A Holistic Double-Reference Explanatory Basis for a Unifying Pluralist Account of Truth

Publication Date

1-1-2023

Document Type

Article

Publication Title

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia

Volume

79

Issue

3

DOI

10.17990/RPF/2023_79_3_1023

First Page

1023

Last Page

1066

Abstract

In reflective explorations of the nature of truth in the philosophical concern with truth (as conceived in people’s pre-theoretic understanding of truth), there are two seemingly opposed strategic directions of explaining the relationship between the two closely related but distinct basic semantic notions, truth (with sentential truth bearers) and reference (with referring terms at the subject position): by virtue of which to hook up to the world in the fundamental relationship between language, thought and the world; eventually which one is more fundamental in this connection, explaining truth by virtue of reference or explaining reference by virtue of truth. In this essay, through elaborating a holistic double-reference explanatory basis of truth, I explain how our pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth fundamentally plays its normative-basis role for a unifying pluralist account of truth through the complementary interplay of its vertical “double-reference-based” dimension and horizontal “sentential-predication-based” dimension. For illustration and for a relatively complete understanding, in Appendix, I present a sample version of the suggested unifying pluralist account of truth which consists of the referentially enhanced base account, as explained in this essay, and sample accounts of some distinct types of perspective elaborations.

Keywords

epistemology, pre-theoretic “way-things-are-capturing” understanding of truth, reference, semantic, truth, unifying pluralist account

Department

Philosophy

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