Abstract
In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle's here. The "point of view" that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one.
Recommended Citation
HONGLADAROM, Soraj
(2017)
"Searle and Buddhism on the Non-Self,"
Comparative Philosophy: Vol. 8:
Iss.
1, Article 10.
Available at:
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol8/iss1/10
Included in
Comparative Philosophy Commons, Metaphysics Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons
