Abstract
This article offers a comparative philosophical analysis of Confucian liang-zhi (innate moral knowledge) and Islamic fitra(primordial nature), focusing on their accounts of innate morality and moral epistemology. Drawing on classical Confucian sources—especially the praxis-oriented interpretation of Wang Yangming—and foundational Islamic texts and commentary, the study demonstrates that both traditions posit an inborn moral faculty grounding ethical universality and responsibility. Wang Yangming’s liang-zhi is conceived as an innate moral principle that, under the imperative of zhi (to actualize or extend), is continually activated through moral practice. In parallel, fitra is understood as a God-given orientation to truth, cultivated and safeguarded through revelation and ethical discipline. Despite differing theological frameworks, both doctrines converge on an optimistic view of human moral potential and reject the notion of original depravity. This comparison not only clarifies the distinctive metaphysical commitments of each tradition, but also illuminates how non-Western philosophies articulate universalist ethics, offering new perspectives for cross-cultural moral discourse and the renewal of contemporary moral philosophy.
Recommended Citation
SHI, Yanrong
(2025)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2025).160209
"Moral and Ethical Nature in Confucian Liang-Zhi and Islamic Fitra: Comparative Perspectives on Innate Morality,"
Comparative Philosophy: Vol. 16:
Iss.
2, Article 9.
Available at:
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol16/iss2/9
Included in
Chinese Studies Commons, Comparative Philosophy Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Islamic Studies Commons
