How the Validity of the Parallel Inference is Possible: From the Ancient Mohist Diagnose to a Modern Logical Treatment of Its Semantic-Syntactic Structure
History & Philosophy of Logic
Inference, truthfulness and falsehood, moism, semantics, predicate
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of how the validity of the parallel inference (as a type of deductive reasoning) is possible in view of its deep semantic-syntactic structure. I first present a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Mohist treatment of the parallel inference concerning its semantic-syntactic structure. Then, to formally and accurately capture the later Mohist point in this connection for the sake of giving a general condition for the validity of the parallel inference, I suggest a modern logical treatment via an expanded predicate logic account.
Bo Mou. "How the Validity of the Parallel Inference is Possible: From the Ancient Mohist Diagnose to a Modern Logical Treatment of Its Semantic-Syntactic Structure" History & Philosophy of Logic (2016): 301-324. https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2016.1169150
This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article that appeared in History & Philosophy of Logic, volume 37, issue 4, 2016. The Version of Record (VOR) may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2016.1169150
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