Algorithmic Collusion among EV Charging Stations with Independent Reinforcement Learning Agents

Publication Date

10-21-2025

Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Publication Title

2025 IEEE International Conference on Communications Control and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids Smartgridcomm 2025 Proceedings

DOI

10.1109/SmartGridComm65349.2025.11204603

Abstract

Recent advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) have significantly enhanced the autonomous decision-making capabilities of energy systems. In the realm of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations, operators aim to autonomously learn optimal pricing strategies based on local observations and user behavior. Traditional multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) approaches often assume cooperative settings with reward sharing or communication, real-world EV charging infrastructures are typically decentralized and competitive. This paper investigates the potential for tacit collusion in such realistic, non-cooperative environments. By leveraging decentralized MARL, we show that independently trained agents can still exhibit emergent collusive behaviors. Our findings highlight a critical need for systematic evaluation and detection of algorithmic collusion in autonomous pricing systems.

Funding Number

70NANB24H301

Funding Sponsor

Concordia University

Department

Mechanical Engineering

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