton, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, convinced King and the Cabinet to prepare for a limited war liability. His idea was for Canada to become the arsenal for Great Britain and also provide all the raw materials and foodstuffs that she needed. Finally, as Canada's primary war effort, Skelton suggested reviving the British plan to use Canada as the major training base for pilots for the Royal Air Force.²⁷

Canada was not yet prepared to commit for total war. The Canadian Government was showing no evidence of vigorous leadership or any attempt to arouse a war spirit. Canada was the only Dominion with the potential to produce and supply the vast munitions needed for Great Britain; but

as the war started there was little incentive to retool industry that was just beginning to make a profit after the Depression years. Under these circumstances, it would be natural for some of the citizens to express their dismay at governmental footdragging. But this was illegal! Under the War Measures Act and the Defence of Canada Regulations a person could be sentenced to five years imprisonment and a five thousand dollar fine for such generalizations as "causing disaffection to His Majesty" or "prejudicing recruiting" or "acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or the safety of the state." This put weapons in the hands of those who would like to suppress every form of criticism, however legitimate. No distinction was made between public speech and private conversations. In Ontario, several people were prosecuted for what were clearly silly remarks made in pubs. These heavy-handed regulations, which were not considered necessary in Britain, caused Life magazine to comment that "Democracy, including free speech and free press, went out the window as soon as Canada declared war." These regulations would have been superfluous if Canada had had strong political leadership

during this time.²⁸

Mackenzie King was too occupied with issues outside the immediate problem of direct aid to Britain. For one thing, on September 25, Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec, called for a general election in Quebec for the end of October. He asserted that proclamations made by Ottawa under the War Measures Act were a federal invasion of provincial rights. His Union Nationale Party had been in power since 1936 and now wanted a clear mandate for Quebec "autonomy." The key issue, of course, was conscription. Among the French-Canadians there was broad agreement that under no circumstances would conscription be accepted. Ethnically homogeneous, geographically concentrated and united in language and religion, this significant minority made up more than two-sevenths of the total population of Canada. Their defection would clearly be a serious setback to the war effort. The Liberal opposition was also against conscription but warned that if Duplessis won reelection, the three Cabinet-level French-Canadians would resign, at which point the Federal Government would not hesitate to introduce conscription. Fortunately, Duplessis' bombast and

his record of broken promises assured his own defeat on October 25. Mackenzie King could now boast that the people of Quebec were at one with their fellow Canadians of the other provinces in their determination that a united Canada should cooperate at the side of Britain and France in the war to defend freedom.²⁹ Unfortunately, a whole month was lost due to this rhetoric that could have been better spent concentrating on getting Canadian industry into the war effort.

The other preoccupation of Mackenzie King was the opportunity to end the war before it progressed any further. Near the end of September, after Poland had been subdued, Hitler offered several proposals to negotiate an end to the war. They were each in turn rejected by the British Government. Mackenzie King intervened on October 6 to suggest that the United Kingdom and France "should put forward their own positive programme of the basis upon which the war could be terminated." King's idea was to have a commission of neutral powers, consisting of the President of the United States, the King of Italy and the King of Belgium, to investigate and report upon the "methods of

adjusting the European situation." Chamberlain replied on October 9 to say, "It would be impossible for Great Britain to accept any such basis without forfeiting her honour and abandoning her claim that international disputes should be settled by discussion and not by force." Mackenzie King was deeply disappointed with Chamberlain because he still believed in appeasement and that Hitler would go no further than Poland. In his mind the war need not proceed any further. Chamberlain, on the other hand, realized that Hitler could not be trusted and would not be satisfied with Poland. Mackenzie King was going to have to come to grips with the truth and focus on Canada's part in the war.³⁰

On September 26, 1939, Chamberlain asked King if he would reconsider the British proposal, made in 1938, to use Canada as the main training facility for pilots from all the Commonwealth countries. King was delighted because this would keep a large portion of wartime spending within Canada. But he was also disappointed because, if the request had come ten days earlier, then his Government might not have felt obligated to offer to send a single division of infantry overseas. In any event, the offer gave King the

opportunity to keep Canada's involvement limited. At first glance the idea of a massive flight training program might have seemed absurd. When the war started, the Royal Canadian Air Force consisted of 4,153 officers and men and 270 aircraft--only nineteen modern Hawker Hurricanes. An order for twenty bombers and fifteen training aircraft from the United States had only been partially filled because of the imposition of the Neutrality Act. In September 1939, only General Reconnaissance Squadron No. 5 was fully trained and equipped for its operational role. The R.C.A.F. claimed that it would need all its fighter squadrons to defend important bases from aerial bombing attacks. The bomber/reconnaissance squadrons would also be needed to patrol and protect the sea approaches to Canada.³¹

Nevertheless, the Chief of the Air Staff confidently asserted that the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (B.C.A.T.P.) would train twelve thousand men a year, including eight thousand ground staff. However, in order to do this he would need an additional six hundred trained and experienced flight officers and 6,500 ground crewmen. The discussions concerned the establishment of the

B.C.A.T.P. dragged on for two months because Canada refused to accept British demands. Canada wanted full administrative responsibility and a sharing of costs. Mackenzie King played up the plan as Canada's part in the war effort to keep the focus off the troops about to go overseas. An agreement was signed by the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada on December 17, 1939 (King's birthday). The final plan called for fifty-eight flight schools to train over one thousand pilots a month. Canada would pay \$350 million of the \$600 million cost and provide the schools, planes and trainers. The students would come from all the Commonwealth countries and Britain. In order to accomplish the goal of the B.C.A.T.P., Canada was going to need 3,540 planes, 33,052 Air Force training personnel and forty airfields. It was going to be a monumental undertaking, but in the end the B.C.A.T.P. exceeded all expectations and, in the process, the R.C.A.F. went from virtual obscurity to the fourth largest Air Force in the world.³²

The small Royal Canadian Navy was in no shape to operate as an independent naval force and yet the Canadian

Government was reluctant to turn over complete control to the Royal Navy. Eventually, the R.C.N. was ordered to cooperate with the R.N. "to the fullest extent" while Ottawa maintained ultimate authority. The lack of naval preparedness was evident in the fact that none of the Canadian destroyers had the submarine detection device known as ASDIC (an acronym for the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee). In addition, there was no system of boom defences to seal off Canadian ports from submarines. The R.C.N. also acknowledged that it was technically feasible for enemy submarines to navigate the St. Lawrence as far as Quebec City. As a result, on the night of October 14, 1939, a false alarm was sounded when two enemy submarines were reported cruising upriver toward that city. It has been the Navy's immediate goal to create an auxiliary force to patrol home waters and to do this, the R.C.N. requisitioned all suitable government and civilian vessels and arranged to purchase fourteen private yachts from the United States. Ironically, most of the volunteers recruited for the R.C.N. came from the interior of Canada, had little or no maritime experience, or had never seen the ocean. It

would take the Navy the longest time of any of the services to get into the war.³³

By October, Maj. Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton had been called back from retirement to lead the Canadian Active Service Force to England. During that month, most of the units had been chosen to make up the First Canadian Division. The choice was based on training, manpower and availability of equipment. Those units chosen were given first priority for boots, clothing, weapons, ammunition and transport. That is not to say that every man was fully equipped by the end of November or even initially trained but, ready or not, they had to be prepared to go overseas. Most of the new recruits knew the basic skills of parade drill, weapons handling and maintenance but lacked knowledge of map reading, battle-order drill, basic battle tactics, defence against gas, enemy techniques, first aid or mine laying. All these skills and many more would have to be learned and honed after arrival in England.³⁴ The Canadian units were clearly not ready to meet the German army.

CHAPTER 8
THE GREAT RESPONSE OF THE COMMUNITY
CANADA 1940-1941

Gradually a pacific and unmilitary society had been transformed to the point where it was beginning to prepare, however reluctantly, to take up arms in the defence of freedom. They joined that small core of dedicated soldiers who had endured years of neglect and abuse in order to keep the military in a position which could respond to a crisis like the present one. Within one month the four thousand-man Active Militia and forty-eight thousand Non-Permanent Active Militia force had been doubled with the addition of fifty-eight thousand green recruits. From this, the General Staff was to organize and train one division as an expeditionary force for immediate overseas duty and a second division to be kept under arms as a reserve in Canada.¹

The first need of the Militia units was a sound

administrative organization--adjutant and quartermaster departments which were capable of mobilizing, enlisting, documenting, outfitting, feeding and quartering each unit as it came up to strength. The training manuals, written primarily for the regular British army, laid down excellent principles for the training of these units. Unfortunately, since there were so few experienced Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers available, the training was usually handled by inexperienced junior officers. The early estimates stated that the First Division would need at least six months training before being ready for action. Among the first units picked to begin to form the First Division were the Edmonton Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver.²

In mid-December, the first of the three sections of the First Canadian Division left Canada led by Maj. Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton. They arrived on December 31 in Scotland and were met by Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Great Britain was in the middle of the "phony war" where no bombs were being dropped on British

soil and the French were secure behind their Maginot Line. The lead elements of the First Canadian Division were taken by train to Aldershot, the Victorian garrison town on the Salisbury Plain of Scotland. For the poor Canadian soldier it turned out to be the coldest winter in forty years. Not that Canadians were used to cold, however, for these mainly mid-western troops, this was not their familiar dry cold but instead a damp, bone-chilling, never-ending cold which had to be endured in barracks with a few open fireplaces, water pipes that burst and no insulation in the walls. The long-promised cold weather gear from headquarters in Ottawa never materialized.³

Despite the cold, training began in earnest under British supervision. The training for this new war picked up where the last war had left off--trench warfare, massed infantry charges, and slow methodical advances. Excellent military theorists like Liddell Hart and J.F.C. Fuller advocated more modern techniques based on mobility, flexibility, speed and cooperation of all types of units; but their ideas were duly ignored by the British General Staff. However, there was one critical area which would

prove to be disastrous to Canadians throughout the war, that being the lack of strategic planning capability of the Canadian Officers corps. The average Canadian Officer saw himself as a technician--expert in the techniques and tactics of waging war. He had never been taught how to plan a battle because the British believed that "colonials" were not capable of independent thought. As a result of this training, it had become ingrained into the Canadian psyche that someone else would do the planning for them.⁴

This is not to say that Canadian Officers were inferior. To the contrary, during the early days of training, the solidarity, discipline and efficiency of the units could be directly attributed to the enthusiasm and brilliance for improvisation of the officers. Handicapped by the weather, by lack of experience, by lack of equipment and by the press of time, these officers produced miracles by making soldiers out of civilians in the most trying of times and conditions.⁵

As was common in war, before the training could be completed, a need arose for the Canadian troops. On April 9, 1940, the Germans attacked Norway. The British War

Office decided to send aid to the Norwegians, but because most of the British forces were in France, the task fell to the Canadians. McNaughton, who never lacked enthusiasm, blindly accepted the British plan for an amphibious attack on Trondheim, Norway. He neglected to refer the plan on to Ottawa for General Staff or Cabinet approval. The Edmontons and the Princess Patricia's were chosen as the two battalions to take part in the assault on the forts guarding the entrance to Trondheim. They left Aldershot for Dunfermline, the Scottish port of embarkation on April 18. On April 19, without explanation, the operation was cancelled and the troops returned to Aldershot. This was the first of what would prove to be a series of bitter disappointments for the eager Canadians. In addition, McNaughton had his knuckles rapped by the Minister of National Defence for not consulting Ottawa before committing Canadian units to combat.⁶

On May 10, 1940, the Germans burst into Holland and Belgium in overwhelming force. Soon they would be pouring out of the Ardennes Forest. The First Canadian Division went on immediate alert and was ordered to be ready

to move on thirty minutes notice. A fleet of thirty-five lorries arrived as transport. Soon the order was rescinded, but afterwards training took on a new meaning as the war drew closer. On May 26, there was another emergency alert. The camp was made ready to move, officers were ordered to wear side-arms and the trucks were loaded with supplies. The British Expeditionary Force was in danger of being surrounded and the Canadians suddenly became front-line troops.⁷

The British War Office wanted elements of the First Canadian Division to protect the Channel ports of France and to reestablish communications with the B.E.F. While the Division moved to Dover for embarkation, McNaughton did a personal reconnaissance of the Calais and Dunkirk ports and reported back to the War Office that the situation was hopeless. Grimly, the Canadians went back to Aldershot. After the Dunkirk evacuation, Britain itself became the next target for invasion and there was little to stop it. The British troops had been forced to leave behind their tanks, artillery and motorized equipment. Most of the men only managed to return to England with their rifles. As

a result, the Canadian First Division became one of the few fully equipped and trained divisions in Britain. McNaughton reported the situation to Ottawa and was rewarded with a message of encouragement from Mackenzie King.⁸

McNaughton next went to the British War Office to suggest that his Division be organized in mobile groups and moved to central areas of the country from where they could counterattack an enemy landing anywhere. Before that plan could be considered the British Government decided to make one last attempt at keeping France in the war by securing an enclave on the Brittany Peninsula. To do this they planned to use the last three combat-ready divisions left in Britain--one being Canadian.

Lead elements of the First Infantry Brigade and the First Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, landed at Brest on June 12 and headed inland. The operation was hastily and poorly planned by the British and flirted with disaster almost from the beginning. Finally, realizing that France was doomed, the troops were recalled on June 14. The 48th Highlanders made it the furthest inland and barely escaped being cut off before they returned to the coast.

Unlike Dunkirk, the Canadians managed to get all their heavy weapons back to England. But left behind were two hundred trucks, four dead and one P.O.W. It could certainly have been much worse and McNaughton was most unhappy with the British mismanagement of his troops.⁹ For the Canadian soldier it was just one more disappointment.

Meanwhile, back in Canada Mackenzie King was engaged in his own set of battles. The first and most crucial was with Ontario Premier Mitchell F. Hepburn. Hepburn was an outspoken Liberal reformer who came to power in 1934. His critics called him the "Huey Long of Canada" because of his sound and fury. After Liberal Mackenzie King was elected Prime Minister in 1935, Hepburn thought he would receive large amounts of aid from the Federal Government to bail out his depressed Province. When the aid did not arrive in sufficient amounts, Hepburn became enraged and did everything possible to block King's pet project, the St. Lawrence Seaway proposal. The King-Hepburn feud intensified in 1937, when King refused to help Hepburn prevent American C.I.O. (Congress of Industrial Organizations) organizers from entering Canada during an automobile worker's strike.

The seemingly lackadaisical attitude of the King Government toward the war effort gave Hepburn the ammunition he had been waiting for. On January 18, 1940, he denounced the all-too-evident lack of uniforms and equipment for the military build-up. He went on to say that, "Mackenzie King has not done his duty to his country--never has and never will." Hepburn then forced a stinging vote of censure against the Federal Government through his own Ontario Parliament.¹⁰

A week later, King was ready with his answer. He ordered that no advance peek of the Speech-from-the-Throne be permitted, even to the leader of the Opposition, Robert J. Manion. On the opening day of Parliament, January 25, 1940, Lord Tweedsmuir read:

My ministers are of the opinion that the effective prosecution of the war makes it imperative that those who are charged with the grave responsibility of carrying on the Government of Canada shall, in this critical period, be fortified by a direct and unquestioned mandate from the people.¹¹

Mackenzie King had, in effect, dissolved Parliament and ordered a "snap-election" scheduled at the earliest possible date, March 26. This was only the third time in Dominion

history that this had been tried and the two previous attempts had backfired against the sitting prime minister. Dr. Manion was livid at the "trickery and unscrupulous politics, of playing the dictator. This is a disgraceful sneering at the political traditions of Canada and the Empire," he went on to say.¹²

One of the key issues focused on by the press in the election debate was the heavy-handed measures used to suppress dissent. Civil liberties were being taken away without the consent of Parliament. Parliament had yet to be allowed to share in the formation of policy--military or diplomatic--of the war. The phrase "Parliament will decide" had become hollow. Canada was being governed by the Cabinet and under the power of the Defence of Canada Regulations, radio and newspapers were censored, habeas corpus was suspended, and even candidates in the election were intimidated as to how far they could go in criticizing the Government. Mackenzie King focused on national unity and won a massive electoral landslide--184 Liberals, thirty-nine Conservatives, ten Social Credit, eight C.C.F. and six assorted independents.¹³

The second crisis hit two months later when the "phony war" ended. Suddenly, the Government's half-hearted mobilization looked pathetic. Britain was in real and serious trouble. France had been knocked out of the war and now Canada was Britain's biggest ally. Canada was going to be called on to produce conceivably everything that would be needed in Britain. But Canada was not ready for that kind of mass production. Even though Mackenzie King had appointed the very capable Clarence Decatur Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, it would be mid-summer of 1940 before Howe had Canadian industry producing arms for the Canadian Army. While Howe boasted that Canadians could produce anything, this was not true. Canadian factories were not capable of producing aircraft engines, tanks or warships larger than frigates. What the Canadians were asked to produce had to be either to British or American design specifications. But in a way, this requirement was not that bad. Britain and America already had proven designs for trucks, armored cars, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, planes of all sorts and anti-submarine/escort vessels. Canada did not have time to design her own weapons and her

industry needed to be completely retooled to produce war goods anyway, so using British and American designs saved a lot of time.¹⁴

However, once the industry, small and ill-equipped as it was, got started it produced a mountain of material. Workers in plants that had never seen war planes in early 1940 were mass producing Mosquitos and Lancasters, as well as artillery guns, wireless sets and radar equipment by the end of 1943. The entire country became a beehive of war manufacturing activity. Small inland shipyards, accustomed to building inexpensive and uncomplicated vessels for the Great Lakes, had to expand rapidly to build ships twice as large and far more complicated. While Canadian war production never approached that of the United States or Great Britain, it did bring Canada into the position of being a major industrial producer when the war ended. For economic reasons, but to the consternation of his fellow countrymen, Howe insisted on shipping arms to Great Britain and the United States before supplying them to the Canadians.¹⁵

One of Howe's greatest problems was manpower. For

a country that seemed to have too many people during the Depression, it now had far too few to run this new war machine. With the armed forces, industry and the farms competing for manpower, women were called upon to fill in the gaps in all three areas. It was not until October 1941 that Parliament passed a National Selective Service Act which called up all able-bodied men for civilian service. Unlike conscription, this was not for military service and no one would be forced to go overseas unless he or she volunteered. By early 1942, those men and women who were not in the armed forces were under the complete control of the N.S.S. No person could take a new job without a N.S.S. certificate and no employer could fire an employee without notifying the N.S.S. Anyone yet unemployed had to accept a N.S.S. designated job. Canada was learning the difficult lesson of what total war meant at home. Fortunately, the spirit of the people began to back the war effort with some enthusiasm.¹⁶

The events in Europe in April-June 1940 changed completely the thinking in Ottawa. Suddenly, Britain and the Dominions were alone facing the Germans and Italians.

Canada's one lone overseas division was not going to be enough. The Canadian military would need at least four or five divisions. As a result of the urgency, Parliament reluctantly passed, on June 21, 1940, the National Resources Mobilization Act--conscription by any other name, but in this case specific provision was made to ensure that this was for service in Canada alone. Eventually, the distinction between the overseas and home guard troops ("Zombies") would create a morale problem in the Army.¹⁷

The Canadian Government soon got over its earlier foot dragging and offered Britain just about anything it wanted. It sent four destroyers (half its force) across the Atlantic to patrol the Channel. Its one fully-equipped fighter squadron was also immediately dispatched to England. The British Government asked Canada to send garrison troops to Iceland, Bermuda and Jamaica to allow the British there to return home. The new Chief of the General Staff, Maj. Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, announced that the Second Division would be sent to Britain as soon as possible and once there formed the First Canadian Corps. He also announced the mobilization of the Third and Fourth Divisions for home

service in the "Canadian Army" (no longer the Militia). After sending a brigade to Iceland, Canada was pressured to send a whole division to protect the island state from German invasion. Canada did not have the troops available and insisted on sending the Second Division to Great Britain and not Iceland. Britain was forced to leave her garrison there and did not get relief until the United States took over responsibility for Iceland in 1942.¹⁸

On May 10, 1940, King's long-time ally Neville Chamberlain was forced to resign as British Prime Minister. Mackenzie King sent Chamberlain a cable which said in part, "I shall always be grateful that it has been my privilege to give to you such support and assistance as it was within my power to give throughout the anxious days and months and years that have intervened." King was genuinely sorry to see Chamberlain go because he did not like Churchill. During the visit of the King and Queen to Canada in early 1939 Mackenzie King had been glad to hear King George VI say that he would not wish to appoint Churchill to any office "unless it was absolutely necessary in time of war." Now Churchill was Prime Minister and the Canadian people

immediately adopted him as another hero to set beside Roosevelt as the great men of the times. It would not have helped Mackenzie King's insecurities to know of the secret cables that Churchill and Roosevelt had been sending each other since the war started. King and Churchill never had a close relationship and this always made King suspicious when it came time for the use of Canadian troops during the war. However, Mackenzie King never missed an opportunity to impress the public with his familiarity to Churchill and Roosevelt who both called him "Mackenzie."¹⁹

The outbreak of World War II did not interrupt the developing friendship between King and Roosevelt. But King was obliged to respect the limitations which neutrality imposed on Roosevelt while the Canadian Government was forced to turn to the United States Government for logistical support. The United States Minister in Ottawa let Washington know that Canada was interested in some form of mutual defence. On Friday, August 16, 1940, Roosevelt telephoned Mackenzie King and invited him to meet the President the next day at Ogdensburg, New York, opposite the little St. Lawrence town of Prescott. King seized the

moment to become the "linchpin" (as he called it) between England and the United States. Together King and Roosevelt came up with the idea of a joint commission on common defence problems and, in a press release, announced the formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Parliament and Congress were left with nothing to affirm. In return for consultation, Canada opened her territory for American defence installations. Somehow this agreement did not violate American neutrality, but Churchill did not like the plan because it took Canada further from his sphere of influence and placed her more under American domination. In its lifetime the Permanent Joint Board on Defence made thirty-three recommendations concerning North American defence and all except two were approved by the Canadian and American Governments.²⁰

The Ogdensburg Agreement was just the beginning of arrangements between the Allies. Immediately after the start of the Second World War, Roosevelt went to work on Congress to change the Neutrality Act and lift the arms embargo. Congress reluctantly agreed to change the law to no longer prohibit munitions sales to belligerent nations,

but only forbade United States ships from transporting any goods to the belligerents. The sale of munitions would be on a cash-and-carry basis. One of the immediate effects of this law was the reinstatement of the embargoed back orders of 1,500 planes to Great Britain.²¹

Early in October 1939, a British Purchasing Mission was set up in Ottawa. After the passage of the 1939 Neutrality Act, the office moved to New York. Appointed to head this Purchasing Commission was a Canadian, Arthur Purvis, who had been the President of Canadian Industries Limited and head of the National Employment Commission during the Depression. Purvis would eventually work very closely with American Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. in supplying Britain with most of her needs.²²

Once Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, he let President Roosevelt know his immediate needs. In a cable sent on May 15, 1940 Churchill said in part:

We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and air borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready for them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone and we are not afraid of that. . . All I ask now is that you should proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help us with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. . . .

Immediate needs are the loan of 40 or 50 of your older destroyers to bridge the gap between what we have now and the large new construction we put in hand at the beginning of the war. . . [He ended with this prophetic statement] We shall go on paying dollars for as long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more, you will give us the stuff all the same.²³

Roosevelt was not yet in a strong enough political position to loan Britain the United States destroyers without Congressional approval (which he doubted he could get, especially with an election coming up). However, he did issue an executive order correcting another sticky problem. Under the existing guidelines, planes purchased by Britain had to be flown to Houlton, Maine or other border points and parked. The Canadians would then drive across the border and tow the planes into Canada where they would be flown to Britain. Roosevelt's order allowed the planes to fly directly to Canada.²⁴

Churchill continued to pester Roosevelt for the destroyers with cables on June 11 and July 31. In August, a deal began to emerge in which the United States would swap the destroyers for ninety-nine year leases to bases on British colonial soil. Roosevelt believed that he could, as

Commander-in-Chief, make the swap in the interest of national defense. Roosevelt saw it as a "can't lose" situation--Britain got the fifty aging destroyers which would buy her time and the United States got naval and air force bases far from the shores of America which could act as a first line of defense against the Germans. Roosevelt also thought he received a promise that if Britain fell it would send its fleet to Canada where the United States could control it.²⁵

On September 3, 1940 President Roosevelt formally informed Congress that he had acquired, from the British Government, the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua and British Guiana. The Newfoundland and Bermuda bases were outright gifts, "gratefully received." In return for the other bases, the United States gave England fifty over-aged destroyers. In a news conference held that same day, Roosevelt proclaimed the deal as "possibly the most important thing that has come for American defense since the Louisiana Purchase." Later, Mackenzie King told Parliament that he had played a role in

the negotiations between Churchill and Roosevelt and helped to work out the final details during the Ogdenburgs meeting.²⁶

It should be noted that Winston Churchill was not playing politics with his urgent requests for American destroyers. England was in real danger of invasion in the summer of 1940 and had little with which to defend itself except the courageous words of its fearless leader. On June 18, Churchill told the British House of Commons:

What Gen. Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. . . Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him all Europe may be free. . . But if we fail, then the whole world including the United States. . . will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age, made more sinister and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will say, "This was their finest hour."²⁷

To repel an invasion the British had twenty-eight divisions--twelve divisions of raw and untrained recruits and twelve divisions which were evacuated from Dunkirk with

little or no equipment and in a complete state of confusion. This left only four divisions in a state of readiness--the Third British Division under Maj. Gen. B.L. Montgomery, the Fifty-Second British Division, the Forty-Third British Division and the First Canadian Division. The First Canadian Division was moved to Oxford at the end of June as part of a mobile strike force. In the first week of July, the Canadians were joined by the hastily reformed British First Armoured Division. By mid-July the War office formed two corps of mobile forces. The other combat-ready British divisions formed a corps stationed north of the Thames. South of the Thames was the newly-formed Seventh Corps commanded by newly promoted Lt. Gen. McNaughton and consisting of the First Canadian Division, the British First Armoured Division and two infantry brigades of the New Zealand Forces.²⁸

Lead elements of the Second Canadian Division began to arrive in midsummer and were sent to Aldershot for intensive training. Some of their Canadian-produced brand new weapons were taken away from them as soon as they reached England. The troops that made up the mobile

reserves had a more pressing need for them. Thus, the Canadian and British recruits had to train with antique or wooden weapons until the real thing could be manufactured. No matter where the Canadians were on the Island they shared the fate of the British civilians when the heavy bombing raids began. One hundred and twenty Canadian soldiers were killed in air raids that summer, while a few Canadian units had the joy of shooting down several German planes.²⁹

On the evening of September 7, General Headquarters Home Force flashed the code word "Cromwell" to all units, signifying the invasion was expected at any minute. Churchill told his people on September 11:

We must regard the next week or so as a very important period in our history. It ranks with the days when the Spanish Armada was approaching the Channel. . . or when Nelson stood between us and Napoleon's Grand Army at Boulogne.³⁰

Fortunately, the German invasion never materialized. As the year wore on, a steady flow of additional units from Canada arrived in the United Kingdom. By December the Second Canadian Division had fully arrived and on Christmas Day the First Canadian Corps was formed with Lt. Gen. McNaughton in command. At the same time the Seventh Corps was disbanded.

From this point on the training of the Canadians was for an eventual return to Europe. However, as time passed the troops became more vocal in their resentment of the fact that they were the only troops not being sent into combat-- British, Australia, New Zealanders, Indians and South Africans were all fighting in North Africa. The Canadian soldiers were growing weary of garrison duty and wanted some action.³¹

CHAPTER 9

CANADA: A COMMUNITY AT TOTAL WAR

CANADA 1941-1942

When World War II started, Canada's production of war material was practically non-existent. After the 1938 Bren gun scandal, industrialists had no interest in going into the arms market. In April 1940, this changed with the appointment of American-born Clarence Decatur Howe as Minister of Munitions and Supply. Mackenzie King had wanted to concentrate Canada's main war effort on its industrial production and Howe went a long way to make that hope come true. He constantly fought the services for manpower and, through aggressive recruiting, had Canada's unemployment level at zero when 1942 began. Howe came to industry's aid when the military demanded that all young men be given ninety days of intensive training in case they were needed for the war. Howe got the requirement lowered to thirty days and worked out a plan so that no industry lost too many

young men to military training at one time.¹

Determined to investigate the British war needs for himself, Howe sailed for England in late 1940. He survived the torpedoing of his ship, met with the British industrialists, determined what Canada could best supply Britain that would not duplicate what was coming from America and returned to Canada a hero with a long list of orders. When Howe could not find a company capable of manufacturing certain items, he created a company himself. By the end of the war, he had created twenty-eight federally-owned Crown corporations. Perhaps Howe's greatest achievement was in the shipbuilding industry. Canada had fifteen yards scattered throughout the country capable of producing a variety of medium-sized cargo vessels from 4,700 tons to 10,000 tons and Canada was going to need a vast number of them in a hurry. In less than a five-year period, Canada's small shipbuilding industry ballooned to become the second largest employer in the country, employing 126,000 men and women. In that same time, they launched 410 merchant ships, 487 Corvettes and minesweepers, 254 naval tugs and 3,302 landing craft.²

All of this cost money and soon it was in short supply. Canada's war production depended on a three-sided trading and financial relationship with Britain and the United States. Canada was buying vital components, such as airplane engines, from the Americans and paying for them with British payments for Canadian goods sent to the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, the Cash-and-Carry system collapsed at the beginning of 1941. Britain had never rebuilt a huge cash reserve after the First World War and was now bankrupt. Meanwhile, Canada's own trading deficit with the United States was out of control even though two-thirds of all Canadian war production was being sold to the Allies. Something had to be done or Britain would go under. Fortunately, by this point the American public was ready to relax neutrality further to ensure the survival of Great Britain. The United Kingdom was spending about thirty-six million U.S. dollars a day on supplies and as 1941 started, was over two hundred and fifty million U.S. dollars in debt.³

Roosevelt decided to ask Congress to underwrite all future British war contracts with America and then lend

or lease the warships, freighters, planes, guns and munitions to England under a "gentlemen's agreement" whereby, at the end of the war, the British would either return the equipment, or, if it were destroyed, would replace it in kind. He used a good analogy, "that it would be like lending one's garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire," and he added, "a man wouldn't try to sell the hose; he would trust that it would be returned in good condition or replaced."⁴

Roosevelt's idea, which would become known as the Lend-Lease Act, was introduced as House Bill No. 1776 and entitled "A Bill to Further Promote the Defense of the U.S. and For Other Purposes." The historic number and the majestic vagueness of the language were symptomatic. With few modifications, Congress passed the legislation and Roosevelt signed Lend-Lease into law on March 11, 1941.⁵

Canada did not qualify for Lend-Lease because she had too many assets in the United States which could be sold for cash. The Canadian Government wanted to avoid the financial disaster of being forced to sell assets at below market value. Mackenzie King, C.D. Howe and Clifford Clark,

the Deputy Minister of Finance, sought a way to reconcile Canada's need for American credit and America's need for arms and other military supplies. The result of the negotiations was the Hyde Park Agreement which was finalized at the President's Hudson River estate on Sunday, April 20, 1941. Under the Agreement, the United States would pay for Canadian manufactured goods in U.S. dollars and the Canadians would use those dollars to buy American goods. The Agreement, in effect, circumvented that part of the Neutrality Act which barred loans to belligerents. Ultimately, Canada was spared the huge debt she would have undoubtedly accumulated without the Hyde Park Agreement.⁶

With her economy secure and her war industry getting into full gear, the Canadian Government could return its attention to the war itself. Unfortunately, Mackenzie King and his Cabinet had no concept of strategic planning nor placed any credibility in the military advice they received. The officers on the General Staff were young and inexperienced in serving two masters--the Canadian politicians and the British military command system. As a result, the officers in Canada and those stationed in

England did not have the experience to question properly the right of non-Canadians to decide the military use of Canadian troops. When orders came down to Canadian commanders, they were obeyed without question--a portent for disaster.⁷

In August 1941, the Canadians received another opportunity for some action in Operation GAUNTLET. On August 19, the H.M.T. Empress of Canada sailed from Glasgow with 645 officers and other ranks under the command of Brig. Gen. A.E. Potts. Included in the operation were elements of the Edmonton Regiment, the Saskatoon Light Infantry Regiment, a British field engineer unit and a Norwegian topographical section. Their destination was the Arctic archipelago of Spitsbergen, 480 miles northwest of Norway. Their mission was the destruction of the coal mines, harbor facilities, the wireless and meteorological stations and the evacuation of about 2,000 Russians and 800 Norwegians to either Archangel or Britain.

The troops landed on August 25, and evacuated the Russians on the 27th. When the transports reached Archangel and disembarked the Russians, they picked up 192 French

soldiers who had escaped Germany and fled to Russia. On September 2, the transports returned to Spitzbergen to remove the Norwegians. By that time, the demolition program had been completed and so the combat troops were also removed from the archipelago, leaving the place deserted. All returned safely to Scotland on September 9, mission accomplished.⁸

Mackenzie King did not like the idea of Prime Ministers' conferences during a time of war because he believed that the Prime Minister's place was in his own country directing the war effort. But King broke his own rule in mid-September by flying, for the first time, across the Atlantic in an American-built bomber. His purpose was to meet with Churchill and the War Cabinet to discuss the future use of Canadian troops. Concluding what King believed were fruitful discussions, he took the opportunity to meet the Canadian troops stationed in England. King was not prepared for their reception. After being forced to wait for their national leader in a driving rainstorm, the ten thousand Canadian soldiers became boisterously restive. When King pontificated, "Never in her history has Canada

been prouder than today of men who crossed the seas to play their part alongside the mother country . . . , " he was met with a thunderous chorus of boos. The average Canadian soldier was angry at King's fuddy-duddy war policies and particularly with the fact that his Government was unwilling to conscript men for overseas service. Momentarily taken aback, King retorted, "I gather from the applause that many of you would rather be engaged in more active operations than you are today." Three days later, King addressed another large contingent of troops who had been ordered against heckling or interruption. This time his audience listened in absolute silence and King left to the sound of no applause.

