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San Jose Police Department

A Managerial Audit of Patrol Staffing, Self-Initiated Activity, Response Times, and In-Field Arrest Rates

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San Jose State University

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Introduction

The San Jose Police Department serves as the municipal law enforcement agency for the City of San Jose, which is the third largest city in California, and tenth largest city in the United States. Located within the southern portion of the Bay Area, the City of San Jose contains a population of nearly one million residents, and is home to a large concentration of technological private enterprises (City of San Jose, 2011b). Coupled with the negative effects of the current global economic recession, rising employee costs and declining property and sales tax revenues, the City of San Jose has had to operate under a General Fund budgetary deficit since fiscal year 2002-03. In fiscal year 2011-12, the General Fund weathered a $115.1 million deficit, followed by an original forecast of $80.5 million deficit for fiscal year 2012-13, as originally projected by the City Manager’s Budget Office. However, revised retirement costs combined with a 10% reduction in employee total compensation has since adjusted the fiscal year 2012-13 deficit to a new forecasted $10 million surplus (City of San Jose, 2011c; City of San Jose, 2012).

The persistent and repetitive General Fund budget deficit has had a dramatic eroding affect on the City’s total workforce, which was measured at 7,453 fulltime equivalent (FTE) employees in fiscal year 2001-02, but is only 5,400 FTE for fiscal year 2011-12 (City of San Jose, 2011c). Specifically, the San Jose Police Department’s level of sworn personnel has shrunk by hundreds of officers through retirement attrition and forced layoffs. With the significant reduction of sworn personnel, the San Jose Police Department has enacted staffing cuts to patrol, special operations, and investigative services. At its peak, in fiscal year 2008-09, the San Jose Police Department was comprised of 1,395 sworn personnel, a 22% difference from its 1,087 sworn personnel level for fiscal year 2011-12 (City of San Jose, 2011d).
This research considered the impacts of the repeated cutbacks on patrol services: From a managerial audit perspective, how has the pattern of the General Fund deficits from fiscal year 2008-09 to fiscal year 2011-12 affected the San Jose Police Department’s ability to carry out its Mission Statement of promoting public safety; preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; and providing emergency and non-emergency services? The managerial audit focused specifically on police self-initiated activity levels, and the reduction of line-level patrol officer positions in relation to the delay of dispatching prioritized calls for service and their outcome dispositions (e.g. arrest, citation, report taken).

Historically, the San Jose Police Department has had a reputation of prestige amongst the law enforcement community, as the Department took pride in offering the highest level of police services. Its Field Training Officer (FTO) program had received national recognition from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and was also adopted by the California legislature as the state standard for training newly hired police officers (SJPD, 2011a). The FTO program has since closed its doors and is no longer staffed.

From 2000 to 2006, the City of San Jose was recognized as America’s safest city amongst cities with a population of 500,000 or more (Kalra, 2010). In 2007, the City of San Jose lost its top ranking position as it fell to third place. The downward spiral has since continued as the City of San Jose has dropped and remained at fourth place from 2008 to 2010 (CQ Press, 2007; CQ Press, 2009; CQ Press 2011). With the previously stated research question in mind, the researcher sought to inquire if the San Jose Police Department is still able to meet its Mission Statement of promoting public safety; preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; and providing emergency and non-emergency services – or in other words, perform to its historic
high standard and deliver satisfactory police services to the residents of the City of San Jose (SJPD, 2011c).

**Literature Review**

There were three types of relevant literature containing pertinent information related to the research question: scholarly articles, government documents, and newspaper publications. The first two types, scholarly articles and government documents, contained either peer-reviewed empirical driven findings or officially endorsed data derived from government statistics. Of the peer-reviewed scholarly articles located, several were recent enough (2010 or 2011 publication) to touch on the nationwide trend of law enforcement reductions by means of layoffs or retirement attrition in relation to the fluctuation of “police productivity” or workload. Within the scholarly domain, the term “police productivity” is measured by the number of arrests, average response time to calls for service, or the number of dispatched calls for service (Zhao, Zhang, & Thurman, 2011).

*Peer-reviewed Scholarly Articles*

The located scholarly articles can be broken up into three categories which were relevant to the research question: (1) Police staffing levels in relation to crime statistics, (2) Factors that contribute to dispatched patrol officer call for service apprehensions, and (3) Politics dictating a police department’s size.

(1) The first category, level of police staffing in relation to crime statistics, is by far the most researched and documented category within academia. The question of: “Do more cops equal less crime?” has been a controversial notion, with evidence supporting both conclusions. This question was pertinent to the research question in that San Jose Police Department (SJPD)
patrol outcome dispositions can be intuitively connected to a perpetrator’s status following the commission of a dispatched crime. If the perpetrator is not taken into custody, he or she could reoffend, ultimately contributing to an increase in the overall crime rate and a given patrol officer’s future workload.

Worrall and Kovandzic (2010) utilized panel data from over 5,000 cities within the period of 1990-2001 and discovered a “fairly robust inverse association” between police levels and four index crime rates (p.1). A more recent study by Zhao et al. (2011), which analyzed the effect of federal Community Orientated Policing Services (COPS) grants to the increase of staffing in awarded local police departments, found that the additional subsidized manpower had a “direct causal relationship” with police productivity in terms of the number of arrests (p.1). In another supporting unique study, Klick and Tabarrok (2005) monitored the terror alert level set by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) over a given period of time within Washington, D.C., which directly affected the region’s level of police presence. Klick and Tabarrok (2005) discovered that the level of reported crime decreased significantly, “both statistically and economically, during-high alert periods,” which was attributed to the increased police presence (p.2).

From a contrasting conclusion, O’Neil (2011) claimed that there was no empirical link between the reduction of crime and the visible uniformed level of police. O’Neil (2011) claimed that previous studies that found a statistical correlation should not have determined a “causal relationship” significance (p.3). A study that supports O’Neil’s (2011) conclusion, and which is considered the empirical standard to contest, was Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown (1975). They conducted an experiment famously titled, the “Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment,” between October 1, 1972, through September 30, 1973; which measured the impact routine
patrol had on incidence of crime and the public’s fear of crime. Kelling et al. (1975) used three experimental patrol conditions (intensified preventive patrol, routine preventive patrol, and no preventive patrol) to conclude that the level of police presence did not affect crime incidence, service delivery, or citizen reassurance of safety.

(2) The second category of scholarly articles, which explored the factors that contribute to dispatched patrol officer apprehensions, contained little if any prior empirical research. Factors that contribute to a successful on-scene patrol officer apprehension were pertinent to the research question in that the assessment of staffing levels in relation to dispatched response times can potentially affect the type of patrol officer disposition in completing a call for service. The two located scholarly articles specifically examined the modeling of a line-level patrol officer’s success in apprehending the perpetrator of an in-progress burglary. In the first noted research, Coupe and Girling (2001) conducted a six-month study of in-progress burglaries within a United Kingdom (UK) police region and determined that the “strength and speed of police response exerts an important impact on catching burglars red-handed” as one of the two most important factors for making an infield arrest (p. 27). In a follow up research design, Coupe and Blake (2005) found that reduced workloads per patrol unit improved the chances of on-scene apprehensions of residential burglars; however, the most important factor was the circumstances in which the citizen reported the burglary and time element. Coupe and Blake’s (2005) findings were at odds with the findings of the “Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment” (Kelling’s et al., 1975), which implied that the level of patrol coverage had a minimal if any affect on response times or on-scene arrests.

