Although coming from two very different paths, both Kant and Patañjali present similar strategies to refute the skeptic argument that denies the real and independent existence of physical objects. This essay examines both strategies through the reconstruction of Kant’s and Patañjali’s twofold refutation of idealism: one based on the perceptual distinction between the real and the illusory, and the other one based on the ontological necessity of a permanent external object to understand change. I argue that the second strategy is philosophically stronger due to its phenomenological recognition of the body as a grounding point, and that this is possible only on account of an anti-realist conception of time. Both Kant and Patañjali utilize a similar line of realist argumentation while diverging in the type of realism that they each hold.
FUNES MADEREY, Ana Laura
"Between the Internal and the External: Kant’s and Patañjali’s Arguments for the Reality of Physical Objects and Their Independence from Mind,"
Comparative Philosophy: Vol. 8:
1, Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol8/iss1/6