The Canadian soldiers were ready for total war and eager to get into the fight. They correctly surmised that the reason they were stuck in England was due to Mackenzie King's reluctance to let them be sent wherever the British needed them the most. The plight of the Canadian Army was enhanced by the fact that except for Gen. McNaughton, no senior officer had become a household name, and thus the general public had no heroes to cheer.⁹

Almost totally forgotten by the Canadian people was the lonely job that the understrength Royal Canadian Navy was doing. When Great Britain surrendered her naval supremacy at the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference and accepted parity with the United States, she also gave up her ability to protect the Western Atlantic. This meant that Canada would have to rely on the United States to protect her shores since Canada had no navy of her own. But when the Second World War started, the United States by declaring herself neutral, left Canada on her own. With little seafaring experience in naval warfare, the R.C.N. was forced to accept the job of safeguarding the first one thousand miles across the Atlantic. If the times had not been so desperate, the concept would have been labeled as criminally negligent. Anti-submarine warfare was a complete mystery to the R.C.N. because few officers had ever seen ASDIC in action and it would be months before their vessels would be equipped with this submarine detector device. For the Canadian Navy, it was the most dangerous struggle of the war.¹⁰

The first eighteen months of the war were

relatively quiet in the West Atlantic because the U-boats had not yet made their way westward to hunt, but from the spring of 1941 onward, the battle of the Atlantic shifted to the mid and western parts of the Atlantic. Great Britain requested that Canada send four of her destroyers to patrol the English Channel in June 1940. This virtually eliminated Canada's capacity to do convoy duty in the western Atlantic. To fill the gap, Canada embarked on an ambitious building program to produce "Bangor" Class minesweepers, "Fairmile" motor launches, armed merchant cruisers and a new British-designed "whaler-type" escort vessel called a "Corvette." Named after the 18th century French man'-o-war, the Corvette was smaller, lighter and faster than a destroyer. Unfortunately for the sailors on board, it was not designed for the rough North Atlantic and it took a special class of men to master them.¹¹

For the British, the Corvette was a stop gap ship to fill out the escort forces until more destroyers could be built. The Corvette was the first warship ever built in Canada in considerable number. It was originally conceived as a close escort vessel to be used within the coastal

waters of Britain. Its design was submitted by William Reed of Smith's Dock Company at Southbank on the Tees. Its extremely simple concept called for a vessel of 940 tons, 205 feet overall in length, thirty-three feet at the beam and seven feet nine inches of mean draught. It would have a single three-block propeller driven by a four-cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating engine which produced 2,750 horsepower. The Royal Navy required that the Corvette be capable of traveling 4,000 miles on two hundred tons of fuel at twelve knots and have a maximum speed of sixteen knots. It would carry three hundred pound depth charges, a four-inch forward gun and a two-pound aft gun. The original design called for a crew of forty-seven but it was not unusual for the Canadian Corvettes to have as many as ninety-three men on board.¹²

In 1939 Canada accepted the plans for the Corvettes and ordered its few shipyards to construct sixty-four of them in two years. These shipyards had never built anything over a hundred feet long and most of them were located on the edge of Lake Ontario, a thousand miles from the sea. In December 1940, fourteen half-equipped and

skeleton-crewed Corvettes sailed down the St. Lawrence to the sea. They were to proceed to England with all possible haste and, since there was a shortage of four-inch guns in Canada, wooden "dummies" were fitted for the North Atlantic crossing. These were the forerunners of 122 Corvettes that Canada would build and sail during World War II. By early 1942, the Royal Canadian Navy required all new Covettes to be fully armed before they moved down the St. Lawrence. As they reached the Gulf of St. Lawrence, they were pressed into convoy duty even though their crews had not yet been trained. Training would have to be conducted while on convoy duty.¹³

The Royal Navy could not release too many ships for convoy duty until after the threat of the German invasion had passed. Thus, it was early 1941 before the convoy system became established. The R.N. would escort the convoys to and from Iceland and also to and from St. John's, Newfoundland. The R.C.N. had the responsibility to escort convoys from St. John's to Halifax and back and thus was given the designation of Newfoundland Escort Force. The Canadians who fought the Battle of the Atlantic were largely

amateurs who had to learn as they fought and were thought, by the R.N., to be undisciplined in anti-surmarine warfare. Fortunately, the R.C.N. had the able assistance of the Royal Canadian Air Force whose Eastern Air Command used long-range bombers to harass the enemy. While sinking six submarines and damaging three others, they constantly forced the German subs to submerge and thus slowed them in their efforts to track or catch convoys. Flying thousands upon thousands of hours in all kinds of weather, these intrepid airmen helped to make up for the lack of equipment available to the R.C.N. to fight the submarines.¹⁴

In the spring of 1941, after Roosevelt easily won reelection and Lend Lease had become a reality, the President took a bold step when he cabled Churchill to announce:

The Government proposes to extend the present so-called security zone and patrol areas which have been in effect since very early in the War to a line covering all North Atlantic waters west of about west longitude 25 degrees. We propose to utilize aircraft and naval vessels working from Greenland, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, the U.S., Bermuda and West Indies. We will want in great secrecy, notification of movement of convoys so our patrols can seek out any ships or planes of aggressor nations operating west of the new line of the security zone. We will immediately make public

to you positions of aggressor ships or planes when located in our patrol area.¹⁵

Later, in October 1941, Canadian naval forces were put under United States "co-operating supervision" even though America was officially neutral. At the same time, United States warships of both the Navy and Coast Guard began to escort ships from American ports to Halifax. Unfortunately, the American help was short-lived because, after December 1941, the United States pulled most of her warships out of the Atlantic and sent them to the Pacific. Despite these shortcomings, the R.C.N. was providing nearly half the surface escorts for convoys from North America to Britain by the end of 1942, when she had 188 warships manned by sixteen thousand men. It was truly a magnificent turnaround.¹⁶

Another little known part of the Canadian war effort was the Air Corps Ferrying Command. Started by pilots from the British Overseas Airways Corporation, who had begun flying-boat services across the Atlantic in 1939, the Ferry Command had a dearth of civilian pilots with enough knowledge of upper air currents and navigational skills to fly long hours beyond the sight of land.

Fortunately some Canadian bush pilots proved to be equally efficient in this type of flying and joined the BOAC pilots in delivering 315 aircraft to Britain over an eighteen-month period of time. By mid-1941, R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. pilots began to take over the job from the civilians and delivered thousands of planes during the war. They were later joined by American pilots who, until Pearl Harbor, could only fly the planes to Canada but afterwards, delivered aircraft to every theatre of the war.¹⁷

Disaster struck the Canadian Army in December of 1941 and halfway around the world from England in Hong Kong. Winston Churchill wrote in January 1941 about the question of whether the garrison in Hong Kong should be strengthened. He said:

This is all wrong. If Japan goes to war with us, there is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we should suffer there. Instead of increasing the garrison, it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale.

Churchill later stated that he allowed others to change his mind and requested the Canadian Government to send two battalions to Hong Kong.¹⁸

The Canadian Government was under public pressure to allow Canadian troops to do more. Therefore, Mackenzie King tragically agreed to send the two battalions to Hong Kong without giving the Japanese threat too much thought. If he had consulted his military advisors, he would have been told that Hong Kong could not be defended with such a small garrison, that Canada did not have any adequately trained troops available to send and that the troops, once sent, had no hope of relief or evacuation. King made his decision based on political rather than military reasons and his military advisors did not try to talk him out of the pending debacle.²⁰

The Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles were chosen, not because they were the best trained units but, because they were available. The Winnipeg Grenadiers had just returned from garrison duty in Jamaica and needed a period of refresher training. The Royal Rifles had yet to be sufficiently trained and were not considered operational. Nevertheless, they sailed on October 27, 1941 after being brought up to strength with new recruits. They reached Hong Kong on November 16 and barely had time to settle in before

the shooting started. They were doomed from the beginning.

The Hong Kong garrison consisted of only six battalions of soldiers including the Canadians, a total of fourteen thousand men from Britain, India, Canada and Hong Kong. They had twenty-nine fixed guns, mostly aimed out to sea, and forty-two mobile guns plus eighteen anti-aircraft weapons, but only six which were not obsolete. All five of their aircraft were destroyed in the initial air attack on December 8. Unexpectedly, the invasion came from the land and not the sea but the gallant defenders held out for seventeen and a half days before being forced to surrender. Out of a body of 1,975 men, the Canadians lost three hundred killed and five hundred wounded plus an additional 257 who died while POWs.

Afterwards, a Canadian Royal Commission investigated the incident and in a whitewash concluded that the expedition had not been either "ill-conceived or badly managed."¹⁸ The House of Commons held a debate on the Hong Kong affair on January 21, 1942. Speaking for the Government was James Layton Ralston, Minister of Defence. He stated that the two battalions were sent to Hong Kong to

boost the morale of those in the Far East and to give evidence of Commonwealth solidarity. He claimed that the troops were sent on the recommendation of the military leaders and with the full consent of the Government. Ralston inflated their level of training and preparedness and glossed over the fact that almost one-fourth of the troops were recent, undertrained recruits. None of the men had any battle experience or even a high level of battle training, since their main duties previously had been as garrison troops. Ralston concluded that, "This is the message for us to remember. The defence of Hong Kong is in accordance with the finest traditions of Canadian armies. All ranks fought it out to the last, and more cannot be asked of any man." Several Members of Parliament questioned the validity of Ralston's remarks and one demanded that Ralston resign, but in the end, Parliament was not willing to question seriously the Hong Kong affair because of the new threat posed by the Japanese entry into the war.²¹

In December 1941, Canada was in the same predicament as the United States in that there were not enough ships to patrol offshore waters along the Pacific

coast. The Royal Canadian Navy requisitioned yachts and fishing boats and their entire crews into the Royal Canadian Navy Fisherman's Reserve. Thus they had a small fleet of patrol boats manned by men with thorough knowledge of British Columbia's west coast. Fortunately, they had little to do. The only reported Japanese activity occurred in June 1942. A Japanese submarine shelled the lighthouse at Estevan Point on Vancouver Island on June 20 and two days later, sank a freighter off the Strait of Juan de Fuca. The R.C.N. hushed up both incidents so as not to alarm the jittery public.²²

Sadly for many British Columbians, the war gave them the opportunity for a unjustified solution to their paranodial grievance against oriental immigrants. Despite a joint investigation by the Army and the Royal Mounted Police, which stated that the Japanese-Canadians did not pose a security risk, they were exempted from the National Resources Mobilization Act. Actually, both the Japanese-Canadians and Chinese-Canadians were denied the right to serve in the armed forces. Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of Pensions and Health and a Vancouver Member of Parliament,

seized the moment to order the collection of 1,700 male Japanese Nationals and 19,000 Japanese-Canadians of both sexes for internment. Mackenzie and other British Columbians used the clumsy excuse that this was necessary to protect the Japanese-Canadians from the riotous activities of their white neighbors.²³

At the same time the Japanese internment was being implemented, the sticky issue of conscription rose again. This savagely divisive and symbolic distraction from reality was the favorite whipping-boy of the politicians. A November 1941 Gallup Poll showed that 60 percent of the Canadian population wanted conscription as a part of the total war movement that was being pushed by the Government. The Chief-of-Staff and Minister of Defence wanted five full divisions sent overseas to form the First Canadian Army and three more divisions formed in Canada as a reserve. This was going to require an enormous number of men. In January 1942, New Brunswick's Liberal Premier, J.B. McNair, publicly called for conscription. Mackenzie King was trapped, so he decided to duck the issue by having a national plebiscite to free him from his election promise of no conscription. The

result of the April vote was 2,945,514 to relieve King of his pledge and 1,643,006 against--only Quebec voted heavily against. The pro-conscriptionists now had their mandate for action. King, still trying to sound against conscription, gave the House of Commons his most famous quote on June 10, 1942: "Not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary." After another lengthy debate, Parliament passed Bill 80 which amended the National Resources Mobilization Act to allow conscripts to be sent anywhere beyond the Western Hemisphere, as long as Parliament was first consulted. Soon the "thirty-day trainees" or "Zombies" would be more extensively trained, organized into battalions and sent to England or kept in Canada as reserves. The population of Canada was now committed to total war.²⁴

Meanwhile, back in England, the Canadian troops were still waiting for significant action. By the end of 1941 the First Canadian Tank Brigade, the Third Division and the Fifth Armoured Division had reached Britain. The Fourth Division, still being formed in Canada, was to be converted into an armoured division and when it reached Great Britain, Canada could form its First Canadian Army. This dream

became a reality on April 6, 1942 when Lt. Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton assumed command of the First Canadian Army and Lt. Gen. H.D.G. Crerar took over command of the First Canadian Corps. There were now over 150,000 anxious Canadian troops on English soil.²⁵

For the next four months, Division level and Corps level exercises were conducted which lasted from two days to two weeks each and were given such colorful code names as: ADOLPH, DOG, CAT, BENITO, RAT, CROW, COBRA, EDWARD, PUNTING, BUMPER, EXLAX and BEAVER. These training exercises were designed to test competence in planning, intelligence work, reconnaissance, communication skills, mapping, field messing, supply disbursement and rapid deployment. The Canadians received mixed reviews from their British observers on their performance and were generally thought to be inferior because they lacked battle experience.²⁶

Tragically, the high command of the Canadian Army set up the circumstances which led to the Dieppe disaster. McNaughton constantly pressured the British for the opportunity to monitor strategic planning, but this was deemed unacceptable by the British Generals because of the

performance of the Canadians in the field exercises. Likewise, the years of waiting and requesting action made it virtually impossible for the Canadian General Staff to reject the Dieppe Operation even though none of them had been involved in the planning of the operation. On the other hand, the British General Staff needed to gain experience in planning large-scale amphibious assaults in preparation for the eventual return to Europe and were under pressure to establish a Second Front to relieve German pressure on Russia. Churchill and his Generals knew that a Second Front was beyond Anglo-American resources at that point. However, a really large and successful raid might worry the Germans enough to focus on strengthening their Channel defences, possibly at the expense of the Eastern Front.²⁷

Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, head of Combined Operations, and Lt. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander-in-Chief of South-Eastern Command, approved the broad outline of "Operation Rutter" as the raid on Dieppe was to be labeled. Unfortunately, almost immediately the Royal Air Force rejected the idea of heavy air bombardment

before the raid and the Royal Navy rejected the idea of risking capital ships in the restricted waters of the English Channel. So immediately the two most important elements of the plan were removed. Naval support would come from six "Hunt" class destroyers and a shallow-draft gunboat. The attacking military force was to be made up of two infantry brigades with Engineers and a battalion of tanks. The finalized goals of "Operation Rutter" were the destruction of the enemy defences at Dieppe and its surroundings, including the radar station, the power station, the port facilities, the rail installations, the ammunition dump and the oil dump.²⁸

When Gen. Crerar found himself in temporary command of the First Canadian Army in mid-April while Gen. McNaughton was back in Canada consulting with the General Staff, Crerar used the opportunity to pressure Gen. Montgomery and Lord Louis Mountbatten for a chance to take part in a cross-channel raid. Montgomery made the decision on April 30 to award the raid primarily to the Second Canadian Division which had been in Britain since May 1940. Crerar notified McNaughton who notified the Canadian General

Staff in Ottawa and all agreed to the operation but without taking the time to see if it was feasible.²⁹

After intensive training on the Isle of Wight, a full-scale exercise christened "Yukon" was staged at Bridport on the night of June 11/12. The result proved very unsatisfactory because some units were landed 1,500 yards from the point intended and the tanks arrived an hour late. The success of the operation depended on synchronization of action. Each set of the five different assault groups had to touch down at the right place and the right time to maintain the element of surprise. Mountbatten had "Yukon" repeated on June 22/23 with better results but he was still not satisfied. He did not like the loss of the aerial bombardment, the lack of capital ships for fire support or the use of troops that had so little amphibious training. But he was anxious to push the raid through to success. The raid was launched on July 6 and recalled because of bad weather, but by that time the troops had been briefed in full and it was assumed that the element of secrecy was lost.³⁰

On the other side of the Atlantic, things were

going equally bad for the Royal Canadian Navy. The unexpected "Battle of the St. Lawrence" turned out to be a series of very effective U-boat sorties into the Gulf of St. Lawrence between May and September 1942. On May 12, Naval Service Headquarters released a press statement which said:

The Minister for Naval Services announces that the first enemy submarine attack upon shipping on the St. Lawrence River took place on May 11, when a freighter was sunk [by U-553]. The situation regarding shipping in the river is being closely watched, and long prepared plans for its special protection under these circumstances are in operation. Any possible future sinking in this area will not be made public, in order that information of value to the enemy may be withheld from him.³¹

On May 22, Naval Service Headquarters transcribed the text of a German military broadcast which stated: "A German submarine penetrated through the Gulf of St. Lawrence into the St. Lawrence River and sank, in defiance of the guard of numerous naval and air formations, three ships totaling 14,000 tons." As a result of the German broadcast, Angus L. Macdonald, Minister of the Navy, reiterated the principle of censorship in that nothing would be published that could possibly provide the enemy with information about his attacks against Allied shipping, and nothing would be

reported publicly about Allied attacks against enemy submarines.³²

On July 10, 1942, J. Sasseville Roy of Gaspé, Quebec rose in the House on a question of privilege to challenge the Government to either clarify the situation of the ship sinkings (by then there had been six ships sunk by U-553 and U-132) or convene a secret session and allow the Gaspé representative to be briefed on the seriousness of the situation. Mackenzie King requested that Mr. Roy be silent as his remarks might benefit the enemy. Three days later, Roy told the House that "half the people in Quebec City knew of the U-boat attacks before they were mentioned in the House," he went on to say that "any effort to withhold information from the enemy that was already an open secret in the whole countryside was frivolous at best." This time, J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, tried to get Roy to sit down. But R.B. Hanson, Conservative Leader of the Opposition, came to Roy's rescue to demand, "What is the Government's position with respect to convoys in the St. Lawrence?"³³

