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Abstract

This paper argues that functional organization alone is not sufficient for phenomenal consciousness or the existence of a unified subject of experience. While many contemporary accounts of artificial consciousness assume that replicating the causal or computational structure of the brain would be sufficient for subjective experience, this paper identifies a deeper constraint: consciousness depends on organismic unity. The argument proceeds through a triangulation of conceptual, empirical, and metaphysical considerations. First, Zuboff’s thought experiment shows that functional organization can be preserved while the unity of the subject dissolves, suggesting that causal pattern replication alone cannot secure subjectivity. Second, findings from neuroscience indicate that conscious states depend on highly specific biological organization, including interoceptive and autonomic regulation, rather than abstract causal structure alone. Third, phenomenology and enactivism explain these findings by characterizing consciousness as an embodied, self-maintaining activity enacted by living systems. Finally, cosmopsychist approaches clarify that even if consciousness is fundamental, its individuation into a subject requires a unified, self-organizing structure. Together, these considerations support the conclusion that consciousness is not a transferable computational pattern but an embodied phenomenon grounded in the self-maintaining organization of living systems. Artificial systems may simulate cognitive functions, but they do not thereby constitute subjects of experience.

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