Abstract
Can information be false? An important debate in the philosophy of information turns on this seemingly simple question. According to veridicalism (or the veridicality thesis), truth is a necessary condition for information; by contrast, according to non-veridicalism (or the non-veridicality thesis), it is not. I argue that this debate has noteworthy implications for how we should conceive of secrecy understood in terms of concealment of information. I also argue that, since falsehoods can be secret, it is more tenable to hold that secrecy is not restricted to true information than to hold that it is.
Recommended Citation
Le Morvan, Pierre.
2025.
"Information, Secrecy, and Falsehood."
Secrecy and Society
3(2).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55917/2377-6188.1084
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol3/iss2/7
