Publication Date

4-1-2021

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Synthese

Volume

198

DOI

10.1007/s11229-018-1860-2

First Page

1909

Last Page

1935

Abstract

There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years (1998–2018): conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction (PMEF). One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality.

Funding Number

P 29050

Funding Sponsor

Austrian Science Fund

Keywords

Conceivability, Counterfactual reasoning, Deduction, Essence, Modality

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Department

Philosophy

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