(3) The final category of scholarly articles provided applicable background information on the politics of determining the size of police agencies within Urban America (Sharp, 2006). In
2006, then-Chief Robert Davis released a Five-Year Staffing plan, which stated that SJPD had the lowest recorded officer-per-capita ratio when compared to 23 cities nationwide with a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (Davis, 2006). In studying the link between politics and agency size, Sharp (2006) compiled a study sample of 66 cities with a population of at least 250,000 in 2000. With aggregate data derived from the U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Justice Statistics, and Congressional Quarterly’s America Votes, Sharp (2006) found that the size of contemporary police departments was “substantially shaped not only by the legacy of the 1960-1970 wave of racial civil unrest in the United States, but also by the reaction to racial disorders in the 1980s and 1990s, and by the prevalence of racial minorities in the current population” (p.1). Sharp (2006) also found that a city’s wealth was a less robust indicator of its police force size.

**Government Documents**

Following scholarly literature, the second type of relevant information that pertained to the research question was official governmental documents in the form of publications, memorandums, and public reports. The Bureau of Justice Statistics, US Department of Justice, is a commonly known source for national level crime data. The Bureau of Justice Statistics “administers two statistical programs to measure the magnitude, nature, and impact of crime in the nation: the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)” (US Department of Justice, 2010a, p.1). The researcher initially believed that both programs were necessary to determine the validity of the crimes-reported statistics; upon analyzing SJPD’s internally recorded data this was ultimately found to be irrelevant, as later described within the *Methodology* section.
Narrowing the scope to a municipal perspective, the City Manager’s Budget Office, City of San Jose, annually releases a “Budget in Brief” document following the adoption of the proposed budget by the City Council. This annual budgetary document describes the allocation of funding or the City’s financial plan within a given fiscal year, which by statute runs from July 1st to June 30th. Detailed within this budgetary document was the funding allocation SJPD received within the General Fund (one of three Funds in the Budget; the other two being the Enterprise/Special Purpose Fund and the Capital Improvements Fund) and a graph that depicted the current total number of fulltime equivalent city employees. To fulfill information requirements regarding the City’s budget variation from fiscal year 2007-08 to fiscal year 2011-12, the “Budget in Brief” documents for each applicable year (City of San Jose, 2008; City of San Jose, 2009; City of San Jose, 2010; City of San Jose, 2011a) were examined.

As previously mentioned within the scholarly article section of this literature review, in 2006, the then-Chief Robert Davis (2006) submitted his Five-Year Staffing Plan that called for an additional 597.5 personnel to be hired and trained in a phased and prioritized implementation approach within the following years. Of the 597.5 proposed personnel increase, 332 were assessed to be front-line patrol officer positions and 146 to be sworn staff for administrative, investigative, specialized, and preventive capacities. Also within his plan, Davis (2006) described in detail the call for service intake process, along with the average response times for various prioritized calls for service. Davis’ (2006) Five-Year Staffing Plan provided significant research information pertaining to previous certified staffing need projections, internal department processes, and historical statistics required for the analysis of the research question.

The last essential government publication examined was the SJPD Duty Manual 2010. The SJPD Duty Manual 2010 contains the most up to date statutory policies and procedures of
the Police Department. An example of the pertinent definitional information it contains can be located on page 730 under section “S 3608.” This specific section, titled “Call For Service Priority Code Definitions” described the definitions (with examples) of how calls for service are prioritized (under six levels) with specific and clear criteria for each level (San Jose Police Department, 2010). In relation to the research question, the SJPD Duty Manual 2010’s information was required to provide background and definitional information for analysis purposes.

Newspaper Articles

Primary sources such as newspaper articles provide a more contemporary view of policing services in a specific community. While there are no scholarly articles written specifically about SJPD, there are many news articles, OpEds, and editorials written about the City of San Jose’s police services that provided important data for this research. Such articles included not only comments on and news about police services, but also articles about the city’s financial condition, which was the driving force for the reduction in patrol personnel.

The recent pattern of annual budget reductions has rattled cities, counties, and states nationwide alongside the federal government. The crippling phenomenon is far from unique to the City of San Jose, as California’s capital city, Sacramento, also recently approved a budget resulting in 42 police officer layoffs this fiscal year, as reported by The Sacramento Bee (Lillis, 2011). The San Jose Mercury News reported that the 2011-12 approved City of San Jose budget required 66 police officer layoffs and the elimination of nearly 100 other vacant sworn positions left open by departures and retirements. During fiscal year 2010-2011, the SJPD shrank from 1,271 to 1,106 police officers, a size smaller than two decades ago when the City of San Jose had 200,000 fewer residents. In 2009, the SJPD reached a historical high of 1,395 police officers
employed (Woolfolk, 2011b).

To reduce a line-level patrol officer’s workload and ensure that the SJPD can promptly respond to priority calls for service, Chief Chris Moore recently issued a memorandum to Mayor Chuck Reed and the City Council which outlined how the Police Department will no longer respond to certain low-level priority calls for service – sometimes referred to as “quality-of-life issues” (Woolfolk, 2011a). The SJPD’s new response policy stated that it will no longer dispatch patrol officers to reported fruit vendor complaints, recycling theft, and parking violations, unless there is underage drinking, fighting, or noise complaints associated. Other types of responses that the Police Department considered adding to the “no response” list were traffic accidents, unless an injury was involved, and burglary alarms (Woolfolk, 2011a).

Newspapers across the nation have captured the reduction of law enforcement services within the Bay Area. White (2011), a writer with the Wall Street Journal, recently wrote an article that described the surge of violent crime in the Bay Area, as both Oakland and the City of San Jose have laid off a large number of line-level patrol officers. White (2011) specifically pointed out the fact that homicides within the City of San Jose increased 73% in later-2011 when compared to the same period during the previous year, and reported robberies experienced a 9% increase. While the City of San Jose’s experience of violent crime increased, Los Angeles had experienced an 18% decrease and San Francisco a 5% decrease in violent crime over nearly the same period (White, 2011). On the other hand, and from an East Coast perspective, New York City had stated that its Police Department was nearly 7,000 police officers understaffed as it experienced a 6.5% increase in homicides and a 32.3% increase in forcible rape when compared to the same time period over the previous year (Blau and Schapiro, 2011).
Methodology

(Refer to the Methodology Process Chart [Fig. 2] located on page 17)

A managerial audit can sometimes be construed as an unpleasant examination of a given organization’s expenditures, policies, and procedures. The audit process usually involves an external researcher with the overarching goal of determining whether or not an agency is operating efficiently and appropriately (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004). The researcher may utilize a predetermined method that could incorporate the analysis of staffing ratios with the end thought of organizational change or quality improvements for the assessed agency (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004). For the purpose of analyzing this research question, the researcher had chosen to conduct a managerial audit incorporating a three-phase research process:

Phase 1

The first phase of the research process contained five action items: (1.1) Determine if Institutional Review Board (IRB) clearance was required / Obtain SJPD approval for the research project; (1.2) Obtain SJPD Patrol Division, Bureau of Field Operations (BFO), staffing levels for the specified periods; (1.3) Obtain SJPD BFO Patrol Division response times and dispositions during specified time periods for selected prioritized crimes / calls for service; (1.4) Obtain SJPD patrol officer self-initiated and overall workload statistics during specified time periods for BFO; and (1.5) Obtain Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program data for specified periods.