The King Government was not in a position to admit

publically that it was incapable of protecting normal shipping down the St. Lawrence or in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Almost the entire focus of the R.C.N. was convoy duty from Halifax to Newfoundland. As a result, the Government announced on September 9, that it was closing, by the first of October, the St. Lawrence River and the Gulf to all merchant traffic that was not bound for Europe. This resulted in a reduction of traffic of about 60 percent and all this traffic had to be shifted to railroads which were already overburdened.³⁴

The Canadian losses continued on September 7 when three merchant ships and the R.C.N. Armed Yacht Raccoon (one of only six armed yachts to cover the whole St. Lawrence River) were all sunk in one night by U-517. The next day the seventy-eight survivors picked up off Gaspé were put on a train in Gaspé bound for Montreal. The Gaspé-Montreal rail line provided reporters with direct access to unauthorized news throughout the U-boat campaign. To the people in the Province of Quebec, the U-boat campaign was no secret. Five days later, the R.C.N. Corvette Chalottetown (one of only five Corvettes assigned to cover the entire

Gulf of St. Lawrence) was sunk by U-517 with the loss of most of its inexperienced crew. Coincidental to the sinkings was the Naval Services' decision not to extinguish or dim coastal lights. It was felt the number of ships that would be lost without the aid of navigational lights along the treacherous coastal waters would be far more than those that might be sunk by the four enemy submarines lurking in the area.³⁵

While the thousand miles of Canada's eastern coastline went virtually unprotected, the eighty Corvettes of the R.C.N. were having better luck in their convoy duty in the Atlantic. After a few disastrous convoys, the R.C.N. settled into a well-disciplined routine which combined new tactics with increased air cover and the introduction of a new SW2C (Surface Warning Two Canadian) radar which could detect submarines on the surface. While the number of Canadian kills may not have been high, the number of ships lost fell dramatically. Unlike the Royal Navy, which used the conservative "avoid all contact with the enemy if possible" approach, the R.C.N. chose to be aggressive and use convoy duty to hunt down and kill enemy

submarines. While leaving a small force to herd the convoy, the bulk of the protection would move rapidly ahead or to the side or drop behind and try to draw the enemy into a trap. The R.N. viewed this with disdain as the "cowboy" form of convoy defence. But it worked because of the aggressive nature of the Canadian captains who knew they could outmaneuver a U-boat in tight quarters and quickly overtake them once they had been forced to submerge.³⁶

Meanwhile, back in Europe the Canadian Army was going to get its chance finally to get into the fight. Within a week of cancellation, the Dieppe raid was revised under the ridiculous name "Jubilee." The reason for this was probably the high-level pressure from both America and Russia to do something. Montgomery wrote to General Sir Bernard Paget, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, telling him that he recommended that the raid on Dieppe be canceled "for all time." Mountbatten countered Montgomery's argument with the thought that even if the Germans had learned of the plans, they would never expect the attack to be re-launched at Dieppe. Mountbatten decided on his own to launch "Jubilee" and kept the launch date a secret even from the

intelligence community as a measure of his own security.³⁷

In fact, security held. Post-war examination of German records revealed that the enemy did not receive any warning of the intended attack. But, after the German air raid of July 7th, against what looked like an invasion fleet, they decided to increase the level of vigilance during the times when the moon and tides made invasion favorable. As a result, an intermediate level of alert was in effect from August 10 through August 19. Even at that level of alert, the troops not on duty were undressed and asleep when the attack came.³⁸

"Operation Jubilee" the largest raid in modern warfare, was launched on August 18/19, 1942, but despite painstaking planning and rehearsals, became a procession of accidents, bad luck, miscalculations and tragedy. Only one part of the five-part operation was a success and that was one of the most minor elements of the raid. The rest were unmitigated disasters. The raid was halted seven hours after it began and those troops that could were withdrawn by sea.³⁹ Of the 4,963 Canadians who started on the raid, 3,963 made it ashore. Of those, 1,944 became POWs (558

wounded), 808 were killed, and 1211 were evacuated (589 wounded). That was an 84 percent casualty rate of those that went ashore. The British Army suffered fifty-five killed, 185 wounded and 197 POWs out of one thousand men. German loses were placed at 345 killed and 268 wounded in the effort. But just as important for the supply-starved allies, the Canadians left behind 28 tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, one command car, 1,242 rifles, 165 sub-machine guns, 22 heavy mortars, 58 light mortars, 60 anti-tank rifles, 50 machine guns and 33 landing craft.⁴⁰ By all accounts, this was too high a price to pay for so little gained!

"Operation Jubilee" became a hotly discussed operation of World War II. Tactically, it was a complete failure. But as a "reconnaissance-in-force" to learn German defences, the ability to capture a port by frontal attack, the status of joint army, navy and air force combined operations and the reliability of amphibious equipment, it was a gold mine. The Allies learned that assaults should be planned to develop around flank attacks rather than frontal assault, that the navy needed a permanent amphibious assault force to train with the army, that a stronger reserve force

was needed, that overwhelming fire support throughout the operation was crucial and that military planning must not demand precise timing for a large, complex operation.⁴¹

It was obviously unfortunate that the best known battle of the Canadian Army in World War II would be remembered as a catastrophe. But there is no doubt that the positive results of the raid are often overlooked. Gen. C. Churchill Mann, Deputy Commander and Senior General Staff Officer for "Jubilee" wrote that he believed that the real purpose of the Dieppe raid was to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the subsequent invasion of Europe. Mountbatten was convinced of this. In a speech delivered in 1974, Mountbatten said, "Dieppe was one of the most vital operations of the whole Second World War. It was the Great Deception. . . . JUBILEE convinced the Germans that the full-scale invasion could not be conducted over open beaches." The Germans became convinced that the primary objective of any invasion was the immediate seizure of a port and put most of their efforts into protecting them and the troops around the ports were always at a higher level of readiness.⁴²

Mountbatten and Churchill concentrated on crafting "Jubilee" into becoming "the Great Deception" after the fact including enhancing the story that "Jubilee" was not a complete failure. Since a complete set of operational orders were lost to the enemy, the intelligence community set out to capitalize on this point by convincing the Germans that the cross-channel invasion would occur at Pas de Calais using the same schematic model as the Dieppe raid. The deception became known as Operation STARKEY. What Mountbatten did not know was that Gen. William J. Donovan, head of American Intelligence and William Stevenson, head of British Intelligence, had sent a whole team of O.S.S. and Baker Street Irregular agents along on the raid. Included in the operation were two radar scientists who got a first hand look at a German radar station and planted a special radiophone that station which sent back signals to England for years so that English scientists could compare German radar data with British data. The intelligence coup of the raid made the whole operation worthwhile even though no one could know about it at the time.⁴³

Meanwhile, back in Canada, the first reaction to

the news of Dieppe was one of pride and admiration for the heroic conduct of the troops. Dieppe was the first major amphibious assault attempted by the Allies in the European theatre of war. As the record shows, many useful lessons were learned by Allied planners that were used and improved in landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and finally the Normandy beaches of France. The other key lesson of Dieppe was that for all their prior training, the Canadians utterly lacked battle experience. Even a few veteran officers and sergeants might have been able to kick the shell-shocked soldiers back into action. The Canadians were not unique in this--most units froze the first time they went into combat and it was only with experience that combat veterans got over the shock of battle.⁴⁴

It was later, long after the battle, that public opinion began to question the politicians and generals for sending Canadian soldiers on such an ill-conceived endeavor. There were indeed many fingers to be pointed at those at the highest level concerning Dieppe. Crerar, McNaughton and the General Staff were not involved in the planning of the raid and did not question the plans they were given to

execute. Mackenzie King had tried too long to keep Canadian troops out of combat but allowed himself to be forced to send troops to Hong Kong and then approve the Dieppe raid. Churchill wanted to get Joseph Stalin off his back about the opening of a Second Front and the raid, if successful, would divert the Germans and if it failed, would show Stalin that a Second Front was not possible at this point in time. Finally, a new theory has emerged that Lord Louis Mountbatten launched the raid on his own initiative and in total secrecy after it had been essentially shelved. Mountbatten's reasons for doing this probably included ego, a feeling that he could not be wrong about the chances of the raid and a need to make a success out of Combined Operations. Unfortunately, we will never know the true story because Mountbatten successfully collected all the records of the raid and wrote the "official history" himself.⁴⁵

But all of the later criticism was lost on the Canadian soldiers because they had done their duty. There was no doubt that the Canadian Army came away with a new sense of pride. After over two years of disappointments and

frustrations, it was demonstrated that the Canadian Army could fight in a manner that was reminiscent of 1914-18. The bad luck and heavy losses could not diminish this new sense of confidence. In the carnage and confusion of war, it was miraculous that anything ever came out right. No matter what lay ahead, the Canadians knew that they would purport themselves in a manner that would gain them respect and admiration. There was no time to excessively condemn or examine the mistakes made. Their focus had to be on the job of winning the war.

CONCLUSION

When historians spoke of Canada as an unmilitary community, they were not declaring that Canada was necessarily anti-military. Actually, the Government of Canada and the people of Canada perceived events from a different perspective than did the military. Or, to use a different analogy, perhaps they were a bit like oil and vinegar. Each manifested its own distinct qualities, characteristics or functions but they remained separated until a crisis arose. Crises forced them to unite together, and the larger the crisis, the better they responded to form a dynamic and distinctive combination. Canadian history has offered several good examples of this phenomenon at work, i.e., in 1775-76 and 1812-13 when the country quickly mobilized to drive out the upstart American invaders or, in 1861-65 when there was another potential for border incidents with the United States. However, after each of these crises, the Militia was demobilized and the military

again separated from the normal flow of Canadian activity.

In reality, the main reason Canada was such an unmilitary community before World War II was because she did not need a military establishment to accomplish her goals. After the 1867 Confederation, the military, with one exception, was not utilized to help settle the western wilderness. Similarly, the Canadian Government did not take the threat posed by the United States seriously even though that threat existed in the minds of some Imperial planners and Canadian officers for years. For example, Canada and the United States had disputed the fishing rights off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts for over a hundred years. But in all that time, Canada never felt she needed a naval force to protect her rights. She did, however, create a small naval force in 1910 as a token gesture to help Great Britain in its naval race with Germany.

In many ways the Canadian people had been fortunate. Their Dominion and later Commonwealth status was not born out of a bloody revolution. They had never suffered the ravages of a civil war even though the potential for one had existed with the contentious

French-speaking minority. Canada was not a pathway to the conquest of other lands as some countries in Europe proved to be. Nor did Canada have any natural enemies. Therefore, the need for a large standing army, navy or air force was not justified and the Canadian Government was correct in keeping those expenses to a minimum.

However, when an unmilitary community is asked to go to war, as it was in World War I, the shock to the system can be quite traumatic. Never before had Canada had so many men in uniform and her small professional Militia was not equipped to carry the burden of training and outfitting such a large group of citizen-soldiers. Canadian industry could not keep up with demand for war material and neither could the Canadian farmers satisfy the requirements for food. Most importantly, the general population was not prepared for the terrible cost in lives extinguished or broken. Therefore, it was easy to understand how and why Canada retreated into isolationism at the end of the Great War.

The Mackenzie King Governments supported the concept of isolationism as a way of keeping Canada free from European entanglements while she recovered from the war

economically, morally and spiritually. King's focus was to get Canada back on an economic expansion program that had started at the turn of the century, and to keep her moving forward despite recessions or depressions. While he may not always have succeeded, he kept the focus of the population on the problems of Canada instead of the problems of the world.

In response to the wishes of the people for disarmament, Mackenzie King dismantled the armed forces almost to non-existence. The "war to end all wars" had been fought, Canada and the world were at peace and there was no need for a military establishment.

Unfortunately, the world did not remain at peace and when war clouds arose in Europe, Canada was hopelessly unprepared. King had placed all his faith in appeasement and was not ready to see it fail. The Canadian people had placed their trust in the security of their Atlantic and Pacific moats and were not yet willing to believe that they were actually threatened. The Canadian Government did start a weak rearmament program but were not motivated to fund it to the level necessary to truly improve the condition of the

military. And the military, well aware of the meaning of the events in Europe, was incapable to equip itself for war without the support of the people, the Government or the Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, the sudden onslaught of the Second World War proved once again that oil and vinegar do mix. The crisis caused the people, the Government and the military to coalesce in a common cause which created a genuine "great response." In less than three years, the whole of Canada was engrossed in a total war effort. C.D. Howe had Canadian industry pouring out trucks, tanks, airplanes and ships to the point that, by the end of the war, Canada had become a major industrial power. The Royal Canadian Air Force, which possessed only nineteen modern fighters when the war started, ended the war as the fourth largest air force in the world. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan turned Canada into one large air base and produced over 130,000 trained aircrews. The Royal Canadian Navy expanded from oblivion to a point where it could handle half of the Atlantic convoy duty and even pick up the slack when the United States shifted its Atlantic fleet to the

Pacific after Pearl Harbor. The Canadian Militia maintained the skeleton of one division and had little equipment in September 1939. But by mid-1942, Canada delivered a fully-equipped Army (five full divisions) to English soil and was mobilizing three more divisions at home to protect Canada against the Japanese. Most importantly, the people changed their mind and voted to allow a limited conscription to meet Canada's defensive requirement at home. The recruiting posters said, "Let's Go, Canada" and go it did with one of the most magnificent responses of any country in modern times.

Two symbols best demonstrate the Canadian spirit during the Second World War and both can be found in the nation's capital of Ottawa. The first is the National War Memorial which stands just down the hill from Parliament. It is an enormous arched monument which contains a massive cannon at its base. Surrounding the cannon are twenty-two bronze figures pushing, pulling, straining every muscle to move that cannon. They represent the response and sacrifice of Canadian servicemen to accomplish their common goal. The other symbol dominates Parliament Hill, the 293-foot

centerpiece of the Parliament building, the Peace Tower, which contains a memorial to all the Canadians who have fought and died for Canada in battle. But it is also the symbol and the goal toward which all those who sacrificed their lives focused--peace. Canadians can be proud of their accomplishments in the Second World War because through them they brought their nation into full maturity and full partnership with the other great nations of the world in the pursuit of peace.

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1

AN UNMILITARY COMMUNITY

1. Mary Beacock Fryer, Battlefields of Canada (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 1986), 69-85. The French and Indian War started as a dispute between the French and the colony of Virginia over claims to the forks of the Ohio, where the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers merge to form the Ohio River. When Major George Washington failed to remove the French from Ft. Duquesne, the governor of Virginia asked Britain for help. After British Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock was decisively defeated at Ft. Duquesne, the French and Indian War erupted along the whole of eastern North America. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Through the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 134-139. The conflict in eastern North America was a part of the Seven Years War (1756-1763) in Europe between Austria, France and Russia against Prussia with Great Britain supporting Prussia. Some scholars now call the French and Indian War, the Great War for the Empire, because it determined which empire would control North America--the French or the British. Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 107-133.

2. Fryer, Battlefields of Canada, 113-127. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 13-17.

3. Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century: 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada Limited, 1970), 3. S.F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown, Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes (Seattle:

University of Washington Press, 1967), 42-43. Maj. Gen. J.H. MacBrien, "A Brief Sketch of the Development of the Canadian Militia, 1627-1927," Canadian Defence Quarterly IV, No. 4 (July, 1927): 384. The exodus of Loyalists from the United States resulted in the creation of the new province of New Brunswick in 1784. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, Fifth Edition, Revised by Norman Ward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 8.

4. James W. Stryker, Early American Wars and Military Institutions in West Point Military History Series (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1984), 53-55. MacBrien, "A Brief Sketch of the Development of the Canadian Militia, 1627-1927," 384.

5. C.P. Stacey, "The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871," The American Historical Review LVI, No. 1 (October, 1950): 1-5. Patrick C.T. White's "The Oregon Dispute and the Defence of Canada" in John S. Moir (ed), Character and Circumstance (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Limited, 1970), 59-60. Unfortunately, a good portion of the Canadian population believed the myth that the Canadian Militia was invincible based on its performance in 1775-1776 and 1812-1813. What was generally overlooked was the fact that poor generalship and poorly coordinated American Militia caused the United States to lose these conflicts while professional British leadership kept the untrained Canadian Militia from losing their own country. Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 6 & 12.

6. While Canada had increased its border fortifications after 1814, the chief elements operating to limit military preparations were financial limitations imposed by the British Parliament and the unwillingness of the colonial legislatures to assume a larger share of the costs. Added to this was the fact that the frontier regions were not being rapidly settled nor defended. Stacey, "The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871," 3-16. Neither the North nor Great Britain wanted to go to war over the incident and after two months of diplomatic posturing the

two envoys were released to Britain without an apology and the crisis passed. However, Britain did send 14,000 soldiers to British North America and the provincial governments did try to bring their militia units up to strength. Donald Creighton's "The 1860s" in J.M.S. Careless and R. Craig Brown (ed), The Canadians: 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, Limited, 1967), 10-11. Britain also shipped 50,000 weapons and 2,250,000 rounds of ammunition to supply the 38,000 man Militia that was called up in British North America. Robin W. Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1960), 69-103.

7. Great Britain was not cutting its imperial connection with Canada, but was anxious to recall her isolated military garrisons, and escape from further territorial obligations in North America. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 14. In addition, Britain needed troops for New Zealand, feared war in Europe and would liked to have remained isolated in Europe if only Europe would remain isolated. Winks, Canada and the United States, 80-81. Speaking of the British North America Act, a Constitutional Law expert stated: "The most important characteristic of the Canadian Constitution is nowhere written down, nowhere guaranteed. It is that Canada is a constitutional democracy." He goes on to say, "It is customary to speak of the British North America Act, 1867, together with its various amendments, as 'the Canadian Constitution,' but in fact only a part of the important provisions of the constitution are contained therein . . . The most important areas of the Canadian Constitution, established by convention rather than by law, have been Canada's changing relationship to the United Kingdom--from colony to member of the Commonwealth--and the operation of cabinet government [which is not mentioned in the B.N.A.]." J.R. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, Limited, 1971), 1-2. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 35. The Canada Act of 1982 has now become the Official Canadian Constitution.

