Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
Publication Date
10-1-2025
Document Type
Article
Publication Title
Sino American Relations A New Cold War
DOI
10.5117/9789463726368_CH06
First Page
185
Last Page
211
Abstract
During the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, the world media was flooded with fear of imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, in both cases, Mao Zedong never intended an actual invasion, and both crises ended through diplomatic compromise. Paying special attention to the memoirs of Chinese military commanders and the newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi, this chapter examines Mao’s decision-making during the Taiwan Strait crises. It attempts to take Mao’s perspective, assess the limits of his calculations, and shed light on the rationales behind Mao’s appearance of aggressiveness. Regardless of militant propaganda, this chapter demonstrates that Mao was extremely cautious not to provoke the US, and never planned to wage large scale warfare against the US or Taiwan.
Keywords
China-Taiwan Relations, Mao Zedong, Shelling of Jinmen, Sino-American Relations, Taiwan Strait Crises
Department
History
Recommended Citation
Xiaojia Hou. "Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises" Sino American Relations A New Cold War (2025): 185-211. https://doi.org/10.5117/9789463726368_CH06