As a precursor to the successful completion of action items (1.1) through (1.4) an appointment was scheduled with Assistant Chief (AC) of Police Rikki Goede, SJPD, on February 2, 2012, in which the researcher presented the research question for Departmental approval. AC Goede provided verbal approval, in turn, which allowed for the acquisition of needed data as outlined in action items (1.2) through (1.4) to be simplified. However, if the
research proposal was denied, the use of a California Public Record Act (CPRA) request would have been exercised. Subsequent to AC Goede’s approval, the following action items were initiated. Action item (1.1) was the determination of whether or not to submit a request for exemption to San Jose State University’s IRB. Procedurally, the IRB is required to ensure that researchers are in compliance with the University’s policy regarding the use of human subjects (San Jose State University, n.d.). Ultimately, human subjects were not utilized, thus, a request for exemption was not submitted, and the research project advanced.

The required SJPD data derived from three separate six-month time frames starting on July 1st and ending on December 31st for the years of 2007, 2009, and 2011 was obtained. Action item (1.2) required data pertaining to the number of patrol officer personnel assigned to the BFO Patrol Division for each six-month period. The staffing data derived from a combination of BFO Administration shift bid data and Bureau of Administration (BOA) Personnel Unit data. Upon acquiring the BFO Administration shift bid data, the researcher cross-referenced that with retirements, terminations, resignations, and layoffs for each month within each six-month period. The cross-referencing only considered those position reductions that occurred directly from the BFO Patrol Division, and that were actual staffed patrol positions. The research excluded the Airport Division, as it bids separately from the BFO Patrol Division and is separately funded.

Action item (1.3) consisted of data portraying the average response times and total dispositions (e.g. arrest, citation, report taken, or other outcome) over each six-month period for the selected prioritized calls for service. For the purpose of this research, a response time consisted of the time length from when the police dispatch call-taker answered the initial 911 phone call to the first dispatched patrol officer’s arrival on scene. Refer to the following chart for a visual depiction of the response time and disposition process:
The selection of prioritized calls consisted of one priority 1 call for service (245 PC – Assault with a deadly weapon), one priority 2 call for service (273.5 PC / 243(e) PC – Domestic Violence), and one priority 3 call for service (10851 CVC – Stolen vehicle report). This data derived from the SJPD’s internal database named Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), which is managed by the Police Department’s Systems Development Unit. According to the SJPD (2011b), CAD is a “specialized application that allows for the coordinated communication, assignment and tracking of Police Department resources in response to calls for service” (p. 1). Due to the complexity of data mining with respect to CAD, the researcher utilized the following specific data scripts for the selected prioritized calls for service:

Priority 1 – Call for service final type: 245 PC – Assault with a deadly weapon

- All calls for service that started as a “415W”* – Weapons disturbance, “10-71” – Person shot, “10-72” – Person stabbed, or “245” – Assault with a deadly weapon, that were dispatched and determined by patrol officers to be a final crime type of 245 PC – Assault with a deadly weapon
Priority 2 – Call for service final type: 243(e) PC – Misdemeanor domestic violence, or 273.5 PC – Felony domestic violence

- All calls for service that started as a “415” – Disturbance, or “415F” – Family disturbance, that were dispatched and determined by patrol officers to be a final crime type of 243(e) PC – Misdemeanor domestic violence, or 273.5 PC – Felony domestic violence

Priority 3 – Call for service final type: 10851 CVC – Auto theft

- All calls for service that started as a “10851” – Stolen vehicle report, that were dispatched and determined by patrol officers to be a final crime type of 10851 CVC – Auto theft

* Call for service types in quotations refer to a specific CAD designation and may not correspond to a final crime type of a penal code or vehicle code from a title standpoint

Action item (1.4) consisted of CAD data pertaining to the total amount of generated CAD events and the total of amount of self-initiated patrol officer events for each six-month period. Lastly, action item (1.5) consisted of gathering UCR data for each six-month period.

Phase 2

The second phase of the research process was the Findings and Analysis portion, which began with action item (2.1). Detailed within action item (2.1) was the holistic analysis of the cumulative data obtained within action items (1.2), (1.3), and (1.4). Action item (2.1) served as the lynchpin of the research question in that it provided a foundation for the developed Conclusion within phase 3. In action item (2.1) the researcher designated the first six-month period of July 1st to December 31st of 2007 as the base-period for comparison. This timeframe was prior to the September 29, 2008, stock market crash in which the Dow Jones industrial average experienced a nearly 778 point drop, the largest single-day point loss in history (Twin, 2008). The 2008 recession would negatively impact subsequent year government budgets by reducing both the tax revenue base and the income earned on invested funds, which could
directly impact staffing levels of police departments. Thus, the first six-month period of 2007 provided a stable economic base-period for comparison in contrast to the following two six-month periods detailed within action items (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4). In addition, within 2007, the SJPD’s sworn personnel level was still experiencing a phased growth as it totaled an approximate 1,360 police officers (SJPOA, 2011).

Furthermore, in action item (2.1) the data derived from the six-month periods of 2009 and 2011 were analyzed in comparison to the 2007 base-period to ascertain the outcome difference in response times and final dispositions (in-field arrests) previously determined in action item (1.3) for selected priority 1 through 3 calls for service. For the calculation of final outcome dispositions, the researcher analyzed the statistical outcome percentage between the numbers of in-field arrests versus when only a police report is taken without custodial apprehension. This data was recorded in CAD and mined with the same specific data scripts utilized for the selected prioritized calls for service response times. Lastly, action item (2.1) incorporated an analysis of the call for service volume over the three six-month periods for BFO. The research assumption was that if staffing levels were reduced over the three six-month periods, response times would increase, in effect decreasing total patrol officer in-field arrests (calculated outcome percentage). The decrease of in-field arrests would naturally allow the perpetrator the opportunity to offend again.

The last portion of the second phase included action item (2.2), which was initially believed to be a checks and balances system in comparing UCR data to SJPD internal crime statistics from CAD. As the researcher progressed through the phased research process, it was discovered that UCR data was irrelevant to the research question and CAD data obtained within action item (1.3) and (1.4). The data derived from CAD was unique to the specific data scripts
and would have no causal relevance to UCR data. For example, if a citizen were to walk into the SJPD’s Main Lobby to report one of the selected prioritized calls for service, the relation of response time and outcome disposition would be null. This is because the incident was reported at the Police Department’s Main Lobby, and the intake officer would only take a report (no response time) as the perpetrator would not be on scene. This statistic would be reflected within UCR data, being that there is no reporting difference between calls for service dispatched and Police Department reporting. For the purpose of this research, the mined CAD data excluded those types of Main Lobby reports or incidents.