8. If the American Civil War had not convinced most Canadians that the United States system was failing, perhaps

more Canadians would have wanted to adopt some of the American principles of government. William Lyon Mackenzie, writing between 1824 and 1837, advocated the American form of government because he believed that the British system had grown stagnant and put too many barriers in the way of those who wanted to improve themselves. He even went as far as to write a draft constitution for Upper Canada based on the American model. Wise and Brown, Canada Views the United States, 34-38.

9. The United States Senate, on which Canada drew its example rather than the House of Lords, was the most highly respected of all American political institutions. On the other hand, the House of Representatives and the Presidency were not respected when compared to a House of Commons and a Prime Minister. Ibid., 76-77 & 100-101.

10. The United States was the only federal union in the English-speaking world, and after the American Civil War, federalism did not present itself as the best choice of government. However, federalism was the only way to ensure that the needs of the varied and widely separated communities could be met and still protect their local autonomy. It was John A. Macdonald's idea that the error of the American system could be corrected by strengthening the general government and conferring on the provincial bodies only such powers as might be required for local purposes. An example of this would be that Quebec retained its European-based Roman Civil Law while the rest of Canada's legal system was based on English common law. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 9-10. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government, 21 & 28. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 26-27 & 36-37.

11. The 1871 Canadian census yielded a predominantly rural population of 3,485,761 (1,620,851 in Ontario and 1,191,516 in Quebec) compared to over 30 million in the United States. Creighton saw the United States after the Civil War as resentful and predatory against Great Britain and British North America because of their sympathy to the Southern cause and the losses inflicted by the Alabama (a Southern cruiser built in a British shipyard). He noted

that, "It was seriously proposed that the whole of Rupert's Land and the North-West territories should be ceded to the United States in satisfaction of the Alabama claims; and both the new American president, Ulysses S. Grant, and his Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, were expansionists who were prepared to use almost any method, short of armed force, to acquire all or part of British North America." The new dominion of Canada indeed did have a lot to worry about. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 2, 5 & 15. Donald Creighton's "The 1860s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 34-35. Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Limited, 1955), 45-47 & 54-55.

12. Winks, Canada the United States, 165. In 1868, the customs laws of the United States were extended to the territory of Alaska, and the District Courts of California, which had jurisdiction in the Oregon territory, gained jurisdiction in Alaska as well. Robert Craig Brown, Canada's National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 42 & 281. In 1869, General Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, an advocate of annexation of British North America into the United States, traveled to Canada to discuss American trade concessions in return for United States fishing rights to the inshore fisheries. Butler tried to convince the Prince Edward Islanders to join the United States at a time when Canada was trying to convince them to join the Confederation. George F.G. Stanley's "The 1870s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 43-45. Sir Charles Metcalfe, the Governor General of Canada, believed that if Britain were forced to fight the United States over the Oregon Territory, that Britain would have to become a greater continental power than the United States. The cost of such an enterprise would be more than the British Government was willing to pay. Patrick C.T. White's "The Oregon Dispute and the Defence of Canada" in Moir, Character and Circumstance, 57-65.

13. MacBrien, "A Brief Sketch of the Development of the Canadian Militia," 385-386. To a great extent the British officers who left Canada failed in their task to

convince the new Canadian Government to establish a strong defence force because the Government was more interested in promoting Canadian economic prosperity in the shadow of the strength of the British Navy and the invisible shield of the Monroe Doctrine. Besides the vocal French-Canadian minority abhorred anything military. Norman Penlington's "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada, 1898-1900" in Imperial Relations in the Age of Laurier (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 45-48. Canada refused to create a regular army in 1870, or even one full-strength instructional battalion of infantry. The Canadian Government still clung to the belief that defence was an Imperial problem to be financed by the British Treasury because control over foreign policy rested in London and not Ottawa. Harris, Canadian Brass, 11 & 17.

14. Penlington, "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada," 48-49. In May 1885, the Saskatchewan rebellion led by Louis Riel was crushed by the Canadian Militia led by British Maj. Gen. Frederick Middleton. This was the first organized use of the Militia since the 1860s when they were used to protect the Canadian-American border during the American Civil War and the first use of the Militia for actual combat since 1812-1813. W.S. MacNutt's "The 1880's" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 96. Stephen Harris critically states that the period before the Great War was one in which amateur soldiers flourished. It was their belief that they were equal to the regular army. Despite the best efforts of the British officers sent to command and reform the army, Canada's Permanent Force soldiers were told repeatedly that they should aspire to nothing more than teaching the Militia, and that to do this they need not worry about preparing themselves to fight in the next war. As a result "the Permanent Force became generally lacking in expertise, corporate loyalty, and the sense that its primary responsibility was to its client." Harris, Canadian Brass, 6, 22-23 & 26. See House of Commons Debates, April 10, 1883; March 27, 1884; May 14, 1886 and May 4, 1888.

15. Lt. Col. G.R. Pearkes, "The Evolution of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," Canadian Defence

Quarterly X, No. 4 (July, 1933): 472. A British Royal Commission, headed by Maj. Gen. E.P. Leach, concluded in 1898 that the Canadian Militia was so deficient that it would offer little more than token resistance to an American invasion force before the British army could get into a position to intervene. The Commission also concluded that the single most important reason for this was the excessive influence wielded by the civil side of the Militia Department. Harris, Canadian Brass, 62-63.

16. MacBrien, "A Brief Sketch of the Development of the Canadian Militia," 386.

17. Pearkes, "The Evolution of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," 475. House of Commons Debates, July 11, 1904. The Permanent Force was divided into a small instructional cadre to train the Militia and a larger body which would be the nucleus of the army. Harris, Canadian Brass, 31-38.

18. Col. J. Sutherland Brown, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924, and Suggestions for the Future," Canadian Defence Quarterly I, No. 4 (July, 1924): 20-22. House of Commons Debates, July 10-11, 1905.

19. J.S. Brown, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924, and Suggestions for the Future," 20-22.

20. R.C. Brown, Canada's National Policy, 281-283. For a complete background of the Alaskan Panhandle dispute see pages 281-322.

21. John T. Saywell's "The 1890s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 130-131.

22. R.C. Brown, Canada's National Policy, 285.

23. Borden had participated in the lively debate in 1910 which centered on what Canada should do to help Britain in her naval crisis. Britain felt threatened by an expanding German navy and asked the dominions for help. Prime Minister Laurier's solution was the creation of the

Canadian Navy made up of five cruisers and six destroyers. Most in Parliament, including Borden, thought the plan too ambitious. It passed anyway, but may have contributed to Laurier losing the election in 1911 to Borden. Robert Craig Brown, Robert Laird Borden (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, Limited, 1975), 142-163. In 1912, Borden promised a contribution to the Imperial Navy and was in turn promised participation in an advisory committee on foreign policy. The promised contribution was \$35 million sent to England to pay for three dreadnoughts. House of Commons Debates, 1912-1913, Vol I, 692-693. Col. C.F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia: Imperial Organization," Canadian Defence Quarterly VIII, No. 2 (January, 1931): 247. Philip G. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations, 1917-1926 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 15. Roger Graham's "Through the First World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 177.

24. J.S. Brown, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924, and Suggestions for the Future," 27-28. As a Major, James Sutherland Brown was on the headquarters staff during the period of mobilization and, with his training at the British Staff College, knew how the British mobilization plan was to work. Brown found the antics of the foolish Minister of Militia both amazing and disgusting. Brown wrote a memo to the Chief of the General Staff warning that the confusion created by Hughes could have serious operational consequences in the war in Europe. It was only during the Great War that the Canadian Permanent Force and the Non-Permanent Militia learned the hard lessons of war and how truly unprepared the Canadian army was for modern warfare. Harris, Canadian Brass, 7 & 94-96. G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: The Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1962), 14-32. Ronald G. Haycock, "The American Legion in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1917: A Study in Failure," Military Affairs XLIII, No. 3 (October, 1979): 115-118.

25. R.C. Brown, Robert Laird Borden, 148-149. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 48. This was the first total war

of modern times and as such, involved the whole of the Canadian economy (from wheat to munitions) and affected the entire Canadian community (from those producing to those who had sons fighting). Creighton, Canada's First Century, 137-140. By 1917, the division of thought over the conscription issue for military service was threatening to pull Canada apart. Sensing this, Prime Minister Robert Borden formed a Union Government of ten Liberals or Labour Members and thirteen Conservatives. Borden knew that the French-Canadians of Quebec would continue their vocal opposition to conscription, but he hoped that a Union Government could hold the country together until the war was over. No matter how odious, the Military Service Act had to be passed and enforced to ensure that Canada met her obligation to the Imperial war effort. Ibid., 149-154. In Quebec, the issue of conscription was seen differently. French-Canadians were willing to die for the defence of Canada, but only in defence of Canadian soil. Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia, complicated things by not establishing French-speaking units, by dispersing French-speaking soldiers in English-speaking battalions, and by not promoting qualified French-speaking officers. Roger Graham's "Through the First World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 186-189.

26. Creighton, Canada's First Century. 140-148. One of the main reasons for the Canadian Government wanting all their troops under one joint Canadian command was the growing concern over what was perceived as the incompetence of the British High Command--"the blundering stupidity of the whiskey and soda British Headquarters Staff." Robert Craig Brown's "Borden and Anglo-Canadian Relations" in Moir, Character and Circumstance, 207-209.

27. The War Cabinet Report for the Year 1917. British Parliamentary Papers, 1918 as extracted by C.P. Stacey (ed), Historical Documents of Canada Vol V The Acts of War and Peace, 1914-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, Limited, 1972), 364-369. R.C. Brown's "Borden and Anglo-Canadian Relations" in Moir, Character and Circumstance, 217-219.

28. The War Cabinet Report for the Year 1918. British Parliamentary Papers, 1918 as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 370-371. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 44.

29. MacGregor R. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 406. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 63 & 84. Creighton stated this quite strongly when he commented on the Paris Peace Conference: "At Paris, Canada's chief interest lay in the public recognition of her new status. They were convinced that Canada's contribution to the winning of the war had entitled her to a standing equivalent to sovereignty. Only a great international gathering could endorse such a lofty claim, . . . validate their country's credentials and admit it to the rank of statehood." Creighton, Canada's First Century, 156.

30. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 72-76. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 157-158.

CHAPTER 2

AN ISOLATIONISTIC COMMUNITY

1. Roger Graham's "Through the First World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 201-203. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 158. Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen (Toronto: Clark, Irwin and Company, Limited, 1960), 224.

2. Desmond Morton, Canada and War: A Military and Political History (Toronto: Butterworths and Co. (Canada) Ltd., 1981), 84-91. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 159-160. C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1970), 1. It should be noted that all monetary figures listed in this paper are given in Canadian dollars.

3. Morton, Canada and War, 82. James Eayrs, In the Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 43-46.

4. Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 21-29.

5. Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, 49-50. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 138-140. H. Blair Neatby's "The New Century" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 138-144. Neatby noted that growth linked the hitherto isolated economy. Production of wheat spiralled, production of manufactured goods doubled, and raw material use (steel, lumber, coal, and minerals) was at an all time high. Despite the rapid influx of immigrants to the prairies, the urban population grew faster than the rural population. Ibid., 150.

6. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 1. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 49-58. A short time later, in May 1919, the Trades and Labour Council of Winnipeg, supported by over 10,000 returning soldiers, called a general strike over their demands for better wages and the right of collective bargaining. Bolstered by negative public opinion, the Union Government crushed the strike and jailed its leaders. Norman Penner, Winnipeg 1919: The Strikers' Own History of the Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1973), ix-xix & 3-150. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 159-160. While the strikers were jailed and the strike broken up by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, elements of the 27th Battalion, fresh from Europe and not yet demobilized, were kept in reserve until after the strikers dispersed. Morton, Canada and War, 85. One of the jailed leaders was J.S. Woodsworth who won a seat in the House of Commons after he was acquitted of all charges. Penner, Winnipeg 1919, xii & xx-xxi.

7. Summary of Proceedings and Documents of the Imperial Conference of 1921, British Parliamentary Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada,

387-392. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 157. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 112.

8. The fear of being drawn into a European war had initiated the isolationist sentiment in Canada even before World War I began. Starting in Quebec and spreading to the other parts of Canada, the isolationist mood grew as the Great War claimed its horrid toll. While never as widely held or as intensely felt as in the United States, isolationism, nevertheless, oiled the wheels of Canadian diplomatic policy throughout the inter-war years. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 401-402.

9. Morton, Canada and War, 91. Lt. Col. George F.G. Stanley, In the Face of Danger: The History of the Lake Superior Regiment (Port Arthur, Ontario: Lake Superior Scottish Regiment, 1960), 40-44. Harris, Canadian Brass, 144-147. Roger Graham pointed out that the "Red Scare" began in the unions in the United States. A good example was the Industrial Workers of the World, a union heavily influenced by Marxist ideology. This western union looked forward to the day when all unions were united in a general strike to bring down the "bosses" and bring about social reconstruction. The unions recruited on both sides of the border for members and predicted a Russian-type revolution in either Canada or the United States or both. Some politicians feared that the Winnipeg Strike was the first act of the National Bolshevik Revolution. Roger Graham's "Through the First World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 195-196. One member of the Union Government who was most concerned about Bolshevism was Arthur Meighen, the Minister of Interior and acting Minister of Justice. Penner, Winnipeg 1919, xiii-xvii. For a detailed discussion of the "Red Scare," the Industrial Workers of the World, and the Winnipeg Strike see Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, 213-235.

10. Morton, Canada and War, 91. The independent Royal Canadian Navy could trace its heritage only back to 1910. Since it was never fully integrated into the Royal Navy system in World War I, the R.C.N. saw little service except in coastal defence. Almost all its ships were purchased or

on loan from the R.N. When the war ended the general public saw no need for its continuance. David Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 6-7.

11. Fortescue Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1760-1964 (Montreal: Gazette Printing Company Ltd., 1965), 231-233. Pearkes, "The Evolution of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," 476.

12. Stephen Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939," Military Affairs XLVI, No. 3 (October, 1982): 121. Lt. Gen. Sir Willoughby Gwatkin, the Chief of the General Staff during the Great War, had pressed for a post war permanent force of 20,000 officers and men which he envisioned being maintained by a conscription system of four months active service and two years in the part-time militia. The Union Government ignored Gwatkin's advice. Maj. Gen. James H. MacBrien, who took over the position of Chief of the General Staff in 1919, agreed with Gwatkin that Canada needed a national army supported by conscription. MacBrien wanted a permanent force of 30,000 officers and men and believed that conscription requiring four months active service and three years part-time service would produce, in ten years, a force for mobilization equal to fifteen divisions. Harris, Canadian Brass, 141-144.

13. Morton, Canada and War, 83.

14. House of Commons Debates (Ottawa: Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty) 1920, Vol. IV, 3646.

15. C.P. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976), 24. Along with the 65 Liberal seats from what had been Conservative Quebec until the passage of the Military Service Act in 1917, the Liberals also captured 52 seats from the whole of English-speaking Canada. In addition, a voter revolt in Ontario and the west placed 64 Progressives in the House of Commons. King looked on them as "Liberals in a hurry" and only occasionally sought their support. Instead he focused

almost entirely on wooing the Quebec Liberals. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 151-175. Again, it must be remembered that conscription had alienated those living in Quebec against the Conservative Party and after 1917 had turned Quebec into an impregnable Liberal fortress. Graham, Arthur Meighen, 212. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 377-381. J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 4.

16. C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict Vol 2: 1921-1948, The Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 4-8. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 16-19, 26 & 31-32. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 154-155.

17. For a complete listing of all twenty-six Articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations see Annex A in C. Howard-Ellis, The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1928), 487-495.

18. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 6-7. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 183. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 402 & 427.

19. House of Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. I, 33-45. King Papers and King Diary as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 418-422. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 17-26. Stanley Baldwin later told Mackenzie King that Canada's actions in the Chanak crisis had been entirely proper and had helped save the British from a disaster. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 33-37. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 408-412. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 164-166.

20. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 28. On September 16, Arthur Meighen, the Leader of the Conservative Opposition, made a public address in which he said:
"Britain sends a message to the Dominions, not a mere

indifferent inquiry as to what was in the mind of Canada, but a message to see if the Dominions were solid behind the Motherland." Meighen then went on to show that he did not understand what Britain had asked for when he said: "There is no suggestion at all that we should send armed forces across the sea. Britain merely sought a declaration of solidarity on the part of the Dominions. . . . Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said: 'Ready, aye ready; we stand by you.'" Meighen also did not understand the growing mood of isolationism in 1922, and his speech helped move the Progressive and Labour Parties closer to the Liberals while he antagonized members of his own party. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 414-415.

21. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 13-14.

22. House of Commons Debates, 1922, Vol. I, 695. Morton, Canada and War, 92-93. Lt. Col. D.J. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1967), 91. W.L. Morton's "The 1920s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 207-210.

23. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 92-93. Harris, Canadian Brass, 148.

24. W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 49, 53 & 62. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 108.

25. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 98. This last act of the new Mackenzie King Government came close to scuttling the R.C.N. The budgeting reductions forced the R.C.N. to retire its cruiser, which left the R.C.N. without a ship larger than a destroyer until 1944. Throughout the 1920s the R.C.N. consisted of just two destroyers and four minesweepers, equally divided between the coasts. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 7. For a complete breakdown of the Department of National Defence

expenditures by services (R.C.A.F., Militia, R.C.N. and total D.N.D.) and by years from 1919 to 1939, see Appendix B in W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 629.

26. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 67. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 91.

27. Morton, Canada and War, 93. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 68. Between 1923 and 1927 Commodore Walter Hose, head of the Navy Department, refused to cooperate with MacBrien and the Department of National Defence which was powerless to accomplish anything. Harris, Canadian Brass, 153-155.

CHAPTER 3

AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

1. The War Cabinet Report for the Year 1918, British Parliamentary Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 371. What had been started by Borden was the move toward Dominion autonomy in foreign affairs and as a part of that independent, treaty-making power the unanswered question was whether each Dominion would support Britain in its foreign policy and whether Britain would consult the Dominions before enacting its foreign policy. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 406 & 431. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 44-46. R.C. Brown's "Borden and the Anglo-Canadian Relations" in Moir, Character and Circumstance, 207. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 90-95.

2. Walter A. Riddell (ed), Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy: 1917-1939 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962), 63-64.

3. For the text of the Treaty and a discussion of the

signing see Riddell, Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy, 78-87. Canada, Sessional Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 424-429. Fishing rights had been a common thread of Canadian-American relations since the War of 1812. The Anglo-American Convention of 1818 barred United States access to British North American in-shore fisheries. The Treaty of Washington of 1854 and the Treaty of Washington of 1871 allowed American access to the fisheries for about ten years each. R.C. Brown, Canada's National Policy, 13. However, these previous treaties had been negotiated and signed by Great Britain. In the case of the 1919 treaties, Sir Douglas Hazen had done all the negotiating and the British Ambassador to the United States signed only because the treaties listed Great Britain as the Contracting Party. In 1923, Ernest Lapointe negotiated the treaty for Mackenzie King, got Great Britain's name removed as Contracting Party, and signed it alone. The British Ambassador was not told that his signature would not be required until after the fact. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 184-185. Up to this point, there were three legal limitations to treaty making by Canada: First, the Government of Canada had to request the Government of Britain to advise the King that a treaty was needed. Second, after the treaty was negotiated and signed by Canada, a formal signature by a British representative was also required. Finally, when the treaty was ratified by the Crown, the King acted solely on the advice of his British Ministers, who again were following a recommendation of the Canadian Cabinet. Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 432-433. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 173-177.

4. House of Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. I, 31-33. Riddell, Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy, 87-94.

5. House of Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. I, 888. Also R. Forke leader of the Progressive Party and J.S. Woodsworth leader of the Labour Party endorsed King's stand on the Chanak invitation. House of Commons Debates, 1923, Vol. I, 40-45.

6. Imperial Conference, 1923, Stenographic Notes, in

King Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 435-443. Included in the list of foreign affairs that Canada had taken on as her own were trade, tariffs, immigration, and boundary disputes. Mackenzie King went on to say, "Great Britain or Canada should not decide Australia's trade policy or South Africa should not determine whether Canada shall join with the United States in the development of the proposed St. Lawrence waterway." Ibid., 439. This was the third of a series of events stretching back over a year in which Mackenzie King was involved in a running engagement with the British Government on the nature of Imperial relations. The other two incidents were the Chanak Affair and the Halibut Fisheries Treaty. King was the aggressor in pushing the idea of Canada as a self-governing Dominion, but his real aim was to prevent the British Government from imposing unwanted responsibilities on the Canadian Government. Britain, on the other hand, found King's insistence on Canadian autonomy inconvenient, and they often just ignored it. H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 32. Wigley believed that Canada dominated the other Dominions in its quest to influence Great Britain. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 1.

7. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 66. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 175.

8. King Papers on the Imperial Conference of 1923 as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 431-434. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 66-67.

9. John W. Dafoe's Diary notes of the Imperial Conference of 1923 as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 443-445. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 68. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 174-175.

10. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 71. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 182-187.

11. Stenographic Notes of the Imperial Conference of

1923 in the King Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 436. After his humiliation in the Halibut Treaty affair, the British Ambassador to Washington suggested that Canada appoint its own fully independent diplomatic representative to Washington. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 176.

12. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 45. Canada also placed missions in Paris and Tokyo between 1928 and 1929. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 90-91. At the time Massey did not want the appointment and had to be talked into it by Mackenzie King. During his tenure of office, Massey did not get much support from O.D. Skelton in regard to the purchase of a house to act as the Canadian Legation or from King in regard to the appointment of a military attache to Washington. Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue: Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey (New York: St Martin's Press, 1964), 109-169. Claude Bissell believed that Massey took the Washington post because he had been promised the job of High Commissioner to London as soon as the job opened up, which occurred in 1930. Claude Bissell, The Young Vincent Massey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 113-145. It was Neatby's interpretation that there was no thought of duplicating the British Foreign Service, instead Canada placed Legations where Canadian interests were most directly involved. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 192-193.

13. King Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 451-453. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 179-180. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 244-247.

14. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 180. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 77-81. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 248-254.

15. Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926, British Parliamentary Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 455-457. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 85-86. Dawson, The

Government of Canada, 49. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 180-185. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 257-260 & 271.

16. Canada was not the product of a revolution or a defiance of established authority. To the contrary, the Dominion of Canada had been established by negotiation and represented traditional values in its government, church and army. It did not want to remove itself from under the British Crown. G.F.G. Stanley's "The 1870s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 68. Neatby noted that no one knew exactly what King meant by autonomy. "Clearly it did not mean that Canada was a nation like other nations." But unknown was whether or not Canada could be neutral and still remain a member of the future British Commonwealth when one of the other members of the Commonwealth was at war. This question remained unanswered even in 1939. H. Blair Neatby, The Politics of Chaos: Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, Limited, 1972), 6-7. The one thing Mackenzie King did not want was for the Commonwealth to be broken up. He never saw autonomy as the evolutionary step from colonial status to complete independence. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 176.

17. Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926, British Parliamentary Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 455-473. Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, 276-277. The Balfour definition was not a Constitution of the Commonwealth but merely a formula by which the Dominions achieved their official status as equals with Great Britain through the Statute of Westminster in 1931. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 186-187.

18. "The Statute of Westminster, 1931," as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 485-488. Riddell, Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy, 149-152.

19. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 88. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 184-187.

20. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 195. Norman

A. MacKenzie, "Disarmament," Canadian Defence Quarterly VII, No. 1 (October, 1929): 34. The essence of the Kellogg-Briand Pact said: "The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Ibid.

21. Sir Edward Grey (Viscount Grey of Fallodon), Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1925), Vol. 1, 91-92.

22. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 30.

23. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 108.

24. In 1929, the Canadian Government ordered two new destroyers from the English shipbuilding firm of Thornycroft. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 7. "Penna," "Canada and Naval Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly IV, No. 1 (October, 1926): 44.

25. House of Commons Debates, 1924, Vol. IV, 4805-4806. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 233.

26. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 43.

27. Morton, Canada and War, 96.

28. Kim Beattie, Dileas: History of the 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1929-1956 (Toronto: The 48th Highlanders of Canada, 1957), 3-5. Besides the one week of unit training in the field, the regiment met once a week for classes or lectures at its headquarters and drilled on special occasions for the local citizens.

29. "The Minister of National Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly IV, No. 2 (January, 1927): 129 & 134-138.

30. Morton, Canada and War, 96.

Chapter 4

THE STRANGE CASE OF "BUSTER" BROWN

1. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 73. Col. C.P. Stacey, as Director of the Historical Section of the Canadian General Staff after the Second World War, inherited one of the few remaining copies of Defence Scheme Number One. In writing his official history of the army on the Second World War, he passed off Defence Scheme Number One with the following statement: "In an earlier day the defence of Canada had meant defence against the United States, pure and simple; but steady improvement in Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations had relegated conflict with that country to the realm of the highly improbable. Nevertheless, some people felt that this contingency could not be entirely overlooked; and a plan of defence against the United States, known as 'Defence Scheme No. 1,' was prepared and circulated to Military Districts under 'Very Secret' cover, beginning in April 1921." Col. C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Vol. I. Six Years of War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1957), 29-30.

2. J.S. Brown, "Military Policy of Canada, 1905-1924, and Suggestions for the Future," 29.

3. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939," 121.

4. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 323-324. The three Defence Scheme contingencies were noted by Lt. Col. George F.G. Stanley without negative comment as the normal military planning direction for the early 1920's. Stanley also noted that none of the officers who saw any of the Defence schemes

thought them to be unusual. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 44.

5. Harris, Canadian Brass, 169-170.

6. Ibid., 170-172.

7. Richard A. Preston, "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939," Canadian Defence Quarterly 3, No. 4 (Spring, 1974): 47-49. Actually the idea of using flying columns to invade the United States was not a new one. Captain Arthur Lee of the Royal Artillery was ordered to draft plans for the possible invasion of the United States in 1895, in response to a possible invasion by the United States during a time of American imperialism. Lee planned to send his flying columns directly south from Montreal, Quebec City and Niagara while mobilizing defence garrisons across the western frontier. Harris, Canadian Brass, 59.

8. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 45. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 156.

9. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939," 121.

10. Harris, Canadian Brass, 171.

11. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939," 121-122. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 72. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 44-45. Since a soldier cannot always be at war, he needs a method in peacetime to keep his skills sharpened. He needs to relearn constantly the appropriate lessons from past mistakes and successes and to teach others who have no experience in battle. Classroom exercises can identify the kinds of weapons and equipment needed for a certain type of operation and the capabilities of the potential enemy can be explored. But, without field exercises designed around specific combat situations the novice soldier cannot appreciate what was learned in the classroom and the veteran

cannot stay sharp. Harris, Canadian Brass, 3-4.

12. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 156.
MacBrien constantly lobbied the Minister of National Defence for a fifteen-division Militia which he wanted fully equipped. MacBrien also wanted official approval to implement any "staff plans" in the event of war. There was no evidence that Ralston knew of Defence Scheme Number One. Harris, Canadian Brass, 174.

13. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 45.

14. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 77.

15. Preston, "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939," 51.

16. Ibid. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 157.

17. Preston, "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939," 52.

18. Ibid, 54.

19. Morton, Canada and War, 94-95.

20. Preston, "Buster Brown Was Not Alone: American Plans for the Invasion of Canada, 1919-1939," 56. Newsweek XIII, No. 17 (April 24, 1939): 12-13. Newsweek XIII, No. 22 (May 29, 1939): 11-12.

21. Brig. Gen. J.A. Gunn, "The Militia of Our Needs," Canadian Defence Quarterly II, No. 3 (April, 1925): 214.

22. Ibid, 215.

23. Gen. Sir Arthur W. Currie, "The Case For a Canadian Militia," Canadian Defence Quarterly III, No. 4 (July, 1926): 435-440.

24. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 81. Harris noted that the Government had the responsibility to provide security for Canada through its policies, but it lacked the specific expertise to determine what may be asked of the military and what was best for it. On the other hand, the military had the requisite knowledge to provide advice on what ought to be done, but it lacked the ability to motivate the legislature to act. Harris, Canadian Brass, 5.

25. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada, 1919-1939, " 123.

Chapter 5

AN ECONOMICALLY DEPRESSED COMMUNITY

1. J.L. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada Into the Arms of the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 9-18. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 238-240. R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime: From the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: A.M. Hakkert, Limited, 1975), 94. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 165. Firestone backs up Granatstein's thesis that, beginning with World War I, Canada began to shift her economic focus to the United States. Firestone states that by the end of World War I Canada's major external source of investment funds came from America. By 1953, foreign investment in Canada totalled \$11.4 billion, of which 77 percent was owned by residents of the United States. In addition, the United States took 38 percent of Canadian exports in 1910, 43 percent in 1930, and 65 percent in 1950. The United Kingdom took 48 percent of Canadian exports in 1910, 27 percent in 1930, and 15 percent in 1950. In 1870, Canada imported 57 percent of her goods from the United Kingdom. Since then there has been an almost uninterrupted decline in the proportion of imports coming

from the United Kingdom and a steady increase in the proportion coming from the United States. By 1953, America supplied 74 percent of Canadian imports, while the United Kingdom supplied only 10 percent. O.J. Firestone, Canada's Economic Development, 1867-1953 (London: Bowes & Bowes Publishers Limited, 1958), 19-21, 31 & 165.

2. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 8-10 & 21-29. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 305. Firestone, Canada's Economic Development, 5, 32 & 39.

3. King's main problem was that he did not see the significance of the October 1929 United States stock market crash and was convinced that the economic turn-around would be as short-lived as the one in 1921 after the Great War. Equally missed was the extent of the prairie drought and the falling price of Canadian products. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 301-309. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 236-237. However, King then went too far in his remarks when he stated that he believed that the Provinces were eager to siphon off the Dominion's hard-earned money for their so-called problems. The Prime Minister was not willing to give a Tory Government even five cents. Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 98-100. Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English, Canada: 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 260.

4. For the King and Bennett platforms in the 1930 Elections see Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 100-106. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 43-44. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 238. It became part of the Mackenzie King Myth that it was his good fortune to lose the 1930 Election. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 327-342. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 121-122.

5. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 122-124. Much of the description of Richard Bennett could be equally said of Mackenzie King, who was growing rich while in public office because of a series of shrewd investments and who was a bachelor, a loner and a great caricature for the editorial

cartoonist. The major difference between Bennett and King was the fact that King was a winner. The 1930 Election was the only major win for Bennett and the only major loss for King. King had shown before and would show again his uncanny ability to win elections, to carry his party to victory, and even to hold on to the Government without a majority of the seats in the House of Commons. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 52-53 & 73-75. Brian Nolan added that King was a terrible orator who put people to sleep with his monotonous voice. His speeches were unmemorable, because his sentences were convoluted and their meaning nearly always ambiguous, which was exactly the way the crafty politician wanted them. Brian Nolan, King's War: Mackenzie King and the Politics of War, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Random House of Canada, Limited, 1988), 5.

6. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 262-263. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 344-349. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 56. Between 1930 and 1937, the total cost of direct relief approached a billion dollars. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 201-207.

7. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 30-31. G.R. Stevens, A City Goes to War (Brampton, Ontario: Charters Publishing Company Limited, 1964), 164-166.

8. Bennett also realized that Canada was in danger of mortgaging its future to the United States. As he said in a speech in Ottawa, "Whenever you send raw materials from this country and bring back the manufactured products you are depriving men and women of this country of an opportunity for work." Ottawa Journal, July 30, 1928, page one. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 126-128. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 57. Creighton, Canada's First Century, 200-201. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 349-350. For an outline of the Bennett Tariff policy see Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 204-208.

9. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 60-61. An outline of the Canadian-United Kingdom trade agreement of 1932 can be found in Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 209-211.

10. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 58-59. Stacey, Canada and the Age of the Conflict, 129 & 169.

11. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 242-243. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 137. Summary of Proceedings of Imperial Conference of 1930, British Parliamentary Papers as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 477-484.

12. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 132-133. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 352-353. Dawson, The Government of Canada, 50.

13. The request for King George V to enact the Statute of Westminster can be found in Riddell, Documents of Canadian Foreign Policy, 149-153. The Statute of Westminster can be found in Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 485-488. Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government, 22-23. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 133-134. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 244.

14. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 6. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 391-397. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 245-248.

15. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 244-245. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 249-254.

16. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 145-148.

17. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 95. Morton, Canada and War, 98. Neatby pointed out that the reason more public works projects were not created to help the unemployed was the cost. Wages, as low as they were, were only a portion of the total cost of a construction project. Expenses also had to be paid for equipment or machinery and this cost usually ran higher than wages. Unfortunately, the Canadian Government could not afford to create employment. The reason that the camps concentrated

on single men was the fact that with no family to tie them down they roamed the land looking for work or food. It was feared that this experience would scar them for life physically and morally. More importantly, it was feared that these men were a danger to the established order. Senator G.D. Robertson, former Minister of Labour in the Bennett Government, suggested that Canada deport all the young men who were not Canadian citizens and send the rest to remote camps. Gen. McNaughton's offer that the camps be run by the Militia and attendance be voluntary was immediately accepted. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 27-28 & 33-34.

18. Kenneth McNaught's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 249. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 34-35. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 95. For newspaper accounts of the meeting of Bennett and strike representatives in Ottawa (June 23, 1935), the Dominion Day riot in Regina (July 1, 1935) and the closing of the camps (July 1, 1936) see Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 292-295.

19. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 256. Kenneth McNaughton's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 261-263. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 64-68. There was evidence that Bennett made his dramatic shift in political ideology as a result of the strong influence of his brother-in-law, W.D. Herridge, the Canadian Minister in Washington. Herridge was much taken with the New Deal concept and saw it as the solution to Canada's problem as well. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival, 6. Extracts of Bennett's "New Deal" broadcasts can be found in Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 310-313. After Bennett's "New Deal" measures were found to be unconstitutional, the King Government sought Provinces' concurrence in an amendment to the British North America Act to permit Parliament to legislate on such matters. By July 1940, the B.N.A. was amended and the Unemployment Insurance Act was passed by Parliament later that year. Ibid., 171-172.

20. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 68. Stacey, Arms,

Men and Governments, 2. For examples of speeches made by Bennett and King in August and September of 1935 for the October 1935 Election see Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 107-114.

21. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 68-69. Firestone, Canada's Economic Development, 6. Bothwell, Drummond & English, Canada: 1900-1945, 267.

22. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 108. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 629.

