Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2001
Publication Title
Cato Journal
Volume
20
Issue Number
3
First Page
359
Last Page
378
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these new anti-merger instruments on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s' antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. Lopez. "New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique" Cato Journal (2001): 359-378.
Comments
Copyright © 2001 Cato Institute.