Phase 3

The third and final phase of the research process included action items (3.1) and (3.2), which detailed portions of the Analysis, and Conclusion. Action item (3.1) referred to the quantitative results, later synthesized into “significant observations,” derived from action item (2.1) in comparison to the SJPD Mission Statement, action item (3.2). In its entirety, the third phase included the Conclusion with respect to the research question. Specific criteria from which the Conclusion was drawn included, but were not limited to, BFO Patrol Division staffing levels in relation to the variation of response times over each six month period, and the change of call for service dispositions (in-field arrest rate). Four other pertinent factors considered were call for service volume, the SJPD’s General Fund budgetary allocation amount for each six-month period, level of self-initiated activity, and staffing levels for the entire Police Department. Action item (3.2) consisted of the SJPD Mission Statement, which was operationalized by utilizing the base-period for comparison from a statistical perspective, along with the Police Department’s discretionary assigned BFO Patrol Division staffing levels. The second discretionary component assumed that as the SJPD’s total sworn staffing level shrunk within the
recent years, its executive command staff had the ability to maintain the BFO Patrol Division’s staffing level at a constant during each six-month period by reallocating police officers from other none core essential positions outside a first responder capacity.

### Methodology Process Chart

![Methodology Process Chart](image)

### Findings

**BFO Patrol Division Staffing Levels**

During the 2007 base-period six-month time frame, starting on July 1st and ending on December 31st, the SJPD experienced its highest level of patrol officer staffing with an average of 562 assigned patrol officers per month. Following 2007, for the 2009 comparative-period, the
SJPD sustained an average of 552 assigned patrol officers, and an average of 531 for the 2011 comparative-period. Upon observing the below chart (Fig. 3), one can notice that the 2007 and 2009 periods are similar in trend and only vary by an average of 10 patrol officers per month, while the 2011 comparative-period portrayed a far different trend. For the 2011 comparative-period, the SJPD’s patrol staffing was on average 31 assigned patrol officers less per month when compared to the 2007 base-period. In addition, from an assessed percentage perspective, in comparison to the 2007 base-period, the 2009 comparative-period experienced an average of 1.78% less patrol officers per month, while the 2011 comparative-period experienced a greater decrease of 5.52% patrol officers per month. When only comparing the first three months of the 2007 base-period to the first three months of the 2011 comparative-period, the SJPD weathered an average decrease of 7.15% assigned patrol officers per month.

![BFO Patrol Staffing Levels Per Six-Month Period](image)

**BFO Patrol CAD Events**

With reference to Fig. 4, the 2007 base-period experienced the highest average amount of generated CAD events with an average of 43,195 events per month. In contrast, the 2009
comparative-period experienced an average of 39,709 generated CAD events per month, while the 2011 comparative-period experienced an average of 33,759 CAD events per month. The progressive reduction of CAD events over the assessed three timeframes showed an 8.07% decrease from the 2007 to 2009 periods, and a 21.85% decrease from the 2007 and 2011 periods.

![Total Amount of BFO CAD Events](image)

(Fig. 4)

**Self-Initiated Activity (10-95: Pedestrian Stop; 11-95: Vehicle Stop)**

For the 2007 base-period, the amount of self-initiated activity events, which included vehicle and pedestrian stops (as opposed to citizen generated calls for service), experienced an average amount of 7,742 events per month. In comparison, the 2009 comparative-period experienced an average amount of 6,550 self-initiated activity events per month, while the 2011 comparative-period experienced an average of 2,861 self-initiated activity events per month. The mined CAD data showed a negative progressive decreasing relationship among the average amounts of self-initiated activity events between the 2009 and 2011 comparative-periods to the 2007 base-period. From the 2007 to 2009 periods, the average amount of self-initiated activity
events fell 15.4%. This decrease continued as the 2011 comparative-period experienced a staggering 63.1% drop in self-initiated activity events when directly compared to the 2007 base-period – refer to Fig. 5, below.

![Total Amount of Vehicle and Pedestrian Stops](image)

**Total Amount of Vehicle and Pedestrian Stops**

245 PC – Assault with a Deadly Weapon (Priority 1 Call for Service)

With reference to Fig. 6, during the 2007 base-period assault with a deadly weapon calls for service experienced an average response time of 6.18 minutes per month. In comparison, the 2009 comparative-period experienced an average response time of 4.67 minutes per month, while the final 2011 comparative-period experienced an average response time of 7.21 minutes per month. The mined CAD data showed a fluctuation in the three average response times between the two comparative-periods to the base-period. From the 2007 to 2009 periods, the assault with a deadly weapon calls for service response time positively decreased by an average of 1.51 minutes, or 24.43%. This positive service decrease was short lived as the 2011 comparative-period experienced an average 1.03 minute increase, or 16.67% increase, when directly compared to the 2007 base-period.
With respect to Fig. 7, the assault with a deadly weapon calls for service in-field arrest percentage rate experienced an average rate of 34.94% during the 2007 base-period. When directly compared to the 2009 comparative-period’s average in-field arrest rate of 41.26%, the average in-field arrest rate positively increased by 18.09%. During the 2011 comparative-period, the average in-field arrest rate of 38.13% positively increased by 9.13% when directly compared to the 2007 base-period’s average in-field arrest rate of 34.94%.

### In-Field Arrest Percentage Rate: 245 PC – Assault with a Deadly Weapon

(Fig. 7)
273.5 PC / 243(e) PC – Domestic Violence (Priority 2 Call for Service)

During the 2007 base-period, domestic violence calls for service experienced an average response time of 9.89 minutes per month. In direct comparison to the 2009 comparative-period, domestic violence calls for service experienced an average response time of 11.15 minutes per month, while the 2011 comparative-period experienced an average response time of 15.57 minutes per month, when also directly compared to the 2007 base-period. The mined CAD data showed a negative progressive relationship among the average response times between the 2009 and 2011 comparative-periods to the 2007 base-period. When the 2007 base-period was directly compared to the 2009 comparative-period, the domestic violence calls for service response time increased by an average of 1.26 minutes, or 12.74%. This negative service increase continued as the 2011 comparative-period experienced an average response time increase of 5.68 minutes, or a 57.43% increase, when directly compared to the 2007 base-period – refer to Fig. 8, below.
With reference to Fig. 9, the overall domestic violence calls for service in-field arrest percentage rate had a consistent negative service finding that was also displayed within the domestic violence response times, as detailed in Fig. 8. The in-field arrest rate experienced an average rate of 69.81% during the 2007 base-period. When directly compared to the 2009 comparative-period average in-field arrest rate of 62.13%, the average in-field arrest rate negatively decreased by 11%. For the 2011 comparative-period, its average in-field arrest rate of 46.61% negatively decreased by 33.23%, when directly compared to the 2007 base-period’s average in-field arrest rate of 69.81%. This strong negative progressive decreasing in-field average arrest rate trend displayed uniformity among the three analyzed periods.

**In-Field Arrest Percentage Rate: 273.5 / 243(e) PC – Domestic Violence**

![Graph showing In-Field Arrest Percentage Rate](image)

(Fig. 9)

10851 CVC – Stolen Vehicle Report (Priority 3 Call for Service)

Lastly, during the 2007 base-period, reported stolen vehicle calls for service experienced an average response time of 38.61 minutes per month. In comparison, the 2009 comparative-period experienced an average response time of 43.76 minutes per month, while the final
comparative-period in 2011 experienced an average response time of 60.17 minutes per month. The mined CAD data showed an increasing negative progressive relationship among the average response times between the two comparative-periods to the 2007 base-period. From the 2007 to 2009 periods, the reported stolen vehicle calls for service response time increased by an average of 5.15 minutes, or 13.34%. This negative service increase continued as the final 2011 comparative-period experienced an average 21.56 minute increase, or a 55.84% increase, when directly compared to the 2007 base-period – refer to Fig. 10, below.

