Document Type
Article
Publication Date
January 2016
Publication Title
History & Philosophy of Logic
Volume
37
Issue Number
4
First Page
301
Last Page
324
DOI
10.1080/01445340.2016.1169150
Keywords
Inference, truthfulness and falsehood, moism, semantics, predicate
Disciplines
Philosophy
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of how the validity of the parallel inference (as a type of deductive reasoning) is possible in view of its deep semantic-syntactic structure. I first present a philosophical interpretation of the ancient Mohist treatment of the parallel inference concerning its semantic-syntactic structure. Then, to formally and accurately capture the later Mohist point in this connection for the sake of giving a general condition for the validity of the parallel inference, I suggest a modern logical treatment via an expanded predicate logic account.
Recommended Citation
Bo Mou. "How the Validity of the Parallel Inference is Possible: From the Ancient Mohist Diagnose to a Modern Logical Treatment of Its Semantic-Syntactic Structure" History & Philosophy of Logic (2016): 301-324. https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2016.1169150
Comments
This is the Accepted Manuscript of an article that appeared in History & Philosophy of Logic, volume 37, issue 4, 2016. The Version of Record (VOR) may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2016.1169150
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