Document Type


Publication Date

January 2016

Publication Title

History & Philosophy of Logic


The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of how the validity of the parallel inference (as a type of deductive reasoning) is possible in view of its deep semantic-syntactic structure. I first present a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Mohist treatment of the parallel inference concerning its semantic-syntactic structure. Then, to formally and accurately capture the later Mohist point in this connection for the sake of giving a general condition for the validity of the parallel inference, I suggest a modern logical treatment via an expanded predicate logic account.


This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article that appeared in History & Philosophy of Logic, volume 37, issue 4, 2016. The Version of Record (VOR) may be found at
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