![Average Response Times: 10851 CVC – Stolen Vehicle Report](image)

**Analysis**

The *Analysis* portion of a managerial audit is exercised with the overarching goal of determining whether or not the assessed agency, in this case, the SJPD, is operating efficiently and appropriately (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004). The researcher utilized the previously described three-phase research process as detailed within the *Methodology* to acquire the *Findings*, which have been synthesized into multiple detailed “significant observations” within this *Analysis*. 

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(Fig. 10)
These significant observations each incorporate a tailored analysis of BFO Patrol Division staffing levels, total call for service volume, level of self-initiated activity events, average response times, and outcome dispositions (in-field arrest rate). These key elements will be combined with the operationalized SJPD Mission Statement of promoting public safety; preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; and providing emergency and non-emergency services (SJPD, 2011c), within the final Conclusion.

**Significant Observation 1:** As the SJPD overall sworn-level decreased by 22%, the command staff attempted to backfill BFO Patrol Division staffing over other non-first responding capacities; however, patrol staffing was still inadequate over the comparative-periods while causing a negative affect on the totality of SJPD’s police services. The City Council should allocate a greater percentage of the General Fund to the SJPD to increase the officer per capita 1,000 resident ratio.

In fiscal year 2008-09, the SJPD, in total, was comprised of 1,395 sworn personnel, a 22% difference from its 1,087 sworn personnel level for fiscal year 2011-12 (City of San Jose, 2011d). This downward spiral of staffing has ultimately impacted and stripped its BFO Patrol Division staffing level. As annotated in Fig. 3, the SJPD experienced its highest level of patrol officer staffing with an average of 562 assigned officers per month during the 2007 base-period, followed by 552 in the 2009 comparative-period, and 531 in the 2011 comparative-period. When directly comparing the 2007 to 2011 periods, the overall difference of an average 31 patrol officers per month assigned to the BFO Patrol Division, or a 5.52% difference, was significant; however, one must acknowledge it in perspective with the greater reduction of 308 officers, or a 22% department-wide reduction from fiscal year 2008-09 to 2011-12. This disproportionate relationship favors the BFO Patrol Division, but obviously comes at a cost to other non-first responding positions, such as administrative positions, or more importantly, detective positions within the Bureau of Investigations.
As the Bureau of Investigations was downsized to reallocate officers to patrol positions, the caseload or burden of investigating cases was increased to those remaining detectives, or now smaller sized specialized investigative units. A consequence of this was recently sensationalized within the media in September 2011, when a San Jose resident’s credit cards and $1,200 cash was pick-pocketed while sitting on a bench at Oakridge Mall, located within South San Jose (Herhold, 2011). Following the San Jose resident’s felony theft report to police, and again at the same shopping mall a short time later, the victimized resident observed the same suspect sitting at the same bench where she had been pick-pocketed. The victimized resident contacted the SJPD investigate unit responsible for investigating the initially reported felony theft only to discover that the SJPD no longer investigated thefts under $20,000 unless the victim was a senior citizen (Herhold, 2011). This media-sensationalized incident truly exemplifies the negative affects occurring to the Bureau of Investigations as the command staff shrinks its ranks to supplement BFO Patrol Division staffing. As a result, this particular suspect is now able to reoffend with an identical modus operandi, thus, causing further victimization among San Jose residents and an increased workload for future responding patrol officers. This media-sensationalized example is only one of many, which extend beyond crimes against property and into the realm of crimes against persons.

Outside of internal command staff decisions, and reaching into the territory of General Fund budgetary allocation from the City Council, the negative progressive overall reduction of the SJPD’s sworn staffing level can be attributed to its discretionary level of funding per fiscal year. Recently, in January 2012, City of San Jose Councilmember Pierluigi Oliverio authored an articulated in which he argued that the annual SJPD budgetary allocation should be a fixed percentage of the General Fund. Councilmember Oliverio recommended a specific change to the
City Charter that would mandate a higher General Fund percentage than the average 34.7% it receives today, in turn, allowing the SJPD to adequately increase its overall sworn-staffing level (Oliverio, 2012). In the fiscal year 2007-08 adopted budget, the SJPD was allocated $281,142,125 within the General Fund, with 15 new police officer positions added (City of San Jose, 2007). In the fiscal year 2011-12 adopted budget, the SJPD was allocated $294,930,454 within the General Fund, with the elimination of nearly 150 sworn positions (some were civilianized) (City of San Jose, 2011); in turn, also causing 66 police officer layoffs (Woolfolk, 2011b).

Recent news television reports have ignited question regarding the SJPD’s extremely low total sworn personnel level. A recent example occurred in October 2011 when CBS local Channel 5 news investigated the SJPD’s low staffing level in conjunction with the then-current rash of gang-related homicides (CBS, 2011b). With respect to that CBS local Channel 5 news report, a true indicator of a law enforcement agency’s staffing level can be portrayed through its officer to 1,000 citizen per capita ratio. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2012), in 2008 municipal law enforcement agencies across the United States employed an average of 2.3 full-time officers per 1,000 residents. The US Census Bureau (2012) reported that the City of San Jose had a 2010-estimated population of 945,942. Based on the US Census Bureau (2012) data, in fiscal year 2008-09 the SJPD had 1.47 full-time officers per 1,000 residents, while in fiscal year 2011-12 it had 1.15 full-time officers per 1,000 residents. The ratio of 1.15 full-time officers per 1,000 residents is a daunting 50% of the 2008 national standard of 2.3 full-time officers, as reported by Bureau of Justice Statistics (2012).

Upon referring to Fig. 3, one will notice the substantial drop in BFO Patrol Division staffing when directly comparing July 2007 with July 2011, month-to-month. In July 2007, 557
officers were assigned to patrol staffing positions, while 517 were assigned in July 2011. This single month-to-month comparison represents a 7.18% decrease in BFO Patrol Division staffing, and is more importantly significant, being that 66 patrol officers had just been laid off in June 2011. In further examination of Fig. 3, one will notice the 2011 comparative-period experienced a consistent progressive staffing increase each month as its staffing level reached a near equal point of 551 with December 2009. This consistent progressive increase may at first seem beneficial to the SJPD as a whole, but one must recognize that it came at the cost of retirements, resignations, and terminations of officer positions outside of the BFO Patrol Division (e.g. BOI and BOA), as recently laid off patrol officers were hired back directly into patrol positions. This observation is pertinent, as one must distinguish that elected officials did not allocate new funding to hire the recently laid off patrol officers, but their application to the patrol staffing level was at the expense of other eliminated or suspended positions throughout the SJPD as they became vacant. This change, along with the overall 22% reduction of department-wide staffing from fiscal year 2008-09 to 2011-12 (City of San Jose, 2011d), has caused a negative rippling effect throughout the SJPD’s service level, both within a patrol setting and for other police services, such as investigations. The negative rippling effect is detailed within the following significant observations.