23. Flt. Lt. G.R. Howsam, "Canada's Problem of Air Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly VIII, No. 3 (April, 1931): 356-358.

24. The Official Reports of the British Parliamentary Debates, November 10, 1932, reprinted as Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, "The Realities of Disarmament," Canadian Defence Quarterly X, No. 2 (January, 1933): 218-219.

25. Judge Uriah McFadden, "A Civilian's View of the Militia," Canadian Defence Quarterly XII, No. 2 (January, 1935): 222.

26. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 99. If this budget had been allowed to stand, the R.C.N. would have ceased to exist. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 6-7.

27. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 274-283. The R.C.N. would not receive any new ships until 1936. As a result, the R.C.N. led a bare-bones existence throughout the Great Depression. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 7.

28. Beattie, Dileas, 8-11. R.W. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare: A History of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, 1935-1960 (Winnipeg: Bulman Bros. Limited, 1960), 3-7.

29. House of Commons Debates, 1931, Vol. III,

2892-2898. Pearkes, "The Evolution of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," 472. John Hasek, The Disarming of Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited, 1987), 119-120. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 89 & 302-315.

30. House of Commons Debates, 1933, Vol II, 2221. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 315-316. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 233.

31. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 172. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 2-3. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 126-127. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, 316-319.

32. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 169-171.

33. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 173-177. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada Into the Arms of the United States, 24. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 81.

Chapter 6

A DIVIDED COMMUNITY

1. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 173-174. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 48-50.

2. A good example of Canadian lectures was Senator Dandurand's famous speech to the League of Nations in 1924 in which he said, "We think in terms of peace, while Europe, an armed camp, thinks in terms of war. . . We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials." League of Nations, Records of the Fifth Assembly, 1924, 221-222 as reprinted in Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 401-402.

3. Senate Debates, April 17, 1934. Stacey, Canada

and the Age of Conflict, 165. Morton, Canada and War, 95.

4. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 168. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 179-180. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 3-4. The limitations of King's legation policy were starting to show up as the average Canadian was beginning to understand that events in Ethiopia or Rome could have direct effect on their lives. But even with that understanding, few politicians wanted to argue for a large diplomatic service which would cost more than they were willing to spend. It was still easier to rely on the British Foreign Office for intelligence. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 195.

5. Exerpts of Howard Ferguson statements to the League of Nations on September 14, October 11, and October 14, Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 533-536. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 181-182. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 6-16.

6. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 16-22. House of Common Debates, 1936, Vol. I, 93. Riddell's statements to the League of Nations on October 17, October 19, and November 2; King's correspondence to Riddell on October 29 and Riddell's reply on October 31--all extracted by Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 537-543. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 169.

7. Lapointe speech of December 2 as extracted by Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 554-555. Introductory Comments by Riddell, *Ibid.*, xiviii.

8. House of Common Debates, 1936, Vol. I, 97. For an extended statement by King on the League of Nations see King's address to the House of Commons on February 19, 1937. House of Commons Debates, 1937, Vol. II, 1040-1059.

9. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 172. W.A.B. Douglas and Brereton Greenhous, Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977),

16. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 131-133.

10. Lt. Col. E.L.M. Burns, "The Defence of Canada," Canadian Defence Quarterly XIII, No. 4 (July, 1936): 379-381.

11. _____, "Canada and Imperial Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly, XIII, No. 1 (October, 1935): 33. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 29-35. House of Commons Debates, 1936, Vol. V, 3862-3872.

12. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 167. For a detailed outline of King's thinking see his January 25, 1937 remarks to the House of Commons. House of Commons Debates, 1937, Vol. I, 243-252.

13. Beattie, Dileas, 24. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 233.

14. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 95.

15. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 46. House of Commons Debates, 1936, Vol. III, 2992 & 3167.

16. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 174. It may also be noted in passing that this is the same G.R. Pearkes who wrote for Canadian Defence Quarterly, see chapter 1, endnote 10 and later, in the 1960's, became the Minister of National Defence.

17. House of Commons Debates, 1937, Vol. II, 1120 & 1123. House of Commons Debates, 1938, Vol. III, 2906 & 2910. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 95.

18. A.B.C., "How to Train the Militia," Canadian Defence Quarterly XVI, No. 2 (January, 1939): 148.

19. Burns, "The Defence of Canada," 391-393. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 92-108. House of Commons Debates, 1936, Vol. IV, 3168. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 140-142 & 629.

20. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 109.
Beattie, Dileas, 28. Morton, Canada and War, 102. Douglas,
The Creation of a National Air Force, 150.

21. Actually, there were three British air training proposals. The first came in November 1934 and called for a cost-sharing agreement between Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Britain to train reserve pilots. This was accepted in principle in June 1935. In April 1936, a more comprehensive plan was suggested. The third plan, offered a short time later, called for primary training in Canada and advanced training in England before admission into the Royal Air Force squadrons. The Canadian Cabinet argued against the plans since they might jeopardize future plans by Canada to establish its own training program. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 194-196.

22. House of Commons Debates, 1938, Vol. III, 3264-3268. James W. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence: Canada's Unknown War (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1984), 12.

23. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 8. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 4. Morton, Canada and War, 94-101. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 101.

24. C.P. Stacey, "The Divine Mission: Mackenzie King and Hitler," Canadian Historical Review LXI, No. 4 (December, 1980): 502.

25. Ibid., 504. As Deputy Minister and then Minister of Labour, early in his career, and later as an industrial consultant, Mackenzie King developed the skill of being a conciliator. He had learned to analyze the conflicting points of view in labor disputes and to devise compromises acceptable to both sides. After becoming Prime Minister he had seen his skills work in Parliament to form governments and hold them together. In King's mind the problem of Germany could be handled in the same way if only he could become directly involved. Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 5.

26. Maj. T.V. Scudamore, "The Future of Germany," Canadian Defence Quarterly XI, No. 4 (July, 1934): 436-437.

27. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 61. House of Commons Debates, 1938, Vol. IV, 3182-3190.

28. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Principal Delegates to the Imperial Conference of 1937 as found in the King Papers and extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 488-491. King saw no need to divide Canada by arming for war on the chance that it might come. If it did, there would be time to arm and a better chance to bring a united Canada to the war. Kenneth McNaughton's "The 1930s" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 272-273.

29. Stacey, "The Divine Mission: Mackenzie King and Hitler," 505. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 44-45. Nolan, Kings War, 11-15.

30. Mackenzie King memorandum on the interview with Herr Hitler, June 29, 1937, Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 233, p 1-15.

31. President Roosevelt sent a cable to Hitler on September 27, 1938 urging a quick settlement of the crisis. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 257. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 65-70.

32. Cable from Mackenzie King to Neville Chamberlain, Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 247.

33. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 1938 Volume (London: Macmillian and Co., Limited, 1941), 491-494.

34. Harris, "Or There Would Be Chaos: The Legacy of Sam Hughes and Military Planning in Canada," 124-125. Morton, Canada and War, 101. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 96.

35. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 176.

36. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Vol. III, 2426-2427.

37. Stacey, "The Divine Mission: Mackenzie King and Hitler," 508-510. In January 1939, King wrote Hitler to "just recall to your memory the conversation we had together, and so express anew the hope that regardless of what others may wish, or say, or do, you will, above all else, hold firm to the resolve not to let anything imperil or destroy what you have already accomplished. If you would not think it too presumptuous on my part, I should like even more to say how much I hope that you will think not only of the good you can do for those of your country, but that you will remember, as well, the good that you can do to the entire world." Ibid., 507.

38. Douglas & Greenhous, Out of the Shadow, 12-20. One of the King's first official acts upon arrival in Quebec City was to meet with Cardinal Villeneuve before meeting with the officials from Ottawa. Also he won over the people of Quebec by addressing his greetings to the Provincial Parliament in French. Newsweek 13, No. 22 (May 29, 1939): 15.

Chapter 7

AN UNPREPARED COMMUNITY

1. Douglas and Greehous, Out of the Shadows, 11-13.

2. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 73.

3. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Vol. III, 2043. Time XXXIII, No. 14 (April 3, 1939): 22. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 74. J.W. Pickersgill stated that, "from the time he first became Prime Minister, Mackenzie King had consistently opposed

commitments to the League of Nations, to the United Kingdom, to the British Empire or Commonwealth or to any other national or international authority which might involve Canada automatically in war." King believed that any commitment had to be made by Parliament, but he failed to say what or how Parliament would decide. J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960),

4. Time XXXIII, No. 8 (February 20, 1939): 21. Camillien Houde was arrested on August 5, 1940 under the Defence of Canada Regulations and spent the rest of the war interned at Camp Petawawa in Ontario as Canada's most famous political prisoner. Nolan, King's War, 50.

5. Evening Telegram interview with J.H. Fisher on March 27, 1939 as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 494-496.

6. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Vol.III, 2409-2427. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos, 176-177.

7. Captain R. John Pratt, "Difficulties in Training the Canadian Militia," Canadian Defence Quarterly XVI, No. 3 (April, 1939): 340.

8. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Vol. IV, 4273-4275. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 27. Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament, 123.

9. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 343. The independent Royal Canadian Navy existed only in the minds of the Canadian Government. In reality, the R.C.N. was little more than an auxiliary squadron to the Royal Navy on which it had to depend for logistic support (weapons and electronic devices), all but basic training and all its scientific expertise. Canada had only two inadequate naval bases in Halifax on the east coast and in Esquimalt on the west coast. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 8.

10. Michael L. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 12 & 21. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 12. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 4.

11. The alert was triggered by a cable from Chamberlain warning of the pending start of hostilities. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 279. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 240. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 178.

12. Ottawa Citizen, August 26, 1939, page one.

13. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 279.

14. Bert Webber, Silent Siege: Japanese Attacks Against North America in World War II (Fairfield, Washington: Ye Gallon Press, 1984), 95. Morton, Canada and War, 104. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 346.

15. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 22. G.M.A. Grube, "Freedom and War," The Canadian Forum 19, No. 226 (November, 1939): 245.

16. King cabled Chamberlain on September 1, 1939 to tell him that Parliament would meet on September 7. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 279. The Ottawa Journal, September 1, 1939, page one.

17. Chamberlain cabled King on September 3 concerned about Canadian vacillation on entering the war. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 279. The Ottawa Journal, September 4, 1939, page one.

18. Mackenzie King Radio Broadcast as extracted by Riddell, Documents on Canadian Foreign Policy, 242-243.

19. Newsweek XIV, No. 12 (September 18, 1939): 22. British request for economic aide, September 6, 1939, Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 279. The chief

spokesman for continued Canadian neutrality was O.D. Skelton, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, who believed that Canada should take the same high moral ground as Ireland and stay out of the fight. In this way Canada might later be available to act as a mediator in the conflict. King was forced to reject his friend's advice and urge Parliament to declare war on Germany. Bruce Hutchinson, The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Portrait of Mackenzie King (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952), 250-251. J.L. Grantstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 12.

20. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Special War Session, 1. The Ottawa Journal, September 7, 1939, page one.

21. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Special War Session, 20-36.

22. The only thing the Government lacked was a glamorous leader or speaker, a Roosevelt or a Churchill. C.P. Stacey's "Through the Second World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 278-279. Included in the Cabinet were C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply; Agnus L. Macdonald, the Naval Minister; Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice (later replaced in 1941 by Louis S. St. Laurent); J.L. Ralston, the Minister of Finance; Charles Gavan Power, the Postmaster General; P.J.A. Cardin, The Minister of Public Works; Norman Rogers, the Minister of National Defence; Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of Pensions and Health; Normal McLarty, the Minister of Labour and J.L. Ilsley, the Minister of National Revenue. Grantstein, Canada's War, 25-26. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 25-26.

23. House of Commons Debates, 1939, Special War Session, 20-36. The Ottawa Journal, September 9, 1939, pages one to five. Some of the evidence that King was successful in uniting his country behind the war effort can be found in a series of letters addressed to the Prime Minister from his citizens. One elderly widow sent her ivory necklace, gold wedding ring and other rings to buy a

"Spitfire or a big gun." A veteran of World War I asked that his \$13/month pension be discontinued for the duration of the war even though he was unemployed and disabled. A retired couple living in Florida (for the wife's health), sent the fifth \$1,000 check (of what would end up as twelve checks of \$1,000 each). Public Archives of Canada, Mg 26, J2, Vol. 213.

24. The Ottawa Journal, September 11, 1939, page three. Granatstein, Canada's War, 42. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 22.

25. The Ottawa Journal, September 5, 1939, page one. The Ottawa Journal, September 11, 1939, page three. Time XXXIV, No. 12 (September, 18, 1939): 10. F.R. Scott, "How Canada Entered the War," The Canadian Forum 19, No. 229 (February, 1940): 344-345.

26. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 25. Morton, Canada and War, 105. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 178-180. Beattie, Dileas, 39-40. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, 10.

27. Morton, Canada and War, 104-105. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 20-29. C.P. Stacey's "Through the Second World War" in Careless and Brown, The Canadians, 281. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 10.

28. Nation 149, No. 18 (October 28, 1939): 462. Life (December 18, 1939): 69. F.R. Scott, "Parliament Should Decide," The Canadian Forum 19, No. 228 (January, 1940): 311-312.

29. Press coverage of speeches by Duplessis and Lapointe in the Montreal Gazette as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 603-605. T.E. Wood, "Canada's War Election," The Nation 149, No. 21 (November 18, 1939): 551-552. Richard Jones, "Politics and Culture: The French Canadians Before the Second World War," Canadian Defence Quarterly 11, No. 4 (Spring, 1982): 35. Brian Nolan, King's War, 22-32. The three Cabinet ministers were: Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice; Charles Gavan

Power, the Postmaster General; and P.J.A. Cardin, Minister of Public Works. Ibid, 26. Granatstein, Canada War, 28-34. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 34-35.

30. Public Archives of Canada, Mg 26, J1, Vol. 279. Granatstein, Canada's War, 27-28.

31. Morton, Canada and War, 105. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 32-34. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 205-206 & 220.

32. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 36-40. Nolan, King's War, 34. Many of the air fields used for this program were built by the "Twenty Centers" during the Depression and these fields were thought of, at the time, as having no purpose. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 155-160. The original plan provided for 3 Initial Training Schools, 13 Elementary Flying Training Schools, 16 Advanced Flying Schools, 10 Air Observer Schools, 10 Bomber and Gunnery Schools, 2 Air Navigation Schools and 4 Wireless Schools. The ultimate output of the B.C.A.T.P was 131,553 air crews, including almost 50,000 pilots, 18,500 wireless operators/air gunners and 15,900 navigators. Ibid. It should also be noted that the Canadian aircraft industry went from 4,000 employees and 40 airplanes annually in 1939 to 116,000 employees and 4,000 airplanes a year at its pinnacle. In all, Canada produced 16,418 aircraft for the war effort, the great majority after 1940. Fred Gaffen, "Canada's Military Aircraft Industry: Its Birth, Growth and Fortunes," Canadian Defence Quarterly 15, No. 2 (Autumn, 1985): 49.

33. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 30-32. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 181. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 24-47. Interesting enough, both the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy command structure believed that the submarine would play only a minor role in the Second World War and that battleships and aircraft carriers would be the decisive weapons. As a result, little work had been done to improve ASDIC and the R.C.N. had no experience in its use. Prior to the war only two officers had received training in the use of ASDIC. The R.N. had a

policy of putting ASDIC only on ships of cruiser size and above and never on destroyers [sic]. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 9-10. The decision of the King Government to maintain control of the R.C.N. rather than place it under the control of the R.N. caused the R.N. to treat the R.C.N. as an outsider in its normal logistical responsibilities. If the R.C.N. needed equipment, it would have to make it on its own. Ibid., 24-25. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 4-5 & 15. The United States called their underwater sound detection system SONAR for Sound Navigation and Ranging. However, neither ASDIC nor SONAR worked on submarines on the surface. As a result, the German U-Boats became quite deadly at night on the surface where its silhouette was almost impossible to detect. Ibid., 11-12.

34. Beattie, Dileas, 53. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, 16-22. Roy Farran, The History of the Calgary Highlanders (Calgary: Bryant Press Limited, 1954), 22-27.

Chapter 8

THE "GREAT RESPONSE" OF THE COMMUNITY

1. C.P. Stacey and Barbara M. Wilson, The Half-Million: Canadians in Britain, 1939-1946 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 4-33.

2. A.B.C., "How to Train the Militia," 149-151. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 181.

3. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 182-187. Leslie F. Hannon, Canada at War (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968), 72. The rest of the First Canadian Division arrived by the end of February. There were now 23,000 Canadian soldiers on the British home island.

4. The ideas of Hart and Fuller had already been fully adapted by the German General Staff and would prove devastating against the French and British in the spring of

1940. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 98.
Hasek, The Disarming of Canada, 91-124.

5. Farran, The History of the Calgary Highlanders,
30.

6. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 99.
Stevens, A City Goes to War, 192. Stacey and Wilson, The
Half-Million, 5.

7. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 194-195.

8. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 6. Public
Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 291.

9. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 7-10.
Stevens, A City Goes to War, 196. Beattie, Dileas, 121-130.
Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 36 & 62-64.

10. Newsweek XV, No. 4 (January 29, 1940): 23.
Morton, Canada and War, 107. Neatby, The Politics of Chaos,
123 & 131-141. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 271-274.
For an example of Mitch Hepburn rhetoric against the C.I.O.
see Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 145-146.
Granatstein, Canada's War, 73-79.

