Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities

Publication Date

September 2018

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review

Volume

57

Issue

3

DOI

10.1017/S0012217318000240

First Page

571

Last Page

590

Abstract

Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative.

Keywords

neo-Aristotelianism, Kantian constructivism, practical identities, practical reasons, moral obligations, transcendental arguments

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