**Significant Observation 2:** The total amount of CAD Events is misleading, and can mostly be explained by a change in response policy and a major drop in self-initiated police activity events. The major reduction of self-initiated police activity events was substantial and could have detrimental effects to proactive crime reduction.

At first glance, one could think that the 8.07% decrease from the 2007 to 2009 periods, and a 21.85% decrease, directly, from the 2007 to 2011 periods, in the generation of CAD events would be significant with respect to the total workload of patrol officers; however, there are
several different factors that contributed to this reduction. First, in 2011, Police Chief Chris Moore issued a memorandum to Mayor Chuck Reed and the City Council that outlined how the Police Department would no longer respond to certain low-level priority calls for service—sometimes referred to as “quality-of-life issues.” Examples of low-level priority calls for service would be reported fruit vendor complaints, recycling theft, and parking violations (Woolfolk, 2011a). In addition, the Police Department also eventually added anonymous music complaints, non-injury vehicle accidents, and, at a later time, unverified burglary alarms to the “no response” list (CBS, 2011a). The change in response policy would have certainly affected the total amount of CAD events generated, with respect to the 2007 base-period when compared to the 2011 comparative-period, as patrol officers were no longer being dispatched to a large number of low-level priority calls for service. This, in turn, also negatively affects a San Jose resident’s general perception of reporting minor incidents to the SJPD, as they now may be less inclined to report minor incidents since they know their effort will no longer warrant a patrol officer response.

Coupled with the CAD event reduction due to the Police Department’s new “no response” policy to low-level priority calls for service, a major and significant drop in self-initiated police activity events occurred from the 2007 base-period to the comparative-periods of 2009 and 2011. This discovered reduction was astonishing and is certainly substantial when viewed in perspective with the lower number of total CAD events generated on average per month. From the 2007 to 2009 periods, the average number of self-initiated activity events fell 15.4%. Generally, a 15.4% drop in self-initiated activity events, in itself, would merit alarm and a need for investigation into the cause; however, during the following 2011 comparative-period, the SJPD experienced a staggering 63.1% drop in self-initiated activity events when compared to
the 2007 base-period (refer to Fig. 5). A 63.1% drop in self-initiated activity events is surely significant, and represents a severe loss of proactive patrol service within the Police Department.

If a patrol officer conducts a traffic stop for a vehicle code (CAD terminology = 11-95) or a pedestrian stop (CAD terminology = 10-95), either consensually or by means of an on-viewed public offense detention, and is able to make a legal self-initiated arrest, that performance example would be above standard, as they chose to conduct proactive “police productivity.” A self-initiated arrest occurs absent of a patrol officer being dispatched to a call for service, and is based on his or her own motivation, discretion, workload burden, and intuition. Examples of self-initiated arrests can include, but are not limited to, driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, possession of narcotics for personal use or sale purposes, possession of a deadly weapon, or even the service of an outstanding misdemeanor or felony arrest warrant. The beneficial premise behind this notion is that if patrol officers conduct a high number of self-initiated arrests, they will proactively reduce the future occurrence of crime. In a study of more than 500 crime prevention practices, and in conjunction with the US Department of Justice, Sherman et al. (1998) found positive links between proactive DUI arrests to the reduction of traffic accident deaths, and directed proactive traffic enforcement (or vehicle stops) in high crime areas with the substantial reduction of future gun crimes, specifically within Kansas City (as cited in Sherman & Rogan, 1995). For these specific reasons, it is incumbent upon a law enforcement agency’s command staff and elected officials to create an environment that encourages and supports proactive behavior by its patrol officers.

As the SJPD experienced a 22% overall reduction in staffing from fiscal year 2008-09 (1,395 sworn personnel) to fiscal year 2011-12 (1,087 sworn personnel) (City of San Jose, 2011d) and a 5.52% average reduction of patrol staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011
comparative-period, the negative outcomes in regard to self-initiated activity events was prevalent and statistically associated. With reference to the previous discussion of a patrol officer making a self-initiated arrest, if a given patrol officer’s self-initiated arrest requires immediate fingerprint identification, narcotic testing, and/or an environment where the patrol officer could conduct a prolonged interview, that patrol officer would transport the arrested perpetrator to the San Jose Police Pre-Processing Center (PPC) for processing, which is the SJPD’s “temporary holding facility” (SJPD, 2006, p.1). In 2010, an average of 5.77 patrol officers per shift (day shift, swing shift, and midnight shift) transported their arrested perpetrator to PPC for processing. In a sharp and significant decrease, in 2011, only an average of 3.47 patrol officers per shift utilized the temporary facility for processing (Unland, 2011). This major decrease represented a reduction of -39.86% usage – a significant statistic when considering its direct portrayal of the reduction of quality self-initiated arrests by SJPD patrol officers.

Once at PPC, patrol officers have the ability to “sign up” the perpetrator to be a confidential informant, in compliance with SJPD Duty Manual 2010 section L 3600 (SJPD, 2010). The use of a confidential informant is “crucial to many law enforcement investigations” as they “can provide specific information that is simply not available from other sources” (Lieberman, 2007). This crucial information can lead to future proactive arrests by means of reliable information or legally obtained search warrants; however, signing up and managing a confidential informant is time intensive for patrol officers, especially when a law enforcement agency has sustained a significant reduction of overall and patrol officer staffing. In 2007, SJPD officers signed up a total of 137 confidential informants, in contrast to 2011 when SJPD officers only signed up 61 (Unland, 2011). This notable statistical decrease represents a 55.47% reduction in the usage of confidential informants, and is indicative of a loss of crime deterrence
and intervention activity when coupled with the 39.86% reduction in patrol officer PPC facility usage and the overall experienced 63.1% drop in self-initiated activity events, when comparing the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period.

**Significant Observation 3:** Assault with a deadly weapon incidents, a priority 1 call for service, have been minimally impacted due to the “priority dispatch” protocol. This minimal impact was at the cost of lower priority calls for service response times and in-field arrest rates.

According to the SJPD Duty Manual 2010, a priority 1 call for service is one in which “there is a present or imminent danger to life” or a “major damage to/loss of property” (SJPD, 2010, p. S 3609). This research utilized CAD data pertaining to 245 PC (assault with a deadly weapon) incidents during the 2007 base-period to the 2009 and 2011 comparative-periods. As detailed in Fig. 6, and with respect to the 5.52% decrease in average patrol officer staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period, the average response time (in minutes) for assault with a deadly weapon events negatively increased 16.67% from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period. This 16.67% average response time increase did not correlate to the positive increase of the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period in-field arrest rate. During the 2007 base-period, patrol officers made in-field arrests 34.94% of the time, while during the 2011 comparative-period patrol officers made in-field arrests 38.13% of the time with a higher average response time. Furthermore, this inverse relationship was not mirrored during the 2009 comparative-period when compared to the 2007 base-period.