11. House of Commons Debates, 1940, Vol. I, 1-3.

12. Time XXXV, No. 6 (February 5, 1940): 25.
Newsweek XV, No. 6 (February 5, 1940): 25. House of
Commons Debates, 1940, Vol. I, 10. Nolan, King's War,
41-42. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 64-66.

13. F.R. Scott, "How Canada Entered the War," 344.
A.R.M. Lower, "Wartime Democracy in Canada," The New
Republic 102, No. 1324 (April 13, 1940): 503. The Nation
150, No. 12 (March 23, 1940): 393. Morton, Canada and War,
107. Granatstein, Canada's War, 80-92. Nolan, King's War,
46-47. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 72-73.

14. Hasek, The Disarming of Canada, 124. Morton,

Canada and War, 112-114. Time XXXVI, No. 2 (July 8, 1940): 28.

15. Morton, Canada and War, 114-115.

16. Howe outlined the man power problem in a speech delivered on September 11, 1941. A written transcript can be found in Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 20290, 934.009, D354. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 404-407.

17. R.H. Roy, "Morale in the Canadian Army in Canada During the Second World War," Canadian Defence Quarterly 16, No. 2 (Autumn, 1986): 40. House of Commons Debates, 1940, Vol. II, 854-1103. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 33. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Records, 96-97.

18. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 13. Donald F. Bittner, "Maple Leaf in the North Atlantic: Canada and the Defence of Iceland, 1940," Canadian Defence Quarterly 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1977): 48-51. Stanley, In the Face of Danger, 52. Morton, Canada and War, 108.

19. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 285. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 193. Nolan, King's War, 52. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 78. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 52-54. Churchill and Roosevelt were the only two people ever to address King as "Mackenzie" and never even bothered to ask King how he wanted to be addressed. Ibid.

20. Stacey, Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle, 51-52. Time XXXVI, No. 9 (August 26, 1940): 11-12. The Ogdensburg Declaration as extracted by Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 650. The Ogdensburg Declaration can also be found in Henry Steele Commager, Documents of American History (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1968), 444. King had been acting as a go-between in discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill since May. He saw Ogdensburg as the next logical step. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 106-134. A cable from King to Churchill questioning Churchill's displeasure at Ogdensburg can be found in the Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1,

Vol. 286. For a summary of the 33 recommendations, including one to link Alaska and Washington state by a \$75 million highway, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 344-346.

21. The 1939 Neutrality Law can be found in Commager, Documents of American History, 415-417. Cuff and Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime, 71 & 101. Newsweek XIV, No. 20 (November 13, 1939): 13. Other equipment released for sale were trucks, motorcycles, clothing, machine tools, field ranges, explosives, foodstuffs, surgical supplies, searchlights, gas masks, water-purifying units, ambulances, tents, saddles, telephone and radio compasses.

22. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 43. Bothwell, Drummond, and English, Canada: 1900-1945, 272.

23. Warren F Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence Vol I Alliance Emerging: October 1933-November 1942 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 37.

24. Ibid., 38. Time XXXV, No. 26 (June 24, 1940): 13. Another ruse being used was the shipment of 60,000 World War I rifles, 68,000 machine guns, 175 cannons and other munitions which had been sold as scrap to a private manufacturer who, in turn, sold them to Britain as scrap metal. "How We Can Help Britain," The New Republic 103, No. 1335 (August 14, 1940): 10-11.

25. Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 43, 56-57 & 60. It should be pointed out that Churchill never actually promised Roosevelt that he would send the British fleet to Canada because he never thought Britain would fall. The threat of the loss of the fleet did get Roosevelt's attention and probably did help lead to the eventual destroyers/bases deal.

26. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1940 Volume, 391-394. Roosevelt also sent Congress the August 27 opinion of Attorney General Robert H.

Jackson that the deal was within the role of Commander-in-Chief and thus did not need Congressional approval. Ibid., 394-405. The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Da Capo Press), Vol. 16 (September 3, 1940), 174-185. House of Commons Debates, 1941, Vol. I, 54-59. King sent Roosevelt a cable thanking him for the condition of the six destroyers that Canada received in the deal. Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 295. Part of the good condition of the destroyers was the fact that they were crammed full of supplies such as every food imaginable, bunks instead of hammocks, typewriters, radios, coffeemakers, etc. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 48.

27. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1949/1979), 193.

28. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 114-115. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 11-13. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 198. When McNaughton became commander of the Seventh Corps, Brig. Gen. G.B. Pearkes became commander of the First Division.

29. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, 33-39. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 41-45. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 202.

30. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 282. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 13. The Calgary Highlanders battalion arrived at Aldershot on September 5. Two days later when they received the coded flash "Cromwell" they did not understand the message. A frantic search of the ciphers failed to reveal its meaning and even divisional headquarters would not enlighten the anxious Calgary Highlanders. Eventually, the solution was discovered in sealed orders which although received, were misplaced in the confusion. However, it would be several days before they were issued ammunition and weapons with which to repel the probable invasion. Farran, The History of the Calgary Highlanders, 59-64.

31. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 116.

Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 103-104. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 41.

Chapter 9

CANADA: A COMMUNITY AT TOTAL WAR

1. Morton, Canada and War, 111-112. Time, XXXVI, No. 17 (October 21, 1940): 40.
2. Max Gissen, "Can We Build Enough Ships?," The New Republic 104, No. 1376 (April 14, 1941): 491-192. Morton, Canada and War, 112. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 53-54. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 38.
3. Morton, Canada and War, 113. Newsweek XVI, No. 24 (December 9, 1940): 17. Cuff and Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime, 73.
4. Newsweek XVI, No. 26 (December 30, 1940): 7.
5. The text of the Lend-Lease Act can be found in Commager, Documents of American History, 449-450. No bill like it had ever been introduced in Congress because it would grant Roosevelt extraordinary powers never held by a President before. The Bill labeled every weapon as defensive in nature; authorized the President to order the manufacture of any defensive weapon he wished, authorized the sale, exchange, transfer or lease of said weapons to any country regardless of previous law; authorized release for export any weapon to any country upon Presidential orders; and, to cover expenses, a near blank-check appropriation was authorized. Newsweek XVII, No. 3 (January 20, 1941): 15-16. Time XXXVII, No. 3 (January 20, 1941): 14. While Roosevelt waited for Congress to act, he made sure that the arms continued to flow to England. He transferred ten Coast Guard cutters to the British Navy and ordered the immediate release of fifty-four hundred airplanes, four hundred thousand Thompson submachine guns, thirty-four hundred

Universal carriers and substantial quantities of other miscellaneous military equipment. Roosevelt probably exceeded his authority at this point but he was so sure of the passage of the Lend-Lease Act that he already had the Office of Production Management geared up to work with the Army and Navy Procurement Division and the British Purchasing Commission. Newsweek XVII, No. 6 (February 10, 1941): 14; XVII, No. 10 (March 10, 1941): 16; XVII, No. 11 (March 17, 1941): 17.

6. Time XXXVII, No. 17 (April 28, 1941): 14. Canada would be selling the United States nickel, platinum, copper, zinc, machine tools and small arms. Newsweek XVII, No. 17 (April 28, 1941): 15. Cuff and Granatstein, Canadian-American Relations in Wartime, 69 & 78-86. Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 651. For two New York newspaper reports on the Agreement see Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 308. On April 28, 1941, Mackenzie King stated in an address to the House of Commons about the Hyde Park Agreement: "It involves nothing less than a common plan for the economic defence of the Western Hemisphere [and a] demonstration that Canada and the United States are indeed laying the enduring foundations of a new world order, an order based on international understanding, on mutual aid; on friendship and good will." House of Commons Debates, 1941, Vol. III, 2286-2289. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 288-289. Granatstein, Canada's War, 132-144. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, 180-200.

7. Hasek, The Disarming of Canada, 126.

8. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 210-212. Col. C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1948), 33-37. Lt. Col. Donald Bittner, "Descent in the North: The 1941 Canadian Raid on Spitsbergen," Canadian Defence Quarterly, 11, No. 4 (Spring, 1982): 28-33.

9. Stevens, A City Goes to War, 212. Time XXXVIII, No. 12 (September 22, 1941): 27. Morton, Canada and War, 127. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 294.

10. Hannon, Canada at War, 78. Morton, Canada and War, 129. Because Mackenzie King had insisted on the R.C.N. being independent of the R.N., the R.N. gave the R.C.N. low priority on modern ant-submarine equipment. Therefore, Canada was forced to provide for its own high-technology needs. Since Canada did not have industry or technology suited to those needs they had to be invented. But that took time and in the beginning the Canadian Government was satisfied to send its few ships to sea without the ability to find or destroy the enemy. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 4-5.

11. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 181. Hannon, Canada at War, 80. Ironically, in the tight confines of the English Channel, two of the Canadian destroyers were lost by accident. On June 25, HMCS Fraser was cut in two by the cruiser HMS Calcutta. Four months later the HMCS Margaree was sliced in half by a merchant ship. In June 1941, the other two Canadian destroyers were released to return to Canada for convoy duty. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 69.

12. Thomas G. Lynch, Canada's Flowers: History of the Corvettes of Canada, 1939-1945 (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Nimbus Publishing, Limited, 1981), 4-7.

13. Ibid., 8-10. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 36. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 18-19 & 25.

14. Marc Milner, "Convoy Escorts: Tactics, Technology and Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-1943," Military Affairs, XLVIII, No. 1 (January, 1984), 20. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 469-491. Lynch, Canada's Flowers, 14-21. Morton, Canada and War, 129. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 30. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 162.

15. Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 166. In May 1941, the United States transferred three battleships, three cruisers, an aircraft carrier and two squadrons of destroyers to the Atlantic from the Pacific. In July, the

United States forces relieved the British forces in Iceland.
Lynch, Canada's Flowers, 26.

16. Early in 1942, the British transferred ten Corvettes to the United States Navy and Canada gave the United States Navy eight completed hulls to build new Corvettes. Lynch, Canada's Flowers, 12. By the end of the war Canada had the third largest fleet in the world, comprising over 450 vessels and nearly 100,000 men. Navy historians believe that the combined role of the R.C.N. and the anti-submarine aircraft of the R.C.A.F. was perhaps the most vital of all of Canada's contributions to the Allied effort, because the R.C.N. had to develop its own anti-submarine devices, formulate its own anti-submarine tactics, fill the gap left by the United States Navy after Pearl Harbor, and protect Canadian territorial waters by themselves. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 4. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 71-75. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 187.

17. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 374-377. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 642-647. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 79-81. Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt, 199.

18. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. 1950/1979), 149.

19. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 104. Nolan, King's War, 57-58.

20. Extracts from the Duff Report on the Hong Kong Affair, Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 617-619. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 106-109. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 118. Hannon, Canada at War, 82. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 316.

21. House of Commons Debates, 1941-42, Vol. IV, 4470-4476. One of the ironies of the war was the fact that a good number of the men in the Royal Rifles came from the Eastern Townships including Gaspé. It was these same Eastern Townships that saw first hand the Battle of the St.

Lawrence and knew how little was being done to stop it. In both cases they were told by the government that everything had been done and was being done to protect the lives of the fighting men. But, in both cases ill-equipped Canadian forces had been sent to do an impossible task against a determined enemy. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 82.

22. Webber, Silent Siege, 39, 95-96 & 100-101. The Royal Canadian Air Force planted pilings (telephone poles) on every sandy beach on the west coast where a Japanese plane or glider might be able to land. Ibid., 96. Morton, Canada and War, 109. As a result of this single action by a Japanese submarine and the concurrent invasion of the Aleutian Islands by Japan, the Canadian Government decided to form an Eighth Division whose sole responsibility was to protect the west coast from invasion. Hannon, Cannon at War, 91.

23. J.L. Granatstein, "How the Japanese-Canadians Were Treated," Canadian Defence Quarterly 4, No. 3 (Winter, 1974): 42-45. After the February 26, 1942 order, Ian Mackenzie told the press that, "It is the government's plan to get these people out of British Columbia as fast as possible. Every single man, woman and child will be removed from the defence areas of this province and it is my personal intention, as long as I remain in public life, to see they never come back here." Ibid., 43. For an Official Report of the removal of Japanese from protected areas of British Columbia see Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 20292, 934.009, D431. Also see Patricia E. Roy "The Soldiers Canada Didn't Want: Her Chinese and Japanese Citizens," Canadian Historical Review, LIX, No. 3 (September, 1978): 341-357. Morton, Canada and War, 109-110.

24. House of Commons Debates, 1942, Vol. IV, 3236. Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, 303-308. Morton, Canada and War, 116-118. The manpower pool was rapidly shrinking. According to a Cabinet manpower study, only 609,000 men were left in Canada who could serve in the military without conscription. The Navy and Air Force would need 175,000, industry needed the whole 609,000, and the Army, expanding

from four to eight divisions, was going to need between 200,000 and 400,000 men. Canadian manpower needs could no longer be met by the National Resources Mobilization Act and the National Selective Service Act. King did not like the idea of a plebiscite at first since he did not want to stump the country for conscription because he genuinely disliked conscription. The final form of the question was a compromise way of asking for conscription without asking for conscription: "Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?" Granatstein, Canada's War, 208-218. The anti-Conscription movement in Quebec opposed the plebiscite with what they called "Manifesto of the Ligue pour la defence du Canada, 1942," Stacey, Historical Documents of Canada, 631-632.

25. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 119. At home in Canada, the Sixth Division was to take over defence of Vancouver Island, the Eighth Division was responsible for the defence of British Columbia and the Seventh Division would remain in general reserve in the Atlantic Command. Ibid., 122. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 14. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, 9-41.

26. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, 48. As a result of the poor Canadian performances during some of the training exercises, Lt. Gen. B.L. Montgomery recommended that Gen. Crerar, who was in temporary command while Gen. McNaughton was back in Canada, should remove both Gen. G.R. Pearkes and Gen. C.B. Price as Division Commanders since they were proving not to be fit for combat command. Therefore, Gen. Pearkes returned to Canada and was given command of the newly-formed Eighth Division. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 16. Hannon, Canada at War, 91.

27. Hasek, The Disarming of Canada, 125. Morton, Canada and War, 138. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 119. Douglas and Greenhous, Out of the Shadows, 109-111.

28. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten (New York: Alfred A Knopf, Inc., 1985), 189. Jacques Mordal, Dieppe: The Dawn

of Decision (London: Souvenir Press, 1963), 117. Notes from March 6, 1942 conference on a cross-channel raid can be found in Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10765, 222CL.

29. Letter from Crerar to Montgomery, Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10765, 222CL. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 16. T. Murray Hunter, Canada at Dieppe (Ottawa: Balmuir Book Publishing, Ltd, 1982), 7.

30. Mordal, Dieppe: Dawn of Decision, 118. Christopher Buckley, Norway, Commandos, Dieppe (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951), 267. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare, 56-62.

31. Ottawa Journal, May 13, 1942, page one. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 70.

32. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 62. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 81.

33. House of Commons Debates, 1942, Vol. IV, 4098 & 4122-4125.

34. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 38 & 112. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force, 493.

35. Lynch, Canada's Flowers, 29-31. Hadley, U-Boats Against Canada, 34, 47 & 119-120.

36. Essex, Victory in the St. Lawrence, 11. Zimmerman, The Great Naval Battle of Ottawa, 38-48. Milner, "Convoy Escorts: Tactics, Technology and Innovations in the Royal Canadian Navy," 19-21.

37. For the July 31, 1942 Operational Plans for "JUBILEE" see Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10765, 222CL. Hunter, Canada at Dieppe, 12. Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery (New York: Signet Books, 1959), 66. Montgomery left England on August 10 to take command of the Eighth Army in Africa. Ziegler, Mountbatten, 190. Brian Loring Villa,

"Mountbatten, the British Chiefs of Staff, and Approval of the Dieppe Raid," The Journal of Military History 54, No. 2 (April, 1990): 212-213.

38. German High Command Official Account of Dieppe, Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10766, 222CL. R.W. Thompson, At Whatever Cost: The Story of the Dieppe Raid (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1957), 192. Unknown to British intelligence, the division responsible for the defence of Dieppe had been reinforced during July and August as a matter of routine.

39. Weekly Summary of Military Action (August 13-20), Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol 20335, 952.013. Morton, Canada and War, 139. For a full account of the Dieppe raid see Stacey, Six Years of War, 321-388.

40. The first cables from Churchill to King after Dieppe can be found in the Public Archives of Canada, MG 26, J1, Vol. 334. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, 80. The losses so decimated the Second Division that it barely existed as an organization. Eight months later it was listed as the lowest priority in the Canadian Army for employment. Terence Robertson, Dieppe: The Shame and the Glory (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1962), 386. The dead were buried with full military honors in a British-owned cemetery above the valley of the Scie River. Mordal, Dieppe: Dawn of Decision, 246-249.

41. Report on "Operation Jubilee" and Lecture Notes on Dieppe Raid Analysis, Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10768, 222CL. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945, 84. Stacey and Wilson, The Half-Million, 18. Hannon, Canada at War, 84-85.

42. Gen. C. Churchill Mann, "The Real Purpose of the Dieppe Raid," Canadian Defence Quarterly 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1979): 13. William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), 414 & 432. Douglas and Greenhouse, Out of the Shadows, 111.

43. John P. Campbell, "Dieppe, Deception and D-Day,"

Canadian Defence Quarterly 9, No. 3 (Winter, 1980): 40-42.
Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid, 422-432.

44. Cable to Crerar from King, Public Archives of
Canada, RG 24, Vol. 10768. Queen-Hughes, Whatever Men Dare,
78. Morton, Canada and War, 139.

45. Villa, "Mountbatten, the British Chief of Staff,
and Approval of the Dieppe Raid," 201-226.

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