During the 2009 comparative-period, the average response time for assault with a deadly weapon events decreased 1.51 minutes, or 24.43%, when compared to the 2007 base-period, while the in-field arrest rate positively increased to 41.26%, or a 18.09% increase over the 2007 base-period’s in-field arrest rate of 34.94%. This conflicting inconsistent three-way relationship
portrayed that a higher in-field arrest rate cannot be attributed to lower than average patrol officer response times, with respect to assault with a deadly weapon events. Ultimately, there must exist a synonymous and consistent cause and effect relationship among lower patrol staffing levels on average per month, to higher response times on average per month, in turn, leading to a lower infield arrest rate; this does not seem to be the case for assault with a deadly weapon events. However, the nature of dispatching priority 1 type calls for service is unique, and for the following reason, may not be largely affected by a 5.52% decrease in average patrol officer staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period.

Priority 1 calls for service, like an assault with a deadly weapon event, are unique in that they are dispatched from CAD with a global positioning system (GPS)-based protocol, commonly referred to as “priority dispatch.” The intent of the GPS-based protocol is to “significantly reduce” priority 1 response times (Moore, 2011). In simpler terms, the CAD system utilizes SJPD patrol officer vehicle equipped GPS to locate the two closest available patrol units citywide, regardless of what patrol team, patrol district, or patrol division they are assigned to. The SJPD has sixteen separate patrol districts, included in four patrol divisions, with each patrol division containing two separate radio channels, operating across the City of San Jose with specific geographic boundaries (SJPD, 2012); thus, theoretically, and in reference to Fig. 1, a priority 1 call for service should have a reduced “call pending” time and immediately cause the dispatching of the two closest available patrol units citywide, regardless of their location or which patrol district they belong to. Although this GPS-based protocol or “priority dispatch” system benefits priority 1 calls for service, it negatively affects the outside patrol districts when its assigned available patrol officers are utilized and dispatched to another district to investigate a priority 1 call for service. The negative effect occurs when priority 2 calls for service and above
(priority 3 and 4) will now “pend” (pending) for a longer sustained time and will not be immediately dispatched because its district-assigned patrol officers have left their designated district to investigate a priority 1 call for service in another district. This negative effect is compounded when patrol officers are already mitigating a 5.52% decrease in average patrol officer staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period, in turn, causing priority 2 calls for service, like domestic violence, to have higher response times and lower in-filed arrest rates.

**Significant Observation 4:** Domestic violence incidents, a priority 2 call for service, have significantly been impacted with higher response times and dramatically lower in-field arrest rates. This observation portrays the strongest correlation among patrol staffing levels to increased response times and lower in-field arrests.

Although assault with a deadly weapon events, a priority 1 call for service, showed no direct link of patrol staffing levels to response times and in-field arrests, domestic violence events, a priority 2 call for service that does not utilize “priority dispatch,” showed a significantly strong relationship among these three measures. During acts of domestic violence physical abuse the victim may sustain verbal and psychological damage, isolation from loved ones, and control and manipulation by the abuser, or perpetrator (Fuchsel, 2012). Domestic violence calls for service events are generally categorized as priority 2 calls for service, which are characterized as incidents “with injuries,” or having “a potential for injury” (SJPD, 2010, p. S 3609). Domestic violence calls for service events are not “priority dispatched,” and will pend until a sufficient amount of available patrol officers are able to respond.

While domestic violence calls for service pend without being dispatched, not only is the victim exposed to a greater timeframe to be physically abused, but there is also a higher chance for children within the household to directly witness the physical violence. Children are typically
present in 36% of domestic violence assaults, and of those that are present, 60% of them directly witness the physical violence (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012). Another pertinent factor to consider is that a majority of domestic violence calls for service begin as a verbal argument then spiral into physical violence through prolonged escalation. Thus, the longer the response time (in reference to Fig. 8), the more likely it is that physical violence will ensue. For this reason, domestic violence calls for service are typically reported to the Police Department as “415” – Disturbances, or “415F” – Family disturbances, that are eventually dispatched and determined by patrol officers to be a final crime type of 243(e) PC / 273.5 PC – domestic violence. Therefore, that is why CAD data scripts pertaining to domestic violence are unique and particular to the crime, as referenced in the prior Methodology section.

In reference to Fig. 8, during the 2007 base-period CAD data showed domestic violence calls for service to have an average response time of 9.89 minutes per month. The average response time increased 12.74%, to 11.15 minutes per month, when compared to the 2009 comparative period, while BFO Patrol Division staffing shrunk an average of 1.78% patrol officers per month. As the average response time increased, in-field arrests of domestic violence perpetrators dropped from 69.81% during the 2007 base-period to 62.13% during the 2009 comparative period, representing an 11% reduction. As the SJPD experienced the 22% overall reduction in staffing from fiscal year 2008-09 to fiscal year 2011-12 (City of San Jose, 2011d) and a 5.52% average reduction of patrol staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period, during the 2011 comparative-period the average response time rose to 15.57 minutes per month. This resulted in a notable average 5.68 minute, or 57.43%, increase when compared to the 2007 base-period. This 57.43% increase in the response time occurred while BFO Patrol Division staffing dropped an average of 5.52% officers, in consequence, causing the
in-field arrest rate to also drop to an average of 46.61% – a 33.23% reduction, when compared to the 2007 base-period.

This negative service decrease was indeed significant. Not only has the domestic violence calls for service average response time ballooned, but the consequences deriving from the substantially reduced in-field arrest rate can be potentially dangerous. With a 33.23% reduction in in-field arrests from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period, there now stands a greater statistical chance that the perpetrator will not be taken into custody; thus, allowing the opportunity for the perpetrator to return and reoffend against the victim. Unlike other felony or misdemeanor offenses, incidents of domestic violence are particular in that the victim and perpetrator commonly live together or may be tied by a child in common. This unique particular element grants a constant nexus between the victim and perpetrator, as opposed to a random act of violence. For this reason, it is essential that the domestic violence call for service in-field arrest rate sustain a satisfactory level consistent with the 2007 base-period standard of 69.81%.

The 5.52% average reduction of patrol staffing from the 2007 base-period to the 2011 comparative-period should be scrutinized, as one can naturally submit that an increase in patrol staffing would enable domestic violence calls for service to be dispatched more quickly, in turn, allowing patrol officers a far greater opportunity to break the commonly known “cycle of violence” associated with the victimization of domestic violence incidents (Carbon, 2010).

**Significant Observation 5:** Auto theft reports, a priority 3 call for service, have been notably impacted with higher response times. This significant impact erodes the SJPD’s general service level in the context of non-emergency calls for service.

The final type of call for service assessed was 10851 CVC – Auto theft report, a priority 3 call for service. Priority 3 calls for service include incidents where “the suspect has most likely left the area” and “there are no injuries to the victim necessitating immediate medical care”
(SJPD, 2010, p. S 3609). The factor of in-field arrest rates does not pertain to this significant observation. The key to this significant observation lies within the variation of the average response time over the three assessed periods. During the 2007 base-period, the average response time for reported stolen vehicle calls for service was 38.61 minutes per month. As patrol staffing decreased an average of 1.78% officers during the 2009 comparative-year, the reported stolen vehicle calls for service average response time increased to 43.76 minutes per month. Furthermore, during the 2011 comparative-period, the average response time again increased to 60.17 minutes per month – a 55.84% increase when compared to the 2007 base-period average response time of 38.61 minutes. This considerable average response time increase occurred while patrol staffing experienced an average 5.52% decrease of officers during the 2011 comparative-period, when compared to the 2007 base-period.

Low-level priority calls for service, such as a priority 3 or above, sustain a sizable impact when BFO Patrol Division staffing is decreased. This logic is simple, and should be intuitive, when one understands that calls for service are dispatched based on their priority level with regard to the availability of patrol units within that particular patrol district to respond (not “priority dispatched”). With reduced patrol staffing, available patrol officers will continually respond to higher priority calls for service while low-level priority calls will pend at longer lengths prior to being dispatched. Although priority 3 calls for service do not inherently possess an urgency of response as “there are no injuries to the victim necessitating immediate medical care” (SJPD, 2010, p. S 3609), they do standout as a relevant indicator in measuring the general non-emergency service level of a particular law enforcement agency. Like reported auto theft incidents, residential burglaries (with the perpetrator not present) and misdemeanor hit and run vehicle collisions are other priority 3 call for service examples where the reporting San Jose
resident would find himself diligently waiting for a patrol officer’s response and arrival. As shown in Fig. 10, the average response time was 60.17 minutes per month during the 2011 comparative-period, with respect to reported auto thefts. From a reporting and victimized San Jose resident’s perspective, if a patrol officer was able to respond to a reported auto theft in an average of 36.61 minutes during the 2007 base-period, but now requires an average 60.17 minutes during the 2011 comparative-period, their dissatisfaction with the Police Department would be justified, especially, if that victimized San Jose resident had to endure the increased 55.84% response time while he was stranded and waiting in a shopping center parking lot for a patrol officer to arrive on-scene and investigate the reported auto theft.

**Conclusion**

The SJPD claims itself to be a professional organization with a “dynamic” and “progressive” approach to implanting its Mission Statement. The SJPD’s Mission Statement includes: (1) the promotion of public safety; (2) prevention, suppression, and investigation of crimes; and (3) the provision of emergency and non-emergency services (SJPD, 2011c). With respect to the *Findings* that lead to the five significant observations detailed within the *Analysis* portion of this managerial audit, the researcher has concluded that the SJPD has “insufficiently” performed its Mission Statement, with respect to the 2011 comparative-period. The researcher has chosen and emphasized the word “insufficient” because of its measurability component. As defined by Merriam-Webster (2012), “insufficient” means that the organization is “lacking adequate power, capacity, or competence” (p.1). It does not mean that the SJPD is completely without “power, capacity, or competence,” but it emphasizes that it is, however, lacking the
adequacy to deliver a satisfactory service level of those defining characteristics inline with the three elements incorporated into its Mission Statement.

The five significant observations within the Analysis each provide a crucial component supporting this conclusion. Significant Observation 1 described that as the SJPD overall sworn-level decreased by 22%, the command staff attempted to backfill patrol staffing over other non-first responding capacities; however, patrol staffing was still inadequate while negatively affecting the totality of police services, as described within Significant Observations 2, 4, and 5. Significant Observation 1 pertained to all three elements of the SJPD the Mission Statement. The sheer fact that in fiscal year 2011-12 the SJPD had 1.15 full-time officers per 1,000 residents – 50% of the 2008 national standard of 2.3 full-time officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012) – was unacceptable, and resembled the lynchpin effect in direct consequence to Significant Observations 2, 4, and 5. As this research only pertained to BFO Patrol Division staffing levels, its inquiry has warranted further research into the actual reduction of investigated crimes due to the downsizing of detective positions with the Bureau of Investigations.

The executive decision to backfill the BFO Patrol Division’s staffing level may have been the only means the command staff could have taken to ensure that the SJPD possessed the greatest ability to satisfactorily meet the elements outlined within its Mission Statement. However, the command staff’s executive decision certainly enacted a positive mitigation measure on the negative impact to police services sustained during the 2011 comparative-period, but was ultimately “insufficient” in preparing the SJPD to satisfactorily perform to its Mission Statement.

Furthermore, it is not the command staff that should bear the burden of criticism for the drop in services documented in this managerial audit. The political level has budgetary authority.
The elected officials within the City Council are the determinants of the overall staffing level of the SJPD, which directly affects patrol staffing, as they ultimately ratify the budgetary allocations within the General Fund for each fiscal year. Significant Observations 2, 4 and 5 are the outcome of those previous years’ budgetary determinations.

Significant Observation 3 described a satisfactorily performing safety net in ensuring that the most life-threatening and potentially dangerous calls for service are immediately triaged by means of “priority dispatch” and responded to by patrol officers. Significant Observation 3 offered no direct negative data findings with respect to the three elements of the Mission Statement; thus, it was the sole significant observation that positively factored into the researcher’s conclusion that the SJPD is “insufficiently” performing its Mission Statement. However, it must be noted that without the findings of Significant Observation 3, the conclusion may not have been just “insufficient,” but a more negative determination.

Significant Observations 2, 4, and 5 are truly the direct outcomes of Significant Observation 1, and stood as the basis that the SJPD was “insufficiently” performing its Mission Statement during the 2011 comparative-period. Within Significant Observation 2, the researcher cited the SJPD’s current significant 63.1% drop in self-initiated activity events when compared to the 2007 base-period, and the new “no response” policy to quality of life calls for service. The extreme drop in self-initiated activity events directly contradicts portions of the first, and more importantly, second element of the SJPD’s Mission Statement, which included the “prevention” and “suppression” of crimes. When a patrol officer is dispatched to a call for service, this sequence is reactive in nature, and not proactive, thus, “prevention” and “suppression” are not satisfactorily occurring. With reduced overall staffing, patrol officers must endure a higher
workload and stress level, which results in lower response times and in-field arrests as outlined in *Significant Observations 4 and 5*.

*Significant Observation 4* contained valuable and practical evidence of how the SJPD is “insufficiently” performing its Mission Statement. The crime of domestic violence is so important to the community that the Santa Clara County of Board of Supervisors has created a Domestic Violence Council (DVC) to advise Board members on progressive policy decisions and improve the government’s general response to domestic violence (Office of Women’s Policy, 2011). *Significant Observation 4* outlined a current 57.43% increase in the average response time when compared to the 2007 base-period in domestic violence calls for service. This 57.43% increase in the average response time occurred while patrol staffing dropped an average of 5.52% of officers, in consequence causing the in-field arrest rate to also drop to an average of 46.61% – a reduction of 33.23% when compared to the 2007 base-period. With the local community’s emphasis on the importance of domestic violence prevention and intervention, these statistics “insufficiently” fall inline with the SJPD Mission Statement’s three elements.

Lastly, *Significant Observation 5* stood as the general cornerstone of how well the SJPD is currently responding to a citizen requesting a police report, or in the nature of *Significant Observation 5*, an auto theft investigation and report. A citizen currently has to wait at least an average of 60.17 minutes for a patrol officer to respond to his given location. This represents a 55.84% increase in the average response time if this same incident had occurred during the 2007 base-period, when the SJPD had an overall 28.33% more officers than today. *Significant Observation 5* brought forth a simple statistic for measuring the SJPD’s general service level in attempting to meet its Mission Statement, as most calls for service are non-emergency in nature.
With respect to the *Findings* and *Analysis* of this managerial audit, the SJPD is “insufficiently” performing its Mission Statement of promoting public safety; preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; and providing emergency and non-emergency services.
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